



Tämä on kauan vain kirjaston hyllyssä olleen kirjan digitaalinen kappale, jonka Google on huolellisesti skannannut, osana tavoitettaan tehdä maailman kirjatsaataville Internetissä.

Kirjan tekijänoikeussuoja on jo rauennut ja kirjasta on tullut vapaasti jaeltava. Vapaasti jaeltavalla teoksella ei joko koskaan ole ollut tekijänoikeussuojaa tai suoja on rauennut. Se, onko teos vapaasti jaeltava, riippuu kunkin maan lainsäädännöstä. Vapaasti jaeltavat teokset avaavat meille paluun menneisyyteen, menneisiin kulttuureihin sekä tietoon, joka muuten olisi vaikeasti löydettävissä.

Reunahuomautukset sekä muut lukijoitten lisäämät merkinnät on jätetty näkyviin kertomaan teoksen matkasta kustantajalta kirjaston kautta Internetiin.

Käyttöohjeet

Google on ylpeä saadessaan digitoida materiaalia yhteistyössä kirjastojen kanssa, ja tuodessaan vapaasti jaeltavaa materiaalia yleiseen tietoon. Vapaasti jaeltavat teokset kuuluvat yleisölle, ja Google toimii ainoastaan asianhoitajana. Koska työ tulee kalliiksi, Google on kuitenkin ryhtynyt toimenpiteisiin kaupallisen väärinkäytön estämiseksi, esimerkiksi rajoittamalla automaattisten kyselyjen suorittamista.

Käyttäjältä odotetaan:

- Rajoittumista vain yksityiskäyttöön
Googlen teoshaku on tarkoitettu yksityishenkilöille, ja teosten kaupallinen hyödyntäminen on kiellettyä.
- Pidättäytymistä hakujen automatisoinnista
Googlen hakujärjestelmien automatisoitu käyttö on kiellettyä. Jos hakujen tarkoituksena on saada materiaalia koneellisen kielenkääntämisen, optisen tekstintunnistuksen tai muun suuria määriä tekstiä vaativan sovelluksen kehittämiseen, ota yhteyttä Googleen. Google on edelläkävijä julkisesti jaeltavan materiaalin hyödyntämisessä ja voi ehkä auttaa.
- Lähdetietojen säilyttämistä
Jokaiseen tiedostoon sisällytetty Googlen leima toimii muistutuksena projektista, ja auttaa etsimään lisämateriaalia Googlen teoshaun kautta. Älä poista merkintää.
- Varmistavan käytön laillisuuden
Käytinpä teosta mihin tahansa, on muistettava, että käyttäjän on itse varmistettava käytön esteettömyys voimassa olevien säädösten kannalta. Ei pidä olettaa, että kirja on vapaasti jaeltavissa kaikkialla, jos se on sitä Yhdysvalloissa. Se, onko teos tekijänoikeussuojan alainen, riippuu maittain, eikä ole olemassa kattavaa ohjetta siitä, miten yksittäistä teosta voi missäkin tapauksessa käyttää. Ei pidä olettaa, että teoksen oleminen Googlen teoshaussa tarkoittaisi, että sitä voi käsitellä miten tahansa missä tahansa. Tekijänoikeussuojan rikkomukset voivat käydä kalliiksi.

Tietoja Googlen teoshausta

Googlen pyrkimyksenä on maailman tietojen järjestäminen ja niiden tuominen avoimesti kaikkien saataville. Googlen teoshaku tuo maailman kirjat lukijoitten ulottuville samalla kun se auttaa kirjailijoita ja kustantajia löytämään uutta yleisöä. Hakuja tämän teoksen tädestä tekstistä voi tehdä osoitteessa <http://books.google.com/>

This is a reproduction of a library book that was digitized by Google as part of an ongoing effort to preserve the information in books and make it universally accessible.

GoogleTM books

<https://books.google.com>



PROPERTY OF
*University of
Michigan
Libraries*

1817

ARTES SCIENTIA VERITAS

UNIVERSITY
OF MICHIGAN

JUN 6 - 1956

LIBRARY

**DOCUMENTS ON
GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
1918-1945**

**UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON : 1956**

D

411

. G 373

201 D

v. 9

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

PUBLICATION 6312

For sale by the
Superintendent of Documents
Government Printing Office
Washington 25, D. C.
Price \$3.25

BOARD OF EDITORS¹

UNITED STATES: Paul R. Sweet, Editor-in-Chief; Howard M. Smyth;
James Stuart Beddie; Arthur G. Kogan; George O. Kent.

GREAT BRITAIN: The Hon. Margaret Lambert, Editor-in-Chief;
K. H. M. Duke; M. H. Fisher; K. Ronau; F. G. Stambrook.

FRANCE: Maurice Baumont, Editor-in-Chief; Georges Bonnin; André
Scherer.

¹ This list shows the composition of the Board of Editors at the time of the final editorial work on this volume. Former editors, with their terms of service, were:

UNITED STATES: Raymond James Sontag, Editor-in-Chief, September 1946–July 1949; Bernadotte E. Schmitt, Editor-in-Chief, July 1949–July 1952; Fredrick Aandahl, January 1951–September 1953; E. Malcolm Carroll, October 1946–August 1949; Jean Brownell Dulaney, December 1946–April 1951; Fritz Epstein, October 1946–July 1948; Anna Maria Herbert, April 1951–August 1952; John Huizenga, January 1947–September 1952; Otto Pfanse, January 1948–August 1949; Joachim Remak, December 1947–July 1951; Norman Rich, August 1949–August 1954.

GREAT BRITAIN: John W. Wheeler-Bennett, Editor-in-Chief, September 1946–May 1948, thereafter Historical Adviser; James Joll, Editor-in-Chief, June–December 1948; General Sir James Marshall-Cornwall, Editor-in-Chief, June 1948–January 1951; E. K. Bramsted, January 1948–February 1952; L. Branney, September 1946–July 1948; P. Ericsson, January 1948–May 1952; W. H. C. Frend, March 1947–October 1951; D. C. Watt, October 1951–October 1954; T. F. D. Williams, September 1947–September 1949.

FRANCE: Jean Estienne, July 1947–April 1950; Léon de Gröer, July 1947–October 1950; Jacques Grunewald, October 1950–October 1955.

III

**DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
1918-1945**

SERIES D (1937-1945)

VOLUME IX

THE WAR YEARS

March 18-June 22, 1940

CONTENTS

	Page
PREFACE	IX
ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS	XIII
DOCUMENTS	1
APPENDICES:	
I. Organization of the German Foreign Ministry	693
II. List of German Files Used	702
III. List of Persons	707
IV. Glossary of German Terms and Abbreviations	717
V. Analysis of the Foreign Ministry Archives	721

VII

PREFACE¹

In June 1946 the British Foreign Office and the United States Department of State agreed to publish jointly documents from captured archives of the German Foreign Ministry and the Reich Chancellery. Although the captured archives go back to the year 1867, it was decided to limit the present publication to papers relating to the years after 1918, since the object of the publication was "to establish the record of German foreign policy preceding and during World War II." The editorial work was to be performed "on the basis of the highest scholarly objectivity." The editors were to have complete independence in the selection and editing of the documents. Publication was to begin and be concluded as soon as possible. Each Government was "free to publish separately any portion of the documents." In April 1947 the French Government, having requested the right to participate in the project, accepted the terms of this agreement.

In accordance with the understandings on the basis of which the project was originally undertaken, the editors have exercised complete freedom in the selection and editing of the documents.

This volume opens with the meeting at the Brenner Pass on March 18, 1940, where Hitler disclosed to Mussolini his plans for the offensive in the West, and ends with the signing of the armistice with France at Compiègne on June 22, 1940. The military events, first in Scandinavia and then in the West, dominated policy and set the tasks and opportunities for diplomacy. This volume records the final stages of the political preparation for the Scandinavian operation and for the attack on Belgium and the Netherlands, and introduces the phase of occupation in France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Denmark, and Norway. It is to be remarked, again, as in the preface to the previous volume, that the documentation on the occupied countries varies greatly from one case to another; in general it is the policy of the editors to record where possible aspects of occupation policy which impinge significantly on foreign policy.

The coordination of German and Italian policy is one of the major themes of the book. The tone was set by the letters exchanged between Hitler and Mussolini, which increase greatly in number and intimacy at this period. All available letters between the two leaders

¹ In each of the first four volumes published in the series there appears a "General Introduction" which describes some of the principles which have guided the editors in their work.

are being printed except where they deal with trivial matters. German relations with the Soviet Union were not so close as with Italy, but the collaboration—tested especially by further Soviet penetration of the Baltic States—continued without serious strain. It is the policy of the editors to include all documents printed in the Department of State publication, *Nazi-Soviet Relations 1939-1941*, but the present collection provides scope for a wider selection. Thus, whereas *Nazi-Soviet Relations* contains 26 documents on German relations with the Soviet Union and Baltic States for this period, the present volume offers 71 documents on these topics.

In Southeastern Europe and the Middle East Germany was seeking to maintain the status quo until she would be in a still stronger position to dominate the situation. Hungary was especially difficult to restrain, and Rumania, anticipating troubles ahead, announced her desire to align her policy with that of Germany.

German relations with Spain, following the coolness attendant upon the signing of the German-Soviet Pact, showed marked improvement. On the other hand, certain existing stresses in Japanese relations were intensified, and new difficulties arose over economic matters and over Indochina and the Netherlands Indies. In Latin America the main objective of German policy remained to keep these countries, as far as possible, outside the orbit of the United States. German efforts to sway public opinion in the United States and to influence the coming presidential elections form one of the main topics documented in this volume.

The documents have been selected jointly by the American, British, and French editors, but editorial responsibility for this volume lies with the American editors. For assistance in its preparation they wish to express appreciation for the assistance of Foreign Service Officers Halleck L. Rose and Eugene C. Martinson, and of Beverly Smith. They are grateful also to various officials of the Department of State for cooperation and assistance, and particularly to G. Bernard Noble, Chief of the Historical Division, as well as to the members of the American Advisory Committee: Sidney B. Fay, Guy Stanton Ford, Carlton J. H. Hayes, Hajo Holborn, William L. Langer, Conyers Read, Bernadotte E. Schmitt, and Raymond J. Sontag. Most of the translations were drafted by the British translation staff, but the American editors have final responsibility for the translations as well as full responsibility for the footnotes and other editorial matter. The technical preparation of edited copy for the printer was done in the Division of Publishing Services of the Department of State under the direction of Robert L. Thompson, and the editors acknowledge

gratefully his assistance and that of Miss Elizabeth A. Vary and Miss Collie E. Halbert and of other members of the staff of that Division.

Readers should bear in mind that these documents are presented as a source book for the study of history, and not as a finished interpretation of history. It has been the aim throughout to keep any interpretative comment out of the footnotes.

ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS¹

BALTIC STATES

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1940 May 30	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department</i> Interview with the Lithuanian Minister concerning further demands made by the Soviet Union on Lithuania as a result of incidents involving Soviet troops stationed in Lithuania.	353	474
June 11	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department</i> The Lithuanian Minister discussed increasing Soviet pressure on Lithuania and described the course of Premier Merkys' conversations with Molotov in Moscow.	415	548
June 13	<i>The Minister in Lithuania to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports unsatisfactory result of Merkys' interviews with Molotov in Moscow and decision of Cabinet to dismiss certain officials who were objectionable to the Soviet Union.	425	561
June 15	<i>The Minister in Lithuania to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports 3-point Soviet ultimatum to Lithuania, including changes in Lithuanian form of government to make it acceptable to the Soviet Union. The ultimatum was accepted.	436	572
June 15	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Press Department</i> The Soviet Union regarded acceptance of ultimatum as insufficient and Soviet troops were entering Lithuania. Since no press and radio announcements had been made, the population was quiet.	438	574
June 15	<i>The Minister in Latvia to the Foreign Ministry</i> A Russian attack had occurred on a guardhouse of the Frontier Guard Brigade; details of the attack and inferences to be drawn from it are lacking as yet.	439	574
June 15	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department</i> Interview with the Lithuanian Minister on the course of events in Lithuania. Woermann indicates that Germany will take no immediate stand.	440	575
June 16	<i>The Foreign Ministry to the Foreign Minister</i> Reports information received from Lithuanian Minister that Lithuanian President Smetona and others had crossed the German frontier. Instructions asked in regard to Lithuanian Minister's request for admission of other political refugees.	443	577

¹ The documents in this volume have been arranged chronologically. For the convenience of readers who wish to trace topics through the volume the analytical list of documents is arranged alphabetically by countries or regions, with the addition of three subject headings: "Directives for the Conduct of the War," "Greater German Economic Sphere," and "Sea Warfare."

BALTIC STATES—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1940			
June 16	<i>Memorandum by an Official in the Foreign Ministry</i> OKW requests instructions regarding Lithuanian troops who may seek to cross the frontier.	444	578
June 16	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Foreign Ministry</i> Lithuanian President Smetona and his following are to be interned by the Gestapo. Border crossings by Lithuanians are to be permitted but not encouraged; troops are to be disarmed and interned by the Wehrmacht.	445	579
June 16	<i>Memorandum by an Official of Political Division I M</i> Hitler has ordered disarming of Lithuanian troops who cross border. German troops returning to garrisons in East Prussia are to avoid any action connecting this with events in Lithuania.	446	580
[June 16]	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Political Department</i> Minister Kotze in Riga reported receipt there of a Soviet ultimatum similar to that presented to Lithuania. Minister Frohwein in Tallinn reported receipt of a similar Soviet ultimatum there.	448	581
June 16	<i>The Minister in Estonia to the Foreign Ministry</i> Has learned of a Soviet ultimatum expiring the same day calling for two Soviet army corps in Estonia and reformation of Estonian Government in accordance with Soviet wishes.	449	581
June 16	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department</i> Interview with the Lithuanian Minister for an exchange of information on course of events in Lithuania. Woermann again states that Germany will take no stand on happenings there.	451	582
June 16	<i>The Minister in Latvia to the Foreign Ministry</i> Cabinet reported to be discussing the Soviet ultimatum, which will probably be accepted. Kotze interprets the Soviet move as aimed at Germany, but as of a defensive character for purposes of assembling troops and constructing defenses.	452	583
June 16	<i>The Foreign Minister's Secretariat to the Foreign Ministry</i> The Foreign Minister wishes to know at once if the Baltic States are tending to seek German support or are forming a bloc.	453	584
June 17	<i>The Minister in Estonia to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports Estonian acceptance of Soviet ultimatum. Further details are given from agents' reports concerning the presentation of the ultimatum and additional Soviet charges against Estonia.	458	589
June 17	<i>The Head of Political Division VI to the Foreign Minister</i> Grundherr and Schnurre report on extent of German political and economic interests in the Baltic States. While political ties had not been close, German economic interests there had been on the increase since the war began and Russian influence extended to these areas would be detrimental to the German war effort.	463	593

BALTIM STATES—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1940 June 17	<i>Circular of the State Secretary</i> Events in the Baltic States concern only those States and the Soviet Union. In view of Germany's friendly relations with the Soviet Union there is no reason for nervousness. Avoid any partisan statement.	465	595
June 17	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department</i> Representatives of Rumania, Finland, and Japan, because of the proximity of those countries to the Soviet Union, have asked for an opinion on the Baltic events. The Finnish Minister said he did not believe his Government would capitulate should the same demands be made on it. Woermann made no statement on the matter.	468	597
June 18	<i>The Minister in Estonia to the Foreign Ministry</i> The President of Estonia said that Soviet demands were increasing and represented an attempt to anticipate a German new order by producing accomplished facts. He urged that in view of German strength and Soviet weakness it would take only slight German pressure to stop the Soviet penetration of the Baltic States.	472	600
June 20	<i>The Minister in Estonia to the Foreign Ministry</i> Forwards an account received from an intermediary of an interview between the President of Estonia and the Soviet representative, Zhdanov, in which the composition of a new Estonian Government was discussed.	494	627
June 22	<i>Memorandum by the Minister to Lithuania</i> Following a review of the Lithuanian crisis Minister Zechlin recommended that preparation be made to resettle the German element in Lithuania, but that the Legation in Kaunas continue to be maintained on its existing scale for the time being.	533	687

BELGIUM

1940 Mar. 21	<i>The Ambassador in Belgium to the Foreign Ministry</i> Belgium's policy of maintaining her neutrality remains unshaken after 6 months of the war, and shows every likelihood of continuing in the future.	8	22
Apr. 13	<i>The Ambassador in Belgium to the Foreign Ministry</i> Sentiment of both the Government and people is favorable to the policy of neutrality which is being pursued. There is no confirmation of British and French pressure on Belgium as yet. The King declared to an informant that he would not be swerved from neutrality and was determined to employ the Belgian Army against any attack.	102	149
May 7	<i>The Ambassador in Belgium to the Foreign Ministry</i> Comments on speech of Minister President Pierlot, which showed that events in Norway had not caused a change in Belgian neutrality policy. Pierlot again emphasized the intention of Belgium to resist any attack.	206	295

BELGIUM—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1940 May 9	<i>The Ambassador in Belgium to the Foreign Ministry</i> Defensive measures taken by the Netherlands have caused some unrest in Belgium, but the Government after studying the situation has taken no special military measures.	211	298
May 9	<i>Memorandum of the German Government to the Royal Belgian Government and the Royal Netherlands Government</i> Because Belgium and the Netherlands have not maintained their neutrality but have favored Britain and France the Reich Government has commanded the German troops to ensure neutrality by all military means.	214	301
May 10	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> In his interview with Weizsäcker the Belgian Ambassador contested the charges in the German memorandum, saying the world would never believe them, and upheld the Belgian policy of resistance as the only honorable course.	217	309
May 10	<i>The Ambassador in Belgium to the Foreign Ministry</i> Called on Foreign Minister Spaak with the German declaration. Spaak read a memorandum in reply, which charged Germany with attacking Belgium for the second time in 25 years, and declared Belgium was now at war with Germany. Spaak declared Brussels to be an open city, with no troops stationed there.	221	311
May 10	<i>Note Verbale From the Belgian Embassy</i> Formal protest of Germany's unprovoked act of aggression against Belgium.	223	313
May 10	<i>The Ambassador in Belgium to the Foreign Ministry</i> The Foreign Minister's statement was declined by Bülow-Schwante because it was in complete contradiction to the German interpretation of the origin of the conflict.	227	316
May 28	<i>Minute by an Official of Political Division I</i> According to reports from Etzdorf, liaison officer of the Foreign Ministry with OKH, a Belgian general called on General Reichenau the previous evening at the order of the King and offered the surrender of the Belgian Army; the Commander of Army Group B made inquiries about providing Laaken Castle as a residence for the King, and requested the views of the Foreign Ministry.	331	453
May 28	<i>Minute by an Official of Political Division I</i> According to the Foreign Minister, the Foreign Ministry has no influence in the matter of a residence for the King. It is exclusively a matter for Hitler, and the Foreign Ministry must keep out of it.	335	456
Undated	<i>Minute by an Official of the State Secretary's Secretariat</i> In view of rumors that the Government will depose the King and proclaim a republic, the Belgian Cardinal Primate was prepared to visit the King and exhort the people to stand behind him.	355	482

BELGIUM—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1940 May 31	<i>The Foreign Ministry Representative With Army Group B to the Foreign Minister</i> Account of an interview between the King of the Belgians and the Italian Ambassador in Brussels. There was extended discussion of the King's conduct and of means which he might take to publicize his justification of it.	358	486
June 5	<i>Memorandum by an Official of Political Division I</i> An investigation of the source of the permission for the interview between the King and the Italian Ambassador developed that it had come from Hitler.	390	520

BULGARIA

1940 May 4	<i>The Legation in Bulgaria to the Foreign Ministry</i> Clodius reports that Bulgarian authorities consider alignment with Germany the only policy, both politically and economically, but they believe the military weakness of the country demands official neutrality.	198	284
June 18	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> The Bulgarian Minister presented his country's revisionist claims, which included southern Dobruja and access to the Aegean. Weissäcker declined to comment, either officially or personally.	478	606

DENMARK

1940 Mar. 27	<i>Ambassador Ritter to the Legation in Denmark</i> The Danish démarche is to be dealt with dilatorily.	15	31
Apr. 1	<i>The Minister in Denmark to the Foreign Ministry</i> The Danish Foreign Minister does not believe there will be any serious British operations in Scandinavian territorial waters.	37	65
Apr. 2	<i>Directive of the Chief of the High Command of the Wehrmacht</i> By order of Hitler, the Kings of Denmark and Norway must not be permitted to escape when their countries are occupied.	41	67
Apr. 8	<i>The Minister in Denmark to the Foreign Ministry</i> To the present, people in Denmark have not fully recognized the gravity of the British threat to the Scandinavian countries.	57	97
Apr. 8	<i>Memorandum by the Head of Political Division VI</i> Truth of the report that Britain had laid mines in Norwegian territorial waters was admitted by the Danish State Secretary. Official Norwegian and Danish Government opinions were as yet unknown.	59	98

DENMARK—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1940			
Apr. 8	<i>The Minister in Denmark to the Foreign Ministry</i> Should German military demands prove necessary Denmark will probably give way under protest but without armed resistance.	62	100
Apr. 9	<i>The Minister in Denmark to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports carrying out first démarche. The Danes accepted all German demands under protest after a Cabinet meeting presided over by the King.	66	102
Apr. 9	<i>The Minister and Plenipotentiary of the German Reich in Denmark to the Foreign Ministry</i> Renthe-Fink reports that he was received in his capacity as Plenipotentiary of the Reich in audience by the King and Queen, who expressed the hope for good relations between the Danish population and the German occupation forces.	72	107
Apr. 9	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Cultural Policy Department</i> Records discussion with Oberführer Behrends of the Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle of the policy to be pursued with regard to the German minority in North Schleswig. As Denmark had been assured of territorial integrity the German national group would not be allowed to bring up the boundary question and anti-Danish agitation would not be pursued.	77	115
Apr. 10	<i>The Minister and Plenipotentiary of the German Reich in Denmark to the Foreign Ministry</i> Recommends that Danish independence be observed outwardly at least, so far as consistent with military considerations. Therefore his own position and functions as Plenipotentiary of the Reich should be clearly defined, and he should have precedence over the military commander. The latter's competence should cover only military questions.	81	119
Apr. 10	<i>The Minister and Plenipotentiary of the German Reich in Denmark to the Foreign Ministry</i> In a note from the Foreign Ministry the Danish Government noted the entry of the German troops into the country and announced the decision to adapt to the conditions of the occupation, but protested the violation of Danish neutrality.	87	127
Apr. 12	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Denmark</i> Defines the position of the Minister and Plenipotentiary of the Reich as the highest German representative to the Danish Government, and as having precedence over the military commander, who will have authority over purely military matters.	97	141
Apr. 13	<i>The Minister and Plenipotentiary of the German Reich in Denmark to the Foreign Ministry</i> Forwards a circular telegram from the Danish Foreign Ministry to all Danish Diplomatic Missions recapitulating the circumstances of the occupation and describing the policy adopted by the Danish Government.	103	150

DENMARK—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1940			
Apr. 15	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Denmark</i> Have the Danish Government instruct its Missions abroad that Germany has promised to respect Danish territorial integrity and political independence, that relations between the civil and military authorities of the two countries in Denmark are on a friendly basis, and that the relations of their Missions abroad should be governed accordingly.	121	173
Apr. 15	<i>The Minister and Plenipotentiary of the German Reich in Denmark to the Foreign Ministry</i> Gives an account of the occupation. Discusses the economic and political problems arising from the new relationship.	125	177
Apr. 15	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Economic Policy Department</i> Notes beginning of economic negotiations in Copenhagen, the intention of which was to turn Danish export trade entirely toward Germany and to have Germany supply Denmark's entire coal requirements.	122	174
Apr. 21	<i>The Minister and Plenipotentiary of the German Reich in Denmark to the Foreign Ministry</i> Circular telegram to all the Danish Missions abroad stresses the correct behavior of the German authorities and urges the Missions to conform to the line followed at home in their attitude to the German Missions.	145	212
Apr. 22	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Denmark</i> Expresses dissatisfaction with circular telegram sent to Danish Missions abroad and gives text of supplementary telegram to be sent, and not to be altered without the Foreign Minister's consent, which emphasizes close German-Danish cooperation.	151	218
Apr. 22	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Denmark</i> In the future Renthe-Fink is to take no political, military, or economic measures which have not received prior authorization by Ribbentrop personally.	152	219
Apr. 30	<i>The Minister and Plenipotentiary of the German Reich in Denmark to the Foreign Ministry</i> Draft circular telegram to all Danish Missions announcing expansion of the Government to include all major parties, emphasizing the understanding existing between Germany and Denmark, and giving details of the economic relations between the two countries.	188	268
May 3	<i>The State Secretary to the Legation in Denmark</i> The Foreign Minister approves the draft circular telegram to Danish Missions abroad, with the proviso that the economic negotiations with other powers, mentioned in the telegram, be carried on only with German agreement.	193	278
May 6	<i>Unsigned Memorandum</i> By order of Hitler SS detachments are to be stationed in Denmark to win volunteer recruits and to work for the solidarity of the Germanic nations. This is purely a political matter and arrangements are to be made by the Reich Plenipotentiary.	199	287

DENMARK—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1940 May 10	<i>Memorandum by the Minister in Denmark</i> German policy in Denmark should be one of noninterference in Danish internal politics, even though such a policy does not help the Danish National Socialists who will have to bide their time. Groups in Germany who have been in touch with the Danish National Socialists should be advised of this policy of noninterference.	231	319
May 21	<i>The Minister and Plenipotentiary of the German Reich in Denmark to the Foreign Ministry</i> Sehested's efforts to bring about the fall of the Stauning-Munch Government are continuing, since he believes he can count on German aid. In order to avoid difficulties he should be told that a cabinet with no Danish National Socialists would not be welcomed by Germany.	288	397
June 5	<i>Ambassador Ritter to the Legation in Denmark</i> Danish economic negotiations with Switzerland and Latvia were opened without prior German approval; the Reich does not agree to this and requests that negotiations be postponed until German and Danish interests have been brought into line.	389	519
June 20	<i>The Minister and Plenipotentiary of the German Reich in Denmark to the Foreign Ministry</i> As a result of additions to the Danish National Socialists from the Nationalist Farmers' movement, the prospects of a Danish governmental crisis have increased. There is a feeling among some members of the Government that Germany may be backing the National Socialists. Renthe-Fink proposed assurances of noninterference in Danish domestic politics, and again advised a reserved attitude toward the Danish National Socialists.	495	629
June 22	<i>The Minister and Plenipotentiary of the German Reich in Denmark to the Foreign Ministry</i> Renthe-Fink discusses the future relationship of Germany and Denmark under the new order in Europe and the degree of sovereignty which Denmark might be allowed to retain. For regulation of Danish foreign policy he recommends the stationing of German representation in the Danish Foreign Ministry.	532	685

DIRECTIVES FOR THE CONDUCT OF THE WAR

1940 Apr. 4	<i>Cooperation With Italy</i>	46	76
May 9	<i>The Administration of the Occupied Territories of France, Luxembourg, Belgium, and Holland</i>	213	300
May 14	<i>Directive No. 11</i>	246	343
May 24	<i>Directive No. 13</i>	312	427
June 8	<i>Directive No. 14</i>	404	533
June 14	<i>Directive No. 15</i>	433	567

FAR EAST

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1940 Mar. 30	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Embassies in Japan and China and to the Legation in Manchukuo</i> Ribbentrop instructs the German Diplomatic Missions to maintain complete reserve if question of recognition of Wang Ching-wei's Government is broached.	29	54
Apr. 1	<i>Memorandum by the Head of Political Division II</i> The Italian Counselor of Embassy suggests to the German Foreign Office consultation on the subject of recognition of Wang Ching-wei.	36	64
Apr. 5	<i>The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that despite official Japanese press statement opposing British blockade measures in the Sea of Japan, the Japanese Navy would welcome appearance there of German naval forces and would give them all possible assistance.	48	80
Apr. 15	<i>The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry</i> Foreign Minister Arita issued a statement of Japan's concern over any development of the European war affecting the status quo in the Netherlands East Indies; the Navy prompted the statement as a warning to Britain and the United States.	123	175
May 10	<i>The Embassy in Japan to the Foreign Ministry</i> After a survey of the political situation in Japan Stahmer concludes that the Japanese Cabinet has little chance of realizing its aim for a settlement with the United States and Britain; anti-British feeling is growing in the wake of German victories; the German Embassy is attempting to promote Soviet-Japanese contacts.	219	310
May 10	<i>The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry</i> Ott, in a review of Japan's foreign policy, concludes that while Arita still hopes for a reconciliation with the United States, this goal is blocked by the China conflict; Britain seeks to prevent closer Japanese cooperation with Germany by small concessions in China; Arita in a recent talk expressed distrust of the Soviet Union.	233	321
May 11	<i>The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry</i> The Japanese Foreign Minister stressed to Ott Japan's interest in preserving the status quo in the Netherlands East Indies for the sake of Japanese trade and peace in the Pacific; he asked that his press statement of April 15 be handed to the German Government.	234	327
May 17	<i>The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry</i> A Japanese spokesman told the press that France, Britain, and the Netherlands had given assurances concerning the Netherlands East Indies, and said it was expected Germany would also do so; Ott considers this an attempt by the Government to undermine its activist critics by committing Germany also to the status quo in the Dutch islands.	261	360

FAR EAST—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1940			
May 17	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Ambassador Kurusu asked that Germany issue a statement to calm the fears of Japanese public opinion concerning action prejudicial to Japan's interests in the Netherlands East Indies; Weissäcker promised to relay the request, adding only that the Allies were the real enemies of Japanese interests.	262	360
May 18	<i>The State Secretary to the Foreign Minister's Secretariat</i> Weissäcker suggests that a statement on the Netherlands East Indies seems necessary in view of Japanese pressure; it should attribute the real danger to the Allies and the United States but should contain nothing which prejudices the eventual disposition of the islands or excludes their use by the German Navy during the war.	273	375
May 20	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Japan</i> The Japanese Foreign Minister is to be informed orally of Germany's disinterestedness respecting the Netherlands East Indies, and told that Germany entirely understands Japan's concern in view of the danger from Britain and the United States.	280	385
May 23	<i>The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry</i> The German statement of disinterestedness in the Netherlands East Indies was very well received in the Japanese press, which regards it as better than the statements of Britain, France and the Netherlands, which pledged only the status quo, whereas Germany gives Japan a free hand.	302	414
May 27	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> A new Chinese bid for German mediation in the Chinese-Japanese war has been made; Weissäcker recommends that no German initiative be undertaken pending outcome of the Japanese attempt to promote a new government at Nanking, but that the Chinese not be entirely discouraged.	327	445
June 11	<i>Memorandum by the Head of Political Division VIII</i> The Chinese Counselor of Embassy was informed that in the opinion of the German Foreign Minister the time was not appropriate to attempt mediation between Japan and China; the Chinese Counselor agreed but said he hoped Germany would keep the possibility open.	414	548
June 12	<i>The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry</i> Ott warns against the Italian suggestion that the Japanese be asked to launch a press campaign against the United States; it would arouse the suspicion that Japan was being used as a tool of Axis policy; the Embassy is already using its influence among leading personalities to foster ill will against the United States.	418	551
June 19	<i>The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry</i> Ott suggests that the Japanese request of Germany for a free hand in French Indochina might be a good opportunity to seek a formula which would commit Japan to German policy unconditionally.	484	617

FAR EAST—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1940 June 19	<i>Unsigned Memorandum</i> Ambassador Kurusu requested that indirect contacts be prompted between himself and the Chinese Ambassador with a view to seeking a settlement of the war between Japan and China.	491	623
June 20	<i>Minute by the Director of the Economic Policy Department</i> Japanese appreciation for the friendly attitude of Germany in the China conflict comes rather late. German sacrifices on behalf of Japan have received no recognition from Japan. The Japanese attitude in economic relations during the war has been unsatisfactory. Instances of this might be pointed out to the Japanese Ambassador.	502	633
June 20	<i>Memorandum by the Head of Political Division VIII</i> Kurusu said that the tendency of Japan to detach herself from the Western Powers would increase if she could be assured of economic help from Germany, especially in building up heavy industry after the war; for the war period her interest lay in peace with the Soviet Union and expansion to the south.	503	634
June 21	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Weizsäcker replied to a query from Kurusu that there would be no general peace conference; Germany preferred bilateral settlements to a "Congress of Vienna."	510	642
June 21	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Bringing Japan's congratulations on the German victory in Europe, to which he said Japan had contributed by tying down the American fleet, Kurusu informed Weizsäcker that Japan would like to have German support in Indochina.	511	642
June 21	<i>The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry</i> Although he has been told that the arrangement for a Japanese control commission in Indochina is only a local affair, Ott considers it evidence of the unreliability of the Yonai Cabinet and urges that no concessions concerning Indochina be made without a firm commitment of Japan to the Axis.	514	654

FINLAND

1940 Mar. 28	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Economic Policy Department</i> In the course of a meeting of officials charged with formulating German economic policy, it was decided to attempt to negotiate with the Finns an immediate trade program providing for the delivery to Germany of vital raw materials.	16	32
Mar. 28	<i>The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> Schulenburg transmits a memorandum of his conversation with Molotov in which the latter gave an account of the peace negotiations with Finland.	19	37

FINLAND—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1940 May 21	<i>Memorandum by an Official of Economic Policy Division V</i> The Foreign Minister had taken up the question of arms deliveries to Finland with Hitler, who decided that nothing was to be done along this line for the present.	293	402

FRANCE

1940 Mar. 19	<i>An Official of the Embassy in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Pétain reported reluctant to join French Government because of his age. He believes the entry into the war was France's greatest mistake.	5	19
May 21	<i>The Embassy in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Forwards information from the Spanish Minister for Air about French military situation.	297	408
May 22	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports a French proposal for French Minister Ybarnégaray to visit Franco with a proposal for the freedom of the Mediterranean and termination of British control of Gibraltar and Suez. The Spanish reply expressed belief that such a mission should be undertaken only if success were assured. Italy was informed of the French step.	298	409
May 25	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> The Spanish Ambassador in France spoke of Pétain as a leader who could resolve the present difficult situation, but Pétain doubted that Hitler would listen to him.	315	433
May 27	<i>The Ambassador to the Holy See to the Foreign Ministry</i> The opinion that France should leave Britain to fight alone was heard after an audience of Poncet with the Pope.	326	444
June 3	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Marshal Pétain was reported to have said it would take a coup d'état to bring him to power, but that it was a possibility.	376	507
June 4	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Pétain told the Spanish Ambassador that all members of the Government were hostile to Italy and that no serious proposals would be made to that country in an effort to avert danger.	379	510
June 5	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> A Spanish report from Paris says that if the new German offensive is successful President Lebrun will resign in favor of Pétain.	391	521
June 7	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Indications are that the natives of French Morocco will soon be ready to revolt, and may ask Germany for protection. Stohrer asks consideration of the attitude Germany might take.	397	525

FRANCE—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1940			
June 7	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Military Attaché has received report that France has rejected the British advice to ask the United States for troop assistance; plans to make a separate peace as soon as Germans reach Paris.	398	526
June 11	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Opinion in the French Council of War reported to be divided as to whether or not a separate peace should be made.	416	550
June 13	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> An unofficial communication through the American Chargé d'Affaires said that Paris was being declared an open city. The form and style of the communication were objected to by Weizsäcker.	426	561
June 16	<i>An Official of the Embassy in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> The Spanish Ambassador in France reported a stormy session of the French Cabinet at Bordeaux, and believed a decision for peace was imminent, with Spain being asked to act as intermediary.	447	580
June 16	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> The Spanish Ambassador in France had been informed that the present Government would resign and that the new one, headed by Pétain, would ask for an armistice.	457	588
June 17	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> The French Government has requested the Spanish Government to act as an intermediary in asking Germany for peace terms.	459	590
June 17	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Weizsäcker informed the Italian Ambassador of the French request for terms.	460	591
June 17	<i>The State Secretary to the Embassy in Spain</i> Germany acknowledges receipt of the French statement and will confer with Italy.	461	591
June 17	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Weizsäcker presents 15 points for consideration in connection with terms of an armistice with France.	462	591
June 17	<i>Former Emperor Wilhelm II to Adolf Hitler</i> Congratulations on the German victory.	469	598
June 18	<i>Order by the Führer</i> Announces the French request for terms, but directs that military operations are to continue.	477	606
June 18	<i>The State Secretary to the Embassy in Spain</i> France is to be told that Germany will agree on cessation of hostilities if France reaches an understanding on this with Italy as well.	481	614
June 19	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> The German reply to the French request for armistice negotiations was delivered at 6:25 a. m., and an answer was promised by 10:00 a. m. The French request for negotiations with Italy has reached the Spanish Foreign Ministry.	485	618

FRANCE—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1940			
June 19	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> The French reply named General Huntziger as head of the armistice delegation and asked that German troops not advance beyond their positions as of noon June 19.	489	621
June 19	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> If the armistice is delayed the Reynaud faction may gain the upper hand again, as conditions in France are increasingly chaotic, and a revolutionary mood is increasing everywhere.	490	622
June 20	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> The Spanish Ambassador in France reported from Bordeaux that the situation in France was still deteriorating. Any agreement with the French must be concluded quickly, because of a plan to transfer high officials to Algiers.	496	629
June 20	<i>The Foreign Ministry to the Embassy in Spain</i> Informs the Spanish Government of a message to the French agreeing to the delegation named.	497	630
June 20	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> The French Plenipotentiaries are empowered to negotiate with Italy jointly with Germany.	499	631
June 20	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> France asks Spanish aid in getting an assurance that département Basses Pyrénées will not be attacked; the French Government will then establish itself there.	500	631
June 21	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> The Italian Ambassador gave information about progress of negotiations between France and Italy.	507	640
June 21	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Information from the Italian Ambassador that Mussolini wanted to ask Franco to occupy French Morocco to prevent a rumored move of the French Government to Algeria.	508	641
June 21	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Weizsäcker gave Alfieri the German and French texts of the armistice terms, warning him that this was a secret document and that the conditions were provisional and not definitive.	509	641
June 21/ 22	<i>Unsigned Memorandum</i> Details of the early armistice negotiations. The French were told that the basic provisions of the treaty could not be changed.	512	643
June 21	<i>Unsigned Memorandum</i> A telephone conversation between Generals Huntziger and Weygand in which the former gave a report of the armistice negotiations to date.	513	652
June 22	<i>Unsigned Memorandum</i> Telephoned comments by General Weygand's adjutant on the articles of the armistice treaty.	521	662

FRANCE—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1940 June 22	<i>Unsigned Memorandum</i> Record of the second day's armistice negotiations. On instructions from his Government, Huntziger put forth several questions and proposed amendments. The armistice treaty was signed.	522	664
June 22	<i>German-French Armistice Treaty</i> Terms of the treaty as signed at Compiègne.	523	671
Undated	<i>Unsigned Memorandum</i> Explanatory notes on the French questions raised and German answers given on various points of the armistice treaty.	524	676
June 22	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> The Italian Ambassador has delivered a communication from Mussolini in which he has reduced the demands in the previously agreed occupation clauses in order to make French acceptance of the armistice easier.	525	679
June 22	<i>Adolf Hitler to Benito Mussolini</i> Acknowledges receipt of Mussolini's communication.	526	680
June 22	<i>The State Secretary to the Foreign Minister</i> Proposals concerning establishment of a peace commission under direction of the Foreign Minister.	527	680

GREAT BRITAIN

1940 Apr. 9	<i>The Director of the Economic Policy Department to the Legations in Hungary, Rumania, Yugoslavia, and Bulgaria</i> The neutrality and economic interests of the various Balkan Governments will be endangered if they do not resist the efforts of the English Trading Company to shut out Germany from trade in the Southeast.	74	108
Apr. 23	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> The impression of the Spanish Ambassador in London is that though outwardly confident the British Government has grave doubts as to victory, and expects a negotiated peace after some further successful action by Germany.	155	222
June 6	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Minister</i> The British Ambassador has spoken of the Government's possible move to Canada and a continuation of the war from there.	394	523
June 19	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> The Swedish Minister in London has observed a growing desire for peace in authoritative circles.	487	620
June 22	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> The Swedish Minister doubted the report that Lloyd George would become Prime Minister, but still believed that a peace trend in Britain was becoming stronger.	529	682

GREATER GERMAN ECONOMIC SPHERE

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1940 May 30	<i>Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Economic Policy Department</i> Clodius sets forth his ideas of the future economic organization of the world following a German victory. The Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, Denmark, and Norway would be included definitely in a customs and currency union with Greater Germany; the German colonial empire would include the Belgian Congo and other African territories, and the United States would be treated coolly.	354	476
June 1	<i>Memorandum by Ambassador Ritter</i> Discusses the greater economic sphere which he envisages as including some 200,000,000 people; the future exports of Germany which he believes would be greatly increased; the colonial empire in Africa which he estimates could produce all of the requirements for Germany for tropical products; finally discusses the treatment of Ireland in the blockade of Britain and recommends that she be excluded from such blockade.	367	496
June 7	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Economic Policy Department</i> Discusses the responsibility for the economic relations of the occupied states. Denmark is treated as a foreign country with a government in existence, but Poland, Norway and the Netherlands are treated more like domestic territory, with foreign economic questions being handled through the German Foreign Ministry.	399	526
June 22	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Göring complains to Weissäcker that Clodius was negotiating in Rome on division of Balkan products between Germany and Italy and that the Foreign Ministry had usurped the Field Marshal's authority in economic matters by calling a meeting on greater economic sphere policies.	530	683
June 22	<i>Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Economic Policy Department</i> Clodius reports that he had arranged satisfactorily with the Italians for Rumanian petroleum transports to Italy to proceed so as not to interfere with similar transports to Germany and had also reached agreement on other Balkan economic questions of interest to both countries.	531	684

GREECE

1940 May 8	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> The Greek Minister feared that Germany planned to draw Greece into the war. Weissäcker did not allay his anxiety, but laid the blame on Britain and France.	210	297
May 25	<i>The Director of the Political Department to the Legation in Greece</i> The Greek Minister has suggested to his Government the possibility of seeking German protection in order to avoid Italian occupation.	318	439

GREECE—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1940 June 4	<i>Memorandum for the Foreign Minister</i> Through Herr Deter, manager of the Rheinmetall-Borsig Company in Greece, Metaxas has asked that Germany keep Italy out of the Balkans and guarantee Greek territory. Woermann believes that a substantive answer should not be given.	384	514
June 6	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department</i> Since Greece has already had Italian assurances, Woermann believes that the whole matter of a guarantee of Greek territory should be dropped.	395	524
June 8	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department</i> Varying reports purporting to come from Deter lead Woermann to the conclusion that amateurish politics of this nature could only result in disaster.	403	533
June 14	<i>The Director of the Economic Policy Department to the Legation in Greece</i> Italy's entrance into the war requires Greece to sell her products exclusively to the Axis.	435	572

HUNGARY

1940 Apr. 2	<i>The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> Ciano said that the talks with Teleki indicated that Hungary would continue to seek to realize its revisionist claims by peaceful means.	40	67
Apr. 17	<i>The Hungarian Minister President to the Führer and Chancellor</i> Teleki proposes a conference among Germany, Italy, and Hungary so that the three countries might be prepared for every eventuality.	135	19
May 1	<i>The Legation in Yugoslavia to the Foreign Ministry</i> Clodius reports that the authorities in Hungary are agreed that her political and economic policies can be conducted only in close concert with the Axis. Such concessions as were made to the British were only to obtain essential raw materials.	182	256
Undated	<i>Unsigned Minute</i> The Hungarian official news agency has published a report that Germany has approached Hungary for permission for troop transit.	207	296
May 15	<i>The Minister in Hungary to the Foreign Ministry</i> The Deputy Foreign Minister of Hungary says that the decision to mobilize the Army was made so as to be ready should Germany request action.	250	348
May 18	<i>The Director of the Legal Department to the Foreign Ministry</i> The message from Hitler to Teleki pointed out the inadvisability of a three-power meeting at this time. The Italian Government agreed with the German view.	271	372

HUNGARY—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1940			
May 20	<i>The State Secretary to the Legation in Hungary</i> Forwards Hitler's letter to Teleki, and asks for the real reason behind Hungary's partial mobilization.	281	387
May 20	<i>The Hungarian Minister President to the Führer and Chancellor</i> Restates Hungary's revisionist claims, but reaffirms that in the common interest of Hungary and the Axis Powers his country will not force the issue, and will cooperate in all ways possible.	284	392
May 26	<i>The Minister in Hungary to the Foreign Ministry</i> Hungary is bringing the third and fourth army corps up to war strength, but only as a precaution. The Italian Minister has not been informed.	321	442
May 27	<i>The State Secretary to the Foreign Minister</i> Asks authorization for the Minister in Hungary to tell the Government there that Germany expects it to inform Italy of the mobilization of the two army corps.	325	444
June 4	<i>The State Secretary to the Legation in Hungary</i> Germany does not want to be made a partner with Hungary in acting mysteriously with respect to Italy.	385	516

ICELAND AND GREENLAND

1940			
Apr. 23	<i>The Director of the Political Department to the Embassy in the United States</i> No German statement on the status of Danish possessions is intended.	157	224
Apr. 28	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department</i> Advised the Minister of Iceland in Denmark that his country should not be allowed to fall under British influence.	178	251
May 9	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports American action respecting Greenland, including appointment of consuls.	216	307
May 10	<i>The State Secretary to the Legation in Denmark</i> The Danish Government is to be urged to issue a protest against the British occupation of Iceland, with mention of earlier British occupation of the Faroe Islands.	228	316
May 11	<i>The Legation in Denmark to the Foreign Ministry</i> Forwards news received from Danish Minister in Washington about American actions regarding Greenland. Reports that the Danish Foreign Minister is not pleased over the situation, and that the Soviet Chargé d'Affaires had expressed apprehensions over too strong American influence in Greenland.	235	327

IRAN

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1940 Mar. 19	<i>The Minister in Iran to the Foreign Ministry</i> Since Iran is preventing the war from spreading to the Middle East, everything possible should be done to accommodate the Shah with respect to the delivery of armaments.	3	17
May 19	<i>The Minister in Iran to the Foreign Ministry</i> A political report on the relations between the Soviet Union and Iran. The inevitable expansionism of the Soviet Union should be diverted into regions where it will not come into conflict with German and Italian objectives.	277	379

IRELAND

1940 Mar. 28	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department</i> The Foreign Minister directs that Veesenmeyer deal with the matter of an Irish rebellion. Details are arranged for a meeting in Germany between Veesenmeyer and McCarthy.	18	36
May 21	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department</i> The Irish Chargé d'Affaires expressed himself apologetically for de Valera's unfriendly speech, remarking that Ireland wished to maintain neutrality toward all Powers.	291	401
May 23	<i>The Minister in Eire to the Foreign Ministry</i> Feeling in Ireland for Germany has materially deteriorated since the march into Belgium and the Netherlands. Any German intervention in Ireland before a British attack would probably produce a reaction contrary to the aims sought.	310	422
May 24	<i>The Minister in Eire to the Foreign Ministry</i> Details of the arrest of the Irishman, Held, because of contacts with the German, Brandy, and the course proposed to be followed by the German Legation.	314	431
June 1	<i>The Director of the Political Department to the Legation in Eire</i> Brandy had been on exclusively anti-English missions, with activity against the Irish Government expressly forbidden.	361	490
June 15	<i>The Director of the Political Department to the Legation in Eire</i> With respect to the Held trial, Hempel is to say to the Irish Government that since Britain is the major enemy of both nations, Germany counted on the greatest possible understanding by Ireland despite her neutral attitude.	437	573
June 17	<i>The Minister in Eire to the Foreign Ministry</i> The Irish Government also favors caution in handling the Held affair, and understands the German position in the war against Britain.	473	601

IRELAND—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1940 June 21	<i>The Minister in Eire to the Foreign Ministry</i> Discussion with de Valera of Ireland's foreign policy. Determination to maintain neutrality has been strengthened by the Held affair which has caused a growing distrust of Germany to match the always present distrust of Britain.	506	637

ITALY

1940 Mar. [18]	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat</i> In a meeting at the Brenner, Hitler briefs Mussolini on the war situation and the plans for an offensive in the west. Mussolini claims that he will be prepared for military intervention in from 3 to 4 months but points out that financial limitations will prevent Italy from sustaining a protracted war effort. In case the German offensive in the west is successful, Mussolini will intervene immediately to hasten the end; otherwise he will wait.	1	1
Mar. 21	<i>Circular of the Foreign Minister</i> The Missions are instructed, in discussing the Brenner meeting between Hitler and Mussolini, to avoid speculation regarding a joint peace offensive and to emphasize Germany's determination to pursue war to a victorious end.	9	26
Mar. 21	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in the Soviet Union</i> Instructs the Ambassador to inform the Soviet Government of the substance of the conversation at the Brenner between Hitler and Mussolini, stressing the identity of views and the belief that no differences exist between Germany, Soviet Union, and Italy.	7	21
Apr. 1	<i>The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that he discussed Italian-Soviet relations with Ciano, outlining the impressions that Schulenburg had received from Molotov. Ciano was inclined to temporize.	34	62
Apr. 7	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Ambassador in Italy</i> Instructs the Ambassador to inform Ciano and Mussolini, early on morning of April 9, of German action against Denmark and Norway planned for that date.	56	96
Apr. 8	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department</i> The Counselor of the Italian Embassy requests that his Embassy be kept informed on events in Norway.	64	102
Apr. 9	<i>Adolf Hitler to Benito Mussolini</i> Hitler informs Mussolini of German operations against Norway and Denmark which began that morning, describing the measure as designed to prevent the British from gaining a foothold in Scandinavia, and assures Mussolini that this operation would have no effect on decisions about which he had been informed at the Brenner conference.	68	104

ITALY—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1940			
Apr. 9	<i>The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> On receiving Hitler's letter, Mussolini gave his unqualified approval to the German attack on Norway, remarking that he expected great strategic results against Britain.	69	105
Apr. 10	<i>Adolf Hitler to Benito Mussolini</i> Hitler reports on the progress of German operations in Scandinavia which came right in the middle of British preparations for a landing on the Norwegian coast. An occupation of Scandinavia by Anglo-French forces would have been awkward for Germany in her future conduct of the war and would have diverted manpower from the decisive battlefield.	82	120
Apr. 10	<i>The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> Ciano called the German military achievements greater than Napoleon's, and described the position of the Western Powers as pathetic; he had refused to receive a special emissary from France.	84	125
Apr. 11	<i>The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> Mussolini was enthusiastic over Hitler's letter; he described the Norwegian action as a master stroke which while employing only a fraction of the German forces would expose the entire English east coast.	86	127
Apr. 11	<i>Benito Mussolini to Adolf Hitler</i> Italy recognizes that her intervention in the war is unavoidable but would like further delay to complete preparations; it remains in the interest of the Axis to keep the Balkans out of the war.	92	131
Apr. 11	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat</i> Hitler told Attolico that the danger of British counteraction in Norway was past; the Norwegian Government had not been reasonable, but German power in Norway was secure in any case; he did not expect Rumania to cause trouble in the Balkans.	93	132
Apr. 18	<i>Adolf Hitler to Benito Mussolini</i> Hitler thanks Mussolini for comprehending the necessity for Germany's action in Scandinavia in view of Britain's plans, with Norway's complicity, to cut off Germany's mineral supplies; Germany's military successes since April 9 are such "as not even the most fervent fantasy would have dared expect"; Hitler agrees that it is better to keep the war far from the Balkan region if possible.	138	200
Undated	<i>Unsigned Memorandum</i> A memorandum which Hitler gave Mackensen for Mussolini states that Germany will take a position on Hungary's proposal for a German-Italian-Hungarian conference only if Italy agrees to it, "and is perhaps prepared to share in the consequences whatever they may be". Germany feels that official discussions of this kind between the three countries would only "give sustenance to rumors of alleged German intentions in the Balkans."	164	232

ITALY—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1940 Apr. 25	<i>The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> Mussolini agreed that it would be best to reject a conference with Hungary to consider her aspirations; he recognized the importance of Hitler's statement that there would be no objection to action by Italy to improve her strategic position as Germany had done in Denmark and Norway.	165	234
Apr. 26	<i>The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that he will transmit the text of a letter from Reynaud to Mussolini and Mussolini's reply, made available by Ciano.	167	237
Apr. 26	<i>Adolf Hitler to Benito Mussolini</i> Documents captured in Norway prove that the British had intended to occupy the country; their troops are now on the run, and in 30 days their losses will greatly exceed Germany's.	168	237
Apr. 26	<i>The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> Rumors which have been circulating that Ciano is pro-British and that there have been differences between him and Mussolini are without foundation; Mussolini is firm for the Axis and only his view counts.	170	243
Apr. 27	<i>The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> Transmits the text of Reynaud's letter to Mussolini, which is in the form of an appeal that Italy and France attempt to restore, even at the late date, their historic friendship and avoid war.	172	246
Apr. 27	<i>The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> Transmits Mussolini's reply to Reynaud. Mussolini reaffirms his alliance with Hitler and rejects the possibility of a meeting with Reynaud.	173	247
Apr. 30	<i>The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> Ciano stated that Attolico had not been told the real reason for his recall from Berlin; he will be given the Vatican post to forestall his becoming associated with the group of disgruntled Italian diplomats who are a center of intrigue against the Axis policy.	181	254
May 1	<i>The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> Mackensen reports the information received from Ciano regarding the call of the American Ambassador on Mussolini to present President Roosevelt's message expressing hope that the conflict would not be extended; Ciano reported that Mussolini was annoyed at Roosevelt's message and had drafted a reply immediately.	185	261
May 2	<i>Benito Mussolini to Adolf Hitler</i> Mussolini adopted a "drastic tone" in replying to Roosevelt because his message was "threatening"; Italian public opinion is increasingly against the Western Powers; there will be 2 million Italians under arms by summer.	190	271
May 3	<i>Adolf Hitler to Benito Mussolini</i> In an account of the Norwegian campaign Hitler regrets the British withdrawal since greater losses could have been inflicted in a major engagement; he was much pleased with Mussolini's replies to Reynaud, Roosevelt, and the Pope.	192	275

ITALY—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1940			
May 7	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Ambassador in Italy</i> Mackensen is instructed to inform Mussolini of German action against the Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxembourg not later than 6 a. m. of a date to be communicated to him verbally by a courier.	205	294 ✓
May 9	<i>Adolf Hitler to Benito Mussolini</i> The invasion of the Netherlands and Belgium, made necessary by British and French plans against the Ruhr, is already under way. Hitler promises to keep Mussolini informed of the progress of the offensive so that Mussolini can make what decisions he believes necessary.	212	299
May 10	<i>Benito Mussolini to Adolf Hitler</i> With the German attack launched in the west, Mussolini feels that time is pressing for Italy too; all Italian forces will be ready for action by the end of May.	232	321
May 13	<i>Adolf Hitler to Benito Mussolini</i> Hitler describes the attack on northern Netherlands; the necessary cover has been created for the further operations against the Dutch and Belgian coasts. The Luftwaffe has been successful in inflicting heavy losses on the British Navy.	239	333
May 14	<i>The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> Mussolini was much impressed with Hitler's account of the winning of air superiority in the west, which would insure victory; Ciano spoke for the first time of an Italian entry into the war, possibly in 10 to 14 days.	242	338 ⁴
May 16	<i>The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> Mussolini refused to receive the American Ambassador for delivery of a Roosevelt message, which Mussolini described as a piece of Christian sentimentality and without significance.	255	354
May 18	<i>The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> Ciano had forwarded to Mussolini a goodwill message from Churchill. Churchill asserted that even if Britain were beaten on all continents she would win in the end with the help of the Americas. Mussolini had decided to send a brief reply to Roosevelt's message.	266	366
May 18	<i>Adolf Hitler to Benito Mussolini</i> In an account of the campaign in the west, Hitler asserts that the Dutch and Belgian forces are out of action, the British and French are in retreat; all fortified positions have been taken and Germany has won complete air supremacy.	272	374
May 19	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department</i> The new Italian Ambassador, Alfieri, stated that Italy would soon enter the war; on leaving his Vatican post he had complained sharply to the Pope of the Church's attitude toward Germany; the Pope had promised that the Vatican press would take a more neutral line.	275	378 ^Δ

ITALY—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1940			
May 19	<i>Benito Mussolini to Adolf Hitler</i> The Italian public is following the German successes with enthusiasm and in the conviction that Italy cannot stand aside much longer; Mussolini will send important news on this latter point in a few days.	276	379
May 25	<i>Adolf Hitler to Benito Mussolini</i> With only 60 weakened enemy divisions confronting 165 German divisions, victory in the west is only a question of time; the 2-day pause in the advance which allowed the escape of some enemy troops was justified so as to clear the roads and move up the infantry.	317	436
May 26	<i>The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Minister</i> Mussolini showed great enthusiasm over Hitler's latest account of the campaign in the west; he said he would have an important communication to make in his reply.	320	441
May 27	<i>The Embassy in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> By June 20 Italian forces in the Po Army, overseas, and on the Alpine front would be fully mobilized, the others 60 per cent mobilized; no action against Yugoslavia or Greece was planned.	323	443
May 27	<i>Memorandum by the Representative of the Foreign Ministry With the High Command of the Army</i> With regard to apprehensions lest possible Italian operations against Yugoslavia lead to Soviet intervention in Bessarabia, it is reported that General von Brauchitsch had told Ribbentrop that the latter should personally see to it that Italy does not create chaos in the Balkans.	328	446
May 29	<i>The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Minister</i> Ciano rejected an American suggestion regarding possibility of securing British and French concessions in exchange for Italy's neutrality.	339	460
May 29	<i>The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> The French Ambassador told Ciano that Italy could fulfill all her aspirations against France, except for Corsica, if she remained out of the war; Ciano replied that the offer came too late.	340	462
May 29	<i>The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> Ciano assured the Yugoslav Minister that Italy had no intentions against Yugoslavia; she would enter the war "through the front door."	341	463
May 29	<i>The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> Ciano told the British Ambassador that Italy had broken off negotiations concerning British blockade measures because she now wished to deal with this matter "by other means."	342	463
May 29	<i>The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> Ciano expressed his desire that Italy enter the war at the earliest possible date, and complained that the military were never ready; Mackensen warned that at the pace with which events were moving it could suddenly be too late.	343	464

ITALY—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1940 May 30	<i>The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> Mussolini's letter to Hitler announcing Italy's decision to enter the war is en route; Ciano's remarks indicate that the Italian attack will be directed mainly against France, not against British territory.	350	472 ^A
May 30	<i>Benito Mussolini to Adolf Hitler</i> Mussolini informs Hitler he is ready to enter the war June 5, but will delay some days if Hitler wishes; he will issue a declaration intended to preserve peace in the Balkan area.	356	483
May 31	<i>Adolf Hitler to Benito Mussolini</i> Welcoming Italy's entry into the war, Hitler promises completion of the action in the Low Countries and northern France in 2 days; he would like Italy to delay up to 3 days to permit Germany to complete destruction of the French Air Force in its present bases.	357	484
June 1	<i>The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> Mussolini understands the reasons for Hitler's desire that the Italian war entry be delayed a few days; he confirms that there will be no action against Greece and Yugoslavia.	360	489
June 1	<i>The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> Ciano said another Roosevelt message had warned of a doubling of American aid to the powers which might be attacked by Italy; Mussolini thought this aid trivial and would not be influenced.	363	492
June 1	<i>The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> Ciano says the King approves the decision to enter the war; Ciano said a formal declaration of war would be made since there would be no military advantage in a surprise action.	366	495
June 2	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Italy</i> Hitler wishes to withdraw his request that the Italian entry into the war be delayed; he will leave the decision to Mussolini entirely, but the original date of June 5 would be quite agreeable.	370	502
June 2	<i>The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> Despite Hitler's readiness to agree to an earlier date Mussolini will delay Italy's entry into the war a few days longer to make additional troop dispositions in Libya; he does not wish to risk reverses there which enemy propaganda would exploit.	371	503
June 2	<i>The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> The date for Italy's war declaration will be June 10 with hostilities to begin on the 11th.	372	504 ^D
June 2	<i>Benito Mussolini to Adolf Hitler</i> Mussolini states that no action will be taken against the Balkans, Greece, or Turkey, and asks to send Italian troops to fight alongside the Germans to demonstrate their comradeship-in-arms.	373	505
June 3	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Italy</i> Mussolini is to be told that Hitler is in full agreement with the plans outlined in Mussolini's last letter.	374	506

ITALY—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1940			
June 5	<i>The Embassy in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> Marshal Badoglio told the German Military Attaché that not a great deal could be expected from the Italian forces since the Army and Air Force were not ready; he hoped the war would be over quickly.	387	518
June 9	<i>Adolf Hitler to Benito Mussolini</i> Hitler welcomes a contingent of Italian troops, and will send a contingent of Germans in return; the French Air Force is destroyed and the French front will collapse in a few days; the Narvik action has been won by an unusual display of German military spirit.	406	535
June 10	<i>The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> Mussolini feels that Italy is well prepared for her entry into the war, but she lacks the matériel to arm all her potential manpower; the Spanish war had been very costly in this respect; he would like to send a delegation to Germany to discuss mutual aid.	408	540
June 10	<i>Adolf Hitler to Benito Mussolini</i> Hitler thanks Mussolini for the Italian declaration of war against Great Britain and France.	410	542
June 12	<i>Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Economic Policy Department</i> Clodius recommends that a delegation go to Rome to discuss Italian requests for war material and economic aid; Hitler has ordered that a reserved attitude be taken; the requests can be met only in part but are more reasonable than those of August, 1939.	420	556
June 13	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> A letter from Mussolini reporting the first British air attacks on northern Italy proposes that Germany provide 50 flak batteries in exchange for which Italy would send a motorized division to Germany; compensation is also promised for the raw materials Italy needs.	421	557
June 18	<i>Unsigned Memorandum</i> Conversation between Hitler and Mussolini on details of the armistice with France. Importance of dealing with a French government on French territory and preventing the escape of the French fleet was stressed.	479	608
June 18	<i>Fifth Secret Protocol</i> A revised protocol on economic cooperation provides for increased deliveries of iron, steel, and chemicals by Germany to Italy in return for increased deliveries of certain raw materials by Italy to Germany.	480	611

LATIN AMERICA

1940			
May 3	<i>The Ambassador in Argentina to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that Argentine neutrality policy, strictly impartial at the outset of the conflict, has now developed into a policy of sympathy for Germany's opponents.	194	278

LATIN AMERICA—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1940			
May 4	<i>The Embassy in the United States to the Foreign Ministry</i> According to intelligence reports, Mexico would be willing to give secret support to Germany, since a German victory would strengthen Mexico as against the United States.	196	282
May 7	<i>The Ambassador in Argentina to the Foreign Ministry</i> The German Ambassador rejected Argentine complaints over German propaganda and protested for his part against the "fifth column" charge made against the German element.	203	292
May 14	<i>The Minister in Uruguay to the Foreign Ministry</i> Foreign Minister Guani is friendly toward Germany and is resisting the movement toward a common anti-German policy on the part of the American Republics.	241	336
May 14	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Weissäcker told the Argentine Ambassador that certain actions and utterances of the Argentine Government seemed to indicate a change from neutrality to nonbelligerency.	247	344
May 15	<i>The State Secretary to the Embassies in Chile and Brazil and the Legation in Mexico</i> Uruguay has taken the initiative in organizing a collective protest of the American Republics against the invasion of the Low Countries; this ought to be prevented by German steps with the Governments of all these countries.	251	348
May 16	<i>The State Secretary to the Embassies in Chile and Brazil and the Legation in Mexico</i> The Missions are to protest the action of the Latin American States on the occasion of the German invasion of the Low Countries; such a démarche is an unfriendly act, instigated by the United States Government.	256	355
May 18	<i>The Ambassador in Argentina to the Foreign Ministry</i> In view of the nervous mood of public opinion in South America, it is suggested that the German Government issue a statement which would reassure the South Americans about German policy.	269	371
May 18	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that the United States is ready to join in a protest by the American Republics against German violation of Low Countries' neutrality; but United States does not agree to changing from neutrality to a state of nonbelligerency.	270	371
May 21	<i>The Deputy Director of the Political Department to the Embassy in Chile</i> The Embassy in Chile is asked whether United States policy in Latin America could not be counteracted by emphasizing the possible conflicts between the United States and the countries of Latin America.	287	397

LATIN AMERICA—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1940 May 22	<i>The Foreign Ministry to the Foreign Department of the High Command of the Wehrmacht</i> In view of the war scare and "fifth column" hysteria prevailing in Latin America, the German armed forces ought to refrain from sabotage in Latin America and from naval actions within the 300-mile zone; the High Commands of the Army and Navy are asked to express an opinion on these matters.	301	414
May 23	<i>The Ambassador in Chile to the Foreign Ministry</i> It would indeed be possible to drive a wedge between the United States and the Latin American countries by pointing to the exploitation by American capitalism and by using the Spanish propaganda literature against United States imperialism.	304	416
May 23	<i>Circular of the State Secretary</i> The Foreign Minister requests the Missions to be very reserved toward the Latin American Governments in view of the protest of these countries against German actions.	307	419
June 1	<i>The Foreign Minister to the State Secretary</i> The Argentine Government is to be told that Germany did not sink the <i>Uruguay</i> and that she therefore objects to the anti-German campaign in Argentina; the Embassy is instructed to induce Argentine papers to print that the anti-German elements in the country are in the pay of Britain and the United States.	365	493
June 8	<i>The Ambassador in Argentina to the Foreign Ministry</i> British and French influence in Argentina is strong and therefore the German position there is difficult; it could be improved, however, by a discreet German policy reassuring Argentina that Germany has no hostile intentions and that the German organizations will not interfere in the internal politics of the country; the few pro-German publications ought to be kept going at almost any cost.	401	529
June 10	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> The Argentine Ambassador requested the promise of an official German statement, regretting the sinking of the <i>Uruguay</i> ; Weissäcker did not admit German responsibility for the sinking.	412	543
June 14	<i>The State Secretary to the Embassy in Argentina</i> The Ambassador is authorized to spend up to half a million pesos to purchase Argentine goods capable of withstanding long periods of storage and for organizing a trading company to do business with Germany after the war.	430	565
June 18	<i>The Ambassador in Brazil to the Foreign Ministry</i> To counteract a United States economic offensive in the form of large purchases from Brazil, it is suggested that Germany enter into definite commitments now to purchase Brazilian products after the war and to carry out a contract for delivery of a steel plant to Brazil.	470	598

LATIN AMERICA—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1940 June 18	<i>Memorandum by the Head of Political Division IX</i> It has been decided to put ample funds at the disposal of the Embassy in Argentina for financing propaganda activities, especially in the form of subsidies to pro-German newspapers; the acquisition by the Embassy of a radio station in Montevideo has been recommended.	482	614
June 18	<i>The High Command of the Wehrmacht to the Foreign Ministry</i> The OKW has put a ban on all sabotage activities in the United States and Latin America; with respect to German naval actions within the 300-mile zone, appropriate instructions have been given earlier to the German Navy.	483	616
June 19	<i>The Director of the Economic Policy Department to the Embassy in Brazil</i> The Embassy is authorized to promise the Brazilians that after the war Germany will buy large amounts of Brazilian products provided Brazil maintains her policy of neutrality.	498	630
June 20	<i>The Director of the Political Department to the Missions in Latin America</i> The Missions are instructed to take all possible steps to prevent the Havana Conference of American Foreign Ministers from giving effect to plans for use of interned belligerent ships in inter-American traffic.	501	632
June 21	<i>The Ambassador in Brazil to the Foreign Ministry</i> President Vargas expressed his dislike for the democracies and his sympathy for the authoritarian states; he desired immediate conclusion of economic agreements on future economic exchanges.	518	659
June 21	<i>The Ambassador in Argentina to the Foreign Ministry</i> A high official of the Argentine Foreign Ministry said that Argentina intended to stay neutral and to maintain friendly relations with Germany even though she could not refuse to attend the Havana Conference; a German promise to investigate the sinking of the <i>Uruquay</i> would help to preserve friendship between Germany and Argentina.	519	660
June 22	<i>The Ambassador in Argentina to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports the press coverage given to the proposed inter-American trade organization; post-war Argentine-German trade has been emphasized in recent official talks.	534	689

LUXEMBOURG

1940 May 9	<i>Memorandum of the German Government to the Government of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg</i> In order to anticipate an attack by England and France, Germany has been forced to extend her military operations to Luxembourg territory; she will not interfere with the territorial integrity or political independence of the Grand Duchy.	215	306
---------------	---	-----	-----

LUXEMBOURG—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1940 May 10	<i>Minute by the Director of the Political Department</i> Circumstances of the presentation of the German memorandum to the Luxembourg Chargé d'Affaires.	218	309
May 10	<i>The Minister in Luxembourg to the Foreign Ministry</i> Since the Grand Duchess and all members of the Government had left, Radowitz presented the German memorandum to Secretary General Wehrer, who entered a protest against the violation of neutrality.	220	311
May 13	<i>Memorandum by an Official of Political Division I</i> Since the behavior of the Luxembourg armed forces has been correct, the High Command of the Army and the OKW believe that Germany should not consider herself at war with Luxembourg.	240	335
May 14	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department</i> The German Legation's view that Luxembourg cannot be at war appears to be correct. When a Secretary of the American Embassy stated that the United States was taking over Luxembourg's interests, the Protocol Department replied that it could not make a definite answer on this. Woermann recommends that no action be taken which would bring about a state of war and that the Minister be allowed to remain in Luxembourg.	248	346
May 16	<i>The Foreign Minister to the State Secretary</i> As a result of the flight of the Government and the Grand Duchess, there is no recognized Luxembourg Government. The country should be treated as hostile, like occupied Netherlands rather than like occupied Denmark. However, no measures should be taken prejudicing the future disposition of Luxembourg.	257	356
May 17	<i>The Minister in Luxembourg to the Foreign Ministry</i> Luxembourg has been proclaimed an enemy country by the German Field Commander; the Wehrer Government will be recognized only as the representative of local authorities, not as the government of the state.	260	359
May 18	<i>The Minister in Luxembourg to the Foreign Ministry</i> Forwards a message from the Secretary General of the Luxembourg Government protesting the German communication according to which Luxembourg is regarded as an enemy country.	267	367

NETHERLANDS

1940 Mar. 19	<i>Minute by the Director of the Economic Policy Department</i> Despite repeated Dutch reversion to the matter, deliveries of antiaircraft guns to the Netherlands have been stopped by direction of Hitler.	4	18
Mar. 26	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Ambassador Papen reports that the Netherlands Minister to Turkey has approached him with offers of mediation.	12	28

NETHERLANDS—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1940 Apr. 13	<i>The Minister in the Netherlands to the Foreign Ministry</i> In a news interview the Netherlands Foreign Minister had declared the intention of the Netherlands to defend itself by arms against attack from any side.	101	149
Apr. 16	<i>The Minister in the Netherlands to the Foreign Ministry</i> The Netherlands Foreign Minister informed the German Minister of the discovery of military espionage activity on the part of Dr. Butting of the Legation staff. Butting admitted to Zech that the charges were true.	128	189
Apr. 17	<i>The Minister in the Netherlands to the Foreign Ministry</i> Since it would be undesirable to have another Legation member found engaged in espionage, Schulze-Bernett, an Abwehr agent attached to the Legation, had been warned to act accordingly.	133	194
May 6	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Economic Policy Department</i> A recommendation, agreed to by the OKW, for the release of thirty-three 2-cm. antiaircraft guns to the Netherlands.	201	289
May 8	<i>Memorandum by an Official of Political Division I</i> Reports that a German plane passed over Netherlands territory because of engine trouble and was shot at by Dutch planes. Hitler ordered that an immediate expression of regret for the violation of Netherlands territory be made to the Netherlands Government.	208	296
May 8	<i>Memorandum by an Official of Political Division I</i> Gives OKW intelligence reports of extensive defense measures being taken by the Netherlands.	209	297
May 10	<i>The Minister in the Netherlands to the Foreign Ministry</i> The Netherlands Government considers the nation at war with Germany because of the attack made on her.	222	312
May 10	<i>Note Verbale From the Netherlands Legation</i> Enters very energetic protest against the German invasion as completely unjustified and requests passports for the Legation staff.	224	314
May 15	<i>The Legation in the Netherlands to the Foreign Ministry</i> The Dutch forces are surrendering to the German troops; the Dutch High Command wishes to discuss measures for maintaining security, calm, and order.	249	347
May 19	<i>The Minister in the Netherlands to the Foreign Ministry</i> Public opinion in the Netherlands is strongly against the Government and Queen for leaving the country; also bitter against the Dutch National Socialists. Sentiment toward Germany is surprisingly favorable and skillful German military administration could secure the good will of the Netherlands for the coming generation.	274	378
May 20	<i>Führer's Directive</i> The power to issue orders in the Netherlands is to be divided between the Reichskommissar for occupied Netherlands territories and the Wehrmacht Commander in the Netherlands.	282	388

NETHERLANDS—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1940 May 21	<i>Memorandum by the Consul General at Amsterdam</i> Since at the conclusion of hostilities all the ministers, together with the Queen, had left the country, governmental authority had been vested in General Winkelman, Commander in Chief of the Army.	294	403
May 21	<i>Note by the Director of the Special Party Section of the Foreign Ministry</i> Transmits instructions of the Foreign Minister to the State Secretary regarding Foreign Ministry personnel in the Netherlands, Luxembourg, and Norway. Benzler is to be assigned to the staff of Reichskommissar Seyss-Inquart as representative of the Foreign Ministry, and Count Zech is to be recalled immediately to Berlin. Radowitz is to be recalled from Luxembourg.	295	404
May 25	<i>Unsigned Memorandum</i> In an interview on May 21 in The Hague, Mussert estimated his party's strength at 40,000 members and 200,000 sympathizers. His program called for creation of a Greater Netherlands in close political, economic, and cultural dependence on the Reich.	296	406
May 25	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Economic Policy Department</i> Discussion held on May 24 by German economic experts on the Netherlands. It was concluded that there were two possible ways of dealing with the Dutch economy; (1) keep it intact and in working order so far as possible, or (2) using up available supplies of raw materials and foodstuffs without regard to the future economy. It was agreed that the first alternative was preferable.	313	429
May 28	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Head of the Auslandsorganisation in the Foreign Ministry</i> The Foreign Minister approves Bohle's proposal that reprisals be undertaken in the Netherlands for internment of Germans in the Netherlands Indies and requests that the matter be taken up with the Reichskommissar at once.	333	454
May 28	<i>Führer's Directive</i> The new governmental organization in the Netherlands is to go into effect on May 29.	334	455
June 12	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Economic Policy Department</i> Conference of German economic experts on the Netherlands to hear and discuss a report by Wohlthat on the Netherlands economy.	419	553

NORWAY

1940 Mar. 28	<i>The Minister in Norway to the Foreign Ministry</i> British incursions in Norwegian territorial waters may be designed to provoke Germany. Aiding Norway in her desire to keep neutral, and thus alienating her from Britain, seems advisable.	17	35
-----------------	---	----	----

NORWAY—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1940			
Apr. 2	<i>Führer's Directive</i> Order for the attack on Denmark and Norway.	39	66
Apr. 2	<i>The Chief of the High Command of the Wehrmacht to the Foreign Ministry</i> Forwards a number of documents and explanations on procedures to be followed in the occupation of Denmark and Norway.	42	68
Apr. 3	<i>The Chief of the High Command of the Wehrmacht to the Foreign Minister</i> Suggests means of coordinating the military and political aspects of the Scandinavian operation; the number of persons participating is to be restricted to the fewest possible.	43	72
Apr. 7	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Minister in Norway</i> Memoranda to be handed to the Norwegian Government, and detailed instructions for the action Minister Bräuer is to take at the time of the invasion of Norway.	53	84
Apr. 8	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department</i> British mines are being laid in Norwegian waters, and coercion is being used in the matter of chartering ships.	58	97
Apr. 8	<i>The Minister in Norway to the Foreign Ministry</i> Encloses the text of the Norwegian statement on Allied mine-laying in Norway's territorial waters. The situation is considered very grave.	60	99
Apr. 8	<i>Memorandum by an Official of Political Division I</i> Bräuer is to take no action on his own responsibility with respect to the sinking of three German ships.	63	101
Apr. 9	<i>The Minister in Norway to the Foreign Ministry</i> Presentation of the German demands on Norway.	65	102
Apr. 9	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Norway</i> Describes the smooth course of the occupation in Denmark and instructs the Minister to advise the Norwegian Government that resistance is hopeless and calculated only to worsen Norway's situation.	67	103
Apr. 9	<i>The Minister in Norway to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports directing a further appeal to the Norwegian Government to give up resistance and stating that Germany has no intention of affecting the independence of Norway or its territorial integrity. An appeal was also made to the Norwegian press.	71	107
Apr. 9	<i>The Chief of the High Command of the Wehrmacht to the Deputy of the Führer and the Higher Reich Authorities</i> Outlines for other German governmental authorities the position and functions of the Wehrmacht in the occupation of Denmark and Norway. It is to be active in the military field only.	76	112
Apr. 10	<i>Unsigned Memorandum</i> Minister Bräuer refused the King's request that their meeting be held in the presence of a committee of four members of the Storting and that troops be withdrawn pending the meeting. Quisling reported to be encountering opposition in all quarters.	79	117

NORWAY—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1940			
Apr. 10	<i>The Minister in Norway to the Foreign Ministry</i> Report of conference with the King at Elverum. Bräuer tried to convince the King of the folly of resistance and the necessity of accepting a Quisling government. The Norwegian decision was that no Quisling government would be accepted and that resistance would continue as long as possible.	83	123
Apr. 11	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Legal Department</i> Transmitted orders of the Foreign Minister to Bräuer that the Norwegian ministries must be occupied and their archives secured. Bräuer advised that the door be left open for further negotiations with the King.	88	128
Apr. 11	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Legal Department</i> Bräuer is instructed by the Foreign Minister to try to arrange another meeting with the King in order to offer the Norwegians a last chance for a reasonable settlement.	89	129
Apr. 11	<i>The Minister in Norway to the Foreign Ministry</i> The King and Koht hold that a Norwegian government under occupation would require the confidence of both Germany and Norway. Quisling does not have the confidence of his own country.	90	129
Apr. 11	<i>The Minister in Norway to the Foreign Ministry</i> Detailed report on the situation in Norway 48 hours after the invasion.	95	136
Apr. 13	<i>The Minister in Norway to the Foreign Ministry</i> Bräuer reports that much of the opposition to Germany is really opposition to Quisling and that the question of support for a Quisling regime should be reconsidered.	98	142
Apr. 13	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Personal Staff</i> Record of a conversation between Director Hagelin and Hitler.	99	144
Apr. 13	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Norway</i> Habicht's independent mission to organize propaganda in Norway does not affect Bräuer's position as Minister and Plenipotentiary of the Reich.	106	152
Apr. 13	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Personal Staff</i> Record of a conversation between Hitler and the Norwegian Minister.	107	152
Apr. 13	<i>Reichsamtseleiter Scheidt to Minister Bräuer</i> Scheidt fears that the staff of the Commander in Chief of the German troops is being prejudiced against Quisling's Nasjonal Samling Government.	110	158
Apr. 14	<i>Unsigned Memorandum</i> Bräuer had called together the Supreme Court to form an administrative committee, the question being whether to form one with or without Quisling. He requests authority to take immediate action.	111	159

NORWAY—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1940 Apr. 14	<i>Unsigned Memorandum</i> Reports are received about contacts with the King by Paal Berg, President of the Supreme Court, and by Bishop Bergrav on the subject of organization of an administrative body.	112	160
Apr. 14	<i>Unsigned Memorandum</i> Bräuer reports a conference with Berg, who was prepared to form a government council. This would not include Quisling who would, however, be given an office with duties connected with the winding-up of military affairs.	113	161
Apr. 14	<i>Memorandum by the President of the Norwegian Supreme Court</i> The Supreme Court has been consulted and approves the formation of an administrative council for the areas under German occupation, such a council to have nothing to do with foreign affairs.	114	162
Apr. 14	<i>Unsigned Memorandum</i> The Foreign Minister approves the proposals for the formation of the administrative council and the disposition of Quisling, emphasizing that Hitler is interested in having Quisling treated with respect and held in reserve for future use.	115	162
Apr. 15	<i>Unsigned Memorandum</i> Details of the negotiations leading to the resignation of Quisling as Minister President.	118	168
Apr. 15	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Norway</i> The King and Crown Prince must not be allowed to establish themselves in Norway as an opposition regime. If possible they should be seized.	119	172
Apr. 15	<i>The Minister in Norway to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports installation of the Government Committee and the issuance of a proclamation on the change in government.	124	176
Apr. 16	<i>Unsigned Memorandum</i> There is to be no publicity at present on the matter of Quisling's place in the Norwegian Government. Bräuer is to return to Berlin to report.	130	193
Apr. 16	<i>The State Secretary to the Consulates at Bergen, Kristiansand, Narvik, Stavanger, and Trondheim</i> While German-Norwegian relations have not developed as foreseen in the German memorandum there has been no declaration of war. The eventual relationship between Germany and the governmental authority in Norway has not been determined.	131	193
Apr. 17	<i>Memorandum by the Minister to Norway</i> Bräuer's account, written in Berlin, of the considerations which led on April 13-15 to the replacement of the Quisling regime by the administrative committee.	134	195
Apr. 19	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in Norway to the Foreign Ministry</i> Executive power in occupied Norway given to the Commander of Group XXI.	143	209

NORWAY—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1940 Apr. 21	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Norway</i> Terboven will soon be named as Reichskommissar in charge of nonmilitary affairs in Norway, subordinate directly to Hitler.	147	214
Apr. 24	<i>Decree of the Führer Concerning the Exercise of Governmental Power in Norway, April 24, 1940</i> Text of the Führer's directive assigning the exercise of governmental powers in Norway to the "Reichskommissar for the Occupied Norwegian Territories."	162	230
May 1	<i>Vidkun Quisling to Adolf Hitler</i> Quisling outlines his proposed program looking to the eventual formation of a new government under his leadership.	186	263
May 1	<i>Vidkun Quisling to Stabsleiter Schickedanz</i> Quisling expresses his feeling of betrayal in being forced out of the Norwegian Government.	187	265
May 20	<i>Unsigned Note for the Führer and Chancellor</i> Complains that Scheidt's advice had been disregarded by Terboven and that Scheidt had been sent home from Norway. Such measures tend to discourage those Norwegians like the adherents of the Quisling movement who were favorable to the Pan-Germanic idea.	283	389
June 8	<i>The Minister in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry</i> The Swedish Foreign Ministry transmits the message that the Norwegian King and Government have fled the country and have ordered hostilities to cease.	400	528
June 9	<i>The Minister in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry</i> General von Falkenhorst orders that all resistance shall cease by 4 p. m., June 9, and that one Norwegian negotiator each is to be sent to Narvik and Trondheim.	405	535

RUMANIA

1940 Mar. 27	<i>The Director of the Economic Policy Department to the Legation in Rumania</i> In view of complaints that all possibilities of obtaining Rumanian petroleum for Germany were not being exploited, Ribbentrop requests a report immediately on the state of negotiations and decides to send two German officials to Bucharest to assist.	14	30
Mar. 29	<i>The Legation in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry</i> Clodius pointed out that the petroleum bottleneck was caused by inadequate provision of tank cars by Germany and not by shortage of deliveries on the Rumanian side. With the opening up of the Danube, the Rumanians would be obliged to redeem their pledge to force British and French companies to sell to Germany.	21	41

RUMANIA—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1940			
Mar. 29	<i>The Legation in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry</i> Neubacher, the Foreign Minister's Special Envoy in Bucharest in charge of petroleum negotiations, expresses resentment at unfounded criticisms made to Göring and other authorities.	23	44
Mar. 30	<i>The Legation in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry</i> Clodius reports the substance of a conversation with Rumanian Minister President Tatarescu in the course of which the Minister President undertook to meet Germany's desires for petroleum and agricultural produce in exchange for German help in arming Rumania and German influence in Rumania's favor with the Soviet Union.	27	49
Apr. 1	<i>The Legation in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry</i> Clodius reports that after a fortnight's negotiations with leading Rumanians he is of the opinion that, although French and British influences are strong and active, the fear of the Soviet Union, shared by the King and influential ministers, will enable Germany to safeguard her interests and successfully assert her vital needs especially in the petroleum question.	33	61
Apr. 1	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> The State Secretary had been asked by the Rumanian Minister for some assurance concerning a passage in a recent speech by Molotov referring to the question of Bessarabia.	35	63
Apr. 14	<i>Minister Killinger to the Foreign Minister</i> Since it can be assumed that the Rumanians will destroy the oil fields in case of a Russo-Rumanian war, it is in the German interest to keep Rumania out of war; to cope with ordinary sabotage attempts, shock troops of Volksdeutsche, armed and commanded by German officers, ought to be formed.	116	165
Apr. 15	<i>The Legation in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry</i> Clodius reports that King Carol has instructed his ministers to accept Germany's terms in the present economic negotiations; nevertheless Clodius told the Court Minister it might be necessary to ask for a control over Anglo-Rumanian trade if the increase in Rumanian exports to Britain should continue.	117	167
Apr. 22	<i>The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry</i> Rumania will not be forced by British economic measures into deviating from its economic agreement with Germany.	148	215
May 16	<i>The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry</i> King Carol promised the German Minister that Rumania would definitely deliver the full quota of petroleum to Germany and would take steps to alleviate transport difficulties. The King had requested restraint in the matter of propaganda as he did not wish polemics in Rumania between the belligerents.	252	349

RUMANIA—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1940			
May 25	<i>The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry</i> The German Minister is informed by the Rumanian Court Minister that a detained member of the Iron Guard revealed during interrogation that he had been sent from Germany with orders to commit acts of violence in Rumania; smuggled arms had also been discovered. Gafencu took up the same topic with the Minister who denied German participation in the matter.	316	433
May 28	<i>The Special Representative for Economic Questions at the Legation in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry</i> Neubacher reports conclusion of the pact for delivery of petroleum to Germany in exchange for German arms based on prewar prices for both items and including a large Rumanian credit to finance German purchases.	338	459
May 29	<i>The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry</i> German military successes have increased Rumania's desire for closer relations with Germany; the Rumanian Minister President asked Germany to suggest ways of achieving even closer collaboration between the two countries, since Rumania did not really know the aims of German policy in southeastern Europe.	345	466
May 29	<i>Minister Killinger to the Foreign Minister</i> The Chief of the political police of Rumania told Killinger that Rumania would destroy her oil fields if attacked either by the Soviet Union or by Germany; however he emphasized Rumania's desire for friendship with Germany.	346	467
June 1	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Rumania</i> The Rumanian Minister President is to be told that concrete Rumanian suggestions for the pacification of the Balkans are the prerequisite of close German-Rumanian cooperation; the question is to what extent Rumania is willing to satisfy the revisionist demands of her neighbors, and precise proposals on that subject ought to be made.	364	493
June 6	<i>The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry</i> The King's reaction to Ribbentrop's advice was favorable and a positive attitude toward revisionist demands is being considered; in spite of popular fears of Germany the authorities try to accommodate German wishes in various instances.	393	522
June 14	<i>The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry</i> The Rumanian Foreign Minister said that the King was worried about German evasions on the subject of the Iron Guardists who were still in Germany; he urged that an official German reply be given soon.	428	564
June 21	<i>The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry</i> The Rumanian answer to the communication from Ribbentrop, while stating Rumania's desire for collaboration with Germany and her readiness to negotiate with the Soviet Union, stressed that Rumania could not abandon Moldavia to Russia.	515	656

RUMANIA—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1940 June 21	<i>The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry</i> The Rumanian Government affirms that collaboration with Germany is necessary in all fields and understands that its conversations with the Soviet Union to clarify Rumanian-Soviet relations will not impair future relations between Germany and Rumania. If Germany agrees, Rumania is ready to take necessary steps to realize German-Rumanian collaboration.	516	657

SEA WARFARE

1940 June 6	<i>The High Command of the Navy to the Foreign Ministry</i> Hitler has decided to intensify sea warfare in the areas around Great Britain and along the French coast, with an exception being made for Ireland. Neutrals are to be notified of the new policy.	396	524
----------------	---	-----	-----

SLOVAKIA

1940 Mar. 18	<i>Minute by State Secretary Keppler</i> Expresses belief that Tiso and Tuka are absolutely reliable, but that Durrčanský must be closely watched.	2	16
May 23	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department</i> In the last few days pro-German personalities such as Sano Mach have been removed from power in Slovakia. Steps should be taken to have them reinstated, and less reliable men, such as Durrčanský, removed.	309	420
May 28	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat</i> The Foreign Minister requests that Minister President Tuka be advised not to take any action pending personal action to be taken by the Reich Foreign Minister.	336	456
June 9	<i>Memorandum by Minister Killinger</i> A report summarizing the reasons why, in the German interest, Durrčanský must disappear from the Government.	407	537

SOUTH AFRICA

1940 Mar. 29	<i>Note for the Foreign Minister by an Official of the Dienststelle Ribbentrop</i> Submits passages on a conversation with Dr. Malan extracted from the report by Hans Denk on his visit to South Africa.	25	45
-----------------	--	----	----

SPAIN

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1940			
Apr. 16	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Spain is afraid of being drawn into the war in view of her lack of preparedness; this fear of war is partly balanced by hope of gains which Spain as an ally of the Axis might expect in case of an Axis victory.	129	190
Apr. 26	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> It is rumored that the Allies offered Spain a guarantee of her territory and of her status as a neutral and that the Spanish Government rejected these overtures.	166	236
Apr. 26	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Economic Policy Department</i> In connection with extensive Spanish requests for German assistance to the Spanish Air Force and in building up an aircraft industry in Spain, Göring has agreed to the dispatch of a Spanish commission under General Barrón to discuss these matters as well as future cooperation between the two air forces.	169	240
May 10	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> The Spanish authorities expressed approval of the German action in Belgium and the Netherlands.	225	315
May 10	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Dienststelle Ribbentrop</i> Ribbentrop told Spanish representatives that, despite sympathy for Spain's plight, Germany had learned from experience that an economy to be effective must be constructed from within and not with outside credits. The Spanish Air Force Commission had been promised satisfaction of their wishes by Göring if guarantees were given that German equipment would not fall into enemy hands.	230	318
May '20	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> The Spanish Foreign Minister expressed hopes for a speedy end of the war; a long war would result in a United States intervention and might lead to great danger to Spain's position.	285	396
May 27	<i>Ambassador Stohrer to State Secretary Weizsäcker</i> High German circles are being incorrectly informed about German-Spanish relations; to present Spain as unfriendly toward Germany and kowtowing to Allies can only serve to discredit the German Foreign Ministry and the Embassy.	330	448
May 30	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> The Spanish Foreign Minister informed the German Ambassador of friendly gestures toward Spain by Britain and France.	352	474
June 3	<i>Francisco Franco to Adolf Hitler</i> Franco assures Hitler that Spain, viewing the war as her own struggle, rejoices over the recent German victories, but is forced to stay neutral due to her political and economic situation.	378	509
June 4	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> A Spanish propaganda campaign has set in, claiming Gibraltar, Tangier, and French Morocco.	380	511

SPAIN—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1940 June 10	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> The Spanish Minister of the Interior stated that there was no longer a necessity for Spain to enter the war automatically as soon as Italy had entered it; he denied that the British had offered Gibraltar to Spain.	409	542
June 13	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Stohrer reports that with the entry of Italy into the war Spain has changed her status from neutrality to nonbelligerency.	423	560
June 14	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> The Spanish Government has decided to occupy Tangier to secure its neutrality.	429	565
June 16	<i>Unsigned Memorandum</i> Franco's envoy General Vigón explains to Hitler the reasons for Spain's present policy; Hitler promises support for Spanish claims on Gibraltar and also military assistance against a future landing of United States troops in Morocco; Spain's efforts to establish a "cultural empire" extending to Latin America are also in the German interest since they counteract "bad influences" from the United States.	456	585
June 17	<i>The Director of the Economic Policy Department to the Embassy in Spain</i> The attention of the Spanish Government should be drawn to the impending collapse of France and its effect on German-Spanish relations; it is assumed that Spain has discontinued delivery of strategic materials to the Allies.	476	605
June 19	<i>The State Secretary to the Foreign Minister</i> Gives the text of a Spanish memorandum concerning Spain's territorial demands and her conditions for entering the war.	488	620

SWEDEN

1940 Apr. 2	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> The Swedish Minister said that Sweden had no fear of violation of northern neutrality by Britain. He made it clear that this statement included Norway. In response to a question concerning German military concentrations near Stettin the State Secretary replied that he had no knowledge of military movements.	38	65
Apr. 4	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry</i> The Swedish Foreign Minister informed him that the Swedish Government had no reason to believe that any western action against Scandinavia was contemplated and had mentioned reports of heavy German concentrations near Stettin. The Chargé d'Affaires had received the impression that the Swedish Foreign Minister feared a possible German action in the north.	47	79

SWEDEN—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1940			
Apr. 5	<i>The Legation in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry</i> The German Military Attaché in Stockholm reports Swedish anxiety about possible German preventive measures in Scandinavia owing to the announcement of intensified warfare by the Allies.	49	81
Apr. 7	<i>The State Secretary to the Legation in Sweden</i> Instructs the Legation to ascribe reports of German military designs in the Baltic to British propaganda.	52	83
Apr. 7	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Minister in Sweden</i> Instructed the Minister to tell the Swedish Foreign Minister at 6 a. m. on April 9 that the Germans were taking safety measures of a military nature to foil imminent Anglo-French action against Denmark and Norway. At 8 a. m. the Minister was to call again on the Foreign Minister and present a memorandum requesting Sweden to maintain neutrality, not to mobilize or deploy troops, to confine movements of Swedish warships to their own waters, to refrain from interference with German official communications passing through Sweden and to maintain ore deliveries to Germany. The Minister was instructed to report after each interview.	55	94
Apr. 8	<i>The Minister in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reported that the Swedish Foreign Minister condemned in the strongest terms violation of Norway's neutrality by the Western Powers and, regarding information that strong German naval forces had already passed through the Sound going north, expressed the hope that Sweden would remain outside any contemplated German action.	61	100
Apr. 10	<i>The Minister in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reported delivery of the German memorandum and note about the German action in Norway and Denmark; transmitted the text of the Swedish note in reply expressing the intention to adhere to a policy of neutrality.	78	116
Apr. 11	<i>Memorandum by the Foreign Minister</i> In an interview with the Swedish Minister the Foreign Minister complained of the attitude of the Swedish press and radio and said that Germany expected a friendly and accomodating attitude on the part of Sweden.	91	130
Apr. 13	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> State Secretary Kleinmann of the Transport Ministry stated that he had been instructed by Göring to undertake negotiations to permit transport of arms across Sweden to Trondheim and Narvik.	108	156
Apr. 16	<i>The Minister in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry</i> Foreign Minister Günther assured the German Minister that the Swedish Government was taking military measures for the defense of Swedish neutrality only. The Government would do everything it could to be agreeable politically and economically, including making ore shipments in accordance with agreements.	126	181

SWEDEN—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1940 Apr. 16	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat</i> Interview between Hitler and Vice Admiral Tamm, Commander in Chief of the Swedish Navy. Hitler charged Britain with responsibility for the war and for the German invasion of Scandinavia. The Admiral maintained that Sweden would defend her neutrality against any assailant, including England.	127	182 ✓
Apr. 17	<i>The Legation in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry</i> The Military Attaché reports that a British attack in the direction of Kiruna would be met by the best Swedish troops and stubborn resistance could be expected.	132	194
Apr. 19	<i>King Gustaf V of Sweden to Adolf Hitler</i> Affirms the intention of Sweden to maintain strictest neutrality and to resist the violation of Swedish frontiers by any power.	142	208
Apr. 22	<i>The Minister in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry</i> Wied informs Berlin of alleged attack by German aircraft on Swedish fishing boats and urges immediate investigation and statement to avoid impairment of Swedish-German relations.	149	216
Apr. 22	<i>The Director of the Economic Policy Department to the Legation in Sweden</i> Detailed directions are given on the course to be followed in case the question of military transit traffic is taken up through a confidential agent with access to the King. An indirect approach should be used, relating this question to other economic questions affecting Germany and Sweden, such as Baltic trade.	150	216
Apr. 23	<i>The Minister in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry</i> Wied reports that the Swedish Foreign Minister informed him that shipments of the size of Narvik train of April 20 could not possibly be admitted as a regular thing by the Swedish Government, and, when it was charged that Sweden had let war material through to Finland during Russo-Finnish War, the Minister replied that no formal Swedish neutrality declaration had then been made.	154	221
Apr. 24	<i>The Legation in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry</i> The confidential agent whom it was proposed to use in taking up the military transit traffic question with the King asked to be excused. The abandonment of this procedure is suggested.	159	226
Apr. 24	<i>Memorandum by the Foreign Minister</i> In an interview with the Swedish Minister the Foreign Minister again made complaints against the Swedish press, though there was agreement that recent episodes need not be regarded too seriously. The Minister again affirmed the Swedish intent to preserve neutrality.	160	227

SWEDEN—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1940 Apr. 24	<i>Adolf Hitler to King Gustaf V of Sweden</i> Hitler acknowledges the King's pledge of strict neutrality by Sweden and reaffirms Germany's intention to respect Sweden's neutrality unconditionally. He deplors the attitude of the Swedish press and stresses the importance of new economic arrangements in the Baltic area.	161	228
Apr. 27	<i>The Legation in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry</i> The Swedish Government is anxious to receive arms shipments promised them; suggests making delivery contingent upon the transshipment of supplies and arms at the same time to Narvik or Trondheim.	171	244
Apr. 28	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Sweden</i> Instructions to seek permission from the Swedish Government for the wounded and shipwrecked to be sent out of Narvik by train. The transport of prisoners would also be desirable, though it probably would involve the question of internment.	179	252
Apr. 28	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Economic Policy Department</i> Swedish Foreign Minister Günther considered that Sweden was capable of defending herself against a British attack in the north and asked that in case of such an attack Sweden be allowed to conduct her own defense.	180	253
Apr. 30	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Sweden</i> The Swedish Government has agreed to allow railway transport of rations and medical supplies through Sweden to occupied Norway. Ribbentrop authorizes negotiators to promise compliance with Swedish desires as regards arms, within certain specified limits, in return for which Sweden must allow German supplies and arms to be transported to Narvik and Trondheim.	183	258
May 1	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Sweden</i> Instructs German negotiators to apply extreme pressure on Swedish War Minister in the transit traffic question. If no success is thus achieved there might be considered a personal meeting between Ribbentrop and the Swedish Foreign Minister to take place at some point along the Baltic coast of Germany and to cover the whole range of German-Swedish relations.	184	260
May 7	<i>The Minister in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry</i> Describes the conference between German and Swedish representatives at the Swedish Foreign Ministry on the subject of transit traffic. The Swedes emphasize their position of strict neutrality, and the Germans receive the impression that arms deliveries will not be sufficient to make them modify it.	202	290
May 17	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Presented to the Swedish Minister before his departure for Stockholm a German proposal for sending 3 trains of 30 to 40 cars to Narvik, containing artillery, munitions, clothing, and communications equipment in sealed cars. Said that refusal would have a bad effect on Hitler. Richert said he would try to have a reply by the following day.	259	357

SWEDEN—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1940 May 18	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> The Swedish Minister reported his Government's refusal of the German request to permit the transit of munitions to Narvik, while granting consent for return of destroyer crews from Narvik through Sweden.	268	368
May 21	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Emphasizes that to ensure continuance of delivery of essential Swedish iron ore to Germany it is necessary that Germany fulfill all obligations for deliveries of war material to Sweden in accordance with agreements.	290	400
May 23	<i>The Minister in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry</i> Boheman, State Secretary in the Swedish Foreign Ministry, related a conversation with Churchill. Upon being asked about British interest in Narvik and intentions with regard to the Swedish ore fields, Churchill said Britain had no plans to attack them since if Sweden sided with Britain such a move would be unnecessary, while if Sweden sided against Britain it would be impossible.	306	418
May 29	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> The Swedish Minister, remarking that the Germans had sent some 300 "medical" personnel through Sweden to Narvik, requested that the Germans in future refrain from requesting passage for groups of medical personnel.	348	471
May 30	<i>The Minister in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry</i> The Swedish Foreign Minister expressed anxiety about the Narvik situation, which he regarded as the only one capable of disturbing German-Swedish relations, as on this point Sweden could not meet German requests for transit traffic in war material or passage of troops. Sweden would welcome neutralization of the Narvik area and it could be occupied by Swedish troops. Such a proposal had already been made to Britain.	351	473
June 1	<i>Minute by an Official of the Political Department</i> Agreement reached between German and Swedish Navies for blocking by a net the northern Sound exit against entrance of submarines.	368	502
June 4	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Describes an interview with the Swedish Minister on the proposal for Swedish occupation of northern Norway. Weizsäcker's attitude toward the plan was skeptical and he said he must consult the Foreign Minister.	386	517
June [13]	<i>The Chief of the High Command of the Wehrmacht to the Foreign Minister</i> A request that the Foreign Ministry renew efforts to secure Swedish permission for transport of arms and troops through Sweden.	427	563

SWEDEN—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1940 June 16	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> In a letter to Hitler, King Gustaf states that plans to depose the King of Norway and members of his house from the Norwegian throne would, if carried out, cause serious ill feeling throughout the northern regions; the King of Sweden requested Hitler to act with all possible moderation toward the King of Norway and the Norwegian people.	450	581
June 17	<i>The State Secretary to the Legation in Sweden</i> Informs that request for permission for transit traffic in arms and troops has been presented to Minister Richert, who is flying to Stockholm to get the answer of the Swedish Government.	466	596
June 19	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> The Swedish Minister reported his Government's favorable reply on the arms and troop transit traffic question, requesting advance notice so that provision could be made for routes and means of transport.	486	619
June 22	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Richert is informed by Weizsäcker that the Swedish agreement to a transit arrangement had been gratefully received. Conversations concerning transit of German military personnel could begin in Stockholm. Economic negotiations would not be merged with these talks.	528	681

SWITZERLAND

1940 Apr. 22	<i>The Minister in Switzerland to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports extensive Swiss preparations for war in case of attack, and the existence of a general spy scare and fear of German Quisling and fifth column methods.	153	219
May 2	<i>Memorandum by the Foreign Minister</i> Informs Swiss Minister that if continued recognition is given the Polish Government in exile the German Minister will be withdrawn from Bern. Ribbentrop also demands a cessation of critical comment on Germany in the Swiss press.	189	270
May 25	<i>Memorandum by the Minister in Switzerland</i> Federal President Pilet-Golaz stated that foreign radio propaganda was to blame for the restlessness among the Swiss people. He said that Switzerland would not accept promises of help except those expressly asked at the moment at which Switzerland was attacked.	319	440
May 30	<i>Minute by Ambassador Ritter</i> Conversation with the Swiss Minister concerning economic negotiations.	329	446
May 28	<i>The Minister in Switzerland to the Foreign Ministry</i> The Swiss Government has attempted to calm the population among whom there have been signs of panic over a possible impending German attack.	337	457

SWITZERLAND—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1940 June 3	<i>Minute by Ambassador Ritter</i> Discussion with the Swiss Minister of German-Swiss economic negotiations in which the Minister complained of threatening remarks by members of the German delegation.	377	508

TURKEY

1940 Mar. 24	<i>The State Secretary to the Embassy in Turkey</i> The best way to prevent Turkey from entering the war on the side of the Western Powers is to keep her in fear of the Soviet Union. A rapprochement between the two countries is therefore not to be encouraged.	10	27
Mar. 30	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Economic Policy Department</i> Wiehl informed the Turkish Ambassador that the economic negotiations in Ankara were not proceeding satisfactorily because of Turkey's vacillating methods of negotiating.	30	55
Apr. 18	<i>The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry</i> The Turkish Ambassador to Germany emphasized President İnönü's determination to uphold the Montreux Convention as long as the Great Powers did not change their attitude.	137	199
May 6	<i>The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry</i> Should Italy enter the war, Turkey would not fight so long as peace was maintained in the Balkans and the Black Sea; the Soviet Ambassador thinks that Turkish efforts to maintain neutrality ought to be encouraged.	200	288
May 14	<i>The Director of the Political Department to the Embassy in Italy</i> An opinion is requested on Papen's suggestion that Italy reassure Turkey of her intentions in order to counteract Allied attempts to draw Turkey into the war under terms of the Anglo-French-Turkish Treaty.	244	341
May 14	<i>The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> Mackensen believes that Italy will not relinquish any of her freedom of movement by giving assurances to Turkey.	245	341
May 17	<i>Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Economic Policy Department</i> The economic negotiations with Turkey will be concluded very soon if Germany commits herself to deliveries of some war material; therefore it is suggested that limited quantities of such deliveries be promised to the Turks for 1941.	264	363
May 17	<i>The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry</i> In a political report Papen elaborated his thesis that it is of utmost importance to keep Turkey out of the war.	265	364

TURKEY—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1940			
May 27	<i>The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> A reliable source indicates that Italy has no intention of attacking Turkey, despite her reluctance to give assurances to that effect.	324	443
June 3	<i>The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry</i> In an audience with President İnönü on the course of the economic negotiations Papen emphasized the necessity for Turkey to revise her relations with Germany in view of the new order in Europe following cessation of hostilities.	375	506
June 4	<i>The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry</i> Papen told the Turkish Deputy Foreign Minister that if Turkey broke relations with Italy it would lead to war; to the Italian Ambassador he pointed out the dangers of keeping Turkey in the dark as to Italy's intentions until her entry into the war.	383	513
June 13	<i>The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry</i> The Turkish Council of Ministers has decided not to enter the war despite Italy's entry; an economic treaty has been signed which does not provide for chromium deliveries.	424	560
June 14	<i>The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry</i> Forwards a statement of the Turkish Government declaring its intention to maintain its neutrality.	431	566
June 14	<i>The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry</i> Details of the negotiations leading to the exchange of notes on the trade agreement between Germany and Turkey.	434	568
June 17	<i>The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry</i> Although the Turkish Government made no official statement on the nonfulfillment of the alliance treaty with the Western Allies, the general feeling is that the defeat of France has canceled the alliance obligation.	464	595

UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

1940			
Mar. 21	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in the Soviet Union</i> Instructs the Ambassador to suggest to Molotov the reestablishment of friendly relations between the Soviet Union and Italy by filling their respective ambassadorial posts in Moscow and Rome, and offers to make the same suggestion to the Italians if Molotov agrees.	6	20
Mar. 26	<i>The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports compliance with instructions of March 21, and suggests that in view of Molotov's attitude a few friendly articles about the Soviet Union in the Italian press would have a good effect.	11	28

UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1940			
Mar. 28	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in the Soviet Union</i> Ribbentrop informs Schulenburg of the desirability of having Molotov and Stalin visit Berlin, and instructs him to issue invitations in the near future.	20	40
Mar. 30	<i>The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> Schulenburg believes that Molotov will visit Berlin as soon as the time seems propitious to the Soviet Government but that chances of acceptance at the present time seem slight.	28	53
Apr. 1	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Four Year Plan</i> At a meeting to consider the handling of business transactions with the Soviet Union Göring recognized the vital importance of Russian raw materials to the German economy and announced the strengthening of the committee established for conduct of the transactions so that it might deal with Soviet complaints.	32	59
Apr. 6	<i>The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> Japan's practice of informing the British of every cargo leaving for Vladivostok or Dairen was making it difficult for the Soviet Government to purchase raw materials for Germany.	50	81
Apr. 6	<i>The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> Mikoyan promised the resumption of grain and oil deliveries before the end of the month on condition that an appreciable part of the German coal consignments promised for April had been delivered by then.	51	82
Apr. 7	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union</i> Schulenburg is instructed to give Molotov on April 9 a copy of the memorandum to be presented in Oslo and Copenhagen, emphasizing orally the reliable reports received of an imminent Anglo-French thrust against the Norwegian and Danish coasts.	54	93
Apr. 9	<i>The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> Molotov stated that stoppage of oil and grain shipments was due to "overzealousness" of the Soviet export organization, which believed itself justified as German deliveries were in arrears. Following assurances from Göring the Soviet Government decided to resume deliveries.	70	106
Apr. 9	<i>The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> Molotov declared that the Soviet Government understood the measures which were forced on Germany and wished her "complete success in her defensive measures" against Denmark and Norway.	73	108
Apr. [9]	<i>Ambassador Ritter to the Embassy in the Soviet Union</i> Ritter makes special reference to the political and economic principles underlying the economic negotiations, affirms that Germany has been fulfilling her obligations, and expresses astonishment at the Soviet complaints and makes countercharges of Soviet non-compliance.	75	110

UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1940			
Apr. 10	<i>An Official of the Economic Policy Department to the Embassy in the Soviet Union</i> Although latest word from Moscow shows Soviet intention to resume deliveries, nevertheless make use of arguments contained in previous instructions in next conference with Mikoyan and Molotov. Stress that Germany must be able to count on continuity of Soviet deliveries and that heavier deliveries should be made in the most favorable transportation season.	85	126
Apr. 11	<i>Ambassador Schulenburg to State Secretary Weizsäcker</i> The previously aloof and somewhat unfriendly attitude of the Soviet Government toward Germany which could apparently be ascribed to fear of a break with the Western Powers, underwent a sudden change when the German operation against Norway started.	94	134
Apr. 13	<i>The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> Molotov declares that the preservation of Sweden's neutrality is in the interests both of Germany and of the Soviet Union.	104	151
Apr. [13]	<i>The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> Molotov asked the Germans to consider selling the Soviet Union a number of magnetic mines without necessarily disclosing the secret of their construction.	105	151
Apr. 13	<i>Minute by Ambassador Ritter</i> Notes information about a conference on April 12 between Göring and People's Commissar Tevosyan who had just received new instructions from Stalin who said he was encouraged by the assurances received from Göring and hoped close relations between Germany and the Soviet Union could be preserved for a long time.	109	157
Apr. 15	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in the Soviet Union</i> Schulenburg is to inform Molotov that Germany is determined to respect Swedish neutrality.	120	173
Apr. 21	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in the Soviet Union</i> Germany can not provide magnetic mines desired by the Soviet Government for defense against a British attack on Murmansk or in the Black Sea as all efforts are being devoted to the war against Britain and France.	146	213
Apr. 23	<i>The State Secretary to the Embassy in the Soviet Union</i> Because of more frequent reports of Anglo-Soviet economic negotiations, Schulenburg is instructed to take up the matter with Molotov, discounting the reports as enemy propaganda, but expressing Germany's disappointment that the Soviet promise to purchase raw materials for Germany in third countries has so far had no practical results.	156	222
Apr. 27	<i>The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> Molotov declared that the initiative in the economic talks had come from Britain, and that the Soviet Union would promise only that purchases made in Britain were for her own needs only.	174	248

UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1940			
Apr. 27	<i>The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> Molotov said that the Soviet failure to secure raw materials for Germany abroad was not due to lack of good will but to conditions in the Far East which made it impossible.	175	249
Apr. 28	<i>The Director of the Legal Department to the Embassy in the Soviet Union</i> Inquires whether anything more has been heard from the Soviets in regard to Schulenburg's approach to Molotov on March 26 concerning the possibility of improving Soviet-Italian relations and suggests taking the matter up again with Molotov.	177	251
May 7	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union</i> On May 10, Molotov is to be notified of the invasion of Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg.	204	293
May 10	<i>The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> Upon receiving the news of the invasion Molotov said he understood the German action and had no doubt of its success.	226	316
May 10	<i>Ambassador Ritter to the Embassy in the Soviet Union</i> In order to bring the petroleum agreement to a conclusion, Germany is ready to compromise on the prices of oil, coal, and the cruiser <i>ex-Lützow</i> . The coal and oil rates would be for the current year only, and the three points must be taken as a unified whole.	229	317
May 12	<i>Ambassador Ritter to the Embassy in the Soviet Union</i> Lists at length difficulties and delays in dealings with Soviet trade representatives in Germany. Soviet deliveries of raw materials, including those from third countries, are also short. Schulenburg is instructed to discuss the matter with Molotov and say that fulfillment of the economic agreement is in danger.	238	331
May 17	<i>The Director of the Political Department to the Embassy in Italy</i> Ribbentrop wishes to know whether further German efforts to improve Soviet-Italian relations are indicated; Molotov had been cool to a first approach, remarking that there must be proof of an Italian desire to improve relations.	263	362
May 20	<i>The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> Ciano informed the Ambassador that he would have to discuss with Mussolini the question of normalization of Italo-Soviet relations before further steps could be taken; he indicated that at least the Russians should request an agreement for an Ambassador as a first step since they had been the first to withdraw their Ambassador.	279	384
May 21	<i>The Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> Soviet troop concentrations have been reliably reported along the Rumanian frontier and in south Russia.	286	396

UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1940 May 22	<i>Memorandum by Ambassador Ritter</i> Because Soviet deliveries, especially of oil, are still unsatisfactory, Ritter proposes a mission to Moscow by himself, Schnurre, and Schlotterer. He also includes a draft for a letter from the Foreign Minister to Stalin complaining of deficiencies in oil and metal deliveries.	300	412
May 23	<i>Memorandum by an Official of Political Division I</i> The Rumanian Military Attaché had inquired at OKW about the German attitude toward the Soviet preparations for an attack on Rumania; OKW considering this a political matter is transmitting this request to the Foreign Ministry.	303	415
May 23	<i>The State Secretary to the Foreign Minister</i> In view of the news of Soviet military preparations on the Rumanian border, Weizsäcker suggests that Rumania be reassured, that Italy be consulted, and that Soviet Union be asked for an explanation.	308	419
May 26	<i>The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> Schulenburg reports Molotov's denial of Soviet troop concentrations on the Rumanian frontier and a projected Soviet-Bulgarian military alliance. The German Ambassador adds that while doubtless Soviet reinforcements have been sent to South Russia, Crimea, and Caucasus such action appears only defensive for the moment.	322	442
May 28	<i>Minister Schnurre to the Embassy in the Soviet Union</i> The coal and petroleum treaties have been accepted in writing by the Germans and the Russians.	332	454
May 29	<i>The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> Mussolini is willing to meet the German desire to normalize Italian-Soviet relations by having the Ambassadors return to their posts simultaneously and without fanfare.	344	465
May 29	<i>The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> There is no reason for alarm over Cripps' mission to Moscow in view of unchanged Soviet attitudes toward Britain and Germany, but any mission by Ritter should not be allowed to look like a race with Cripps.	347	470
May 30	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in the Soviet Union</i> Molotov is to be informed that Mussolini is ready to have the Italian and Soviet Ambassadors return to their posts simultaneously; Schulenburg is to urge acceptance as a solution which saves face for both parties.	349	471
June 1	<i>The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> Molotov reacted negatively to the proposal to normalize Soviet-Italian relations on the ground that no evidence of Italian good will had been shown; only after repeated urgings did he consent to refer the matter to his Government.	359	488

UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1940			
June 4	<i>The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> Molotov has agreed that Italian and Soviet Ambassadors should return to their posts at once; the Soviet Union cannot provide oil for Italy, but trade relations may improve later in the wake of better political relations.	381	511
June 4	<i>The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> Molotov says that Mackensen told the Soviet Chargé d'Affaires in Rome that all Balkan problems would be solved without war, by joint action of Italy, the Soviet Union, and Germany. He wants to know if this is actually the view of Italy and Germany.	382	512
June 5	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in the Soviet Union</i> Schulenburg is asked to elaborate more fully upon his impressions of how Molotov's inquiry concerning Balkan cooperation is to be taken. He is not to make further inquiries of Molotov, however.	388	519
June 6	<i>The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> Molotov had only asked for information about Mackensen's reported statement, but there is no doubt he would be pleased if this actually was the German and Italian attitude.	392	522
June 8	<i>The Foreign Ministry to the Representative of the German Foreign Ministry With the Reich Protector of Bohemia and Moravia</i> To prevent disturbance of Soviet-German relations, Ukrainian movements like that of Skoropadsky are not to carry on any political activities.	402	532
June 14	<i>The State Secretary to the Embassy in the Soviet Union</i> Schulenburg is instructed to discuss tactfully with Molotov the hostile attitude of Madame Kollontay, Soviet Minister in Sweden, toward Germany.	432	566
June 16	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in the Soviet Union</i> Molotov is to be told that Mackensen's statement was not so definite as reported by the Soviet Chargé d'Affaires, and that he had added that a Balkan settlement could be more easily reached after the war. Germany and Italy were both on record as against war in the Balkans.	454	584
June 18	<i>The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> Molotov informed Schulenburg of the Soviet action in the Baltic States, and said he wished to end the intrigues by which Britain and France tried to cause discord between Germany and the Soviet Union.	471	599
June 20	<i>Memorandum by an Official of Political Division I M</i> OKW reports that information that Soviet troops have moved right up to the German frontier in the east has been confirmed.	504	636

UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1940 June 22	<p><i>The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i></p> <p>In the course of an interview with Molotov regarding restoration of normal relations between Italy and the Soviet Union, the Italian Ambassador in Moscow was told by Molotov that the problem of Bessarabia was very acute and that a settlement could not be much longer delayed.</p>	520	661

UNITED STATES

1940 Mar. 27	<p><i>The Chargé d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry</i></p> <p>Hertslet, a special agent of the OKW, reports to Reich Main Security Office that in the interest of the German war effort any confidential agents in the United States other than those engaged purely in gathering information should be withdrawn; Thomsen supports Hertslet's request.</p>	13	30
Mar. 29	<p><i>The Chargé d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry</i></p> <p>Warns that reputable American journalists will not lend their names to propaganda articles and suggests other means of obtaining publication of articles presenting German viewpoint in American press.</p>	22	43
Mar. 29	<p><i>The Chargé d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry</i></p> <p>Reports Roosevelt's press conference statement regarding Welles' journey. Roosevelt minimized as German propaganda publication of Polish Ambassador's conversation with Bullitt.</p>	24	45
Mar. 30	<p><i>The Chargé d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry</i></p> <p>Thomsen reports wide interest in American press and radio in alleged Bullitt-Potocki interview and states that the average reader is so aware of President's interventionist policy that the accuracy of the reports is taken for granted despite denials.</p>	26	48
Mar. 31	<p><i>The Chargé d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry</i></p> <p>Thomsen, making further report of the success achieved in the propaganda field through publication of documents captured from Poland, stresses that further follow-up action to be taken should not compromise the Embassy.</p>	31	57
Apr. 3	<p><i>The Chargé d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry</i></p> <p>Forwards information received through a confidential agent concerning reports of American Ambassadors in London and Rome.</p>	44	73

UNITED STATES—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1940 Apr. 4	<i>The Embassy in the United States to the Foreign Ministry</i> The Military Attaché estimates that Allied aircraft deliveries from the United States will amount to 1250 bombers and 900 fighters during April–December 1940, and ascribes successful conclusion of negotiations regarding airplane deliveries to reasons of domestic policy and success of British propaganda.	45	73
Apr. 10	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry</i> Following the first shock to American opinion, which quickly condemned the German action in Scandinavia, the seriousness of these events for the Allied cause is being realized; Roosevelt will be strengthened and the isolationists weakened.	80	118
Apr. 12	<i>The Embassy in the United States to the Foreign Ministry</i> Despite British propaganda, American military opinion continues to hold the view that the United States should enter the war only in case of a threat to the Western Hemisphere; in any case, incompleteness of military preparations and insecurity in the Pacific continue to be effective restraints.	96	139
Apr. 18	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry</i> Isolationists have failed to attack Hull's strong statement on preservation of the status quo in the Netherlands East Indies because raw materials, rubber, and tin, vital to the United States, are involved; pro-Allied circles hope Germany will identify herself with Japan's ambitions.	136	198
Apr. 19	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry</i> The German action in Norway has increased anti-German feeling even among isolationists and the excited state of feeling assists the interventionists; but the election campaign, the Pacific situation, and lack of preparation still prevent American entry into the war.	139	206
Apr. 19	<i>The State Secretary to the Embassy in the United States</i> The reports of the Military Attaché appear to give an unwarrantedly favorable version of the American reaction to the German invasion of Scandinavia; the Chargé d'Affaires should indicate divergencies from his own views.	141	208
Apr. 20	<i>Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Legal Department</i> Discusses the application of the Polish Food Commission, under the leadership of Herbert Hoover, to send 15 representatives to Poland to supervise food distribution there.	144	209
Apr. 24	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry</i> Negotiations conducted with the greatest caution have resulted in an agreement with an American publishing house to print the captured Polish documents.	158	225

UNITED STATES—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1940 Apr. 24	<i>Counselor of Embassy Thomsen to State Secretary Weizsäcker</i> Relations between the Chargé d'Affaires and the Military Attaché are delicate in view of the latter's higher rank, but Thomsen attempts to compensate in his own reports for General Bötticher's overestimate of the influence of the American General Staff on foreign policy.	163	231
May 4	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry</i> Every effort is being made to avoid compromising the Embassy in connection with the publication of the Polish documents; persons involved have been offered refuge in Germany in the event of action against them by the American authorities.	195	281
May 4	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry</i> Various steps have been taken to spread the story of British intentions to widen the scope of the war, including contact with a well-known columnist and with isolationist Congressmen, rumors launched in the diplomatic corps, and a paid article in a well-known weekly news letter.	197	283
May 11	<i>The Embassy in the United States to the Foreign Ministry</i> The Military Attaché reports that American reaction to the new German campaign in the Low Countries makes it clear that intervention in the event of a threat to Britain is an empty phrase; only a danger to the Western Hemisphere would provoke American action; concern over Japan continues to be a restraining factor.	236	328
May 14	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry</i> The attack on the Low Countries has greatly lowered Germany's moral credit in the United States, but no countermeasures are possible for Roosevelt because of the election campaign, the speed of German operations, and inadequate military preparations.	243	339
May 16	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry</i> Roosevelt is still obliged to base his plea for arms increases on an alleged threat to the Western Hemisphere; this latter idea is gaining credence in American opinion and a German declaration of disinterest in the colonial possessions of European States in the Western Hemisphere might have a wholesome effect.	253	350
May 16	<i>The Embassy in the United States to the Foreign Ministry</i> The Military Attaché reports that the Roosevelt arms message to Congress alters nothing in the American military position; despite wishful propaganda designed to support the Allied cause, the United States would not have military preparation adequate for action outside the Americas before mid-1941.	254	352

UNITED STATES—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1940 May 21	<i>The Chargé d' Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry</i> Assurances given previously by the Wehrmacht that no secret agents would be used in the United States have been proved false; attempts to train saboteurs and establish radio communication have been made; this should be stopped at once as the risk of discovery is great and the political damage, as in 1917, far outweighs the value of such efforts.	289	398
May 21	<i>Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Legal Department</i> After conference with Hitler the Foreign Minister has given instructions that American attempts at relief work in Poland are to be discouraged as much as possible; the possibility that relief work would provide a cover for intelligence operations is the main reason for this decision.	292	402
May 22	<i>The Chargé d' Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry</i> Further evidence on the activities of Wehrmacht agents indicates acts of sabotage have already been committed; this is the surest way to nullify the mission of the Embassy which is to keep the United States out of the war.	299	410
May 23	<i>The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> It has been learned reliably that an exchange of messages between Roosevelt and Churchill dealt with the transfer of destroyers to Britain and other arms aid.	305	417
May 24	<i>The Embassy in the United States to the Foreign Ministry</i> The Military Attaché notes that his view that the United States would not intervene to save Britain and France has been confirmed by events; sane American opinion, especially among the military, is coming to accept their defeat and this view is gaining influence; acts of sabotage or espionage by Germany would reverse this trend.	311	424
June 1	<i>The State Secretary to the Embassy in the United States</i> The German military authorities deny that they have given any orders for sabotage in the United States; the agent alleging to have such instructions is probably a provocateur.	362	491
June 2	<i>The Chargé d' Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry</i> If it was not intended to give sabotage orders to the German agents, it remains to clarify who the alleged German officer is from whom they independently received such instructions.	369	502
June 10	<i>The State Secretary to the Embassy in the United States</i> One of the alleged agents has been identified under another cover name; he was not assigned for sabotage but had been active in the field of Communist anti-war propaganda; he should be sent back to Germany at once.	411	543

UNITED STATES—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1940 June 11	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry</i> A reliable informant reports that Roosevelt has told former Attorney General Cummings that every legal device would be used to send aid to the Allies despite the neutrality law, that the United States would arm for intervention and would continue to arm if Britain and France suffered an early defeat, and would fight immediately if Germany attacked in the Americas.	413	547
June 12	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry</i> A sum of \$3,000 has been provided a Republican Congressman to invite about 50 isolationist colleagues to the Republican Convention to make their influence felt there; he is also willing to form an anti-war committee if half of the \$60,000 to \$80,000 cost could be provided him.	417	550
June 13	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry</i> Approval is requested for the expenditure of \$20,000 for the publication of five pro-isolationist books by well-known American authors; they would counter the growing pro-Allied propaganda and prove useful in the election campaign.	422	558
June 15	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry</i> It is hoped that isolationist leaders will control the Republican Convention so that the party can become the party of peace in contrast to the Democrats; the Embassy is in close touch with the "Make Europe Pay War Debts Committee."	441	575
June 16	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat</i> The Foreign Minister has approved the grant of funds recommended by the Washington Embassy for "literary countermeasures" against Allied propaganda in the United States.	455	585
June 17	<i>The State Secretary to the Embassy in the United States</i> The Embassy is instructed to spread the view that events have now shown the folly of the Roosevelt foreign policy; he has unnecessarily alienated Japan, the Axis, and the Soviet Union, and the states which he encouraged to a warlike policy now feel themselves left in the lurch.	467	596
June 18	<i>The American Chargé d'Affaires in Germany to the Foreign Minister</i> Taking note of the French request for an armistice the United States informs Germany that it would not acquiesce in the transfer of any territory in the Western Hemisphere from one non-American power to another non-American power.	474	603

UNITED STATES—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1940 June 18	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry</i> Because of the effectiveness of German information activity, anti-German circles have launched a campaign under cover of a "fifth column" panic against the consular representatives, particularly in New Orleans, Boston, and San Francisco.	475	603
June 19	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry</i> The propaganda action utilizing the Polish documents has been successfully completed with the distribution of 50,000 copies to influential personalities; they were placed in the <i>Congressional Record</i> and a Senator will use them to attack Roosevelt's policy during the Republican Convention; the Embassy's role has been fully camouflaged.	492	624
June 19	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry</i> Full advantage will be taken of the Republican Convention to spread the view that the Roosevelt foreign policy has failed; close relations are maintained with Congressmen to insure the widest distribution of their speeches opposing intervention; these circles urge a separate peace with France as the most effective blow to Roosevelt's foreign policy.	493	625
June 20	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry</i> Two new OKW agents, one of them alleging to have orders to employ secret radio communication for transmission of intelligence, have arrived in the United States; if the OKW cannot dispense with this dangerous kind of activity, the agents should at least be instructed to stay away from the official German Missions.	505	636

YUGOSLAVIA

1940 Apr. 13	<i>The Minister in Yugoslavia to the Foreign Ministry</i> Prince Regent Paul professed admiration for Germany but also distrust of Germany's friends, Italy and the Soviet Union.	100	148
Apr. 19	<i>The Minister in Yugoslavia to the Foreign Ministry</i> Antagonism between Minister President Cvetković and former Minister President Stojadinović has become more noticeable since the latter's re-entry into the field of domestic politics. Questions of foreign policy are not at issue.	140	207
Apr. 27	<i>The Minister in Yugoslavia to the Foreign Ministry</i> Heeren protested to the Yugoslavian Foreign Minister the anti-German practices of the police and threatened German reprisals if the attitude of the police did not change.	176	250

YUGOSLAVIA—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1940			
May 3	<i>The Legation in Bulgaria to the Foreign Ministry</i> Clodius reports that the Yugoslav authorities intend to preserve economic neutrality, but sympathies in the country are divided and Italy is held in great distrust.	191	272
May 12	<i>The Legation in Yugoslavia to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports signing of a secret protocol concerning metal and ore deliveries.	237	330
May 17	<i>The Deputy Director of the Legal Department to the Legation in Yugoslavia</i> There is no objection to the return to the Reich of individual German citizens from Yugoslavia as long as it is done inconspicuously, and will not give the impression of a war panic.	258	357
May 20	<i>The Minister in Yugoslavia to the Foreign Ministry</i> In view of anti-Axis feeling aroused in Yugoslavia by recent events, anything that might lead to anti-German demonstrations, including German cultural events, should be avoided.	278	383
June 15	<i>The Director of the Economic Policy Department to the Legation in Yugoslavia</i> Italy's entry into the war makes Yugoslavia completely dependent on the Axis economically, if only for reasons of transport. This should be pointed out to the Government there.	442	577
June 21	<i>The Minister in Yugoslavia to the Foreign Ministry</i> It would be useful for the German press to express astonishment at Yugoslavia's slowness in adopting a definitely pro-Axis policy, and also at the way in which Stojadinović is being treated despite the vindication of his foreign policy.	517	658

No. 1

F17/247-274

Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat

BRENNER, March 17 [sic], 1940.

CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE FÜHRER AND THE DUCE IN THE PRESENCE
OF THE REICH FOREIGN MINISTER AND COUNT CIANO AT THE BRENNER
ON MARCH 18, 1940¹

The Führer began by expressing his satisfaction that after such a long time, which appeared to him twice as long, he had once again the opportunity of conferring with the Duce. He had come in order to give the Duce a picture of the situation from the German point of view, before the beginning of the momentous struggle with which Germany was faced.

Last autumn the Führer had examined the question intensively whether or not September would be the right moment for Germany's intervention. Undoubtedly Germany could have bought another year or two of peace if she had submitted to great humiliation at the time. To be sure Danzig would then have been lost, but this alone had, of course, not been the determining factor in the decisions then taken. Of far greater importance was the consideration that if Germany had submitted to such a humiliation, she would have encouraged her enemies, in particular Poland, and would thus have contributed to the moral and material mobilization of the Polish State. In any case, Germany would have had to fight Poland within 2 years, but with the difference that then Germany's position would have been far more difficult. Later on East Prussia could only with difficulty have been defended against Poland.

The time gained by postponing the general conflict with the Western Powers would have worked out definitely to Germany's advantage only if England had not meanwhile introduced general conscription and embarked on large-scale rearmament. If the conflict had been delayed, these measures would, however, have ensured that Germany's purely military superiority would be overhauled by her enemies even on land. Without overestimating or underestimating the English it could be assumed that within 2 years they would have raised 1 to 1.2

¹ This meeting had been arranged during Ribbentrop's visit to Rome, Mar. 10-11. See vol. VIII, documents Nos. 669 and 670; also *The Ciano Diaries*, entry for Mar. 13, 1940.

million men, of whom they would then have mobilized 800,000 to a million within a few weeks. In these circumstances Germany would later have had to face 65 Polish, 90 French and 40 to 45 English divisions, and, moreover, these forces would have been ready for action against Germany almost from the first moment of the conflict, in contrast to the present war when mobilization of the forces on the other side had only been carried out gradually.

As regards the Polish Army, its armored troops, artillery and air force would undoubtedly have improved considerably in the next few years. Especially in the case of the last-named, light and heavy anti-aircraft artillery would have been reinforced, fighter aircraft developed, and new bombers delivered. At the outbreak of war 240 of the latter had already arrived in Poland. Some of these were still packed up or had been sent back to the factories because they had not proved powerful enough on trial flights. In taking action against Poland at a later date, Germany would have had to reckon with all this material. Germany had provided 70 divisions for the war against Poland, 56 of which had in fact been deployed. Only a small part, however, had actually been used in combat. But in 2 years it would certainly have been necessary to employ 60 to 70 divisions against Poland, because a war against that country could always be an offensive war only. Because of its length, the German eastern frontier would have been most unsuitable for purely defensive operations. Therefore, if the conflict had broken out only in 2 or 3 years hence, it would have been necessary to assemble at least the same military strength in the east, while in the west, one would have been faced from the start with a considerably stronger Anglo-French force, so that the relative strength there would have had to be put at 90 to 100 divisions on the German side against 130 divisions on the opposing side.

With regard to the English Navy, the relative strength compared with Germany would not have altered much before the year 1943/44. Apart from the two 35,000-ton battleships, *Bismarck* and *Tirpitz*, which were nearing completion, a further 6 were provided for, of which at first 3 were to be completed, and later another 3. As up to the present, however, there had been delays in the construction of every large German warship, the commissioning of the aforementioned units could not have been expected until 1944/45. It is true that to these large-scale constructions there would have been added a number of cruisers, destroyers, and submarines, but a decisive change in the ratio of strength would not have resulted, because by that time the English, too, would have built 5 to 7 large ships and a corresponding number of medium-sized and smaller ships.

Last autumn Germany's air superiority had been very considerable. Even so, Germany had feared that this superiority would, in part, be lost through the much publicized construction programs in England and France, and the deliveries from America. Meanwhile it has turned out, however, that the English and French construction programs have not been fulfilled, and that American deliveries have not been carried out. Within 2 or 3 years the enemies of Germany would perhaps, nevertheless, have caught up with this lead in the air to a certain extent, and, above all, would have improved their anti-aircraft defenses. Germany knew from experience that building up such anti-aircraft defenses was a long and complicated business, for it did not depend only on the production of a number of guns according to program, but there were also complicated range finders, predictors with numerous precision parts which determined the efficiency of any air defense. In spite of special opportunities for production, Germany was suffering from a shortage of these things, so that she was obliged to some extent to get along with ersatz equipment. In air defense, which was the enemy's most vulnerable point, England and France would have been able to make considerable progress in 2 or 3 years. To what extent the air arm was a deciding factor at all was not yet known at the beginning of the present conflict. From experience in Spain and China, experts were inclined not to credit the air arm with a decisive role, but continued to consider the infantry the determining factor. Experience gained since the outbreak of the war, however, has presented a different picture. The English had, for instance, been completely driven from the North Sea by the Luftwaffe, so that they were only able to undertake operations occasionally by night in bad weather and with small ships, as in the *Altmark* case,² but they no longer sent large ships into the North Sea, nor did they dare to approach the German coasts any more. The English east coast had also become too dangerous, as had been very clearly shown only the day before yesterday by the successful air attack on Scapa Flow. The Führer gave the Duce a detailed description of the action and the direct hits scored by German aircraft in this most recent successful operation, and added that very soon even the west coast of England would probably no longer be safe enough for the fleet, which would in the end be forced to move to Canada.

It was moreover a piece of real luck that Germany's construction program for battleships and cruisers was not further advanced, because the enormous amount of steel and production capacity which would have had to be diverted to large ships of this kind could now be put to far more effective use in building submarines and smaller vessels.

² See vol. VIII, documents Nos. 568, 615, and 618.

He had given much thought to these and similar considerations during sleepless nights last autumn, in order to find an answer to the question whether postponement of the war for 2 years would or would not be better for Germany. Had it been possible to put off the conflict for 5 or 6 years, that would have undoubtedly been better for Germany, but as things stood in the autumn, hesitation on Germany's part would merely have led to the conquest of Danzig by Poland in the winter, because Germany could not have waged a defensive war in the east against Poland during the cold and snowy season; thus Poland would have been in a much better position and the English and French would still have appeared on the scene in the spring, so that Germany would have had to fight in the east as well as the west. For this reason the Führer had attacked Poland in the autumn without more ado. He had reckoned that the war would last 2 months, 1 month for the actual fighting and a further month for mopping-up operations. Actually Poland was already finished in a fortnight. The Führer had then intended also to attack at once in the west, as there were often periods of fine weather there in late autumn. However, he had subsequently waited in vain for the fine weather to start in the west. On the contrary the weather had turned out to be such that the air arm could not go into action, nor could tanks and artillery operate away from the roads. The weather had actually been so bad that even infantry operations had become impossible. While he had been waiting week after week for the fine weather that never came, the Army had meanwhile been brought up to full strength. On the basis of experience gained in the World War, the High Command of the German Army had reckoned with 150,000 to, at the most, 200,000 dead, and 300,000 to 500,000 wounded in the Polish campaign, and had held proportionate replacements in readiness. In point of fact, however, the losses had amounted to only 8,400 dead, 3,000 missing, most of whom would, probably, have to be counted as dead, and 28,000 wounded. In consequence of these small losses, Germany had, therefore, an available surplus of over half a million men with which to form the cadres of 36 divisions over and above those otherwise provided for. In the interim too, tens of thousands of young officers who had been through the war in Poland as officer cadets, and had won distinctions there, had been trained. The training period for these young officers was made up of 6 months' labor service, 3 years' military service, the campaign in Poland followed by 6 months of officers' courses. These young officers, 21 to 24 years of age, were all extremely brave soldiers, because only officer cadets had been chosen who had distinguished themselves in some way and were therefore, as an officer corps, certainly better than that of 1914.

Here the Duce interjected that anyhow they had the experience of one war behind them.

The German Army, continued the Führer, consisted at the moment of 205 divisions, 160 of which could unquestionably be described as first-class. The rest were in process of formation, or training, or were attached to the occupation troops. Added to these were another 3 SS divisions, 12 "Death's Head" regiments, and 25 police battalions.

It was, in fact, not possible to form new divisions, but only to improve still the existing ones. Replacements were likewise amply provided for. For each regiment there was twice the complete replacement in combat troops. Ample supplies of ammunition were available. Delivery of the new aircraft Ju. 88 was in full swing. New types of pursuit fighters and divebombers were being produced in large numbers so that rearmament had reached its peak. Confidence was very high in the Army and among the people, morale was unparalleled, the men were eager to go into action and to get at the enemy. It had also been possible to imbue the leadership of the Wehrmacht with the same spirit, a thing that is often more difficult than instilling this spirit into ordinary riflemen. People with weak nerves, army commanders who burst into tears, were completely eliminated.

Field Marshal Göring, with his characteristic enthusiasm, had put his whole personality behind the development of the Luftwaffe and had made a superb instrument of it.

The Navy was fighting very bravely, especially the U-boats. Only a fraction of the U-boats which the enemy claim to have sunk have actually been in active service at all. Not until May, June, and July would the production of U-boats increase to any considerable extent, and by the end of the year would reach a production rate of 35 per month. By the end of the coming year Germany would have more U-boats than had been built during the whole of the last war. Of capital ships, *Tirpitz* and *Bismarck* would be ready in September or October. At the moment, most of the U-boats were being employed for the training of new crews, and the U-boats could only be put into full and effective use from the coming autumn, but he (the Führer) hoped that by that time he would have disposed of his enemies.

Here the Duce intervened to ask whether the Führer really believed this.

The Führer replied that he knew his enemies well. In the last war he had seen that, given numerical equality, the Germans were always superior to the English. He was not greatly impressed by the English, though he did not underestimate them. He knew that they were extremely tenacious in defense, on the other hand they were clumsy in attack and their leadership was poor. They could not bear comparison with a continental army. Therefore he believed that the chances were better for Germany. Of course he was aware of the fact that luck was necessary for victory, but Moltke had said that in the long run luck was on the side of the able, and the Germans had

been able and thorough in their preparations. The German people knew what they were fighting for. Either they would gain the victory over their enemies and prosper, or they would lose this war and perish. But they would have perished even if there had been no conflict, for a situation in which a people can, at any moment, be cut off from vital sources of supply, was untenable. Besides this, Germany could not, in the long run, have avoided the struggle. The Führer had also been anxious to assume command personally in this conflict, because it was certainly not going to be an easy struggle and because he knew, to be sure, who would be his first or second successor, but did not know whether whoever came after that would possess the qualities necessary for leadership in such a struggle. Since the conflict was however unavoidable, he had preferred to take the responsibility himself.

He had thoroughly understood the Duce's attitude in the autumn, because he realized what rearmament signified in terms of time, and what it meant to be really ready. If it had been possible, by a demonstration on Italy's part, to prevent England and France from entering the conflict, all would have been well. As this did not succeed, it was better for Italy to remain out of the conflict. England and France were seeking to keep the war on the periphery because they wanted to keep war operations, including air attacks, as far as possible from their own countries. Germany's position had been rather tense in September. Her mobilization had been directed against Poland, because a decision had to be reached there in the shortest possible time, with the result that in the west, for instance, there were on August 25 and 26 only 7 divisions, whose number was later increased to 9, then to 19, and on September 10 to 28 divisions. If the English and French had attacked then, at least a much larger number of troops would have been tied down (the Duce: "But they were simply not ready!"), even though, of course, there could, in no event, have been any question of a breach in the West Wall. The Führer had had the West Wall constructed according to his own war experiences and against the wishes of his generals. A veritable Maginot-complex had developed, even though the Maginot Line could be looked upon as a kind of "defeatist pacifist" system of fortifications in which, for instance, there were 150 men housed deep down underground to every 4 machineguns on the surface, while on the German West Wall the entire garrison would go into the outside positions as soon as the shooting and fighting began. The thickness of concrete employed were approximately in this order: 1.50 meters, 2 meters, 3 meters, 3.50 meters to 5 meters. In all, some 23,000 fortifications in lines three deep had been constructed.

No French attacks of any kind had so far been launched against the West Wall. The French had merely occupied a zone which had

been evacuated by Germany, of which a few kilometers were on German territory, but even there they had encountered great difficulties from German mine fields. As soon as Germany had finished in the east, she had attacked these advanced French positions and the French had retreated, so that now the Germans had advanced into French territory. On occasion, he had himself taken a look at the French positions from there and had seen for himself that during the lull the French had not exactly worked very hard at consolidating their positions.

Since the middle of September no further danger had threatened Germany from the west, and hence Italy had done right to keep out of the conflict. While England and France, as already remarked, wished to have the war on the periphery, it was in the interest of Germany (and Italy) to thrust forward to the heart of the enemy's territory. He had worked out a great plan for this. Everything had been well thought out and the whole thing rehearsed in detail with the troops, and he did not for a moment doubt that he would defeat France. The only reason for this plan was that there was no other possibility of ending the present conflict. He would prefer to take another course, for Germany had, after all, achieved her territorial objectives. He would need 40 to 50 years to develop the territories which now belonged to him again, as for instance, the granary of Poznan, for there the most incredible conditions had prevailed, and there had often been moments in Poland when he had asked himself whether he would not do better to turn back and just leave the wretched country and its even more wretched people to themselves. The Führer then described in detail the phenomena of decay he had noticed in Poland and the ghastly scenes, some of which he had witnessed personally, as for instance, the massacring of a German ambulance column by a Polish elite regiment 20 minutes before he himself had passed by a wood on the Vistula. The Germans were shocked at first by all these atrocities, but had then become very hardened to them and the troops had taken reprisals. He spoke of the torment of the German minority, of the decadent appearance of the Jews, and of all the confusion and decay he had found in Poland, and added that his greatest war aim was peace, which he needed to resettle and cultivate this territory in 30 to 40 years, to provide it with farms, schools, and roads, to rebuild the wrecked railways and blown-up bridges. In contrast to this, the war aim of England and France was the annihilation of Germany, and he therefore did not see any other possibility of ending the conflict than by taking up the struggle.

Nevertheless, he was asking the Duce not to base his decisions on his (the Führer's) account, but solely on the facts. If Germany lost (the Duce: "Then Italy has lost too!"). If Italy was content with a second-rate position in the Mediterranean, then she need do nothing

more; if, on the other hand, she desired to be a first-class Mediterranean power, she would always find England and France across her path. If Germany won the war she could only carry out the general settlement which would be due, in cooperation with a great partner, for it was not only a question of gaining positions but also of holding them.

Passing on to the subject of Russia, the Führer remarked that only bitter necessity had made him join forces with that country. He had already explained in *Mein Kampf* that Germany could either side with England against Russia, or against England with Russia. He had always wanted to cooperate with England on the condition that England would not set limits to Germany's Lebensraum, especially eastwards, and that Germany would get back her colonies, which after all, were going to waste under England's administration, because England was no longer sending colonial pioneers to her colonies, but only businessmen. Moreover he had not raised his claim in the form of an ultimatum, but had merely pointed out that it was an impossible situation to have to beg for every pound of tea or coffee. As however England had wanted the war, he had been forced to side with Russia. Incidentally, Russia, too, was going through a great transformation of her own. Stalin was an out-and-out autocrat and if one were to substitute a Russian tsar of 1540 for Stalin in 1940 it would really not make any difference. The Jews, too, were being increasingly forced out of key positions in the Russian administration. Admittedly they had at first played a certain part in the Polish territories occupied by Russia, but had then all been deported to Siberia. However, as the Russians had told the members of a German delegation, no one knew how many had arrived there. Thus Bolshevism had discarded its Muscovite-Jewish and international character and had assumed a purely Slavic-Muscovite character, which must not be taken to mean that this, too, might not prove dangerous for Germany. As matters stood he (the Führer) had had no other choice but to cooperate with Russia. Bolshevik Russia was nevertheless an absolutely alien world for Germany. For Germany there was only one ally and one friend and that was Italy alone: necessity had brought him (the Führer) together with Russia. But, as he had already remarked, Germany and Russia were two different worlds, especially in their social structure, and here he (the Führer) had learned a very great deal especially of late. When, for instance, the Russians transferred workers who had gradually distinguished themselves in a particular specialty to another kind of work solely to prevent individuals from distinguishing themselves, this was a procedure quite incomprehensible to Germans, and precisely this example showed how alien the Russian world was to Germany, and how impossible it was

for her ever to be on friendly terms with it. In Europe there were only two partners: Germany and Italy. Italy and Germany represented two systems that would last, whereas the democratic world would either fall a victim to Bolshevism or else slowly disintegrate. For Germany there was only one partner: Italy. Russia was only the protection for the rear. In the possible event of England and France trying once more to get on good terms with Germany, she would not go to meet them with open arms, and there would not be the slightest change in her attitude toward Italy.

In a cautious manner he (the Führer) had thought about the creation of a buffer state between Germany and Russia in the territory left over from Poland, at the same time of course ensuring that the danger must never again arise of this state becoming a center of intrigue against Germany. The Führer declared that he would be glad if only this Polish state could stand on its own feet and he no longer had to bear responsibility for it, for he would rather rule over Negroes than Poles. The culture that had come from Greece and Rome had not penetrated to these regions. There Asia began.

Summing up, the Führer declared that he had come to this meeting with the Duce with the sole desire that the latter should himself determine the moment for Italy's intervention in the conflict, and that he should consider this question when, in his own judgment, events seemed ripe for it. There were two possibilities: Either the Führer would succeed in so shaking the western world by an attack that only one last blow would be needed to bring the whole western system crashing down. In that case the Duce should consider whether, in view of this state of affairs, Italy should not help in dealing this last blow. Or a longer struggle would flare up between Germany and the West, in which the West would gradually be worn down. For if Germany once attacked she would not let go again. Then if the fight became protracted, Italy could at a given moment supply the last ounce which would turn the scales definitely in favor of Germany and Italy. The Führer fully realized that Italy could not wage a long war. When he had heard of the coal difficulties created by England,⁸ he had been indignant. Germany, too, had had a terrible winter. But in spite of all the difficulties the people had only become more fanatically determined. The situation had been particularly difficult in Germany, because not only had river transports stopped because the waterways were frozen, but because at the same time the railway system with its electrically controlled switches which were sensitive to the cold had been thrown into such disorder by the weather conditions that extensive dislocation of traffic had resulted, which in

⁸ See vol. VIII, documents Nos. 647 and 652.

some instances had led to stoppages affecting up to 1,800 trains. He was, nevertheless, convinced that the coal question could and must be solved to Italy's satisfaction. Once again this showed how a state that was dependent on foreign countries for certain vital materials was often in danger. Trade could only be rated as an adjunct but could not assure the daily bread and current supply of raw materials. Hence he understood that with the Italian coal and iron situation as it was, a lengthy war was not possible for Italy. He was a man with a sense of realities and did not in the least wish that the Duce should do anything which ran counter to the welfare of the Italian people. The Führer was not an Englishman who asks others to pull the chestnuts out of the fire for him. Hence, even if Italy had offered military aid for the war in Poland, he would not have accepted it any more than Italy would have accepted German help in the Abyssinian war. Apart from this, there were certain accounts which could only be settled personally. This had been the case in Poland after all that country had done to Germany and the Germans. And this was still Germany's attitude. It was on Germany's account that the conflict had broken out and therefore she wished to bear a generous share of the sacrifices it entailed. It was, therefore, not a question of asking the Duce for help, but that he himself should determine the moment when he considered it possible to take his place at Germany's side. He would be happy if the Duce came, said the Führer, for it was not merely a question of fighting but of conquering and of holding on to the conquest. If the Führer had seen any other course he would have chosen it, but now he no longer believed it possible to settle this conflict in any other way, since his offer of October ⁴ had been rejected. The English could have accepted this offer without any loss of prestige, because Germany could have given an affirmative answer to the question of an independent Poland by pointing out that the part of Poland that remained would at least be as big as the Hungary that had been left after the last war. The obvious condition for Germany to make would naturally have been that this Poland should not become a center of intrigue against the German Reich.

There were certain countries which were in sympathy with each other as a result of their social structure. The big Polish landowner who spent in Paris the fortune which had been accumulated by the toil of wretched Polish agricultural workers and peasants, and who, at home, treated his people worse than dogs found support in other countries with an exclusively aristocratic setup, as for instance, England or in certain circles in Hungary, etc. England had made all other questions dependent on this Polish problem. Two nations, France and England, with territories covering in all 10 and 40 million

⁴ See vol. VIII, Editors' Note, p. 227.

square kilometers respectively, were blockading the entire world, without being able to make full use of the territories, either economically or culturally; in the same way some German iron industrialists had bought up the ore deposits in central Germany with an iron content of only 35 percent but did not exploit them, in order at the same time to prevent exploitation by others, because they felt it was more profitable to import the 50 percent ores from Sweden. In Germany their property had been expropriated and used as a source of ore for the Hermann Göring Works. In the same way the English also defended overseas territories out of a certain feeling of avarice, and refused to give them to those who needed them for their livelihood.

For this reason too England's reaction to the Sumner Welles visit had been very negative. Every idea of peace had been rejected from the outset, and the destruction of Germany and the end of National Socialism had again been proclaimed as the war aims of England and France.

The Duce replied that he, too, was experiencing great satisfaction participating in this discussion with the Führer. He was convinced that it had been impossible for Germany to put off the war with Poland any longer. September had been the right moment for it. Postponement for 2 or 3 years would only have complicated matters. He (the Duce) would have needed these 2 or 3 years for his preparations. If, on September 1, 1939, he had staged a military demonstration, Italy would indubitably have become involved in the war. The Allies would have attacked her at many different places, among others, in Libia, in order thus to counterbalance the defeats in Poland to a certain extent. The Duce had found himself in a very embarrassing position at that time, because, after all he was no pacifist, and he had suffered very much from the situation which these limitations had imposed upon him, but there was no other way. Germany's interest lay in bringing the war in the west to a decisive conclusion. The interest of the Allies lay in spreading the war to other theaters.

The Fascist Government, the Fascist party, and the Italian people felt that it was impossible to remain neutral until the end of the war. A change of attitude on Italy's part toward England and France was inconceivable. Cooperation with these countries was out of the question. "We hate them." Therefore, Italy's entry into the war was inevitable. Italy wanted to march with Germany, but not for the sake of giving military aid. Germany had neither needed it in Poland, nor would she need such help in the west. But Italy's honor and her interests demanded her entry into the war.

The great problem, however, was the date of this entry into war. One condition for this would at any rate have to be fulfilled. Italy would have to be "very well prepared." The Navy would be ready in

3 or 4 months and 4 more battleships would be added to the 2 already in service. The air arm would also be ready in 3 to 4 months, while the Army was making considerable progress, especially with the formation of a new artillery and an armored unit. Morale was good. But, as he had already told the Foreign Minister,⁵ Italy's financial position did not allow her to wage a protracted war. It was impossible to spend a thousand million a month.

He also believed the rapprochement between Germany and Russia to have been inevitable. At all events it was clever tactics, for, in that way, a war on two fronts had been avoided—and 60 first-class divisions saved, interpolated the Führer. He (the Duce) did not believe either that there was any danger of Bolshevist contamination. As the Führer had said, Germany and Russia belonged to two different worlds and infection was a physical impossibility.

Here the Führer interposed that such a danger would be lessened the closer Italy and Germany stood together. The Duce then pointed out that as early as 1924 he had been the first European Government to recognize Soviet Russia and 10 years later he had made an agreement with Russia at the conclusion of which he had even received Litvinov. He had, however, made a sharp distinction between policy and ideology. On the latter point he would never agree with Russia.

If Italy had entered the war in September, operations would certainly have extended to the Balkans, and peace in the Balkans was also in Germany's interests.

Sumner Welles, whom he had seen yesterday,⁶ had told him that the feeling against Germany in France and England was really not so bad, and that they were no longer thinking about the dismemberment of the Reich and the destruction of National Socialism. The morale of the people in France and England was poor because the people did not know why they had declared and were waging war. This question was often asked, especially in France. In conversation with Sumner Welles, he (the Duce) had described the war aims of the Allies as absurd, i. e., the restoration of Bohemia and Moravia, etc., and had told him that if he desired a peaceful settlement of the present conflict the *faits accomplis* would have to be accepted. When, in reply to this, Sumner Welles had spoken of guarantees for the future, the Duce had told him he ought not to speak like a jurist, but like a practical man. Welles had then added that when once the offensive was launched in the west, all hope of a peaceful solution would be lost. The Duce added that, as he was not a pacifist, he had not continued this conversation

⁵ In the conversation with Ribbentrop in Rome on Mar. 11, 1940. See vol. VIII, document No. 669.

⁶ Cf. Galeazzo Ciano, *L'Europa verso la catastrofe* (Milan, 1948), pp. 542-544. and Sumner Welles, *The Time for Decision* (New York, 1944), pp. 137-140.

further. But he was asking the Führer whether there would be any danger for Germany if the offensive were delayed. He did not believe there was such a danger; on the other hand, he (the Duce) would have finished his military preparations in 3 to 4 months, and would then not be in the embarrassing position of seeing his comrade fighting and himself being limited to making demonstrations, although even now he was conscious of being of use to Germany in his role on the "left wing." But he wanted to do something more and he was not now in a position to do it.

The Führer replied that timing was an important factor in an offensive. If his first terrible blows brought France and England to their knees, then the moment would come when Germany might need not only some rest but also additional strength. For this eventuality he had evolved a few purely theoretical ideas which he wanted to submit to the Duce, while reiterating, however, that the final decision rested entirely with the Duce, since he alone was responsible for the life and future of the Italian people. With this reservation he could imagine that, after the first heavy blows, the moment would come when England and France would be so shattered that one more blow would surely annihilate them. Here certain strategic possibilities might then arise, which, the Führer emphasized, were merely his own ideas and might be judged differently by the Duce's collaborators. The war would be decided in France. Once France was disposed of, Italy would be mistress of the Mediterranean, and England would have to make peace. For Italy to attack France was, however, strategically very difficult for geographical reasons. There was the danger that this conflict would cost a great deal in blood and yield only modest profits. For this reason it seemed preferable to him (the Führer) if at the moment when Italy intervened, a decisive Italian force did not attack the French frontier between Switzerland and the Mediterranean but advanced together with the German Army on a line roughly parallel with the Swiss frontier toward the Rhone Valley in order to turn the Franco-Italian Alpine front from the rear. Any frontal attack on this frontier would only cost blood and achieve little success. In any case great decisive successes which would bring the whole enemy structure crashing down could only be achieved by large-scale operations in large areas. This theory had proved itself in the east. In the west the German Army would open the way. This presupposed the breaching of large sections of the Maginot Line. That was a question that had been carefully studied and for which the troops had been suitably trained. But once such an open door had been established then on the left flank Italy could carry out her own advance behind the Italian-French front. These contingencies had been worked out on a purely theoretical basis by

the Germans and the conclusion reached was that this task could be carried out by an army of 20 divisions, the transport of which, the Germans reckoned, could be accomplished in 20 to 25 days once a heavy blow had been dealt at the French. In the initial attack Germany reckoned with losses of up to 30 percent. But there was the prospect of annihilating the enemy, or of so disabling him that, by the end of the year, he would have no wish to engage in any more large-scale attacks. Germany was in a favorable position, thanks to her large reserves, and would attack ruthlessly in any case. Then, when the enemy had been smashed, the moment would come for Italy to intervene actively, not, as he reiterated, at the most difficult point, i. e., on the Alpine front, but elsewhere. The decision to intervene could be taken by the Duce himself according to developments in the military situation. To assist him on this, the Führer would keep him supplied regularly with situation reports. It would be useful perhaps if the Duce and the Führer were first to have another brief meeting. It would be easy to arrange such a meeting. He could get by plane in a short time from the western front to the Brenner, or some other meeting place.

The Führer again stressed that he had not come to ask for help, or to fix a definite date for Italy's entry into the war. He had only wanted to communicate his ideas on the situation and on the procedure to be followed, and he left it to the Duce to make all his decisions according to the actual situation. If for example there was a danger of Italy rushing into the struggle and Germany not being able after all to finish with the west quickly, it would be better for Italy to stay out of the war for a while. For the rest, Germany had also made her preparations for the event of her offensive coming to a standstill. On the Führer's instructions, Dr. Todt, who was shortly to be appointed Minister of Munitions in order to tighten up still more the supplying of the Army with material, had assembled all the material for the construction of new defense positions with armored cupolas, concrete structures and the like wherever they were wanted.

If, however, the final decision depended on just one last effort which could then be made with Italy's collaboration, the operation would have to be coordinated. In the air, the English and French air forces based on and behind the western front would be subjected to an all-out attack by the Germans, while the Italian air force could attack from the south the training fields and bases of the enemy air force which lay farther back.

Germany would first of all have to see to it that the position of the Ruhr was improved, so that this area would be made immune to any danger of an attack. The security of the Ruhr was a matter of supreme importance for Italy, as well as for Germany. It was a question of life or death, for in the event of persistent attacks on the

Ruhr territory from the air or by long-range artillery, Germany could not win the war. The enemy certainly knew that too. It is true that efforts had been made to establish an industrial area in central Germany but such things required a great deal of time.

The Duce replied that once Germany had made a victorious advance he would intervene immediately, and when the Führer remarked that he (the Duce) was undoubtedly well able to assess the situation, the Duce assured him that he "would lose no time" when the first contingency arose, i. e., when the Allies were so shaken by the German attack that it only needed a second blow to bring them to their knees. ✓

Regarding the second contingency, i. e., if Germany's progress was slow, the Duce said that then he would wait. The Führer added that in that event the moment would come when Germany would need to recuperate and replenish her supplies, and then it would be a good thing if Italy were to act, as a sort of rear protection until the decisive hour should come.

The Führer again stressed with great emphasis that the entire Mediterranean, including the Adriatic and other parts of the sea, was no concern of Germany's. Referring to the evacuation of the South Tyrolese,⁷ he remarked that he wanted to settle them in a good region which he did not as yet possess but would most certainly acquire. Thus Germany and Italy were the only Powers who had a great common destiny before them, which did not contain elements of a conflict of any kind.

Germany had prepared the attack on the Western Powers with the greatest possible care. She was advancing against the west with three times as many soldiers as in 1914. She had twice as much artillery ready for action, not counting the *Infanterie-Artillerie*⁸ and the reserves of ammunition were 8 to 12 times those of 1914. Everything that was humanly possible had therefore been done and he (the Führer) believed he would be able to deal the knock-out blow. But he was cautious and had, as already said, taken steps to meet the other contingency. The Foreign Minister inserted the remark here that, personally, he thought the first contingency the only possible one. Continuing, the Führer referred again to the preparations for the second contingency; 460 armored cupolas [captured] from the Czechs and 300 new armored cupolas with material for 3½ thousand pillboxes and all the relevant diagrams were ready for all eventualities.

From May onwards mine warfare against England would be pushed forward with the utmost energy. So many mines would be laid that it would take 5 to 8 years to sweep the waters round the British Isles clear of them. New special types of mines would also continually

⁷ See vol. VIII, documents Nos. 281 and 244.

⁸ Artillery units used to engage enemy infantry.

be brought into use. To be sure, the English were asserting that they had found a countermeasure against the latest German mines. However, as the shipping losses resulting from mines showed, they did not seem to have progressed very far with it. In any case, Germany had still several other surprises in the way of mines in preparation.

Similarly, in the sphere of aircraft construction, as already mentioned, the Ju. 88 was being produced in great numbers, but at the same time an improved model of the Ju. 88 was also coming out and a Dornier model. Nevertheless, it had to be admitted that in the long run the situation would be more favorable for our opponents. They had immense reserves of manpower, the whole world was at their disposal. The Jews were all on their side, the capitalists and aristocrats as well, and finally enormous sources of raw materials were available to them. Only in the energy of the leadership of the state and the readiness of her people to make sacrifices, Germany could not be surpassed. Therefore he (the Führer) believed that he would defeat his enemies. The Foreign Minister remarked here that when once the enemy was reeling, the biggest rout in world history would ensue.

The Führer replied to a question by the Duce about patrol operations by saying that the relative efficiency in these operations was shown to a certain extent in the number of prisoners on either side. While we had taken 1,100 prisoners, the other side had only taken 117. The Führer then described in detail the experience which Germany had gained in these operations, on the basis of which the conclusion had been reached that the quality of the French and English troops had deteriorated as compared with 1914.

The Duce then asked whether Germany's enemies were expecting an offensive, to which the Führer and the Foreign Minister replied in the affirmative.

After the conversation had lasted 2½ hours it closed with refreshments.

SCHMIDT

No. 2

1918/430951

Minute by State Secretary Keppler

BERLIN, March 18, 1940.

zu Pol. IV 875.¹

During my visit to Bratislava on the 14th of this month, I gained the impression that we can rely absolutely on President Dr. Tiso

¹ Pol. IV 875: Not printed (1918/430943-50). This was a report of Mar. 9 by Bernard, the Minister to Slovakia, on the situation of the Czechs who were still residents of Slovakia.

and the Minister President Dr. Tuka. On the other hand, the impression that we must keep a very watchful eye on Dr. Durčanský, the Foreign Minister, was strengthened, even though his manner toward me was extremely courteous. Tiso and Tuka will always acknowledge that the existence of an independent Slovakia has been and will be possible only with Germany's help, while Durčanský—whose character is generally suspect—does not do so, and obviously attempts to put on airs as if Slovakia were a great power and hardly in need of German good will.

KEPPLER

No. 3

4809/E238122

The Minister in Iran to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

SECRET

TEHRAN, March 19, 1940—1:09 p. m.

URGENT

Received March 19—3:50 p. m.

No. 128 of March 19

W 1566 g.

In the course of an audience lasting an hour with the Crown Prince¹ in the presence of the Foreign Minister,² the Crown Prince turned the conversation to the expansion of the Iranian Army which the Shah considers to be the most pressing task, because only a strong army makes possible an independent foreign policy. The policy of strict neutrality pursued by his father is preventing the spread of the war to the countries of the Middle East, desired by England, especially as the unremitting efforts of the Shah to bring Afghanistan and Turkey to adopt a similar policy of neutrality had been successful. The Shah assumed that these things were known to the German Government. The Shah therefore counted on Germany's help with respect to material for the expansion of the Army. The Crown Prince went on to describe his father's great anxiety lest he should be disappointed in these expectations. An hour after the audience the Foreign Minister asked me to come to see him. He explicitly confirmed the Crown Prince's statements and added that, of course, the Shah did not ask for the impossible, but only expected the maximum of what was possible. The Foreign Minister asked me to acquaint the Reich Foreign Minister with the situation, and to present his best personal regards.

I am convinced that, especially since the conclusion of the treaty with the Soviet Union, Iran is in fact a valuable guarantor for preventing the spread of war in the Middle East. There is no doubt

¹ Mohammed Reza Pahlavi. He ascended the throne in 1941.

² Muzaffor Aalam.

as to the sincerity of the Shah's policy, and I urgently recommend every possible accommodation in the delivery of armaments.¹

ETTEL

¹ Arrival in Iran of arms shipments, including gun and howitzer carriages, gun and howitzer barrels, ammunition, and about 3000 machine guns of several types, was acknowledged in telegrams by Ettel on Apr. 30 and June 22 (not printed: 4809/E238143; 4809/E238149). Negotiations for additional shipments were conducted throughout 1940. The relevant documents have been filmed as serials 4809 and 9662.

No. 4

173/84258-59

Minute by the Director of the Economic Policy Department

BERLIN, March 19, 1940.

Subject: Deliveries of antiaircraft guns to Holland.

Under the contracts concluded during the first months of the war there remain to be delivered to the Dutch Government:

1. Thirty-three 2-cm. antiaircraft guns which are earmarked for the Netherlands Indies.
2. Sixty-eight 7.5-cm. antiaircraft guns and
3. Sixteen 3.7-cm. antiaircraft guns.¹

The Dutch Government has for months been kept waiting for the delivery of these guns. At every opportunity they have requested delivery more and more urgently. Director General Hirschfeld, Chairman of the Dutch Government Committee who is at present in Berlin for economic negotiations, has now reverted to the matter with the greatest insistence. He has declared that he cannot return to Holland without some kind of promise of further deliveries and that he would be obliged to resign from the chairmanship of the Dutch Government Committee for the negotiations with Germany as a protest against the treatment of the Dutch Government in this matter which, in his view, was no longer tolerable.

The loss of M. Hirschfeld as leader of the negotiations, who has always shown special understanding for Germany's requirements, would render future economic negotiations and economic relations with Holland extremely difficult. It is to be feared that thereby valuable supply possibilities from Holland and, through camouflaged transactions, from other countries too, will be lost.

As recently as March 4, the Führer decided,² on the report by the Foreign Minister, that no further deliveries of antiaircraft guns to the Netherlands were to be effected and that, on the contrary, at-

¹ On the negotiations for the delivery of antiaircraft guns to the Netherlands, see vol. VIII, documents Nos. 7, 44, 447, 536, 635.

² See vol. VIII, document No. 635, footnote 5.

tempts should be made to keep the Dutch waiting. A further approach to the Führer would probably not alter this decision.

M. Hirschfeld hinted that it would be easier for him to explain the German standpoint to his Government if, before his return, he could discuss the matter with a prominent German with whom he had not yet conferred on the subject.

In these circumstances it would be advisable for State Secretary von Weizsäcker to receive M. Hirschfeld on the afternoon of March 20, or on the morning of March 21. During the discussion M. Hirschfeld could be told that the Wehrmacht could not yet estimate what reserves would be needed for the contingency of more extensive operations, and for this reason the antiaircraft guns could not be dispensed with until a decision could be taken on the amount of reserves needed. Nevertheless, the guns remained earmarked for the Dutch Government and would be placed at its disposal as soon as it was decided that we did not require them ourselves.³

A similar statement was already made some weeks ago to a Dutch acceptance officer by the High Command of the Wehrmacht.

To be submitted to the Foreign Minister through the State Secretary.⁴

WIEHL

³ Weizsäcker in a memorandum of Mar. 20 recorded that Hirschfeld had called upon him that afternoon and that he had spoken to Hirschfeld in the sense of this paragraph (173/84257).

⁴ Wiehl recorded on Mar. 28 that the Foreign Minister told him that day that the matter should continue to be treated dilatorily, even though this might involve the resignation of Hirschfeld (173/84260). See also document No. 201.

No. 5

1570/380106

An Official of the Embassy in Spain to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 838 of March 19

MADRID, March 19, 1940.

Received March 20—2:00 a. m.

For Abetz, Dienststelle Ribbentrop.

According to a reliable report Marshal Pétain is said to have told his close associates that in view of his advanced age he would be reluctant to join the French Government. France's greatest mistake, he said, had been to enter the war. In the present state of the country, when peace was concluded the internal disintegration of France which would then clearly emerge would exclude her from European politics for decades to come.

GARDEMANN

No. 6

F18/226-224

The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in the Soviet Union

BERLIN, March 21, 1940.

RM 101.

I assume from the closing sentence of your telegram No. 530 of the 18th of this month ¹ that there is a possibility of making the question of the reestablishment of good relations between Italy and the Soviet Union the subject of further discussions with M. Molotov. I would consider this very desirable. The best opportunity for this would probably be provided when you acquaint M. Molotov with the substance of my instruction of today ² containing information on the meeting between the Führer and the Duce on the Brenner.

If M. Molotov told you that there was no concrete evidence that Italy seriously desired an improvement in her relations with the Soviet Union, then that is not quite understandable in view of Mussolini's remarks to me on this subject in Rome.³ Italy's real attitude is, after all, amply proved by the fact that the Head of her Government expressed himself as unequivocally as he did to the German Foreign Minister on the occasion of his visit to Rome. The Soviet Government therefore, has no reason to still doubt Italy's intentions.

As the deterioration in the relations between the two countries came to light mainly through the Soviet Ambassador's sudden departure from Rome and then the Italian Ambassador's recall from Moscow,⁴ the main thing would now certainly be to terminate this state of affairs by the return of both Ambassadors to their posts. Perhaps you could suggest to M. Molotov that the Soviet Union might, in the first place through your good offices, intimate to me its willingness to fill the vacant post of Ambassador in Rome, on condition that the reappointment of an Italian Ambassador to the Moscow post be also made at the *same time*. I would be very glad to help bring about an understanding between Rome and Moscow on this basis which gives equal consideration to the prestige of both countries.

In this connection I would add, in strict confidence, that hints were given me in Rome by well-informed people, which throw a rather peculiar light on the personality of the present Soviet Chargé

¹ Vol. VIII, document No. 684. Its closing sentence reads as follows: "Despite the indifference displayed, I have the impression that the Soviet Government will gladly avail itself of any opportunity which may arise to normalize its relations with Italy."

² Document No. 7.

³ See vol. VIII, document No. 669.

⁴ See vol. VIII, document No. 494; also Mario Toscano, *Una mancata intesa italo-sovietica nel 1940 e 1941* (Florence, 1953), pp. 13-19.

d’Affaires in Rome, M. Helfand. His conduct on various occasions was described to me in such a way that I did not have the impression that his work was exactly helpful in improving Italian-Soviet relations. I leave it to your judgment to decide whether it is feasible and advisable to draw M. Molotov’s or even M. Stalin’s attention cautiously and unofficially, in an entirely personal way, to the somewhat problematic part which M. Helfand is apparently playing in Rome. Should you consider such a step advisable I am enclosing a private letter^{*} to you which is written in such a way that you could read it out during the conversation with M. Molotov or M. Stalin, thus giving to the discussion of this point from the outset a purely personal and confidential character. You could perhaps begin the conversation on this by saying that although this private letter was meant for you alone and did not contain any instruction, yet, in view of the friendly relations with MM. Molotov and Stalin, both on your part and on mine, you considered it fitting not to conceal from the Soviet Government the question I had raised, as it might perhaps be of interest to them.

RIBBENTROP

^{*} An unsigned draft of such a letter dated March 1940 (without day of the month) and showing a few corrections in Ribbentrop’s handwriting is in the files (F18/223-221).

No. 7

F18/232-230

The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in the Soviet Union

BERLIN, March 21, 1940.

RM 103.

Please inform the Soviet Government orally as follows regarding the Duce-Führer meeting:¹

The meeting was under consideration during my stay in Rome and was finally decided upon after my return to Berlin. The object of the meeting was the discussion of the general political situation by the Heads of Government of the two allied countries who had not met personally since the outbreak of war. During the conversation which took place in a very friendly atmosphere, the Führer began by explaining to Mussolini in detail the causes which had led to war in the autumn, the course of the Polish campaign, the subsequent development of the war on land, sea, and in the air since then, as well as his ideas as to the future conduct of the war. The discussion showed that, because of the intransigence of the Western Powers, neither the Führer nor Mussolini could see any possibility of peace. Therefore Germany is determined to break England’s and France’s will to annihilate and to continue the war until final victory. Italy’s position is clearly and indisputably with Germany, and the con-

¹ See document No. 1.

versation between the Führer and the Duce has once more confirmed Italy's positive attitude toward Germany in this conflict. Moreover, during this meeting the elements of further cooperation between the two Heads of Government against the Western Powers were discussed and complete identity of views was established. German-Russian relations also came up for discussion during the conversation, with the Duce remarking that at the time he had been the first, after Germany, to recognize Soviet Russia, and that he understood and welcomed the German-Russian understanding. For his part the Führer explained to Mussolini that he had already said in *Mein Kampf* that Germany would either have to side with Russia against England, or with England against Russia. Now, from his experiences since the assumption of power, he, the Führer, had become convinced that a settlement between Germany and England was not possible, and that therefore Germany should side with Russia. On the basis of this knowledge he had last autumn sought agreement with Russia, and, thanks to the fact that an autocrat like Stalin ruled in Russia, he had also met with understanding. This decision by the Führer was inalterable and the final delimitation of their respective spheres of interest had been achieved by the Boundary and Friendship Treaty.² They had resolved not to interfere in each other's domestic affairs and now there were not only no differences between Germany and Russia, but the two states were complementary to each other, politically as well as economically. It was the Führer's fixed resolve that this should be a lasting relationship between the two states and that relations should become closer. Both statesmen were in full accord that no differences of any kind existed between Germany, the Soviet Union, and Italy, and that the good relations among them were a natural consequence of the identity of their interests.

Mussolini, for his part, then drew attention to the senselessness of the war aims of the Allies, and described the mission of the American, Sumner Welles,³ as highly problematic. No other political questions were touched on during the conversation.

R[IBBENTROP]

² See vol. VIII, document No. 157.

³ See vol. VIII, documents Nos. 640, 641, 642, 643, 649, and 653.

No. 8

3066/611939-43

The Ambassador in Belgium to the Foreign Ministry

A 628

BRUSSELS, March 21, 1940.
Pol. II 1074.

POLITICAL REPORT

Subject: Belgian foreign policy after six months of war.

A review of the first 6 months of the war in Belgium is an unproductive subject for a report intended to give an account of the development of Belgian foreign policy. In the regular reports from the

Embassy during the past 6 months the *constancy* of the Belgian policy of neutrality has repeatedly been stressed and confidence expressed in its *immutability*. There can, therefore, be no question of a development leading to a complete change or the setting of new aims. On the contrary, at the end of the sixth month of war all that can be said is that Belgian foreign policy has remained what it was at the beginning of the war, namely, an endeavor by the King and the Government, approved by an overwhelming majority of the Belgian people, to keep the country out of war and to avoid any partiality toward one side or the other. This policy remains unshaken even today despite the severest tests and will, I am convinced, continue unchanged. A definite line has been adopted which finds repeated expression in statements by the Foreign Minister, as well as in those of nearly all Belgian politicians. As explained in a speech by the Catholic Senator Carton de Tournay only a few days ago, the basic principle of Belgian foreign policy is freedom from any commitments and the liberty to adopt whatever attitude is consonant with the interests of the country. On the strength of this freedom Belgium had declared her neutrality in the present war, and would observe it loyally, as long as her vital interests and sovereign territory are not violated by the belligerents.

Two features in the official attitude of the Belgian Government have come particularly to the fore during these months of war: the statements by Spaak on Belgium's position toward the Netherlands,¹ in which revision of the policy of neutrality is announced in the contingency of the Netherlands becoming involved in the war, and those on the unilateral deployment of the Belgian Army on the northern and eastern frontiers of the country, leaving the Belgian frontier with France well-nigh unprotected.²

Regarding the first point, M. Spaak, as I reported, gave me detailed explanations, to the effect that the Belgian Government wanted to make its policy of neutrality dependent on the maintenance of the status quo in the Low Countries area [*im niederländischen Raum*] without, however, intending to give help automatically should Holland become involved in the war. This point of view is, after all, comprehensible, considering the geographical position of the country. Although this does indicate the limited character of the policy of neutrality, it is not an indication of its unreliability. However, in the meantime this question has once more receded into the background, since Holland has shown so little response to Belgium's eagerness to help, and has declined to consider the Belgian suggestions.

¹ See vol. VIII, document No. 522.

² See vol. VIII, documents Nos. 541, 544, and 588.

It has become more and more obvious, too, that the whole discussion of relations with Holland was brought out into the open by the President of the Chamber, van Cauwelaert, solely for reasons of domestic politics, and was designed primarily to prepare the way for his candidature—at present, moreover, hopeless—for the post of Minister President, by a move which would be acceptable to Flemings and Walloons alike.

It is only with difficulty that the Belgians can be drawn into conversation about the one-sided disposition of the army, which only faces Germany and leaves the southwest frontier with France to all intents and purposes open. The Belgians admit, of course, that the prospects of a possible French-English attack through Belgium are thereby vastly improved, but they consider the possibility of such an advance out of the question.

Apart from the aforementioned two points, the helplessness and weakness of the Belgian Government in respect to the biased attitude of the press and in general the lack of neutral-mindedness in Belgium might also be criticized. Since the beginning of the war, the Embassy has carried on an untiring struggle in which certain successes have undoubtedly been achieved. Various prohibitions and urgent warnings by the Government have had a welcome effect; moreover, the changes in our favor in the general political situation have not been without influence on Belgian public opinion. Nevertheless, there is still much that is unsatisfactory here in this field. It would, however, be wrong to conclude from the Belgian Government's failure to take stronger measures against the press—for instance by an official censorship—that they are not sincere in their policy of neutrality. In the democratic-liberal conditions here the Government hesitates, not least for reasons of self-preservation, to take stringent measures which would involve them in the greatest difficulties in Parliament, and perhaps even lead to their fall.

Although it can, therefore, be put on record that during the first 6 months of the war the aim of Belgian foreign policy has remained unaltered and that there is every probability of its continued stability, nevertheless, a perceptible change has taken place in the assessment of the general political situation and consequently in the mental approach of leading Belgian circles to the policy of neutrality.

Belgium, with her experiences in the World War and the recollections of her history with its centuries of struggle in and for the Low Countries area, could scarcely believe a great war in northwest Europe any longer possible without her own participation, even if involuntary; yet she has meanwhile adjusted herself to the state of neutrality and has become reconciled to her status as a nonparticipating onlooker.

At the outbreak of war doubts were widespread as to whether, even with the best intentions, neutrality could be maintained for more than a few weeks, and the dread of once again becoming the victim of the unfavorable geographical position of the country was general. Hence, to many neutrality appeared to be wishful thinking rather than a practical possibility. Today broad masses of the people are undoubtedly thinking otherwise. Six months of war without Belgium having so far become involved have led them to think that, after all, the country has a good chance of remaining outside the conflict. The ingenuous, optimistic ideas of the people are not so prevalent in influential circles, but even here the mood of gloomy anxiety has given way to a more confident view after the January crisis³ had been safely overcome. The Government itself is more skeptical about the success of its efforts and continues to contemplate the situation with mistrust and concern. But even in its ranks the mood of desperation at the end of January and the beginning of February has given way to one which is more hopeful.

One thing which is significant for the change of view on the general situation is the assessment of the prospects of the two conflicting parties in the war. At the outbreak of war there was no doubt in influential quarters in Belgium that Germany would lose the war. The probability of an Allied victory was rated so high that its chances were put at 10:1. All that has changed. The poor results from the blockade which is the Allies' only weapon, their hesitant attitude in military matters, their numerous political failures, but especially the end of the Russo-Finnish conflict, have led to a considerable loss of prestige for the Allies, so that today, while their ultimate victory is still looked upon as probable, the certainty of this victory is rated much lower.

Hand in hand with the realization that the possible effectiveness of Allied military and political resources was limited, a certain change of mood has also taken place here which is operating in our favor. In particular the attitude of the Allies toward Finland has been much criticized here and has alienated sympathy from France and England. The argument put out by our propaganda that, while England tries to employ and exploit other countries for her own ends, she is not prepared, or not able, to render the assistance promised them, has had considerable effect in Belgium, too. Hence it is not at all rare of late to hear critical, sometimes even disparaging, remarks about England. It would be a mistake to see in this the beginnings of more friendly

³ See vol. VIII, documents Nos. 528, 529, 531, 532, 534, 538, 540, 541, 544, 551, and 585.

feelings toward us. For reasons based on recent historical experiences as well as on her political, economic, and social outlook, Belgium is and will remain spiritually closely linked with the Western Powers. Only if their decline were to become obvious would these ties be sundered and Belgium be moved to bestow her sympathies on other powers. At all events it may be said that we can derive advantages from the recent development in the Belgian attitude of mind and that our propaganda, in so far as it is directed against England, will in future meet with a somewhat more eager reception in Belgium than before. The mental attitude toward the outcome of the war has undoubtedly undergone a certain change too. While at the outbreak of war the defeat of Germany was desired by the great majority of the Belgian people, the idea is prevalent today that a negotiated peace would best meet Belgian interests.

This awareness and these changes of feeling contribute, through their effect on Belgian foreign policy, toward a further strengthening of the idea of neutrality, so that the wish for continuance of a policy of impartiality and nonparticipation in this war becomes the expression of a united popular feeling.

VON BÜLOW-SCHWANTE

No. 9

486/231813

*Circular of the Foreign Minister*¹

Telegram

BERLIN, March 21, 1940.

Sent March 22—7:45 a. m.

e.o. RM 102.

For guidance of your conversations on the meeting between the Führer and the Duce² the following is to be observed:

Any speculation about a joint peace offensive is pointless, because neither Germany nor Italy considers peace to be possible. On the contrary, Germany is determined once and for all to break and militarily to defeat England's and France's will to annihilate. The detailed and cordial discussions between Führer and Duce have again confirmed Italy's unmistakable and inalterably positive attitude toward Germany in this war, and the complete agreement on the future attitude of both countries was reaffirmed.

RIBBENTROP

¹ A notation on this document indicates that it was to be sent to a number of Missions listed in an enclosure. This enclosure has not been found.

² See document No. 1.

No. 10

425/217876-77

The State Secretary to the Embassy in Turkey

BERLIN, March 24, 1940.

Pol. II 553 g.

With reference to report No. A 1315 of March 15, 1940.¹

We must reckon with Turkey's entry into the war on the side of our enemies when the obligation to render assistance under the treaty of October 19, 1939,² with Great Britain and France becomes operative. Under the treaty the possible contingencies are, themselves, multifarious—the main contingency, as we know, being Italy's entry into the war (article 2 of the treaty). A settlement between Turkey and the Soviet Union might therefore, under given circumstances, establish in the Near East between the Soviet Union and our enemies a certain link via Turkey, and might, at all events, reduce or remove the differences existing there between them and the Soviet Union. Conversely, it is precisely the Russian clause in the second protocol to the treaty of October 19, 1939, which offers Turkey certain possibilities of keeping out of the war, even though the obligation to assist had actually become operative under the treaty. As is known, according to this protocol Turkey cannot be forced by the treaty obligations to take any action which would involve her in armed conflict with the Soviet Union. It is in our interests that Turkey shall continue to consider a threat from the Soviet Union so much a reality that she can, if necessary, invoke this clause from the protocol.

For the rest, according to strictly confidential but completely reliable information,³ the Soviet Union is itself pursuing at present the policy of leaving Turkey in uncertainty as to its intentions, and consequently keeping her under pressure. According to our information, the Turkish Ambassador was not able, in a recent conversation with M. Molotov, to coax the latter out of his reserve or to get him to make definite declarations of good will toward Turkey.

In consideration of this you should—as indicated in telegram No. 140 of March 17⁴—refrain from actively furthering on our behalf a direct rapprochement between the two powers. Our efforts of course must continue to be directed toward keeping Turkey out of the war, even if the provisions of the treaty of October 19, 1939, were formally

¹ Not found.

² For the text, see League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. cc, p. 167.

³ Nothing more has been found regarding the origin and nature of this information.

⁴ Vol. VIII, document No. 680.

operative. From what has been said, the best way to achieve this appears to us to be precisely for Turkey to remain in fear of the Soviet Union.

WEIZSÄCKER

No. 11

F18/237

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 572 of March 26

Moscow, March 26, 1940—7: 32 p. m.

Received March 26—9: 00 p. m.

For the Foreign Minister personally.

With reference to your instructions RM 101 ¹ and 103 ² of March 21.

Today I carried out with Molotov the instructions referred to above. M. Molotov thanked me warmly for the valuable information.

With regard to the question of an improvement in Italian-Soviet relations, M. Molotov upon my urgent representations stated that he would submit the matter to his Government. In connection with this, he again intimated that concrete public proofs of a change of mind on the part of the Italian Government would be very desirable.

In this connection I feel that a few friendly articles in the Italian press about the Soviet Union would have a favorable effect. For several weeks now the Soviet press has completely stopped its attacks on Italy, a fact which the Italian Chargé d'Affaires here—as he told me—reported also to Rome.

SCHULENBURG

¹ Document No. 6.

² Document No. 7.

No. 12

124/122550-52

Memorandum by the State Secretary

SECRET

BERLIN, March 26, 1940.

St.S. No. 251

Ambassador von Papen has sent me the enclosed communication. Submitted herewith to the Foreign Minister.¹

WEIZSÄCKER

[Enclosure]

SECRET

ANKARA, March 19, 1940.

Dr. Visser, the Dutch Minister, came to see me again the day before yesterday. As I had in recent months adopted a purely noncom-

¹ Marginal note in Ribbentrop's handwriting: "[For] F[ührer]".

mittal attitude on this subject² in accordance with the Foreign Minister's instructions,³ it was clear that this visit was being made in agreement with his Government. Dr. Visser told me that according to information which had reached him from London, the English appeared to be much more inclined for peace now than they were in October–November, which was a result of German naval warfare and the conclusion of peace between Russia and Finland. Lord Halifax had asked whether he, Dr. Visser, would not be coming to London again soon. The Netherlands Government, which had heard of this inquiry, had let him know that it had no objections to a possible continuation of the conversations.

The British Ambassador⁴ here with whom Dr. Visser has been in constant touch since his return from The Hague, and who left yesterday for a 12-day visit to Beirut, has let him know that, should fresh conversations be desired, he could fly back here from Beirut at any moment.

All this seemed to indicate that a continuation of the conversation which he had initiated in October in London was desired by the British.

I replied to Dr. Visser that, in view of the present situation and the Führer's repeated declarations, his wish did not seem to me to be very likely of fulfillment although I could thoroughly appreciate his motives. Nevertheless, I would not fail to inform my Government again of his offer, for it might always be useful to have at one's disposal a person who enjoyed the special confidence of leading British circles as he did and who also had full understanding of the German point of view.

Dr. Visser added that, in his view, the question of the return of the colonies did not present any difficulty, but that the future "form" of the reconstituted Polish Government, as well as of the Czech statute, had to take into account the fact that England must be able to make peace without loss of face. Hence, if it could be of use, he was at all times ready to make the journey to London via Berlin after a detailed discussion of the matter with the Foreign Minister.

If, as I assume, Dr. Visser's well-intentioned offer is without significance in the present circumstances, I would still consider it politically advisable if I were authorized to convey a few words of thanks to him.⁵

PAPEN

² This refers to several previous occasions on which Visser had broached to Papen the subject of possible peace mediations by the Netherlands Government. See vol. VIII, document No. 242, footnote 5.

³ Cf. vol. VIII, document No. 373.

⁴ Sir Hughe Montgomery Knatchbull-Hugessen.

⁵ Marginal note: "At the next opportunity express personal thanks. Also tell him [Dr. Visser] that England had wanted war and would now get it. R[ibbentrop]." On Mar. 30 instructions along these lines were sent by Weizsäcker to Papen (124/122554).

No. 13

B21/B005449

The Chargé d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, March 27, 1940—2:25 p. m.

No. 443 of March 27

Received March 28—1:00 a. m.

Hertslet¹ asks me to transmit the following communication to Goetz, Reichssicherheits-Hauptamt, with the contents of which I agree:

Please inform the Brigadeführer that in the interest of keeping the U. S. A. out of the war it is absolutely necessary that no activity should develop here. Otherwise, owing to the incalculable mentality of the American people, irreparable damage can be caused to the German conduct of the war. It is proposed that confidential agents, in so far as they are not engaged purely in collecting information, be withdrawn. The Wehrmacht has been similarly informed. If a full report by telegram is desired please inform me by telegram.²

THOMSEN

¹ In telegram No. 62 of Mar. 6 (1725/401172) from Guatemala, Reinebeck reported the arrival from Rio de Janeiro of Joachim Hertslet, a Reich German claiming to be traveling under special orders of the OKW to Washington via Mexico, where he was to speak to the President. He left Guatemala on Mar. 4 for Mexico, and was to arrive in Washington on Mar. 8-9. In telegram No. 55 of Mar. 7 to Guatemala, Heyden-Rynsch confirmed Hertslet's account of himself (1725/401173).

² No reply to this telegram has been found.

No. 14

5556/E395542-43

The Director of the Economic Policy Department to the Legation
in Rumania

Telegram

MOST URGENT

BERLIN, March 27, 1940—12:00 midnight.

SECRET

e. o. W 1627 g.

No. 295

Also for Clodius.¹

1) At today's conference on petroleum with the Field Marshal, in which the Foreign Ministry did not take part, the fact was apparently brought up for discussion, mainly by Ministerialrat Fetzer,² that not all the possibilities of obtaining Rumanian petroleum were yet being fully exploited.³ The quantities purchased had not always sufficed

¹ Clodius had gone to Bucharest on Mar. 18 as head of the German delegation for a special session of the Rumanian and German governmental committees. See vol. VIII, document No. 678.

² Of the High Command of the Navy.

³ Wiehl elaborated on Fetzer's ideas and on the meeting with Göring in a letter of Mar. 29 to Clodius (2182/471734-37).

to fill up the available means of transport, so that tank cars had even had to be returned empty. The Rumanian Government had not yet succeeded in inducing the big oil companies, particularly the Americans, to sell to us. Sales contracts already concluded were disadvantageous. If Polish arms were sold for dollars to third countries, more petroleum could be bought in Rumania with these dollars. There were differences of opinion between several groups among interested German circles in Rumania.

2) The Field Marshal thereupon expressed renewed concern to the Foreign Minister. The Field Marshal ascribed the alleged differences of opinion to groups within the Legation or delegation (which the Foreign Minister considers improbable), while Ministerialrat F. spoke of competition between different business groups.

3) After discussing the matter with Ministerialrat Fetzner, the Foreign Minister gave instructions that the former should fly to Bucharest as soon as possible, probably on Friday, to put forward his suggestions for the negotiations there. The exact time of his arrival will be announced by telegram.

4) The Foreign Minister requests a detailed telegraphic report as soon as possible on the state of the negotiations, and in particular, too, whether opportunities for exerting political pressure are again being exploited as might perhaps be inferred from recent press reports of an alleged ultimatum, in spite of the Rumanian *démenti*.

5) Ministerialrat F. is to be accompanied on his journey by air by a representative of the Foreign Ministry. I intend to send Hudeczek⁴ who could stay on there for the remainder of the negotiations, provided Junker⁵ can return with the aircraft at once.

I request report by telegram.⁶

WIEHL

⁴ Senior Counselor Karl Hudeczek of the Economic Policy Department.

⁵ Counselor Werner Junker of the Economic Policy Department.

⁶ Document No. 21.

No. 15

247/164020

Ambassador Ritter to the Legation in Denmark

Telegram

No. 259

BERLIN, March 27, 1940.

zu R S 1118.¹

Drafting Officer: Counselor Dr. Lohmann.

For the personal information of the Minister.

On instructions from the Foreign Minister the Danish move—the *démarche* by the Danish Minister here with State Secretary von Weiz-

¹ R S 1118: Not found.

säcker on March 19²—with proposals for entering into discussions regarding better security for Danish commercial shipping, and likewise the parallel moves by Norway³ and Sweden⁴ are to be dealt with in a dilatory fashion.

RITTER

² Described in Weizsäcker memorandum St.S. 243 of Mar. 19 (2691/529238-39).
³ The Norwegian proposal was contained in Note No. 95 of Mar. 8 (8871/-E620104-06).

⁴ Ritter recorded such a move by the Swedish Minister in a memorandum of Mar. 2 (4196/E072771-76).

No. 16

2110/456728-32

Memorandum by an Official of the Economic Policy Department

MEETING CONCERNING FINLAND ON MARCH 28, 1940, AT 6:00 P. M.

Present:

Ministerialrat Ludwig	Ministry of Economics
Regierungsrat Mützelburg	Ministry of Economics
Minister Schnurre	Foreign Ministry
Counselor van Scherpenberg	Foreign Ministry
Counselor of Legation	Foreign Ministry (German
Kreutzwald	Legation, Helsinki)
Assessor Besser	Foreign Ministry

To begin with, Herr Kreutzwald gave a short survey of the immediate effects of the Russo-Finnish war on Finland. The feeling toward Germany was decidedly unfriendly; people felt that Germany had left them in the lurch or even "sold them out." They pinned their hopes, as in the past, on the Western Powers and expected that a defeat of Germany would also lead to a restoration of the old Finnish boundaries.

Herr Schnurre briefly described the agreements recently concluded with Latvia and Estonia and about to be concluded with Lithuania.¹ The Foreign Ministry had conceived the idea of regulating economic relations with Finland in a similar way. He, too, thought that some arrangement was necessary in order to maintain and expand the vital supplies hitherto imported by Germany from Finland. Such agreements had to be concluded immediately in order to forestall similar wishes on the part of Russia and the Western Powers.

Herr Kreutzwald pointed out on the other hand that in view of the present attitude of the Finns an expansion of economic relations between Finland and Russia was not to be expected in the foreseeable

¹ See document No. 463, footnotes 4 and 5.

future. However, it was to be anticipated that energetic action on the part of the English would, because of the political considerations indicated above, meet with a favorable response from the Finns. He believed that negotiations such as those that had been conducted with the Baltic States would have little prospect of success in the case of Finland. It was true that Finland was in a tight spot, but, on account of her access to world trade through Sweden and Norway, Finland could not be put in the same class as the Baltic States. Herr Ludwig, too, expressed misgivings about the conclusion of agreements with Finland on the Baltic model, since, if English imports from Finland were cut off, England would also block Finnish imports.

Herr Schnurre emphasized that he, too, feared that German proposals on the Baltic model would meet with rejection by Finland and make further negotiations more difficult. He thought it would be better to negotiate with the Finns about an immediate program [*Sofortprogramm*] for the delivery of some Finnish raw materials that were vital to Germany, but reserve an expansion of this minimum program for later negotiations.

In the consideration of the question of which supplies should be included in the immediate program to be drawn up, the following discussions took place.

1. *Copper*. Herr Ludwig stated that the entire copper production of Finland had already been going to Germany up till now. The quantity in question was 13,000 tons annually, of which 2,000 tons had gone back to Finland as semi-manufactured products, 11,000 tons remaining in Germany. These imports were assured through 1940. The delivery stoppages that had occurred were due only to transportation difficulties. He had no doubt that after the impending elimination of these difficulties the Finnish deliveries would be resumed on a full scale.

An extension of this delivery commitment for 3 years, an increase in copper production and the opening up of the nickel deposits at Nivala had been promised in October 1939 in return for the delivery of 134 German 2-cm. antiaircraft guns.² Fifty of these antiaircraft guns had been delivered. It was to be expected that the Finns would make the fulfillment of the promises they gave in October 1939 conditional upon the delivery of the remaining 84 antiaircraft guns. It is to be ascertained whether the Finns can be given promises to that effect.

2. *Molybdenum*. Herr Ludwig stated that the molybdenum deposits were still in the possession of the Finns. Herr Kreutzwald pointed out, however, that the plants in the immediate vicinity of the combat area have suffered considerably from the military actions. Herr Ludwig stated that Germany had already been assured of the molybdenum production, too, by firm agreements.

3. *Nickel*. It was agreed that production from the Nivala deposit

² Documents concerning these negotiations are on serials 2110 and 9881.

could not be counted on for the immediate future. Attention should therefore be directed mainly at Petsamo. Only the shipment of nickel ore could come into question, since the smelting installations destined for Petsamo had been retained in England on account of the outbreak of the war. As Herr Kreutzwald emphasized, the mining installations in Petsamo had been severely damaged by the war. That the Canadian concession company would begin mining operations was at present all the more unlikely in that the terms of the concession did not as yet provide for any commitment about production in the near future. It was emphasized that a satisfactory settlement of this point could be achieved only if the Finnish Government, as a result of political pressure from Germany, either takes over the management of the mines itself or at least makes the concessionaires start production early. It was agreed that ensuring the Petsamo production was the most difficult question in the impending negotiations. Russian support could hardly be expected.

4. *Iron pyrites.* Herr Ludwig called attention to the need of securing for Germany the Finnish iron pyrites which were of importance for the production of copper and cobalt. Here, above all, a collision with Russian interests was to be feared.

The other items of Finnish exports in the past were then discussed. Herr Ludwig revealed, on the bases of material he had in his possession, that the main export item had consisted of cellulose, the greatest part of which had gone to England. Second in importance were pit props, pulpwood and lumber, the greatest part of which had likewise gone to England and a certain part also to Germany. Finally, paper and cardboard had played a big role in Finnish exports.

It was agreed that Germany had no interest whatever in expanding trade with Finland in these fields. The importation of these products was not vital to Germany. In the second place, payment through German counterdeliveries would involve great difficulties, since the most important Finnish import items (iron, metal and metalware, coal) could not be delivered by Germany in sufficient quantities. This would become especially evident if, as was to be expected, the Finnish Government should set up a reconstruction program and reduce the volume of consumer and luxury goods hitherto imported. It was agreed that for this reason, too, a procedure such as had been suitable vis-à-vis the Baltic States would in the case of Finland also be contrary to the German interest.

In conclusion it was emphasized that the credit of 10 million RM granted by Germany through the agreements of March 12, 1940,² hence shortly before the conclusion of peace, constituted a considerable asset in the impending German-Finnish negotiations.

Arrangements have been made for sending Herr Schnurre as Special Plenipotentiary of the German Government to Helsinki for a

² Documentation concerning these agreements has not been found.

few days, accompanied by Herr Ludwig, to negotiate with Minister President Ryti and others of the highest Finnish Government leaders on the immediate program described above. The trip to Helsinki is to start on April 8.⁴

BESSER

⁴Details concerning Schnurre's negotiations in Helsinki have not been found; but see document No. 293, footnote 1.

No. 17

51/84290-91

The Minister in Norway to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

OSLO, March 28, 1940—12: 00 midnight.

No. 410 of March 28

Received March 29—5: 45 a. m.

For the Foreign Minister and State Secretary with reference to my telegram No. 406 of March 28.¹

1. When I confronted Foreign Minister Koht, in today's discussion about submarine *U-21*, with last week's operations of English warships in Norwegian territorial waters,² he declared that the Norwegian Navy had in all cases succeeded in preventing the carrying out and completion of warlike actions even if one wanted to assume that an attempt was made in that direction. He also believed that the Norwegian Navy would in future succeed in protecting and maintaining shipping in Norwegian territorial waters. He added, in confidence, that the English behavior seemed to him to be intended (group missing) and to provoke Germany into starting warlike operations herself, which would give the English a free hand in Norwegian waters. The English apparently did not want to take upon themselves the responsibility for openly violating Norwegian territory and Norwegian territorial waters without cause, and for carrying out warlike operations there.

2. The future will show whether Foreign Minister Koht sees things entirely correctly. It definitely appears, however, as I have frequently pointed out, that the English have no intentions of landing,³ but that they want to disturb shipping in Norwegian territorial waters, perhaps, as Koht thinks, in order to provoke Germany. Of course it is also possible that the English behavior last week, as I

¹Telegram No. 406 dealt with the grounding of the German submarine *U-21* in Norwegian territorial waters on Mar. 27 and its internment by Norwegian authorities (51/84284-87).

²It had been announced on Mar. 25 that the Norwegian Minister in London had called the attention of the British Government to incidents in which Norwegian neutrality had been infringed, including instances of violation of territorial waters by warships.

³See, for example, vol. VIII, documents Nos. 571, 650, and 682.

likewise have pointed out, may develop into more or less regular and increasing interference in territorial waters in order to strike a blow at our iron ore shipments along the Norwegian coasts.

3. The firm intention of Norway to maintain her neutrality and to insure that Norway's neutrality rules are respected can be accepted as a fact. The internment of the submarine *U-21* can be traced back to these anxious endeavors to prevent any doubt arising as to this intention of Norway's; this does not of course affect at all our criticism of Norway's attitude.

This also includes the order to fire given to Norwegian anti-aircraft units and the Navy, of which the English were notified also, on the occasion of the Norwegian protest against the English encroachment on Norwegian territorial waters.

4. As seen from here, the attempt to fortify Norway further in her desire to keep neutral and thus prejudice her gradually more and more against England would seem worth while. At the same time we might state that any deviation from this line which might be harmful to our interests, or the inability to maintain this line, would confront us with serious decisions.

BRÄUER

No. 18

91/100176-77/1

Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department

BERLIN, March 28, 1940.

St. S. No. 144 g. Rs.

After my oral report to the Foreign Minister today he made the following decisions on the question of an Irish rebellion:

1. The Foreign Ministry is instructing Herr Veessenmayer to deal with this matter.

2. An attempt is to be made to bring Sean Russell, in accordance with his offer, to Italy through the agency of McCarthy.¹

3. Herr Veessenmayer is to discuss the matter with McCarthy when he arrives at Genoa again. McCarthy is not to be acquainted with the details of the plans we have in mind.

4. I reported to the Foreign Minister the fact that McCarthy is already in contact with the Intelligence Department [*Abwehr*] and indeed at our instigation. It would therefore be necessary for the Intelligence Department to be notified by us if we likewise used McCarthy as an intermediary. The Foreign Minister then decided that the Intelligence Department should not yet be acquainted with the matter at this stage.

¹ On these negotiations see vol. VIII, documents Nos. 562 and 605.

-----²

Accordingly the following arrangements are to be made:

1. It should be ascertained by suitable means through Herr von Heyden-Rynsch, either through the agency of the Intelligence Department or better still through the Consulate General at Genoa, when McCarthy will be in Genoa again.

2. Herr Vessenmayer, who is at present on a tour of the Balkans with Minister von Killinger, is to be notified as soon as it is definitely known when McCarthy will be in Genoa again. He is then to be called to Berlin by telegram and sent to Genoa. While he is in Berlin Vessenmayer is to report to the Foreign Minister after the matter has been discussed with him here.³

Forwarded herewith to Senior Counselor von Rintelen.

WOERMANN

¹ Thus in the original.

² No further documents on these plans have been found for the period covered by this volume.

No. 19

171/134874-78

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry

SECRET
A 1516

Moscow, March 28, 1940.

Subject: Finnish-Soviet peace negotiations.

With reference to the instruction of March 15, 1940—e. o. Pol. VII 512 g.¹

The enclosed memorandum reproduces a conversation with M. Molotov in which he gave me an account of the course of the peace negotiations with Finland. M. Molotov repeatedly pointed out that the initiative for the negotiations had come from the Finnish-Swedish side and that in particular the Soviet Minister in Stockholm, Mme. Kollontay, had been urged to induce the Soviet Government to state the conditions on which it would be prepared to make peace with Finland. I assume that Molotov will deal with these matters in his speech to the Supreme Soviet which is meeting tomorrow.²

M. Molotov has doubtless got into a fix [*eine Panne*] over the affair: He has forgotten to inform us about it in time either through me or

¹ In instruction Pol. VI 512 g Weizsäcker said that various accounts had been received of the course of peace negotiations between the Soviet Union and Finland. He asked Schulenburg to look into the matter (171/134879-85).

² For the text of Molotov's speech to the 6th Session of the Supreme Soviet, see V. Molotov, *Soviet Peace Policy* (London, 1941), pp. 49-67. Extracts from the speech, but with sentences omitted from *Soviet Peace Policy*, are printed in *Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy*, selected and edited by Jane Degras (London, 1953), vol. III, pp. 436-449.

through M. Shkvtartsev. I am firmly convinced that this omission was not due to any malicious intention or deep design on the part of M. Molotov. It was probably entirely owing to his great pressure of work and his little experience as yet as Foreign Minister. During his conversation with me M. Molotov noticed that I was somewhat astonished at the way matters had gone. The whole affair was obviously embarrassing to him.

I might add that around March 1 this year, rumors of Swedish mediation in the Soviet-Finnish conflict cropped up in the international press. There has been no mention of this in the DNB reports which have reached us, and we now receive foreign newspapers so late that we only heard of these rumors after M. Molotov had already put me in the picture regarding the affair.

COUNT VON DER SCHULENBURG

[Enclosure]

Moscow, March 26, 1940.

MEMORANDUM

Subject: Finnish-Soviet peace negotiations.

In accordance with instructions P 4685 of March 13,³ Pol. VI 664 of March 14,⁴ and Pol. VI 512 g of March 15, 1940,⁵ the Ambassador, Count von der Schulenburg, called on M. Molotov on March 26 and requested a faithful account of the chronological progress of the Finnish-Soviet peace negotiations. The Ambassador stated that the numerous contradictory newspaper reports on the subject had produced a state of complete confusion. For example, the Swedish Foreign Minister, Günther, had recently asserted that the initiative for the peace negotiations had come from the Soviet Government, thus contradicting Molotov's statement that the Soviet Government had not taken the initiative at all in this matter. Other sources would have it that the first move was made as early as January 29. It was at least an established fact that the Soviet Ambassador, Maisky, had already acquainted the British Government with the contents of the peace conditions on February 22, whereas M. Molotov did not communicate them to the German Ambassador until March 5.⁶

³ Instruction P 4685 forwarded copies of United Press dispatches from London according to which Great Britain had been informed of Soviet peace terms as early as Feb. 22 but had declined to act as a mediator (171/134817-20).

⁴ Instruction Pol. VI 664 forwarded copies of reports from the German Legation in Stockholm and DNB reports from Stockholm concerning statements by Swedish Foreign Minister Günther on Sweden's role in the Soviet-Finnish peace negotiations (171/134933-36).

⁵ See footnote 1.

⁶ See vol. VIII, document No. 664.

M. Molotov replied to this as follows:

He, Molotov, had not read the statement by the Swedish Foreign Minister, Günther, according to which the initiative for the peace negotiations had come from the Soviet Government. Furthermore it was not in accordance with the facts, for the Soviet Government had not taken the initiative in any way in the whole matter but had exercised the greatest restraint and let matters take their course. It was not until the Soviet Government had received information from Mme. Kollontay, its Minister in Stockholm, that the Finnish Government was endeavoring to learn through the mediation of the Swedes the conditions on which the Soviet Government would be prepared to cease hostilities, that the Soviet Government took the matter up for the first time and decided to give the Finns the reply which they had requested through the mediation of the Swedes. Besides putting on record that an understanding was not possible on the basis of the previous conditions, this had contained information in brief and general terms as to how the Soviet Government envisaged the conclusion of peace. The Finns had thereupon stated that they agreed to everything, but it was still not clear what the Finns were agreeing to: whether they had the Soviet Government's old or new conditions in mind. In order to clarify the matter, the Soviet Government had put their conditions in writing and handed them to the Swedes for the latter to bring them to the notice of the Finnish delegation before it left Stockholm by air.

As regards the information given to the British Government, Maisky, the Soviet Ambassador, had received instructions only to inform the British Government in quite general terms. The Soviet Government had done this on the assumption that the Swedish Government had also informed other governments.

[Molotov said that the reason why he had not mentioned the whole range of questions to the Ambassador until March 5 was that the Ambassador had been absent from Moscow until the second half of February and after his return he had not wanted to trouble him owing to an indisposition.⁷]

With reference to the matter of the fortification of the Åland Islands⁸ Molotov expressed himself to the effect that this question had not been discussed at all on the occasion of the peace negotiations. When the Ambassador inquired whether the Soviet Government's previous attitude (the fortification of the Åland Islands either by Finland alone or with the participation of the Soviet Union in the event of provision being made for Sweden to participate) still held good,

⁷ This paragraph was crossed out before dispatch to Berlin.

⁸ The question of fortification of the Åland Islands was regulated by the Convention Relating to the Non-Fortification and Neutralization of the Åland Islands, signed at Geneva, Oct. 20, 1921, to which the Soviet Union was not a signatory; for text, see League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. ix, p. 211. For previous references in this series to the question of the Åland Islands, see vol. v, ch. iv; vol. vi, documents Nos. 145, 187, 229, 528, 612, 626, 776; vol. viii, documents Nos. 106, 147, and 206.

For the Soviet position, see the Soviet memorandum of Oct. 14, 1939, to Finnish Minister Paasikivi, *Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy*, vol. iii, pp. 382-384; also Molotov's speech of Oct. 31, 1939, in V. Molotov, *Soviet Peace Policy*, pp. 27-46.

Molotov stated repeatedly and with great emphasis that this question had not been discussed at all during the peace negotiations.

When the Ambassador inquired whether the Soviet Government had demanded that Finland should eliminate British economic influence in the Petsamo region, Molotov replied that the Soviet Government had made no such demand.⁹ He then explained at some length that originally the Soviet Government's attitude toward Finland was motivated solely by consideration for the security of Leningrad, but later the necessity had become apparent for taking measures for the security of Murmansk and the railway leading to it, especially since Murmansk was the only ice-free port in the north of the Soviet Union. Despite this last fact the Soviet Government had not availed itself of its right to retain the Petsamo area as war booty, but had returned it to Finland on condition that, in accordance with the peace treaty of 1920,¹⁰ no military bases might be constructed and no war-ships stationed there.

HILGER

⁹ This statement had been immediately reported by Schulenburg in telegram No. 578 of Mar. 26 (171/134832).

¹⁰ The Treaty of Dorpat between Finland and the Soviet Union, signed Oct. 14, 1920; for text, see League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. III, p. 5.

No. 20

F18/242-240

The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in the Soviet Union

Telegram

SECRET

No. 543

BERLIN, March 28, 1940.

Sent March 29—3:25 a. m.

RM 12 g. Rs.

For the Ambassador personally. Secret.

During my recent visit to Rome,¹ where—as you know—I worked on the improvement of Italian-Russian relations among other things, I contemplated carrying out the plan of a visit by M. Molotov to Berlin shortly. Although I did not mention this idea to anyone, the Anglo-French propaganda, correctly guessing my intentions, spoke of it with the hope of interfering with the plan and thereby with the further consolidation of our relations with Russia. I could have denied the Anglo-French report without any trouble, but refrained from doing so out of consideration for Molotov. Then the Russian press for its part issued a denial.

Nevertheless, I have not given up the idea of a visit by Molotov to Berlin. On the contrary, I should like to retain it, and if it can be realized I should like to put it into effect in the near future. It goes without saying that the invitation is not to be confined to M. Molotov; it would suit our own needs better, as well as our relations

¹ See vol. VIII, documents Nos. 663, 665, 667, 669, 670, and 675.

with Russia, which in fact are becoming ever closer, if M. Stalin himself came to Berlin. The Führer would not only be particularly happy to welcome Stalin in Berlin, but he would also see to it that he would get a reception commensurate with his position and importance, and he would extend to him all the honors that the occasion demanded.

An invitation both to M. Molotov and to M. Stalin has, as you know, already been issued orally by me in Moscow ² and was accepted by both of them in principle. In what manner the invitation should now be repeated, and its definite acceptance and realization attained, you, yourself, can judge best. During the conversation to be conducted you will have to word the invitation to M. Molotov more definitely, whereas you will have to state the invitation to M. Stalin in the name of the Führer in less definite terms. We must, of course, avoid receiving a clear refusal from M. Stalin.

Before you take any action, I request that you comment on the subject immediately, reporting to me by telegram your opinion as to the procedure to be followed by you and the prospects for its success.³

RIBBENTROP

² Cf. vol. VIII, documents Nos. 258, 261, and 267.

³ See document No. 28.

No. 21

8893/E621576-77

The Legation in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

URGENT

No. 399 of March 28

BUCHAREST, March 29, 1940—6:00 a. m.

Received March 29—6:40 p. m.

W 1670 g.

With reference to your telegram No. 295 ¹ and my telegram No. 390.²

1) It is incorrect that tank cars have been returned empty because of insufficient purchases of petroleum. All cars have been filled on arrival and sent back full.

2) It is furthermore incorrect that American oil companies are not delivering to us. On the contrary, Romana-Americana is one of our principal suppliers. British and French companies have so far not been compelled by the Rumanian Government to supply us, because, as long as the Danube was frozen, sufficient quantities were available to make full use of the limited overland transport facilities. We have

¹ Document No. 14.

² Not printed (2182/471726-27). This telegram, dated Mar. 27, gave details on the state of the economic negotiations in Bucharest.

on the contrary got into a remarkable situation with respect to Rumania, because in December we first extracted the promise, by the strongest political pressure, of the definite delivery of 130,000 tons per month³ and since then, because of the totally inadequate transport facilities provided by us, we have taken only some 15,000 in January, and about 18,000 in February. In discussing the matter with Field Marshal Göring at Karinhall on January 3,⁴ I explicitly pointed out that the bottleneck was not in the sphere of deliveries but of transport. However, already in December⁵ Minister President Tatarescu gave me a definite pledge that, if necessary, he would compel the British and French companies to supply us, either directly or indirectly. Only recently he reiterated this pledge to Minister Fabricius. With the opening up of the Danube, the moment has now come when he must redeem this pledge, which he has meanwhile repeatedly confirmed. I believe that he will do this in spite of British threats or blockade measures. Otherwise, we will exert influence on him in an appropriate manner by using the authority given me by the Foreign Minister.

3) To sell Polish arms for dollars to third countries and with the proceeds to finance the purchase of Rumanian petroleum would be very bad business, because since the last rise in the reichsmark in December, the dollar now stands only at about 65 percent above the reichsmark, while the purchase price of petroleum in dollars in the free market is about 150 percent above the prewar price secured by Neubacher.⁶

Besides, such an arrangement is not possible for the reason that the delivery of war material constitutes the basis of all agreements with the Rumanian Government, and (1 group garbled) the results achieved since the summer of last year in negotiations on the subject would be jeopardized if the quid pro quo in which Rumania was chiefly interested did not materialize. Moreover, deliveries of war material are the most important factor in our efforts to bring the Rumanians more and more into our camp in a political sense also.

4) There are no differences of opinion whatever on the petroleum question, but only a single point of view, namely that taken vis-à-vis the Rumanian Government by me as (group garbled) and by Minister Neubacher as Special Envoy for Economic Affairs, in full agreement with Minister Fabricius and all the members of the delegation. It goes without saying that all other subordinate officials working here and the representatives of the companies have to follow our instruc-

³ See vol. VIII, document No. 422.

⁴ See vol. VIII, document No. 502.

⁵ See vol. VIII, document No. 533.

tions exactly. Moreover, no dissenting views have reached me from these quarters.

5) We shall discuss the subject of a conference of experts here with Fetzner. In the course of repeated conversations which I have had since the beginning of the war with him and his colleagues he had hitherto not brought forward any new arguments whatever, so that I do not expect any fresh results from (2 groups garbled) either.

CLODIUS
FABRICIUS

No. 22

B21/B005454

The Chargé d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry Telegram

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, March 29, 1940—12:15 p. m.

No. 459 of March 28

Received March 30—4:30 a. m.

With reference to your telegram No. 299 of March 26 (*Presse geh.*).¹

In view of the well-known state of affairs in American press circles and the mistrust of propaganda it will not be easy to carry out the enlightenment campaign [*Aufklärungsaktion*] in the manner contemplated by you. Experience shows that articles cannot be got into the American press as they can, for instance, into the French. Even the English cannot achieve this here on the spot but only from London, if at all. Influential journalists of high repute with whom I am in contact will not lend themselves, even for money, to publishing outside material under their name without alteration or re-editing. Lesser rated journalists and writers are not accepted by important newspapers, especially if they offer articles in accord with the German point of view. The "Letter to the Editor" method appears practicable, but acceptance depends, of course, on the editor. Mr. Albert Fox's letter to the *New York Times* about his visit to the Führer was, for instance, a great success.

There is, of course, the possibility of supplying material to leading journalists and writers on military subjects, and furthermore of charging agents with the task of utilizing these articles and, should occasion arise, of placing them.

Hence I would request you, to begin with, to let me have by telegram, if possible, any article you have in mind for an experiment. If sent by diplomatic pouch I fear it would lose all news value. I shall take pains to utilize every possible outlet, including those in non-

¹ Not found.

metropolitan areas. In conclusion I repeat that among the leading people here, there is already no doubt that the Allies are endeavoring to open up new theaters of war, with a view to weakening Germany's powers of resistance, and, if necessary, to provoke her. This view is being increasingly expressed in conversation and in print.

THOMSEN

No. 23

8893/E621578

The Legation in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

No. 400 of March 29

BUCHAREST, March 29, 1940—9:40 p. m.

Received March 30—4:30 a. m.

W 1671 g.

With reference to your telegram No. 295.¹

In view of my responsibility for the oil pact negotiations I wish to define my position with reference to Clodius's telegram No. 399 of March 28.²

I request that it be determined once and for all by people who are competent to judge whether the Foreign Minister's Special Envoy has or has not succeeded in rendering ineffective a price trend on the Rumanian oil market which was engineered by the enemy powers, and was endangering our petroleum supplies from Rumania and the whole of our trade with Rumania.

I take full responsibility for the method and for the results of my negotiations in the sphere of war economy, and I most strongly object to the criticisms which are repeatedly being made to the Field Marshal, and which are devoid of all knowledge of the subject.

As long as no concrete and effective results had been achieved, no pathfinder reported to me with a plan for getting out of a most difficult situation. Subsequent attempts to prove to the highest Reich authorities that the results achieved are disadvantageous are calculated, in direct contrast to the real state of affairs, to cause unnecessary concern in a sphere which is important to the war economy.

For my part, I wish to emphasize that there are no differences of opinion whatever within the delegation, and I urgently request that incompetent critics be resolutely repulsed.

NEUBACHER
FABRICIUS

¹ Document No. 14.

² Document No. 21.

No. 24

B21/B005456

The Chargé d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram

URGENT

WASHINGTON, March 29, 1940—11:00 p. m.

No. 467 of March 29

Received March 30—1:10 p. m.

I. At a press conference Roosevelt made his first statement on the result of Welles' journey,¹ the text of which is being telegraphed by the DNB representative.² In it, Roosevelt's declaration that there were no immediate prospects of peace attracted particular attention. His remark that, in certain instances, Welles' journey could contribute toward improving relations with the countries he had visited is generally taken here to refer to German-American relations.

II. At the same press conference Roosevelt tried to minimize as a transparent propaganda maneuver the publication by the Germans of the report by the Polish Ambassador Potocki³ of his conversation with Bullitt about the American Government's readiness to give support to the Allies in a possible war. In addition Roosevelt tried to protect Bullitt by announcing that the latter was returning to his Paris post next week. The German publication hit political circles like a bombshell and caused unusual excitement in the State Department. I shall keep you informed by telegram as to reaction.⁴ (See my telegram No. 470 of March 29.⁵)

THOMSEN

¹ On Welles' mission, see vol. VIII, documents Nos. 598, 603, 609, 613, 637, 640, 641, 642, 643, 649, 653, 655, and 659.

² The text of Roosevelt's statement of Mar. 29 is in *The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt*, edited by Samuel I. Rosenman (New York, 1941), vol. IX, pp. 111-112.

³ See German White Book No. 3, *Polnische Dokumente zur Vorgeschichte des Krieges* (Berlin, 1940), p. 8.

⁴ See documents Nos. 26, 31, 158, 195, and 492.

⁵ This telegram (B21/B005463), transmitted the text of a statement of Secretary of State Hull in which he declared, "The statements alleged have not represented in any way at any time the thought or policy of the American Government." Hull's statement is printed in Department of State, *Bulletin*, 1940, vol. II, p. 335.

No. 25

116/66170-74

Note for the Foreign Minister by an Official of the Dienststelle
*Ribbentrop*Hauptreferat VI
Mo/Hr

BERLIN, March 29, 1940.

I submit herewith the passages which are of interest concerning a conversation with Dr. Malan taken from the extensive report¹ by

¹ The full report has not been found.

Herr Hans Denk on his visit to South Africa undertaken on behalf of the Foreign Minister with the object of establishing contact with the nationalist opposition there.²

KARLOWA

² On Denk's mission to South Africa, see also vol. VIII, document No. 577. A previous memorandum of Karlowa for the Foreign Minister, dealing with South African affairs and dated Feb. 22, 1940, is in vol. VIII, document No. 629.

[Enclosure]

EXTRACT FROM THE REPORT OF HERR HANS DENK ON HIS VISIT
TO SOUTH AFRICA

. . . My mission was first of all to get in touch with Dr. Malan who had already shown himself to be a fighter. On January 15 therefore, leaving our son behind, my wife traveled from Crondaal to Cape Town and by January 16 she had had a long conversation with Dr. Malan. (I shall give the substance of the conversation later.) Dr. Malan was extremely grateful for the information he received and asked my wife to convey his most sincere thanks to me. He gave the assurance that he intended to continue to organize and work entirely according to our ideal. He said, moreover, that he would immediately consult General Hertzog and all the leading nationalist Afrikaners in order thus to exert influence on the individual speeches which they would make in Parliament.³

Dr. Malan was told that the German Reich is surprised that the Union of South Africa wants to go to war for England. The Reich has nothing against the Afrikaner people and in general does not want war. England declared war on Germany. Germany accepted this declaration of war and is waging this war against England. The German people want to live in friendship with the nationalist Afrikaner people. The sympathy of the German Government for the Afrikaners even goes so far that help would be given them if they seriously wish to achieve their autonomy and independence.

The German people do not doubt for one moment that this war, which England brought about, will end with total victory for Germany. The German Government will dictate peace to England.

Influential German quarters are prepared to assert the wishes of the nationalist Afrikaner people in that treaty. Here the question of awarding the three provinces of Bechuanaland, Swaziland, and Basutoland to the South African Government might be considered.

³ General J. B. M. Hertzog, former Prime Minister, at the time a leader of the opposition, had introduced a motion in the South African House of Assembly declaring that the war with Germany should be ended. The motion was debated in the Assembly from Jan. 24 to 27 and defeated.

The German Government does not claim anything for itself that belongs to the Afrikaner people. On the contrary, as already stated, it wants to help them to develop fully and entirely on their own as an Afrikaner people.

It is incomprehensible that the Union of South Africa should have deprived of their liberty, interned, and illtreated Germans who have committed no crime, especially as here in Germany no Afrikaners have been interned.

It must again be emphasized that the German Reich considers that it goes without saying that her colonies, in this case, Southwest Africa, will be returned to her without further question.

The decision rests with the Afrikaners themselves: Are they going to refuse the hand of friendship that Germany is offering them, or are they going to grasp it and thus, of their own accord, take the initiative toward a better shaping of their destiny?

The Führer has said: The German people will of themselves always keep faith with peoples who are well-disposed toward us and keep faith with us.

It is up to the nationalist Afrikaner people themselves to form a nationalist Government in order either to declare absolute neutrality, or, possibly, to conclude a separate peace with Germany, which ever they themselves consider right.

I also told Dr. Malan through my wife that a fundamental condition for attaining this goal for the Afrikaner people is that they should first establish complete unity within their own ranks.

(Note: I think I can say that this is now the case. The whole Afrikaner nationalist movement has placed itself with Malan under General Hertzog's leadership.)

I let Dr. Malan know that I would wait in Lourenço Marques in case he should be able to send a suitable personal representative over to me as intermediary. My wife told me, however, after conversations with Malan, that this would prove too dangerous for the whole undertaking. Apart from this, it was impossible, on account of the strict supervision, frontier control, the Secret Service in Lourenço Marques etc., etc. Then Dr. Malan was told that if this was not feasible, he could count on the possibility of a link being established in Lourenço Marques, namely, through the firm of Schröder and Leidenberg (Justus). This party member, Leidenberg, who has already been mentioned, would then take the intermediary to Dr. Werz at the German Consulate there.

In this connection Dr. Malan was also told that when he had progressed with his work and considered it advisable, he could, on the strength of this first contact, send a suitable agent to Europe through me at any time and that I considered the route via Italy and Portugal the best. Since both he and General Hertzog know me very well

personally, it would be possible, if desired, to transmit information to Germany at any time through the aforesaid contact (Justus) at Lourenço Marques, in which case, I would meet the emissary in question at a suitable place in Europe and take him to the authoritative quarters.

I knew that General Smuts had tried to make it clear to the Afrikaner people that, unless they entered the war against Germany, England would send 200,000 Australian troops to Africa to occupy South Africa. When this did not work he tried to persuade them that the seizure of Abyssinia by Italy constituted a grave danger for South Africa. On this I sent him word that the South Africans had in the Irish the best example of the way to obtain their independence and autonomy. Ireland wants and will achieve complete independence and the incorporation of Northern Ireland. Ireland lies within immediate reach of England, and England is not even in a position to send any troops there to prevent the realization of the Irish ideal. It must moreover be reckoned with that the present war will develop with lightning speed and I would advise the Afrikaner people to decide quickly on what they want and where they want to go, lest perhaps they come too late. . . .

No. 26

8828/E614117-18

The Chargé d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

URGENT

WASHINGTON, March 30, 1940—2: 50 p. m.

No. 475 of March 30

Received April 1—12: 15 a. m.

With reference to Press Department circular telegram No. 17 of March 29¹ and to my telegrams Nos. 467² and 470³ of March 29.

The Polish documents relative to the background of the war are being quoted and discussed, and excerpts from the originals are being published in the American press under sensational banner headlines. Since yesterday also the news bulletins and commentaries on the American radio are almost entirely taken up with this. The only way in which press and radio can at present make use of the almost precipitate denials by Roosevelt and Hull, reported yesterday evening,⁴ and the short disclaimers by Bullitt and Potocki,⁵ is by first giving a detailed version of the contents and range of the documents. Thus the

¹ Not printed (8823/E614109).

² Document No. 24.

³ Not printed (B21/B006463). See document No. 24, footnote 5.

⁴ See document No. 24.

⁵ Statements by Bullitt and Potocki were published in the *New York Times* on Mar. 30, 1940.

widest publicity is achieved in America, and public opinion is informed. In spite of all attempts at denial the average American is so fully aware of Roosevelt's interventionist policy that he is quite prepared to take for granted the accuracy of the statements contained in the documents.

As I reported yesterday, the publication came as a bombshell here. It can be seen from the unusual haste of the disavowals, especially by Roosevelt and Hull, how extremely embarrassing to the American Government the German propaganda attack is; it feels that it is driven into a corner and that Roosevelt's foreign policy is being exposed. The date of publication has generally been recognized as a means by which Germany might exert influence on the American election campaign and has been, to some extent, criticized as an inadmissible interference in American domestic politics. Pro-Allied American circles are consoling themselves over the effect of the German propaganda attack by assuming that thereby the favorable atmosphere created for German-American relations by Welles' reception in Berlin will be disturbed.

THOMSEN

No. 27

175/136810-14

The Legation in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

URGENT

No. 413 of March 30

BUCHAREST, March 30, 1940—3:50 p. m.

Received March 31—9:10 p. m.

I. I had a discussion today with Minister President Tatarescu lasting 1½ hours. The Minister President began the conversation by explaining Rumania's political situation. The King and Government were determined, as always, to defend neutrality by every possible means. Molotov's speech yesterday,¹ while not amounting to direct propaganda against Rumania, was nevertheless not at all reassuring. Hence Rumania must continue to rearm. He asked that special thanks be conveyed to the German Government for the prompt way in which we had recently delivered Polish booty material.² The arrival of these arms would make an excellent impression throughout Rumania and would help to gain popularity for Germany. Besides it was necessary to strengthen Rumania's political position with respect to Russia. The King and Government were convinced as heretofore that in order to accomplish this the most important thing was to gain and keep Germany's friendship, for Germany alone was in a position to exert influ-

¹ See document No. 19, footnote 2.

² See vol. VIII, document No. 660.

ence effectively in Moscow in favor of Rumania. I confirmed the Minister President in this opinion by pointing out among other things that Germany, unlike England and France, was interested in the maintenance of Rumania's neutrality. It was self-evident that the more honestly she [Rumania] fulfilled her obligations in economic matters, the greater would this interest be. The Minister President assented vigorously and remarked that after all, I must know from my numerous conversations in recent months, that not only he and all the important political personages, but above all the King himself, held this view. It was precisely this political consideration that had primarily caused Rumania to go to the utmost limits to accommodate us in economic matters. As long as he was in power, he would adhere to this policy and would see that pledges given by him were honored. Moreover, anyone who might succeed him could not do otherwise either. In the further course of this political conversation the Minister President evinced particular interest in German-Italian cooperation in southeast Europe, and in the state of Italian-Russian relations.

II. From the discussion of the most important points under negotiation, emphasis may be laid on the following:

1. *Deliveries of petroleum.* The Minister President said that he would keep his word and would ensure that we could buy 790,000 ^a tons per month. I told him that with the opening up of the Danube, the moment had come when English and French companies, too, must be compelled to supply us. Tatarescu replied that he had already taken the necessary steps. The full amount (group garbled) was already assured for April and May, and that for the coming months would be arranged for next morning. Rumania was holding at our disposal some 80,000 tons a month of state-produced petroleum alone. We could buy a further amount of about 20,000 tons from the same companies as in recent weeks. He would probably commission a Rumanian company for the remaining 30,000 tons a month.

The English had recently been exerting very strong pressure and immediately about 10,000 tons (group missing) for days held up all ships bound for Rumania with raw materials. He had told the English that in no circumstances would Rumania allow any third state to prevent her from scrupulously observing her neutrality. This comprised also the honoring of commitments in the economic sphere which she had entered into. Germany had never interfered in Anglo-Rumanian trade relations and Rumania must expect England to observe the same restraint as regards Rumanian-German trade relations. He thought that Rumania's resolute attitude had for the present brought England to her senses which was also shown by the

^a In another copy of this document the correct figure of 130,000 has been inserted in Wiehl's handwriting (2182/471728-32).

lifting of the embargo on goods. Should England nevertheless again resort to coercive measures, he would confidently discuss with us how to meet them. In this connection the Minister President inquired about German-Italian measures to counter English pressure on Italy exercised through the ban on coal transport.

2. *Credit transactions for financing clearing arrangements.* I explained the necessity for obtaining 2 to 3 billion lei for urgent German purchases, and justified our claim by pointing out that Rumania's indebtedness to Germany was very considerable, because we had sold large quantities of our export for (group apparently missing). The Minister President promised to work for a satisfactory solution. To this I remarked that I had also had this question explained to the King in detail by a reliable person with a view to a positive arrangement.

3. *Exchange of war material for petroleum at prewar prices.* The Minister President repeated his willingness to make an arrangement for one year patterned after the provisional one concluded by Minister Neubacher.⁴ A serious difficulty lay in charging the credit of 40 million RM arranged between me and Minister Bujoiu on September 29, 1939,⁵ against the deliveries of Polish war equipment. I explained that we were obliged to reject the charge on account of the fresh price adjustment which had now been made.

4. *Ensuring our agricultural supplies.* I pointed out that apparently the available grain supplies were much smaller than we had arranged for in September. The Minister President promised to see that maize and wheat, too, would be delivered up to the limits of what is possible. Admittedly, the bad outlook for the next harvest made the retention of a certain reserve for their own needs imperative, at any rate until the yield of the new harvest could be assessed.

The Minister President met my request for some sort of price stabilization for agricultural products on the lines of that for petroleum by pointing out that, in contrast to petroleum, grain showed only a trifling price increase, and that, according to data furnished to him, the increase in price of the most important German export goods was much greater. We agreed to continue investigation of the question.

5. *Rate of exchange.* I reminded the Minister President that the German Government had agreed to the exchange rate of 50 lei to 1 RM only because he had told me, at the time, that the Rumanian Government intended stabilizing the dollar at about 180 lei. Since it had now been stabilized at a ceiling approximately 20 percent higher, we were

⁴ See vol. VIII, document No. 660. See also enclosure to document No. 800, *post.*

⁵ See vol. VIII, document No. 166.

entitled to an exchange rate of 60 lei to the reichsmark, all the more so, as meanwhile the lira had been raised by 31 percent, which corresponded to an increased rate of even 74 lei to the reichsmark. The Minister President conceded that in view of our earlier negotiations and the increase which had now been granted to Italy our claim was justified. He asked us, however, to take into account that for Rumania, 50 percent of whose export trade was with Germany, the rate of the mark had a very different importance from that of any other currency. If the mark rate of exchange were to be further raised the present price level could not be maintained either, which would, perforce, lead to the gravest social and financial upheavals. He took note of my declaration that, while adhering to our fundamental standpoint, we were prepared, taking into consideration the apprehension felt by the Rumanian Government, to withdraw our demand for adjustment of the rate, provided a satisfactory agreement was reached on the other points under negotiation. The Minister President took cognizance of this declaration with particular satisfaction and gratitude, and asked that these thanks be conveyed to Germany.

6. *Safeguarding land cultivation.* When I expressed our concern about this (group missing) the Minister President declared that the Rumanian Government had taken every care to ensure cultivation of the land to the fullest extent. Hence, the King was hopeful of securing at least an approximately normal harvest in spite of adverse weather conditions. The army was, at the moment, to a large extent demobilized. On the frontier there were only troops left who were needed for the upkeep of arms and trenches and for the care of horses (regarding this I refer you to the conversation with the War Minister⁶).

7. *Sabotage.* I questioned the Minister President about the situation with regard to measures against sabotage. He said that, in accordance with the promise he had given at the end of November,⁷ all the steps had been taken and maintained that were necessary for the protection of the petroleum area, the means of transport and the Danube waterway. Everything that was humanly possible had been done to prevent acts of sabotage on Rumanian territory. Quite recently, however, Yugoslav police had informed the Rumanian police of existing suspicions that acts of sabotage were being planned in Yugoslav territory along the Danube. This could probably only mean the channel at the Iron Gate. He [the Minister President] asked, however, that he should not be referred to as the source of this information in any

⁶ This conversation was reported in Bucharest telegram No. 414, sent on Mar. 31 (175/136815-16).

⁷ This might refer to a conversation which Clodius had with the Minister President on Dec. 6, 1939, and to which reference is made in vol. VIII, document No. 422, footnote 1.

discussions on this question in Belgrade. I refer you on this point, too, to the conversation with the War Minister.

III. I gained the impression from the conversation that, just as I had expected after our negotiations in November and December, the Minister President is in fact determined to honor his obligations. This applies particularly to the petroleum question. The tone of this conversation was most cordial. In conclusion the Minister President remarked that it was a pity that Reuter's correspondent who had spread the latest lying reports could not for once see for himself the friendly and trustful character of German-Rumanian cooperation which had been once more demonstrated in today's conversation.

CLODIUS
FABRICIUS

No. 28

F5/0486-0467

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry*¹

Telegram

MOST URGENT

Moscow, March 30, 1940—11:30 p. m.

TOP SECRET

Received March 31—8:15 a. m.

No. 599 of March 30

For the Reich Foreign Minister personally.

With reference to your telegram No. 543² of March 28.

I. I personally believe firmly—as I reported on the occasion of my inquiry of October 17, telegram No. 554³—that Molotov, conscious of his obligation, will visit Berlin as soon as the time and circumstances appear propitious to the Soviet Government. After careful examination of all factors known to me I cannot, however, conceal the fact that I consider the chances slight for the acceptance of an invitation at the present time. My opinion is based on the following considerations:

1. All our observations, particularly the speech of Molotov on March 29,⁴ confirm that the Soviet Government is determined to cling to neutrality in the present war and to avoid as much as possible anything that might involve it in a conflict with the Western Powers. This must have been one of the main reasons why the Soviet Government broke off the war against Finland, abandoning the People's Government.⁵

¹ Marginal note in Ribbentrop's handwriting: "[For] F[ührer]."

² Document No. 20.

³ Vol. VIII, document No. 267.

⁴ See document No. 19, footnote 2.

⁵ The original draft of this telegram (1379/357717-20) carried two drafts of a second paragraph here, both of which were deleted before dispatch. These were as follows:

First version: "The manner in which the Soviet Government would like to represent its relations with Germany to foreign eyes is shown for example by Molotov's comparison with Rumania. According to this statement, France and England do not object to Rumania trading with Germany, whereas the German-

2. The Soviet Government, having this attitude, probably fears that a demonstration of the relations between the Soviet Union and Germany such as a visit by Molotov or by Stalin himself to Berlin might, at present, involve the risk of severance of diplomatic relations or even of warlike developments with the Western Powers.

3. Indicative of the situation is the Tass denial mentioned by you, which denies with rather striking plainness and firmness all rumors about an allegedly impending trip to Germany by Molotov.

4. It is a known fact that Molotov, who has never been abroad, has strong inhibitions against appearing in strange surroundings. This applies as much if not more to Stalin.

Therefore, only very favorable circumstances or extremely important Soviet advantages could induce Molotov or Stalin to make such a trip, in spite of disinclinations and "considerations" ["*Rücksichten*"]; furthermore, Molotov, who never flies, will need at least a week for the trip, and there is really no suitable substitute for him here.

II. Although the prospects for success therefore appear to be slight, I will, of course, do everything in my power in order to try to realize the plan, in case it is to be pursued any further. A suitable starting point for an informal conversation on that subject can be found without much trouble. The course of the conversation will reveal whether and how far I can go into the subject.⁶ As regards the invitation to Stalin, the possibility of a meeting in a border town would have to be left open from the very beginning.⁷

SCHULENBURG

Footnote (5)—Continued

Soviet exchange of goods in spite of its smaller percentile share in total Soviet exports is taken as occasion for justifying hostile actions."

Second version: "At a time when in France and England strong forces are pressing them to break off relations, yes, even to war against them, the Soviet Union would have to take care [not] to give these forces new stimulus and provide a handle against itself."

⁶ In the original draft (see footnote 5) this and the preceding sentence were as follows: "A suitable means for initiating an informal conversation on this subject seems to me to be to inquire from Molotov the grounds which influenced him to publish so categorical a denial. From his answer it will appear whether and how far I can develop the theme."

⁷ The Foreign Minister replied in telegram No. 570 of Apr., 1940 (F5/0465): "The Foreign Minister requests that nothing further be initiated for the time being."

No. 29

191/138626

The Foreign Minister to the Embassies in Japan and China and to the Legation in Manchukuo

Telegram

- 1) No. 285 to Tokyo
- 2) No. 71 to Shanghai
- 3) No. 61 to Hsinking

BERLIN, March 30, 1940.
Büro RAM 113.

According to a statement made in confidence by the Japanese Ambassador,¹ when Japan has herself recognized Wang Ching-wei's gov-

¹ Saburo Kurusu.

ernment² she intends to suggest to Germany that she, too, should recognize it. You should not broach the subject of recognition in conversations and should maintain complete reserve if the matter is raised.

Identical texts to Tokyo, Shanghai, and Hsinking.³

RIBBENTROP

² A conference, called by Wang Ching-wei of representatives of the pro-Japanese provincial governments of Peking, Nanking, and autonomous Mongolia, and of other pro-Japanese politicians met at Nanking on Mar. 20-22 and resolved to set up on Mar. 30 a Chinese Central Government at Nanking. See also vol. VI, document No. 526 and footnote 3; vol. VII, document No. 368; and vol. VIII, documents Nos. 112 and 558.

³ In telegram No. 371 of Mar. 30 (8783/E612083) the Embassy in Rome was requested to maintain "complete reserve in the question of a possible recognition of the Wang Ching-wei government with Japanese as well as with Italians. The Foreign Minister confidentially requests that note be taken in this matter that he does not wish to force the issue in any way but rather reserves the German position completely."

No. 30

265/172220-22

Memorandum by an Official of the Economic Policy Department

BERLIN, March 30, 1940.

e. o. W. III c 1106.

The Turkish Ambassador here called on Ministerialdirektor Wiehl today and inquired about the latest developments in the economic negotiations¹ in Ankara. Ministerialdirektor Wiehl explained that the latest reports on the subject from the German Embassy in Ankara² did not sound very satisfactory; in particular one could not but note some uncertainty as to Turkish methods of negotiation.

Negotiations for an agreement involving 5 million Turkish pounds had, it is true, ended on January 30 this year, but the subject matter of the further negotiations had been repeatedly altered by the Turks since December last year. At the request of the Turkish Government, negotiations had been carried on originally for an agreement involving 2 million Turkish pounds besides the agreement involving 5 million Turkish pounds. At the same time discussions went on concerning the settlement of transactions which could not be completed on account of the war. The Turkish Government suggested that the amounts to be discussed be around 16½ million pounds including the projected agreement on 2 million Turkish pounds. According to the latest report of March 23 from the German Embassy in Ankara, the Turkish Government has again amended this proposal to 20 million Turkish pounds. This new sum is to refer to old transactions amount-

¹ On the background of these negotiations see vol. VIII.

² This refers in particular to a detailed report sent by Papen on Mar. 23 which is not printed (8493/E597014-18).

ing to some 14 million Turkish pounds, and to new transactions to the value of some 6 million Turkish pounds.

These continuous changes in the proposals were bringing an unsatisfactory element of uncertainty into the negotiations. The Germans for their part could not consider starting discussions on new transactions until agreement had been reached on the method of dealing with the old orders.

In our opinion adjustment of the old transactions required primarily also the settlement of the question of guarantees (return of the guarantees for payment and performance). We had unfortunately been obliged to take cognizance of the fact that, notwithstanding oral assurances to the contrary given to the German Embassy by the Secretary General³ of the Turkish Foreign Ministry, a number of Turkish authorities had in many instances made use of the guarantees. The Foreign Ministry had recently been informed that these attachments had so far reached a total value of 40 million RM. This state of affairs had recently caused the German Ambassador in Ankara to declare in all seriousness to the Turkish Foreign Minister that he, for his part, would break off the negotiations as being useless if the Turkish Government persisted in prejudicing the issue by the continued attachment of guarantees.

Moreover, satisfactory statements by Turkey were still lacking regarding repayment of the German clearing balance, and payment for the contemplated German deliveries in those Turkish goods which Germany was interested in.

Referring to the Turkish Ambassador's letter of March 6⁴ to State Secretary von Weizsäcker on the question of the Turkish order for merchant ships in Germany, Ministerialdirektor Wiehl informed the Ambassador, on instruction of the State Secretary, that Germany was disposed to deliver three merchant ships, viz., *Dogu*, *Egemen*, and *Savas*, but that on the other hand, the steamship *Salon* could not be handed over.

The delivery of the three ships was contingent on two conditions:

(1) The Turkish Government would have to assume the commitment that, for the duration of the war, with the exception of the Black Sea, the ships would be employed only for Turkish coastal shipping.

(2) In return, but not as payment for the delivery of the ships, the Germans would demand delivery of chromium amounting to at least about 110,000 tons which represented the equivalent of about half the value of the ships.

³ Numan Menemencioğlu.

⁴ Not found.

Ministerialdirektor Wiehl informed M. Gerede further that the German Embassy in Ankara had been instructed⁵ to inform the Turkish Government of this German attitude in the matter of the delivery of the ships.

M. Gerede expressed his thanks for the reply to his letter to State Secretary von Weizsäcker. The reply was clear even though not very satisfactory.

Regarding Ministerialdirektor Wiehl's statements about the difficulties in the economic negotiations, Ambassador Gerede asked that the German wishes should be summed up in a short personal note to him.⁶ He gave an assurance that he would get in touch with the Turkish Government on the matter so as to have the difficulties removed.

On his part Ambassador Gerede handed over two notes⁷ dealing with the Turkish view of the present economic discussions in Ankara which contained nothing positive.

RIPKEN

⁵ Telegram No. 155 of Mar. 28 sent over Wiehl's signature, not printed (8493/E597010-11).

⁶ A note to that effect under the date of Apr. 8 is in the files (4531/E144241).

⁷ Not found.

No. 31

B21/B005462

The Chargé d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

WASHINGTON, March 31, 1940—4:04 p. m.

SECRET

Received April 1—6:30 a. m.

No. 488 of March 31

[Inf. 4378.]¹

For the State Secretary.

White Book documents,² commentaries, and text continue to take up much room in press and radio. Reports follow separately.³

The objective pursued by us with the publication—that of enlightening American public opinion—has been fully achieved. Isolationist Congressmen are demanding an investigation in view of the seriousness of the charge. Hamilton Fish⁴ will move that Bullitt be put under public indictment.⁵

¹ This number is from another copy of this document (2858/551462).

² See documents Nos. 24, and 26.

³ In telegrams Nos. 491 of Mar. 31 (21/B005464-65), 496 of Mar. 31 (B21/B005468/1-68/2), 497 of Mar. 31 (B21/B005469-71), and the New York Consulate General's telegram No. 100 of Apr. 1 (B21/B005472-87).

⁴ Republican member of the House of Representatives from New York.

⁵ In telegram No. 507 of Apr. 1 (B21/B005488) Thomsen reported the introduction of resolutions by Congressman Hamilton Fish in the House and Senator Robert Reynolds, Democrat of North Carolina, in the Senate calling for investigation of the statements attributed to Bullitt and Kennedy which appeared in German White Book No. 3.

The mood in the Government and State Department may be described as one of rage caused by a guilty conscience. In this mood, hints about countermeasures are being conveyed to me, investigation into German propaganda methods in America, and the like. Hence, I expect that the American Government will hit back in some way or other. The easiest target is the information library which has long been prepared for a sudden attack. We have so far studiously avoided carrying on anti-American propaganda from American territory. We would be playing into American hands if the Embassy were to approach the public now by distributing pamphlets consisting of material which obviously could emanate only from the Embassy. The instructions from Schmidt and Altenburg⁶ disregard the fact that the American Government will not stand for interference in American politics by the Embassy. The result might mean the destruction of our propaganda apparatus here, a demand for my recall, and even the breaking-off of relations.

In view of the tremendous propaganda success already achieved the proposed follow-up campaign with a pamphlet will only have a novelty value when photostat copies of the original documents have arrived here. I shall then try, so as not to compromise the Embassy, to have the pamphlet published by the isolationists themselves.⁷

Finally, I may mention that the material for Potocki's report of January 1939 on the influence of Jewry⁸ was at the request of the Polish Embassy specialist placed at his disposal in January 1939 by our specialist on the subject here.

THOMSEN

⁶ Not printed. These instructions were set forth in Press Department circular telegrams P 5471 of Mar. 29 (8823/E614102-03), P 5472 of Mar. 29 (8823/E614109) and P 5544 of Mar. 30 (8823/E614111), and in telegrams Nos. 310 of Mar. 29 (8823/E614116), 320 of Mar. 30 (8823/E614112), and 320 of Mar. 31 (8823/E614114) to Washington.

⁷ In telegram No. 343 of Apr. 3 (2858/551400) Hnblcht instructed Thomsen to abandon the project of distributing from the Embassy photostatic copies of the original documents, and to offer various American publishers the publishing rights to the documents through middlemen, who were to represent themselves as acting for German publishing firms.

The Special Committee on Un-American Activities of the U. S. House of Representatives, popularly known as the "Dies' Committee," conducted an investigation of the "manner in which [German White Book No. 3] was received into the United States, published, and disseminated . . ." See *Investigation of Un-American Propaganda Activities in the United States: Hearings before the House Special Committee on Un-American Activities, 76th Cong., 3rd sess., on H. Res. 282, Appendix, pt. II, "A Preliminary Digest and Report on the Un-American Activities of Various Nazi Organizations and Individuals in the United States, Including Diplomatic and Consular Agents of the German Government"* (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1940), pp. 1054-1059.

⁸ See German White Book No. 3, document No. 6, p. 15.

No. 32

8783/E041775-77

Memorandum by an Official of the Four Year Plan

V.P. 5697 g

BERLIN, April 1, 1940.

SECRET

W 1734 g.

A meeting took place on March 30, 1940, under the chairmanship of the Field Marshal [Göring] to consider the further handling of business transactions with Russia. The following were present:

Reich Minister Todt
 State Secretaries Körner
 Neumann
 Landfried
 Milch
 Ambassador Ritter
 General Becker
 Admiral Witzell
 Lieutenant Generals Udet
 Thomas
 Bodenschatz
 Ministerialdirektor Dr. Gritzbach
 Ministerialdirektor Dr. Gramsch
 Ministerialdirigent Schlotterer
 Minister Schnurre
 Ministerialrat Müller
 Oberregierungsrat Ter-Nedden

1. The Field Marshal described the complaints made to him by the Russians on the previous day¹ and the instructions he had issued in consequence, which resulted in the deliveries of grain starting again.² He emphasized that particularly in the military sphere the decision

¹ In telegram No. 573 to Moscow of Apr. 3 (2097/453132-34) Schnurre reported on the Russian complaints referred to here as follows: "Tevossyan and Savchenko were received by Field Marshal Göring on March 29 for a detailed discussion. Tevossyan registered the Soviet complaints about the delays which had occurred in offering deliveries of war material. They had now been three weeks in Germany and had not succeeded in bringing a single thing to a conclusion. Field Marshal Göring gave the Russians far-reaching assurances. Delivery of airplanes will be made in April and May. The chief complaint of the Russians is thereby disposed of." For earlier Russian complaints about the slowness of negotiating contracts implementing the Russo-German Economic Agreement, see vol. VIII. document No. 677.

² A Herr Dasser had been conducting negotiations in Moscow concerning Soviet grain. A memorandum of a meeting held in Schnurre's office on Mar. 27 recorded that these negotiations had been broken off without any agreement being reached, and furthermore deliveries in advance of an agreement had been stopped (3783/E041778-81). After Göring's meeting on Mar. 29 with Tevossyan and Savchenko (see footnote 1), the Foreign Ministry received word which was understood to mean that the Russians had agreed to resume grain deliveries (Schnurre telegram No. 577 of Apr. 4: 3783/E041790). See, however, document No. 61.

about the delivery of even the most valuable material had actually been taken, that the branches of the Wehrmacht must no longer have any misgivings on that account, and that it was now just a question of settling the business details. In doing so all German departments must proceed from the fact that Russian raw materials are absolutely vital to us, that for a prolonged war further contracts would have to be concluded, and that, on this account, it was necessary for the current contract to be executed promptly and all mistrust on the part of the Russians dispelled. According to an explicit decision by the Führer, where reciprocal deliveries to the Russians are endangered, even German Wehrmacht deliveries must be held back so as to ensure punctual delivery to the Russians. Objections which arise in branches of the Wehrmacht are to be reported first of all to the Field Marshal.

2. The following directives have been issued regarding further procedure:

a) The committee appointed for the current conduct of transactions with the Russians under the chairmanship of State Secretary Landfried, with Minister Schnurre as deputy chairman, will be strengthened by the appointment of a representative of the Ministry of Transport, whom the Minister of Transport will be asked to nominate. All branches of the Wehrmacht are also represented on this committee.

b) The committee itself will not negotiate with the Russians. It will function however, as soon as differences of opinion arise, so that in practice the Russians and their complaints will no longer be heard by individual German departments, but are to be referred by them to the committee. The Russians are to be informed which gentlemen will be recognized by us as alone authorized to put forward complaints (Babarin, Tevosyan, the General detailed to him³). The committee will ascertain whether the Russians are justified in bringing the claim which is in dispute. Should it decide that under the contract the Russians have no such right, then they are to be informed of this by the Foreign Ministry in Berlin or in Moscow.

Should the committee decide that the Russian complaint is justified, then the committee chairman will see that the matter is settled. Should difficulties arise, such as conflicts with certain directives for our own armament, a report will be made to the Field Marshal, who, if necessary, will in turn report to the Führer.

c) The committee is to remove all obstacles now in the way of a speedy conclusion of contracts with the Russians. It will regulate questions of part payments, dates of payment, Reich guarantees, etc. The committee's directives are binding on the departments.

d) The committee will see furthermore that the deliveries to Russia are made punctually; in the event of difficulties in this matter the Foreign Ministry should be asked to intervene.

e) The committee also will ensure that while the volume of German deliveries within the scope of the contract is maintained no substantial

³ Presumably General Savchenko.

advance deliveries are made which would result in unnecessary credits for us on the regular balancing of accounts.

f) Progress reports as required by the Field Marshal in his letter to the branches of the Wehrmacht yesterday⁴ are to be submitted to the committee.

3. The Foreign Ministry undertakes to inform the Russians of the competency of the committee. The Field Marshal will himself write a private letter to the Russians.

4. At the suggestion of Admiral Witzell, the Field Marshal expressed willingness to explain in a circular letter to industry the necessity for the transactions with the Russians. The Ministry of Economics will submit the draft.

5. People's Commissar Tevossyan and the General detailed to him will be assigned permanent aides who will be present at all negotiations with German departments, so as to eliminate in good time all possibilities of complaint.

DR. GRAMSCH

⁴ Not found.

No. 33

175/136822-23

The Legation in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

URGENT

BUCHAREST, April 1, 1940—8:00 p. m. [sic]

SECRET

Received April 1—2:30 p. m.

No. 421 of March 31

With reference to my telegram No. 413.¹

1) After negotiations and discussions extending over a fortnight with almost all the leading people, I will sum up my impressions of the situation here as follows: French and, above all, English influence has been particularly strong in recent months (word apparently missing) the English have used threats more of a material nature, while the French have relied rather on psychological and sentimental factors. The effect of the blunt English methods here has been resentment, rather than intimidation, especially as it contrasts with the German method of negotiating, which has remained true to the maxim *suaviter in modo fortiter in re*. On the other hand the overwhelming sympathy of the widest circles for France, above all in the capital and in so-called "Society," remains unaltered.

In spite of enemy influence the King, the Court Minister, the Minister President, Foreign Minister, and War Minister all hold fast to

¹ Document No. 27.

the line of policy that Rumania's vital interests demand, above all, that they should seek protection against Russia, and they are convinced that in this regard the most effective protection is to be found in alignment with Germany. With the majority of those concerned, however, this line of policy is dictated by the head and not by the heart. The result is that it will be followed only as long as faith in the victory of German arms, or at least in the maintenance of German hegemony in Europe endures. As our prime concern during the war must be with results rather than with feelings, we shall, in view of this Rumanian attitude and Germany's continuing political and military successes, always be in a position to safeguard our interests.

2) It follows from this in regard to the present economic negotiations, that, on the most important points, especially in the petroleum question, we can successfully assert at least our vital claims. To be sure, it must be expected that grave difficulties will be created for us again and again by the vigorous counteractivity of the Minister of Finance and President of the Bank of Issue, Constantinescu, and of the Minister for Foreign Trade, Christu, as well as in the influential economic circles close to them, who, for political and economic reasons, will always seek the alignment with the liberalistic West. This applies in particular to questions regarding the fixing of prices and the possibility of financing clearing accounts in default, whereby our opponents can derive a strong argument from Germany's diminishing ability to execute deliveries, and, parallel with this, a diminishing ability to pay. We shall again and again have hard battles to fight in this sphere up to the conclusion of the negotiations and even afterwards.

CLODIUS
FABRICIUS

No. 34

562/241000-91

The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

URGENT

TOP SECRET

No. 611 of April 1

ROME, April 1, 1940—9:00 p. m.

Received April 1—10:30 p. m.

For the Foreign Minister personally.

In accordance with your instructions ¹ I spoke to Count Ciano about Italian-Russian relations during our conversation today, and referred to the opinion expressed by the Duce in the conversation of March

¹ These instructions had apparently been given orally to Mackensen who had recently been in Germany.

11,² when he declared his complete willingness to cooperate in normalizing these relations. Ciano confirmed that this attitude of the Duce still obtained. I then outlined for him the impressions which Ambassador Count Schulenburg had received from his conversation with Molotov on March 26,³ and at the same time I pointed out that Molotov had declared his willingness to submit the question to his Government. To this Ciano remarked that the matter needed time, the Italian press had of late been entirely restrained, but the idea of going further and adopting a friendly tone was at the moment not so easy to accomplish, because Molotov's last speech⁴ contained two passages offensive to Italy to which the press here did not react solely out of consideration for our wishes. Here he referred in particular to one passage in which Molotov, according to his account, must have compared Russian action against Finland with Italy's action against Albania. In reply to my remark that, after all, the Duce himself had let it be known that a Russian-Italian détente was very desirable in the common interest, Ciano declared his willingness to submit the matter to the Duce, and made relevant notes.

The question of the Ambassadors was not mentioned in the conversation any more than was that of Helfand.⁵

I told Count Ciano in conclusion that I would revert to the matter if I learned anything about the result of the consultation which Molotov said he would have with his Government.

MACKENSEN

² See vol. VIII, document No. 669.

³ See document No. 11.

⁴ See document No. 19, footnote 2.

⁵ See document No. 6.

No. 35

372/208266

Memorandum by the State Secretary

St.S. No. 262

BERLIN, April 1, 1940.
Pol. V 3674.

The Rumanian Minister¹ asked me today for a word of assurance regarding the Molotov speech.² He considered Molotov's remarks very abusive toward Rumania. He also disputed the suggestion that no nonaggression commitment existed between Rumania and Russia.³ The Minister was himself not quite sure whether a definite threat to Rumania was to be inferred from the speech. I gave it as my personal

¹ Radu Crutzescu.

² See document No. 19 and footnote 2.

³ The relevant passage in Molotov's speech read as follows: "Of the southern neighboring states I have mentioned, Rumania is one with which we have no pact of nonaggression." (*Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy*, vol. III, p. 447.)

interpretation of Molotov's remarks that Russia would continue to treat the Bessarabian question as existing, without however taking action now, or in the immediate future.

WEIZSÄCKER

No. 36

191/138682-38

Memorandum by the Head of Political Division II

BERLIN, April 1, 1940.

[Pol. VIII 613 g.] ¹

The Italian Counselor of Embassy ² called on me today in order to acquaint me with the contents of a telegram received by the Embassy from the Italian Foreign Ministry on the question of recognizing Wang Ching-wei's government. In connection with the fact of Baron Plessen's conversation ³ at the Italian Foreign Ministry the telegram states that the Italian Government is quite willing to enter into consultation with the German Government on the subject of recognizing Wang Ching-wei's government, but at the same time it must be pointed out that Italy's attitude on this question is already prejudiced to a certain extent. In the first place, as is well known, Ciano some time ago sent Wang Ching-wei a telegram ⁴ wishing him success, and certain assurances have also been given in Tokyo to the Japanese Government by the Italian Ambassador. Accordingly, the Italian Government would have to consider granting recognition within a foreseeable period. It believes, furthermore, that it is also in Germany's interests for her to continue in this way to work for the promotion of good relations between Rome and Tokyo. But notwithstanding this state of affairs Rome would, of course, be very willing to enter into an exchange of views with us on this question.

In accordance with the instructions which have gone out, I received this information from the Italian Counselor of Embassy with complete reserve ⁵ and confined myself to replying that I would report his proposal to the Foreign Minister and the State Secretary. ⁶

VON RINTELEN

¹ The file number is taken from another copy (8783/E612081-82).

² Guelfo Zamboni.

³ In an instruction, Pol. VIII 564 g. of Mar. 23 to Rome (8783/E612085), Weizsäcker requested that the Italian Government be told that Italian consultation with Germany before Italy formally recognized the Wang Ching-wei government would be welcomed. In telegram No. 590 of Mar. 28 (8783/E612084) Plessen replied that Anfuso, *Chef de Cabinet* in the Italian Foreign Ministry, had assured him that such prior consultation would take place.

⁴ See vol. VIII, document No. 558.

⁵ See document No. 29, footnote 3.

⁶ With instruction Pol. VIII 613 g. of Apr. 10 (8783/E612079) Woermann forwarded to Rome a copy of this memorandum and, stating that the Italian position seemed to be more or less determined, requested that the matter be dropped.

No. 37

9870/E693046

The Minister in Denmark to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

URGENT

COPENHAGEN, April 1, 1940—10:40 p.m.

No. 242 of April 1

Received April 2—3:15 a.m.

R S 1289.

During today's conversation I drew the Foreign Minister's attention to statements by Churchill¹ and threats against the Scandinavian countries appearing in the press of the Western Powers, which lead to the conclusion that it is intended to intercept German ore transports in Scandinavian territorial waters. Munch answered in the negative when I asked whether English pressure had so far been brought to bear on Denmark, and he considered that the outcry in the press was intended primarily to satisfy an excited public opinion in the western countries which was demanding more action. He did not believe that there would be any really serious operations in Scandinavian territorial waters, especially since the ore route would shortly be open. Munch regarded naval war measures by England in the Skagerrak as possible in any case, as for example near Lindesnes where ore ships were in his view temporarily obliged to leave territorial waters, but he did not think that there would be systematic operations in the Kattegat and despite skeptical comments on my part he was not anxious about Danish territorial waters.²

RENTHE-FINK

¹ The reference apparently is to Churchill's broadcast speech of Mar. 30. Text in *The War Speeches of the Rt. Hon. Winston S. Churchill*, compiled by Charles Eade (London, 1951), vol. 1, pp. 155-158.

² Copies of this telegram were sent to the Legations in Norway, Sweden, and Finland on Apr. 4 (8668/034386).

No. 38

2134/467599-600

Memorandum by the State Secretary

SECRET

BERLIN, April 2, 1940.

St.S. 264

The Swedish Minister, who had business with other departments of the Foreign Ministry this morning, finally came to see me, too, and read out the following from a memorandum:

"The Swedish Minister hereby states that according to reports in Stockholm there is no reason to fear the violation of the neutrality of the North by Britain at present. The Swedish Government intends to repulse any such intervention and considers itself to be in a position to do so. Attention may be drawn to the fact that considerable troop units are still stationed in northern Sweden."

(M. Richert left the text of the memorandum with me.)¹

¹ The original is filmed as 8900/E621652.

I asked the Minister whether he meant to include Norway also in the expression of unconcern regarding a violation of the neutrality of "the North" by Britain; past events—the *Altmark* incident² and such like—told a different story.

When M. Richert replied that nevertheless his Government was not worried about the future conduct of the Allies, I made various allusions to the French and English press and also to speeches by various Allied Ministers, in particular to the need for action by the new Reynaud Cabinet. M. Richert declared on his own accord that Churchill's latest speech³ was not encouraging; nevertheless his Government assessed the situation as he had stated it.

The Minister then asked me point-blank whether I could give him any information about reports which were circulating to the effect that German troops and transports were being concentrated near Stettin. When I asked M. Richert in return whether he was connecting this point with the matter he had mentioned at first, he denied this. I added that I knew absolutely nothing about such military reports. I was not informed about our military movements. Furthermore it was, of course, not the custom in time of war to give information on military matters to third persons, not even to close friends.

When M. Richert insisted on asking whether I could not make inquiries, I once more replied in the same terms.⁴

Submitted herewith to the Foreign Minister.

WEIZSÄCKER

² See vol. VIII, documents Nos. 568, 615, and 618.

³ Apparently a reference to Churchill's broadcast speech of Mar. 30. Text in *The War Speeches of the Rt. Hon. Winston S. Churchill*, vol. I, pp. 155-158.

⁴ Richert sent both a telegraphic and a written report on this interview to the Swedish Foreign Ministry. These are printed in the Swedish Foreign Ministry's publication *Handlingar rörande Sveriges politik under andra världskriget: Förspellet till det tyska angreppet på Danmark och Norge den 9 April 1940* (Stockholm, 1947), pp. 196, 198-200.

No. 39

8589/E602677

Führer's Directive

TOP SECRET MILITARY

BERLIN, April 2, 1940.

The Führer and Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht
OKW/WFA Abt.L.Nr.22128/40 g.K.Chefs.

The Führer and Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht has ordered the execution of *Weserübung*¹ and has called attention to the

¹ Code name for the attack on Denmark and Norway; cf. vol. VIII, especially documents Nos. 537 and 644.

Jodl recorded in his diary, entry for Apr. 2 (Nuremberg document 1800-PS) that at a meeting of Hitler with Göring, Raeder, and Falkenhorst at 3:30 p. m. on that day the Führer ordered that *Weserübung* be carried out on Apr. 9.

particular importance of preserving secrecy with regard to the impending measures. *Wesertag* is Apr. 9, 1940; *Weserzeit* 5:15 a.m.

By order:
KEITEL

No. 40

73/52297

The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 613 of April 1

ROME, April 2, 1940—3:30 p.m.

Received April 2—4:55 p.m.

With reference to my telegram No. 591 of March 28.¹

Concerning the Teleki visit,² Count Ciano told me that the talks showed that Hungary continued to judge the situation quietly and, consistent with the political line laid down on the occasion of Csáky's visit in Venice,³ would seek to realize by peaceful means its revisionist claims while the present conflict was going on.

MACKENSEN

¹ Not printed (73/52295).

² Teleki had been in Rome from Mar. 23-28, 1940.

³ Csáky had gone to Venice for talks with Ciano on Jan. 6-7, 1940. Information which came to the Foreign Ministry concerning what was said is contained in Mackensen's telegrams Nos. 41 of Jan. 10 and 59 of Jan. 11 (73/52150-51; 52163) and Erdmannsdorff's telegram No. 29 of Jan. 11 (73/52158-61).

No. 41

9514/E671818-19

Directive of the Chief of the High Command of the Wehrmacht¹

BERLIN, April 2, 1940.

WFA/Abt.L No. 22125/40 g.Kdos (IV)

Subject: Occupation of Denmark and Norway

The Führer has directed that the escape of the Kings of Denmark and Norway from their countries at the time of the occupation must be prevented by all means.

The necessary measures will be undertaken by the Plenipotentiaries of the Foreign Ministry in cooperation with the military commanders. It will be essential to keep the residences of the sovereigns under close surveillance and, if necessary, to prevent the Kings from leaving their palaces. The military commanders are to take the military

¹ The table of distribution shows that this directive went to the Commander, Group XXI, the Commander, Corps Command for Special Operations XXXI, and to offices in OKW.

measures necessary therefore independently until further arrangements are made through the Plenipotentiaries. In the manner in which these measures are carried out due regard will be given to the positions of the sovereigns so far as that is possible.

The duration and extent of the measures of surveillance will further be dependent upon the attitude and conduct of the sovereigns.

*The Chief of the High Command
of the Wehrmacht*
KETTEL

To the Foreign Ministry:

The foregoing communication of the High Command of the Wehrmacht to the military commanders is forwarded with the request that appropriate directions be given to the German Plenipotentiaries in Oslo and Copenhagen.

The Chief of the High Command
of the Wehrmacht
By order:
J[ODL]

No. 42

2953/576582-87

*The Chief of the High Command of the Wehrmacht to the
Foreign Ministry*

BERLIN, April 2, 1940.

WFA/Abt.L Nr.22127/40 g.K.(IV)

Subject: The occupation of Denmark and Norway.

1) The following documents relative to the occupation of Denmark and Norway prepared by the High Command of the Wehrmacht are forwarded herewith: ¹

Annex 1—Basic military demands on the Danish and Norwegian Governments.²

Annex 2—Further desires of the Wehrmacht for bringing about cooperation with the Danish and Norwegian Governments.

Annexes 3a and 3b—Proposals by the Wehrmacht for regulating general economic questions and those relating to military economy. (annex 3a—Denmark, annex 3b—Norway).

Annex 4—Extract from the special orders of the High Command of the Wehrmacht for Group XXI.

¹ This document and its annexes appear to have been sent to the Foreign Ministry as enclosures to Kettel's letter of Apr. 3; see document No. 43. The annexes are not printed here (2953/576588-615) but are to be found in the publication of the Danish parliamentary Commission *Beretning til Folketinget . . . vedrørende forholdene ved Danmarks besættelse den 9. April 1940* (Copenhagen, 1951), vol. XII, *Bilag*, pp. 119-133.

² See documents Nos. 53 and 66, footnote 1.

Annex 5—List of the requests to be made to the highest Reich authorities by the Wehrmacht in connection with the occupation of Denmark and Norway.³

Annex 6—Military demands on the Swedish Government.⁴

2) The basic military demands contained in annex 1 must be communicated to the Danish and Norwegian Governments as soon as the occupation is announced, in order to ensure that the military operations are carried out smoothly. In order to ensure the element of military surprise the handing over of the notes in Copenhagen and Oslo must occur simultaneously with the commencement of the landing and the crossing of the frontier. In order to prevent unnecessary bloodshed and put a stop quickly to any hostilities which may break out, it will therefore be necessary to obtain very quickly from the Danish and Norwegian Governments a preliminary general decision as to their attitude toward the German demands.

If this preliminary decision is to refrain from any resistance and is for peaceful cooperation, both the Danish and Norwegian armed forces, the local authorities, and the population, and also the German occupation troops must be notified by the speediest means possible. In this connection wireless communications en clair are not permitted (radio, wireless messages) in order to keep the events secret from enemy states as long as possible. Thus, there is left only the possibility of wireless communication in cipher (and in a cipher not known to enemy states) and also telephonic communication. The Governments of the two countries must be asked to arrange for their departments to be notified as soon as possible despite these difficulties. The observance of the ban on en clair wireless communication is to be supervised.

Should the Danish and Norwegian Governments refuse to comply with Germany's demands they must be prevented as far as at all possible from issuing orders for resistance by wireless or telegraph.

3) In order to safeguard military interests from the outset and to assist the Plenipotentiaries when settling military questions, the following will be appointed by the Commander of Group XXI to serve with the Plenipotentiaries:

With the Plenipotentiary accredited to the Danish Government: Major General Himer, Chief of the General Staff of Corps Command XXXI.

With the Plenipotentiary accredited to the Norwegian Government: Lieutenant Colonel Pohlmann of the General Staff, the senior General Staff officer of Group XXI.

³ Annex 5 included only extracts from the requests to be directed to the higher Reich authorities. A letter of Apr. 9 from Keitel to the Führer's Deputy and the higher Reich authorities concerning these requests is document No. 78.

⁴ For the demands as presented to the Swedish Government on Apr. 9, see document No. 55.

These military commissioners will travel with the Plenipotentiaries to Copenhagen and Oslo. Their first task is to see that by the speedy notification of the German occupation troops, the occupation is carried out according to plan and as far as possible without fighting. In this connection they will communicate the preliminary result of the diplomatic démarches to the occupation troops by means of a prearranged signal through the broadcasting stations at Copenhagen and Oslo. The Danish and Norwegian Governments are to be asked to make the broadcasting stations available for this without delay.

Independently of this the Plenipotentiaries are requested to inform the commander of Group XXI, who will at first be in Hamburg on the day appointed for the occupation, as quickly as possible of the result of the diplomatic démarches. Apart from the direct telegraphic link the wireless channels between the Legations in Copenhagen and Oslo and the Foreign Ministry are available as a means of communication. For the first message it will also be appropriate to use in this case the wireless signals prescribed for notifying the occupation troops. The Foreign Ministry is requested to effect immediate onward transmission to the High Command of the Wehrmacht (National Defense Department) from which Group XXI will be notified. Onward transmission of situation reports from Copenhagen to the Commander of Corps Command XXXI will be effected through Group XXI.

The Plenipotentiaries are furthermore requested to acquaint the German career Consuls in Denmark and Norway with the agreements made with the governments of these countries as soon as possible by telephone and to instruct them to offer the commanding officers of the troops entering these countries their services in reaching agreements with the local authorities.

4) In order to keep the operation secret for as long as possible and to delay English countermeasures, it will be necessary to stop as quickly as possible communications between the enemy representatives in Denmark and Norway and the outside world. In addition it will be necessary to cut the representatives' telephone lines and secure their wireless apparatus.

The Plenipotentiaries are requested to arrange for the necessary measures to be taken in Copenhagen and Oslo without delay at the commencement of the occupation. The Wehrmacht authorities have been instructed to provide military personnel for carrying these out if requested to do so.

In other places commanding officers have received orders to take the initial measures which cannot be postponed, pending the arrival of instructions from the Plenipotentiaries. The orders given to the

commanding officers for this purpose are to be found in annex 4, section 8.

5) The detailed implementation of the basic military demands and the fulfillment of the further requirements contained in annex 2 for ensuring smooth cooperation with the governments and local authorities will follow the initial basic moves as soon as possible. The officers assigned under paragraph 3 are at the disposal of the Plenipotentiaries for conducting negotiations on military questions. It is furthermore requested that action should be taken in closest consultation with the first senior German commander to arrive in each capital.

6) Annexes 3a and 3b contain first the initial economic measures which from the point of view of the Wehrmacht appear necessary to ensure that the commencement of the occupation runs as smoothly as possible. They then contain proposals on the lines to be taken subsequently in the interests of war and armament economy. On the day fixed for the occupation, the High Command of the Wehrmacht will submit these proposals to the Commissioner for the Four Year Plan and the General Plenipotentiary for Economic Affairs with the request that they should approve and take them into consideration in connection with general economic measures.

7) The "special orders for Group XXI" announced in annex 4 provide guidance for the initial action by the commanding officers in so far as the latter are obliged to take steps of a political, administrative, or economic nature in order to accomplish their military tasks pending the arrival of instructions from the Plenipotentiaries.

8) Since, by order of the Führer, the highest Reich authorities must not be notified until the day fixed for the occupation, the requests to be made to their departments on behalf of the Wehrmacht will not be communicated to them until this same day. These requests are listed in annex 5.

9) The High Command of the Wehrmacht asks to be informed of the contents and exact time of the démarche which is to be made to the Swedish Government (annex 6), so that the Wehrmacht authorities concerned may be notified of this and military measures arranged accordingly. For the same reason notification is requested as soon as possible of the result of the démarche and especially the Swedish Government's reply to the military demands.

10) It is furthermore considered necessary to assure the cooperation between the German Plenipotentiaries in Copenhagen and Oslo and the commanding officers of the occupation troops by close personal agreement beforehand. It is requested that in connection with this the Plenipotentiary in Oslo should be referred to the Commander of Group XXI and the Plenipotentiary in Copenhagen to the Com-

mander of Corps Command XXXI. Personal contact before the departure of the Plenipotentiaries is necessary for the smooth course of the occupation.

*The Chief of the High Command
of the Wehrmacht*
KEITEL

No. 43

Nuremberg Document 629-D
Exhibit GB-141

*The Chief of the High Command of the Wehrmacht to the
Foreign Minister*

TOP SECRET MILITARY

BERLIN, April 3, 1940.

WFA/Abt. L No. 22126/40 g. k. (IV)

DEAR HERR VON RIBBENTROP: The military occupation of Denmark and Norway has been, by command of the Führer, long in preparation by the High Command of the Wehrmacht. The High Command of the Wehrmacht has therefore had ample time to occupy itself with all the questions connected with the carrying out of this operation. The time at your disposal for the political preparation of this operation is on the contrary very much shorter. I believe therefore that I am acting in accordance with your own ideas not only in transmitting to you herewith ¹ those wishes of the Wehrmacht which must be fulfilled by the Governments in Oslo, Copenhagen, and Stockholm for purely military reasons, but also by including a series of requests, which certainly concern the Wehrmacht only indirectly, but which are, however, of the greatest importance for the fulfillment of its task.

I would request, in order to bring about complete agreement in action, that personal contact between the German Plenipotentiaries and the military commanders appointed for Oslo and Copenhagen be established as soon as possible. The entire direction of the military operation is in the hands of General of Infantry von Falkenhorst, Commander of Group XXI. Under him, the occupation of Denmark will be directed by Corps Command for special Operations XXXI [*Höhere Kommando s.b.V. XXXI*] Commander, General of the Air Force Kaupisch.

In accordance with the Führer's specific instructions, may I furthermore request, that the number of persons participating in the preparations be restricted to the fewest possible. Apart from the Foreign Ministry and the High Command of the Wehrmacht, other higher Reich authorities and similar offices are not in principle par-

¹ Apparently a reference to document No. 42.

ticipating. The information necessary for the higher Reich authorities will only be given on the day of occupation itself by the High Command of the Wehrmacht.²

Heil Hitler,

Yours, etc.

K[ETTEL]

² See document No. 76.

No. 44

B21/B005496

The Chargé d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, April 3, 1940—1:12 p. m.

No. 527 of April 3

Received April 3—12 midnight.

A reliable and tried confidential agent who is very friendly with the director of the code room [*Leiter Chiffrierbüros*] of the State Department reports as follows after having seen the relevant telegraphic reports:

1) Kennedy reports serious differences of opinion between London and Paris. The French were "fed up"¹ and desired to loosen the close ties with England. Laval was emerging as Reynaud's probable successor. In order to make France keep in with them, the English Government had promised her the Rhine-Ruhr district after final victory and after the division of Germany into the constituent parts as before 1870.

2) Phillips reports a dispute between Mussolini and Ciano. Ciano, who made no secret of his pro-Allied sympathies, had been sharply reprimanded by Mussolini. Mussolini had declared that he would not dream of ever being disloyal to the Führer.

THOMSEN

¹ In English in the original.

No. 45

B21/B005497-99

The Embassy in the United States to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

URGENT

WASHINGTON, April 4, 1940—1:02 a. m.

No. 538 of April 3

Received April 4—3:00 p. m.

For OKW Foreign Department [*Ausland*]; the Luftwaffe Operations Staff; and the Army General Staff via the Attaché Group.

With reference to my telegrams Nos. 489¹ and 469.²

Schedule of plane deliveries to the Allies.

¹ Not found.

² Not printed (B21/B005457-58). This telegram of Mar. 29 analyzed American aircraft production potential and possible deliveries to the Allies in light of official statements.

347875-56—10

A. The following are the reasons why negotiations concerning airplane deliveries to the Allies, which had been carried on for 3 months, were suddenly concluded, upon Roosevelt's intervention, on a basis previously rejected by the Government and the armed forces:

First: Support of the Allies.

English propaganda has been rather successful of late in spreading the view that Germany has shown herself to be the enemy of the democracies and capitalism and would therefore in the event of victory jeopardize the American economic system and the value of the American gold holdings. The situation of the Allies was serious, a German victory possible, and hope for an early peace had vanished. Roosevelt's decision for early support of the Allies by means of planes is geared to this mood of many Americans who are opposed to American participation in the war and emphatically desire the end of the war. The willingness to sell a considerable number of planes to the Allies is intended to suggest to American public opinion and world opinion that in this way the danger of an Allied defeat would be averted. Germany would then be endangered within a foreseeable time; the German food supply would collapse in the autumn; the blockade would be intensified, especially with reference to Swedish iron ore and Russian oil and also as a result of closing the "back doors" in the Pacific Ocean; and there would be the threat of Allied intervention in the Near East, etc.

Second: Considerations of American domestic policy.

The Presidential election year is also affecting armament policy. The prospects of Roosevelt and the Democrats are endangered by the mediocre economic situation and the increase in unemployment. Roosevelt would like to make the expected billion dollar plane order of the Allies effective as soon as possible in the interest of the economy and economic confidence, and to improve sentiment in Congress through savings in the Army budget resulting from the cut in deliveries to the Air Force.

B. Effect of these measures on the military preparedness of the nation.

With reference to the assertion that the American aircraft and engine industry will, through the Allied orders, achieve a considerable increase in its capacity to strengthen American military preparedness, it should be stated that the industry will probably not expand very much further for the time being, but will strive for a greater volume of production by increasing the number of workers, introducing three shifts, and improving the machine-tool equipment. The essential point is that the Army Air Force will probably fulfill its plans with regard to personnel, but will not achieve its hitherto planned expansion as regards equipment before the middle of 1941. It is willing to give up a still to be approved plane reserve since obsolescence is feared and it is believed that the latest equipment can be obtained sufficiently quickly in case war threatens. This consideration is evidently also acceptable to the American armed forces because it coincides with the basic idea of the present Army organization, which

provides for a small army that is ready for action, but allows a period of several months for organizing a large expeditionary army. In the future an air force of about 3,500 planes, which in case of mobilization could be expanded within several months, would be in keeping with such an army of preparedness.

For the present, therefore, these measures can be interpreted as abandonment of preparations for speedy active intervention in an overseas war.

C. There are other limitations, too, as regards the American aviation industry, and it is well to differentiate between fact and propaganda.

The assertion that the American aviation industry can achieve an annual production rate of about 30,000 to 40,000 planes by the end of this year does not become more credible by frequent repetition. The Chief of the Air Force has estimated a monthly output of 1,200 planes for the beginning of next year. Probable deliveries to the Allies for the period from April to December of this year are calculated as follows:

Maximum capacity for delivery of multi-engine planes is approximately 2,150. From this number should be deducted approximately 200 commercial planes which have priority and approximately 700 planes for the American armed forces. That leaves a maximum of 1,250 bombers for the Allies.

Maximum capacity for delivery of fighter planes is approximately 2,000. From this should be deducted approximately 700 for the American armed forces and about 400 for the neutrals. That leaves a maximum of 900 fighter planes for the Allies.

In addition there may be some training planes for the national training program, which have no significance for war operations. The above figures have been calculated on the basis of the best available data and are the top figures which can for the present be considered in determining relative strength. The volume of deliveries to the American armed forces is, of course, only an estimate. If deliveries to the armed forces decrease, the share of the Allies will increase.

The Allies received 242 bombers, 12 training planes, and no fighter planes in January and February of this year. I would advise restraint in the German press and *Interavia*,³ since Jewish propaganda here will, as heretofore, utilize any German criticism in order to spur on the competitive spirit of the domestic aviation industry and contribute toward a speedy settlement of the current difficult price negotiations between the Allies and industry.

BÖTTICHER
THOMSEN

³ A publication devoted to aviation developments.

No. 46

8230/E585468-74

Führer's Directive

CHEFSACHE

BERLIN, APRIL 4, 1940.

TOP SECRET MILITARY

The Führer and Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht

No. 22140/40 g. Kdos. Chfs.

By officer only

The Wehrmacht discussions with Italy which were interrupted by the war¹ are to be resumed with the aim of finding a speedy solution for all questions which would arise on the entry of Italy into the war.

For this purpose I hereby order:

(1) The *conduct* of the discussions shall be in the hands of the OKW.

The *High Command of the Wehrmacht* will first, in a basic discussion, explain the strategic-operational aim of the joint conduct of the war.

The principles for this are contained in the enclosures separately for the eventuality that Italy

- (a) agrees to a joint operation in the German theater of war,
- (b) does not intend to do this.

Apart from this, the OKW also has the task of carrying out discussions in special spheres (communications [*Nachrichtenverbindungen*], military propaganda, counterintelligence, armament economy).

(2) The High Commands of the Wehrmacht branches will for their part initiate discussions of an *operational* nature only when they have the results under (1) before them.

Until then it is permissible for the *High Command of the Army*, within the limits of the arrangements made at the wish of the Italian General Staff, to enter into discussions without delay.

The *High Commands of the Navy and the Luftwaffe* may likewise without further permission agree to Italian requests for discussions which come within the limits fixed last year.²

The communication of experiences from the Polish campaign may be offered to the Italians.

Intentions and results are to be reported to me via OKW (WFA/Abt. L.).

(3) *Fall Gelb*³ and *Weserübung* must not be the subject of discussions in any way before the operations begin.

Questions of joint command are also excluded for the time being.

(4) In the further course of the discussions the establishment of a *liaison staff* will be necessary.

¹ See vol. VI, documents Nos. 57, 459, 527, 546 and 717, and Appendix, "Italo-German Staff Talks."

² See vol. VI, Appendix, "Italo-German Staff Talks", No. 11 as regards the Luftwaffe, and No. 16 as regards the Navy.

³ Code name for German operation against the Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxembourg.

I request the Commander in Chief of the Army in this connection to nominate to me a General, who at the same time will be available for purposes of the High Command of the Army.

ADOLF HITLER

[Enclosure 1]

REQUESTS TO ITALY IN THE CASE OF ITALY ENTERING INTO A JOINT OPERATION IN THE GERMAN THEATER OF WAR

I. *West European theater of war*

(1) *The war will be decided in the West European theater of war.* During the offensive in the west, therefore, all efforts, including Italy's, must be directed to the defeat of the enemy forces in France. In view of the difficulties of the terrain on the Alpine front, apart from holding down French forces there nothing much can be achieved. It is in the interest of the joint conduct of the war, therefore, to transfer the strongest possible Italian forces to Germany. They would be used here on the offensive on the German southern flank on an independent task which would reduce the unavoidable difficulties of an allied war as much as possible.

(2) For this the following operations are necessary:

(a) *Army:*

(1) Transport of at least 20 Italian divisions to the upper Rhine front for an attack through the south Vosges-Burgundy gateway.

(2) Holding down *part* of the French forces by activity on the Italian Alpine frontier.

(b) *Luftwaffe:*

(1) The employment of a large part of the Italian Air Force in south Germany in support of the attacking operation on the upper Rhine and the conduct of attacks by both air forces in close cooperation.

(2) Pinning down French air defense forces in southern France by conducting attacks from northern Italy.

(3) Strengthening the Italian air defense in northern Italy according to arrangements yet to be made.

II. *Subsidiary theaters of war*

(1) In theaters of war away from the west front the main thing is to tie up enemy aircraft and to disrupt or cut enemy lines of communication.

The Balkans:

It is in the common interest to keep the Balkans quiet. Operations on own initiative are therefore undesirable, also with a view to Russia.

Should the Balkans nevertheless be drawn into the conflict then it is of importance to prevent the enemy from establishing himself there: by Italy in Greece, Yugoslavia, and the Straits; by Germany in Rumania; and through support from both countries to Bulgaria.

Mediterranean:

It is important to tie up extensive British-French naval, air, and land forces in the Mediterranean area and to prevent their use in the Balkans, and particularly in the western theater of war. For this the disruption of the enemy's east-west communications in the Mediterranean and the ending of the British naval domination in the eastern part, including the blocking of the Suez Canal, is of particular importance.

(2) From the foregoing the following tasks arise:

(a) Naval forces

(1) The disruption, or where this is not possible, the disturbance of enemy sea communications in the Mediterranean. In addition to the enemy's east-west communications, which will be interrupted anyhow by Italy's entry into the war, it is particularly important to eliminate enemy sea power in the eastern Mediterranean with the object of keeping enemy activity away from the Balkans and the Black Sea.

In the western Mediterranean the French north-south communications are fruitful objects of attack.

(2) Prevention of or interference with enemy sea traffic through the Straits of Perin.

(3) Warfare against merchant shipping outside the Mediterranean after agreement between the two naval staffs.

(4) Possibility of the use of the Italian bases in Africa by our forces waging warfare on merchant shipping.

(b) Air Force

Participation in the conduct of the war in the Mediterranean and possibly in the Balkans.

[Enclosure 2]

REQUESTS TO ITALY IN THE CASE OF ITALY NOT ENTERING INTO A JOINT OPERATION IN THE GERMAN THEATER OF WAR

Army

(1) An attack with strong forces on the Alpine front, an attack against Corsica.

(2) Treatment of the subsidiary theaters of war as envisaged in enclosure 1.

Air Force

(1) Use of the Italian Air Force against France in close cooperation with the German air warfare command.

(2) The strengthening of the Italian air defenses to the extent promised by the Führer.

(3) Participation in the conduct of the war in the Mediterranean and possibly in the Balkans.

Navy

As in enclosure 1.

No. 47

205/142083-84

The Chargé d'Affaires in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

No. 383 of April 4

To be kept secret

STOCKHOLM, April 4, 1940.

Received April 5.

Received by telephone.

Foreign Minister Günther asked me to come to see him today in order to discuss the political situation. He started by saying that a great deal had been written and said lately about the threat of intervention by the Western Powers in Scandinavia. On the other hand the Swedish Government had reports that large bodies of troops were massed in northern Germany, especially in Stettin and near other Baltic ports.¹ He thought it important that it should be made clear to the German Government regarding the actual situation as seen by the Swedish Government, and he had instructed the Swedish Minister in Berlin to make an explanation accordingly to State Secretary von Weizsäcker.² The Swedish Government had no reason whatever to believe in imminent action by the Western Powers against Scandinavia. On the contrary, on the strength of all official reports and other recent information they regarded the situation much more calmly. In particular, Günther did not believe at all in the possibility of a surprise British attack on the Swedish ore region being carried out via Narvik. Sweden had a very strong force of troops in the north at the present time which could frustrate any such attempt, and Sweden continued to be determined to repel by force of arms any violation of her territory. Without wishing to prophesy, Günther did not believe in an English attack against Norway, even though naturally he could not speak of this with the same degree of certainty as he could of Sweden, but in any case the Norwegian Government, with which he was in close contact, took the same view. In comparison with Sweden's total deliveries of ore to Germany, which would soon be possible again in the Baltic, the amount carried from Narvik was too small to make the great risk worth while for England. Günther regarded the threatening statements in the press of the Western Powers on the subject more as an attempt to provoke Germany.

The Swedish Government had no fears regarding Russia either. Günther mentioned here that the project for a Scandinavian defensive alliance was not a matter which could be developed quickly and there could be no question of any threatening attitude toward Russia. Fur-

¹ For such reports in the possession of the Swedish Government see *Förspælet till det tyska angreppet på Danmark och Norge den 9 April 1940*, pp. 186-227.

² See document No. 38.

thermore, the Swedish Government was not even thoroughly acquainted with the occasion² of the Finnish Government on the project, which the latter had brought up during the final stage of the peace negotiations.

In conclusion Günther requested me to report his statements to my Government and repeated that the Swedish Government considered it of the greatest importance that the German Government should not gain an erroneous impression of the existence of circumstances which would give rise even to the possibility—he would not use the word necessity—of special German measures regarding Scandinavia.

From the cautious way in which Günther expressed himself, I had the impression that he was filled with a certain amount of anxiety about a possible impending German initiative in a northerly direction. It is possible that the message in today's *Aftonbladet* about a report by the journalist Steer to the *Daily Telegraph*⁴ has been partly responsible (I refer you to today's DNB report from Stockholm). This is confirmed by the statement made by Secretary General [*Kabinettsekretär*] Boheman, who before going into the Minister's room asked me jokingly whether I had read the dreadful news in *Aftonbladet*.

BELOW

² The German text here reads *Angelegenheit*.

⁴ An article by George Steer appeared on the first page of the London *Daily Telegraph* of Apr. 4 in which it was stated that troops and transports were being assembled in German Baltic ports.

No. 48

174/186281

The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

SECRET

TOKYO, April 5, 1940—9:20 a. m.

No. 313 of April 5

Received April 5—9:15 p. m.

I would draw attention to DNB bulletin No. 494 from Tokyo¹ regarding the statement made by a spokesman of the Naval Ministry on Japan's attitude in the event of English blockade measures in Japanese waters. The spokesman described the Sea of Japan as "Japan's Odessa pond"² and stated that she would strongly oppose the involvement of this region in the European conflict. On the other hand, the Naval Staff has given me to understand in strict confidence through the Naval Attaché³ that the Navy would greatly welcome the appearance of German naval forces, especially submarines, in Japanese waters. Any success by them would also be

¹ Not found.

² In English in the original.

³ Captain Lietzmann.

enthusiastically received by the people. The Navy would be prepared to give all possible assistance.

OTT

No. 49

220/148261

The Legation in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT
No. 386 of April 5

STOCKHOLM, April 5, 1940—2:40 p. m.
Received April 5—6:35 p. m.
[Pol. I M 4819.]¹

Invo for OKH.

Swedish military and government circles are gravely concerned about possible military preventive measures by Germany in Scandinavia in reply to the announcement of intensified warfare by the Western Powers.² Swedish and Norwegian military and government authorities do not regard military measures by the Western Powers against Scandinavia as probable. Press statements by the Western Powers on this subject are attempts to provoke Germany.

Military Attaché
BELOW

¹ The file number has been ascertained from the journal.

² The reference is to British and French notes of Apr. 5 to the Swedish and Norwegian Governments. The texts of the notes to the Swedish Government are in *Förspålet till det tyska angreppet på Danmark och Norge den 9 April 1940*, pp. 235-240. See also document No. 58.

No. 50

2097/453135

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

URGENT
SECRET
No. 637 of April 5

Moscow, April 6, 1940—5:09 a. m.
Received April 6—8:10 a. m.

Mikoyan called attention in our talk today to the peculiar role played by Japan, who made it impossible to effect shipments destined for Germany but consigned to the Soviets, by informing the British of every cargo leaving for Vladivostok or Dairen; she had even provocatively stated that goods demonstrably destined only for the Soviet Union were being purchased for Germany. This conduct on

the part of Japan was making it difficult for the Soviet Government to purchase raw materials for Germany.¹

I would be glad to have your reaction.²

SCHULENBURG

¹ Marginal note: "Wiehl or deputy. To be discussed. R[ibbentrop]."

Unsigned marginal note: "Transit prohibition for tin and rubber, other raw materials license obligatory. In the last few days, signs that enough is to be let through unofficially."

² No reply has been found.

No. 51

108/112090-100

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

Moscow, April 6, 1940—5:10 a. m.

No. 635 of April 5

Received April 6—10:20 a. m.

With reference to my telegram No. 631 of April 5.¹

In a detailed discussion with Mikoyan I made use of the arguments contained in telegrams Nos. 573² and 577³ to demand emphatically the resumption of the deliveries of grain and oil, and in so doing I encountered strong opposition from Mikoyan. It took lengthy persuasion before Mikoyan at last declared his willingness to issue instructions for the resumption of delivery before the end of this month, provided that an appreciable part of the German coal consignments promised for April had reached the Soviet Union by then.

Mikoyan countered my objections with the fact that, notwithstanding all the German promises, not a single ton of German coal had arrived on Soviet territory to date. Compared with Soviet deliveries to Germany since August 1939 of a total value of 66.5 million RM, German deliveries only amounted to 5.5 million RM. As long as there was no decided change for the better in this respect and no actual German deliveries were made, there could be no question of a resumption of deliveries of Soviet grain and oil.

Mikoyan confirmed that Tevosyan and Savchenko were very satisfied with their reception by Field Marshal Göring and grateful for

¹ Not printed (3783/E041789). In this telegram Schulenburg reported that the Embassy had expressed to Ambassador Shkvartsev, who was temporarily in Moscow, its astonishment over the cessation of grain and oil deliveries and had demanded that deliveries be resumed. Schulenburg stated further that he himself had an appointment to see Mikoyan about the matter very soon. See document No. 32, footnote 2.

² See document No. 32, footnote 1.

³ Not printed (3783/E041790). In this telegram Schnurre asked for immediate report whether oil and grain deliveries were to be continued and included in the quota of the anticipated agreement. In case deliveries were stopped, the Embassy was instructed to tell Mikoyan with all emphasis and urgency that they should be resumed.

the assurances given them. On their fulfillment depended the further attitude of the Soviet Government which could not for long appear only in the role of the giver.

Mikoyan answered my criticism of Soviet price policy by saying that agreement on pre-war prices had to be taken *cum grano salis*. The Soviet Government understood perfectly that in the case of particular German products, certain increases in price were justified. The Soviet Government had, for its part, accepted the German coal prices, although it knew quite well that these were 30-40 percent higher than the price increase which Germany was getting from Sweden and Italy.

Regarding the question of further negotiations on oil and grain deliveries, Mikoyan said that Sojusnefte-Export and Exporto-chleb had received instructions to continue or, as the case may be, to resume the conditions, prices, dates of delivery, and quantities. He was sure that agreement on prices would not present any problem either.⁴ A representative of the Reich Grain Office could therefore come here again.

SCHULENBURG

⁴ See document No. 70.

No. 52

220/148267

The State Secretary to the Legation in Sweden

Telegram

MOST URGENT

No. 274

BERLIN, APRIL 7, 1940.

zu Pol. I M 4819 g.¹

Drafting Officer: Counselor of Legation v. d. Heyden-Rynsch.

With reference to your telegram No. 386.¹

For information only.

The Legation in Helsinki received on April 3 the following instruction² with reference to a similar communication from the Military Attaché in Helsinki.

"Reports of concentrations of shipping in Baltic ports are completely erroneous. Assertions about German military designs in the Baltic area can doubtless be traced to British propaganda tricks.

"Please inform the Military Attaché to this effect and if the matter is mentioned to you react accordingly."

WEIZSÄCKER

¹ Document No. 40.

² Sent as the Foreign Ministry's telegram No. 159 to Helsinki (220/148260).

No. 53

2953/576623-57

The Foreign Minister to the Minister in Norway

BERLIN, April 7, 1940.

For your personal information.

1) It has come to the knowledge of the Reich Government that, despite accounts to the contrary, England and France intend in the next few days to proceed to occupy a number of important military bases on the Scandinavian coast.

2) The Reich Government has therefore decided to forestall this attempt by England and France at the last minute.

German troops will therefore occupy a large number of important Norwegian and Danish bases with effect from 5:15 a. m., German summer time, on April 9 or will already have begun to enter Denmark, as the case may be.

3) The aim of these measures is solely to prevent Scandinavia from being made by England and France into a theater of war on Germany's flank.

4) During your interview with the Foreign Minister, or audience with the King, as the case may be, your task, Herr Minister, will be to make it clear to the one or the other that the aim of the German measures is exclusively as stated above.

Your task is furthermore to leave no doubt that these measures will be carried out in one way or another and that the resources employed by the Reich Government are so enormous that any resistance is out of the question; that the more smoothly the German measures proceed the more quickly the country can be made secure against being drawn into the war; that it is therefore in the Government's own interests to put a stop to any resistance immediately. Should the Government state that it is unable to do so and resign, then it would be for you to join in an attempt to influence the formation of a new pro-German government or to suggest it, as the case may be.

Your most important task, Herr Minister, is therefore to ensure in all circumstances that by means of immediate orders on the lines of the enclosed statement of German military requirements all resistance is avoided or else suspended immediately. Your supreme task, Herr Minister, is to achieve this.

5) You will receive enclosed herewith three envelopes numbered I, II, and III. You will first open envelope I, which, in addition to the information here, contains precise instructions for your démarche which is to be carried out at 5:20 a. m., German summer time, on April 9. As soon as you have familiarized yourself with it you will open en-

velope II. This contains the memorandum to be handed to the Norwegian Government together with the note which is also to be delivered. You should then open envelope III. This envelope contains a carbon copy of a letter from the High Command of the Wehrmacht to the Foreign Ministry together with six annexes dealing with the course and further execution of the whole operation.¹ You will likewise familiarize yourself with this set of documents. It contains further instructions for you as Plenipotentiary of the Reich; however, these instructions have no direct bearing on your initial démarche, but you will have to make use of them in the further course of the operations.

RIBBENTROP

[Enclosure]

BERLIN, April 7, 1940.

I

You are hereby directed to hand over personally to the Norwegian Foreign Minister at 5:20 a. m. (sharp) on April 9 the originals of the enclosed memorandum and note,² a carbon copy of each of which is appended for you. You must ensure that you are received by the Foreign Minister at this hour. The requisite application and other preparations for the visit must not, however, in any case be made before 5 a. m. No hint whatever as to the nature of the démarche is to be given when making the application; it may only be stated that it is a question of an urgent matter which brooks no delay.

II

Should it prove impossible to reach the Norwegian Foreign Minister at the hour mentioned, the démarche is to be made with the Minister President. Should it not be possible to reach the latter either, the Foreign Minister's deputy should be sought out.

III

At the interview the memorandum is to be handed over together with the note and at the same time the following points are to be emphasized orally:

1) The information in the possession of the Reich Government regarding impending action by the English and French against Norwegian sovereign territory is incontrovertible. The Reich Govern-

¹ Document No. 42.

² The two documents were headed in the original, respectively, *Memorandum* and *Aufzeichnung*.

ment has therefore been unable to postpone its security measures any longer. As a result of the rapid development of events it has not been possible either for them to inform the Norwegian Government sooner. The German operations will probably materialize at the very moment of your visit.

2) The attention of the Norwegian Government is particularly to be drawn to the concluding part of the memorandum and the binding assurances contained therein. The Reich Government is convinced that Germany's action is in the well-understood interests of Norway, since in view of the plans of the English and the French this action is the only possibility of preventing Norway from becoming a theater for direct operations. Nothing could therefore be further from the Reich Government's mind than a hostile act against Norway.

3) The Reich Government therefore definitely expects that the Norwegian Government will with the greatest speed issue orders that no resistance is to be offered and will comply with the other German demands set forth in the note. The consequence of any resistance on Norway's part would inevitably be to aggravate the situation for Norway to an extent which could not be foreseen. The Norwegian Government should also be left in no doubt that any resistance to the German operations which are being carried out with powerful forces will be utterly senseless and in vain and that in view of the security measures taken by Germany (mines and U-boats) Norway cannot even count on intervention by a third party.

4) The Reich Government expects an immediate declaration of assent by the Norwegian Government. As soon as you receive this declaration you should immediately get in touch with the Norwegian Government regarding the clarification of the other separate questions resulting from Germany's action.

IV

At approximately 3:45 a. m.³ in a manner not outwardly apparent and without giving or hinting at the reason you will arrange for your deputy to be at the Legation an hour before the *démarche* is made, that is at 4 a. m.⁴ The Military Attaché is also to be summoned to the Legation in the same manner and for the same hour.⁴ These gentlemen are then to be informed orally by you so that during your absence they may be available at the Legation to the commanding officers of the German troops who are entering the country. Lieutenant Colonel Pohlmann, who is accompanying the special courier from here and is receiving the necessary orders here will also be present at this discussion at 4 a. m.⁴ The remaining members of the Legation staff are not to be summoned to the Legation by you or your deputy until 5:30 a. m.⁵

³ Unsigned marginal note: "2:45."

⁴ Unsigned marginal note: "3 a. m."

⁵ Unsigned marginal note: "4:30 a. m."

V

You will report the result of your démarche to the Minister's Secretariat at the Foreign Ministry by telephone with the greatest possible speed.

At the same time it must be borne in mind that communications between Oslo and Germany pass through Swedish territory, so that telephone messages may only be given in camouflaged language not understood by a third person.

Should it prove impossible to send a message by telephone, the wireless channel between the Legation and the Foreign Ministry will be used. In this case the wireless signals in the possession of Lieutenant Colonel Pohlmann are to be employed as far as possible. Should these wireless signals prove inadequate the message should be encoded. Besides these two kinds of message a short message in cipher should in any case be telegraphed also.

VI

It is of particular importance that the King of Norway should in any case be prevented from leaving the country when it is occupied. You should arrange for the necessary measures to be taken in agreement with the military commanders. It will be necessary to keep a close watch on the residence of the King and, if need be, to prevent him from leaving his palace. The position of the Head of the State should be respected as far as possible in the manner in which these measures are put into effect. The duration and extent of the observation measures should continue to be made dependent on the attitude and conduct of the King.

VII

Your further tasks to be performed later are shown in the appended carbon copy of a secret letter from the High Command of the Wehrmacht of April 2 together with annexes.* You yourself are the Plenipotentiary of the Reich referred to in this letter and its annexes. The contents of annex 1 to this letter correspond to the note already mentioned above which is to be delivered to the Norwegian Government at your first démarche. The following observations are made on the remaining annexes to the letter :

1) The assignment of German commissioners to the most important Norwegian ministries, as mentioned in paragraph 2 of annex 2, cannot be done immediately. Further instructions are reserved in this matter. The same applies as regards the appointment of German liaison staff to the local authorities of the domestic administration which is mentioned in paragraph 4 of this annex.

* See document No. 42 and footnote 1.

2) The economic demands and those relating to war economy, which are to be regarded as particularly urgent and are listed in paragraph 1 of annex 3b, had better not be put forward immediately at the time of your first démarche but only when the fundamental attitude of the Norwegian Government has been clarified. If developments in the situation permit, this would have to be done during the morning of April 9.

3) The High Command of the Wehrmacht will at our suggestion supplement the orders to the German occupation troops as set forth in annex 4 of its letter by stipulating that special care is to be given to the correct treatment of all neutral Diplomatic Missions in Norway and also to the correct treatment of the nationals of powers which are friendly toward us (Italy, Russia, Spain, and Japan) and also of the United States. Furthermore the High Command of the Wehrmacht will issue orders that the archives of enemy Consulates are to be respected.

Finally, the High Command of the Wehrmacht will issue orders that not only warships and merchant ships of the United States but also of Italy, Spain, Japan, and the Soviet Union may sail freely (annex 4, paragraph 11). You will for your part ensure that there are no incidents in this connection.

VIII

It is naturally understood that the Legation is also to keep me continuously informed about developments in the situation by the quickest means after the initial message mentioned above. The manner in which this is done will depend on the situation at the time. Lieutenant Colonel Pohlmann will be available to advise you.

IX

All the times given above are to be taken as being German summer time.

RIBBENTROP

[Subenclosure 1]

APRIL 9, 1940.

MEMORANDUM

Contrary to the sincere desire of the German people and their Government to live in peace and amity with the English and French peoples, and in spite of the absence of any reasonable grounds for a conflict between them, those in power in London and Paris declared war on the German people.

With the unleashing of this war of aggression against the existence of the German Reich and the German people for which they had long been preparing, England and France also started a maritime war against the neutral world.

While with complete disregard of the most elementary rules of international law they sought to direct a hunger blockade against German women, children, and old people, at the same time they subjected neutral states to their ruthless blockade measures. The immediate consequences of these methods of warfare initiated by England and France, which are contrary to international law and which had to be met by Germany with countermeasures, were the most severe damage to neutral shipping and to neutral trade. This English procedure, however, dealt the very concept of neutrality a shattering blow.

Yet Germany, for her part, has made serious efforts to preserve the rights of neutral countries by her endeavors to limit maritime warfare to maritime zones lying between Germany and her opponents. In contrast to this, England, with the object of diverting danger from her own islands and at the same time of preventing German trade with neutral countries, has expended greater and greater efforts on carrying maritime warfare into neutral waters. In pursuance of this truly British method of waging war, England has taken belligerent action at sea and in the air and even in the territorial waters and on the territory of Denmark and Norway to an ever increasing degree and in flagrant breach of international law.

From the outbreak of the war Germany had foreseen this development. Through her economic policy at home and abroad she has known how to frustrate the attempt made by the British to set up a hunger blockade against the German people and to prevent the strangulation of German trade with neutral states.

This has caused the complete collapse of the British blockade policy to become increasingly evident in recent months.

This development, together with the hopelessness of any direct attack on German western defenses and the growing anxiety in England and France in the face of the successful German counterattacks at sea and in the air, has recently caused both nations to make increasingly serious efforts by every means in their power to transfer the theater of war to the neutral *mainland* both within and outside Europe. It goes without saying that following the British tradition, England and France, in making these attempts, have the territories of the small European states *primarily* in view. During recent months English and French statesmen have quite openly proclaimed the extension of the war to these territories to be the fundamental strategical concept of their conduct of the war.

The Russo-Finnish conflict offered the first occasion for this. The English and French Governments expressed quite openly their intention to intervene with military force in the conflict between Soviet Russia and Finland, and to use the territory of the northern states as a base of operations for this purpose. Only the early conclusion of

peace in the north, which occurred contrary to their wishes and expectation, hindered them from putting this decision into effect at that time. When the English and French statesmen subsequently declared that they had intended to make the carrying out of this action dependent upon the concurrence of the northern states, that is a gross untruth. *The Reich Government has documentary proof in its possession showing that England and France had together decided, if necessary, to carry out the action through the territories of the northern states even against their will.*

The decisive factor is, however, the following:

From the attitude of the French and the English Governments before and after the conclusion of the Soviet-Finnish peace, and from the documentary evidence in the hands of the Reich Government, there is indisputable proof that the decision to assist Finland against Russia should over and above that serve to aid further plans.

The further aim of England and France in Scandinavia was and is rather:

1. By the occupation of Narvik to cut off Germany from her ore supply route from the north.

2. By the landing of English and French fighting forces in Scandinavian countries to establish a new front in order to attack Germany's flank from the north.

In this way the northern countries would serve as a theater of war for the English and French forces, while the northern people in accordance with age-long English tradition would be allotted the role of auxiliary and mercenary troops. As by reason of the conclusion of the Finnish-Russian peace this plan was frustrated, it then became even clearer to the Reich Government that England and France were making definite endeavors immediately to realize and develop their plans in a different way. With the continued necessity of preparing an intervention in the north, the English and French Governments in recent weeks have openly proclaimed the thesis that there could be no neutrality in this war, and that it was the duty of small countries actively to take part in the war against Germany. This thesis was spread abroad by propaganda from the Western Powers, supported by ever-increasing political pressure on the neutral countries. Definite reports of forthcoming endeavors by the Western Powers to land in Scandinavia have increased recently. If there ever was the slightest doubt regarding the definite intention of the Western Powers to intervene in the north, it has finally been removed during the last few days: *The Reich Government has in its possession conclusive evidence that England and France intended to effect a surprise occupation of certain territories in the northern countries within the next few days.*

The northern countries have on their part not only not offered any resistance to these encroachments by England and France thus far,

but have even tolerated without taking any countermeasures the gravest encroachments on their sovereign rights.

The Reich Government must, consequently, assume that the Royal Norwegian Government will adopt the same attitude toward the action now being planned and about to be carried out by England and France. But even if the Royal Norwegian Government had been intending to take countermeasures, the Reich Government is quite certain that the Norwegian military forces would not be sufficient to be able to oppose the English-French operations successfully.

In this decisive phase of the fight for existence forced on the German people by England and France, the Reich Government can in no circumstances tolerate that Scandinavia should be made by the Western Powers the theater of war against Germany, and that the Norwegian people, whether directly or indirectly, be misused in a war against Germany.

Germany does not intend to await idly or to put up with such a realization of her opponents' plans. The Reich Government therefore has today begun certain military operations, which will lead to the occupation of strategically important points on Norwegian territory. The Reich Government therewith undertakes the protection of the Kingdom of Norway for the duration of the war. It has resolved, from now on, to protect and definitely assure peace in the north with all its power against any English-French attack.

The Reich Government did not wish this development. England and France alone bear the responsibility. Both States proclaim quite hypocritically the protection of small countries. In reality, however, they offer violence to them in the hope of being able thereby to realize their will to destroy, directed against Germany and every day proclaimed more openly.

The German troops therefore do not set foot on Norwegian soil as enemies. The German High Command does not intend to make use of the points occupied by German troops as bases for operations against England, as long as it is not forced to do so by measures taken by England and France. On the contrary German military operations aim exclusively at protecting the north against the proposed occupation of Norwegian bases by English-French forces.

The Reich Government is convinced that by this action it is at the same time serving Norway's interests. *For this protection by the German Wehrmacht offers the Scandinavian peoples the only guarantee that during this war their countries will not become a field of battle or the scene, perhaps, of most terrible engagements.*

The Reich Government therefore expects that the Royal Norwegian Government and the Norwegian people will respond with understanding to the German action and offer no resistance to it. Any resistance

would have to be and would be broken by all possible means by the German forces employed and would therefore lead only to absolutely useless bloodshed. The Royal Norwegian Government is therefore requested to take all measures with the greatest speed to ensure that the advance of the German troops may take place smoothly and without difficulties.

In the spirit of the good relations between Germany and Norway which have existed hitherto, the Reich Government declares to the Royal Norwegian Government that Germany has no intention of infringing by her measures the territorial integrity and political independence of the Kingdom of Norway now or in the future.

[Subenclosure 2]

NOTE

The Reich Government requests the Royal Norwegian Government to adopt the following measures immediately :

1) An appeal by the Government to the people and the armed forces to refrain from any resistance to the German troops when they occupy the country.

2) An order to the Norwegian armed forces to establish contact with the German troops entering the country and to make the necessary arrangements with the German commanding officers regarding loyal cooperation. The Norwegian troops will be allowed to retain their arms as far as their conduct warrants it.

As a sign of willingness to cooperate the white flag of truce is to be flown side by side with the national flag on military installations which German troops are approaching.

Liaison detachments are to be sent to :

- a) the commanding officer of the German troops entering the capital (officers from the Army, Navy, and the Air Force).
- b) the local commanding officer.

The German commanding officer will in return detail liaison officers for service with the Norwegian commanders in chief.

It is the duty of the liaison detachments to ensure smooth cooperation and prevent clashes between German and Norwegian troops.

3) The handing over intact of military apparatus and installations which are required by German troops to make Norway safe from an enemy from without, particularly the installations for coastal defense.

4) The provision of the most detailed information regarding any mine fields laid by the Norwegian Government.

5) The imposition of a complete blackout in Norwegian territory from the evening of the first day of the occupation.

6) The maintenance intact and in service and the safeguarding of the machinery of transport and communications.

The transportation system (railways), inland and coastal shipping, and communications at the disposal of the German occupation troops as are required for the tasks of the German troops and their supply.

7) A ban on sailings by warships and merchant ships to foreign countries and the grounding of all aircraft.

The release of shipping bound for German and neutral Baltic ports will be reserved.

8) Instructions for Norwegian pilots to continue to provide their services as ordered to do so by the German authorities and that light-house service on the Norwegian coast be maintained in accordance with orders from the German authorities.

9) The maintenance of the present meteorological service, which is to be placed at the disposal of the German occupation troops. The publication of weather reports is to cease.

10) A ban on all communications and postal services by sea with foreign countries. Communications and postal services with Baltic States are to be restricted to fixed routes and supervised on instructions from the commander of the occupation troops.

11) Instructions to the press and radio not to give out military information without the approval of German Wehrmacht authorities. Radio stations are to be made available for broadcasting announcements by the German commanding officers.

12) A ban on the export of raw material from Norway to foreign countries.

13) The transmission of all the appeals and orders to be issued by the Royal Norwegian Government on the basis of the above-mentioned points may at first be effected in so far as wireless is used only in code—in a code which Germany's enemies do not know. The raising of the ban on wireless telegraphy en clair through radio stations is reserved to the commander of the occupation troops.

No. 54

354/203141-42

*The Foreign Minister to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union*¹

BERLIN, April 7, 1940.

Received Moscow, April 9.

You receive herewith two copies of a memorandum² which will be presented by our Ministers in Oslo and Copenhagen on April 9, at 5:20 a. m., German summer time, to the Governments concerned. Until the step which you are instructed below to take has been carried out, the strictest secrecy is to be maintained with regard to the memorandum and this instruction, and no mention thereof is to be made even to any other member of the Embassy.

On April 9, at 7 a. m., German summer time, you are requested to ask for an interview with M. Molotov, and during the course of the morning, to hand him a copy of the memorandum.

You will kindly emphasize orally that we had absolutely reliable reports regarding an imminent thrust of Anglo-French military

¹This document and its enclosure were brought to Moscow by Senior Counselor von Saucken (telegram No. 598 of April 7, Weizsäcker to Moscow: 8836/E614879).

²Document No. 53, subenclosure 1.

forces against the Norwegian and Danish coasts and therefore had to act without delay. As outlined in the memorandum, it is a matter of security measures. Swedish or Finnish territory will in no way be affected by our action.

The Reich Government is of the opinion that our actions are also in the interest of the Soviet Union, for execution of the Anglo-French plan, which is known to us, would have caused Scandinavia to become a theater of war, and that, in all probability, would have led to a re-opening of the Finnish question.

Please report immediately by telegram how your communication is received.²

RIBBENTROP

² See document No. 73.

No. 55

30/22578-81

The Foreign Minister to the Minister in Sweden

APRIL 7, 1940.

1) You receive herewith two copies of a memorandum¹ which will be delivered by our Ministers in Oslo and Copenhagen to the Governments there at 5:20 a. m. on April 9.

Until the step which you are instructed below to take has been carried out, the strictest secrecy is to be maintained with regard to the memorandum and this instruction, and no mention thereof is to be made even to any other member of the Legation.

2) On April 9 at 6 a. m. please call on the Foreign Minister. Your request to be received by him must not be made before 5:30 a. m. and the only reason given should be that you have an important communication to make to him. You should not mention the memorandum at this first stage but only inform the Foreign Minister orally as follows:

You had received instructions from Berlin to the effect that you would have a long communication to transmit to the Foreign Minister. For this purpose you were now requesting a second interview at 8 a. m. You could, however, already inform the Foreign Minister, in accordance with instructions from the Reich Government, that it was in possession of accurate and definite information regarding an imminent English-French action against the Norwegian and Danish coasts, and had therefore been compelled to decide on certain immediate safety measures of a military nature. In no circumstances would Swedish territory or territorial waters be affected by the German measures. You were making this preliminary communication before the arrival of the instruction referred to from Berlin, in order to prevent the Swedish Government from receiving wrong impressions through rumors of one kind or another.

¹ Document No. 53, subenclosure 1.

3) Then I request you to call on the Foreign Minister again at 8 a.m. and hand him a copy of the memorandum as well as of the note enclosed herewith, at which time you should add the following orally:

Swedish interests would in no way be harmed by our move. On the contrary, our measures would have the effect of securing the territories of the Scandinavian States against becoming a theater of war. Moreover, our operation would be carried out by such large forces that resistance against it from whatever side would be completely hopeless and therefore senseless. We were therefore taking it for granted that Sweden would remain perfectly calm and would also not encourage the Danish and Norwegian Governments to adopt an attitude of rejection. Our demands which will be made on the Swedish Government are set out in detail in the note. You were reserving the right to bring up other questions arising from the German precautionary measures later on after clarification of the situation in Denmark and Norway. (Instructions regarding these further questions will be communicated later.)

4) Should you not be able to carry out the above démarche with the Foreign Minister at the time indicated, then you should visit the Swedish Minister President, or in case you cannot see him either, the Foreign Minister's representative.

5) After each of these two steps please report the result immediately by telephone to the office of the Foreign Minister. Should transmission of the report by telephone not be possible, please report at once by means of cipher telegram.²

6) All the times given above are to be understood as German summer time.

² See document No. 78.

[Enclosure]

NOTE

1. The German Government expects Sweden to observe the strictest neutrality: to refrain from any kind of measures directed against the German occupation of Denmark and Norway, particularly military mobilization and the deployment of troops.

2. The German Government requests that Swedish warships in their own interests should not for the present sail outside Swedish territorial waters (3 nautical miles) in the Kattegat, the Sound, and along the south coast of Sweden as far as Karlskrona. When the situation has been clarified this restriction on the freedom of movement of Swedish warships will be abolished.

3. The German Government expects that where the lines pass through Sweden, there will be no interference with the telegraph and telephone services used by German official quarters in Norway.

4. The German Government expects that ore deliveries to Germany will be maintained (prevention of acts of sabotage inspired by England).

No. 56

2281/481821-28

The Foreign Minister to the Ambassador in Italy

BERLIN, April 7, 1940.

You receive herewith two copies of a memorandum¹ which will be presented by our Ministers in Oslo and Copenhagen to the Governments concerned at 5:20 a. m., German summer time, on April 9.

Until the step which you are instructed to take has been carried out, the strictest secrecy is to be maintained with regard to the memorandum and this instruction, and no mention thereof is to be made even to any other member of the Embassy.

On April 9, as early in the morning as you consider possible according to the conditions there, perhaps about 6 o'clock, German summer time, please call on Count Ciano in order to hand him the memorandum. In making the request to be received, you should only say that you had urgent information for Count Ciano.

At your visit you should supplement the statements in the memorandum orally as follows: We had absolutely reliable information that an attack by Anglo-French forces against the Norwegian and Danish coasts was imminent. For this reason we had to act at once. Our operation was purely a security measure but would necessitate the occupation of strategically important points in Norway and Denmark, including both capitals. The operation would be carried out with such strong military forces that we were not expecting any serious resistance which, even if it did occur, would be easily crushed.

You had reason to believe that the Führer would also inform the Duce directly. Nevertheless, I had attached great importance to informing Count Ciano as quickly as possible for my own part. I was asking him to pass on your information to the Duce at once.

RIBBENTROP

P. S. Meanwhile the Führer had written a letter to the Duce direct, which I also enclose herewith.² You should ask to be received by the Duce at some suitable time and hand him the letter in the course of the morning of April 9, at the earliest possible moment after the Duce has begun work for the day.

¹ Document No. 53, subenclosure 1.

² See document No. 68.

No. 57

220/148270-71

The Minister in Denmark to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

COPENHAGEN, April 8, 1940—10:10 a. m.

No. 271 of April 8

Received April 8—1:25 p. m.

Although the serious character of the Western Powers' notes to Sweden and Norway¹ is becoming more and more apparent, reports from Stockholm and Oslo published in this morning's press are trying to play down the wider implications of the English attack on Scandinavian neutrality and to represent the position more optimistically with regard to the Western Powers. This astonishing attitude is explained in part by reluctance to believe in sharp measures by the English and in part by the desire not to add fresh fuel to German apprehensions. The fact that in authoritative quarters here there is undoubtedly very great anxiety about a possible development in the political situation in the north has been revealed to me for instance by the interest shown by persons close to Foreign Minister Munch as to whether German forces, which according to Danish reports were held in readiness in Schleswig-Holstein and the Baltic ports, have now after the end of the Finnish conflict been withdrawn.

Alarmist reports from Germany about the situation in Scandinavia are being given prominence this morning in the press, in which it is particularly noted that authoritative German circles are said to be reckoning with the extension of the theater of war to Scandinavia at any moment.

I have the impression, however, that in spite of warnings, people here had not, up to this morning, fully realized the gravity of the situation.

RENTHE-FINK

¹ The texts of these notes are in the Swedish Foreign Ministry's publication *Förspellet till det tyska angreppet på Danmark och Norge den 9 April 1940*, pp. 261-270.

No. 58

220/148277

Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department

IMMEDIATE

BERLIN, April 8, 1940.

Minister Bräuer telephoned from Oslo at 12 noon today and inquired whether the reports from English and French sources were already known here, according to which English mines were being laid

in Norwegian waters, to which I replied in the affirmative. Confirmation of these reports had just come from Consul Nolda at Trondheim (cf. annex).¹

Herr Bräuer added moreover that the British and French Ministers had delivered notes to the Norwegian Foreign Minister at 6 o'clock that morning which, no doubt, related to this mine field.² Herr Bräuer emphasized that they were not the British and French notes already reported on Sunday.³

Herr Bräuer referred us, furthermore, to his telegram No. 467 of April 6⁴ and to the report No. 1859 of the same day,⁵ which proved that England was using force against Norway in the matter of chartering ships.

WOERMANN

¹ Not printed (220/148278).

² See document No. 57, footnote 1.

³ This is a reference to the British and French notes of Apr. 5. See document No. 49, footnote 2.

⁴ Not printed (22/18918-14).

⁵ Not printed (9868/E693032-38).

No. 59

220/148279

Memorandum by the Head of Political Division VI

BERLIN, April 8, 1940.

Minister von Renthe-Fink in Copenhagen telephoned to me at 12:20 p. m. today and said that he had this morning informed Minister Mohr, the State Secretary in the Foreign Ministry, that England had laid mines in Norwegian territorial waters. M. Mohr had had no information about this so far, and doubted the accuracy of this report. Sometime after, however, he telephoned to Minister von Renthe-Fink and told him that he had ascertained in Oslo that the information had proved correct.

He had not been able to learn anything as to the attitude of the Norwegian Government, because the Norwegian Cabinet was in session at the time; the Danish Cabinet was likewise meeting.

M. Mohr had to admit to Minister von Renthe-Fink that he had been mistaken, after hearing the Minister's statements, in continuing to hold the opinion that England would respect Scandinavia's neutrality.

Minister von Renthe-Fink described the situation in Scandinavia to M. Mohr as extremely grave as a result of the English action.

GRUNDHEER

No. 60

220/148287-88

The Minister in Norway to the Foreign Ministry

Telephone Message

OSLO, April 8, 1940—3:35 p. m.

1) The (Norwegian) Government has made the following announcement jointly with the [Storting] Committee on Foreign Policy:

The British and French Governments have this morning caused mines to be laid in Norwegian territorial waters at three points with the object of blocking free navigation within Norwegian territorial waters, and British warships have been detailed to patrol this area.

The Norwegian Government is making a firm and solemn protest against this open breach of international law and such violent infringement of Norwegian sovereignty and neutrality. Throughout the whole of this war Norway has observed all the rules of neutrality with the greatest care, and it was in full accordance with these universally recognized rules, that Norway has kept her waters open to all legitimate shipping of belligerent countries.

If the British and French Governments have now undertaken steps to block export traffic to Germany, the Norwegian Government must remind them of the pact which the British Government had signed with Norway on March 11 declaring its agreement to the sale and delivery of Norwegian goods from here to Germany, among them even goods which count as contraband of war.¹ On that account the Norwegian Government should have still less reason to expect the Allied Governments to intervene by force and seek to block these deliveries. The Norwegian Government can in no way countenance the laying of mines by belligerent countries in Norwegian territorial waters. They must demand that such mines be removed at once and that patrolling by foreign warships should cease. The Norwegian Government must reserve the right to take the appropriate steps which such a violation of neutrality would warrant.

2) In authoritative official and political circles the situation is considered extremely grave. According to the latest reports several large warships have been sighted in Norwegian territorial waters up to within half a mile of the coast. As STB (Norwegian telegraphic bureau) reports, Norway's entire coastal traffic has had to be stopped.

3) *Dagbladet* reports that this morning large German naval forces were passing through the Kattegat on a northerly course.

BRÄUER

¹ In his review of Norwegian foreign policy before the Storting on Apr. 6 Foreign Minister Koht had referred to the conclusion of agreements regulating Norwegian wartime trade negotiated with Germany on Feb. 23 (3072/012811-16 and 3520/E021179-81) and with Great Britain on Mar. 11. He had stated that Norway was prepared to negotiate a similar agreement with France. Bräuer reported these statements in his telegram No. 471 of Apr. 6, received in Berlin at 10 a. m. on Apr. 7 (22/18916-19).

No. 61

3638/E028406

The Minister in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

No. 400 of April 8

STOCKHOLM, April 8, 1940—3: 55 p. m.

Received April 8—7: 15 p. m.

Pol. VI 875.

I called on Foreign Minister Günther today in order to learn Swedish opinion on the Allied course of action toward Norway. Günther declared that the Swedish Government condemned in the strongest terms the flagrant violation of Norwegian neutrality by the Western Powers. When I repeated that the violation of neutrality might quite conceivably very soon spread to Sweden, the Foreign Minister assured me that he did not believe in such a development, but in any case the Swedish armed forces would resist by force of arms any violation of the integrity of Swedish sovereign territory.

In connection with information he had received, according to which a strong German naval force with troopships had already passed the Sound in a northerly direction, Günther expressed the hope that Sweden would not be affected by any measures that might be taken by Germany.

WIED

No. 62

220/148299

The Minister in Denmark to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

No. 274 of April 8

COPENHAGEN, April 8, 1940—7: 16 p. m.

Received April 8—10: 40 p. m.

For the State Secretary.

The extreme danger of a theater of war starting in the north has caused great disquiet here, and simultaneous reports that German warships and troopships are in the Kattegat have caused the Council of Ministers to occupy itself with the question of what attitude to take if Germany were to make demands of a military nature on Denmark. The Government is aware that it could not resist any German demands but fears that in the case of acquiescence it would be blockaded by England and thus cut off from vital supplies.

The Council of Ministers is, therefore, considering not submitting to possible military demands by Germany completely without resistance, in order thus to establish proof of a "violation".

When the Foreign Minister, who asked me to call on him this after-

noon, put forward such considerations and asked me what Germany intended to do about England's violation of neutrality, I told him that I had no instructions yet and did not know, therefore, whether such a situation would arise at all; nevertheless, I was bound to say that a military clash could certainly only lead to a catastrophe for Denmark. Denmark had, wisely, so far always shown understanding for our military needs and I hoped that this would also be the case in the future.

The Minister was obviously impressed and will, I believe, use his influence this evening in the Council of Ministers to the effect that, if military demands should prove necessary, the Danish Government will in the last resort give way to these under protest but without armed resistance.

RENTHE-FINK

No. 63

220/148298

Memorandum by an Official of Political Division I

BERLIN, April 8, 1940.

zu Pol. I M 4937 g. Ang. IV.¹

Acting on instructions from Under State Secretary Woermann, I informed Minister Bräuer at 7:35 p. m. that pending further instructions he should not take any steps on his own responsibility in the matter of the sunk or torpedoed ships *Rio de Janeiro*, *Kreta*, and *Posedonia*.

Herr Bräuer said that this was his opinion too, and he had already made known to Under State Secretary Woermann in his telephone message this morning at 11 o'clock that, for his part, nothing would be done pending special instructions.

In this connection Herr Bräuer drew attention to the additional information which had since come through regarding the loss of the ships, and said that the questions of an auxiliary cruiser and internment² had been mentioned by a local authority but so far had not been broached to him.

HEYDEN-RYNSCH

¹ Documents filed under number Pol. I M 4937 g. were telephone messages received on Apr. 8 from the Legation in Oslo about the sinking or torpedoing of *Rio de Janeiro* and other German ships. The first message came at 5:40 p. m. (220/140289, 140295-97). The German troop transport *Rio de Janeiro* had been torpedoed and sunk by the former Polish submarine *Orzel* off southern Norway about noon on Apr. 8.

² A message from the Legation in Oslo at 5:45 p. m. had reported that Norwegian naval authorities at Kristiansand, where some survivors of *Rio de Janeiro* had arrived, regarded that vessel as an auxiliary cruiser and were considering the question of internment of its personnel (220/148295-96).

No. 64

220/148204

Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department

BERLIN, April 8, 1940.

Counselor of Embassy Zamboni spoke to me today, apparently without instructions from Rome, about the English action against Norway, at the same time cautiously mentioning current rumors of German military operations. I denied these. Signor Zamboni urgently requested that the Italian Embassy be kept informed regarding the Norwegian affair.

WOERMANN

No. 65

220/148306

The Minister in Norway to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 488 of April 9

OSLO, April 9, 1940.¹

Received April 9—7:50 a. m.

At 5:20 a. m., German time, I presented our demands to the Foreign Minister in firm and energetic terms; I also explained the reasons for them and delivered the memorandum and note.² The Foreign Minister then withdrew to the Council of Ministers assembled in the Foreign Ministry, whereupon I urged the greatest possible speed in making a decision in view of the gravity of the situation. In a few minutes he gave the answer:

We will not submit voluntarily; the struggle is already under way.

BRÄUER

¹ The Oslo Legation copy of this message indicates that it was sent at 5:52 a. m. (2969/578455).

² Document No. 53, subenclosures 1 and 2.

No. 66

220/148322

The Minister in Denmark to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

COPENHAGEN, April 9, 1940—8:34 a. m.

No. 275 of April 9

Received April 9—12:05 p. m.

For the Foreign Minister.

I have carried out the first démarche.¹

After a Cabinet meeting presided over by the King, the Danes accepted all our demands made in the memorandum while registering a protest against our action. According to reports so far available, sporadic shootings which had previously taken place passed off without bloodshed. The Danes are trying to resign themselves to the inevitable with composure and correctness.

So far there are no reports about events outside the capital.

RENTHE-FINK

¹ The instructions for the démarche with the Danish Government have not been found.

For the circumstances of the démarche see Renthe-Fink's detailed report of Apr. 15, document No. 125.

The same memorandum was delivered to the Danish Government as to the Norwegian Government (220/148375/2-76). For the text see document No. 53, subenclosure 1.

A note was also delivered to the Danish Government which was the same *mutatis mutandis* as that delivered to the Norwegian Government (see document No. 53, subenclosure 2), except that item 8 of the note to the Danish Government read:

"(8) Establishment of a temporary embargo on passenger and freight traffic between Denmark and Sweden (stopping the ferry service).

"The resumption of traffic and requirements for its supervision will be dealt with later;"

while item 10 contained the additional paragraph:

"The channels of communication from Denmark to the Faroes, Iceland and Greenland running via England are also to be closed." (220/148377-79)

No. 67

3664/E034172

The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Norway

Telegram

MOST URGENT

BERLIN, April 9, 1940.

No. 345 of April 9

Received April 9—10:55 a. m.

The position in Denmark is as follows:

Action is proceeding smoothly according to plan without clashes. The Danish Government has, it is true, made a formal protest, but has in effect accepted all the German demands, and has wisely placed its neutrality under the protection of Germany.

You will once more impress on the Government there that Norwegian resistance is completely senseless and only calculated to aggravate Norway's position very seriously. Request continued situation report.¹

RIBBENTROP

¹ See document No. 71.

No. 68

9917/E694514-18

*Adolf Hitler to Benito Mussolini*¹

BERLIN, April 9, 1940.

DUCE: In the last few weeks it had become more and more apparent that the British were intending to use the Russo-Finnish conflict as a pretext for turning Scandinavia into a base for the further conduct of the war in the military and economic fields. In the past few days it was clear from the information received from our agents that it was probable that during the current week England would undertake to land troops at two important places on the Norwegian coast:

1) The occupation of separate islands of the Lofoten group and also the occupation of Narvik.

2) The occupation of the island of Storfosna at the entrance to Trondheim Fiord.

On this island the construction of an airfield had been started but we only learned of this a few weeks ago. Whether the landing ground has been completed or not cannot be established from the interpretation of the photographs which were immediately taken by our reconnaissance aircraft; and it is also impossible to ascertain whether the decision to build this characteristic field was made from the start on the basis of an agreement whereby Norwegian circles had accepted the British demands. However, it is a fact that in the hands of the British this base, both naval and air, would have had an importance which must not be underestimated. It controls and eventually could block the whole Norwegian coast. In the last few days we have been directly informed by reliable Norwegian sources—as I have already pointed out—that this occupation by British troops might be expected at any moment and that the Norwegian Government was aware of this but was not in a position to react other than by means of a formal protest owing to a complete lack of adequate means of defense.

The importance of the independence of Norway is decisive for the conduct of the German war of liberation. In view of the effectiveness of English methods, it is to be feared that not only will all transport of iron ore be stopped, but also that England will take possession of the Swedish mines in a short time and above all turn Sweden and Norway into a base for air warfare against Germany. In this case the Baltic would cease to be navigable for us. That would create an intolerable situation for us both from the economic and the military points of view. If Britain should gain a foothold in that area it would be necessary to eject her at all costs. And, naturally, the advantage is with the party which is already established on the ground.

Since it involves a question of vital importance here, neglect of

¹ This document is translated from a photostatic copy of an Italian version of the letter found in a collection of Italian Foreign Ministry documents brought to Lisbon during World War II. The originals were later returned to the Italian Government. No German text of this document has been found.

which could not in any case be subsequently justified, I have taken the decision to have the most important bases in Denmark and Norway occupied this morning by German naval, land, and air forces. The operation has been in progress since 5:15 this morning. Therefore, Duce, I am not at present in a position to give you a detailed picture of military events. I shall provide you with this as soon as possible and perhaps in the course of today, that is, as soon as it is possible to gain some preliminary idea of the effects of the operations which extend over an area of more than a thousand kilometers.

I have been generous in estimating the number of forces for this operation in order to avoid or to overcome any possible counterstroke. *I only wish to assure you, Duce, and this is the chief purpose of this hurried letter, that the present military operations do not affect or make any difference to the account which I gave you or to the decisions of which I informed you on the Brenner.*

It is indeed obvious that the possession of Norway, or of Sweden, by the British would have had catastrophic consequences for Germany, while on the other hand a German success in those sectors cannot have a decisive bearing on the outcome of the war. *The conflict will be decided solely in the West!*

I have followed with profound gratitude the measures which you, Duce, have ordered as far as Italy is concerned.

They have caused profound depression in French and English military circles. I am deeply moved, Duce, by the belief that Providence has chosen us two for the same mission.

Yours,

ADOLF HITLER

No. 69

582/241993-94

The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

TOP SECRET

MOST URGENT

No. 654 of April 9

ROME, April 9, 1940—12: 55 p. m.

Received April 9—2: 30 p. m.

For the Foreign Minister personally.

The Duce, to whom I have just delivered the Führer's letter ¹ at 9 a. m. in the presence of Ciano at the Palazzo Venezia and who had already been informed by Ciano by telephone of the essential content of the memorandum,² said when he had finished reading it: "I approve of

¹ Document No. 68.

² In telegram No. 652 of Apr. 9 (582/241992) Mackensen reported that at 6: 30 a. m. that day he had handed to Ciano the memorandum and made the oral communication in accordance with Ribbentrop's instruction (see document No. 56). According to Mackensen, "Ciano listened to the statements very calmly and remarked that he would have expected rather an offensive against the Maginot Line."

this decision down to the last detail. The Italian people will approve of it in exactly the same way, especially as it is a blow aimed at England. My approval is absolutely 100 percent. This is the way wars are won. He who gets in first is right, speed is everything. The Führer's action will have far-reaching strategic results." Having made these observations the Duce translated the letter word for word for Count Ciano not without emphasizing again and again his entire agreement. His obvious mood of elation was further heightened when Ciano informed him of the occupation of Copenhagen and parts of Denmark which had already been carried out without resistance, as announced by Stefani reports which had just come in. He remarked that resistance was certainly not to be expected either from the Danes or the Norwegians. Besides, developments during the last few days had paved the way well for these events, in particular Koht's speech yesterday.³ The Führer had chosen the right moment for the right decision. He would of course reply personally,⁴ but asked me to convey his thanks.

When Ciano asked whether the memorandum would be published,⁵ I replied that no instructions had reached me about this. He said he thought one could count on its publication with certainty.

MACKENSEN

³ See *Norway and the War, September 1939-December 1940*, edited by Monica Curtis (London, 1941), pp. 43-48.

⁴ See document No. 92.

⁵ Only the document printed as subenclosure 1 of document No. 53 was published by the German press.

No. 70

108/112108

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

Moscow, April 9, 1940—3:50 p. m.

No. 652 of April 9

Received April 9—7:20 p. m.

With reference to my telegram No. 635 of April 5¹ and my telegram No. 650 of April 9.²

Molotov told me today that the cessation of the grain and oil deliveries could be traced to "excessive zeal" of the Soviet export organizations which believed they had acted rightly because Germany was in arrears with her deliveries. As meanwhile Field Marshal Göring had personally given satisfactory assurances³ the fulfillment of which was not doubted here, the Soviet Government had decided to resume grain and oil deliveries with immediate effect.

SCHULENBURG

¹ Document No. 51.

² Not found.

³ See document No. 82.

No. 71

220/148359-60

The Minister in Norway to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 504 of April 9 OSLO (by telephone), April 9, 1940—4:00 p. m.

1) At 1 p.m. I addressed the following appeal to the Government, orally and in writing, through Johannessen, administrative officer at the Foreign Ministry:

In reiterating my appeal of this morning I would once more point out in all earnestness to the Norwegian Government that Norwegian resistance to the action taken by us is completely senseless and only calculated to aggravate Norway's position very seriously. I repeat that Germany has no intention of infringing the territorial integrity or political independence of the Kingdom of Norway by these measures, either now or in the future.

I hear, regarding the situation in Denmark, that the German action is proceeding smoothly according to plan and without hostilities. The Danish Government has, it is true, made a formal protest, but has in effect accepted the German demands, and wisely placed their neutrality under German protection.¹ End of the appeal.

2) I received the Norwegian press just now and handed them this appeal as well as the memorandum of this morning.² I made the position clear and exhorted them to take a sensible view of the situation. I also emphasized to Johannessen and the press the detrimental effect and senselessness of evacuation and met with a certain amount of understanding. I have just heard that the request to evacuate Greater Oslo which was issued this morning has been withdrawn in a broadcast on the Norwegian radio. The evacuation centers have closed down.

BRÄUER

¹ See document No. 67.

² Document No. 53, subenclosure 1.

No. 72

220/148357

The Minister and Plenipotentiary of the German Reich in Denmark to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

COPENHAGEN, April 9, 1940—4:25 p. m.
(Transmitted by telephone.)

At 2 p. m. today I was received in my capacity of Reich Plenipotentiary by the King with Foreign Minister Stauning present. On this occasion I presented to the King Major General Himer as Military Plenipotentiary. The King was deeply moved by events. He expressed the hope that good understanding would be reached between

the Danish population and the German troops. The King also said that he hoped he would be allowed to keep his battalion of guards. In spite of his painful emotions the King expressed his frank amazement at the extraordinary speed and precision of the German troops. After the audience, I was received by the Queen, who also expressed the hope for a good relationship between the Danish population and the troops.

The audience confirmed my impression that the King and the Government were making an effort to stress their intention of a friendly and correct attitude. At the same time there was noticeable respect in the atmosphere of the conversation.

RENTHE-FINK

No. 73

854/203182

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

Moscow, April 9, 1940—5:00 p. m.

SECRET

No. 653 of April 9

For the Foreign Minister in person.

With reference to your instruction of April 7 (delivered by Senior Counselor von Saucken) ¹ and my telegram No. 648 of April 9.²

Instruction carried out with Molotov today at 10:30 a.m., Central European time. Molotov declared that the Soviet Government understood the measures which were forced upon Germany. The English had certainly gone much too far, inasmuch as they had disregarded completely the rights of neutral nations. In conclusion, Molotov said literally: "We wish Germany complete success in her defensive measures."

SCHULENBURG

¹ Document No. 54.

² Not printed (354/203138). In this telegram Schulenburg reported that Saucken had delivered the instruction to him at 7:00 a.m. on Apr. 9.

No. 74

8612/E604109-10

The Director of the Economic Policy Department to the Legations in Hungary, Rumania, Yugoslavia, and Bulgaria

Telegram

No. 305 to Budapest

BERLIN, April 9, 1940—10:00 p. m.

No. 354 to Bucharest

e. o. W IIIa 1768.

No. 249 to Belgrade

No. 193 to Sofia

The newly established English Trading Company Enco [English Commercial Corporation Ltd.] which is financed by the English Government and serves in the intensification of English economic war in the southeast is reported as not merely confining itself to purchases for purposes of interference, but as building up a great organization for placing the whole of England's southeastern trade for the postwar period on a new basis. With this pretense it is obviously intended to remove the anxiety of the southeastern countries that England after the war will again withdraw from them economically.

In your conversations please draw the attention of the Government at your post to these intentions pointing out the well-known reasons (natural and more advantageous economic exchange with Germany, absence of an economic basis for a similar exchange with the Western Powers) for our naturally expecting them, in defense of their economic neutrality and their own interests, to resist with all the means at their disposal the English efforts which ultimately aim at shutting out Germany from the markets there. Furthermore, please observe very carefully all manifestations which could fall within the new company's sphere of action and consider the possibility of counter-action. Particular attention should also be given to business transactions of the enemy powers exceeding the scope of purchases for the sake of interference, by means of which they would get into their hands the production and transport of ores (e. g., influence inside business directorates and ownership of share capital in ore-producing companies as well as in transport companies and organizations which might also be involved).

In the first place please report by telegram ¹ on how [your] step has been received.

The same instructions will be received by the other German Missions in southeastern countries.²

WIEHL

¹ See document No. 148. The reply from Belgrade is telegram No. 290 of Apr. 14 (not printed, 8612/E604116); that from Budapest is telegram No. 226 of Apr. 15 (not printed, 8612/E604117); and from Sofia, telegram No. 153 of Apr. 28 (not printed, 8612/E604132-33). These reports were supplemented by later ones from Clodius, who, being at the time in Bucharest, was instructed on Apr. 15 (telegram No. 397: 8612/E604111) "to visit Sofia, Belgrade, and Budapest on your way back so that in conversations with the Governments there you may emphasize our earnest expectation that they will oppose with all means the efforts of the enemy powers to impede German imports from the southeastern countries." See documents Nos. 182, 191.

² The corresponding instructions to the Legations in Greece and Turkey were sent on Apr. 18 in telegrams Nos. 184 (8612/E604112-13) and 186 (8612/E604114-15).

No. 75

2097/458140-48

Ambassador Ritter to the Embassy in the Soviet Union

Telegram

SECRET

BERLIN, April [9],¹ 1940.No. [604]¹

e. o. W II 1874 g.

With reference to your telegrams 631² and 635³ of April 5.

Mikoyan's attitude respecting the interruption in deliveries of petroleum and grain is so little in keeping with the political and economic principles underlying the German-Soviet treaties that we must ask you to call on Mikoyan and Molotov once again and inform them as follows:

I. The Reich Government expressed its views on the political and economic principles of the economic negotiations and the purpose of the Economic Agreement of February 11, 1940,⁴ in the memorandum which was delivered to Chairman Molotov on February 5.⁵ The Reich Government does not deem it necessary to recapitulate the political and economic ideas which were at that time put forward as the basis of the German point of view regarding Soviet advance deliveries, but would like to make special reference to them again in the present situation. In the conversation which followed the delivery of the memorandum,⁶ M. Stalin also made these ideas the basis of his decision. As he put it, the purpose of the economic agreement should be mutual assistance. The Soviet assistance to Germany was to consist of deliveries of raw materials which should commence at once and be carried through quickly. Both MM. Stalin and Mikoyan frequently described these large-scale deliveries, which were scheduled to be carried through in a comparatively short period, as the help which the Soviet Union wanted to give Germany. According to the terms of the Agreement, re-examination and comparison with German deliveries shall only take place after 6 months. Apart from the delivery of industrial products, German assistance to the Soviet Union was regarded by Stalin as being the delivery of high-grade war material and the availability of German military experience and knowledge for Soviet rearmament. That the German deliveries would get under way more slowly was a foregone conclusion. Hence it was envisaged that conclusions as to the Soviet counterdeliveries could only be drawn after 6 months had elapsed because of the naturally slower flow of German deliveries. In fact, pursuant to the provisions of the Agreement, the German deliveries have been fully prepared and have already been executed in part. It should be noted that most important military material has already been delivered to People's Com-

¹ Ascertained from a registry minute on Moscow telegram No. 670 of Apr. 11 (8835/E614710).

² See document No. 51, footnote 1.

³ Document No. 51.

⁴ Vol. VIII, document No. 607.

⁵ Cf. vol. VIII, documents Nos. 594 and 602.

⁶ See vol. VIII, document No. 600.

missar Tevosyan and General Savchenko before the conclusion of the purchase contracts, and that negotiations for the purchase of numerous and important items in the list of war equipment are, even in the opinion of the Soviet negotiators in Berlin, making favorable progress and in part are about to be concluded. In view of the complicated nature of the deliveries and the manifold Soviet wishes it is natural that the German side will take rather longer to conclude the commercial contracts. The delays are largely occasioned by the Russians, who do not give the necessary technical data and specifications. Particularly troublesome is the fact that the Soviet representatives here keep making additional alterations in their wishes and demands, thus causing loss of time. Field Marshal Göring has furthermore given the Soviet negotiators an express assurance that the Agreement is being fulfilled to the letter on the German side.⁷

In these circumstances Mikoyan's instruction for the cessation of the deliveries of petroleum and grain, which are of special importance for Germany at the present moment, causes astonishment, as this attitude is quite contrary to the political and economic principles of the Agreement laid down by both parties in the conversations with M. Stalin. Mikoyan's attitude is not in accord with the confidence which for both sides is a prerequisite for large-scale and vital deliveries. If the Reich Government on its part is to fulfill the Agreement as contemplated, it must definitely be able to count on the continuity of the raw material deliveries necessary for Germany's war economy. It requests the Soviet Government to acknowledge these political and economic principles of the Agreement in plain and unequivocal terms.

II. Quite apart from this, the transactions and deliveries which have so far resulted from the Credit Agreement⁸ and the Economic Agreement do not justify the Soviet Government in adopting the critical attitude it has taken. Under the Credit Agreement the Soviet Union must take deliveries to the value of 90 million RM. in the first year. The equivalent of only 28.2 million has been delivered under the Credit Agreement. Transactions on list B⁹ of the Credit Agreement alone already amount to 73 million RM. Under the Economic Agreement the Soviet Union has so far delivered the equivalent of 28.7 million RM. Against this, transactions to the extent of about 100 million RM. have already been put through on lists 3 and 5.¹⁰ Negotiations concerning numerous immediately available items on the war equipment lists are progressing favorably and will lead to actual delivery within the first 6 months.

III. Coal.

Mikoyan's assumption that the German coal prices accepted by the Soviet side are 30-40 percent above the Swedish and Italian prices is not correct. The agreed f. o. b. prices correspond very closely to the Swedish prices and are considerably lower than the Italian prices. In the case of prices for delivery at the land frontier, negotiations are still going on at present for a compromise on the increased overland

⁷ See document No. 32.

⁸ See vol VII, document No. 131.

⁹ List B of the Credit Agreement included armament items and other goods to be delivered by German firms against the free balances from current proceeds of Soviet exports.

¹⁰ These lists included items to be delivered by Germany. See vol. VIII, document No. 607, footnotes 6 and 8.

freight rates. If it has not yet been possible to conclude the coal negotiations this also is to be ascribed in particular to the trade conditions put forward by the Soviet side regarding, for example, analysis, guarantees in respect to quality, and delivery in a form which is entirely unusual in the international coal trade. Furthermore, considerable delay has been caused by the fact that specifications as to sorts were communicated only a short time ago in spite of repeated pressure. Notwithstanding the existing difficulties we expect to conclude the commercial contract this week. Already, as described in detail in telegram No. 589 of the 6th of this month,¹¹ a start has been made with deliveries in anticipation of the future contract.

IV. As things have turned out so far, the Reich Government is not as satisfied as it should be with the execution of Soviet deliveries of raw materials as conforming with the idea of mutual assistance. It urgently requests the Soviet Government to make increased and continuous deliveries during the months of the year favorable for transport, and in particular to start immediate and increased deliveries of petroleum and grain.¹²

Please report by telegram.¹³

RITTER

¹¹ Not found.

¹² Marginal note: "Urgent! Min[isterial] dir[ektor] Wiehl in accordance with yesterday's conversation. Schn[ur]re] Apr. 9."

¹³ See document No. 85.

No. 76

220/148326-29

*The Chief of the High Command of the Wehrmacht to the Deputy of the Führer and the Higher Reich Authorities*¹

BERLIN, April 9, 1940.

St.S. No. 145 g. Rs.

Pol. I 417 g. Rs.

WFA/Abt.L Nr.22144/40 g.Kdos (IV)

Subject: Occupation of Denmark and Norway by the German Wehrmacht.

1) In consequence of the threatened danger of an occupation of Norwegian ports and coastal areas by Anglo-French forces, German troops, on the orders of the Führer and Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht, crossed the Danish frontier in the early hours of the morning of April 9 and also landed in Norwegian ports.

At the same time the necessary diplomatic steps were taken with the Danish and Norwegian Governments by political plenipotentiaries appointed by the Führer.

2) The Wehrmacht has orders to render a landing by Allied troops impossible by occupying important bases in Norway, and to establish a safe connection with south Norway by the simultaneous occupation of Denmark. The units of the Wehrmacht detailed for this purpose

¹ See document No. 48.

are under the command of General of Infantry von Falkenhorst, whose official designation is: "Commander, Group XXI."

The troops detailed for the occupation of Denmark are under Corps Command XXXI, commanded by General of the Air Force Kaupisch, subordinate to Commander, Group XXI.

3) The political measures to be taken with the Danish and Norwegian Governments and the extent of German control over the administration and economy of both countries are based on the principle of peaceful occupation, serving to safeguard the neutrality of the northern states. The aim of the political measures is to restrain the Danish and Norwegian Governments from any armed resistance, to induce them to tolerate the German occupation, and to prepare them for loyal cooperation with the German military and civil authorities.

The Governments and administrations of the countries shall continue to function unhindered wherever they are prepared to do so loyally.

The military measures with respect to the authorities and population of both countries take account of this objective.

4) The mission of the Wehrmacht is exclusively military. In political, administrative, and economic matters the occupying troops will only act directly on their own account and intervene or take action in so far as this is absolutely necessary for the execution of their military duties, pending settlement by the civilian authorities.

Measures already introduced by the Wehrmacht, and requests which are still to be submitted in connection with the carrying out of the mission of the Wehrmacht, are set out in the annexes² so far as they concern the various higher Reich authorities.

5) Denmark and Norway are to the fullest extent *operational areas* as defined militarily. In accord with the character of the occupation, however, the competence to exercise executive power will not be vested in the military authorities in this operational area.

The mission of the Commander, Group XXI, is the military protection and defense of the occupied countries. To this end he exercises supreme military authority and is entitled to take all measures necessary for the fulfillment of his military mission. For Denmark these powers have been vested in the Commander, Corps Command XXXI.

6) In nonmilitary matters representation of the German Reich with the Danish and Norwegian Governments will be effected by the Ministers, or by plenipotentiaries appointed by the Foreign Ministry. It will be their duty to communicate the German political and mili-

²These annexes, directed individually to the Four Year Plan, the General Plenipotentiary for Economic Affairs, the Ministry of Transport, the Postal Ministry, the Propaganda Ministry, the Ministry of Finance, and the Reichsführer-SS, are not printed. Copies of all but the last, which has not been found, were distributed in the Foreign Ministry (220/148330-55).

tary demands to the Danish and Norwegian Governments and to supervise the efforts of the Governments of both countries toward fulfilling the German demands and honoring the assurances given by them.

The foreign policy of the Governments of Denmark and Norway will be regulated according to their conduct.

7) The economic life of the occupied countries should continue to run as smoothly as possible. Intervention is to be resorted to only where necessary for the supply and security of the occupying troops and for ensuring the population's food supply. Representatives of the High Command of the Wehrmacht (Military Economy and Armaments Office) are detailed to the plenipotentiaries of the Foreign Ministry with the object of safeguarding German interests in the armament industry.

Both countries will continue as separate customs and currency areas. The fixed rate of exchange between German and Danish and Norwegian currencies, which will obtain until further notice is:

1 Danish crown = 0.50 RM
1 Norwegian crown = 0.60 RM

The occupation forces have orders to pay exclusively in occupation currency [*Reichskreditkassenscheine*] in the occupied countries. Severe restrictions on purchases are imposed on the occupation forces, and the import of goods into the Reich has been prohibited.

8) The German-Danish frontier will be closed to nonmilitary traffic with effect from the commencement of the occupation. There will be a similar ban on nonmilitary traffic from German ports to Denmark and Norway.

The issue to nonmilitary persons of entry permits to Denmark and Norway is reserved to the High Command of the Wehrmacht in cases involving military jurisdiction, and to the Foreign Ministry in cases involving civilian jurisdiction.

Applications for entry permits in cases involving military jurisdiction are to be addressed to the High Command of the Wehrmacht (Amt Ausland/Abwehr-Passstelle).

The frontier will be opened as soon as possible for normal business traffic with Denmark and Norway.

9) Telephone and postal traffic from Denmark and Norway overseas with foreign countries will be stopped; that with the Baltic States limited to certain routes and supervised at the request of the officer commanding the occupation forces.

Other telephone and postal traffic from Denmark and Norway to neutral countries will be directed via Germany, and at the same time supervised.

10) The higher Reich authorities are requested, until further notice, to make any communication which may be necessary with the Commander, Group XXI, via the High Command of the Wehrmacht.

*The Chief of the High Command
of the Wehrmacht*
KEITEL

No. 77

220/148364

Memorandum by an Official of the Cultural Policy Department

BERLIN, April 9, 1940.

In connection with our march into Denmark I have discussed in detail with Oberführer Behrends¹ the lines to be followed governing the conduct of our national group in North Schleswig and for the authorities in the Reich connected with it. I told him that our attitude was as follows:

1. In the Memorandum² we guaranteed Denmark's territorial integrity. The frontier question may therefore not be raised by the national group. Statements such as those made recently in public by Deputy Møller, the leader of the national group, must on no account be made.

2. It is important because of the world press (especially the U. S. A.) that the occupation should proceed smoothly without major incidents. There must therefore be no acts of provocation, no triumphal shouting, and there must be correct behavior toward the Danish authorities.

3. There may be cordial relations with the German Army, but without any anti-Danish tendency. There may be no ostentatious fraternal reunions.

4. The interests of the German national group are to be looked after by the Reich discreetly as hitherto.

Oberführer Behrends agreed with these guiding principles and will impress them strongly on inflammatory circles in the Reich who have already approached the Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle, and also on the leaders of the national group. Within the next few days he will also send his specialist on the subject, Riemann, to North Schleswig for this purpose. I have also spoken in detail to the latter.

I have also arranged with the Reich Ministry of the Interior (Counselor Essen) that instructions to that effect should be issued to our authorities in Schleswig and that unauthorized incursions or frontier crossings into North Schleswig should be prevented.

LORENZ

¹ Of the Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle.

² See document No. 66, footnote 1.

No. 78

220/148391-92

The Minister in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

STOCKHOLM, April 10, 1940—1:00 a. m.

SECRET

Received April 10—7:05 a. m.

No. 409 of April 9

With reference to your telegram No. 278 of the 9th (RAM 128),¹ as well as to the Foreign Minister's instructions of April 7,² and with reference to two telephone messages to the Minister's Secretariat early today.³

The Swedish Foreign Minister received me today at 5 a. m., Swedish time. On my declaration, given in accordance with No. 2 of the instructions mentioned, he showed special interest in the assurance that Swedish territory or territorial waters would on no account be affected by German moves. At 7 a. m., Swedish time, I also personally visited Foreign Minister Günther and carried out the order contained in No. 3 of the instructions. Günther declared that he could give no answer on his own initiative; the Swedish Cabinet would meet at 10 a. m.

To No. 1 of the note he stated that he assumed that the Swedish military precautions already in preparation were not meant. (On April 8 at 10 a. m. the Naval Attaché made inquiries of the Chief of the Naval Command in the Defense Ministry regarding the meaning of the statement of the Defense Staff of April 8. The answer was that it was a question of reinforcing the escorts within Swedish territorial waters by means of auxiliary warships and airplanes.)⁴

Günther also asked whether Germany's attitude to Sweden could undergo a change as a result of possible happenings in Denmark and Norway? I referred to my oral communication in accordance with the last sentence under No. 3 of the instructions of April 7.

Upon telephone instructions from the Reich Foreign Minister this afternoon,⁵ I visited Günther at 5 p. m., Swedish time, to receive the Swedish Government's answer to today's démarche. Günther informed me about the contents of a note not yet then completed, which he sent me at about 6 p. m. In translation, the note runs as follows:

¹ Not found.

² Document No. 55.

³ A record of only one of these telephone messages has been found. In it Minister Wied, at 10:15 a. m. on Apr. 9 (220/148368), reported on his second interview with Günther substantially as in this telegram and asked for instructions regarding the points raised by Günther. Such instructions have not been found.

⁴ In the Minister's telephone message to Berlin (see footnote 3) he had already reported on the statement of the Swedish Defense Staff regarding Swedish escort measures and the answer received by the Naval Attaché to his inquiry.

⁵ No record of these instructions has been found.

"Mr. Minister: In accordance with instructions of your Government you have today handed me a note containing certain requests which your Government, in the present situation, has found it necessary to make of the Swedish Government.

"At the same time you have informed me that there is no intention to involve Sweden in any way in the military moves which have been found necessary in regard to Denmark and Norway.

"With reference to this, I have the honor to transmit the following reply:

"The Swedish Government intends to maintain the policy of neutrality which it has already declared several times during the present war. It must retain complete freedom to take all such precautions as may be considered necessary for the preservation and defense of this neutrality.

"While emphasizing this attitude and this freedom of action, the Swedish Government wishes to inform you that it has not the intention of taking any such measures as are mentioned under paragraph 1 of your note. With reference to the remaining paragraphs of this note, the Swedish Government has likewise no intention of undertaking anything which might give rise to a conflict between the two Governments."

"Please accept, Mr. Minister, the assurance of my highest consideration. Signed, Christian Günther."

A copy and translation of the note follow by courier airplane tomorrow.*

WIED

*The Minister telephoned an account of this interview and a translation of the Swedish note to the Foreign Ministry at 9 p. m. on Apr. 9 (220/148383-84), and forwarded the Swedish text and a translation in his report No. 1544 II of Apr. 9 (8638/E028408-09, 2686/528912). Günther's memorandum of his interview with the German Minister in the afternoon of Apr. 9, and the Swedish text of the Swedish Government's note are in the Swedish Foreign Ministry's publication *Handlingar rörande Sveriges politik under andra världskriget: Transiteringsfrågor och därmed sammanhängande spörsmål April—Juni 1940* (Stockholm, 1947), pp. 4-5.

No. 79

220/148385

Unsigned Memorandum

BERLIN, April 10, 1940.

Minister Bräuer telephoned from Oslo at 1:45 a. m. (German summer time) and said:

The King was willing to receive him today at 11 a. m. at Elverum. He, Bräuer, would go there. As Elverum was 3 hours from Oslo, he expected to be away from the capital for about 7 hours.

Four representatives from the Chamber of Deputies [*Abgeordnetenhaus*] had been nominated by the Storting to negotiate with him about further developments and the restoration of order: Mowinckel, the former Minister President, Koht, the Foreign Minister, Lyche [*Lykke*], a former Minister, and Siunby [*Sundby*] former Minister of Agriculture. They wanted him to hold up the advance of the

troops pending the negotiations with these four representatives. This, however, he definitely refused.¹

In conclusion Minister Bräuer added confidentially that Quisling was having some difficulty; he was meeting strong opposition in all circles in Oslo and the country.²

¹ A memorandum of the Oslo Legation recorded the following telephone conversation with M. Johannessen of the Norwegian Foreign Ministry:

"Minister President Nygaardsvold stated that the King was prepared to receive Minister Bräuer at Elverum under two conditions: (1) that the German advance troops be withdrawn as far as Stange; (2) that the delegation chosen to negotiate all be present at the interview." (2000/578468)

² Quisling had issued a proclamation over the radio on the evening of Apr. 9 stating that the Nygaardsvold Government had fled and that Quisling as leader of the Nasjonal Samling had assumed governmental authority. He announced a list of ministers and called for an end to resistance in order to prevent further destruction. For previous German relations with Quisling, see vol. VIII, documents Nos. 133, 441, 443, 466, 483, 511, and 626.

No. 80

2431/514133-34

The Chargé d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry Telegram

URGENT

WASHINGTON, April 10, 1940—11:17 a. m.

No. 616 of April 10

Received April 11—12:35 p. m.

With reference to my telegrams Nos. 590¹ and 599² of April 9.

I. The first shock to the American public over German action in Scandinavia and the immediate upsurge of sympathy for the northern states and condemnation of the German action were followed by reflections on the significance of the events. The press sees in this a blow against the Allied blockade, increased possibility of a German counter-blockade, and a serious situation for the Allies, who can no longer remain on the defensive. The suddenness of the German action indicates a prepared plan, but high appreciation of German military skill is also strongly expressed as well as the recognition of the political repercussions caused by the entirely new situation. Iceland's declaration of independence³ has considerably reduced concern about danger to the Western Hemisphere. On the whole, the press is at the moment relatively restrained, in spite of its pro-Allied bias, especially as the Roosevelt Government does not see any immediate possibility of giving active support to the Allies, and must avoid anything which, in the election campaign, might earn it the reproach of actively involving America in the European conflict. Typical of the mood in political quarters in the National Capital is today's editorial in the *Washington*

¹ Not printed (2003/586656-57).

² Not printed (220/148380-82).

³ On Apr. 10, the Icelandic Parliament announced that it would exercise the prerogatives formerly vested in the Danish crown. See also document No. 157.

Post, whose example is, in the main, followed by other leading American papers. The text of the article follows en clair.

II. For reasons of electioneering tactics Roosevelt has confined himself thus far to his unimpassioned statement of yesterday, which he essentially intended as an argument against the isolationist critics of his foreign policy, to the effect that his own evaluation of the political and military developments in Europe is and has been correct.

III. From the point of view of American politics I assess the political repercussions of the action in Scandinavia as follows:

a) It is not yet possible to judge whether the prejudicial effect on Roosevelt's chances of reelection achieved through our propaganda attack by means of the Polish documents¹ has been weakened by the military operations in Scandinavia. Roosevelt's position of leader and his chances of reelection have certainly been considerably improved for the moment.

b) Isolationist circles will, indeed, keep to their noninterventionist policy, but they see part of their arguments shattered by the developments of the past few days. Scandinavian voters in the Middle West may begin to waver in the strictly isolationist attitude they have adopted until now.

c) Since the Allied fleet is tied up in the North Sea, America sees herself obliged to watch very carefully developments in the Pacific, where she will be called upon to remain with only herself to rely on and without any real help from other Powers.

THOMSEN

¹ i. e., German White Book No. 3. See documents Nos. 24, 26, and 31.

No. 81

220/148396-07

The Minister and Plenipotentiary of the German Reich in Denmark to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

No. 281 of April 10

COPENHAGEN, April 10, 1940—1:30 p. m.

Received April 10—4:30 p. m.

For the Foreign Minister.

With the end of the military operations, political considerations should be the decisive factor for the further treatment of questions arising now. These considerations indicate that as far as is compatible with military requirements Danish independence should to all *outward appearances* be preserved. This is desirable and possible, as at present there is no resistance either from the Danish Government or from the Head of the Danish State. Increased cooperation with the Government and the King through the existing organs of foreign policy must have a good effect in winning over world opinion, and in particular will make cooperation with the Danes easier.

It therefore seems to me essential that the competence of the Foreign Ministry should be preserved and expressly stipulated in the questions now arising in relations between Germany and Denmark. To make this possible the following is necessary:

1) My relationship to the military commander must from the start be clearly established. I therefore ask to be provided with an instruction specifying that in my capacity as Minister and Plenipotentiary of the Reich I am its highest representative to the Danish Government, so that I will take precedence over the military commander, and that also it is my duty to present the latter to the King and to the Government.

As to the other aspects of my relationship with the military commander, it is also desirable that after the conclusion of the military operations the competence of the military commander should be confined to tasks arising out of the protection and defense of the country while all other tasks of political and otherwise nonmilitary nature should be exclusively within my competence. In its instructions (see annex 4, paragraph 2 of the OKW letter of April 2,¹ forwarded to me with the instruction on April 7²) the High Command of the Wehrmacht has already made a pronouncement in this sense, and I request instructions to that effect from the Foreign Ministry too.³

RENTHE-FINK

¹ See document No. 42.

² See document No. 66, footnote 1.

³ For the instructions see document No. 97.

No. 82

2281/481324-30

Adolf Hitler to Benito Mussolini

MESSAGE FROM THE FÜHRER TRANSMITTED BY TELEPHONE TO THE GERMAN AMBASSADOR IN ROME AT 8:30 P. M. ON APRIL 10, 1940, TO BE DELIVERED TO THE DUCE IMMEDIATELY ¹

BERLIN, April 10, 1940.

DUCE: Yesterday's operation came right in the middle of English preparations for a landing on the Norwegian coast. For weeks we had had proof that English and French officers in civilian dress were making a study of Norwegian ports from the point of view of their suitability for disembarkation of military troop transports. It is therefore not out of the question that such attempts will be made even now or that it is intended to make them. In judging the situation, Duce, it can in general be said that operations are spread over a distance of more than 1500 km., that for this as you know, Duce, the German Navy is unfortunately still very weak, but that we certainly possess decided superiority in the air and that the quality of our infantry in particular

¹ This passage in Italian is found on the original of the copy printed which is from the files of the Rome Embassy.

has once more shown itself. The operation began at 5:15 a. m. and a few hours later had achieved complete success in some places. In other places hard fighting was necessary partly because of weather conditions (fog) and the very strong Norwegian resistance. With unexampled daring our ships sailed through the heaviest fire from fortifications which previously many had thought impregnable. In numerous instances, however, these batteries had to be silenced by the ships' guns at close range. Shock troops of the infantry landing parties disembarked and small detachments of engineers captured a large number of these coastal fortifications and battery positions in conjunction with the Luftwaffe. Almost everywhere it was one man fighting against ten. The result of this struggle is at present as follows:

1. Denmark is completely occupied. Heavy batteries have been installed on the northernmost tip since this morning. All the airfields are held by the Luftwaffe and have been in use since yesterday. Their anti-aircraft defenses are secure.

Very friendly relations have already developed between the Danish population and the German soldiers. There will be no more difficulties here.

2. Norway.

Oslo was attacked by naval forces yesterday. The fiord, which extends a very long way, has fortifications which were actually regarded as impregnable. The German ships performed extraordinary feats in gradually subduing these defense works. The cruiser *Blücher* which sailed into the middle of this narrow passage continued on her course despite damage which was gradually incurred and which became heavier and heavier during a continuous fight with enemy batteries until she eventually ran into an electric mine field and thus met her glorious end. The bearing of officers and crew and also that of the infantry who were on board for the landing operations was outstanding. By continuously throwing in new forces we finally succeeded in overcoming these defenses. The last resistance put up by one battery was actually not broken until noon today. All the fortifications are thus in our hands now. Since then landings of fairly large units have been in progress along the whole of the southern coast of Norway.

Oslo was occupied yesterday first by airborne troops who were continuously reinforced and even during the night they advanced as far as 100 km. north of Oslo and disarmed the Norwegian troops there. The units which had been disembarked are now arriving in Oslo at short intervals. By tomorrow morning there will be approximately two complete infantry divisions around Oslo, apart from the occupation troops.

Kristiansand was also taken and occupied after very heavy fighting. The coast is now firmly in our hands. There are no more Norwegian military forces in these areas.

Stavanger. Stavanger is completely occupied. The German Luftwaffe is already in full working order here.

Bergen is occupied; the batteries there were subdued, captured by our troops and immediately put in order again for defensive purposes.

Trondheim. The coastal batteries there were also subdued, stormed by small forces of shock troops, occupied and also put in order again immediately for defensive purposes. The town of Trondheim has also been in our possession since then.

Narvik. Narvik was occupied, the coastal installations captured and put in order for defensive purposes and all other security precautions taken.

The whole of the German submarine fleet has been assembled off these places.

The transfer of the Luftwaffe is proceeding almost hourly.

Strong English forces attempted to penetrate into Narvik this morning. They were engaged by our ships at the entrance to the fiord and for the greater part destroyed while the remainder withdrew. English claims that coastal guns took part in this are untrue. They never reached the coastal defense zone and the submarine barrier at all. German long range bombers have been circling over Narvik since this afternoon.

A naval engagement which took place yesterday also ended with the destruction of a British destroyer. I cannot give you any information yet, Duce, about the results of further naval engagements since, for reasons which can be easily understood, the ships are using wireless telegraphy very little. Nevertheless I have no doubt that a fairly large number of successful operations have also been fought here. The most decisive event, however, occurred yesterday afternoon: the discovery of the English landing expedition. It was then that the German Luftwaffe scored its greatest success so far. Eighty-eight bombers were sent against this expedition and for the most part engaged the enemy. Quite a number of large British units were hit by heavy bombs. So were two large troop transports.

To sum up, Duce, I should like to assure you that I already regard this step, which was so necessary, as a great success for our cause. Moreover our forces in Norway are being reinforced from hour to hour so that we shall be strong enough to consolidate the position gained or to overcome any possible setbacks. My determination not in any circumstances to abandon to the English the success gained is matched by the determination of the troops. The German people feel that they have escaped a very great danger: for an occupation of Scandinavia by Anglo-French forces would have been very awkward for Germany in her future conduct of the war. This would in any case have diverted a great deal of manpower from the battlefield in which alone the final decision can and will be reached.

Allow me to thank you particularly, Duce, for the attitude and the support of your press and consequently that of public opinion. He who risks as much as we do will always be lonely. The feeling of gratitude for every sign of friendship is, however, all the stronger precisely at such times.

Yours,

ADOLF HITLER

No. 83

2969/578473-75

The Minister in Norway to the Foreign Ministry

Telephoned Report

OSLO, April 10, 1940—10:30 p. m.¹

After the King this morning had declared himself ready to receive me unconditionally, I departed at about 11 o'clock, German summer time, by way of Hamar for Elverum where I arrived about 4 p. m., German time. The meeting place was in a school building. The King received me at once and requested that Foreign Minister Koht be present at our conversation. However, I asked the King that I be allowed to speak to him at first alone, which after some discussion was agreed upon. I then explained to him again the situation and the circumstances which had brought about our occupation of Norway. I emphasized in that connection that England was solely to blame. The King listened without contradiction, even apparently with a certain amount of agreement. I then told him that a change in the dynasty in Norway was not only not favored, but that, on the contrary, we considered it of importance in Norway, as in both the other Scandinavian countries, that the dynasty should be preserved and strengthened. I then referred to the folly of the continuing military resistance in isolated places in Norway. I said that yesterday, unfortunately, Oscarsborg² had had to be completely destroyed and that we would like to spare other places from suffering the same fate. For this it was necessary, however, that all resistance cease at once.

I went into my proposal of the [night and]³ morning of April 9 and referred to the burden of guilt which the previous Norwegian Government had brought upon itself through refusing the proposals in our memorandum. I referred further to the lack of confidence on our part in this Government, which had taken a position repeatedly in the last several months which had to be regarded by us as favoring England in a one-sided manner and which had finally culminated in the incomprehensible refusal of our generous offer. We had no desire to mix in the internal political situation in Norway in any way. We did consider it of importance to know that there was at the helm in Norway a government upon which we could count for an understanding of the necessity of the preservation of good relations between Germany and Norway and for an appreciation of the

¹ A record of this message in the files of the State Secretary gives its time as 11 p. m. (220/148417-20).

² Oscarsborg was the Norwegian fortress in the Oslo Fjord where the German heavy cruiser *Blücher* was sunk in the early morning of Apr. 9. The fortress was later attacked by German aircraft.

³ The words in brackets are from the copy cited in footnote 1.

position of Germany. A government had been formed yesterday in Oslo by Minister [*Staatsrat*] Quisling, and it seemed proper to us that this man, whose Norwegian national attitude and whose understanding for Germany is well known, should be entrusted with the responsibility of government in these times.

The King was visibly impressed, especially by the reference to the attitude of his brother, the King of Denmark, who by his radio address⁴ and by his position with respect to the German entry, had preserved his country in peace and had avoided unpleasantness for himself and his family.

At the conclusion of our conversation, however, the King considered it necessary to renew contact with his Government and brought in Foreign Minister Koht for the end of the interview, in whose presence I repeated my views as previously outlined.

The King and M. Koht both promised me to acquaint Minister President Nygaardsvold with the matter and, since I did not wish to wait for the decision, to give me the reply by telephone on the way back to Oslo. I had already described this as necessary, since otherwise in the circumstances decisions might be made on our side which would lead to certain consequences.

I then departed at about 6:15 p. m., German time, from the Elverum school. At Eidsvold the message reached me from Foreign Minister Koht, which I had forwarded by the Legation.⁵ It read:

After a 2-hour conference with the King, Foreign Minister Koht forwarded to me on the way to Oslo the following message: The King will name no government headed by Quisling and this decision was made upon the unanimous advice of the Government. To my specific question, Foreign Minister Koht replied: "Resistance will continue as long as possible."

The decision, I think, can be explained by the fact that not only the Cabinet, but also the Storting assembled at Elverum, or at least part of it, had been made acquainted with the matter. The real difficulty for the King and perhaps also for the Cabinet was that no proper way could be found in order to bring about a summons to Quisling in consonance with the Constitution. The desire to come to an agreement with us was no doubt very strong, which became especially evident as I referred to pledges that we would make for upholding the integrity and independence of Norway now and for the future. In the presence of the crowd of heterogeneous elements assembled there and under the influence of parliamentary intrigues,

⁴ The King of Denmark had made a radio address to his people in the afternoon of Apr. 9 in which he called upon them "to assume a completely correct and worthy attitude, since every thoughtless action or statement can have the most serious consequences."

⁵ Bräuer's message was forwarded by the Legation to the Foreign Ministry in telegram No. 520 of Apr. 10 (22/18920).

the only course which could have clarified the situation could not, however, be taken.

On the journey back to Oslo in the neighborhood of Hamar and Eidsvoll, troop movements of limited numbers and road blocks were observed. I shall report my observations to the military Commander in Chief.

BRÄUER

No. 84

582/241995-96

The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

ROME, April 10, 1940—11:00 p. m.

TOP SECRET

Received April 11—3:40 a. m.

No. 669 of April 10

For the Foreign Minister personally.

Ciano has just told me that the Duce's letter in reply to the Führer¹ is ready and is only awaiting signature. The letter contains thanks, congratulations and complete approval and finally an indication that the Duce "will speed up developments here." Count Ciano added the request that there should be conveyed to the Führer and the Foreign Minister his personal congratulations on the operation which was unique in world history. Even in Napoleon's career there was no instance of the occupation of two capitals within 24 hours; the effect here and throughout the world was tremendous, the Italian press was underlining this brilliant German achievement almost more than the German press was doing. He described as simply pitiful the situation which had arisen for the Western Powers. When England set against her own shipping losses the sinking of two German warships, she forgot to add that they were destroyed not by the English fleet but by the Norwegians. Moreover, this loss was a mere nothing compared with the success.

For my amusement he was also going to tell me that yesterday evening the English Chargé d'Affaires² had called on him in a most urgent manner to hand over a yard-long note from the British Government on British minelaying in Norwegian waters. The Chargé d'Affaires himself keenly felt the absurdity of this démarche.

François-Poncet, whom he refused to receive yesterday but whom he had seen today for the first time since the former's return, had looked dejected for the first time since he had known him and the only comment he could make on the events of yesterday was to point out that time was working for the Western Powers. He [Ciano] merely replied to this by saying that one also needed to "have time in order

¹ Document No. 68.

² Sir Noel Charles.

to let time work for one." This seemed unlikely to him in view of the speed of our timing. On this occasion Poncet also touched once more upon the question of sending a special French envoy here, for which the French had Laval in mind. He [Ciano] had confined himself to showing him the telegram in which he had instructed Guariglia a few days ago to inform the French that no special envoys of this sort would be received here.

Ciano then expatiated in very bitter terms on the attitude of the English toward Italy saying that their encroachments on and interference in the matter of Italian shipping were gradually becoming intolerable. At present they were holding another 15 Italian ships in control ports. The English had even intended to interfere with traffic between Brindisi and Albania. For such a case he had given instructions that the Italian ships be escorted by warships under orders to resist by every means. He had collected a complete file of all these instances of English encroachments which could be published at the appropriate time. Hitherto restraint had been exercised in this connection in order to gain the necessary time, which had indeed been utilized to the full for completing rearmament.

MACKENSEN

No. 85

3783/E041800

An Official of the Economic Policy Department to the Embassy in the Soviet Union

Telegram

MOST URGENT

BERLIN, April 10, 1940.

No. [609] ¹

zu W IV 1877/II.²

With reference to our telegram No. 604 of April 9.³

I. Telegrams Nos. 650 ⁴ and 652 ⁵ of April 9 crossed telegram No. 604 of yesterday. Nevertheless, please utilize the arguments in your next discussions with Mikoyan and Molotov and thus indicate that the reaction which has been caused here by the Soviet attitude is based not on the excessive zeal of subordinate authorities but on the official communications from Mikoyan to you. Please emphasize two points in particular:

In the first place, we must be able to count on continuity of Soviet deliveries of raw materials. Furthermore, the Soviet Government

¹ The number is from a registry minute on Moscow telegram No. 670 of Apr. 11 (8835/E614716).

² W IV 1877/II: Not found.

³ Document No. 75.

⁴ Not found.

⁵ Document No. 70.

should utilize the season of the year favorable for transport for increased deliveries within the scope of the agreed quotas.⁶

II. The representatives of the Reich Grain Office are arriving in Moscow at the beginning of next week at the latest. It is impossible for them to leave here earlier as at present they are still negotiating in southeast Europe.

SCHNURRE

⁶ In telegrams Nos. 663 of Apr. 10 (8835/E614715) and 670 of Apr. 11 (8835/E614716), Schulenburg reported assurances that deliveries of oil and grain were beginning again.

No. 86

582/241997

The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

TOP SECRET

No. 670 of April 10

ROME, April 11, 1940—1:35 a. m.

Received April 11—5:30 a. m.

For the Foreign Minister personally.

The Duce has just received me at 11 p. m. in his private residence in the presence of Ciano so that I might hand him personally the letter from the Führer transmitted to me by telephone.¹ Despite his very heavy cold he translated the whole of the letter for Ciano sentence by sentence into Italian and expressed his enthusiastic approval at many passages. In particular he pointed out to Ciano that by tomorrow there would be two complete infantry divisions in Oslo besides occupation troops. He added that any further troops required in Norway would make little difference to the effective strength of 205 divisions about which the Führer had told him. Furthermore Germany was in his opinion in a position to reach a strength of up to 250 divisions. He then dwelled on the importance of occupying the Danish and Norwegian coasts which would leave the whole of the English east coast exposed to us. The whole operation was "a master stroke about which he was enthusiastic." He would convey his thanks by telephone tomorrow.

MACKENSEN

¹ See document No. 82.

No. 87

220/148398

The Minister and Plenipotentiary of the German Reich in Denmark to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 286 of April 10

COPENHAGEN, April 10, 1940.

Received April 11—3:40 a. m.

Also for the Press Department and Geheimrat von Grundherr.

Foreign Minister Munch sent me the following note today:

"Mr. Minister. The Royal Danish Government has acquainted itself with the contents of the documents which you handed to me this morning.¹ It has noted that the entry of German troops into Danish territory did not take place in a hostile sense and that the Government of the German Reich has no intention by its measures of infringing on the territorial integrity and the political independence of the Kingdom of Denmark either now or in the future. After the receipt of this communication the Danish Government decided in the circumstances to adapt conditions in the country to the occupation which has taken place. It nevertheless strongly protests against this violation of the neutrality of Denmark. Please accept, Mr. Minister, the assurance of my highest consideration. Munch."

RENTHE-FINK

¹ See documents Nos. 66 and 125.

No. 88

220/148401-02

Memorandum by the Director of the Legal Department

BERLIN, April 11, 1940.

At 10:40 this morning I telephoned to Minister Bräuer in Oslo the Foreign Minister's order to take effective steps at once to secure the files of all Norwegian ministries, especially the Foreign Ministry and the Military departments. To this end it will be necessary to purge the ministries of all Norwegian officials. He had definitely to see to it that no document was destroyed in the ministries or removed from them and could call upon any necessary military support for this. The Foreign Minister was making him personally responsible for the prompt execution of the order.

Herr Bräuer understood the order perfectly and declared that he would carry it out forthwith.¹ He pointed out that if agreement were reached with the Norwegians, the ministries would naturally have to carry on the administration of the country. To this I replied that, at the moment, the Norwegians were adopting a hostile attitude toward us and that, should agreement be reached, further decisions regarding the treatment of the ministries could be taken. In the present situation the main thing was that all the files of the ministries should be made absolutely secure.

Herr Bräuer took this opportunity of requesting me to submit the following suggestion to the Foreign Minister: He considered it appropriate to let the King of Norway know that after the reply he, Herr Bräuer, had received yesterday ² he would, of course, not hold up the

¹ Bräuer reported by telegram on the same day that this instruction had been carried out, but that the secret papers of the Foreign Ministry and Ministry of Defense had been removed (220/148440-41).

² See document No. 83.

German operation, but that he would keep the door open for any communications or suggestions the King might have to make to him.

I replied to Herr Bräuer that for my part I could, of course, not say anything on the subject but that I would bring his suggestion to the knowledge of the Foreign Minister.

GAUS

No. 89

220/148403

Memorandum by the Director of the Legal Department

BERLIN, April 11, 1940.

At 12 noon I transmitted the following instruction from the Foreign Minister to Herr Bräuer:

He should at once endeavor to reestablish contact with the King of Norway and, with reference to the present situation, should urgently recommend a new meeting. He should at the same time add that he wished thereby to give the Norwegian people one last chance of a reasonable agreement. But if the meeting were still to be of any use, it would have to be held at once, and in the interest of speed preferably at a point between Oslo and the King's present place of residence. "For obvious reasons" he, Bräuer, would have to discuss this move fully with General von Falkenhorst, and would then also have to inform the latter of the meeting place agreed upon.

Herr Bräuer clearly understood the meaning of the instruction.¹

GAUS

¹ In accordance with these instructions Bräuer made a telephoned and written request through the administrative officer and chief of protocol of the Norwegian Foreign Ministry for a further interview with the King (2969/578479). Such an interview did not, however, take place.

No. 90

30/22473

The Minister in Norway to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

URGENT

OSLO, April 11, 1940—[11:50 a. m.]¹

No. [524]¹ of April 11

Received April 11—2:05 p. m.

With reference to my telephone message of April 10 at 11:30 p. m. German time:²

1) As I informed the Foreign Minister by telephone the King and Koht pointed out at yesterday's conversation that while they appreciated that during a period of occupation the Norwegian Government must enjoy the confidence of Germany, it must also enjoy the confi-

¹ Supplied from the Oslo Legation copy (2969/578484).

² Document No. 83.

dence of its own country. This confidence was not, however, enjoyed by M. Quisling, the lone wolf [*Einzelgänger*] without followers, who was rejected by the country.

2) As I informed Herr Gaus on the telephone,¹ I intend to reply to the King's communication of yesterday that in view of his answer I could not, of course, hold up any impending moves, but that I was keeping the door open for any suggestions on the basis of yesterday's conversation.

BRÄUER

¹ See document No. 88.

No. 91

F14/119-120

*Memorandum by the Foreign Minister*¹

BERLIN, April 11, 1940.

RM 13.

I requested the Swedish Minister to call on me at 1 p. m. today.

First I gave the Swedish Minister a comprehensive description both of the Scandinavian operation and of the general state of the war. I then turned to German-Swedish relations and pointed out that the attitude of the Swedish Government was regarded with approval on the part of Germany. I said that I must indeed add that the Swedish press and the Motala broadcasting station were not conforming to the Swedish Government's promise not to incite Norway in any way to useless resistance. Everyone must realize that Norwegian resistance was entirely senseless. Germany had 12 divisions ready for the operation, of which 10 divisions would already be on the spot tomorrow or the day after.

I had also heard that Hambro, the President of the Storting, had crossed over to Swedish territory, and was intending to broadcast over the Swedish radio in the name of the Norwegian King.²

The Führer desired friendship with Sweden. He had with his operation even done Sweden a great service, since the country would,

¹ Richert's report to Günther on this interview is in *Transiteringsrdgor . . . April-Juni 1940*, pp. 12-14.

² Weizsäcker in his memorandum No. 275 of Apr. 11 recorded: "Today at 5:45 p. m. I told Minister Prinz Wied in Stockholm by telephone that we could not permit the radio address of M. Hambro scheduled for 7:15 p. m. in view of the present political attitude of Norway. I asked Prinz Wied to see that a Swedish ban on it should be issued." (220/148423)

In memorandum No. 276 of the same day (220/148424) Weizsäcker recorded: "Prinz Wied called me today at 7:30 p. m. to let me know that Minister Günther had promised him to do what he could to prevent the radio address of Norwegian Storting President Hambro. Günther believes that he will be able to succeed in doing so." The address did not, in fact, take place.

as a result of the German move, definitely remain out of the war. The German Government expected, however, a loyal Swedish attitude. Certain desires had already been expressed on our part, and the German Minister had already indicated the day before yesterday that Germany would announce some further wishes. The German Government assumed and expected that Sweden would in every respect adopt a friendly and accommodating manner toward Germany.

The Swedish Minister replied that he had been informed by his Government that Sweden wished to remain neutral. He believed that the attitude of the Swedish press and radio could be explained by the first confusion following upon the news of the German operation. He would at once inform his Government, bring to their notice my information concerning Hambro, the President of the Storting, and ask them to put an end to all agitation at once.³

R[IBBENTROP]

³ Marginal note: "I conducted the conversation in a friendly but firm manner. R[ibbentrop]."

No. 92

F17/221-222

*Benito Mussolini to Adolf Hitler*¹

ROME, April 11, 1940/XVIII.

FÜHRER: I am very grateful to you for having sent me the message² announcing your action in the north and the second one³ describing the separate phases of it. It is superfluous for me to tell you that I entirely approve your action, which has forestalled a French-English landing in Norway, a landing which, as you rightly say, would have created a difficult situation for Germany.

The Italian people have been unanimous in admiring the truly lightning rapidity of your action and have realized that it was inevitable.

The increasing vexations of the blockade against Italian traffic have created a very strong anti-Allied *Stimmung*⁴ in the Italian people, and those in Paris and London who assert the contrary are showing once again that they confuse reality with their desires.

I consider that the French-English counteraction on the coast of Norway will be powerless to undo what you have accomplished, the far-reaching consequences of which can already be foreseen.

¹ This letter has been published as document No. 20 in *Hitler e Mussolini: lettere e documenti* (Rome-Milan, 1946), but that text contains slight variations from F17/221-222. The translation has been made from F17/221-222. A German translation is also in the file (F17/223-224).

² See document No. 68.

³ See document No. 82.

⁴ Thus in the original.

I take this opportunity of calling your attention to the situation in the Balkans and to the ambiguous attitude of Rumania, which has accepted the usual French-English guarantee. It is sufficient to consider that the Rumanian authorities did not decide to detain the flotilla of the Intelligence Service until it had traveled 200 miles on the river.⁵ Nevertheless I believe it is in our common interest that this part of Europe should not become involved in the war; but here too we must be ready to forestall moves of the French and English.

I assure you that from tomorrow, the 12th, the Italian Fleet will be entirely on a war footing while I am speeding up the "tempo" of the other armed forces. I do not know whether the French ever seriously harbored any illusions as to what Italy's attitude might be, but if they did, they will undoubtedly have lost them now.

As to the Italian people, although they desire a delay in order to be better prepared, they are now aware that they will not be able to avoid entering the field.

I should be very grateful, Führer, if you would keep me informed of any future developments in the operations. Pray accept my cordial greetings and a comrade's best wishes for yourself and your armed forces.

MUSSOLINI

⁵ Cf. document No. 116.

No. 93

F14/121-123

*Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat*¹

BERLIN, April 11, 1940.

CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE FÜHRER AND ATTOLICO, THE ITALIAN
AMBASSADOR, ON APRIL 11, 1940

Attolico delivered a message from the Duce to the Führer with a German translation.² After taking cognizance of the appended letter the Führer stated that he was very grateful to the Duce for it.

The reports of alleged attacks by the English on Bergen, Trondheim, and Stavanger were complete fabrications. On landing in Norway, Germany had first of all established bridgeheads which had meanwhile been extended in such a way that there was no further danger.

The Führer then went on to announce that according to a report just received they had been able to seize 10 more English transport ships carrying war material. Furthermore, the Luftwaffe had again acquitted itself in an outstanding fashion.

¹ Marginal note: "[For] F[ührer]."

² Document No. 92.

When Attolico asked about Germany's relations with the Norwegian Government the Führer replied that the old Norwegian Government had fled. It had been in Hamar yesterday; in the meantime the place had been captured by German troops and it had moved to Elverum, but apparently had already vanished from there. Its whereabouts at the moment were unknown. It was, however, quite unimportant who formed the Government in Norway; in any case power was for all practical purposes in Germany's hands. If the King had been as sensible as the King of Denmark, everything could have been settled quite easily, but English influence in Norway was after all very strong.

When Attolico inquired about the negotiations with the Norwegian Government, the Führer merely replied that negotiations had still been going on with the Norwegians the previous night.

When Attolico further inquired about relations with Rumania, the Führer stated that he fully endorsed the views of the Duce on Balkan questions. Germany wanted to maintain peace and order in the Balkans just as Italy did. His own confidence in the neutrality of the Balkan countries was, however, only conditional. The Balkan countries, and Yugoslavia in particular, would only remain neutral as long as there was a strong Italy.

Attolico then inquired point blank about Rumania and wanted the Führer to tell him whether he thought that Rumania would behave "sensibly." The Führer answered in the affirmative and added that if Rumania started anything, certainly Russia and Hungary, and possibly Bulgaria too, would intervene at once. Germany herself would of course not remain inactive either, but would support Hungary and finally Italy would probably intervene also.^a

^a German concern at the time about possible complications in southeastern Europe is also reflected in entries in the Halder Diaries introduced in the Trials of War Criminals before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals as document No. NOKW-3140. On Apr. 11 Halder recorded a conversation with Welzsäcker at 6-7 p. m. at the Foreign Ministry. The passage concerning Rumania read as follows: "W[eizsäcker] sees no other possibility of exerting influence on Rumania than through the idea that we shall take action faster and more vigorously than the English. For the rest, he thought more favorably of the formula 'against Rumania' than of the one 'for Rumania'."

"Russia has unsettled accounts with Rumania; among other things, Bessarabia. We cannot induce Russia to make an official promise that she will not move. Russia is not going to take any action of her own accord at present, nor is she going to make any promise which we might use as a card in dealing with Rumania."

"Bulgaria will not move of her own accord; moreover we would be able to restrain her. Hungary is prepared not to do anything without our consent. If it is intended to make Rumania adopt a negative attitude toward a landing by the English, this is best accomplished through the Military Attaché, not through diplomatic channels."

On Apr. 14 Halder further recorded: ". . . 3. South East: Führer is informed about general situation, also about message from Werth [Chief of the Hungarian General Staff]. Führer agrees to the contact with Hungarian General Staff. The assumption in this is that the Rumanians permit the English to land and consequently are considered an enemy. Then, of course, Hungarian claim to Transylvania will be recognized. Preparations with regard to railroads are urgent."

When Attolico further inquired whether Germany expected an Anglo-French reaction to the Norwegian undertaking, the Führer replied that in his opinion a large-scale attack would be attempted. Germany had, however, always reckoned with that. It was possible that the Faeroes Islands, Greenland, or Iceland would also be occupied.

In conclusion, the Führer also drew attention to the great economic importance of the Norwegian undertaking. England obtained 60 percent of her pit-props from Scandinavia and an extremely large quantity (2½-3 million tons) of iron ore; lastly food as well, among other things bacon, which was so important for the English. Attolico agreed fully and gave a few examples to underline the economic effects of the occupation of Norway on the English supply position.

SCHMIDT
Minister

No. 94

124/122616-20

*Ambassador Schulenburg to State Secretary Weizsäcker*¹

A 1833

Moscow, April 11, 1940.

DEAR STATE SECRETARY: In pursuance of instruction No. M.B.D. 534 of March 27,² I send certain observations, the connections of which are not sufficiently tangible to make them a suitable subject for a report.

For some time we have observed in the Soviet Government a distinct shift unfavorable to us. In all fields we suddenly came up against obstacles which were, in many cases, completely unnecessary; even in little things like visas they started to create difficulties; the release of the Volksdeutsche imprisoned by the Poles, which was promised by treaty, could not be achieved;³ the deportation of Reich Germans long imprisoned in Soviet jails suddenly stopped;⁴ the Soviet Government suddenly withdrew its promises already given with regard

¹ This document, minus the first and last two paragraphs, was given the heading "Memorandum" for circulation in the Foreign Ministry (384/210958-60).

² Not found. It is evident from a subsequent reference by Weizsäcker to instruction No. M.B.D. 534 that it contained directions concerning the use of private letters to the State Secretary for official communications (letter, Weizsäcker to Schulenburg, Apr. 16: 124/122621).

³ Under Article I of the German-Soviet Resettlement Agreement of Nov. 16, 1939 (6314/E470970-90), the Russians were pledged to return to Germany Volksdeutsche in custody in the areas of Poland under Russian occupation. Material on the negotiations in which the Germans were attempting to secure the implementation of this pledge has been filmed as serial 8837.

⁴ In a report R 3 No. 6 of Mar. 18, 1940 (8837/E614897-98) Tippelskirch forwarded to Berlin the copy of a note given by Schulenburg to Molotov on Mar. 17, protesting that the expulsion of Germans under arrest in the Soviet Union, which had been begun in November 1939 as the result of a German request, had come to a complete standstill in February, although there were still 219 Germans to be transferred.

to the *Basis Nord*⁵ in which our Navy is interested, etc. These obstacles, which were apparent everywhere, reached their climax in the suspension of petroleum and grain shipments to us. On the 5th of this month I had a long talk with M. Mikoyan,⁶ during which the attitude of the People's Commissar was very negative. I had to make the most strenuous efforts to get at least some concessions from him.

We asked ourselves in vain what the reason might be for the sudden change of attitude of the Soviet authorities. After all, nothing at all had "happened"! I suspect that the tremendous clamor of our enemies and their sharp attacks on neutrals—particularly on the Soviet Union itself—and on neutrality in general were not without effect upon the Soviet Government, so that it feared being forced by the Entente into a great war for which it is not prepared, and that for this reason it wanted to avoid anything that might have furnished a pretext to the English and French for reproaching the Soviet Union with unneutral behavior or even partisanship for Germany. It appeared to me as though the sudden termination of the Finnish war had come about from similar considerations. Of course, these suspicions could not be proved. However the situation had become so critical that I decided to call on M. Molotov in order to talk these matters over with him, and after the discussion to notify the Foreign Ministry. On the 8th of this month I therefore asked for permission to see M. Molotov—i. e., *before* the Scandinavian events. Actually, the visit to M. Molotov did not take place until the morning of the 9th—i. e., *after* our Scandinavian operation. During this talk it became apparent that the Soviet Government had again made a complete about-face. Suddenly the suspension of the petroleum and grain shipments was termed "excessive zeal of subordinate agencies" which would be immediately remedied. (M. Mikoyan is Assistant Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, i. e., the highest Soviet personality after M. Molotov!) M. Molotov was affability itself, willingly received all our complaints and promised relief. Of his own accord he touched upon a number of issues of interest to us and announced their settlement in a positive sense. I must honestly say that I was completely amazed at the change.

In my opinion there is only one explanation for this about-face: Our Scandinavian operation must have relieved the Soviet Government enormously—removed a great burden of anxiety, so to speak.

⁵ *Basis Nord* was the code name given by the Germans to the base near Murmansk put at the disposal of the German Navy by the Russian Government. See vol. VIII, documents Nos. 195, 248, and 257. The Germans had used the base in preparation for operations in Norway, but in the early part of April the Russians imposed certain restrictions on such use. Details appear in the War Diary of the Naval Staff, Part A, vol. 8, p. 38, entry for Apr. 5 (9107/E640428-29); Part C VIII, p. 168, entry for Apr. 7 (9106/E640419).

⁶ See document No. 51.

What its apprehension consisted of can again not be determined with certainty. I suspect the following: The Soviet Government is always extraordinarily well informed. If the English and French intended to occupy Norway and Sweden it may be assumed with certainty that the Soviet Government knew of these plans and was apparently terrified by them. The Soviet Government saw the English and French appearing on the shores of the Baltic Sea, and they saw the Finnish question reopened, as Lord Halifax had announced; ' finally they dreaded most of all the danger of becoming involved in a war with two Great Powers. Apparently this fear was relieved by us. Only in this way can the completely changed attitude of M. Molotov be understood. Today's long and conspicuous article in *Izvestia* on our Scandinavian campaign (already sent to you by telegram) ^a sounds like one big sigh of relief. But, at any rate—at least at the moment—"everything is in order" again here, and our affairs are going as they should.

Here there is again a rise in prices, especially the food prices (up to 40 percent); they have caused the population considerable uneasiness. The food supplies in the provinces are said to be frequently completely inadequate.

With the very best greetings and Heil Hitler!

Yours, etc.

F. W. SCHULENBURG

^a On Mar. 24 a message to Finland from Lord Halifax on behalf of the British people was broadcast in Finnish by the B. B. C. Lord Halifax declared that when victory was won Finland would share in the benefits of the peace. Text in *Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 1937-1940*, p. 3975.

^b In telegram No. 672 of Apr. 11 (354/203129-30).

No. 95

8664/E084182-87

The Minister in Norway to the Foreign Ministry

URGENT

OSLO, April 11, 1940.

No. 2800

Subject: Situation report.

I. The Military Situation:

The occupation of the coastal towns of Oslo, Kristiansand, Arendal, Egersund, Stavanger, Bergen, Haugesund, Trondheim, and Narvik is completed. The occupation will be pushed forward into the interior from these coastal points according to plan. Centers of resistance are situated:

- 1) immediately to the east of Bergen;
- 2) in the area Hamar-Elverum-Eidsvold;
- 3) in and near Halden; and
- 4) a new center seems to be forming near Drammen, 50 kilometers southeast of Oslo.

II. Political Situation:

As I have already reported by telephone,¹ the adherents of the new Minister President, Quisling, are few (cf. my earlier reports, in particular that of April 8²). As a man, Quisling is respected; only a few take him seriously as a politician. There is no doubt that the personality of Quisling renders the situation exceptionally difficult for Germany. The consensus of opinion is that the great majority of Norwegians would have accepted the German occupation, as in Denmark, but that they will not accept Quisling.

Our view, that the fugitive Nygaardsvold Government which was responsible for the bloodshed in the struggle is not acceptable to the Government of the German Reich, is generally appreciated, especially as the flight of the Government, after having ordered resistance, has deprived it of all prestige. Neither has the King gained in prestige by his flight from Oslo in the hour of danger; also his seemingly obstinate adherence to the now out-of-date Nygaardsvold Government has not worked to his advantage.

The Norwegian view of the situation is approximately along these lines: Peace between Germany and Norway must be reestablished as soon as possible for the benefit of both peoples. This peace cannot be concluded for Norway by the fugitive Nygaardsvold Government, nor yet by the Quisling Government, which does not enjoy the confidence of the people, especially the working classes, and has very few adherents. In the Norwegian view it would be quite possible to form a government from the Storting acceptable to the Germans, and possessing in sufficient measure the confidence of the Norwegian people. There even seems to be some readiness to admit Quisling as a member of this government and to entrust him with the Ministry of Defense or of Foreign Affairs.

Although matters have already gone very far, it is still thought possible that everything can be put right without disowning Quisling: When the Government fled Quisling stepped into the breach so that there was someone available to negotiate with the German occupying power. In the event of peace being concluded between Germany and Norway, a new situation will have arisen which Quisling can exploit to his own considerable advantage.

It is said here that this arrangement, which is entirely acceptable to Quisling, will have a steadying effect. People are saying that in this way Germany will save at least two divisions and that the danger of the Western Allies "coming to Norway's assistance" would be automatically reduced.

It is, of course, after 48 hours too early yet to form an opinion on Quisling's prospects, but the impression is immediately gained that

¹ This message has not been identified.

² Not printed (2969/578457-58).

Quisling is not a man of action, he is more critical than productive, and one is impelled to conclude that he is lacking in initiative. It is hard to believe that he will be equal to his task, and already the probability is becoming apparent that, under Quisling, the German occupying power will of its own accord have to take things more and more in hand if general anarchy is not to break out to the detriment of our armed forces.

III. Feeling among the Population:

The startling thrust by the German Wehrmacht has made a powerful impression. The German soldiers were received, if not with jubilation, certainly with interest. Their bearing and demeanor, which were so different from the picture of a German soldier one had drawn from atrocity stories, won general approval. Very soon after the entry of the first German troops one could observe the beginning of friendly relations between German soldiers and Norwegians, and it was just this fact that gave many people food for thought.

On the second day a hysterical, panic-stricken mood was created by some foreign elements: The English were going to bomb Oslo and the city was to be completely evacuated in a few hours. Many inhabitants fled the city in terror, the most absurd rumors were circulating and found credence among these Phaeacians unaccustomed to war and the struggle for existence (as a people). The inhabitants of Oslo behaved as if a pack of wolves were breaking into a herd of reindeer. Air-raid warnings and all-clears went off pell-mell, conflicting signals were given in different parts of the city, even the police were infected by the panic. Everything pointed to a systematic incitement of the population.

Calm was to a certain extent restored by the press and radio announcements and appeals which I had arranged, and by Quisling's broadcast,³ but it was only very slowly and hesitatingly that the fugitives returned next day. The shops were opened again and the newspapers appeared in greater numbers. But there is still great uneasiness and the exodus from Oslo may start again at any time.

IV.

The Norwegian governmental offices in so far as their officials had not fled, have established contact with us. On the first evening representatives of the city administration and the Oslo Commissioner of Police came and made a declaration of loyalty to me personally.

The sealing of the archives of the Ministries passed off without major difficulty, but it looks as if valuable official documents in the Foreign Ministry and Ministry of Defense had been taken away in time.⁴

³ See document No. 79, footnote 2.

⁴ See document No. 88.

The Legations of the enemy countries were sealed by the American Legation without the Germans having entered them; they are guarded by military sentries. The British and French consular officials who were still there have meanwhile left for Sweden; the Consulates have been searched and made secure.

The documents in the Polish Legation were seized and put in safe-keeping; the building is under guard.

V.

The radio is in the hands of the Quisling Government and is supervised and fed by us.

VI.

Immediately after occupation the direction of the Norwegian press was taken over by the Press Attaché of the German Legation. This change-over also took place without incident; the press is quite willing to take orders from the Legation; and from now on we shall see to it that they are kept supplied with material useful to our purposes. The gospel of the freedom of the press has been abandoned, outwardly at least, with unexpected speed.

VII.

Immediately after occupation I requested the Commissioner of Police in Oslo to confiscate Rauschnig's book: *Gespräche mit Hitler* [*Conversations with Hitler*] and to withdraw it from circulation. The German Career Consulates were instructed to make the same request to the local authorities in their districts and in case of refusal to call in German military assistance.

VIII.

As a result of the still extraordinarily inadequate telephone service and the partly interrupted telegraph service, contact between the Legation and the Career Consulates is not yet fully established; I hope, however, that the gradual penetration of the country will remedy this.

BRÄUER

No. 96

B21/B005512-13

The Embassy in the United States to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

SECRET

No. 631 of April 12

WASHINGTON, April 12, 1940—9:28 p. m.

Received April 13—12:45 p. m.

[Pol. IM 5313 g.]¹

For the Army General Staff, the Luftwaffe Operations Staff via the Attaché Group, and OKW, Foreign Department.

¹ The number is taken from the journal entry.

As in every major crisis, so this time also, Allied military propaganda is, for the greater part, being put out via the United States. Through the American press and propaganda by word of mouth England wants to exert influence on the neutrals, not least on Italy and Japan, so that reports "from the best sources" on English policy are sent from here to the neutral Governments. This time failure in the case of Japan was at once manifest. The Japanese Military Attaché got in touch with me as early as April 10 and offered his congratulations.

To begin with the pet theme was hinted at in the usual veiled language that the United States would enter the war if England were in danger. In this way the neutrals are to be assured that victory lies with the English and that there is very little risk in joining England. Germany, on the other hand, is to be intimidated and made to feel uncertain.

The question of entry of the United States into the war is, undoubtedly, of great importance. However, the consideration mentioned repeatedly in my reports is vital: that intervention on the Atlantic front is dependent on certain defenses along the Pacific front, and on preparations lasting months, which especially in respect to the Air Force cannot reach any definite conclusion before 1941. The American General Staff continues to take the view that entry into the war by the United States should only take place if the Western Hemisphere is menaced, or if other German measures endanger the security of the United States. Any step which might prejudice relations with the American General Staff, and any discussion in public of the war preparedness of the United States and its weakness in this field, is to be urgently warned against.

The second subject in recent days has been the account of the German military position in Norway. Sooner or later Germany must succumb to the naval strength of the Allies. England still ruled the seas. The aim of this extravagant propaganda, supported from all sides by news of English successes, was to represent Germany as being militarily at a disadvantage, to strengthen confidence in England's invincibility and the certainty of the pretendedly expected German defeat and in this way to impress the neutrals afresh.

Against this propaganda operating in the interests of England, there was also to be found in all sections of the press objective military reporting which did justice to German initiative and achievements, and which was often in contrast to English propaganda. The situation was judged remarkably well, England's peril and her weaknesses were pointed out, and the propagandist aims of the Allies were practically counteracted. The influence of the General Staff, whose views have up to Friday prevailed in the press and which has again shown

its objectivity in the face of much political baiting, was clearly recognizable. In the General Staff, official reports by the German Wehrmacht are regarded as an unimpeachable source of information. They are anxious to discuss things with me. On the other hand, whatever news I can get enables me to learn the views of the authorities here and to obtain information from them.

THOMSEN ²

² Marginal note in Welzsäcker's handwriting: "Böttcher?" See document No. 141.

No. 97

220/148392-94

The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Denmark

Telegram

No. 335

BERLIN, April 12, 1940.
Pol. I M 5070 g.

For the Minister personally.

With reference to your telegrams Nos. 280 ¹ and 281.²

1) As Minister and Plenipotentiary of the Reich you are the highest German representative to the Danish Government. It was therefore completely in order that the military commander was presented by you to the King and to the Government.

2) The military commander is competent and responsible for all purely military measures arising out of his mission. In so far as negotiations on purely military questions with the Danish Government as such are necessary, they are to be conducted by you. On the other hand, negotiations with Danish military authorities are the affair of the military commander.

3) The circumstances of the particular case can alone decide whether purely military matters are involved or not. It goes without saying that in all questions within your competence which directly or indirectly involve military interests, you will act in the closest personal cooperation with the military commander.

4) Until further notice Major General Himer is at your disposal in accordance with paragraph 5 of the OKW letter of April 2 ³ for the carrying out of negotiations on military matters.

5) Armed forces attachés are also subordinate to you until further notice. In accordance with paragraph 3, annex 2 of OKW letter of April 2, however, they are to be available to the military commander as liaison officers with the Danish military authorities.

¹ Not printed (220/148395).

² Document No. 81.

³ See document No. 42.

6) The question of sending a special Military Attaché with his headquarters in Copenhagen does not seem particularly urgent, but will be studied here in consultation with the military authorities.⁴

Foreign Minister

⁴ Renthe-Fink had raised this point in telegram No. 280 of Apr. 10, not printed (220/148395). Previously the German Military Attaché at Stockholm had been accredited also to Copenhagen.

[EDITORS' NOTE. Swedish Minister President Per Albin Hansson in a radio address on April 12, 1940, said :

"Sweden is firmly determined to continue to follow the line of strict neutrality. That implies that we must reserve for ourselves independence of judgment and independence of action in every direction. It is not consistent with strict neutrality to permit any belligerent to make use of Swedish territory for its activity. Fortunately no demands in such a direction have been made of us. Should any such demands be made they must be refused."

The text of the address is in *Transiteringsfrågor . . . April-Juni 1940*, pages 16-17, and in the collection of Hansson's addresses, *Svensk hållning och handling* (Stockholm, 1945), pages 88-89.

The Legation in Stockholm reported on the speech in telegram No. 448 of April 12 (220/148484).]

No. 98

220/148504-05

The Minister in Norway to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

OSLO, April 13, 1940.

No. 541 of April 13¹

Received April 13—8:40 a. m.

For the personal attention of the Foreign Minister only.

I have carried out both the instruction to maintain contact with Quisling and to entrust him, as the candidate to be proposed, with the formation of a new government,¹ as previously directed by the Führer. In so doing I disregarded completely my own private misgivings as to the person and position of Quisling.

Following the formation of the government by M. Quisling, it became daily more obvious that the Norwegian people would not countenance the usurpation of power by a man who had no support

¹ A comparison of the text of this telegram as received in Berlin with that sent for encoding in Oslo (2969/578508-10) indicates that the document was considerably garbled in transmission. The chief deviations are indicated in the footnotes.

The Oslo Legation copy reads: ". . . to maintain contact with Quisling and to propose to the King that Quisling be entrusted with the formation of a new government."

among the people and whose claim to leadership was not based on hard work and achievement. Hence resistance to the German invasion receded into the background compared with opposition to Quisling so that we have the situation almost as in civil war of the Norwegian people fighting directly against the usurper and only indirectly against the power supporting him. I daily receive assurances from genuine friends of Germany here that the Norwegians would be quite willing to subordinate themselves to me or even to the German military authorities, but that they could never bring themselves to accept a Quisling government.

According to the above view the resistance which has now flared up in Norway is due, in the first place, to hostility toward Quisling.

In these circumstances I consider it necessary to reexamine the question whether we should continue to support Quisling. Another reason for this question is that Quisling, in spite of the absence of a legal government and despite the presence of German bayonets has, so far, not been able to put anything approaching a national government in the saddle.²

His list of Ministers exists partly only on paper as four candidates are missing; ³ two of them had not been consulted at all before inclusion in the list of Ministers and are now refusing to accept the appointments.

We must however realize clearly that, in the event of our dropping Quisling, the methods of doing so would have to be determined precisely and carefully, and it might become necessary for us to take the administration of the country into our own hands. However, in spite of the progressive stiffening of resistance in Norway, it is even now possible that the settlement of the question point by point might cause such a revolution in popular feeling that acquiescence on the part of the constitutional representatives of Norway might create the state of affairs requested, and originally striven for, by us.⁴ The results arising out of this, favorable to our operation here and to our relations with the belligerent powers, with Sweden and the whole neutral world, are obvious as I explained in my report telephoned on April 9.⁵ In addition there is also the possibility that, if the fugitive members of the Storting do not give in, the Government will be taken over by the Supreme Court here, as provided for by the Constitution in the event of the absence of the King and Storting, and which is

² The Oslo Legation copy reads: "... not been able to come close to putting himself in the saddle."

³ The Oslo Legation copy reads: "... four candidates are not in Oslo."

⁴ The Oslo Legation copy reads: "... the settlement of the Quisling question might cause such a revolution in popular feeling that acquiescence on the part of the constitutional representatives might result and the state of affairs originally striven for by us might be realized."

⁵ The Oslo Legation copy reads: "... on the evening of April 9."

being put forward as a possibility today in every (group missing).^o On the other hand, the chances of inducing the representatives of the Norwegian people to give in at all are declining every day, especially in view of the now very necessary intensification of our conduct of the war.

BRÄUER

^o The Oslo Legation copy reads: ". . . which was put forward to me today as a possibility."

No. 99

F14/181-140

Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Personal Staff

BERLIN, April 13, 1940.

CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE FÜHRER AND DIRECTOR HAGELIN, THE MINISTER OF ECONOMICS AND SUPPLY IN THE NEWLY FORMED NORWEGIAN NATIONAL GOVERNMENT, AT 11:15 A. M. APRIL 13, 1940, IN THE PRESENCE OF THE FOREIGN MINISTER AND UNDER STATE SECRETARY HABICHT

Hagelin reported that the operation in Norway had gone off well. Only one flaw appeared and that had been that the German airborne troops arrived in Oslo too late as a result of cloudy weather. Thus the Government had been able to get away. Had the arrival of German troops taken place according to plan, the King and the Government could have been taken prisoner and the order to cease fire would have been issued and obeyed. It was regrettable that it had come out differently. However, some of the members of the Storting who had fled were now already returning, among others Bjørnsen and the Commander of the Guard, whose name he didn't know.

The Führer read a Reuters report from Stockholm which stated that Major Hvoslef, who had been named as Foreign Minister by the shadow Government, had resigned and had arrived at Stockholm. Hagelin said that this must be a lie, for he himself had seen the telegram in which Hvoslef had placed his services at the disposal of the new Government. Hvoslef had been an officer in active service in Finland and had organized the SA of the Nasjonal Samling.

He considered the problem of the King as not yet settled. Unfortunately the German Minister had made his proposals to the King at the same time as Quisling, and he was convinced that if Quisling had gone to the King before Bräuer the affair would have come out well. However, the Quisling Government would lay great importance on coming to an agreement with the King, and he believed that it would be possible to achieve this by working through the Crown Princess. It must be admitted that the King was closely bound to

the English and was anti-German. If an arrangement could not be made with him it could probably be made with Crown Prince Olaf. In reply to the Führer's questioning Hagelin stated that conditions in Oslo itself were completely quiet.

The Führer then outlined the military position and said that today there are 3 divisions in Norway and tomorrow 4, 2½ in Oslo itself. He had planned on 2 divisions for Denmark and 10 for Norway and these figures he could easily increase without drawing on the Army reserve. Seven divisions were still at his ready disposal. Narvik presented a difficult problem since there was no communication with it. He did not believe that the Swedes would ever permit the transit of German troops and arms over their railways. In addition, the Norwegians had blown up bridges and tunnels so that he must use other routes, but that also had been foreseen. With the exception of Stavanger and Oslo, the airfields in Norway were exceptionally bad, and he had had a great deal of difficulty in reconstructing the airfield at Trondheim for military purposes.

He was convinced that the English would try to land some troops here and there. They wanted a sort of guerrilla warfare. That the country would be completely destroyed thereby made no difference to them. The tragedy consisted of this, that through the destruction of railroads and roads the country itself would be thrown into greatest want, since the people would lose their means of transportation. Norway needed these communication lines worse than he did since his troops could be transported in other ways. Within the next few days he would have completely barred the Kattegat to English war vessels.

After some discussion of the technique of landing and loading of ships, the Führer said that in a short time there would not be an Englishman to be seen in Norway. They had attempted an air attack on Narvik in which one plane had been shot down. In a second attack on Stavanger nine more were shot down. They could not continue that much longer, but in the course of it Norway would be destroyed.

The Führer then asked Hagelin whether he could estimate reasonably what might be the following of the Quisling regime. Hagelin said that this would amount to 15 percent of the population, including the most active elements. In discussing efforts at stabilizing the new Government, the Führer said that the Quisling Government would have to secure the active support of certain groups who would have to declare their positions, such as the chambers of commerce, the merchants, the shipping interests, intellectual elements, professors, etc. Resistance was pure folly, and what would follow if it were continued would be terrible and fruitless. Many guiltless people would be thereby destroyed. It was evident that the English could no longer

drive out the Germans. The Germans were now occupying the country according to plan. Hagelin said that the King also would have given in had not new hopes been repeatedly encouraged in him by false reports.

The Führer considered whether he himself should address a letter to the King in order to put the problem in front of him and to show him that he would be forced to make a decision between two eventualities: Either to follow the example of Denmark where everything was developing quietly and in order, even in an atmosphere of friendship, or to urge his country to a purposeless resistance and thereby commit everything to ashes and ruins. He inquired about the possibility of forwarding such a letter, and Hagelin said that he could guarantee that through him the letter would reach the hands of the King even if he were in Sweden. He had personal contacts with good friends of the King, especially Captain Irgens and his wife who were not active politically and who could approach the King at any time. Where the King was at the moment he did not know. The last report of his location had come from Elverum.

As the discussion came to the proposal that the Swedish Legation should undertake the protection of Norwegian interests, the Führer said that he wished to speak to the Norwegian Minister. The latter was thereupon invited to the Reich Chancellery.

During the period of waiting the Führer made some observations about the circles around the King which had led the King to make a false estimate of the situation. He said that the little man in Norway, especially since he had had no military training, was inclined easily to put faith in the English lies, since he was totally unprepared to form a judgment of the military situation. In that way rumors could upset everything and, for example, the report that Bergen had been occupied by the English fleet could rekindle into flame a resistance which had been once stamped out. The age of battle fleets was over, and England could no longer even maintain her fleet at Scapa Flow.

The Führer believed there was no longer any possibility of making an impression on the King. Even in Sweden there was a totally false idea to the effect that England might possibly win the war. It would have to be made entirely clear that England could never win the war. Even if Germany lost the struggle, Russia would be the victor, especially in the northern lands, but never England. The people were being deluded, and in that connection the Jews in Sweden were taking a large part. Hagelin again declared that there was certainly still a chance to make an agreement with the King or the Crown Prince. The King had been under the influence of those who surrounded him, who were a crowd of absolute weaklings who had lost their heads and were now running around like chickens in a chicken yard. That sort

of people, said the Führer, had no power of decision and never had the capacity to judge a situation correctly. Such weaklings had no presence of mind for deciding what had to be done and what not, and what would be of some use and what not. He made some comparisons with the happenings in Poland. At the suggestion of the Foreign Minister that the King also might well have been sobered by the latest news, the Führer said that new lies were always being made up. Hagelin portrayed the King as not stupid even if he were also not very acute politically. The Quisling regime would certainly first of all attempt to come to an agreement with the King in order to calm the population. In the meantime in Oslo economic life was proceeding quietly.

The Führer noted, however, that we had unfortunately had to destroy the radio station at Tromsø by bombing since it was broadcasting regularly in English.

Following a short discussion on the subject of Russia and Finland, the conversation was interrupted as the Norwegian Minister had arrived.

After Hagelin had been brought in again the Führer asked him how large he estimated the military forces of Norway to be at the moment. Hagelin said that they were not large. There were several regiments, but these had been completely mixed up and in part they were untrained. For the German Army they would certainly form no hindrance. The Führer considered it sinful to attempt to make a stand with such forces and Hagelin was of the opinion that it was essential to bring this to the attention of the King.

The Foreign Minister again brought up the question of whether an attempt might be made through the King of Denmark, who, Hagelin said, had a strong influence on his brother. The Führer concluded the interview with the remark that it made no difference to him who ruled up there. He was sending his troops in and that was the main thing. Our soldiers certainly did not conceive of the Norwegian troops as opponents.

Hagelin requested the Führer to name a military liaison officer to his Government and mentioned a Major Richter, Breslau, Holderstrasse 9, as especially suited for the position since he had many friends up there. The Führer agreed and gave the order that Major Richter should be summoned to Berlin.

With this the conversation ended having lasted, with interruptions, from 11:30 a. m. to 1:15 p. m.¹

HEWEL

¹ On Apr. 13 Hagelin also had a conversation with Rosenberg. The memorandum of the conversation is not printed (APA Reel No. 290). The original of the document is in the custody of the German Military Documents Section, Departmental Records Branch, the Adjutant General's Office, U. S. Army, file 250-4-18-42/1.

No. 100

280/152174-75

The Minister in Yugoslavia to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

SECRET

No. 278 of April 12

BELGRADE, April 13, 1940—11:20 a. m.

Received April 13—3:10 p. m.

The Prince Regent, who received me today for the purpose of presenting the Goathischer [sic] drawing, Kult W 2178/40,¹ expressed in the subsequent conversation the greatest admiration for Germany's recent military operations which were unparalleled in their daring and speed. As I could naturally imagine, he was following the heroic battles taking place at present with the deepest emotion and not without anguish at the thought that they were battles between Germany and England.

The Prince Regent then asked me, by referring to our long-standing friendship, whether he might talk quite frankly as to his feelings about the present conflict. I knew with what love he had always been attached to German culture, to the German country, and to the German people. Nothing could dissuade him from this love. When taking over the Regency in Yugoslavia he was happy in the realization that these, his feelings toward Germany, were in no way at variance with the interests of Yugoslavia, for in his opinion the urgent necessity for friendly relations arose from Yugoslavia's geographical proximity to Germany alone. However much Europe might change, the Yugoslavs and Germans would always have to live as neighbors. He was glad to be able to state today that even in the most difficult days of his Regency he had at all times found the greatest possible understanding and genuine friendship on the German side. Because of this, his confidence in the German Government had constantly grown stronger. Nor did he conceal this from the English and French and had often pointed out to them that Germany, in contrast to England and France, had always been helpful and correct toward Yugoslavia. Unfortunately, he was unable to place the same trust in Germany's present-day friends, Italy and Russia. He fully understood the compelling reasons for Germany's policy but could not get rid of the feeling of mistrust toward these friends of Germany. He hoped that this mistrust would prove to be unfounded. In conclusion the Prince Regent said that his ardent wish had always been for a German-English understanding. This hope had, of course, been shattered now but this did not change his feelings toward Germany.

The Prince Regent made these observations with most unusual warmth and obvious deep emotion.

HEEREN

¹ Not found.

No. 101

173/84271

The Minister in the Netherlands to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 271 of April 13

THE HAGUE, April 13, 1940—2:25 p. m.

Received April 13—5:55 p. m.

The Foreign Ministry drew my attention to the Foreign Minister's interview yesterday with the Stefani Agency, in which the Foreign Minister declared anew that the Dutch were firmly resolved to oppose by force of arms any attack on their country from whatever side it came. In this connection the Minister referred to two assurances reiterated by England within the last few days that they would respect Dutch neutrality, namely the first through an official Reuter announcement of April 9, and the second during a conversation between the Netherlands Minister and Halifax on April 10. The Minister concluded by declaring that the integrity of the Netherlands could not be the subject of negotiation.

ZECH

No. 102

141/126555-56

The Ambassador in Belgium to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 187 of April 13

BRUSSELS, April 13, 1940—6:45 p. m.

Received April 13—10:05 p. m.

With reference to my telegram No. 174 of April 11¹

The general situation in Belgium is unchanged. The attitude of the Government corresponds in every respect to the trend of the policy of independence and neutrality which has so far been followed. In his speech yesterday at Menin, Foreign Minister Spaak again stressed the firm intention of the Government to continue this policy, but at the same time he also drew attention to Belgium's military strength and her determination to resist any aggressor. Rumors of Anglo-French pressure on Belgium, which were spread about in connection with a visit to the Foreign Ministry by the French Ambassador and the British Chargé d'Affaires, have so far not been confirmed in any way. The Government has even denied the rumors in a short Belga communiqué to the effect that the visit in question was merely for the purpose of information. At yesterday's session of the Council of Ministers the students' demonstration among other things came under

¹ This telegram described Belgian reaction to the German invasion of Norway (4021/E059291-98).

consideration, and was condemned in the strongest terms by the Minister President, as it had also been in the Belgian press yesterday. The press, especially in the Flemish area, is unanimous in declaring that neutrality must be preserved, and, if violated, defended by all possible means. This accords exactly with the mood of the people who are determined on defense. Yesterday the King told a confidant that nothing would induce him to abandon the policy of neutrality. Regarding events in Scandinavia, he remarked that the King of Norway had done the right thing; whether the same could be said of the King of Denmark, history would show. Sovereigns should tread the path of honor, even if this meant their own downfall; he was determined to send the Belgian Army into action against any attack.

BÜLOW

No. 103

220/148502-08

The Minister and Plenipotentiary of the German Reich in Denmark to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 301 of April 13

COPENHAGEN, April 13, 1940.

Received April 13—10:05 p. m.

Below is the text of a translation of a circular telegram which the Danish Foreign Ministry sent to all Danish Diplomatic Missions and Career Consular representations on April 11.¹ It was passed on my instructions. Beginning of the circular telegram:

Last night German troops crossed the Danish border and landed in Copenhagen and various other Danish ports. In the memorandum² which the German Government sent to us, as well as in the German proclamation which was dropped from airplanes, the occupation is justified on the grounds that Germany wished to forestall an English attack and protect Denmark's neutrality as long as the war lasts. The German troops are in occupation of the most important military installations in Denmark. According to the memorandum and the proclamation it is the intention of the German Government to ensure the territorial integrity of the Kingdom, the maintenance of the Army and Navy, the freedom of the people, and the future political independence of the country.

From an appeal addressed by the Government to the Danish people the following is cited: The Danish Government has decided under protest to regulate conditions in the country with regard to the occupation that has taken place and in connection herewith the following announcement is made: The German troops which are now in this country will make contact with the Danish armed forces, and it is the

¹The Danish text of the telegram is in the Danish Government's publication *Beretning til Folketinget afgivet af den af Folketinget under 8. Januar 1948 nedsatte kommission i henhold til Grundlovens § 45* (Copenhagen, 1948), vol. v, *Bilag*, p. 169, where it is stated to have been sent on Apr. 9.

²See document No. 66.

duty of the people to refrain from any opposition to these troops. The Danish Government will try to safeguard the Danish people and our country from the misfortunes arising out of war conditions and therefore calls on the people to take a calm and restrained attitude toward the conditions that have arisen. Calm and order must prevail in the country and loyal behavior must be shown to all who hold an office. Foreign Ministry. End of the circular telegram.

RENTHE-FINK

No. 104

103/112110

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

Moscow, April 13, 1940—10:31 p. m.

SECRET

Received April 14—5:20 a. m.

No. 687 of April 13

Molotov today asked me to see him and brought up the following:

Persistent rumors were being circulated everywhere that Germany might soon be forced to include Sweden in her Scandinavian operation, particularly in order to ship more troops to Norway. Molotov added that in his opinion Germany, and definitely the Soviet Union, were vitally [*lebhaft*] interested in preserving Swedish neutrality. He asked me how much truth there was in these rumors.

First, I referred to my statement to him on April 9,¹ that our operation would not touch Sweden and Finland and added that I was not aware of the slightest indication that we had any designs on Swedish territory. Nevertheless, I would pass his inquiry on to Berlin.

In conclusion, Molotov declared that the Soviet Government was greatly interested in preserving Swedish neutrality, that its violation was not desired by the Soviet Government, and that it hoped the inclusion of Sweden in our operation would not take place, if this could at all be avoided.

Request instructions by telegram.²

SCHULENBURG

¹ See document No. 73.

² See document No. 120.

No. 105

103/112112

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

Moscow, April 14 [13?], 1940—10:31 p. m.

SECRET

Received April 14—3:15 a. m.

No. 688 of April 13

Molotov approached me today with the following information and request.

It was perhaps not altogether out of the question that England might make an attempt to force a way into the Black Sea in order

to disrupt our [sic] trade there. In this event it would be of importance to the Soviet Union to be able to employ the magnetic mines used by Germany. He asked us to consider whether we were in a position to sell the Soviet Union a number of such mines without thereby necessarily disclosing the secret of their construction. If Germany were prepared in principle to meet the Soviet Union's request, discussions regarding the terms could be begun immediately.¹

Request instructions by telegram.²

SCHULENBURG

¹ In a further telegram (No. 712 of Apr. 16: 103/112120) Schulenburg reported: "Molotov told me today that the situation which had arisen in the north would probably make it necessary to defend Murmansk against the English by means of magnetic mines. The use of such mines off Murmansk was at the moment much more urgent than their use in the Black Sea."

² See document No. 146.

No. 106

220/148501

The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Norway

Telegram

No. 416

BERLIN, April 13, 1940.

For the Minister personally.

With reference to our telegram No. 400.¹ Under State Secretary Habicht who is flying to Oslo on Sunday,² not Saturday, has instructions to organize propaganda in Norway and in particular to place himself at Quisling's disposal for propaganda purposes should the occasion arise. Without prejudice to the independent character of this task and to Under State Secretary Habicht's responsibility for its execution, your position as Minister and Plenipotentiary of the Reich will not be affected by this special mission. I request you to support Herr Habicht in his work by all available means.

Foreign Minister

¹ Telegram No. 400 announced that Under State Secretary Habicht was being sent to Oslo on a special mission for a stay of several weeks (22/13921).

² I. e., Apr. 14.

No. 107

F14/124-130

Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Personal Staff

BERLIN, April 13, 1940.

CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE FÜHRER AND THE NORWEGIAN MINISTER SCHEEL ON APRIL 13, 1940, IN THE PRESENCE OF THE FOREIGN MINISTER, UNDER STATE SECRETARY HABICHT, AND SENIOR COUNSELOR HEWEL

The Foreign Minister received Minister Scheel in the Reich Chancellery and informed him that the Führer wished to speak with him re-

garding the uncertain situation. With that they took themselves to the presence of the Führer.

The Führer opened the discussion by asking what Government the Norwegian Minister was actually representing. Minister Scheel replied that he did not know himself. Thereupon the Führer outlined to him the reasons for the entry of the German Army into Norway. The situation was very simple. He had gone in since he had learned that England intended to occupy Norway. Thanks to the talkativeness of Mr. Churchill and reliable reports which had reached him, he had complete knowledge of the English intention. No other course was open to him but to march into Norway, since England could not be permitted to open a new theater of war up there against the Reich.

The King of Denmark had come to the most intelligent and beneficent decision. Germany had moved in there and would pay for everything. Favorable trade relations would be cultivated with Denmark. Denmark could send many things to Germany, and he would insure that Denmark would be able to secure from Germany whatever she had previously secured from the Allies, even if Germany had to draw on Russia for the purpose. After the end of the war Denmark would get everything back. The German troops were conducting themselves in a praiseworthy manner. There was no plundering and already friendly relations with the population were being formed. Thus Denmark was completely unharmed by the war. If the English should undertake bombing attacks on Danish cities, he would answer every such attack by a powerful counterstroke. The same situation would have prevailed in Norway also if the King, under the influence of irresponsible advisers, had not decided on a foolish course. He, the Führer, did not wage wars with kid gloves. In the meantime he had four divisions over there. In Oslo alone, this evening, there were three divisions. Only a childish sort of adviser would counsel resistance against such force. The whole thing was utter folly. If the Norwegians destroyed their railroads they were hurting themselves, for they needed these means of transportation for the upkeep of their country much worse than he did, who had other means of supplying his troops. Personally he regretted all this very much, for he did not wish to wage war against Norway. He wanted only to protect his own country against England. The neutrality of Norway would have been best for him. On the following day the German troops would pass to the attack. Any resistance would be broken by most barbarous means. The sacrifices in destruction and loss of life which Norway would have to suffer were to him personally a cause of boundless regret, but as the Norwegian King had decided on war, he, the Führer,

would wage war. To the question of Minister Scheel, whether the Führer did not believe that all would be over quickly, the Führer replied that he certainly believed so, but that it would be a slow process to stamp out all the small demolition units which had formed. No one could now drive us out of Norway, least of all the English. Minister Scheel said he did not know whether sufficient force had been on hand to prevent the English from making an attempt at landing in Norway. To this the Führer replied that he had accurate information that Norway had known of the English plans for a landing, and that he was convinced that Norway had not undertaken to prevent it. But he was not one of those people who, as Mr. Chamberlain expressed it, missed busses. He spoke of the *Altmark*¹ and protested against the practice of the smaller neutrals dealing with the belligerents by dissimilar standards. It was time that responsible people even in Norway should remove the picture of the German people of 1918 from their minds. They were still confusing the German people of today with those of that day, when Germany was being governed by a lot of mercenary dogs. Today there were 83 million Germans who would not let themselves be treated like just anybody and who above all would not let themselves be treated worse than the English. The Norwegians should have opened fire in the *Altmark* case. We Germans had not violated Norwegian neutrality. German U-boats had not operated in any territorial waters, and if, as M. Scheel believed, Norway was actually powerless against English attacks, he certainly could not allow these English attacks to take place. The tragedy for all these countries was that whenever he was forced to make certain demands upon some country or had to make threats against these countries, the English always appeared upon the scene and told the people in control: "He can do nothing. He is only bluffing. He is only trying to frighten you!" The result of foolish trust in these shameless English declarations was an endless amount of sorrow and ruin. He believed even today two-thirds of the Norwegians put trust in the English insinuations. Minister Scheel said that he had a different opinion. The Führer continued that he had not willed this war. What had he done to the English and French? He had not made any demands of them! Minister Scheel said that Norway had always adopted a correct attitude toward Germany. The Führer disputed this and pointed to the shocking attitude of the press in the small neutral states. In those states any ragamuffin could attack Germany and sling mud at the head of the German State. Had M. Scheel ever seen that the head of the Norwegian State was attacked in the German press? M. Scheel sought to show that the relations of Norway to Germany had been really very good and as for what appeared in the press,

¹ See vol. VIII, documents Nos. 568, 615, and 618.

there was in Norway a considerable degree of freedom of the press. Here the Führer interrupted him and showed examples indicating that the freedom of the press was very one-sided and that if an article favorable to Germany turned up, this was forbidden on the grounds of neutrality, while the most hostile articles on the opposite side were permitted under the motto of freedom of the press. The Führer also cited examples of this from the Belgian, Swiss, and Turkish press.

To the Foreign Minister's question of whether Minister Scheel was in communication with his Government, whether he had sent telegrams or had an answer, M. Scheel answered that he had had no word from his Government since the entry of the Germans. He did not even know where it was. He supposed that it was in the neighborhood of the Swedish border. He had telegraphed by way of Stockholm but had had no reply. He returned once more to German-Norwegian relations and said that these had always been good, except for the Ossietzky case,² which had been very difficult. Also his personal relationships in Germany had been most excellent. At this the Führer said that after all Germany had not declared war on Norway. He had only gone in ahead of the English and had anticipated them only, as it now appeared, by about 10 hours. To the remark of Scheel that the English through their mine fields had violated Norwegian sovereignty, the Führer declared that that was only the beginning. He had in the meantime discovered that the English had already planned their first landing on February 12. To the question of the Führer as to whether M. Scheel had received any instructions from his Government, the Minister replied in the negative. The Führer advised him to get into communication with his Government. He would permit the Minister to fly up there. He could do whatever he liked. He wished to help him in every way. The Führer continued that it made no difference to him who was in control in Norway, he would deal with those who were there and if it turned out there was no one, he would just appoint a military governor. We could do that and it would be no problem for him. M. Scheel referred to the offer of the Swedes to take over protection of Norwegian interests.³ To this the Führer replied that it was entirely impossible, for in the meantime another government had been formed in Norway. In any case he believed that some sort of civilian authority had already been established. To Scheel's objection that this would first have to be confirmed constitutionally, the Führer

² Karl von Ossietzky, German pacifist writer, in November 1936 was awarded the Nobel peace prize for 1935 by the Nobel Prize committee of the Norwegian Storting. Ossietzky was at the time confined in a concentration camp at Oranienburg. The German Government made an official protest to the Norwegian Government over the action of the Nobel Prize committee.

³ Such an offer had been made through the Swedish Minister in Berlin on Apr. 12 (220/148488). German assent to this arrangement was given on May 2 (22/13948/2).

answered that he could confirm it; for whoever had the power and the responsibility could name governments and he who had no power could not establish a government. To this M. Scheel agreed. The Führer requested the Minister to express some opinion, for something must now be done. To this M. Scheel answered that in his opinion, a head of a state who had once fled from his country had no further connection with his people and he referred to the example of Poland. The Führer once more outlined the danger which impended for Norway and compared the more favorable lot which Denmark had chosen for itself with the chaos and destruction which confronted Norway. M. Scheel asked the Führer whether he ought to depart and was under the impression that this was a matter which depended on the Führer. The Führer replied that if we were in a state of war with Norway, the Norwegian Minister could not possibly carry on his duties here any longer. The Minister replied that Germany had certainly not declared war on Norway, and when the Führer answered that Koht in his speech⁴ had declared that Norway was in a state of war with Germany, the Minister said that he had also heard that, but he added that if he remained here and the old government disappeared and a new one was formed, he could continue to work for the new government. His personal relationship with the German Government had always been a very good one. The Foreign Minister proposed to the Minister that he fly to Norway to speak with the King. He could make clear to the King that he was not only gambling with his crown and the future of his children but also the fate of his country. To the question of the Führer as to whether he knew the King well, the Minister replied that he had often been received by the King and had met him on ceremonial occasions. The Führer proposed that the Minister should communicate by telegraph to which the latter agreed.

To the Minister's question as to whether he had to leave Berlin at once the Führer said that he did not wish to turn him out. He could first put his affairs in order calmly. The Minister then requested an interval for consideration and the Führer bade him farewell.⁵

HEWEL

⁴ It is not clear to what speech this reference was intended.

⁵ The Norwegian Minister and the staff of the Legation left Berlin on Apr. 19 (22/13923).

No. 108

220/148485

Memorandum by the State Secretary

St.S. No. 279

BERLIN, April 13, 1940.

State Secretary Kleinmann of the Ministry of Transport has just informed me by telephone of the following: He has been ordered by

Field Marshal Göring to make the necessary technical arrangements for the speedy supply of war material to Trondheim and Narvik by rail via Sweden, and also to make contact at once for this purpose with the Swedish transport authorities. An arrangement had been made by which the transport in closed cars during transit on Swedish territory would be possible. The escorting would be done by German personnel in civilian clothing. Herr Kleinmann asked that an official of the Foreign Ministry should make contact with him in connection with a speedy settlement of the matter where the Swedish Legation here was concerned (visas, etc.).

I asked Herr Kleinmann whether the Swedish Legation had already been instructed in the matter by their home authorities, for the Legation could hardly act without orders from Stockholm.

Herr Kleinmann replied that Field Marshal Göring had promised him information on this question.

Because of the speed demanded, I have first requested Herr von der Heyden-Rynsch to contact State Secretary Kleinmann, but not to undertake anything as regards the Swedish Legation without having received further instructions from me.

Hereby submitted to the Foreign Minister.¹

WEIZSÄCKER

¹ No further documents have been found on this aspect of the negotiations.

No. 109

103/112113-14

Minute by Ambassador Ritter

BERLIN, April 13, 1940.

I have received the following information from Colonel Conrad ¹ regarding the visit of People's Commissar Tevossyan to Field Marshal Göring on April 12.

People's Commissar Tevossyan has received from M. Stalin a letter replying to the previous Göring-Tevossyan conversation,² and has been instructed to convey its substance to Field Marshal Göring orally.

M. Stalin informed People's Commissar Tevossyan in the letter that the Soviet Government would endeavor to observe the agreed undertakings; they must, however, expect that Germany would do the same. M. Stalin expressed in the letter his gratification at the promises which the Field Marshal had made during the first conversation. He was especially gratified that the German deliveries were now getting under way. Germany and the Soviet Union were dependent on each

¹ Of Göring's personal staff.

² See document No. 32, footnote 1.

other. He therefore hoped that the relations now started would be really lasting.

When this communication was conveyed a further short conversation ensued. The Field Marshal informed People's Commissar Tevossyan that he had, after Tevossyan's first visit, held a meeting with the competent military and civil authorities and had given them definite instructions.³ If difficulties continued to exist Tevossyan should approach Herr Ritter and Herr Schnurre. In important questions, however, he himself was also available. With regard to the prices of aircraft the Field Marshal said that new constructions which were still in course of development naturally commanded a higher price than did mass-produced airplanes.

No other details were discussed. Tevossyan put forward no grievances. He was accompanied by Secretary of Legation Pavlov.⁴ The conversation lasted about 25 minutes.

R[ITTER]

³ See document No. 32.

⁴ First Secretary of the Soviet Embassy in Berlin.

No. 110

4487/E087402-05

*Reichsamtseleiter Scheidt to Minister Bräuer*¹

OSLO, April 13, 1940.

DEAR MR. MINISTER: In connection with the visit of Colonel Schmudt from Berlin I was invited to meet the Colonel and was asked about my impressions of the situation in Oslo and the position of the present Government.

I outlined my ideas to Colonel Schmudt and I would like to tell you, Mr. Minister, what impression I received upon leaving Headquarters of the view held in Wehrmacht circles of the situation here.

Undoubtedly the staff of the Commander in Chief of the German troops has formed an opinion of its own on the prospects of the new N[asjonal] S[amlings] Government and to my mind the danger exists that these gentlemen have gotten their information from those circles which claim to be nationally-minded and loyal, but are zealously pursuing the course of discrediting the Quisling Government with the Commander in Chief and his aides. This represents the latest effort of these elements to extricate themselves from the political consequences which must be feared.

Quisling has, it is true, declared emphatically that he will not pursue a radical course and that he wishes to cooperate with all bourgeois

¹ This document has a typed letterhead reading "Director of the German Liaison Staff with the Head of the Norwegian Government."

nationalist elements. It is apparent, however, that the years-old scare stories about Quisling's dictatorial intentions still have their effect today.

Since the gentlemen at German Headquarters do not understand the backgrounds and relationships of the political groups here, which are often very difficult to discern, there is likewise the possibility that some prejudice against the Quisling Government carried over from those sources may fall on fertile ground. This is all the more understandable because the known aim of the German Army leadership is to produce order at any cost.

In the course of conversation anxiety is expressed that Quisling possibly may not be popular. On this it should be said that Quisling on the first day gave his adherents the directive not to stage any demonstrations and, especially, celebrations. By this he wanted to prevent internal political differences from being displayed in public which would only produce unrest.

Besides it should be said that there is, it is true, a number of bourgeois nationally-minded men, who have well-known names, but there is no one who from political conviction and complete sense of responsibility is willing to assume all the consequences of his German orientation to the extent that Quisling is. If a bourgeois nationally-minded man could at this moment bring about a compromise, the dangers arising from such a compromise for the German Wehrmacht would be disproportionately increased. All of us know from Germany how the work of a government can be sabotaged, when people outwardly protest their loyalty, but secretly sabotage every effort. Besides, a government built on a compromise would not be a fit partner to achieve certain of Germany's political goals for the future.

I would be very grateful if you would take an opportunity to submit my views to the Reich Foreign Minister.

Heil Hitler!

SCHIEDT

No. 111

2969/578521

Unsigned Memorandum

CONVERSATION BETWEEN MINISTER BRÄUER AND THE FOREIGN MINISTER
AT 11 A. M. ON APRIL 14, 1940

The situation is such that we must do something at once to pacify the population. Can you, Herr Reichsminister, give me an idea of the trend of the 600-word telegram which, I hear, has arrived for me.¹ (The Foreign Minister denied this.) At the moment, I have summoned the Supreme Court and I intend to form a directorate with the

¹ It is not known to what message this may refer.

Supreme Court. The question is whether this should be done with or without Quisling. The matter is very urgent as acts of sabotage have taken place and there are still people who are ready to put themselves at our disposal. These people, especially the administrative officials, have for the greater part refused to pledge their support to Quisling. Consequently, I must either take the matter in hand myself or put myself entirely on Quisling's side. (The Foreign Minister asked repeatedly why the matter was so urgent and disclosed that Under State Secretary Habicht was on his way as a special envoy for this question.² Obviously, the Foreign Minister continued, Habicht must return to Berlin to report so that no decision will be taken till then.)

The Minister: That will not be possible; I must request that a decision be taken previously. I shall still be able to reach a peaceful settlement today if I receive instructions accordingly. I therefore request you once more to deal with the matter at once and to give me instructions.

² See document No. 106.

No. 112

3664/E034190

Unsigned Memorandum¹

OSLO, April 14, 1940.

About 12 o'clock this morning Pastor Günther came to see me and gave me the following information:

1) Paal Berg, President of the Supreme Court, proposed to the King by telephone via the Norwegian Legation in Stockholm that negotiations be begun with the German occupation authorities at once and unconditionally.

2) Bishop Berggrav also made contact with the King via the Norwegian Legation in Stockholm, but instead of being connected with the Norwegian Minister in Stockholm he spoke to Hambro, the President of the Storting,² who informed him that the King and he desired that an administrative body [*Verwaltungs-Instanz*] authorized by the King be set up, consisting of the Fylkesmann of Oslo³ and Bishop Berggrav, so that there would be an authorized body which could work together with the German occupation authorities. Bishop Berggrav declined for himself, since an administrative body of which he was a member would at once give the impression of a shadow government.

3) Bishop Berggrav put the question to the King whether the King and his Council [*Rat*] (this is the constitutional term) wished him to

¹ Marginal notes: "For the Minister. v[on] N[eu]haus 14/4." "Br[äuer] 14."

² A verbatim report of portions of this telephone conversation appears in Ferdinand Schjelderup, *Fra Norges kamp for retten: 1940 i Høyesterett* (Oslo, 1945), pp. 87-88.

³ The local governor or prefect of the district adjacent to Oslo.

go to the King, if need be with the clearly-worded conditions of the German occupying power. There has as yet been no reply to this inquiry. Bishop Berggrav is ready to leave at any time.⁴

⁴ Telegram No. 457 from Ribbentrop on Apr. 17 directed that nothing be done about the matter for the time being (2969/578578).

No. 113

2969/578535-36

Unsigned Memorandum

APRIL 14, 1940—6:00 p. m.

TELEPHONE MESSAGE FROM MINISTER DR. BRÄUER TO THE FOREIGN MINISTER VIA THE HIGH COMMAND OF THE WEHRMACHT

With Under State Secretary Habicht present, the German Minister had a conversation with Berg, the President of the Supreme Court, and representatives of the citizens of Oslo. The President was prepared to form a government council [*Regierungs-Ausschuss*] and to entrust the entire administration to the persons nominated by him. The government council would carry on with the administration until normal conditions were restored. Under the constitution the President of the Supreme Court was empowered to do this; thus the administration would function at once and peace and order be restored.

The retention of M. Quisling in the Government, however, could not be tolerated. The President of the Supreme Court was ready to accept the following terms:

- 1) The government council shall pledge complete loyalty to the occupation authorities.
- 2) Each member of the council shall be personally responsible for maintenance of peace and order and for carrying out the instructions of the occupation authorities.
- 3) The President of the Supreme Court shall proclaim publicly that on April 9 M. Quisling showed himself to be a good patriot by stepping into the breach and then in renouncing the exercise of government authority.
- 4) M. Quisling will take over certain duties connected with the winding-up of military affairs and, when dealing with such matters, he will have the rank of Head of Department.

A conversation with Herr Scheidt brought out little opposition to this solution. Habicht is now with Quisling to discuss the situation with him. As, however, Quisling himself does not rate his prospects very high, he will probably accept the solution readily. The Supreme Court is at present in session to receive the President's report.

We have reserved our opinion but have left no doubt that in the event of an unsatisfactory solution the citizens and authorities of Oslo would have to bear responsibility for further developments.

We have all along the line observed the wish to return quickly to normal conditions. The President of the Supreme Court believes it possible to make a reassuring impression on people throughout the country by returning to a legal form of government. The proposal has also been discussed with the Commander in Chief who would welcome the solution.

No. 114

3664/E034209-10

Memorandum by the President of the Norwegian Supreme Court

OSLO, April 14, 1940.

I have submitted for discussion by the Supreme Court the proposition whether the Supreme Court is prepared to appoint a temporary civil administrative council [*Verwaltungsrat*] for those parts of the country which are presently occupied by German forces.

The Supreme Court has undertaken to make such an appointment for the reasons indicated in the proclamation by the Supreme Court. As is further stated there, the Supreme Court is doing this in the anticipation that the King of Norway will approve this step. The Supreme Court will inform the King about this as soon as possible.

In this the Supreme Court proceeds from the assumption that this temporary administrative council should not concern itself with questions of foreign policy.

PAAL BERG

No. 115

2969/578532-34

Unsigned Memorandum

TELEPHONE CONVERSATIONS OF THE FOREIGN MINISTER WITH UNDER STATE SECRETARY HABICHT AND WITH THE MINISTER [IN NORWAY], ON APRIL 14, 1940, FROM 9:40 P. M. ONWARDS

Berlin: The Foreign Minister agrees in principle with the proposal,¹ but would like to know how they envisaged continued participation by M. Quisling.

The Foreign Minister is particularly anxious that M. Quisling should not be compromised outwardly. The main thing is not to give the impression that M. Quisling is being dropped, but that he should appear blameless in the eyes of his people and should also participate in the Government in some capacity.

The Minister: The participation will, it is true, be of a more technical nature and will serve rather to cover up his retirement. Ar-

¹ i. e., the replacement of the Quisling regime by an administrative council.

rangements have been made to entrust M. Quisling with the winding-up of all Norwegian military affairs in the occupied territory.

To a question from Berlin: He would also take part in committee meetings in so far as his province is concerned.

Berlin: The Führer would in any case like M. Quisling to be held in reserve.

The Minister: I suggest that M. Quisling's retirement, should it happen, be accompanied by propaganda from our side.

To a question from Berlin: Then of course not in the German press but it would, in any case, be supported on the radio here. That need not appear as coming from us, but we will see that it is done.

To a question from Berlin: Yes, I will see to that and I will also see that Quisling can speak to the country if he wishes.

Berlin: The Foreign Minister considers that essential.

To a question from Berlin: I have two things to say on this:

1) The President of the Supreme Court will not be chairman of the government council [*Regierungs-Ausschuss*], but will nominate him.

2) The President of the Supreme Court has already given me an assurance to this effect. The President of the Oslo council will be appointed chairman (or at least he is earmarked for it).

To a question from Berlin: Yes, he is thoroughly acceptable. I shall have the other members screened. Among others there is the Rector of the University. Furthermore Bishop Berggrav backs it with his authority, which is very important here in the north.

To a question from Berlin: Quisling was not so willing as I had reported this afternoon.

To a question from Berlin: Yes, when all is said and done he sees the necessity for it but he has, nevertheless, made various attempts to get round it. On the other hand Herr Scheidt is in complete agreement with our view (shares our view to a large extent).

CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE FOREIGN MINISTER AND UNDER STATE SECRETARY HABICHT

Habicht: I can only corroborate the impression Herr Bräuer has just given. I found M. Quisling in a frame of mind which makes it seem absolutely impossible that he could assert himself. He is at bottom entirely unstable and weak. That is all I can say about it. Nothing can be done with him. He lacks all control.

To a question from Berlin: I can see no other possibility either for the moment, or for the immediate future.

Berlin: The Foreign Minister agrees to the proposal but expressly desires that M. Quisling be dispensed with in a dignified manner and that he will take part in sessions of the Government even though he has not a seat in the Government, as was suggested this afternoon.

Habicht: The President of the Supreme Court has already agreed to this proposal. Although he is not a member of the Government Quisling will nevertheless take part in meetings of the government council in so far as his departments are concerned.

Berlin: Herr Habicht is to tell M. Quisling that the Führer appreciates his attitude to the full and that the Foreign Minister will also send M. Quisling a personal communication in writing. The Foreign Minister wishes to know whether the government council has any contact with the King.

Habicht: The government council declares that it could still make contact with the King and could find a way to do so.

To a question from Berlin: The government council considers it possible to find a way of contacting the King.

Berlin: The Foreign Minister would consider it desirable for the King to return to Oslo and recognize the government council without, however, giving the impression that this was in accordance with Germany's wishes. The government council is to do that of its own accord.

Habicht: That was our impression also.

To a question from Berlin: Not at the moment.

To a question from Berlin: In the course of tomorrow.

Berlin: Would Quisling consent to go along with this?

Habicht: We left him half an hour ago. He had not yet promised 100 percent but he will undoubtedly get to that point in the course of the evening. We have not yet demanded it of him. We only described the situation to him and urged him to draw his own conclusions.

Berlin: 1) The Foreign Minister is expecting information by this evening as to how the conversation with M. Quisling finished and whether he is prepared to collaborate on the terms suggested.²

2) The Foreign Minister informs Herr Habicht for his personal guidance that the Führer sets great store by his [Quisling's] being retained, so as to have him to fall back on in case the next government does not function in accordance with our ideas.

3) The Foreign Minister emphasizes once more that the Führer sets great store by M. Quisling remaining in reserve and collaborating in the manner just discussed.

² A telephone message from Under State Secretary Habicht and Minister Brüner at 1:30 a. m. on Apr. 15 reported: "Quisling agrees to the proposed arrangement. Further details will be settled tomorrow morning. After that a report will be sent from here." (2969/578541)

No. 116

F17/119-122

*Minister Killinger to the Foreign Minister*¹

TOP SECRET

BUCHAREST, April 14, 1940.

RM 18 g. Rs.

With reference to my report of April 11, 1940,² regarding the attempted sabotage by the British on the Danube, I am making a further report on the situation with regard to my assignment.³

In close cooperation with the Rumanian Intelligence Department and Canaris' Intelligence Department [*Abwehr*] we succeeded in discovering and preventing the act of sabotage planned by the English on the Danube.

In my opinion King Carol still continues to have a firm grip on policy. The action taken by the Rumanian authorities is solely due to the King's dread of communism and a possible Russian invasion. He is perfectly aware that he can only remain King if he closely associates himself with Germany. He knows quite well that England and France are unable to help him and that this help would at any rate come too late. But he also knows that Germany urgently requires Rumanian petroleum for waging war and therefore has also a strong interest in keeping the war away from Rumania. King Carol has previously stated that in the event of an attack on Rumania by Russia the entire petroleum production would be destroyed by the Rumanians themselves and that preparations have already been made for this. A member of the English Legation has now made the same statement to an agent. Should the Rumanians and the English together destroy the petroleum production and means of transport, this cannot be prevented. The guarantee of a continuous supply of petroleum to Germany from Rumania is only assured if Rumania keeps out of any warlike complications.

Should Rumania, nevertheless, be attacked by Russia and an advancing army approach the oilfields, I am convinced that the planned destruction of the entire petroleum industry will actually be carried out by the Rumanians and the English. The King would probably then leave his country and join the Western Powers. I also consider that there is little prospect that any possible internal revolution in Rumania will be able to stop the planned destruction of oil production. The primitive Rumanian people, consisting for the most part of peasants of whom 50 percent are illiterate, could not be used for such

¹ Marginal note in Ribbentrop's handwriting: "[For] F[ührer]."

² Not found.

³ See vol. VIII, document No. 495.

an undertaking in the prevailing conditions. They obey orders as soldiers without question, including the destruction of the oil wells.

The question is now above all to stop English attempts at sabotage by every means and to strive successfully to prevent fresh attempts which are doubtless to be expected.

Our successes in the north are for the most part overshadowed here by fear of Russia. It is a fact that this is being systematically stirred up by every conceivable means by the English and French agents of the Secret Service planted in Rumania. The deployment of Russian and Rumanian troops in Bessarabia provides them with a welcome pretext for this.

England is determined to bring about military chaos in Rumania with all the means at her disposal so that Germany will lose the Rumanian oil she needs for waging war.

In addition to the existing countermeasures already taken by Canaris' organization and the Security Service [SD] and those mentioned in my last report I am now making the following further proposals which I have discussed with all responsible authorities.

1) Shock troops will be trained within the volksdeutsch circles (Sibiu, Braşov) and held in readiness and this will be done in fact under German shock troop officers and noncommissioned officers. Approximately 10 such leaders are required; these must be supplied by Canaris' Intelligence Department.

2) A Danube passenger steamer lying at Vienna which is laid up will immediately be put into service by the Danube Steamship Company as a training ship for Danube helmsmen and pilots. The Danube Steamship Company will provide the actual ship's personnel. Sixty men from the Security Service will go on board as trainees divided into 6 boarding parties each consisting of a leader and 9 men.

Should action become necessary these boarding parties will be distributed among the tugs lying nearby with which the operation will be carried out.

No other accommodation for the assault groups which are to safeguard the Danube route is feasible on land or on the tugs themselves. It would be possible for training in seamanship and in boarding tactics to be given on the training ship at one and the same time.

Arrangements for putting the ship into service would be made by Canaris' Intelligence Department while the boarding parties would be provided by the Security Service.

A precise proposal will be forwarded to Canaris by the responsible Intelligence agent and myself in the next few days. Heydrich and Luther are to receive a copy of it.

Kindly support this proposition of mine.

V. KILLINGER

No. 117

8893/E621582-83

The Legation in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

TOP SECRET

No. 524 of April 14

BUCHAREST, April 15, 1940—2:40 a. m.

Received April 15—12:30 p. m.

W2042 g.

I. As negotiations have not made any satisfactory progress despite the statements made by the Ministry for Trade and Industry at the conversation on March 30,¹ the King, who had already been informed about our most important wishes by Neubacher at his initial audience,² has again been acquainted by us with the chief questions. In particular, I had detailed discussions with Court Minister Urdareanu and Foreign Minister Gafencu a few days ago. The Court Minister then asked me to call on him today and told me the King had directed him to give me the following information:

There had been a Cabinet meeting with the King today at which the state of the negotiations with Germany had been discussed in detail. The King had told the assembled ministers that he intended to adhere to the political line hitherto taken with Germany and that this fact was to be taken into account in conducting the negotiations. He had given the ministers instructions to this effect individually so that we could now count on an early satisfactory conclusion. In particular the King had directed him to give me confirmation once more that the promised quantities of petroleum would be maintained in all circumstances and in face of all possible opposition. The King had given explicit instructions that arrangements should be made to catch up as far as possible with the arrears which had accumulated during the winter. In the coming 6 months we could obtain about 60,000 more tons per month than was agreed upon, if means of transport could be made available. In respect to the oil pact and funds for balancing the clearing account, the ministers had received instructions which would make possible an early favorable conclusion. Furthermore, the King had directed the Minister of Finance to withdraw his opposition to the ordering of the powder factory from Germany (an order to the value of 86 million reichsmarks), so that the order can now be placed immediately.

I shall report in detail³ on the stage reached in the negotiations as soon as we have received the promised additional information from

¹ No record of this conversation has been found.

² This was reported in Bucharest telegram No. 437 of Apr. 2 (not printed: 8912/E622160-61).

³ Such a report was sent in telegram No. 557 of Apr. 20 (not printed: 9723/-H293954-58), which conveyed assurances by the Minister President that additional deliveries of oil up to the limit of transport capacity were being arranged and that Rumania was prepared to ship 130,000 tons in May, 150,000 tons in June, 170,000 tons in July, and 190,000 tons beginning in August. The telegram added that this was "far beyond present transport capacity."

the Ministers in charge of individual departments. It remains to be seen whether the latter will not after all make still further difficulties.

II. Afterwards I had a detailed political discussion with the Court Minister which he started with the direct question, obviously posed on orders from the King, whether Germany was in a position to protect Rumania from a Russian attack. In the course of the conversation it was confirmed afresh that Rumania's economic (group garbled) is only dictated by political considerations. The Court Minister repeated his previous statement⁴ that the King and all authoritative political quarters were convinced that scarcely any other state was as anxious as Rumania that Germany should remain strong, for only Germany was in a position to protect Rumania's interests. It was solely the attitude of the King which mattered. We ought not to allow ourselves to be misled by gossip in certain pro-French circles in Bucharest. The preservation of Rumania's [territorial] integrity, however, was also in Germany's interests, because Germany both now and in the future always must consider it a matter of importance that the Danube Estuary should not fall into the hands of another Great Power.

For my part I carried on the conversation on the lines of the instructions which the Foreign Minister gave me orally. Furthermore, I stated that we should be obliged to demand control of Anglo-Rumanian trade, should exports to England continue to increase on as disproportionate a scale as in recent months. This was a very grave question since this development was entirely incompatible with Rumania's neutrality. The Court Minister promised an immediate investigation and a report to the King.

CLODIUS
FABRICIUS

⁴ See document No. 33.

No. 118

4469/E087780-86

Unsigned Memorandum

OSLO, April 15, 1940.

NOTE ON THE NEGOTIATIONS LEADING TO THE RESIGNATION OF MINISTER PRESIDENT QUISLING

The following negotiations took place:

1. On Sunday, April 14, 1940, at about 6:30 p. m. at Hotel Continental; the following were present: from the German Legation, the Minister Dr. Bräuer, as well as Under State Secretary Habicht, Counselor of Legation von Neuhaus, Secretary of Legation Graf; from the Norwegian Government, Minister President Quisling and Minister Hagelin. The German liaison officer with the Norwegian

Government, Reichsamtsleiter Scheidt, also took part in the negotiations.

In these negotiations the Minister Dr. Bräuer and Under State Secretary Habicht told M. Quisling that in their opinion the best solution for the situation in Norway after the occupation by the German troops, in view of the serious consequences which further resistance by the Norwegian troops might entail, was the resignation of the Quisling Government. The resignation of the Quisling Cabinet would make it possible to find a constitutional form of government. The legal basis for this was found in section 46 of the Norwegian Constitution. Quisling stated that no such allegedly legal solution supported by some section of the constitution was possible, since the present case had not been provided for in the constitution. Section 46 expressly referred only to the case of the death of the King when there was no successor to the throne who was of age. In such a contingency it was the duty of the Government to convene the Storting, and the Supreme Court (Høyesterett) assumed this duty if the Storting was not convened by the Government within 4 weeks.

Quisling also pointed out that according to the constitution the right to appoint a governing authority was vested in the King alone and that this right could in no case be claimed by the Supreme Court. (The Supreme Court, too, was obviously aware of this, since it expressly stated in the subsequent appointment of the administrative council [*Verwaltungsrat*] that it undertook the appointment in the confidence that the King would approve the step. This has not yet occurred.)

Thereupon Under State Secretary Habicht explained that in the opinion of the Germans the Government had only a very small minority behind it, so that this Government could be maintained only by the bayonets of the German Wehrmacht. This would perhaps lead to disturbances even while the German Wehrmacht was in the country, and undoubtedly after its departure.

For the occupation of Norway, however, the German Wehrmacht needed the same condition of peace and order as existed in Denmark, and in such a democratic country a peace of that kind could be obtained most quickly if the preference of the Norwegian people for constitutionality were taken into consideration. Moreover, a large number of stern measures were contemplated with which one did not wish to burden Quisling and his movement. The opposition now had to be broken by all available means; the new form of the contemplated administrative council and its representatives had a justified expectation of persuading the King to return and thereby to achieve the pacification of Norway.

If an administrative council should not be convened, there would be a German military administration. Quisling and Hagelin

both stated that, apart from the lack of a tenable legal basis, the appraisal of the situation in Norway by the German gentlemen was incorrect and was based on false premises and information. This information came from the circles of the old party cliques. The political situation in Norway was much too complicated to be reduced to such simple formulas and was difficult for foreigners to understand. Moreover, political life, too, was not without loyalty and comradeship, which Quisling for his part esteemed highly and took for granted on the German side. Under State Secretary Habicht thereupon remarked that there were situations in which larger viewpoints justified a break even with political partners. He mentioned in that connection that the events in Austria in 1936, under which he himself had suffered, also represented a similar fate. With reference thereto he pointed out that the Führer had permitted the fall of party members, who were later hanged. Quisling replied that in this case, precisely from the higher point of view, the policy adopted had to be maintained and the action could be carried out successfully only in collaboration with him and his movement. It was impossible to warn sufficiently against the dangerous experiment of a resignation of Quisling and the appointment of an administrative council consisting of men from the old anti-German parties. Germany thereby risked losing the only friends she had in Norway and then being surrounded only by enemies. In view of the great extent of the country it was positively necessary that the German military be able to rely on an absolutely dependable and friendly government. Quisling insisted, moreover, that he and his Government would unquestionably prevail and win the people over. Many instances were cited to support this. It was also mentioned that the Government was already able to maintain peace and order in Oslo, even if the German troops were not in the city. By the proposed arrangement, however, the national movement might be disillusioned, whereas the avowed and secret enemies of Germany would undoubtedly be strengthened. The responsibility for the continuation of the bloodshed was of course almost impossible to accept if one assumed a hypothetical case according to which quiet and peace were to be assured by the administrative council.

To this the reply was given that the resignation of Quisling might give the movement a strong impetus and create the basis for the formation of a new government by Quisling. In the negotiations with the men of the proposed administrative council the condition would be laid down that Quisling's exit should occur in such a way as not only not to reflect on him but, on the contrary, make him a great figure, with the accompaniment of suitable publicity.

Quisling and Hagelin were unable to accept the conclusions of the Germans; the parties to the negotiations took leave of each other with the understanding that Quisling and Hagelin should remain available

for new negotiations while the German gentlemen would conduct further negotiations with the proposed administrative council. No decision was reached.

2. On Sunday, April 14, 1940, at 11:45 p. m., in the residence of the German Minister. Those present were: the same men as at the first discussion with the exception of Secretary of Legation Graf.

The Minister opened the discussion by stating that he had talked with Berlin¹ and had received a fixed directive for the further conduct of Norwegian policy from the Führer and Chancellor. He read parts of an instruction which he had received from Berlin, according to which the Führer and Chancellor approved the solution of the situation which the German gentlemen proposed. The condition was laid down that Quisling's exit was not to cause any injury whatever to his personal standing or the prestige of his movement (complete integrity of his person and the movement). Quisling was to be held in reserve. Thereupon the implementation of the Führer's wishes was discussed. The Minister said it was planned that Quisling would be publicly thanked for his personal action and his patriotic conduct. The Foreign Minister of the German Reich would send a personal letter to that effect to Quisling. Quisling would be given the task, outside the administrative council, of demobilizing the Norwegian Army and thereby receive an opportunity to exert a far-reaching influence on the demobilized soldiers. This would benefit his movement. No restriction of the movement through measures by the new administrative council would be tolerated; on the contrary, the assurance could be given that everything would be done to promote his movement. In reply to Quisling's question whether, for example, the prohibition against uniforms would again be enforced, the Minister said that a prohibition against uniforms was out of the question. Quisling expressly requested that Reichsamtsleiter Scheidt might remain with him in Norway for subsequent consultation and as liaison chief with the German authorities, while M. Hagelin would go to Berlin as his representative. After brief deliberation both requests were granted.

The parties to the negotiations took leave of each other about 1:30 a. m., with the understanding that MM. Quisling and Hagelin would consider the proposed solution.

3. On Monday, April 15, 1940, about 11:00 a. m., in the German Legation. The following took part in the negotiations: on the German side, the Minister Dr. Bräuer, Under State Secretary Habicht; and on the side of the Norwegian Government, Minister President Quisling.

Quisling stated that he had come determined to submit his ideas on the situation and his objections to the proposed arrangement im-

¹ See document No. 115.

mediately to the German Führer, with whose wish he would then comply in order to continue cooperating loyally. The Minister replied that the decision of the Führer had already been received and if Quisling refused they would just proceed with the business. Quisling stated that he did not by any means refuse through pig-headedness, but that his objections in this matter were dictated both by the national Norwegian viewpoint and the general Germanic viewpoint, for which he had always worked and would also continue to work. Quisling again stressed that in his opinion the proposed arrangement was based on a mistaken appraisal of the political situation in Norway. Quisling asked the Minister to write down this statement and he did so. The Minister reported further that the proposals concerning the future employment of MM. Scheidt and Hagelin had been accepted and he read from his instruction various points concerning the position of Quisling's person and his movement, Nasjonal Samling. There was a brief discussion of some points, as, for example, the prohibition against uniforms, in the sense of the negotiations on the preceding day. The proposals for supporting the Nasjonal Samling movement were to be formulated concretely in writing as soon as possible. Quisling was requested to draft a statement for publication.² Quisling said that he would place the chief emphasis in this statement on explaining his resignation as due to his inability to take responsibility for further bloodshed and that for him this was the decisive point. This met with general approval.

² See document No. 124.

No. 119

2969/578544

The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Norway

Telegram

No. 428 of April 15

BERLIN.

Received April 15, 1940—5:50 p. m.

It is important for the authority of the new Norwegian Government that neither the King nor the Crown Prince retain the possibility of establishing themselves anywhere in Norway with members of the old government, or with members newly appointed by them as a kind of opposition government. It would therefore be politically desirable, if possible, to seize the persons of the King and the Crown Prince without endangering their lives. You will discuss this with General von Falkenhorst and consider with him if and what military steps might be possible in this direction.¹

RIBBENTROP

¹ Marginal note: "Discussed with General von Falkenhorst on Apr. 12 and with Col. von Buschenhausen [*Buschenhagen*] on Apr. 15. B[räuer] 15."

No. 120

171/134664

The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in the Soviet Union

Telegram

SECRET

BERLIN, April 15, 1940—6:53 p. m.

No. 636 of April 15

Received April 16—1:30 a. m.

With reference to your telegram No. 687.¹

Please explain to M. Molotov our attitude toward Sweden as follows:

We share completely the attitude of the Soviet Government that preservation of Sweden's neutrality corresponds to both German and Soviet interests. As you told him on transmitting our memorandum on April 9² and repeated during the conversation of April 13,³ it is not our intention to extend our military operation in the north to Swedish territory. On the contrary, we are fully determined to respect unconditionally the neutrality of Sweden, as long as Sweden in turn also observes strict neutrality and does not support the Western Powers.⁴

RIBBENTROP

¹ Document No. 104.

² See documents Nos. 54 and 73.

³ See document No. 104.

⁴ Handwritten marginal note: "Settled on 16.4 with Molotov (see note). File. HI[lger] 16/4."

In telegram No. 715 of Apr. 16 (171/134662) Schulenburg reported: "Instructions carried out today with Molotov. He appeared satisfied and showed acute interest in the general situation in Norway. In referring to the fact that occupation of Narvik and as a consequence occupation of the Swedish ore district by the English had been imminent, M. remarked that it was well that we had forestalled the English."

No. 121

220/148535-36

The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Denmark

Telegram

No. 353

BERLIN, April 15, 1940.

With reference to your telegram No. 301.¹

According to reports reaching us here, some of the Danish Missions abroad are obviously still uncertain about the attitude now to be adopted by them. You are therefore requested to urge the Danish Government immediately to supplement its circular telegram, reported in your previous telegram, and to instruct its Missions abroad in the following sense:

¹ Document No. 103.

Germany has taken over the protection of Danish neutrality and in so doing has given an assurance to respect the territorial integrity and the political independence of the Kingdom of Denmark. On this basis, the Danish Government has reached a friendly understanding with the German Government. As a result there is close and sincere cooperation between the Danish civil and military authorities and the German authorities. Complete calm and order prevail in Denmark; the economic life of the country continues undisturbed. It is the duty of the Danish Missions abroad to bring this state of affairs to the knowledge of foreign Governments, to adopt their whole attitude accordingly, and in particular to model their relations with German Missions abroad on the situation at home.

You are authorized to permit the Danish Government to use its coding system for instructions to that effect, as soon as you have approved the contents, in consultation with Hencke, to whom the Danish code should be made known. I request you to obtain the text of the Danish instruction, so that we can inform our Missions abroad in the same sense.²

Foreign Minister

² The Minister in Copenhagen replied in telegram No. 352 of Apr. 20, sent Apr. 21, document No. 145.

No. 122

3355/E009274-76

Memorandum by the Director of the Economic Policy Department

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

BERLIN, April 15, 1940.

No. 9

No. W. H. A. 756.

MEETING OF THE COMMERCIAL POLICY COMMITTEE ON APRIL 15, 1940

Present: Ministerialdirigent Bergemann representing Under State Secretary von Jagwitz (Reich Ministry of Economics), Ministerialdirektor Walter (Reich Ministry of Food), Ministerialdirektor Berger (Reich Ministry of Finance), Ministerialdirektor Wucher (Reich Ministry of Finance), Reichsbankdirektor Wilhelm, member of the Board of Directors of the Reichsbank, Oberregierungsrat Kadgien, representing Ministerialdirektor Gramsch (Four Year Plan).

I. BULGARIA

Ministerialdirektor Walter reported on his negotiations in Sofia. According to a report from Ministerialdirigent Bergemann it is expected that the request expressed by Ministerialdirigent Landwehr (Sofia Legation telegram 120¹) regarding supplies of iron to Bulgaria can be fulfilled.

¹ Not printed (2136/467908-09).

II. DENMARK

1. Ministerialdirektor Walter reported on his intentions regarding the negotiations of the Government Committee which are to open in Copenhagen on Thursday.²

The aim is to divert to Germany the whole volume of Danish export which was previously sent overseas. In return we can promise our willingness to supply the Danes with all the coal they require on condition that supplies for domestic use are strictly rationed, and supplies for industry are limited to those firms which produce goods of interest to us.

Before the departure of the delegation there must still be settled to what extent we can also supply motor fuel, fertilizers, and iron. With regard to motor fuel and iron, concessions seem advisable only in the case of supplies to firms which manufacture goods vital to us; with regard to fertilizers, we have in mind advising them to obtain supplies from Norway for the time being.

2. Direktor Wilhelm, member of the Board of Directors of the Reichsbank, gave notice of a statement by the president of the Danish National Bank that the issue of occupation currency [*Reichskreditkassenscheine*] introduced by the Armed Forces to pay our occupying forces in Denmark had led to substantial rises in prices and was therefore not in *our* interest. The Danish National Bank is prepared instead of this to advance the Wehrmacht amounts in crowns on condition that the members of the occupying forces be paid only 75 percent or less of their pay in Denmark. The Reichsbank has already reached agreement in principle on this with the Wehrmacht.

WIEHL

² i. e., Apr. 18.

No. 123

2332/486553

The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

URGENT

No. 348 of April 15

Tokyo, April 15, 1940—11:00 p. m.

Received April 16—4:00 a. m.

Pol. VIII 472.

With reference to my telegram No. 344 of April 15.¹

I refer to DNB telegram No. 36 according to which Foreign Minister Arita said today that Japan would follow attentively any development which, by intensifying the war in Europe, would affect

¹ Not printed (2332/486552).

the status quo in the Netherlands Indies.² As regards the events leading up to this, I hear that on April 13 the Japanese Navy, independently of the Foreign Ministry, instigated the press campaign referred to in the above-mentioned telegram in order to forestall an allegedly imminent statement by Secretary of State Hull on America's attitude to the Netherlands Indies, and to warn the United States and England. By this action the Navy forced the Foreign Minister into making today's Government statement. Immediately afterwards the Foreign Minister received the Netherlands Minister³ for a long discussion at the latter's request.

Identical texts to Shanghai and Batavia.

OTT

² On Apr. 20 the Japanese Ambassador handed Woermann a copy in English of Arita's statement of Apr. 15 on the Netherlands Indies (Woermann memorandum: 2332/486568-69). The text of the Arita statement is in *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, Japan, 1931-1941* (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1943), vol. II, p. 281. See also document No. 234.

³ General J. C. Pabst.

No. 124

80/22895-96

The Minister in Norway to the Foreign Ministry

Radio Telegram

URGENT

OSLO, April 15, 1940.

No. 565 of April 15

Received April 16—6:30 a. m.

I. The Government Committee [*Regierungsausschuss*] was formed today and installed in office by me. For that purpose I received the President of the Supreme Court, the chairman and members of the Government Committee, and representatives of the largest Norwegian organizations and of the press in the conference room of the Academy of Sciences. In my talk I again explained in the sense of our memorandum¹ the reasons which led us to our action in Norway. In doing so I brought out the clear guilt and responsibility of England and emphasized that it was the fault of the previous Government that bloodshed had not been avoided. With the formation of the Government [Committee we wanted²] to meet the wish expressed to us by all parts of the population for a return to a constitutional form of government. I pledged the members of the Government Committee to loyalty to us and emphasized that each individual was responsible for the maintenance of peace and order and was to carry out the instructions of the competent occupation authorities.

The press was given:

¹ See document No. 53, subenclosure 1.

² The words in brackets, garbled in transmission, are from the Oslo copy (2969/578545-46).

- 1) An announcement by me
- 2) A proclamation by the President of the Supreme Court
- 3) His statement of recognition for Quisling
- 4) The text of the latter's radio address (statement to the Norwegian people)
- 5) An appeal by the Government Committee, and
- 6) A declaration of approval by the business and labor organizations.³

II. The instructions in the telephone conversation⁴ were taken fully into account in the arrangement made. The statement of recognition for Quisling is unequivocal. His radio speech to the Norwegian people assures him the maintenance and probably even enhancement of his [authority⁵]. With the authority delegated to him for carrying out demobilization measures retention and strengthening of his influence is possible.

III. The mere rumors of an impending reorganization of the government administration have greatly reassured the people and relieved tension perceptibly. This morning a large stream of refugees began returning to Oslo. The High Command reports that on certain sectors of the front, too, there are signs of relieved tension and, among other things, attributes the capitulation of 100 officers and 2,000 men at Kristiansand to that fact.

IV. *Dagbladet* has an extra edition which gives prominence in headlines to the restoration of a constitutional position, the investment of Quisling with the functions of a commissioner for demobilization, and the declaration of loyalty by the organizations.

BRÄUER

³ The texts of these documents in German and Norwegian were transmitted to the Foreign Ministry by Bräuer in his report No. 2945 of Apr. 15 (3664/E034194-207).

⁴ See document No. 115.

⁵ The word in brackets is supplied from the Oslo copy.

No. 125

2135/467895-99

The Minister and Plenipotentiary of the German Reich in Denmark to the Foreign Ministry

No. D. Pol. 3/588

COPENHAGEN, April 15, 1940.
Pol. VI 987.

Subject: The military occupation of Denmark.

When I sent a message to the Foreign Minister at 4 a. m., Danish time, on April 9 that I had an urgent démarche to make to him at 4:20 the Danes at first thought that I wanted to speak to the Foreign Minister at 4:20 p. m., and were extremely surprised when I insisted on making my visit at 4:20 a. m. In spite of the early hour of my visit, which betokened something unusual, no one was in any way

prepared for the contents of my *démarche*. They refused at first to believe the news that German troops had already crossed the Danish frontier, and were even at that moment about to land in Copenhagen. Their utter surprise showed how completely successful we had been in keeping our intentions secret until the decisive last minute. This provided an essential condition for the success of the operation, but did not remove all difficulties. In view of the Danish temperament and the difficulty of bringing the leading persons together quickly it was evident that it was not easy to obtain a speedy decision. As in the meantime fighting threatened to break out between the landing forces and the Danish troops—rifle and machinegun fire was increasing to an alarming degree—I did all that was humanly possible to make it clear to the Danes that to delay a decision meant a catastrophe for Denmark. It was not until 6:15 a. m., when telephonic communication in the city was no longer possible, that the State Secretary of the Foreign Ministry came to me in person to inform me that the King and the Royal Council had decided to protest but to offer no resistance. It was only then that the question arose as to how the order not to resist was to be conveyed to the troops. One great difficulty was that Danish time is an hour behind German time and that the Danish radio station, Kalundborg, over which the order was to be conveyed, had not yet started broadcasting. It was only thanks to the fact that a successful attempt was made in the meantime to establish a telephone line between the landing party in the castle and the Legation, that the landing party in the castle was able to broadcast the announcement in question on its transmitter on the Kalundborg wave length and thus at the last minute prevent considerable bloodshed.

From conversations which I had with the Danes during the critical hours I must stress that they first of all called attention to the Non-Aggression Pact¹ and then described a landing by the English as improbable. My announcement that we must in case of necessity put down any resistance finally convinced the Danes that it would be better for Denmark to submit to the inevitable. Other factors which very largely contributed to this were our statements that our invasion was not a hostile measure but was only designed to prevent England from making Scandinavia into a theater of war on the [German] flank, and in particular our assurance that it was not Germany's intention either now or in the future to infringe by her measures the territorial integrity and the political independence of the Kingdom of Denmark.

It was certainly no easy matter for the Danish Government and the King to force themselves to this decision and the population will undoubtedly accept the unresisting retreat of the Danish Army and

¹ Signed May 31, 1939, vol. vi, document No. 461.

the presence of German troops with mixed feelings. At present, however, the dominant feeling is one of relief that a catastrophe has been avoided and that Denmark will in all probability not become a battlefield in the German-English war.

In view of the threat of catastrophe, the Danish Government and the Danish people reconciled themselves comparatively easily to the 13 demands from the memorandum which I put forward in the first instance.² But some uncertainty about our final intentions was evident when I submitted the demands in the second and third categories,³ and there was fear that our plans went very far beyond a mere temporary military occupation for security reasons and anxiety as to whether Danish sovereignty would not gradually be undermined. The Danish Government and people are only now beginning to visualize what a decisive effect the occupation will have on the whole national and economic life of Denmark. The appointment of representatives and liaison officers with central and local Government authorities intensified this feeling and greatly increased the fear of a slow process of penetration. How little the Danes at first realized the far-reaching consequences of the occupation is shown by the fact that they thought that persons who committed offenses against the security of the occupying forces would be tried according to Danish penal law and by Danish judges.

For the present there can be no doubt that the Danes honestly desire to cooperate loyally with us within the limits of the necessities imposed by the occupation, but will naturally try to preserve their sovereign rights as far as possible. This naturally arises from sober realistic political consideration and not from any special friendship for us. This willingness to cooperate will of course only go as far as circumstances demand. The beginning of a change in the feelings of the Danish people, who have hitherto been for the most part pro-English can already be seen to a certain extent now but the change will only be finally completed when the realization dawns that English influence is excluded from Central and Northern Europe.

The most urgent problem arising out of the occupation and the cutting off of Denmark from her overseas supplies and from her trade with England is to keep Denmark's economic life going. A great change will be necessary in Denmark itself as well as a readjustment of German-Danish trade. The economic commissioner has already begun these tasks in consultation with me. The most urgent matter

² See document No. 66, footnote 1.

³ The instructions to the German Minister in Oslo, and presumably those to the Minister in Copenhagen, concerning actions to be taken in connection with the occupation, contained as an enclosure a copy of the OKW letter of Apr. 2 to the Foreign Ministry (document No. 42) which referred to additional demands to be made on the Danish and Norwegian Governments in connection with the occupation.

in this respect is the problem of coal and fuel in general. Secondly there is the question of providing agriculture with feeding stuffs: the greater adaptation of agriculture to production of its own needs and the question as to whether we can supply Denmark with feeding stuffs from the continent. Industry, which hitherto has worked for the most part to supply Denmark's own needs, must in future switch over to orders from Germany. Previous experience has shown that we cannot successfully employ Danish workers in Germany. It is better to let them work for us indirectly by employing them in their local industry.

It is of the utmost importance for the maintenance of calm and order that economic life should be kept going, and this will help to safeguard the security of the occupying forces and our military interests in the country. The best thing to do would be to keep the economy going by smooth, friendly cooperation with the Danish Government and Danish industrialists. If we took over the administration directly, that would produce considerable points of friction. In that way it would probably be possible to get something from the country for our own war economy on a short term basis. The maximum economic output will certainly not be reached in that way on a long term basis, and at the same time we would be seriously handicapped both militarily and economically. Our aim must therefore be to keep the Danish Government in cooperation with us, which will be all the easier if we adopt strong measures while at the same time outwardly preserving the appearance of Danish sovereignty, which will make it easier for the Danish Government to justify many unpleasant measures to its own people and to put them into effect.

The other problem is the development of domestic policy. Events have given rise to a certain feeling of crisis here which has not been dispelled by the fact that a coalition government has been formed consisting of all the large traditional parties. It is the aim of the traditional parties, especially the Social Democrats who are in control here, to maintain their previous position and the previous régime if possible. On the other hand the reform parties, who so far have had only a fraction of the population behind them, feel that their day is coming and are trying to take advantage of events in order to come to power. We shall not be able to avoid these problems permanently, all the more so as it must first be shown whether the present government will be capable of overcoming with the old methods the new problems which will now confront it. With regard to the conduct of the war we are not interested in one party or another, but primarily in the internal political stability of Denmark. Our policy should therefore be not to interfere in internal political affairs, as long as there is no compelling reason to do so. Therefore, when the Foreign Minister recently told me of rumored attempts at a Putsch by the Danish National Socialists and asked how the German military would

react if there should be attempts at revolution, I told him that it was for the Danes to settle their internal political differences among themselves and that, as long as these did not affect German military interests, intervention by us was not to be expected. It is feared here that we are really more interested in political conditions within the country, and that we will take action against Jews, emigrés, and radical left wing circles and that we will set up our own police system for this purpose. If we were to go further than is absolutely necessary in this direction, it would have a crippling effect and cause serious disturbances in political and economic life. The importance of this question must therefore not be underestimated. After consulting the military commanders I answered a question by the Foreign Minister by saying that our primary interest was that there should be no espionage, sabotage, or sedition which might threaten military interests.

Although our assurance that we will not infringe the political integrity of Denmark is believed, it is nevertheless feared here that the German national group in North Schleswig will take advantage of the new situation to attempt to separate North Schleswig from Denmark, and that a center of unrest will develop in North Schleswig. I told the Foreign Minister, when he mentioned this to me, that it was quite understandable if the German national group took an active interest in events and that it was now more important than ever that the Danish authorities should show understanding and should not pursue a policy of pin pricks and resentment. That applied not only to the Danish authorities but also to the Danish population in North Schleswig.

RENTHE-FINK

No. 126

220/148561-62

The Minister in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

No. 487 of April 15

STOCKHOLM, April 16, 1940—12:05 a. m.

Received April 16—5:40 a. m.

Foreign Minister Günther received me today in order, as he told me by way of introduction, to hand me a note¹ concerning violation of neutrality by German air forces in the last few days. When I asked him to make use of the channel via the Swedish Legation in Berlin, he agreed to do so most willingly, and then came to the real theme of our conversation. The Foreign Minister assured me once more in an unusually formal manner, personally guaranteeing the accuracy of his statements, that all military precautions now taken by the Swedish

¹ The text of the note has not been found.

Government were exclusively for the defense of the country's neutrality. This was also true of the posting of reinforced units, absolutely necessary for the protection of the long Swedish-Norwegian frontier. It was always the sincere desire and earnest endeavor of the Swedish Government to be as accommodating as possible, both politically and economically. In particular, his Government was determined to complete the deliveries of ore agreed upon in the quantities contracted for.

In reply to his question as to what else we objected to, I asked him once more to give his whole attention to the attitude of press and radio, which he promised to do. Günther seemed to me to be somewhat disquieted about the supposed prevention of the departure from Germany of Swedish nationals which was reported today.

I reproduce this conversation in detail because I believe that the seriousness of the Foreign Minister's words and the honest good will he expressed deserve our full consideration and appreciation.

WIED

No. 127

F14/141-155

Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat

CONVERSATION OF THE FÜHRER WITH THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF OF THE SWEDISH NAVY, VICE ADMIRAL TAMM, ON APRIL 16, 1940, FROM 3:30 P. M. TO 4:30 P. M., IN THE PRESENCE OF MINISTER OF STATE MEISSNER, GENERAL BODENSCHATZ, AND SENIOR COUNSELOR HEWEL ¹

The Führer began the conversation with the words: "You come at a very difficult time." The Admiral nodded in agreement and said how surprised he had been that the Field Marshal had invited him here.² The Führer went on to say that he had much regretted having

¹ Admiral Tamm's memorandum of this interview is printed in *Transiteringsfrågor . . . April-Juni 1940*, pp. 43-44.

² A telegram of the Swedish Minister in Berlin, *ibid.*, pp. 26-27, indicates that the invitation to Admiral Tamm to come to Germany had been forwarded through Göring's friend, the Swedish businessman Dahlerus. In the party accompanying Tamm, besides Dahlerus himself, were Foreign Ministry Counselor Gunnar Hägglöf, Professor Sven Tunberg, head of the Swedish Office of Public Information, and the businessman Rolf von Heldenstam. Memoranda from the German side on the conversations of the Swedish party with Göring on April 15 and 16 have not been found, but Swedish memoranda are printed, *ibid.*, pp. 29-43.

At these meetings with Göring and at others held in Berlin at the same time and subsequently at which members of the Swedish Legation participated, German proposals for transit of certain nonmilitary supplies, including clothing, food, medical supplies, and skis, to Narvik were considered. These requests were brought before the Swedish Cabinet on Apr. 17, and it was decided that the German request should be granted but that it should be regarded as an individual case. A German request for transit of medical personnel to Narvik was also granted.

Documents on the negotiations which took place in Berlin concerning this transport, the nature of its contents, and its progress through Sweden are printed in *ibid.*, pp. 49-51, 55-63, 66-67, 70-72, 80-83, 89-90.

had, for political reasons, to undertake the operation in the north. He had done everything to contribute to the preservation of the Nordic race. His offers to England had been more than one man could really be responsible for. He had been warned against the English, who placed all thought of race and all great communal action after their selfish aims and capitalistic desires. Those who had warned him had been justified and now the die was cast. He was not the man to take half measures, and now he was determined to pursue the struggle to the bitter end. England had greatly deceived herself, and her hope that Germany would collapse as a result of inner discord and economic difficulties was as ridiculous as it was ruinous. The happenings in Norway were very regrettable. We had had no interests up there and no demands to make, and a strictly maintained neutrality would have been the most desirable for us. He must, however, say that wherever in the world a fire flared up and threatened Germany, he would act at once and stamp it out, for he was not one of those who allowed historical moments to go by unused.

During the Russo-Finnish war he had feared for the first time that England would make use of the north for her war against Germany. The English had never wished to help the Finns; all their actions had only been for the purpose of gaining a footing in Scandinavia. Why did not the English publish their White Book now? Only, of course, because they had given the north up to the Russians in their endeavor to come to an agreement. Those talkative gentlemen, Churchill and Reynaud, had then further confirmed his intuition, and it had become clear to him that the next English attack would take place in Norway. He had therefore prepared himself for this and had awaited the day when the English wished to put their decision into effect, in order to forestall them. The pity of it was, and he knew this now, that Norway had agreed to occupation by the English, and would in any case not have fired. He deeply regretted that Norway, on the grounds of its Anglophile point of view, had decided to put up a resistance. For us this resistance was no problem at all, but it might bring destruction to the country, for Germany would ruthlessly beat down all resistance.

It was necessary for people in the northern countries to realize that, if Germany were to be defeated, not England but the Asiatic world would rule there. The development in the last few years had shown that only Germany and never England could help there. In connection with this he much regretted that public comment in Sweden, chiefly press and radio, should adopt so wrong an attitude. An embittered feeling was being caused which would be very hard to remedy. It was certainly not Germany's purpose to extend the war, but it was her one intention to win it. In other words, she was only protecting

her own skin and nothing more. It was madness to accuse him of a lust for conquest based on racial ideological concepts.

He did not know whether England had a correct idea of the determination of the German people to fight to the end in this war. It seemed to him so stupid that the English called the German soldiers cowardly and not much good. That might cost them dearly. He himself and many of his leading colleagues had got to know the English in the World War; they knew them all and had not *that* much respect for them. He [the Briton] was not bad, but he was no match for the German soldier. Otherwise England would not have had to mobilize the whole world in the World War, in order finally to bring about the collapse of the German people by an act of treachery. Germany would fight this war to the end, and he would only be very sorry if other areas were also involved in this conflict. This was particularly true of Sweden. He only desired Sweden for her part loyally to guard her neutrality, especially in the realm of publicity, where he warned her not to poison the atmosphere. One must also look into the future and realize that Sweden and Germany were natural business partners. Germany was not only a producer, but also a gigantic consumer, and in this respect more important to Sweden than any other country.

It was with mistrust that the German people regarded public opinion in Sweden, which was being influenced by irresponsible elements. He had only the one desire that the former friendly relationship between Germany and Sweden should be restored. A man like Field Marshal Göring, who had deeply loved his Swedish wife and who was wholeheartedly attached to Sweden and to Swedish-German friendship, read the Swedish press with embitterment. Swedish publicity was committing an act of madness and he did not think that Sweden was doing her kindred-country Norway a service by it. The reports of the victorious sea battles and landings of the English were childish. He could only regret statements alleging that the English could push us out of Norway. As long as the war lasted no power on earth could get us away from there, and if the English persistently encouraged the Norwegians in their resistance up there, they would not be destroying German territory, but Norwegian. Never, however, in the history of war had an army been prevented, by the destruction of a country, from conquering it. The Jewish journalists incited the people to a resistance which was senseless. This resistance was militarily ridiculous. Why does one stir one state against another when in the long run they are dependent upon one another? He touched upon Finland's relationship with Germany.

The Admiral said that Sweden wished to defend, and would defend, its neutrality, and that against all attackers. On the Führer's question, whether this was also true as regards England, the Admiral af-

firmed this with great emphasis and added that Sweden would fight and *could fight* in the north too. The Führer was convinced that Sweden could defend itself in the north, and remarked that this only depended on whether Sweden wished to do so. A Sweden at war would be useless to Germany, but Norway or Sweden occupied by the English would be intolerable. Tamm emphasized that Sweden regarded Norway as its brother nation and extended its neutrality even to Norway. No troops and volunteers had been sent by the Swedish Government to Norway. The Führer only desired that Norway should realize that the struggle against us had no purpose either materially or morally. It was not very glorious for Norway to fight against us, for, although they were not fighting against overwhelming odds, they were all the same incredibly inferior. A German battalion was a match for a Norwegian division.

The Admiral found it quite understandable for a people to defend itself. He now mentioned that it was almost time to adapt Swedish-German trade relations to the new circumstances. General Bodenschatz remarked that this had already been foreseen and that discussion of the details could begin as soon as next week.*

The Führer now described the Baltic as a free inland sea in which the eight countries bordering on it could carry on an unhindered, unsupervised, free trade. Naturally supervision would be necessary at the start, but within the Baltic Sea there need be no restrictions, and every war precaution could disappear. The eight countries had so much to offer one another that a great increase of trade could develop in the Baltic, which after all in the Middle Ages had been the greatest of the trading seas. Import and export could be greatly increased especially between Germany and Sweden. The conversation turned to the English mine fields, and the Admiral remarked that one need have no great fear of Mr. Churchill's mines. To this the Führer added laughingly that some time must pass before the English could infest the Baltic with effective mines, and in this time anything could happen.

The Admiral assured the Führer that he would make efforts to influence press and radio in Sweden. The Führer then gave the Admiral a detailed description of the causes of the war, spoke of his offers to Poland which he represented as the opposite of dishonorable, of the English intervention which he blamed for everything which had happened. He spoke further of his good fortune in being al-

* In telegram No. 343 of Apr. 18 Ribbentrop informed the Legation in Stockholm that during the unofficial discussions between Göring and Tamm's party the Swedes had agreed to propose to their Government that a delegation be sent to Berlin to negotiate about economic relations on the basis of the new situation. Meanwhile, Ribbentrop went on to say, it seemed desirable for preliminary talks to begin, and for that purpose Minister Schnurre and Ministerialdirektor Walter were being sent to Stockholm and would be ready to start discussions on Apr. 20 (205/142095-96). See also document No. 150.

lowed to direct this war himself now that it had at last become inevitable, and in not having to leave the solution of this gigantic problem to a successor. The English would still meet with such surprises that their hair would stand on end, for they had not as yet any inkling of the effect of the German arms.

The Admiral affirmed that the possibilities for defense in the north were extremely good. Of course there was the danger that the English would bomb the iron mines. On this the Führer remarked that if this were to be the case, Sweden could have aircraft and antiaircraft batteries put at her disposal by us, for it was in Germany's interest too that the iron mines should not be destroyed. On the Führer's question whether the Admiral believed that the Swedes could protect their northern territory against an English attack, the Admiral answered with a decisive yes. The Führer too did not for a moment doubt this, the question was only whether they would indeed do so. The Admiral said that this was self-evident.

The Führer uttered some thoughts on strategy in connection with Narvik and demonstrated that the English could not land many troops there. The country was so poverty-stricken that every piece of bread for the troops would have to be taken there. The German bombers would see to it that the long approach there would not be left in peace. Of course the English might land some troops in bad weather, but, as soon as the clouds parted, the bombers would clear them out of there brutally. Then, if winter came, it would become even harder for England. The Englishman was a lazy soldier who preferred to freeze half to death rather than build himself something; he also demanded a lot where his rations were concerned. He was convinced that the English would put great pressure on the Swedes, and this was why he was sending such large forces to Norway. It was not for the Norwegians that he needed the 12 divisions which were going there. The Baltic was a sea important for our existence, and he quoted stories from the history of the Hansa towns.

The Führer asked the Admiral about the King's opinion. The Admiral replied that both the King and the Government were of the same opinion as he, and that the people and the armed forces would follow the Government. This the Führer did not doubt.

Captain von Below brought the Führer the Field Marshal's report that the iron ore railway from Narvik to the Swedish frontier and the line from Trondheim to the Swedish frontier were in our hands. The Führer read this aloud to the Admiral and added remarks on what the destruction of their lines of transport would mean to the Norwegians. We would of course first take care of ourselves, and for this, ways and means could always be found. It was the Norwegians who should worry, and not we. The Führer continued by saying that

he could well understand Sweden's bonds of sentiment with Norway. The Admiral thanked the Führer for this remark, which was very important to him. Continuing, the Führer declared that if a Germanic world existed at all today, Germany had made the greatest sacrifice of blood for its survival. Since the beginning of the Thirty Years' War, 24 million Germans had fallen for the preservation of the Germanic racial identity. Only 2 million Englishmen had died in battle during this period, and, moreover, England had always allowed foreign peoples to fight for her. With incredible efforts Germany had made the Germanic bloc safe from being overrun by the East. England had never done anything for this concept, but had always labored only for a splitting up of this bloc in order to follow her own selfish ends. If Germany were to fall apart today the cares of the Swedes would certainly become far greater even than they were at the moment. For the rest, the Admiral must understand that the Führer was *very* proud of his people. In this war the German Wehrmacht had performed incredibly heroic deeds, and he described the heroic sinking of the *Blücher* and also gave other examples from the Polish war. He also had understanding for Swedish heroism, and Germany owed great gratitude to the Swede Gustavus Adolphus. He did not believe in Norwegian heroism and gave several examples from the occupation of Norway, where the great uncertainty of the Norwegian Army before small German armed forces became clear. The German soldiers were fine soldiers, and that was why he had tremendous faith in victory. In war it was not only the weapon that won, but also he that bore it, the man, the soldier.

The Führer expressed his desire to restore the great old friendship with Sweden. The development with England also grieved him deeply. He hated the few people who had driven the English people, who had no desire at all for this quarrel, into this disastrous war. This handful of criminals the Churchills, the Edens, the Jews, etc. The Führer drew a picture of German-English cooperation, as he had often imagined it to himself, and expressed the conviction that, if Germany and England had worked together (as he had dreamed), these countries would have been able to bring great peace to the world. But the English had decided otherwise, and now he would not lay down arms before the verdict had been given. It was also intolerable for Germany to have continually to expect attack from one side or the other, and it was intolerable that at the whim of someone or other the German people could be cut off from coffee or other products. The Führer now inquired whether the Norwegian soldiers who had crossed over to Swedish territory had been disarmed and interned, which the Admiral affirmed. The Führer said that it was a fact that English submarines operated and fired from Swedish territorial

waters. The Admiral could hardly believe this; he had telephoned yesterday once more to Stockholm and had ordered that everything which lay in the power of the small Swedish Navy should be done to prevent this. The Führer was convinced that we would in any case soon master the submarines. The Kattegat would be blockaded. At the moment the English were fortunate because of the bad weather, but as soon as the weather was fine our aircraft would comb the coasts and deal with them. Moreover, the equipment for a whole division had been landed in Norway yesterday.

It was said that the Danes had not been brave; he would not say that, for he was convinced that the Danes had been braver than the Norwegians, but they had been sensible. The Norwegian attitude was not brave at all; it was stupid. The Danes had simply realized the uselessness of destroying the country. It was clear that we had had to take action, and navigation up there would in any case have stopped sooner or later, for the war at sea had also become more and more brutal, and in this way we had at least safeguarded the Baltic. Returning once more to his concept of a free Baltic Sea, the Führer explained that the eight European countries bordering on it could build up an entirely secure economic system. They could fully complement each other and he mentioned grain, ore and coal, butter and eggs, wood, and industrial products; he spoke of the Baltic States as areas of agricultural surplus, and of the possibility of balancing the riches of the countries. These were worth more than English currency, and he wanted to know what the pound would be worth in another year's time. The English became abusive about the fact that we had friendly relations with Yugoslavia, and alleged that we exercised pressure there. This pressure, however, only consisted in the fact that we had goods instead of pounds and that today arms were worth more than gold. He was the greatest specialist in the production of arms, and he was therefore in a position to judge everything which England wrote about her own production, and that of America was the biggest swindle on earth. For him all this was simply a joke. People were babbling about a monthly production of from 2 to 7 thousand airplanes in the U. S. A., but while 63,000 workers were employed in the airplane industry in the United States, there were 480,000 in Germany. England could not supply one single anti-aircraft gun, and we obtain everything in the world for our arms.

Upon this the Führer bade farewell to the Admiral, who gave cordial thanks for his reception by the Führer.

HEWEL

No. 128

9865/E692881-83

The Minister in the Netherlands to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

TOP SECRET

MOST URGENT

No. 280 of April 16

THE HAGUE, April 16, 1940—8:45 p. m.

Received April 17—12:15 a. m.

Pol. I M 6131.

For the State Secretary's personal attention.

The Foreign Minister, who asked me to come to see him this morning, told me that he had a very serious matter to discuss with me. It had come to the knowledge of the Netherlands Government that Dr. Butting, a member of the staff of the Legation, was carrying on military espionage against the Netherlands on a vast scale. He had not believed it possible that the hospitality and immunity granted to diplomats by the Netherlands could be abused to such an extent as Butting had done. The guiding principle of the Auslandsorganisation for party members abroad was that they were to conform to the laws of the country whose hospitality they enjoyed. The value of such guiding principles was shown in the case of Butting, who had been constantly engaged in activities which would be subject to severe penalties under Dutch law. The Minister showed me a thick bundle of photostat copies of fairly closely typewritten sheets which, as he said to me, contained nothing but reports on military activities, such as troop movements, the construction of fortifications, etc., and which, as I was able to see for myself, were signed by Butting. One of the sheets bore the letterhead: German Legation, Butting. This document had been found by the police in the street in a suburb of The Hague, and was in fact enclosed in an envelope addressed to Herr H. Cohrs, c/o the Auslandsorganisation, Berlin, which bore as the sender's name and address: Butting, Cleve. This package had been handed in to the police who had noticed with surprise that it was obviously not intended for posting in the Netherlands, but only after it had reached Germany, and had thereupon examined it. It had then turned out that the contents signed by Butting himself exposed the crassest instance of military espionage that he had ever come across.

The Minister continued: A few days ago a German named Sommer (here I may add: the local Ortsgruppenleiter) had been arrested in Amersfoort on suspicion of espionage. At his interrogation Sommer had stated that he had been told by Butting to spy out a certain district and to keep him currently informed. This statement by Sommer supplemented the finding of the documents in a manner which could not be explained away. Finally, the Minister demanded that Butting should leave the country this very day, otherwise further measures would be taken against him.

I sent for Butting at once and he admitted the truth of the Minister's statements. He, too, was unable to explain how the envelope containing the memoranda had come to be in a street in The Hague. To my question why Butting had not confined himself to passing on the military information to the appropriate department at the Legation for transmission to Berlin but, over and above this, had forwarded it on his own initiative, Butting said that this was on explicit orders by the High Command of the Wehrmacht. Butting will leave Holland today and will go to Berlin. It is, of course, extremely unpleasant for me and the Legation that a member of the staff of the Legation has been caught at military espionage. Some time ago, when a communication arrived here from the Foreign Ministry to the effect that Butting was suspected of espionage, I took him to task about it, upon which he replied that his activity in this sphere was confined to passing on to the military authorities at the Legation the items of military information which he happened to gather in the course of his many journeys through the country. Butting told me nothing of having built up a military spy system in Holland, as seems to be the case, or of having made use of the party organization for this purpose, at least to some extent. Besides, if, in accordance with the instructions of the Reich Foreign Minister, he had forwarded his reports through me, instead of taking them to Germany to post them there, they would have gone to Berlin with mine, and would not have landed in a street in The Hague.¹

ZECH

¹ Weizsäcker in a memorandum of Apr. 17 recorded that the Netherlands Minister had come to see him about the Butting case and expressed the hope that it could be settled without publicity (173/84277).

By telegram No. 333 of Apr. 30 the Legation at The Hague was informed: "The Netherlands Minister here was apprised verbally on Saturday that Butting, without the knowledge of his superiors, had engaged in matters with which he should have had absolutely nothing to do. State Secretary Bohle was extremely disturbed by the undisciplined conduct of Butting and Cohrs and had immediately removed them from their offices in the party. It was understood that Germans abroad must abide strictly by the laws of the country whose hospitality they enjoyed and that violations of this principle would be treated accordingly.

"The Minister expressed his thanks for this communication and said that he would bring it to the personal attention of the Netherlands Foreign Minister." (173/84288)

No. 129

136/74103-06

The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

TOP SECRET

No. 1141 of April 16

MADRID, April 16, 1940.

Received April 16—10:30 p.m.

The interest of Spanish political circles and public opinion was, after the Civil War, as could well be understood, almost exclusively

concerned with internal political and economic matters (reconstruction). The Spanish declaration of neutrality and the appeal made by Franco¹ at the beginning of the war to limit the conflict as much as possible appeared to be the right approach, particularly as in the first months of the war Italy's attitude gave rise to the hope that the Mediterranean would not be drawn into the struggle. In consequence, Spanish concern in the war, in spite of friendly support of German interests in the Spanish press, was confined almost completely to the discussion of the economic effect of the European conflict and its reaction on internal Spanish consolidation. With the war continuing and the economic measures taken by England and France violating more and more the rights of neutrals, there has been perceptible in the past few weeks a gradual change in the previous optimism and idea of nonparticipation. The ever more obvious rearmament of Italy has also increased the uneasiness, and after the events in Scandinavia political and military circles fear, and some are even convinced, that Spain will not be able to keep out of the conflict in the long run. Public opinion, despite the strict guidance of the Spanish press by the Government clearly shows the same reversal.

As stated in my report No. 1376 g of April 11,² Minister of the Interior Serrano Suñer, who is today the authoritative man in Spain, told me frankly a few days ago that he was convinced that with an entry of Italy into the war Spain would also have to decide on her attitude. The complete confidence which the Minister of the Interior has in our victory, which is shared by Franco, and his strong stand against England which he repeated on the following day to the Italian Ambassador are a guarantee that they are on our side—which is only natural.

The Foreign Minister told me the same today. If Italy enters the war, Spain will be automatically drawn in. The Defense Council and Council of Ministers last Friday and Saturday had thoroughly discussed this question. The Minister stated that he expected attacks by England and France as soon as these countries were convinced that Italy's entry into the war, which they feared, was imminent. He assumed that our enemies would first occupy Tangier and then at once try to extend the Gibraltar zone as well as occupy the Balearic Islands. The Minister considered the Canary Islands as less endangered. In answer to my question as to how Spain would react in such a case, the Minister replied that with regard to the Balearic Islands there was really no statement needed; he had, however, told the English and French Ambassadors a few days ago that even the occupation of Tangier and the extension of the Gibraltar zone would be regarded as

¹ In a radio broadcast on Sept. 3, 1939. A text of this address had been handed to Woermann by the Spanish Ambassador on Sept. 4 (52/35615-17).

² Not printed (4459/E086913-16).

an attack on Spanish neutrality and would be answered by armed force. I believe that this applied to the Balearic Islands and Gibraltar. But whether the occupation of Tangier alone would cause a military reaction, I consider uncertain on account of the small interest taken in it by Spanish public opinion. In view of Spanish-Portuguese relations, which are at present particularly cordial due to the visit of the Spanish fleet, the Foreign Minister believes that danger from this side could only arise after the possible overthrow of the present Portuguese Government; this could perhaps be brought about by English threats and possibly by a landing corps; Spain could then be threatened also through Portugal.

The Foreign Minister further told me, strictly confidentially, that during the discussions at the end of last week a number of military measures were decided upon in view of the threatening situation; in particular, the strengthening of the garrisons on the Balearic Islands and around Gibraltar, protective measures in Spanish Morocco on the Tangier border (group garbled) (see my telegram No. 1112 of April 12³). The calling up of some age groups was decided against in order to avoid causing alarm. I hear that the Spanish Navy is also taking precautions, e. g., for the laying of mine fields, particularly near the Balearic Islands.

The Foreign Minister in the further course of conversation confirmed to me the pessimistic opinion of the Minister of the Interior regarding the possibility of Spain's waging war in consequence of the poor economic situation (shortage of gasoline and bread grain). The Minister of the Interior mentioned the need for Italian-German help, which would immediately become necessary especially from the air forces; the Foreign Minister said that then war must and would be carried on even under difficult conditions.

The fear of becoming involved in the war is to a certain extent counterbalanced here by the hope of obtaining advantages from a victorious outcome of the war for us; among these the hope of driving the English out of Gibraltar plays a special part with two leading Spanish personalities, namely Franco and Serrano Suñer, as well as in military circles; the acquisition of Tangier is also hoped for.

Further developments will depend, therefore, on Italian decisions or on the evaluation by our opponents of probable Italian measures, provided that England and France do not act first this time; nevertheless, the Spanish Foreign Minister does not expect the latter to happen.

STOHRER

³ Not printed (77/58132).

No. 130

3664/E084208

Unsigned Memorandum

OSLO, April 16, 1940.

The Foreign Minister lets it be known that :

1) For the present no further steps are to be taken and no announcements or declarations of any kind are to be instigated in the matter discussed by him in detail during the past night with Under State Secretary Habicht.¹

2) Minister Bräuer is to come to Berlin by the quickest route to report.²

¹ A telephone message at 6:50 p. m., Apr. 15, from the Adjutant of the Foreign Minister instructed Habicht to await a call from Berlin (2969/578547). No record of the ensuing conversation between Ribbentrop and Habicht has been found.

² Bräuer reported in telegram No. 571 of Apr. 16 that Habicht would arrive in Berlin at 4 p. m. and that he himself would reach Berlin at 8 p. m. (4452/E086790).

No. 131

220/148600

*The State Secretary to the Consulates at Bergen, Kristiansand, Narvik, Stavanger, and Trondheim*¹

Telegram

BERLIN, April 16, 1940.

e. o. Pol. VI 982.

For your information.

In consequence of the attitude of the Nygaardsvold Government in Norway, German-Norwegian relations have not developed in the way we proposed in our memorandum.² A declaration of war on us by Norway has, however, not ensued. Neither have diplomatic relations so far been broken off. Our occupying forces are, of course, breaking Norwegian resistance wherever they meet it in the methodical progress of our operations; but beyond this we are not waging war on Norway.

Our ultimate attitude toward the sovereign power in Norway has not yet been clarified. Please acknowledge receipt of this telegram through the same channel.

WEIZSÄCKER

¹ The Consulates at Haugesund and Kirkenes had also been indicated as addressees, but their addresses were struck out. A marginal note reads: "The OKW is undertaking the dispatch of the telegram. Haugesund and Kirkenes cannot be reached at present."

² See document No. 53, subenclosure 1.

No. 132

220/148619

The Legation in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

STOCKHOLM, April 17, 1940—4:10 p. m.

No. 498 of April 17

Received April 17—9:00 p. m.

For the OKH Attaché Group.

In a written report of April 15¹ you were informed that, according to the Swedish High Command, Swedish troops would in all circumstances prevent an English advance from Narvik on Kiruna, and were in a position to do so. The best Swedish troops are stationed there; they have been intensively trained for 8 months, and are familiar with the terrain. Against these troops, aided by the very easily defensible terrain, German troops perhaps, but no others, especially not English troops, could break through. Since December the mobile Norrland division has been stationed there; reinforcements have been on their way there for 2 days; the headquarters staff [*General-Kommando*] has not been dispersed; this points toward further reinforcements. Serious resistance by Sweden to be expected there. A further report follows.²

Military Attaché

WIED

¹ Not found.² Telegrams Nos. 502 of Apr. 17 (220/148611) and 511 of Apr. 18 (220/148641); not printed.

No. 133

173/84280-81

The Minister in the Netherlands to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

TOP SECRET

THE HAGUE, April 17, 1940—6:55 p. m.

No. 285 of April 17

Received April 18—12:15 a. m.

For the State Secretary's personal attention.

The Butting case induces me to raise the following questions: When in September 1938 Schulze-Bernett was appointed to the Legation for intelligence work [*zu Zwecken der Abwehr*], I agreed to have him as a member of the staff of the Legation and to list him as such with the Netherlands Government, on the condition that his activities were to be directed against Belgium, France, and England, but not against Holland. With the progress of the war the situation has changed, inasmuch as Schulze-Bernett's work now consists to quite a considerable extent in collecting and transmitting military information about

Holland. Besides this he is shortly to get an assistant whose main work will be to procure military information about Holland. I did not raise any objection to these changes in the original purpose of Schulze-Bernett's mission, because the information which he obtained from Holland appeared to me very valuable for the German military authorities. Besides, I hope that even if the Netherlands Government discovered that a member of the staff of the Legation was carrying on military espionage under the protection of diplomatic immunity, I would be able to settle the matter with the Government without any great harm being done.

However, now that the full extent of Butting's activities in this sphere has become known we cannot, in my opinion, afford to let it become known that yet another member of the staff of the Legation is doing similar work under the protection of diplomatic privilege. I have no knowledge of how much the Netherlands Government may have learned from the Butting material and the statements by the Reich German, Sommer. At any rate all the departments of my Legation will now be closely watched by the Dutch. For this reason I have instructed Schulze-Bernett to limit the procurement of information from Holland to the minimum for the present and request instructions on how to deal with the matter in the future.¹

ZECH

¹ No reply to this telegram has been found.

No. 134

220/148602-05

Memorandum by the Minister to Norway

BERLIN, April 17, 1940.

On Saturday, April 13, 1940, the situation in Oslo was such that something had to be done to arrest the development of conditions akin to civil war. The Quisling Government was regarded as unconstitutional. It was known that the King had rejected him; the 5 days following the formation of his Government had been allowed to pass unused without his having really established himself even in one ministry. He lived in five rooms of the Hotel Continental which is under German military occupation and for a short while in the Storting building, which is likewise occupied by German military, and left things to take their course. His rejection by the population was just as unanimous as their desire for a return to constitutional conditions.

In these circumstances there were only three possibilities:

1) to establish a government which would be regarded as constitutional but which without the King's abdication and dissolution of the Storting could only have restricted competence, or

2) to acknowledge Quisling publicly and to support him through thick and thin, or

3) to set up a German military administration.

For another solution such as the formation of a new cabinet, even third-rate people could not have been found. In the absence of the mandate from the King required by the constitution, such a government would have had just as little right as Quisling to be considered constitutional and would only have made the situation worse.

Solutions 2) and 3) would have strengthened the inner and also the outward will to resistance on the part of the population, in so far as this was possible in the face of our bayonets, a state of affairs difficult to cope with from the military standpoint, because the sparsely populated character of the country makes it difficult to control.

At this juncture the Commander in Chief of the troops had signed the draft of an ordinance which provided for the taking as hostages 20 of the most distinguished citizens of Oslo, for instance, Bishop Berggrav, Berg, the President of the Supreme Court, prominent ship-owners, etc., who were to be shot in the event of continued resistance or attempted sabotage. The people concerned, whom I was asked to name, would have been personages well known throughout the whole of Scandinavia. The Commander in Chief agreed with me that the main cause of unrest was the existence of the unconstitutional Quisling Government, and he welcomed my effort to eliminate resistance and sabotage by restoring a constitutional state of affairs.

The solution arrived at in the course of Monday (April 15) is generally regarded as a return to constitutional conditions. It does not aim at the politically impossible, i. e., the immediate control of the whole country, but is capable of being developed as military occupation progresses and as calm spreads also to those parts which are occupied by us. As has been expressly stated, the expression "occupied territory," which tallies logically with the designation Administrative Council and with the situation, does not mean that it is confined to territory occupied *today*. In its proclamation¹ the Council has coupled its functions with the person of the King, which opens up possibilities for relations with him and for his return, which would not have obtained under either Quisling or any other usurper government. The latest solution counteracts to a certain extent the earlier proclamations by the Norwegian King and the former Government.²

¹ This proclamation had been issued at the time of the meeting in the Academy of Sciences on Apr. 15. See document No. 124.

² Texts in Norwegian Foreign Ministry's publication *Ny Norsk Kvittbok: Opplysninger om det tyske overfallet på Norge, April-Juli 1940* (July 1940), pp. 6-8. In translation in *Norway and the War, September 1939-December 1940*, pp. 64-65, 72-73.

The Administrative Council has pledged loyalty and every member knows that he is personally responsible for peace and order and has to comply with the instructions of the occupation authorities.

The pacification which has ensued is more complete than was to be expected. The High Command immediately availed itself of the proclamation issued at the time of the formation of the Administrative Council and is circulating it extensively in the unoccupied territories. Resistance is manifestly slackening under the influence of the settlement reached in Oslo. The Chief of Staff of the Falkenhorst group confirmed this to me in the presence of Under State Secretary Habicht—who was always present when I telephoned or had conversations—and drew attention to the capitulation of 100 officers and 2,000 men near Kristiansand. As I reported by telegram, General Falkenhorst has himself welcomed the settlement reached.¹

The recognition by Norway of the establishment of constitutional conditions within the existing political and military limits offers the sole possibility of providing effective rear cover for our troops, of keeping the institutions of the country going without recourse to military force, of weakening resistance among the population of territories so far unoccupied and of forging a link with the King by the roundabout route via Denmark and Sweden.

BRÄUER

¹ Cf. document No. 124, sec. III.

No. 135

2281/481843-44

The Hungarian Minister President to the Führer and Chancellor

BUDAPEST, April 17, 1940.

YOUR EXCELLENCY: The Royal Hungarian Government still feels bound by the pledge to maintain peace in Central Europe and the parts of the Balkans bordering on Hungary. The statement was made at the time¹ at the request of Germany and Italy with the additional proviso that unless there were new consultations Hungary would strive with all her might to maintain peace in the above-mentioned parts of Europe as she has done up to the present even at the cost of sacrifices. Nevertheless events which have recently taken place in the Balkans and on the Danube make it the duty of the Royal Hungarian Government to inquire whether Your Excellency does not consider that the time has come to initiate talks among the three powers, so that all three States may be prepared for every eventuality.

On the basis of the consultative agreement of March 17, 1934, which

¹ See documents Nos. 40 and 284, and vol. VIII, document No. 30.

remained in force by the Italo-Hungarian Declaration of June 29, 1938, the Royal Hungarian Government is obligated to propose that Italy be included.

The talks ought also to include those eventualities which lie outside the normal means of diplomacy.

In view of the rapid course of events I should be grateful if Your Excellency would inform me whether the representatives of the three powers could meet in order to hold these, naturally, very confidential talks.²

Please accept, Your Excellency, the expression of my highest consideration.

COUNT PÁL TELEKI

² Ribbentrop recorded on May 9 that he talked to the Hungarian Minister about Teleki's letter "according to the instructions from the Führer," informing him at the same time that the Führer personally would reply to Teleki within a few days (F8/0090). See documents Nos. 165 and 271.

An entry in the Halder Diaries under the date of Apr. 24 indicates Hitler's reactions shortly after the letter had been received:

"3:30 p. m. Conference with the Führer.

"(a) Political survey: Teleki has written a letter to the Führer: So far Hungary has made sacrifices only. This must be changed. Proposes tripartite talks. Führer afraid that Hungary wants to resort to force against Rumania. Does not fit in with our intention to maintain tranquillity in the Balkans. Besides, Hungary can not do this by herself. She will be thrashed. The state is ripe for an internal collapse. During the past summer assurance that Hungary was unable to wage war longer than three days, as ammunition, etc. was lacking. Therefore, the first thing will be that tremendous demands will be made upon us. Duce has tried to restrain the Hungarians. Up to now, apparently, not with definitive success. Therefore the Führer has established contacts with the Duce through Mackensen and is making his own attitude dependent on that of the Duce. He wants to leave the southeastern area to the Duce anyway.

"It is not impossible that England is inciting the Hungarians. Press rumors about German concentrations on the Hungarian-Slovak border apparently launched by Hungary in order to stir up the Balkans. England is interested in having the oilfields burn. It makes no difference to her who sets the fire. Until next spring, at least, we are interested in having the oilfields supply us. Afterwards we will be freer.

"Führer has had the following communicated to the Duce: a) Hungary has made no sacrifices so far. b) Hungary should not march alone, if only on account of Yugoslavia. c) Hungary's dashing forward [*vorprellen*] might bring Russia into the Balkans which would be very serious. Duce has the lead."

The entry in the Halder Diaries for Apr. 24 also refers to the question of German-Hungarian staff talks on common action against Rumania. Cf. Editors' Note under the date of Apr. 26, p. 239.

No. 136

8785/E612097-98

The Chargé d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry

No. 684 of April 18

WASHINGTON, April 18, 1940—5:00 p. m.

Received April 19—5:45 a. m.

Pol. VIII 485.

The Hull declaration regarding the Netherlands East Indies, the

text of which was transmitted via DNB,¹ is receiving marked attention here as, for the first time, by virtue of the Four Power Treaty on the status quo in the Pacific Ocean concluded in 1922 between France, England, Japan, and America,² Washington is actively intervening and has announced that it cannot allow Japan to occupy sources of raw materials vital for America's economy.

The declaration is also important for domestic politics as it strengthens the position of the Democratic administration in the Congress as well as in the election campaign. The Republican candidates for the Presidency, Taft and Vandenberg, cannot criticize this action as the states which they represent depend completely on the unrestricted import of rubber and tin. Criticism by isolationists is also hardly to be expected as they come mainly from the Middle West which is industrially interested in rubber and tin, and the Western States where the feeling as regards Japan is always definitely hostile.

Through the Hull declaration attention has partly been drawn away from Scandinavia and concentrated on the Pacific area. Pro-Allied circles are consoling themselves about this with the hope that German-Japanese cooperation and possible German support of the Japanese point of view can now be used for representing both States as a common threat to American interests.

THOMSEN

¹ In this statement of Apr. 17, 1940, Hull stressed the importance of the Netherlands East Indies to the trade of the whole world and said: "Intervention in the domestic affairs of the Netherlands Indies or any alteration of their *status quo* by other than peaceful processes would be prejudicial to the cause of stability, peace, and security not only in the region of the Netherlands Indies but in the entire Pacific area." He recalled also the international agreements, to which both the United States and Japan were partners, recognizing the right of the Netherlands Government to its insular possessions. For the full text of this declaration see Department of State, *Bulletin*, 1940, vol. II, p. 411.

² Treaty between the United States, the British Empire, France, and Japan relating to their insular possessions and insular dominions in the region of the Pacific Ocean, signed at Washington Dec. 13, 1921. Department of State Treaty Series No. 669 (43 Stat. 1646).

No. 137

265/172244

The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

SECRET

ANKARA, April 18, 1940—5:25 p. m.

No. 245 of April 18

Received April 19—12:10 a. m.

Gerede has just informed me of the result of his conversations.¹ He said, first of all, that my statements to the Foreign Minister yester-

¹ Papen reported in telegram No. 237 of Apr. 15 that he had discussed with Gerede the current problems of German-Turkish relations. "He assured me that he was influencing all the important people here in the direction of Berlin's wishes." (265/172239-40)

day² in accordance with instructions by telegram No. 230 of April 11 (Pol. VII 340)³ had made an excellent impression and greatly quieted feeling here. The President and the Marshal⁴ had assured him that they would rigidly adhere to the Montreux⁵ provisions, so long as the attitude of Russia, Italy, and Germany did not change.

As to the attitude of the press, many thoughtful people agreed with him that a change was urgently necessary in the country's own interest as well as that of German-Turkish relations. He had been authorized by the Minister President⁶ also to approach him personally with any wishes he had on the subject.

Despite British pressure, feeling on the conclusion of the economic agreement⁷ was optimistic and it was hoped that this would bring about a psychological improvement in our relations.

I have the impression that Gereke has done very useful work here. His position with İnönü is as strong as ever. He will depart on April 20. I should be very grateful if the Reich Foreign Minister would receive him upon his return.

PAPEN

² Papen reported about this visit to Saracoglu in telegram No. 241 of Apr. 17 (265/172243). The main purpose of this visit was to explain the German action in Scandinavia.

³ This is apparently an error. Telegram No. 230 of Apr. 11 was an Ankara telegram (265/172235-36). Papen probably meant to refer to Weizsäcker's telegram No. 178 of Apr. 13, which was the instruction requested in telegram No. 230 and which informed him that the Foreign Ministry agreed completely with his statement "that there were no factors whatever in our action in Scandinavia from which it might be concluded that the war would spread to the southeast." (265/172238)

⁴ Fevzi Cakmak, Chief of the Turkish General Staff.

⁵ For the text of the Montreux Convention of July 20, 1936, on the regime of the Straits, see League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. CLXXIII, p. 213.

⁶ Reñk Saydam.

⁷ See document No. 30.

No. 138

9917/E694529-42

*Adolf Hitler to Benito Mussolini*¹

BERLIN, April 18, 1940.

DUCE: I write you this letter after the situation in Scandinavia has become sufficiently clarified to make it possible for me to give you an account of it.

¹ This document is translated from a photostatic copy of an Italian version of the letter found in a collection of Italian Foreign Ministry documents brought to Lisbon during World War II. The originals were later returned to the Italian Government. No German text of this document has been found; an unsigned note on F17/220 reads as follows: "The Führer's letter to the Duce of Apr. 18 remains in the possession of the Führer, since this letter contains some private communications."

First of all I thank you sincerely for the sentiments expressed in the letter² which you transmitted to me through Ambassador Attolico.

I am especially pleased at the comprehension which you, Duce, have shown with regard to the necessity which prompted me to act. Every day that passes shows how grave was the danger that was threatening Germany. The English intended not only to cut off the supplies of minerals from Narvik (which represents only a part of our mineral imports from Sweden); they also had the aim of establishing at Narvik a base of operations for exerting pressure on Sweden, employing their possession of the railway to the mines, a most important strategic supply line, far enough from the possible radius of action of Germany.

Sweden was to be induced to put her mineral production at their disposition; that is, to route it all to Narvik and offer it exclusively to England and France. Moreover, by the occupation of Bergen and Stavanger, the North Sea was to be blocked in such a way as to prevent the exit of German submarines and possibly make it completely unusable by a subsequent mine barrier. Finally they hoped to create in southern Norway a great air base from which they could threaten and strike at Germany's right flank.

The counteraction undertaken by me to parry the British blow came just at the 11th hour. Duce, I believe I have never in all my life had greater luck than this time. For months England has been hatching that plan. At the time of the Finnish crisis she tried to make a landing in Norway and in Sweden under the pretext of a relief expedition. It is clear from exceptionally important documents³ which came back to Oslo in the meanwhile, that Sweden was actually prepared loyally to retain her neutrality and, if necessary, to defend it. But these documents—which I will show you after they have been exhaustively examined—also indicate quite clearly that even at that time Norway had taken a negative attitude only in appearance. The Norwegian Government in any case was determined not only to offer no serious resistance but even to array itself on England's side.

The efforts made at that time by England did not remain unknown to me. It is obvious that I had the duty of preparing a counterattack. When the Finnish conflict was ended it seemed that the problem was no longer so urgent. But from Scandinavian circles we received continuous warnings about the continuation of English efforts as well as about the probability of a surprise attack. Moreover, there were

² Document No. 92.

³ This apparently refers to documents some of which were subsequently published in German White Book No. 4, *Dokumente zur englisch-französischen Politik der Kriegsausweitung* (Berlin, 1940). An English language edition of this White Book was published under the title, *Britain's Designs on Norway* (New York, 1940).

two facts which brought this out very definitely, a meeting organized by Churchill, during which he imprudently revealed ideas of the type which had been reported to us. From a document which found its way into the Foreign Ministry at Oslo⁴ we have been able to establish in the first place that the meeting was really held; in the second place, that the conversations did develop just on those points and that those opinions were expressed. But above all we were warned by an observation which Paul Reynaud confided to another diplomat and which we were able to learn about. In the course of that conversation he declared that within a few days "the great blow in the North" would have taken place and that the Western Front would thus certainly have lost much in importance.

I immediately ordered preparations to begin in order to prevent, if possible, such an attempt by the French and British. When we received the information that England and France had the intention henceforth no longer to recognize Norwegian territorial waters as a first act of violation of neutrality, then I understood everything and gave the order to attack immediately the strategic points in western Norway. Truly, Duce, the outcome of the war was perhaps determined that time in a period of less than 10 hours! Without the imprudent loquacity of those two gentlemen, matters would certainly have taken a different turn.

Enough time has elapsed since the beginning of the action so that it is now possible to draw some conclusion.

1. *Denmark.* Denmark is completely occupied by German troops. The Danish Army has been demobilized today, April 18. It is disarmed. The arms are under the secure surveillance of the German armed forces. The only exception is the battalion of the King's Guards, which remains intact. On the whole, the situation with respect to Denmark is such that in time we can count on an amicable evolution; our interest in that country is to avoid its becoming a base for enemy forces and that, for the rest, its own life may develop undisturbed. The Danish national group is related to ours so that there is no reason to doubt a happy future for that nation too. The King conducted himself in a manner both skillful and energetic. He has thus saved not only his country but also his crown.

2. *Norway.* By means of my action of April 9, I have had the following points of great strategic value occupied:

Oslo
Arendal
Kristiansand
Stavanger
Bergen
Trondheim, and
Narvik.

⁴ Apparently a reference to document No. 28 in German White Book No. 4.

The complex of military forces now in Norway comprises, not including the Air Force and the Navy, about 4 divisions and is being continually augmented. For the Norwegian and Danish undertaking I envisaged a total of 12 divisions. On the other hand, it will be possible, after the complete pacification of Denmark, to transfer the forces at present stationed in Norway and replace them with a few para-military organizations. For that purpose I have at my disposal a considerable quantity of first-rate "Death's Head Units" in addition to police battalions.

Consequently this will cause no weakening of my attack forces in the west. The situation today is as follows:

Oslo, Arendal, Kristiansand, Stavanger, Bergen and Trondheim are in our hands. At all these points, military centers have been established which will provide for the pacification of the country. In Oslo where the principal forces are located, all the Norwegian troops located there have been completely destroyed or dispersed, captured or forced across the border into Sweden. The arms of the infantry and artillery and also the munitions depots are in our possession. The particularly effective fortifications of Oslo Fjord—which had to be won by bloody actions—are now occupied by our coastal artillery and are ready for defense. This is also true of the fortifications at Kristiansand, Bergen and Trondheim. Arendal and Stavanger on the other hand were lacking in fortifications. And the same must be said of Narvik. It would have been much more advantageous for us if Narvik had had fortifications rather than being devoid of them.

The areas occupied by us, and especially that of Oslo, are the only zones in that territory which have a relatively dense population. Among them are large inhospitable tracts in some of which there is not even one inhabitant per square kilometer. The occupation of such zones is of no importance from a military point of view and can therefore be completed at leisure. Centers of military resistance might be formed on a small scale only; in any case these would immediately be destroyed by our air arm. The essential thing is that we have been able to put the few airfields which existed in this country into shape so as to make them important centers of actions for our aviation.

The reports, Duce, of great naval battles, etc., are nonsense invented by the English. No encounters have taken place either in the Skagerrak or in the North Sea but only in the Ministry of Information in London. The transporting of German troops to Oslo and to the southern ports of Norway continues uninterruptedly as does the transporting of war material.

The closing of the whole Skagerrak by mine fields is being inten-

sified from day to day. The breaking through by large units is absolutely excluded, thanks also to the efficiency of the German air arm. The English and probably also French submarines which operate in the Skagerrak have been destroyed by our antisubmarine defense or forced to submerge to such depths as to lose any capacity for action. Our losses are becoming smaller from day to day. The last transports have not suffered any incidents of this sort.

The activity of the English fleet is limited to carrying out single attacks and then quickly returning under cover of night. In that manner the English last night effected a brief bombarding of Stavanger. However, they tried to return quickly to their own bases but were discovered by our air arm and were battered with heavy bombs. A heavy cruiser was quickly destroyed while two others were so badly damaged that it is doubtful that they were able to return to their own ports.

The English reaction:

The English reaction is limited generally to attempting to land troops in positions very far to the north. From the military point of view the matter is of no importance since the landings could be carried out only because of the bad atmospheric conditions in the last few days. As soon as the weather is clearer, our aviators will free the Norwegian coast of all English ships.

Narvik:

Narvik is the northernmost point; it is 600 kilometers from Trondheim; it lacks direct communications either by road or railway. I have sent a strong detachment of troops there with orders especially to destroy completely the railway for the transportation of minerals, which no longer has any importance for Germany. Two naval battles took place in the Narvik fiord. In both cases my destroyers have had to fight against far superior forces. A large part of the enemy units was seriously damaged; the remainder was destroyed. It was only after the German destroyers had exhausted their own ammunition that they were sunk or destroyed by their own crews. These same crews are now fighting within the ranks of the troops landed there. These latter are provided with everything necessary. Narvik is now in our hands and likewise the whole railway and a large radius of the surrounding territory. As soon as the weather is more favorable the German airplanes will renew the attack, giving the English forces no respite until they decide to put an end to such a ridiculous demonstration. For the rest, all that England is doing is only to satisfy public opinion, which is demanding some successes at any cost. I have already pointed out in my last letter how it is inevitable, in operations of such scope, that one must meet here and there with difficult moments. One thing, however, Duce, is certain: No force in the world

can make me leave Norway before the conclusion of peace. And the result of the few days which have passed since April 9th, if it is examined from the military point of view, is such as not even the most fervent fantasy would have dared expect or hope.

Duce, in your letter you alluded to the problem of Rumanian neutrality as a point of danger.⁵ My point of view on the subject coincides exactly with yours. I, too, am of course convinced that for all of us it is desirable to keep the war far from the Balkan region in so far as that is possible. That desire, however, is no reason to see things differently from what they are. When I, in the beginning, was waging my battle to gain power in Germany I had before me the most fearful adversaries, above all Marxism. However, the most vile enemies were not the great adversaries having a different conception of life but rather those intermediate, unprincipled parties of bourgeois economic origin. Similar to them now because of their attitude are some of those little neutral states which insist on the privilege of seriously offending and damaging or at least insolently threatening some great powers which neglect them. This is excused by invoking the "democratic freedom" of the press and of public opinion. However, there is no doubt that, if anything is written or said which does not suit the true leaders of those little nations, they have an infinity of means of exercising their influence or even imposing their veto.

With great joy I have heard from your mouth, Duce, confirmation of the report with respect to the recent mobilization of the Italian fleet. This, as is known, did not remain hidden from France and England. I believe that precisely the attitude of Italy, followed with increasing interest in England and France, has made more intense their desire to take the conflict to the periphery wherever that was possible. The occupation of Norway seems to have made that dream vanish, and their goal will not be achieved.

What these operations mean for us, especially for me, is understood throughout the world by only one man other than myself and that man is you, Duce. You yourself once had the courage to undertake your action in Abyssinia under the English cannon. My situation up to today has not been very different; but I too have decided not to listen in the most difficult hours to so-called common sense but to appeal instead to the force of honor, to the sense of duty, and finally to my own heart.

Yours,

A. HITLER

⁵ See document No. 92.

No. 139

8822/E614086-87

The Chargé d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 701 of April 19

WASHINGTON, April 19, 1940—10:20 p. m.

Received April 20—11:10 a. m.

Pol. IX 644.

The opening up of the extended front against England in Norway has had the following effects on the attitude of American public opinion.

1) The operation has shown that widespread and readily believed reports about a state of exhaustion in Germany were false.

2) Germany had been provoked to a counterblow by the English breach of neutrality.

3) For strategic and propagandist reasons England was forced to (group missing) large troop formations in Norway.

4) Should England not succeed in putting an end to the German occupation of Norway, she ran the risk of losing the war.

5) All the other neutrals, including Turkey, had had a lesson and a warning.

Against these positive effects there must be set the following negative ones:

1) Feeling toward Germany has deteriorated considerably, even among isolationists. This goes for the whole of the United States, but especially for the Middle West, where there is a strong Scandinavian element in the population.

2) Excitement among the American people has reached such a pitch that the interventionists are having an easy task. They are successfully robbing the isolationists of their best slogans to the effect that America's foreign policy must be decided only by her own self interest, arguing with heightened emphasis that defeat of the Allies must at once bring the most vital interests of America into direct conflict with Germany. Hence, America must strive to prevent their defeat. The attack on peaceful Scandinavia showed that Germany does not recoil from anything. America could, without sending her own troops into action, exert decisive influence on the outcome of the war by increasing deliveries and by lifting the embargo on credits. This line of argument is undoubtedly gaining ground and supporters.

Delaying factors:

1) During the election campaign far-reaching decisions in the field of foreign policy are to be expected only in exceptional circumstances. Such circumstances would to be sure arise if protection of neutrality were extended to Sweden or Holland.

2) In its program the Republican party has tied itself down to strictest isolationism in the field of foreign policy.

3) The situation in the Pacific Ocean makes it impossible for America to give full support to the cause of the Allies.

4) America's entry into the war would require complete military and economic mobilization for which there is no organizational or financial basis at present.

The absence of any direct provocation of America by Germany.

Conclusion :

Public opinion is systematically kept in a state of high tension by allusions to the dangers threatening America from an Allied defeat. The experiences gained from participation in the World War are in danger of being replaced by the revival of wartime antagonism against Germany. The mood is partly one of hysterical excitement and partly one of apathetic resignation to having to accept the inevitable, both being equally dangerous. The prospects for Roosevelt's reelection have improved considerably.

THOMSEN

No. 140

230/152179

The Minister in Yugoslavia to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

URGENT

BELGRADE, April 19, 1940—11:00 p. m.

No. 308 of April 19

Received April 20—2:50 a. m.

Since former Minister President Stojadinović, by founding a party of his own, had reentered the arena of domestic politics and had increasingly found followers among circles of the Serbian opposition, the antagonism between him and the present Government, particularly Minister President Cvetković became more and more noticeable. Attacks against the domestic policy of Stojadinović which Cvetković recently made in a public speech were sharply answered by Stojadinović in pamphlets and leaflets. This gave Cvetković an opportunity for having Stojadinović's house searched by the police and for having him brought against his will to some place away from the capital to keep him confined there.

This treatment of the highly regarded former Minister President is going to arouse opposition in large groups of the Serbian population and can only help the party of Stojadinović propagandistically.

There are no reasons of foreign policy behind this measure.¹

HEEREN

¹ Additional information on this subject was supplied by Heeren in telegram No. 308 of Apr. 23 (230/152180). It stated that according to reliable information the main reason for the search of Stojadinović's house and for his being confined was the Prince Regent's fear that the former might publish letters in his possession written by the Prince Regent and expressing anti-Croat tendencies. This correspondence was said to have been confiscated during the search. Heeren added that enemy propaganda was spreading rumors to the effect that compromising correspondence with German authorities was also discovered in this search.

No. 141

B21/B005514

The State Secretary to the Embassy in the United States

Telegram

No. 403

BERLIN, April 19, 1940.
zu Pol. I M 5313 g.¹

For the personal attention of the Chargé d'Affaires only.

Telegram No. 631 of April 12¹ bears only your signature but obviously comes from the Military Attaché² and, as I assume, represents his opinion.

The last paragraph of the telegram is calculated to give a more favorable impression of the judgment by the American public on the operations in Scandinavia than has, unfortunately, in any way been given in other information and reports reaching us.

I request you now to study the press again and to see to it that reports by the Wehrmacht Attaché where, as in this instance they touch on the political field are coordinated with your views. In so far as this may not be possible in particular cases, you should make known at the same time the divergent view held over there, see instruction of January 27, 1938—Pol. I M 61 g.³

WEIZSÄCKER⁴¹ Document No. 96.² Lieutenant General von Bötticher.³ Not printed (1932/433401-02).⁴ See document No. 163.

No. 142

205/142098

King Gustaf V of Sweden to Adolf Hitler

STOCKHOLM, April 19, 1940.

MY DEAR HERR CHANCELLOR: I have been informed by Admiral Tamm of the conversation which you recently had with him in Berlin.¹ In this connection I heard that you asked him whether Sweden would resist with all her might any English attempt to cross the Swedish frontier. In order to avoid any misinterpretation on this point I wish now solemnly to declare to you, Herr Chancellor, that Sweden will observe the strictest neutrality. The consequence of this attitude is that Sweden is fully determined immediately and with all her strength to resist any violation of her neutrality, and especially any military attempt to cross the Swedish frontier, from whatever side this might

¹ See document No. 127.

come. Finally I would add that this declaration has been given both to England and to France.²

Yours, etc.

GUSTAF ADOLF R.

¹ The Swedish Minister delivered the letter in a sealed envelope to Weizsäcker on the afternoon of Apr. 20 for transmittal to Ribbentrop (memorandum St.S. No. 306:206/142101). For Hitler's reply see document No. 161.

No. 143

220/148671

The Chargé d'Affaires in Norway to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 614 of April 19

OSLO, April 19, 1940.

Received April 20—12:40 a. m.

This evening the Commander of Group XXI¹ invited me to take part in a discussion by his staff, and informed me that at 7 o'clock this evening the Führer had, by telephone, conferred on him executive power in the occupied territories of Norway.

NEUHAUS

¹ General Nikolaus von Falkenhorst.

No. 144

8818/E613921-25

Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Legal Department¹

BERLIN, April 20, 1940.

zu R 8150.²

Under the leadership of former President Herbert Hoover an organization of American citizens called the Polish Food Commission, has been formed in the United States, which aims to continue on a new basis the relief operations for the Government General which have hitherto been supported by the Quakers.

Regarding the proposed organization, John Hartigan, the representative of the Commission now staying here, has given the information presented in enclosure 1.³ According to that, the Commission now has at its disposal 1½ million dollars, which it has received from the Polish sham government in Angers. It hopes to receive considerable additional funds, up to 15 million dollars, partly from the same source, partly from the English and French Governments. It also intends to take over the relief operations which are being supported by other benevolent organizations in the United States,

¹ Marginal note: [For] F[Führer].

² According to the journal entry the number should read "e. o. R 8150."

³ Enclosure 1 (8818/E613926-27) consists of an extract from a letter from Hartigan to Albrecht dated Apr. 13 summarizing the state of negotiations between the German Government and the Polish Food Commission.

so that it, together with the American Red Cross, would be the sole supporter of such operations.

As indicated by its very name, the Commission considers its main task to be the distribution of food to the Polish population. This is to be carried out chiefly on the basis of charity; in addition, however, food packages paid for by American donors are to be sent to persons for whom they designate these gifts. The Commission wishes to establish food warehouses in the Government General under the control of American agents, and, according to the oral statements of Mr. Hartigan, this is the essential part of the whole plan. From these warehouses the amounts required for distribution to the poor are to be taken and the food packages made up. The number of agents required for this in the event of a full implementation of the plan was given as about 15. The Commission intends to send only such agents as have previously been investigated by the German Government and agrees to the immediate withdrawal of any agent concerning whom the German authorities make a request to that effect.

The Commission has already inquired of the Allied blockade authorities whether they would permit the passage of food shipments. It has received from the British Ambassador in Washington the letter found in enclosure 2,⁴ from which it appears that the English are willing to permit passage through the contraband control of a first shipment to the value of 100,000 dollars. Before letting further shipments through they wish to get a report from the Commission on its experiences with the first shipment, from which they can convince themselves that the American supervisors have been permitted by the Germans to supervise the distribution with full freedom and that the shipments have not benefited the German Reich either directly or indirectly through the exportation of equal amounts of Polish products to Germany. In the event of further shipments the English also want confirmation from Mr. Hoover or the Commission that the number of American supervisors is sufficient to ensure full supervision.

On the basis of this letter the Commission has already sent the food listed in enclosure 3⁵ on its way to Stettin via Bergen. In view of the events in Norway, however, the ships are to be rerouted to the Mediterranean.

The matter was first taken up for discussion with representatives of OKW, the Gestapo, the Food Ministry, the Economics Ministry, and the Governor General.⁶ The result of the discussions was as follows:

1) All the agencies concerned would warmly welcome additional deliveries of food for the Government General. The representatives

⁴ Not printed (8818/E613928).

⁵ Not printed (8818/E613929).

⁶ Hans Frank.

of the Governor General pointed out in particular that the food supply in some areas of the Government General, especially in Warsaw and the Ruthenian districts east of Krakow was inadequate. The existing Polish and Jewish relief organizations could continue their activity only under great difficulties.

2) On the demand for the dispatch of American representatives to the Government General for a longer period, the opinion of the departments concerned was not uniform. The High Command of the Wehrmacht, after a report was made to Admiral Canaris, took the position set forth in enclosure 4,¹ according to which the relief operation must not be ruined on account of this demand. The representative of the Governor General reported that in the opinion of Reich Minister Seyss-Inquart the dispatch of four American representatives to the Government General could be permitted. The representative of the Gestapo adhered to the existing instructions, according to which a permanent American mission was unacceptable, but he thought he could promise a reconsideration if political reasons indicated that a certain accommodation with respect to the American wishes was desirable.

3) The issuance of a binding declaration in accordance with which Germany would, if the relief operation were carried out, refrain from bringing equivalent amounts of Polish products from the Government General to Germany, was considered not feasible by the representatives of the Food Ministry and of the Governor General. They pointed out that certain administrative measures had been taken which aimed at such exportation.

From the point of view of foreign policy it seems a ticklish matter that the Commission is to operate mainly with Polish, French, and English Government funds. It would perhaps be possible, however, to counter enemy propaganda by calling attention to the gold stocks taken out of Poland, of which a small part at least would in this way be used for the benefit of the Polish people. It should also be taken into consideration that it seems doubtful at least whether the English would permit the relief work to assume the scope contemplated by the Americans. In 1915, when Hoover wanted to carry out a similar relief operation for Poland, the plan came to naught because the English made the demand, which was unacceptable to Germany, that Germany must renounce completely the right of military requisitioning in the area of the then Kingdom of Poland. In view of the propaganda effects, however, it might be advisable to treat the matter in such a way that the odium of failure of the relief work falls on the English and not on us. It might therefore be suggested that the demand of the Americans for the dispatch of permanent representatives to the area of the Government General be approved within the limits laid down by Minister Seyss-Inquart. In the discussions the American representative also pointed out that the carrying out of the relief operation would mean a political success for Hoover and consequently a certain

¹ Not printed (8818/E618980).

impairment of Roosevelt's position. Moreover, it would contribute toward placating the mood of the many Poles living in America (about 5 million) and have the effect that the agitation for entry into the war by the United States will in any case not be strengthened from this quarter.

Herewith submitted to the Foreign Minister through the Under State Secretary and the State Secretary with the request for a decision.^a

ALBRECHT

^a See document No. 292.

No. 145

220/148686-87

The Minister and Plenipotentiary of the German Reich in Denmark to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 352 of April 20

COPENHAGEN, April 21, 1940.
Received April 21—1: 55 a. m.

With reference to your telegram No. 353 of the 15th.¹

On April 20 the Danish Foreign Ministry sent to its Missions abroad the following encoded circular telegram reproduced here in translation:²

(1 group garbled ³) Danish civil and military authorities have conducted a series of negotiations with the German civil and military authorities. Under the occupation the cooperation with the German authorities, who have all shown perfectly correct behavior and considerateness, is proceeding loyally. Each side is striving to make the cooperation as satisfactory as possible. Calm and order prevail in the country. The daily life of the people goes on undisturbed. Government and economic organization are striving to adapt the economic life of the nation to the demands of the present situation. Economic negotiations are now being conducted with a German Government delegation.⁴ Danish Missions abroad are requested to bring the foregoing to the attention of the Foreign Ministers and government officials in the countries concerned. Their general attitude, especially toward the German Foreign Missions, must conform exactly to the line which is followed here in view of the existing situation. Acknowledge receipt of this telegram by wire (2 groups garbled ⁵).

¹ Document No. 121.

² The Danish text of the telegram is in the Danish Government's publication *Beretning til Folketinget* . . . vol. v, *Bilag*, p. 169.

³ Comparison with the Danish text of the telegram indicates that the garbled group contained a reference to the previous circular telegram of the Danish Foreign Ministry on the subject of the German occupation. See document No. 103 and footnote 1 thereto.

⁴ See also document No. 122.

⁵ Comparison with the Danish text of the telegram indicates that the garbled groups contained the telegraphic signature of the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The wording constitutes the result of detailed negotiations on the part of the deputy of the Danish Foreign Minister, who strove to find a formulation which in substance would meet the German wishes without giving Foreign Missions the impression that the instruction was issued under German pressure. Minister Mohr asked that it be taken into consideration that the invasion by German troops, which the Danish Government and the Danish people felt to be a hard and serious blow, took place only a few days ago. In view of the present situation the Danish representatives abroad would not take seriously telegraphic instructions of the Foreign Ministry which spoke of *friendly* cooperation, and might possibly doubt the genuineness of the telegram. Thereby an effect might easily be produced which was the opposite of that intended.

The deputy of the Foreign Minister expressed the opinion that it would gradually be possible by instructions in increasingly cordial terms concerning relations between the two countries to make the Danish representatives abroad adapt themselves in their own minds as well to the new situation.

I request that you ensure confidential treatment also as regards the Danish Missions in the transmittal of the Danish instruction to German Missions abroad.*

RENTHE-FINK

* For the Foreign Minister's reply see document No. 151.

No. 146

1379/357726

The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in the Soviet Union

Telegram

URGENT

BERLIN, April 21, 1940—1:03 p. m.

No. 676 of April 20

Received April 21—5:25 p. m.

With reference to your telegrams No. 688¹ and No. 712.²

The question of delivering magnetic mines to Russia has been examined here. Please tell M. Molotov that, despite all good will, we are unfortunately not in a position at the present time to supply such mines, as we need them ourselves for the increasingly intensive warfare. The manufacture of these mines is a very complicated process which is constantly being modified and improved. Moreover, climatic conditions both in the Black Sea and at Murmansk are quite different from those in the North Sea and the Atlantic, so that from the purely technical point of view it is questionable whether the mines we are using could be employed in those waters at all. Probably quite different mines

¹ Document No. 105.

² See document No. 105, footnote 1.

would have to be devised for this purpose. The Soviet Union will understand that the need to concentrate all our energies in the war against England and France renders it difficult for us to devote ourselves to the construction of other mines. I am sure that the Soviet Union will view this matter with understanding. However, please add when speaking to Molotov that if ever danger really does threaten the Soviet Union from the Western Powers, Germany will naturally review the question of delivering magnetic mines, and will show all possible consideration.³

RIBBENTROP

³ In a minute of Apr. 27 (1379/357727) Hilger noted that Schulenburg had passed this statement on to Molotov on Apr. 26, with the addition that Germany would re-examine the question at a later date. Molotov accepted the statement with understanding and emphasized that the Soviet Union was not asking for the secret of their construction.

No. 147

220/148690-91

The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Norway

Telegram

No. 496

BERLIN, April 21, 1940.

For the Chargé d'Affaires.

Information which is temporarily confidential.

Oberpräsident Terboven will probably arrive in Norway shortly as Reichskommissar charged with the safeguarding of nonmilitary German interests there. He will work along with the German Commander in Chief in Norway and will coordinate with him. He is directly subordinate to the Führer. The details of his powers will be laid down by a decree of the Führer, the text of which will be telegraphed.¹ As, however, the publication of the decree is to be deferred for a few days, the foregoing information is for the time being intended exclusively for your personal information.

It will probably be mentioned in the detailed instructions or regulations for implementation relating to the said decree that a representative of the Foreign Ministry will be assigned to the Reichskommissar for questions of foreign policy.

Although the function of the Legation as such has ceased, you will remain on the spot for the present with the whole staff, place yourself at the disposal of Oberpräsident Terboven on his arrival, and assist him in questions of foreign policy. Further instructions regarding

¹ See document No. 162.

organization there may be issued. Minister Bräuer is not returning there.²

RIBBENTROP

² On May 3 a circular was issued by the Personnel Department of the Foreign Ministry which announced: "In view of the designation of Oberpräsident Terboven as Reichskommissar for the Occupied Norwegian Territories, the German Legation at Oslo has been converted into the 'Representation of the Foreign Ministry with the Reichskommissar for the Occupied Norwegian Territories, Oslo.' Counselor of Legation von Neuhaus is designated as Representative of the Foreign Ministry with the Reichskommissar." (220/148847)

No. 148

8612/E604180

The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry

No. 569 of April 21

BUCHAREST, April 22, 1940—12: 01 a. m.

Received April 22—3: 15 a. m.

W IIIb 2281.

With reference to your telegram No. 354 of April 9.¹

I have spoken to Gafencu repeatedly about "Enco." He stated that the Rumanian Government would not let itself be forced by British economic measures to deviate from the path, which it had taken and recognized to be right, of carrying out loyally the economic agreement with Germany. Rumania's economic relations with Germany were normal and rested on a natural foundation. The Rumanian Government had successfully explained this in London and Paris.

Gafencu also had expected that the conference in London of English Chiefs of Missions from the southeastern countries² would bring new developments in the direction of an English economic offensive; the English Minister, however, did not talk about this subject on his return. Hoare, the English Minister here, is not at all economically-minded. I therefore would assume that the British Government is not using (group apparently missing) but that it will entrust the carrying out of an economic action against us to a person under the camouflage of private business.

FABRICIUS

¹ Document No. 74.

² A conference of British Diplomatic Representatives to the Balkan and Danubian States had been held in London Apr. 8-15. It appears from Rome telegram No. 847 of May 9 that Ciano was in possession of detailed information about this conference "from an absolutely reliable source" which he communicated to Mackensen (F9/0876-0877). On May 31 Welzsäcker recorded (F9/0374-0375) that he had now received material that had been promised in this earlier telegram indicating "that the Italian Government has actually come into possession of the complete text of the Foreign Office protocols of the conferences held with the British representatives in southeast Europe." A copy of these alleged British Foreign Office protocols in German translation has been found (F10/060-004).

No. 149

205/142105

The Minister in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

STOCKHOLM, April 22, 1940—10:30 p. m.

To be kept secret

Received April 23—5:30 a. m.

No. 566 of April 22

As the radio here has just reported, it is alleged that Swedish fishing boats have been attacked inside Swedish territorial waters near Strömstad by German airplanes.¹ One fisherman was reported wounded. I would be grateful for an immediate investigation and statement of facts, because since yesterday mistrust of German intentions has increased to such a degree that serious danger threatens German-Swedish relations.²

In case we increase our pressure further and test the patience of the Swedes to an even greater extent, I am afraid of serious consequences. First of all I see these arising in connection with the deliveries of iron ore which have been agreed upon, since armed conflict would certainly mean the discontinuance of these deliveries for a long time. Sweden would only take action against us if she were driven to desperation. Yet with my knowledge of the Nordic character I feel that such a situation may soon come about.

WIED

¹ Marginal note in Weizsäcker's handwriting: "Completely incredible."

² In telegram No. 575 of Apr. 23 Weizsäcker informed the Legation in Stockholm that the German military authorities had received no report concerning the alleged incident, but in view of the strict orders which had recently been given to the Luftwaffe it was considered unlikely that German aircraft could have been responsible (205/142132). Also on Apr. 23 DNB issued a statement describing the report of the shooting as "a complete invention." In a memorandum of Apr. 25 (205/142154) Heyden-Rynsch noted that "after these diplomatic and press reports to the Swedish assertion it did not appear useful to make more of the matter through further polemics in the press."

No. 150

319/192803-05

The Director of the Economic Policy Department to the Legation in Sweden

Telegram

MOST URGENT

BERLIN, April 22, 1940—10:50 p. m.

SECRET

e.o. W g 2141.

No. 371 of April 22

For the delegation.¹

1) Having once more considered the matter, the Foreign Minister

¹ i. e., the German delegation headed by Schnurre and Walter which had just arrived in Stockholm. See document No. 127, footnote 3.

thinks it advisable for Brunhoff to conduct the first conversation with the confidant² in such a manner and to such effect that the impression of a special action for the solution of the transport question be avoided and that the confidant should not feel called upon to put the direct question to the King immediately and ask for a reply to it, as the King might then too hastily give a refusal. The conversation with the confidant should rather be held under the pretext of informing intelligent Swedish circles about the general German opinion on the situation; and it should be suggested to the confidant, that, if possible, he should inform the King on his own initiative, and then acquaint Br. with the latter's point of view.

2) More particularly, the Foreign Minister suggests that Br. should inform the confidant more or less as follows:

a) Br., on returning from a short stay in Sweden, reported to the Foreign Minister, and was able to become acquainted with the Foreign Minister's opinion on the situation in Scandinavia. Here should follow today's communications from the Foreign Minister about the military situation, the early overthrow of Norwegian resistance, the English danger to Swedish neutrality, and in particular to the iron mines, and Sweden's interest in remaining outside the war.³ Lay strong emphasis here on the Foreign Minister's declaration that Germany will absolutely respect Swedish neutrality and, for her part, is firmly convinced that Sweden will do all in her power to maintain absolute neutrality.

b) The Foreign Minister is extremely interested in the economic negotiations to be opened by the delegation in Stockholm. The German plan for the Baltic as a free inland sea,⁴ resuscitation of trade of all Baltic States, especially Sweden's. Germany is prepared to take Swedish economic needs fully into account.

c) Within the framework of the economic negotiations, questions concerning transit on the Swedish railways to Trondheim and Narvik will play a part, since supplies for the Norwegian civil population and the German troops in these areas must be ensured, which can easily be done by rail. Also, in so far as the supplying of equipment for German troops is concerned, this is fully compatible with the maintenance of absolute Swedish neutrality. There is, of course, no question of the transport of troops.

d) It would, of course, be very important, if those Swedish circles which are in favor of German-Swedish cooperation were, in the interests of Sweden, to make their influence felt in the furthering of such ideas, and if, for instance, the confidant, on the strength of his well-known friendly relations with the King, were to suggest such ideas to him.

3) If after such initial sounding out the King's attitude is not a negative one, it would be possible to speak more definitely in later discussions. The Foreign Minister assumes that, in case of necessity,

² Documents on the background of this have not been found.

³ These communications have not been found.

⁴ See document No. 160.

the confidant often has inconspicuous access to the King. Certainly the urgency of the matter must not be left out of account.

4) Economic negotiations will be opened as arranged and will be prolonged if necessary, according to the discussions with the confidant. The Foreign Minister requests you to report by telegram on the progress of the first discussions.⁵

WIEHL

⁵ This instruction was initialed by Ribbentrop. Schnurre's reply, reporting the preliminary conversation with the Swedish Foreign Minister, was Stockholm telegram No. 578 of Apr. 23 (30/22324), the German text of which is in *Norges forhold til Sverige under krigen 1940-45* (Oslo, 1947), vol. I, pp. 242-243.

No. 151

220/148689/1-89/2

The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Denmark

Telegram

No. 408

BERLIN, April 22, 1940.

With reference to your telegram No. 352.¹

The text of the circular telegram on which you agreed with the Danish Foreign Ministry does not correspond to the sense of the instruction in our telegram No. 353.² From the wording of the circular telegram the Danish Missions abroad might get the impression that the Danish Government is cooperating with us only under direct pressure and with great reluctance and that it is taking into account the possibility of an early change in the present situation.

Since the circular telegram has unfortunately been dispatched already, there remains only the possibility of a subsequent supplement, which should be worded as follows:

"With reference to our circular telegram of April 20 you are informed further that the cooperation of the Danish civil and military authorities with the German occupation authorities is based on a fundamental agreement between the two Governments and is becoming increasingly close and fruitful. In particular, the economic negotiations with the German Government delegation which were mentioned in the previous telegram have fortunately already led to an arrangement which as far as possible takes account of Danish economic requirements. In view of the tendentious propaganda reports of the Western Powers all Danish representatives abroad must be especially careful in their statements and their attitude in general to bring out the fact that Danish-German relations have already been thoroughly consolidated and will remain consolidated also in the future."

I request that any change in the foregoing text be approved only after my personal authorization has been obtained.³

Foreign Minister

¹ Document No. 145.

² Document No. 121.

³ The Legation's reply is document No. 188.

No. 152

220/148688

The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Denmark

Telegram

No. 409

BERLIN, April 22, 1940.

For the Minister personally.

I request that in the future you take no measures of a political, military, or economic nature nor come to any definitive agreement thereon with the Danish Government, also in so far as you act in your capacity as plenipotentiary of the Reich on the basis of previous instructions, until you have in each individual case obtained my personal authorization. That applies also to any public announcements or press statements. The full text of all such agreements, announcements, or press statements is to be sent here in each case when my approval is requested.

Foreign Minister

No. 153

3832/E044052-55

The Minister in Switzerland to the Foreign Ministry

No. 2080

BERN, April 22, 1940.

Pol. II 1506.

Subject: The orders for mobilization in the event of a surprise attack.

With reference to telegram No. 336/20 of April 20.¹

On April 18 the Swiss Federal Council and the Swiss Army Command issued joint orders for mobilization in the event of a surprise attack. The text of the proclamation is enclosed² and it bears the signatures of Pilet-Golaz, the Federal President, of Leimgruber, the Vice Chancellor and of General Guisan.³ The proclamation is addressed not only to the soldiers, but to the entire population. The Swiss public was at first so deeply shocked by Germany's military operations in Denmark and Norway, that the General Staff instructed the press to exercise more restraint. Only as the operations progressed did it become clear what had really happened, and people then imagined they had discovered that the two northern countries had become the victims of cunning underground propaganda. They found it incomprehensible that Denmark, even though under protest, should have yielded to Germany's demands, and still more incomprehensible that in Norway men were to be found who were ready to co-operate with the intruders against the will of the people and the

¹ Not printed (9877/E693136-37).

² Not reprinted.

³ Chief of the Swiss General Staff.

lawful Government. The Norwegian Major Quisling became a symbol here of internal corruption and treason. The consequence of this was that it was thought advisable to take a look around one's own home in case such "Quislings," as they were called, who would be ready at a given moment to collaborate with the enemy, might also be found in Switzerland. For some days past, spies and traitors have been suspected everywhere in this country. The Reich German colony of about 130,000 is under suspicion, and it has even been demanded of the Federal Council that all officials and officers who are in sympathy with the Greater German Reich or who are married to foreigners, shall be removed from their posts. It is now thought that the German system has now been fully exposed: the methodical undermining of morale in neutral states, creation of disorder by spreading false reports, and the engendering of a defeatist attitude. Only in such soil could the noxious seed flourish which the intruder only had to harvest in order to gain possession of the country by brute force. For the past few days the Swiss press has been insisting more and more on the abolition of the International Hague Convention on land warfare and its replacement by a Swiss national statute on land warfare which would legally oppose total war with total defense in which the civilian population would be obliged to take part. The Federal Council and the High Command of the Army have—not unwillingly and obviously in order to yield to public opinion which has been growing more and more disturbed—taken the opportunity to promulgate the "orders for mobilization in the event of a surprise attack." The text of the orders reflects the deep emotion which has gripped the country. It can be assumed that the course thus embarked on will be adhered to because in this way they believe they can counter what is described in this country as strategy of attrition.

Referring to the tremendous excitement, a Swiss officer told a member of the Legation yesterday that in all the offices a committee of three, consisting of junior officers, had been secretly formed whose task it was to watch the commanding officers of units. Should, in the event of an invasion, a commanding officer show signs of giving way before overwhelming enemy forces, these officers have mutually pledged themselves to shoot such a commander on the spot. The source referred to, who appeared to be obsessed with the idea of a total war against the intruder, added that these officers' committees had already drawn up a list of senior commanders whom they did not consider absolutely reliable, and who were to be liquidated at once in an emergency. However fantastic these statements may sound, still, in the existing circumstances I consider them quite worthy of credence.

In today's press it is demanded among other things that the 130,000 Germans in the country should no longer be permitted to meet in associations "which take their orders from abroad." The social-democratic *Arbeiter-Zeitung* draws attention to the branches of the Auslandsorganisation which, as the instrument for obtaining blind obedience, should be banned at once. It is very doubtful whether the Federal Council will be willing to accede to such radical demands, but nonetheless the German community in Switzerland must be prepared for increased hostility.

A number of newspaper cuttings typical of the temper of the country are enclosed.⁴

KÖCHER

⁴ Not reprinted.

No. 154

30/22826

The Minister in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

No. 572 of April 23

STOCKHOLM, April 23, 1940—2:10 p. m.

Received April 23—6:53 p. m.

For the Foreign Minister.

Today's Swedish morning papers publish the following announcement by the Swedish news agency (TT):¹

"In connection with reports in the foreign press concerning the transport of war material through Sweden, TT has been informed by the Foreign Ministry that all such statements are incorrect. From the outset the Government has taken the standpoint that the neutrality declared by Sweden does not allow her to grant permission to any power involved in the war, either for the transit of troops or for the transport of war material of whatever kind."

To this statement I would add the following from the substance of my conversation with the Foreign Minister on the 20th of this month: On April 20, a train left with medical stores, 40 members of the medical corps, and rations for the troops stationed in and around Narvik.² Günther told me that such transports could not possibly be admitted as a regular thing by the Swedish Government. He himself had only afterwards heard of the quantity of these goods destined for Narvik, and had, on the strength of the negotiations carried on by the Swedish Legation in Berlin, believed that it was only a matter of a few carloads. To my remark that it was after all possible to let food for the population through, the Foreign Minister replied that

¹ *Tidningarnas Telegrambyrå.*

² See document No. 127, footnote 2.

there had been no mention of this on the German side. When I further remarked that Sweden had let war material through as transit goods during the Russo-Finnish conflict, Günther replied that at that time Sweden had made no formal declaration of neutrality.

WIED

No. 155

259/169912

The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

URGENT

MADRID, April 23, 1940.

No. 1211 of April 23

Received April 23—8:30 p. m.

The Foreign Minister received me today immediately after the Spanish Ambassador in London who had just arrived in Madrid and told me the following about the latter's general impressions:

Outwardly the English Government is confident of victory, but already has grave doubts. The English Government's hope is based on the expectation of a very long war and on a cooling-off in Russian-German relations, which is said to have already begun as a result of the occupation of Norway. After some further successful action by Germany, the English Government expects a peace gesture by the Führer, which they do not feel they could reject, especially if the gesture were supported by the heads of foreign states (in particular Roosevelt). In addition to the fulfillment of Germany's demands in the East there even appears to be a readiness to surrender colonies.

The English people as a whole desire the end of the war.

The Duke of Alba also said that the morale of the English Navy was bad, that of the English airmen was excellent.

STOHRER

No. 156

108/112132-33

The State Secretary to the Embassy in the Soviet Union

Telegram

No. 698

BERLIN, April 23, 1940.

W 2104 g.

For the Ambassador.

With reference to written instruction W IV 1715 of April 4¹ and your telegram No. 655 of April 9.²

(1) Reports on alleged Soviet-English economic negotiations either impending or already in progress become more frequent.

¹ Not found.

² Not printed (84/23747). In this telegram Schulenburg reported Molotov's declaration that there were no negotiations in progress, economic or otherwise, between Britain and the Soviet Union.

The United Press reported on April 20 from London that Maisky had visited Halifax on April 19 at the latter's invitation. Halifax had told him that England expected binding assurances from Russia on the latter's trade with Germany, especially with regard to the re-export to Germany of goods imported into Russia. From this it could be inferred that England was now ready to negotiate with Russia over deliveries of important empire raw materials and machinery manufactured in England, on condition that guarantees be given that these deliveries would not come into German hands. Halifax had informed the Soviet Ambassador that England was awaiting detailed proposals for a trade agreement.

Another United Press report stated that the English Government had on April 19 conveyed to Moscow its consent in principle to the negotiations recently proposed by Russia for the conclusion of a Russian-English trade agreement. The prospective Russian-English conversations are also said to cover future Allied measures to stop the German contraband import through Vladivostok. The Soviet Government would probably bring up the capture of the two Soviet steamships now held in Indochina. The Allies would, however, make the release of the ships conditional upon a Russian pledge that no part of the cargo should reach Germany. During negotiations it would be made clear to Russia that a relaxation of the watch on ships bound for Vladivostok or a reduction of control measures on the part of the Allied fleet would be made conditional upon assurances Russia might give of a future discontinuance of contraband imports through the port of Vladivostok.

Yesterday almost all London newspapers reported Soviet-English economic talks, which were to be taken upon Soviet initiative, and through which Soviet re-exports to Germany must be prevented at all costs.

Finally, reference was made to Butler's statement in the House of Commons on April 11^a that the initiative for the trade talks had come from Moscow.

(2) Please draw Molotov's attention to these reports and comment on them somewhat as follows:

On the basis of his binding assurance to you on April 9^a that no economic negotiations with England were taking place, we place no credence in these reports and are convinced that they are machinations of enemy propaganda. We also take it as a matter of course that the Soviet Government will give England no assurances regarding a limitation of exports or transit facilities to Germany, and will recognize no English control of Soviet imports, exports or transit trade by enemy powers. Please express to M. Molotov at this opportunity our disappointment that the promise M. Stalin made in person (minutes of

^a *Parliamentary Debates*, fifth series, H of C, vol. 359, col. 717.

^a See footnote 2.

the conversation of January 29⁶), which is also set down in writing in the confidential protocol to the Economic Agreement of February 11,⁶ to purchase raw materials for us in third countries has so far led to no practical results. Furthermore, the promise of making the addresses of Soviet authorities available as a cover for our own purchases of raw materials abroad is not being kept. The proposals we have put forward have come up against the evasive or procrastinating reserve of the Soviet authorities. We are far from assuming that this Soviet behavior is to be ascribed to English pressure or to consideration for English wishes. The Foreign Minister, however, attaches great importance to this matter and considers it of great moment that practical evidence of the honoring of this promise should soon be forthcoming, for instance, by our participation in raw material purchases effected by Russia, which as is well known was specifically referred to by M. Stalin himself, and also by permission being granted for the raw materials purchased by us—especially tin, rubber, and whale oil—to be forwarded to Russian cover addresses.

Please report by telegram on the result of this démarche.⁷

WEIZSÄCKER

⁶ See vol. VIII, document No. 584.

⁶ See vol. VIII, document No. 607.

⁷ See documents Nos. 174 and 175.

No. 157

1900/427898

*The Director of the Political Department to the Embassy in
the United States*

Telegram

No. 418

BERLIN, April 23, 1940.

zu Pol. VI 931.¹

1061.²

946.³

With reference to your telegrams Nos. 618¹ and 682² of April 10 and 18 respectively.

I. By a note of April 15, the Danish Minister here communicated the resolution of the Icelandic Althing,³ adding that Iceland's resolu-

¹ Washington telegram No. 618 of Apr. 10 (Pol. VI 931) stated that the Danish Minister had discussed the situation with Roosevelt and had said that Iceland would now have her own diplomatic missions. Thomsen recommended that an authoritative statement be obtained from the Danish Government on the status of Danish possessions (1900/427885).

² Washington telegram No. 682 of Apr. 18 (Pol. VI 1061) forwarded telegram No. 30 of Apr. 18 from Reykjavik, which stated: "The Icelandic Government intends to establish diplomatic missions in Washington, London, and a Mediterranean country, but apparently not in Germany." (1900/427887)

³ In telegram No. 113 of Apr. 12 (Pol. VI 946) the German Consul General at Reykjavik had forwarded a statement by the Icelandic Foreign Minister to the German Government that, as the King was unable to exercise his constitutional powers, the Althing had transferred these powers to the Icelandic Government and that Iceland would now control her own foreign affairs (1900/427886).

The Danish Minister's note of Apr. 15, which also communicated the resolution of the Althing, is not printed (1900/427880-81).

tion appeared to the Danish King and to the Foreign Minister as a measure natural in the present situation. Until other arrangements for the safeguarding of Icelandic interests in Germany were made, the protection of Icelandic nationals would be entrusted to the Danish Legation and Danish Consular Missions in Germany.

II. It is not intended to make a German statement on the status of Danish possessions nor to approach the Danish Government to arrange for any similar Danish statement to be made.

WOERMANN

No. 158

2858/551470

The Chargé d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, April 24, 1940—11:43 a. m.

No. 735 of April 23

Received April 24—11:40 p. m.

Inf 56 g.

With reference to your telegram No. 413 of April 21.¹

For obvious reasons negotiations with the publishers regarding the Polish documents must be conducted with utmost caution. Although the documents have only been at our disposal 4 days and negotiations have had to be conducted in part over the weekend, it has been possible, thanks to the unremitting efforts of our agent, to bring the negotiations to the point where the relevant agreement could be initialed today. The publishers are a purely American firm which is said, in strict confidence, to be closely connected with the Republican opposition. To begin with they will bring out an edition of 3,000 copies, to be followed shortly by a further edition. As far as can be ascertained so far, a contribution of 3,000 dollars toward the cost of printing will suffice for the present. The Embassy will continue to report on the progress and reception of this special brochure.²

THOMSEN ³

¹ Not printed (8824/E614162).

² See document No. 195.

³ In telegram No. 438 of Apr. 26 (2858/551471) Altenburg replied that an edition of 3,000 copies was completely insufficient. The Foreign Minister desired the most extensive dissemination of the documents. The Embassy was to take all necessary measures, including financing the distribution of free copies.

No. 159

80/22818-14

The Legation in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

STOCKHOLM, April 24, 1940—3:40 p. m.

SECRET

Received April 24—9:00 p. m.

No. 592 of April 24

For the Foreign Minister.

With reference to your telegram No. 371 of April 22.¹

1) The confidant, with whom discussions were held yesterday in the afternoon and evening, has informed us this morning that however much he shares the German point of view on this question, he must ask us only to use him for his mission to the King if no other person can be found. As he suffers from severe nervous heart disease, he fears that he would not be able to carry out the mission in the manner which its importance requires. Brunhoff (group missing, probably "thinks") that in these circumstances we should give up the idea of using J.

2) It is the opinion here that there might be considered in his stead Sven Hedin, General de Champs, president of the Swedish-German Association, or the industrial magnate Sigfrid Edström, president of the International Chamber of Commerce, vice president of the International Olympic Committee, who is also known there. With the last named it might be hard to persuade him to undertake the mission.

3) The prospects of success for the step under discussion—a confidant to see the King—must, according to impressions gained here, be described as not very favorable. The Swedish Government regards the question of transit traffic as an essential part of its neutrality policy and has, obviously as a precautionary measure, declared its point of view publicly and to the [German] Minister. (Cf. telegram No. 572 of April 23.²) In addition to this there is the negative result of the Tamm mission.³ The transit through Sweden of the transport train, agreed upon with the Tamm mission, is already being discussed in the press (*Arbetaren* of April 23). The Foreign Minister, as appears from the telegraphic report quoted, has emphasized that the permission for the transit is for one journey only.

In these circumstances there is little likelihood that the King, on being privately approached by Swedish subjects, can adopt an attitude other than that already declared by the Government.

¹ Document No. 150.

² Document No. 154.

³ Cf. document No. 127.

4) In this state of affairs I would suggest you consider whether the opportunity of handling the answer of the Führer and Chancellor to King Gustaf⁴ could be used first to express the declaration of friendship contained in 2 a) and b) of your telegram No. 371 of April 22,⁵ and then to touch upon our point of view in the question of through transport. In this way a basis of confidence would be established, and we would avoid causing the Foreign Minister, who is sincerely sympathetic to us, to feel that he has been passed over. Please send further instructions by telegram.⁶

SCHNURRE
WIED

⁴ See document No. 142.

⁵ Document No. 150.

⁶ See document No. 183.

No. 160

F14/156

Memorandum by the Foreign Minister

BERLIN, April 24, 1940.

RM 14.

I received the Swedish Minister today¹ and informed him that the Führer would answer the King of Sweden's letter² in the next few days; I would make the answer accessible to the Minister.³

I then spoke of the press and of the not very satisfactory part that it was playing in German-Swedish relations. This the Minister admitted, and promised that he would do everything to cooperate in altering the present situation; it had already improved a little.

With regard to the various recent occurrences, the Minister and I agreed that these should not be taken too tragically by either side. In connection with this I made some remarks about German-Swedish relations in general and concluded by stating that the Führer's decision to keep England and France out of Scandinavia was as much in the Swedish as in the German interest. The Minister asserted that he was of the same opinion and once more reiterated that Sweden would, in case of necessity, defend her neutrality with all the power at her disposal.

Finally, I pointed out to the Minister that the Führer had ordered me to subject German-Swedish trade relations to a special examination. Minister Schnurre and Ministerialdirektor Walter were al-

¹ Richtert's telegraphic report of this interview is in *Transiteringsfrågor . . . April-Juni 1940*, p. 112, and a more detailed account is contained in his report of Apr. 24 to Günther, *ibid.*, pp. 100-102.

² Document No. 142.

³ For Hitler's reply, see document No. 161.

ready in Sweden for this purpose.⁴ The Führer intended to turn the Baltic into a free inland sea.

I concluded with the assurance that we were prepared to help Sweden in every imaginable way in the reorganization of her economy, and I expressed the hope that Sweden would show the same compliance with German wishes.

R[IBBENTROP]

⁴ See document No. 150, footnote 1.

No. 161

205/142099-100

Adolf Hitler to King Gustaf V of Sweden

BERLIN, April 24, 1940.

YOUR MAJESTY: I thank you for your letter of April 19.¹ It is with special satisfaction that I have taken cognizance of your solemn declaration that Sweden would observe the strictest neutrality in this war, would immediately and with all her strength resist any violation of this neutrality, and in particular any attempt to cross her frontiers with armed forces.

As early as April 9 my Government assured the Swedish Government that Swedish territory would not be affected by the action in the north which has been forced upon Germany.² I would like to make use of this opportunity to repeat this assurance on my own part, and solemnly to declare that Germany is determined to respect absolutely the neutrality of Sweden.

Just as I am conscious that this attitude of the German Government corresponds to the natural feelings of friendship of the German people for the Swedish people, I am also convinced that the Swedish decision to adopt an absolute and armed neutrality in this war will serve the true interests of Sweden in the future to the same extent as it has done in recent months.

My Government has recently had access to official Norwegian documents which demonstrate to it the Swedish desire for neutrality and the logic of this policy, just as clearly as, on the other hand, they give proof of the one-sided anti-German policy of the former Norwegian Government. According to these the former Norwegian Government had long been counting on the landing of English and French forces and had decided that in this case they would enter the war against Germany on the English and French side. Owing to this attitude which, regrettably, inevitably led to the entirely senseless and useless bloodshed and the destruction in the north, the former Norwegian

¹ Document No. 142.

² See document No. 55.

Government has burdened itself with a heavy load of guilt in the eyes of history. For, in contrast to the Western Powers, Germany had not the slightest interest in the extension of the theater of war to Scandinavia. She did not come to the north as an enemy, but exclusively to resist the imminent English and French invasion of the northern countries. I can assure you, Your Majesty, that my Government possesses irrefutable proof of the English and French plan first to cut Germany off from the Swedish iron and then to launch a flanking attack against her.

I do not doubt that the action by which we at the last moment forestalled the English and French plan, and by which we will in all circumstances prevent England and France from gaining a footing in Scandinavia during this war, will in its results also prove a blessing to the northern nations. From this point of view I am also glad that your Government has informed the English and French Governments of the decision to resist with all your strength every attempt to attack Swedish neutrality.

In view of the agreement on our mutual attitude which exists between the two Governments, you will surely agree with me that the recent anxiety in Sweden, regrettably caused by the press there, is entirely groundless, and that there is no reason to attach exaggerated importance to isolated occurrences which can be traced back to a mere error on one side or the other.

It seems to me more important that special attention on both sides should be given to questions of political-economic reorganization in the Baltic area, now necessary as a result of developments. I have therefore requested the Foreign Minister to devote himself particularly to the treatment of this problem, in which Sweden is, naturally, also greatly interested. I believe that a completely new settlement must be reached here, and I can say even now that my Government wishes to deal with these matters generously in the expectation that an equally deep understanding of German interests will be shown by the other nations concerned.^a

With deepest respect,

ADOLF HITLER

^a The Minister in Sweden reported in telegram No. 615 of Apr. 26: "I delivered the Führer's reply to the King in person at 11:30 a. m. today and he read the letter in my presence. The King expressed in especially warm terms his thanks for its friendly form and requested that I inform the Führer, and he spoke of his pleasure at the reception which his personal letter had encountered.

"I have the definite impression that the reply will have a lasting effect, since the Foreign Minister also, whom I informed by means of a copy, showed that he was visibly impressed and pleased with the contents." (205/142161)

No. 162

220/148770/1-70/2

Decree of the Führer Concerning the Exercise of Governmental Power in Norway, April 24, 1940

RK 6838 B

The Nygaardsvold Government, by virtue of its proclamations, its conduct, and its initiating of military action between Norway and the German Reich, has created a state of war. In order to ensure public life and public order in the Norwegian territories under the protection of German troops, I hereby give the following orders:

Article 1

The occupied Norwegian territories are to come under the jurisdiction of the "Reichskommissar for the Occupied Norwegian Territories." His headquarters are to be in Oslo. The Reichskommissar is to be the protector of Reich interests and to exercise supreme governmental power in the civilian sector.

Article 2

The Reichskommissar may make use of the Norwegian Administrative Council and of the Norwegian authorities for the execution of his orders and for administrative purposes.

Article 3

(1) The hitherto existing body of law shall remain in force wherever it is compatible with the occupation.

(2) The Reichskommissar may issue laws by decree. The decrees will be published in the official *Gazette* for the occupied Norwegian territories.

Article 4

The commander of the German troops in Norway shall exercise the supreme military authority; his requests will be carried out in the civilian sector exclusively by the Reichskommissar. He shall have the right to order measures necessary for the execution of his military mission and for the military security of Norway, in keeping with military requirements.

Article 5

The Reichskommissar may make use of German police organs for the execution of his orders. The German police organs shall be at the disposal of the commander of the German troops in Norway as far as is necessary in the interest of military requirements and compatible with the duties of the Reichskommissar.

Article 6

The Reichskommissar shall be directly responsible to me and shall receive his guidance and directives from me.

Article 7

I appoint Oberpräsident Terboven Reichskommissar for the Occupied Norwegian Territories.

Article 8

Regulations for the implementation and supplementation of this decree will be issued in the civilian sector by the Reich Minister and Chief of the Reich Chancellery and in the military sector by the Chief of the OKW on the basis of my directives.

BERLIN, April 24, 1940.

The Führer	Adolf Hitler
The Chairman of the Ministerial Council for the Defense of the Reich	Göring, Field Marshal
The Reich Minister and Chief of the Reich Chancellery	Dr. Lammers
The Chief of the High Command of the Wehrmacht	Keitel
The Reich Minister of the Interior	Frick

No. 163

124/122644-46

Counselor of Embassy Thomsen to State Secretary Weissäcker

WASHINGTON, April 24, 1940.

DEAR MR. STATE SECRETARY: I thank you very much for the suggestion which you have given me in your personally addressed telegram No. 403 of the 19th.¹

The fact that my telegram No. 631² appeared with my signature only would appear to be due to a decoding error of the code room. The name of the actual sender had been properly coded at this end.

I should like to take advantage of this opportunity to tell you that, in every respect, a harmonious relationship of confidence exists between General von Bötticher and myself. True, this does not always exclude differences of opinion on facts. No doubt you know General von Bötticher better than I and thus know that he has an extraordinarily sensitive personality. In the form in which they are received in Berlin his telegrams, in so far as they touch on political matters,

¹ Document No. 141.

² Document No. 96.

are mostly the result of extensive discussions between him and myself.

General von Bötticher is understandably inclined to place a rather high evaluation on his sources of information and consequently on the degree of influence which the military leadership of the American armed forces exercises on the formation of American foreign policy. Hence his telegrams often convey a picture of the situation which may express the mood of the American General Staff but not that of other, more decisive factors in American politics. Through my general reporting I attempt to counteract these one-sided judgments, and I will make use of the authorization given in the official instruction if occasion should warrant this and if it should not be possible to resolve differences of opinion in any other way.

If the position of Military Attaché to this country were held by a person of my rank I would risk a conflict; under the present circumstances I am trying to avoid one. Apart from the fact that since the outbreak of the war General von Bötticher regards the importance of his position as greatly increased, he has now the unusually high rank of a commanding general. On the occasion of the anniversary of his 40th year in the service he received a personal telegram of recognition from the Führer which justified him in concluding he was assured that his activity here is appreciated in the highest quarters. This is all the more reason why I should acknowledge that General von Bötticher upholds my authority in every respect, even in the internal operations of the Embassy.

That General von Bötticher's relations with the leading men of the American General Staff and Army high command, even in these times, have remained as excellent as one can possibly imagine is a political asset whose significance is not to be underestimated.

Yours, etc.

THOMSEN

No. 164

2281/481355-59

*Unsigned Memorandum*¹

1. The Reich Government does not believe in dangers actually threatening in the Balkans or in Rumania, of which England or

¹This undated document is apparently the memorandum which Hitler gave Mackensen in Berlin for guidance in the conversation with Mussolini recorded in document No. 165. There is also in the files a somewhat different version of this memorandum in Italian (2281/481361-63) and, also in Italian, a copy of Teleki's letter to Hitler (2281/481364).

The Italian version of this memorandum starts with the following passages which are not found in the German copy:

"The Führer has asked me to convey his most cordial greetings to the Duce. He has also instructed me to deliver to the Duce a copy of a letter from the President of the Council of Hungarian Ministers in which Count Teleki proposes that the three Powers enter into certain discussions concerning the present situation in order to be prepared for all eventualities.

"The Führer has instructed me to submit to the Duce his reaction to this initiative on the part of Teleki."

Russia might be the cause. It is conceivable, however, that by creating a general atmosphere of nervousness, they hope to tie down German troops or be able thereby to withdraw them from use in the west. On the other hand, it is natural that England and France should be trying by means of sabotage operations to interfere with vital economic lines of communication of the Axis Powers.

2. Germany² cannot reply to the request of the Hungarian Government until she has had an exhaustive consultation with Italy.

In principle, however, the German Government² does not think that Hungary is really making a sacrifice by acceding to the German-Italian wish that she desist at the present moment from the execution of her plans with respect to Rumania. The sacrifice would only occur if Hungary took such a step. And a sacrifice, to be sure, which, in the opinion of the German Government,² would be less of an impediment to Hungary than to Germany and Italy. The German Government² perceives a danger in permitting a development to get under way, whose beginnings may perhaps be foreseen, but whose outcome is veiled in obscurity. The following is possible:

(a) Hungary takes action against Rumania without any support by a third party. In that case it must be expected that Yugoslavia will take a stand against Hungary or at least throw herself into the open arms of the Allies.

Italy and Germany would then have to cover the Hungarian step with their arms, that is, therefore, make the decisive sacrifices.

(b) Hungary gets assistance from Russia and Bulgaria.

In that event, the move against Rumania will do very serious economic injury to Germany and Italy.

It is therefore the opinion of the Reich Government that it can only take a position on the Hungarian proposal if Italy also agrees to it, and is perhaps prepared to share in the consequences, whatever they may be.

3.³ The Reich Government at present regards with a certain mistrust those forces that are forever trying to represent it as probable that Germany is intending something in the Balkans or which emphasize this danger by reporting military appearances that might be construed in this sense. Therefore, it cannot help feeling that an official discussion between the three countries concerning these matters would only give new sustenance to these rumors.⁴

² In the Italian text: "The Führer".

³ In the Italian text this paragraph is not numbered and, moreover, starts with the following words: "The Führer continued: That the German Government . . ."

⁴ In the Italian text, this sentence starts as follows: "It is precisely for this reason that the Führer cannot . . ."

The Reich Government fears this all the more since in Berlin, for example, even the Italian Ambassador does not show the necessary firmness in contradicting these rumors.⁵

* In the Italian text, this last paragraph differs considerably from the German version, and there is also a final paragraph not found in the German text. These two paragraphs read as follows:

"And the more so since at this moment he observes in the diplomatic circles in Berlin that there are among those who know quite well or at least ought to know well the true state of affairs, persons who unfortunately lack the firmness to contradict such rumors and who, on the contrary, even help to spread them.

"Finally the Führer has commissioned me to state to the Duce that if the Duce deems it necessary or even opportune to improve his strategic position as he has done in Denmark and in Norway, the Führer will have no objection to it and will always be found at the side of the Duce."

No. 165

582/241999-2001

The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

ROME, April 25, 1940—3:10 a. m.

TOP SECRET

Received April 25—6:45 a. m.

No. 762 of April 24

For the Foreign Minister personally.

I handed the Duce, who received me at 8 p. m. this evening in the presence of Ciano, the copy of Teleki's letter¹ together with greetings from the Führer and set forth to him in Italian the arguments in the memorandum² given to me by the Führer. The Duce accompanied my account with such comments as "brilliant" "excellent" and said at the conclusion, "I am in complete agreement from beginning to end." He said that a few days ago he had received from the Hungarians a copy of the letter addressed to the Führer and his only reaction to this would now be to have Teleki informed soon—probably by means of an oral communication from Ciano to the Hungarian Minister³ here—that he had nothing to add to the German reply⁴ of which he knew and which was fully in accordance with his own views. The Duce remarked that he assumed that our reply would be diplomatic and courteous in form and would follow the line of the Führer's arguments which I had explained to him and which hit the nail on the head. Such a three-power discussion, which could never remain secret, would at the present juncture mean putting a match to the powder keg and sounding the alarm too soon.

The Duce and Ciano judged the Hungarian démarche as being a product of Csáky's singular mentality, and by no means the work of

¹ See document No. 135.

² See document No. 164.

³ Frederic Villani.

⁴ See document No. 271.

Teleki who was much too deliberate for that. The Duce added that he had again found Teleki very level-headed during his recent visit⁵ and had moreover urgently warned him once more against working to create a "third mosaic state" but to bear in mind the fate of the mosaic states Nos. 1 and 2, Czechoslovakia and Poland.

On my remarking that the Führer had expressly authorized me to tell the Duce that the Führer would have no objection to the Duce's improving his strategic position, should he consider this necessary or desirable, very much as the Führer had done in the case of Denmark and Norway, the Duce reacted with obvious pleasure, remarking "very important," which Ciano also underlined.

When I transmitted to the Duce the final paragraph of the Führer's memorandum, I made the modification, in accordance with the discretion allowed to me, that "certain diplomats in Berlin" were not combating the rumors in question with the necessary firmness.⁶ My subsequent conversation with Ciano in the Palazzo Chigi left Ciano, who had already begun to understand, in no doubt as to the meaning of this statement.⁷ He recalled spontaneously the obliging gesture with which the Führer had once dealt with a corresponding case on receiving a hint from Italy.⁸ He said he thought it would certainly be difficult to find a successor. When he asked whom I had in mind I answered by naming Alfieri and Farinacci and confirmed his view that the former was acceptable to us and in particular to the Führer. He said that Farinacci was out of the question, but for his part named Anfuso, although it would be very hard to let him go since Anfuso was his right-hand man. He was however *persona gratissima* with the Duce too, which was certainly very valuable. I told him that I thought I could assure him that being his closest collaborator and in addition a confidant of the Duce's, and a man with whom I had always been on the best of terms, Anfuso would certainly be regarded with particular favor in Berlin. Ciano said that he would put for-

⁵ See document No. 40, footnote 2.

⁶ See document No. 164 and footnote 8.

⁷ *The Ciano Diaries*, entry for Apr. 24, 1940, give the following account of the conversation, reported by Mackensen in this document:

"Von Mackensen, on his return from Berlin, comes to see me, and I go with him to the Duce. He speaks of the Hungarian proposal for a three-nation conference and is against it. This is a far-fetched idea of the restless Count Csáky. On his return from the Palazzo Venezia, in his car, he mentions the position of Attolico. I invite him to talk, and then he says that in Berlin they would now welcome his recall. That is natural. He is an Italian and a gentleman. As his successor, Hitler is thinking of Farinacci and Alfieri. I eliminate the first and dwell upon the second. I am sure that Mussolini will meet the German desire."

⁸ This apparently refers to the recall of Hassell, the German Ambassador to Italy in 1938.

ward the names of Alfieri and Anfuso to the Duce tomorrow morning as the two suitable men for Berlin.⁹

The Duce concluded the conversation, which was extremely cordial, with words of admiration for the operations in Norway and observed that beyond what he had said to me about Teleki's letter he would perhaps touch on this subject in the same vein in a letter which was about to be dispatched to the Führer in any case.

MACKENSEN

⁹ In telegram No. 765 of Apr. 25 (582/242002), Mackensen reported that Ciano had just informed him by telephone that Mussolini had chosen Alfieri as the new Ambassador to Germany and that Italy was officially requesting the *agrément* for him.

No. 166

136/74110

The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

TOP SECRET

No. 1247 of April 26

MADRID, April 26, 1940.

Received April 26—6:50 p. m.

I hear from an absolutely reliable source that the French Ambassador¹ a few days ago, referring to the possibility of Spain being drawn into the conflict through Italy's possible entry into the war, suggested to the Spanish Government the initiation of negotiations on the guaranteeing of the Spanish borders and on the same day the English Ambassador,² on instructions from his Government, made the offer of a unilateral declaration on respecting Spanish neutrality. In addition, the French Governor General in Morocco made a proposal to the Spanish High Commissioner that in order to calm public opinion in Morocco French and Spanish troops should be charged with the guarding of the frontier between the Spanish and French Protectorates in sections.

The Foreign Minister has categorically rejected all these suggestions and informed the Spanish Ambassadors in Paris and London of this by telegram.

As the Foreign Minister is ill, it will probably be the beginning of next week before I hear details.³

STOHRER

¹ Marshal Henri Philippe Pétain.

² Sir Maurice D. Peterson.

³ In telegram No. 1289 of Apr. 30 (136/74111) Stohrer reported that the British and French démarches and their absolute rejection by Spain had been confirmed by the Spanish Foreign Minister. The latter added that the Allied Ambassadors, on the basis of his statements, knew "that any uniform landing in Spain would be shot at immediately."

No. 167

582/242003

The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

ROME, April 26, 1940—10:30 p. m.

TOP SECRET

Received April 27—12:45 a. m.

No. 772 of April 26

For the Foreign Minister personally.

Ciano asked me to call on him this evening in order to inform me, on behalf of the Duce, of the letter dated April 22 which Prime Minister Reynaud had written to him and which François-Poncet had handed (not to the Duce but) to Ciano the day before yesterday so that it might be brought to the notice of the Führer. Ciano read me the letter, the tenor of which he described as melodramatic, in a tone of strongly ironical pathos and thereupon handed me a copy, the text of which I am transmitting by teletype in supplementary telegram No. 773.¹

The Duce immediately drafted a reply which however Ciano will not hand to the French Ambassador until tomorrow. I am transmitting by teletype also in separate supplementary telegram No. 774² the translation of the copy of the Duce's letter, written in Italian, which Ciano gave me.

The documents handed to me by Ciano will follow with the next safe mail.³

MACKENSEN

¹ Document No. 172.² Document No. 173.³ They were sent as enclosures to Mackensen's report No. 222 of Apr. 27 (F12/190-187).

No. 168

F17/208-213

Adolf Hitler to Benito Mussolini

APRIL 26, 1940.

DUCE: Pray accept my thanks for the letter which reached me today.¹

I am sending this letter in all haste, in order to bring to your notice documents which will serve to unmask Anglo-French designs once and for all. This is the beginning of the publication I have arranged for. But even these few documents which are to be laid before world

¹ Not printed (F17/207). This letter dated Apr. 26 was an acknowledgment of Hitler's letter of Apr. 18 printed as document No. 138; for the text of Mussolini's letter, see *Hitler e Mussolini: lettere e documenti*, No. 21, pp. 40-41.

opinion tomorrow² expose the perfidious mendacity of the English and French and the great danger in which Germany was placed. It is now an established fact that England already intended to occupy Norwegian ports on April 8. At that moment they learned that the German fleet had sailed. They probably had hopes of being able to deal our fleet a devastating blow. In view of England's enormous superiority they might well have believed this.

They did not now wish to risk the transports and therefore sent them back into port as quickly as possible to disembark the troops or, if they were still in port, caused them to be unloaded again. What we had only been able to conjecture for months from a mass of separate observations and what became a certainty for us later as a result of a number of most careless statements by Messrs. Churchill and Paul Reynaud, we can now prove with the aid of documents in a way which is hitherto almost unique in history. The whole of the files of the French and English Consulates fell into our hands as a result of our lightning occupation of the most important Norwegian coastal towns. I shall start on the publication of this material tomorrow. It truly provides complete proof of the systematic preparations for the occupation of Norway.

2) We have obtained possession of material from which it is evident beyond all doubt that the Norwegian Government had knowledge of this and was, at least as far as her leading members were concerned, determined not to offer any resistance to the occupation by Anglo-French forces.

3) And now this is the most important thing, Duce:

For reasons of military necessity I have not allowed any premature detailed description of our operations to be given in the report of the High Command of the Wehrmacht during the last few days, but have restricted it to general descriptions of our advance. In actual fact what has happened is as follows:

Norwegian forces opposed us north of Oslo on a general line Hamar-Elverum. They were joined by British troops. We attacked them and threw them back over 200 km. in barely 4 days. The British battalions were as good as completely wiped out. Those who escaped were reduced to a disorderly rout. Most of the officers of these British troops from the brigade commander downwards were taken prisoner. At the moment the spearheads of our units are outside Trondheim, while the regular divisions are following behind by forced marches. It must be borne in mind, Duce, that the roads are not good and above all that deep snow is still lying there in places, that lakes and rivers are covered with ice and that the terrain itself is very difficult to

² This refers to German White Book No. 4. See document No. 138, footnote 3.

negotiate away from the roads and pathways. Our group in Bergen, too, has continued its thrust in an easterly direction and today captured Vossen, the last Norwegian training and supply depot in this area. The units also attacked advancing English and Norwegian troops north of Trondheim and drove them back. Numerous English and Norwegians were taken prisoner, among them also officers.

As already remarked, Duce, we succeeded in capturing a brigade commander and the whole of his staff and in seizing all his papers, orders, and secret instructions.

This material is devastating for the British Government. The English operations themselves bear the visible stamp of Churchill's work. From the military point of view it can only be described as frivolous dilettantism. The enclosed documents will, however, certainly be of interest to you.

As far as Narvik is concerned, there is one thing about which I do not need to assure you: We are determined to defend every square meter with the tenacity which such a cause merits. No Englishman has landed in Narvik so far. There was a skirmish today about 20 km. northeast of Narvik; my Alpine troops attacked Norwegians there and completely wiped out the Norwegian battalion opposing them. I have very valiant soldiers up there, Duce.

Besides, it is naturally a good thing for us if the English allow themselves to be lured into engaging their military honor in Norway. They will never get the German divisions out of this country now. No matter what they do, 30 days from now the position will certainly not be worse for us than it is now, but better. However, if every day this month I destroy, as I have done so far, or badly damage by bombing only 1 or 2 destroyers, sink transport vessels, attack or sink cruisers (and perhaps with better weather a larger ship will again come within our range)—then, after 30 days, the British fleet will have sustained more losses than I might have inflicted on it in 6 months if it stayed in its hideouts in the west of England; and that in the last analysis is what matters.

In conclusion I should like to assure you, Duce, that all operations are continuing entirely according to plan. The transport of personnel of the 6th Division ended today and there are only transports with material still to come. The transport of personnel of the 7th and 8th Divisions has begun.

With a comradely greeting,

Yours,⁸

⁸ Hitler's signature does not appear on the copy of the letter in the Foreign Ministry files.

[EDITORS' NOTE. A document from the files of the Office for Military Economy and Armament, which was introduced at the Nurem-

berg Trial of the Major War Criminals as document No. 1456-PS, but not included in the published collection, contains the following passage concerning German policy in southeastern Europe:

BERLIN, April 26, 1940.

NOTE ON A CONFERENCE

Conference of Chief of Office [General Thomas, Chief of Office of Military Economy and Armament] with Colonel General Keitel.

1) Chief of Office requests complete clarification with regard to the questions: What is the matter with the Balkans and what has to be done?

The Führer is striving with all possible means to keep the Balkans quiet.

The High Command of the Army has worked on the problem of an attack on Rumania and has approached Colonel General Keitel and the Führer to get permission to talk to the Hungarian General Staff. The Führer refused this, pointing out that the Hungarians were unreliable and that there was danger that the matter would be brought before the Duce. The Führer intends to take up the question of the Balkans with the Duce through Mackensen. Besides, Ribbentrop was to talk with Ciano!

In spite of this, the High Command of the Army has apparently established certain underground connections with Hungary, to which the Führer has not objected.

The Führer considers the matter of the Balkans and/or Rumania as a defensive action against the Russians (Bessarabia), possible operations by General Weygand, the British (development of the fuel areas).

The High Command of the Army seems to have in mind a quick transport of troops via Vienna-Budapest for an attack on Rumania from the west. The Führer rejects this idea.

Colonel General Keitel wishes the Office [of Military Economy and Armament] to prepare the matter of the Balkans with respect to military economy (in consultation with the High Command of the Army).

The remainder of the document dealt with other topics. Cf. *The Ciano Diaries*, entry for April 8, 1940; also document No. 207.]

No. 169

4896/E254323-25

Memorandum by an Official of the Economic Policy Department

BERLIN, April 26, 1940.

e. o. W 2217 g.

1) Visit to Berlin by Lieutenant Colonel Arranz¹ from January 3-29. The following requests:

a) Delivery of spare parts valued at 5 million RM (granted).

¹ Director in charge of material of the Spanish Air Force.

b) Delivery during the year 1940 of spare parts and aircraft valued at 15 million RM.

c) The same for 1941 to the amount of 20 million RM.

d) Expansion of Spanish aviation industry with 45 percent German participation.

Total value of German participation approximately 45 million RM.

The deliveries under *b-d* at the total value of 80 million RM have to be made on a credit basis since, on account of the transport conditions alone, there is no possibility of receiving compensation within the next few years.

Apart from the possibility of making deliveries, the question arose, whether there are important *military* or *political* reasons in the face of which the economic objections have to be overruled. This is primarily within the jurisdiction of the Political Department and the OKW. Prior to a decision on this cardinal issue, no positive promises could be made by the Economic Policy Department.

The intention had been that the following passage addressed to the Ambassador be added to a telegram from the Air Minister to the Air Attaché in Madrid concerning the conversations held with Arranz:

"On an occasion that seems suitable, please express, for your part also, to the Spanish Government our interest in continuing the conversations with a commission that is to be dispatched, and confirm our willingness to meet Spanish wishes to the extent permitted by the reduced possibilities for deliveries owing to the war situation."

This telegram was not sent as ~~the conditions still appeared to be too unsettled.~~²

2) With a letter of March 9 $\frac{\text{Az 57 h Lf.1 Nr.1084/40 g}}{\text{h v Lf. 1 781/40 g}}$

the Reich Air Minister encloses the copy of a letter ³ from General Udet ⁴ to the Air Attaché in Madrid. It sets forth the position of the Air Minister with respect to the requests by Arranz. The delivery of spare parts and of training aircraft at the value of 5 million RM—see figure 1) *a*) above—is to be speeded up. With regard to the other requests there is willingness, in principle, to help to the extent permitted by the war situation. The Air Attaché will point out that the Air Ministry is responsible for the handling of deliveries of aviation material to Spain. As the Field Marshal, owing to the pressure of more urgent tasks, had not been in a position to receive M. Arranz, the statements made by Udet on instructions from him [the Field Marshal] are to be considered as authoritative. No other offices were to be considered in dealing with this question. Furthermore, the Air Attaché is reminded that Herr Rasch of Economic Group Aviation

³ These words were struck out on the original.

² Neither printed (4896/E254289-94).

⁴ Col. Gen. Ernst Udet, Chief of Ordnance of the Luftwaffe.

Industry is going to Madrid for a discussion of economic questions that are still open.

3) Conference at Karinhall on March 16 (Clodius memorandum).⁵ Our opportunities for export of war material in the field of military aviation are very limited. To be considered are primarily countries from which we receive in compensation goods essential for the war. This is not the case with respect to Spain, on account of transport difficulties. The Field Marshal expressed himself very critically about the fact that the Spaniards had not paid for aviation material delivered during the Civil War and he said that this material "must again be taken back from the Spaniards."

4) It appears from various reports by the Embassy in Madrid that in the meantime Air Minister General Yagüe has been further pursuing the question of acquiring German aviation material and of dispatching a commission to Berlin. The report of the German Embassy in Madrid of March 6—No. 1302 g (W 1400 g)⁶—already shows how General Yagüe, in conversations with the Air Attaché and Herr Rasch, expounded vast plans of Spanish air rearmament with German help. Going beyond deliveries of material mentioned in the beginning, Yagüe has the intention of building up with German help a large-scale Spanish aviation industry which is to have the capacity of even supplying German air units stationed in Spain. Foreign Minister Beigbeder intimated that political considerations were also decisive. A closer association of Spain with Germany during this war was absolutely within the realm of the possible. To be sure, Beigbeder admitted that there was not yet a final decision by Franco.

5) The Embassy in Madrid has been repeatedly instructed to bring about a final decision by Franco.⁷ The anticipated conversation between the Ambassador and Franco has failed to materialize.

6) Telegraphic report of Air Attaché and Embassy Madrid No. 1014 of April 5⁸ (dealt with by Pol. I Lu): The Air Minister, after consultation with the Generalissimo requests [German] agreement to the dispatch to Germany of an air commission of six members led by State Secretary General Barrón. The commission is to report to the Field Marshal on the plan to rebuild the Spanish Air Force and to clear up fundamental questions of future cooperation. A detailed report was to follow.

7) Report of the Air Attaché in Madrid of April 5⁹ (dealt with by Pol. I Lu): According to General Yagüe, Franco has approved his plans and has agreed to the proposal of dispatching an air force

⁵ See vol. VIII, document No. 679.

⁶ Not printed (4896/E254302-03).

⁷ Such instructions were sent by telegram No. 406 on Mar. 29 over Moraht's signature (4896/E254310).

⁸ Not printed (4896/E254316).

⁹ Not printed (1306/348351-56).

commission for the purpose of settling cooperation with Germany in this field. General Yagüe requests that consent be given to this commission going to Germany as soon as possible (composition of the commission and further individual proposals follow).

8) After consulting Franco, the Spanish Air Minister requests agreement to the dispatch of the commission. The Ambassador supports the request (Pol. I L 53 g.).¹⁰

9) Telegraphic instruction by the Operations Staff, Attaché group, to the Air Attaché in Madrid: The Field Marshal has agreed to the dispatch of a Spanish air force commission, led by State Secretary General Barrón and is prepared to receive the commission. Wire time of arrival, etc. This telegraphic instruction¹¹ was transmitted to Madrid on April 10 and after it had been sent, was brought to the attention of Pol. I Lu and W II.

10) Commission arrives May 1, in the evening.¹²

SCHÜLLER

¹⁰ Madrid telegram No. 1029 of Apr. 6, not printed (4896/E254317).

¹¹ Not found.

¹² A memorandum by Sabath of Apr. 27 which sums up the main points of the document printed mentions that "Spain expressed the wish that the negotiations be kept strictly secret." (4896/E254326-27)

No. 170

4459/E086899-901

The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry

SECRET

ROME, April 26, 1940.

No. 227/40 g.

Subject: Rumors of differences of opinion between the Duce and Count Ciano.

Certain rumors of differences of opinion between Mussolini and Count Ciano have recently been circulating in Rome. The influenza which kept the Foreign Minister away from his office for about 10 days was busily represented to be a diplomatic illness. The sufficiently well-known assertion that Count Ciano was advocating a more conciliatory policy toward England and France in opposition to the views of the Duce was dished up again. As proof for the rumor that the influence of Count Ciano must have greatly declined, it was pointed out that he did not speak on the budget for his Ministry in the Chamber, whereas other Ministers, such as Pavolini, the Minister of Propaganda, yesterday made detailed program speeches.

With reference to these rumors it should first be stated that Count Ciano was really suffering from a bad attack of influenza and was obliged to keep to his bed and moreover, as he told me, still does not feel quite fit again even today. Nevertheless, he retained control of the Foreign Ministry even during his illness and had all im-

portant dispatches submitted to him for signature. For the last few days he has again been at his office in person and has also been taking part in the proceedings of the Chamber. The fact that he did not speak in the debate on the budget is convincingly explained by the tactics which Italy has manifestly been employing recently, i. e., using the press as a vehicle for polemics against the Western Powers and gradually producing among the people a warlike mood, while not relieving the Western Powers of the uncertainty which is a source of anxiety to them by making a statement on foreign policy.

The question as to whether Count Ciano of his own accord would have decided in favor of the unswerving policy based on the Axis and on the pact of alliance with Germany as laid down by Mussolini can be left open. It is at any rate a fact that this political line of the Duce's is the sole authoritative standard for Italian foreign policy. It is also difficult to imagine Count Ciano daring to attempt opposition or not carrying out the Duce's instructions faithfully. There is also no doubt that he submits completely to the Duce on every question involving a decision. Therein lies the decisive factor for us. In addition the Duce has again in the last few months been concerning himself more with detailed aspects of foreign policy than previously, not only as regards decisions but also in the stages of preparation and formulation. I need only mention the question of Italian deliveries to England and France,¹ the coal question, and finally the Reich Foreign Minister's visit,² during which Count Ciano kept completely in the background in favor of the Duce. The above-mentioned rumors³ are therefore in my opinion devoid of foundation, as I earlier reported orally in Berlin.

MACKENSEN

¹ See vol. VIII, document No. 599.

² See vol. VIII, documents Nos. 665, 667, 669, and 670.

³ On Mar. 23 Heydrich, Chief of the Security Police, had sent to Ribbentrop a report "on the attitude of leading circles of Italian society" said to be based on reliable information from a confidential agent who recently returned from Italy (F12/159-150).

No. 171

205/142164-66

The Legation in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

STOCKHOLM, April 27, 1940—12:05 a. m.

SECRET

Received April 27—5:15 a. m.

No. 623 of April 26

For the Foreign Minister.

With reference to my telegram No. 592 of April 24.¹

¹ Document No. 159.

1. Economic discussions in the first stage practically ended. The result is that the Swedes, on the one hand, are requesting an additional delivery of some 1.5 million tons of coal,² besides putting forward other requests, for which they have not yet given figures; with regard to exports they have likewise made certain requests, particularly for lumber, cellulose, and paper, for which figures have likewise not yet been specified. At the present moment, neither of these two groups of wishes has been presented by the Swedes with particular urgency. It is to be expected, however, that this will change in a relatively short time. The urgent wishes of the Swedes have heretofore had to do only with navigation from and to neutrals and between the Swedish west and east coasts. The Swedes have also requested that some 15 Swedish ships lying in England, a few of which come from England itself, but most of which have put in at English ports of inspection on the run from neutral countries to Sweden, be allowed to enter. Further acquiescence in these Swedish wishes must be deferred until after they have been studied in Berlin. The Swedes have, moreover, complained vigorously about the failure to make deliveries of arms shipments now overdue.³ At the moment no position has yet been taken on this matter either.

From an economic point of view the conversations to date duly justify the expectation of a new agreement that is favorable both to Germany and to Sweden, and that will mean an expansion of trade on both sides and a closer interlocking of economic interests. This expanded agreement between Germany and Sweden will also conform to the general policy of developing the Baltic trade in accordance with the interests of the riparian countries concerned.

On the other hand, both the Legation and the economic delegation are convinced that in the present stage of the economic negotiations and in view of the present attitude of the Swedish Government toward them, the complex of economic questions is not suited, at least in the immediate future, to serve as a basis for the discussion of the question of the transit of material to Narvik and Trondheim.

2. In our opinion, only the following can be considered as an expeditious way of taking up the question of the transit to Narvik and Trondheim without danger of an official rejection or a press discussion:

In the present situation, the Swedish Government is especially interested, on the one hand, in receiving those deliveries of arms to which we have already committed ourselves, and of which a portion which is due for shipment is supposed, by agreement, to be shipped in the very near future. Also further deliveries of arms in excess of this, and concerning which the Swedish authorities last sent the Economic and Armaments Office (Presidential Chancellery Becker)

² Cf. vol. VIII, document No. 481.

³ Cf. document No. 290.

a list in the middle of March.⁴ If it were possible to ship to the Swedish Government the additional material that it urgently needs for the defense of northwestern Sweden, we could make it contingent upon the transshipment to Narvik or Trondheim of other material shipped at the same time. German cooperation in the case of arms delivery must, to be sure, be such that Germany's concession largely covers Sweden's military requirements. How great this German concession should be, should be determined from the Swedish list in the possession of Colonel Becker in Berlin. As soon as this is clarified, a suitable step could be taken here with War Minister Sköld, who by virtue of his personality and office may be in a position to give energetic support to our standpoint in the Cabinet, in the interest of the military rearmament of Sweden. We propose Major General von Uthmann, the Military Attaché here, who should be accompanied by Counselor of Legation Dankwort, as suited for the execution of this step with Sköld. In preparation for such a step it would be necessary to expedite as much as possible the delivery of war material which is overdue.

Request instructions.⁵ In order to avoid attracting unnecessary attention, I suggest that Walter and Brunhoff return to Berlin as quickly as possible; that Schnurre and Ludwig start on their proposed trip to Helsinki.⁶ Continuation of the economic conversations with the Swedish delegation is contemplated for about May 8 in Berlin.

WALTER
WIED

SOHNURRE

⁴ Not found.

⁵ See document No. 183.

⁶ See document No. 293, footnote 1.

No. 172

F12/183-184

The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

TOP SECRET

No. 773 of April 26

ROME, April 27, 1940.

Received April 27—1:50 a. m.

zu RM 19 g. Rs.¹

For the Foreign Minister personally.

With reference to my telegram No. 772 of April 26.²

Text of Reynaud's letter to the Duce:

"Excellency: I have just read your telegram to Chancellor Hitler. You express the wish publicly for Germany to be victorious. I see in this gesture a new manifestation of an historic misunderstanding, a misunderstanding concerning the relations of your country and of mine, a misunderstanding on the relations of your regime and of ours.

"Having been responsible for the Government of France for several weeks, I am writing you, without respect to considerations of protocol,

¹ RM 19 g. Rs.: Not printed (F12/190).

² Document No. 167.

as to one of those chiefs, rare in history, who have held in their hands the fate of millions of human beings.

"I am not seeking to entreat you or threaten you in this letter. Nothing is worthy of us except to understand each other well and to get on with each other.

"Perhaps this letter will not change anything.

"Perhaps tomorrow, the mountaineers of my country will be fighting with the people of yours. The die once cast, we will see which forces are the strongest. Perhaps, then, we will surprise each other.

"But also, perhaps destiny has not yet been written.

"It is possible, that other means than war exist for revealing the true Italy to France, for revealing the true France to Italy. In order to establish laws which our children will read together, there may exist some other seal than that of blood, and equally as noble.

"I believe in democracy. You believe in fascism. But neither of us will deny our past, while we confirm by actions that these are the two glorious forms of a Mediterranean civilization which remains worthy, today as yesterday, of inspiring the future of the world. And this civilization rests first on our two countries.

"The maintenance of a European balance of power is a vital necessity for Italy as well as for France. Without it, no prosperity can endure. Set beside this fundamental fact, what do the disagreements which have persisted between us during these last years amount to?

"It is not too late to try to fill the large chasm which seems at present to separate us. Your frankness and mine should try to throw up a bridge between a traditional regime like ours, and a new regime like yours, each one being reinforced, henceforth, by the lack of mistrust in its neighbor.

"I speak in the name of a country which I know would entirely approve of my step of today if it knew of it.

"It will not be said that, without a complete explanation and a meeting between the leaders, France and Italy clashed on the field of battle.

"Our people would feel as well as we that a war between us would be a sacrilege against our common heritage and against the sacrifice of the dead of Bligny. In these days when peace is so much more difficult to wage than war, I offer you the most difficult.

"Please accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration. Paul Reynaud."

MACKENSEN

No. 173

F12/185

The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

ROME, April 27, 1940—12:59 a. m.

TOP SECRET

Received April 27—2:45 a. m.

No. 774 of April 26

zu RM 19 g. Rs.¹

For the Foreign Minister personally.

¹ RM 19 g. Rs.: Not printed (F12/180).

With reference to my telegram No. 772 of April 26.²

Translation of the Duce's letter in reply to Reynaud :

"Mr. President : I am replying without delay to your letter of April 22, handed to me on the 24th by your Ambassador at Rome. (Note : As Count Ciano told me, delivery was to him and not to the Duce.)

"Permit me, above all, to say I find what has prompted your letter unjustified, and that is the telegram in which I wished the victory of the German Army. This fact should not surprise you and should not make you forget that Italy is, and intends to remain, allied politically and militarily to Germany, according to the Treaty of May 1939, a treaty which Italy, like all nations which uphold their honor, intends to respect.

"Your remarks on the relations between democracy and fascism and on the necessity of a European balance of power require a long discussion which it is not possible to have.

"At a certain point in your letter it seems you are presenting the possibility of our meeting. I am sorry to have to decline such a proposition, and it will not be difficult for you, Mr. President, to understand the reason.

"Accept, Excellency, the expression of my consideration. Mussolini."

MACKENSEN

² Document No. 167.

No. 174

108/112140

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

URGENT

Moscow, April 27, 1940—5 : 27 a. m.

No. 792 of April 26

Received April 27—9 : 10 a. m.

With reference to your telegram No. 698 of April 23.¹

Molotov informed me today that reports in the foreign press that the Soviet Government had taken the initiative in economic negotiations with England were quite untrue. The Soviet Government had done nothing of the sort. The talks on economic matters (not negotiations) of which we knew were begun by the English in September and, conducted in a dilatory manner, were revived from time to time as for instance when the two Soviet ships detained in the Far East were impounded.² About 10 days ago Halifax had again approached

¹ Document No. 156.

² On Mar. 27 Malasky had called on Lord Halifax to discuss the detention in the Pacific of two Soviet cargo vessels bound for Vladivostok on suspicion that their cargoes might be destined ultimately for Germany. See the Tass statement of May 22, 1940, a translation of which appears in *Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy*, vol. III, pp. 450-452.

Maisky and asked for clarification on the following points:

(1) England wanted to know what the economic relations between the Soviet Union and Germany were;

(2) England must have a guarantee that English deliveries would not be forwarded to Germany.

The Soviet Government intended giving the following replies: With regard to (1) the Soviet Union's economic relations with Germany were its own affair, and it would fulfill the treaties concluded with Germany; with regard to (2) the Soviet Government would make purchases in England for its own needs only. Furthermore, the Soviet Government would state that the prerequisite for any conversations would be the release of the steamers detained in the Far East which Britain had maneuvered into French hands.

SCHULENBURG

No. 175

2097/453154

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

SECRET

No. 794 of April 26

Moscow, April 27, 1940—5:27 a. m.

Received April 27—9:55 a. m.

W 2268 g.

With reference to your telegrams Nos. 698 of April 23¹ and 712 (W 2184 g.) of April 25.²

I made energetic representations to Molotov today about the reserve displayed by the Commissariat for Foreign Trade and its organizations with regard to the cover addresses and the purchase of raw materials in third countries, and demanded that the promises formerly given be honored.

Molotov said that the Soviet Government was not wanting in good will but that the conditions in the Far East—the increasingly noticeable British blockade, American (group garbled) and the Japanese attitude—made fulfillment of the promise impossible. Molotov emphasized that the Japanese press was blazing forth that all shipments to the Soviet Union were intended for Germany. The Soviet Government's attempt to purchase for its own requirements through Japan had been rejected by the Japanese, who referred to the blockade.

When I pointed out that according to reliable reports which had reached us³ Japan was fully prepared to forward goods as long as they were not directly addressed to a German recipient, Molotov

¹ Document No. 156.

² Not found.

³ No record has been found.

replied that he would give instructions to make use of such practical opportunities as presented themselves. In this connection I drew Molotov's particular attention to the instances dealt with in your telegram No. 639 of April 15.⁴

SCHULENBURG

⁴ Not found. Cf. document No. 50.

No. 176

8628/E027608-09/1

The Minister in Yugoslavia to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 321 of April 27

BELGRADE, April 27, 1940—8:40 p. m.

Received April 28—5:45 a. m.

Pol. IV 1855.

The coincidence of several particularly striking cases of complete failure of the Belgrade police in combating enemy propaganda and of ruthless proceeding against reputable Reich Germans living here provided me with an occasion today to make the strongest and most serious representations to the Foreign Minister.¹ I stated that I did not wish to doubt the good will of the Foreign Ministry, to be sure, but that the tendency of the domestic authorities and particularly the police deliberately to frustrate in practice Yugoslavia's official policy of neutrality was openly displayed and could not possibly be denied. The slackness of the police in taking action against enemy propaganda and their ruthless proceeding against Germans would not only result in inciting the population against Germany but also in giving the man in the street the impression that the Government's policy of neutrality was only an outward camouflage of an, at heart, anti-German feeling. If there was no change in the attitude of the domestic authorities and above all the police, this would inevitably become a heavy burden on German-Yugoslav relations. Moreover, in that case the strongest reprisals must be expected from the German side.

The Foreign Minister admitted, on the strength of the data I submitted to him, that my complaint was justified. He said he realized that an increase in such incidents, which he regretted most deeply, would represent a serious danger and he would immediately get in touch with the responsible authorities to lodge a protest against these methods in the strongest manner. He will do everything in his power

¹ Aleksander Cincar-Marković.

to see that the official policy of neutrality prevails also in the practice of the domestic authorities.²

HEEREN

¹ A memorandum by Bruns of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat, dated Apr. 29 (3623/E027609/2), refers to this telegram as follows: "The Foreign Minister requests a report in two weeks, as to the effect of the representations made by our Minister in Belgrade." Such a report was submitted to Ribbentrop by Senior Counselor Heinburg on May 14 (3623/E027624). The report stated that the Yugoslav Foreign Minister had told Heeren that the Cabinet had issued instructions to the domestic authorities and the police, which would prevent repetition of such acts; according to a telegram from Heeren of May 10, there had been no new police outrages against Reich Germans since that time. On the basis of this, Heinburg expressed belief "that the stronger language used by the Minister did not fail to make an impression upon the Yugoslav Government."

No. 177

103/112142

*The Director of the Legal Department to the Embassy in the
Soviet Union*

Telegram

RM No. 159
No. 720

BERLIN, April 28, 1940.

With reference to your telegram No. 572.¹

The Foreign Minister asks you to report whether, since your last démarche with Molotov on March 26, you have heard anything more about this matter either from him or from some other Soviet quarters. If this is not the case, he requests you to ask Molotov at the next opportunity you have if the Soviet Government has taken any decisions with respect to your communication of that time, and what these are.²

GAUS

¹ Document No. 11.

² See document No. 263.

No. 178

1900/427914

Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department

BERLIN, April 28, 1940.

Today I received M. Björnsson, the Icelandic Minister in Copenhagen, after he had previously discussed a few factual matters with Herr von Grundherr and Herr van Scherpenberg.

The Minister received with a great deal of understanding my observations that Iceland should guard against being drawn into the wake of England. Herr von Grundherr, he said, had already told him that, and he would advocate this in Iceland.

The Minister will also try, first from Genoa, and if that does not succeed, from New York, to reestablish radio contact between Copenhagen and Iceland which has been broken off.

Regarding the question of Iceland's own missions abroad, the Minister said that as far as he knew, Iceland had representatives of her own only in Genoa, New York, and London. The reason for the missions was Iceland's shipping interests. The Minister was trying to make the point that it would be a good thing if Iceland had a mission of her own in Germany also. I gave him no encouragement in this.¹

WOERMANN

¹ Marginal note in Ribbentrop's hand: "Grundherr: If M. B.[jörnsson] calls again, we will agree to Iceland having a mission of her own in Berlin. R." The memorandum is also marked "[For] F[ührer]."

On May 9 Grundherr drafted a telegram to be sent to the Consulate in Reykjavik (1900/427921) saying that Germany would agree to a mission of Iceland in Berlin.

A manuscript note on this draft telegram states: "Canceled as Iceland was occupied by England on May 10. Grdhr. [Grundherr] May 10."

No. 179

205/142174

The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Sweden

Telegram

MOST URGENT
No. 470

BERLIN, April 28, 1940.
Pol. I M 6013 g.

In view of the special climatic and geographical conditions of the fighting in the Narvik area, the military authorities are anxious for the noncombatants and the disabled to be removed from this area if possible.¹ I therefore request you to obtain from the Swedish Government agreement that the wounded and shipwrecked be allowed to be transported on the trains making the return journey from Narvik.

It would, moreover, be desirable for these returning transports to bring prisoners with them, in which connection questions of internment might arise.

¹ Permission had already been asked by the German Legation in Stockholm on Apr. 18 for the passage through Sweden of some 600 German seamen from German merchant ships in the harbor of Narvik. Such permission was granted. This had been reported in Stockholm telegram No. 520 of Apr. 18 (220/148643), and Political Department night service memorandum of Apr. 21, which noted that the transport had passed into Sweden on that day (220/148714). The transport, which included 514 men, was completed on Apr. 23, with 14 others following later. A memorandum of Apr. 30 by Brunhoff in the German Foreign Ministry (205/142198-95) indicates that members of U-boat crews and other German naval personnel had been included in the transport. The German text of the Brunhoff memorandum is printed in *Norges forhold til Sverige under krigen 1940-45*, vol. I, pp. 249-251.

Swedish documents on this incident are printed in *Transiteringsfrågor . . . April-Juni 1940*, pp. 60-61, 67-69, 79-80, 87-88, 96-97, 309.

In any case it appears to us, for humanitarian reasons, to be justifiable that return transport from the battle area be permitted.

Report by telegram.²

RIBBENTROP

² The text of the reply from Stockholm has not been found, but the journal for Pol. I M indicates that the reply was given in telegram No. 643 of Apr. 29, which stated that the Swedish Foreign Ministry had assented to the German request concerning "return transport from the battle area."

No. 180

319/192786-88

Memorandum by an Official of the Economic Policy Department

Stockholm, April 28, 1940.

In a conversation with Foreign Minister Günther, which took place in connection with an invitation to lunch at his house, the following is to be noted:¹

I. Sweden will in all circumstances defend her neutrality against England, and will be able to do so, in the present state of her military preparations, and in view of the fact that the terrain in northeast [sic] Sweden lends itself to defense. The Swedish Government does not believe, in view of Sweden's determination to defend herself, that England will make an attempt to attack Swedish territory on the mainland. Since England knows that in doing so she would meet strong and determined Swedish resistance, she will not undertake the attempt. On the other hand the Swedish Government is taking into account the fact that, owing to the deliveries of iron to Germany (which will be increased in future), it will be put under great pressure economically and politically. The Swedish Government is further taking into account the fact that England will interfere with shipping in the northern Baltic, that is to say in the Gulf of Bothnia in the region of Luleå, either by means of aircraft flying across Sweden at great height, or by means of submarines which will attempt to penetrate into the Baltic. Sweden is determined to repulse these attempts too. The critical moment will come in the middle or at the end of May, when navigation between Luleå and Germany opens.

At this point I might add that these statements of Foreign Minister Günther have been confirmed to me by other Swedish circles. In this connection anxiety was evident that it might perhaps not be possible to mount the necessary number of medium and heavy anti-aircraft batteries before the opening of navigation at Luleå. In this connection the desire expressed to us, that we should supply heavy anti-aircraft guns to Sweden, acquires special significance.

¹ The German Minister in Stockholm reported in telegram No. 631 of Apr. 27 (205/142169-70) on a conversation he had had with Günther at a lunch given for the economic delegation, possibly the same occasion described by Schnurre. Minister Prinz zu Wied had discussed with Günther the anti-German attitude of sections of the Swedish press.

II. Foreign Minister Günther then spoke of the Swedish attitude to Germany and of the concept of Swedish neutrality. Sweden had declared her strict neutrality and would maintain it on all sides. At heart, and in accord with historical tradition, however, Sweden was on Germany's side. With the present grouping of powers, Sweden's participation in the war did not come into question, and this was expressed in the Swedish policy of neutrality. In the distant future and with a different grouping of powers the necessity might arise for Sweden to fight too. But, in contrast to Norway, she would then always remember that her place was at Germany's side. Foreign Minister Günther then expressed the view that if Sweden were forced to defend herself against an English attack Germany should leave the decision to her and give her time to fight it out herself. Sweden was able to defend herself against an English attack.

III. Foreign Minister Günther described the Narvik position as untenable for Germany in the long run. Nor did it possess any decisive value for Germany, since the Swedish frontier was sufficiently secure. By this remark Günther obviously wished to anticipate the German demand for passage of military equipment along the transit route to Narvik across Swedish territory. I emphatically contradicted this view of Günther's and pointed out that we would keep Narvik and that the German position in Narvik was of decisive military importance for Sweden.

The conversation was carried on by Günther in an especially cordial and friendly tone. The discussion itself took place on his initiative. He expressed special satisfaction concerning the results of the first stage of the economic discussions.²

SCHEURER

² See document No. 171.

No. 181

582/242008-09

The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

TOP SECRET

No. 784 of April 30

ROME, April 30, 1940—4: 35 p. m.

Received April 30—6: 15 p. m.

For the Foreign Minister personally.

Attolico, to whom Ciano has obviously not given so much as a hint about the reasons underlying his recall,¹ expressed himself absolutely in favor of his change of activity in conversation with me. Since his

¹ See document No. 165 and footnote 9.

badly undermined state of health had just at this juncture brought him face to face with the question of seriously considering whether, as he had twice been refused leave to recuperate, he should relinquish his post in Berlin for which he was no longer physically fit, he felt that the present solution, which assured him of a further field of activity and one which would be within his physical powers, was really the ideal solution; and he saw in it the expression of particular good will on the part of his Government, even though it was naturally hard for him to relinquish just at the present time the ambassadorial post which was now the most important for Italy. He had long regarded Alfieri as his obvious successor and was actually surprised, and had said so at the time, that Alfieri had not been sent to Berlin immediately on resigning his post as Minister of Propaganda. He was convinced that both Alfieri and his wife would fit in excellently in their new sphere of activity.

To these remarks by Attolico I can add in strict confidence that Count Ciano recently told me that he was very anxious to present to Attolico his recall from Berlin in a way which would not make a kind of martyr of him; if he were sitting around here unoccupied it might make him the center of that disagreeable circle which carried on its intrigues around Cerutti² and other has-been diplomats. In order to prevent this it would not have been sufficient to make Attolico a senator as was planned at first. On the other hand the Vatican post provided the very solution especially in view of the close relations of Signora Attolico's family with Vatican circles and also the opportunity which Attolico would have here in his own home of caring for his health, which actually was seriously undermined, now that the burden of work would be very much lighter than in Berlin. Ciano added that he was convinced that we too would welcome this solution since by presenting the change of Ambassador in Berlin in this way the rumors which were otherwise to be expected would be rendered groundless. I assured him that the solution he had found was also welcome to us, but, as I could tell him in confidence, the Reich Foreign Minister had weeks ago shelved the idea of a change of Ambassador in Berlin principally because the opportunity for tendentious rumors was too obvious.

Attolico was intending to remain here for a week at most and then to return to Berlin to deal with the formalities connected with his departure, in the course of which he is planning a fairly large farewell reception at the Embassy. He had told Alfieri, however, that the Embassy premises would be at his disposal from about May 15.

MACKENSEN

² Vittorio Cerutti, Italian Ambassador to Germany 1932-1935, to France 1935-1937.

No. 182

73/52335-37

The Legation in Yugoslavia to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 330 of April 30

BELGRADE, May 1, 1940—12:55 a. m.

Received May 1—9:30 a. m.

I. I have discussed Hungary's attitude from the point of view of political and commercial policy toward England's economic warfare¹ with influential persons and (apparently group missing) explained what attitude we expect and demand from Hungary. I am giving below the substance of the most important conversations in the order in which they took place:

1) Minister President Teleki stated that Hungary would defend her sovereignty as far as it was at all possible. Only the dilemma of having to arrange for imports of most urgently required raw materials had caused the Government to make certain concessions in the matter of navicerts. When I pointed out that even the Office for Foreign Trade was cooperating in obtaining these documents for English Consulates, Teleki stated that this was unavoidable in order to stop direct dealings between industrial circles and the Consulates. In the event of direct dealings there would be a danger of increasingly extensive English encroachments, especially as Jewish industrial circles were prepared to yield completely. Now (2 groups garbled) they were merely allowed to hand in the completed forms at the Office for Foreign Trade, and forwarding the information to the English authorities direct would be liable to prosecution. Evidence proving the retention in Hungary of imported raw materials was being refused. Furthermore the Government had repeatedly said it would not stand for interference in matters which were the prerogative of a state. The delegation led by the Director of the National Bank, Quandt, which had recently been sent to London had adopted the same attitude on instructions from the Government. Hence the negotiations had in the main yielded no result.

In reply to my inquiry Teleki stated yesterday afternoon that there had been no sign of the English Purchasing Company in Hungary so far. During the only conversation which he had had so far with the English Minister after the latter's return from the Conference of Ministers in London,² he had not said a word at all about this purchasing company or the intensification of economic warfare. He, Teleki, had the impression that London had written off the Continent and thus would scarcely be making any more serious efforts. London knew that Hungary was determined fully to maintain her trade with Germany in all circumstances. Count Teleki took note without demur of my statement that for political reasons and those of commercial policy we had the right to expect that the Continent would give us the first offer of any further exportable surplus. Count Teleki in-

¹ See document No. 74.

² See document No. 148, footnote 2.

quired in detail about my impressions of the other states in southeastern Europe. During this it was confirmed that Hungary's attitude to Rumania was basically unchanged and that there was some feeling of uncertainty with regard to Yugoslavia because Budapest did not know what factors were really decisive there. It is certain that Hungary still regards the Yugoslavia State as being rather unstable and finds it expedient at all events to arouse suspicions in the minds of third parties regarding the internal stability of its structure as a state.

2) Freiherr von Werth, the Chief of the General Staff.

The General, who has always been a reliable friend of Germany, expressed his sincere admiration for the achievements of the German Army in Norway. Referring to England's economic warfare he stated that every Hungarian soldier knew that Hungarian rearmament had only been possible and could only be completed with Germany's assistance. Hence the Minister for War and he himself had, as I was aware, constantly advocated an intensification of German-Hungarian economic relations and would also in future always be ready to oppose interference.

3) Varga, the Minister of Economics.

Varga assured me that they could not be disturbed by any English maneuver. Hungary knew that such disturbance could not be tolerated in Hungary's own interest either. The more Germany was in a position to maintain vital deliveries to Hungary even in war time, the easier it would be for Hungary to resist English economic warfare.

4) The Regent.

The Regent confirmed the Minister President's statements. He concluded the conversation by requesting me to convey his special greetings and good wishes to the Führer and repeat to him the declarations he had previously³ made to the Führer, to the effect that Germany had in the Hungarians absolutely reliable friends.

5) The Foreign Minister.

We discussed in detail all the questions connected with English economic warfare and the methods of combating it. Count Csáky adopted in the main the same attitude as the Minister President while at the same time laying greater emphasis on the political aspects.

He stressed much more markedly than in previous conversations his generally well-known pro-German attitude. He had now given fresh proof of this in his move for control of the "Iron Gate" by armed forces of the riparian states.⁴ He had believed himself to be acting in Germany's interests in taking this step. Furthermore, he had wished to forestall any subsequent reproach that Hungary had not taken the initiative in time. The French and English Ministers had

³ See vol. VII, document No. 328.

⁴ A Hungarian proposal to this effect was made in a note verbale sent to the Governments of the riparian countries of the Danube on Apr. 25 (2141/468222-23).

made indignant démarches of protest with him. The French Minister had inquired whether he was willing to grant transit for German gunboats, for example, through Hungary. Csáky maintained that his answer to this question was in the affirmative. He referred further to numerous personal attacks in the allied press in connection with his forthcoming marriage from which it was plain that internationally he was being stamped as a partisan of Germany.

I will report orally on the conversation which ensued on the political situation in southeastern Europe and individual states in the southeast.

II. To sum up it may be said that authoritative political elements are fully aware that Hungary's policy can only be conducted in close concert with that of Germany and Italy and that they are determined to act consistently with this in the economic field. Hungary's attitude during all the economic negotiations that have taken place since the beginning of the war is proof of this.

Statistics confirm that while there has been a continuous increase in German-Hungarian trade, exports to enemy countries have remained more or less the same. It is not possible to cut them off completely because of the need to obtain foreign exchange to pay for raw materials.

CLODIUS
HEEREN

No. 183

205/142190-92

The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Sweden

URGENT

SECRET

No. 479 of April 30

BERLIN, April 30, 1940.

(Sent May 1—1:50 a. m.)

For the Minister.

With reference to your telegrams Nos. 623¹ and 629.²

1. For your information only. In unofficial discussions between Field Marshal Göring and the Swedish Military Attaché here, the Swedish Government has agreed to railway transports for rations, medical supplies, etc., through Sweden to the occupied Norwegian territory, provided that only single freight cars, not special trains, are used and consignment is made from a German to a Norwegian private firm.³ Against this, the German suggestion that transit of arms and ammunition to German troops in Norway be permitted in conjunction with the German supplies of arms to Sweden was rejected in these discussions.

¹ Document No. 171.

² Not printed (319/192789).

³ The Foreign Ministry had been notified of this agreement in a communication of Apr. 28 from the OKW (319/192785).

2. In spite of this I desire that the line suggested in your telegram No. 623 under 2) be taken up energetically and without delay. I request you therefore to have Major General von Uthmann and Counselor of Legation Dankwort discuss the matter as soon as possible with the Swedish War Minister; for this, his inquiry reported by you in telegram No. 629⁴ will form an appropriate pretext.

3. The negotiators are authorized to promise compliance with the Swedish desires as regards arms within the following limits:

(a) Prohibition of export of arms to Sweden has never existed. Temporary delays have been eliminated. The deliveries due under agreements made will at once be executed, among them the remaining 52 two-centimeter antiaircraft guns and the remaining 14 four-centimeter antiaircraft guns. This promise can be given in the expectation that the Swedish promise will be fulfilled without difficulties in accordance with 1. above (admittance of all transit transport except arms and ammunition), even though no further Swedish concessions are made.

(b) Should Swedish compliance extend to the transport of arms and ammunition we could supply on the Swedish list given in March:⁵

(1) 2850 machine guns with 38 million rounds of ammunition—1500 in May and the rest in June;

(2) 24,000 rounds of howitzer ammunition, immediately;

(3) 30 two-centimeter naval antiaircraft guns with ammunition, immediately;

(4) 200 three-centimeter and seven-centimeter antitank guns with 500 rounds of ammunition each, 50 in July, 75 in August and 75 in September;⁶

(5) 1000 pistols in June;

(6) the possibility of supplying further two-centimeter antiaircraft guns and 100,000 rifle barrels. Investigation of the delivery possibility not yet concluded.

(c) Should Sweden absolutely insist on heavy antiaircraft guns, and should she be prepared to allow transit for our war material, the supplying of heavy antiaircraft guns may in the last resort also be discussed.

4. In return for our compliance we expect that supplies, including arms and ammunition, for our troops near Trondheim and Narvik will be allowed on the Swedish railway, without particular limitation or restriction. If necessary, it can however be stated that it is not intended to send heavier caliber than 10.5 centimeters and that the transports can be made to look inconspicuous. For the purpose of overcoming possible Swedish objections on the grounds of neutrality we would also be prepared formally to sell to Sweden the arms the transit of which we desire together with the arms that are to be delivered to

⁴ See footnote 2. Sköld wanted to know whether the Germans were ready to deliver in large quantity heavy antiaircraft guns.

⁵ Not found.

⁶ Marginal note: "N. B. OKW has approved proposal as set out. Proposed; 50 already in May instead of July".

Sweden, on condition that Sweden will immediately sell them back to us, and undertake to deliver them to a place to be designated by us. This procedure would certainly not be very desirable because of the Swedish checking which it would entail, and I request you, before making such a proposal, to await the result of the negotiations and in case of need, to ask for instructions.

5. I request you to make use in the discussion of the arguments in telegram No. 371,⁷ and in particular, should it prove necessary, to emphasize that the supplying of our troops is entirely compatible with the full maintenance of Swedish neutrality and that the Swedish Government has itself admitted this point of view by allowing the passage of large deliveries of war materials to Finland, in spite of its neutrality during the Russo-Finnish conflict. The objection that Sweden had at that time made no formal declaration of neutrality is not valid, since the policy of neutrality was then emphasized in numerous public utterances by leading Swedish statesmen. It may in general also be pointed out that the Germany military action is in the main directed against the English and not against the Norwegians, and that the Swedish interest in keeping out of the present war would be most surely realized if German armed forces could prevent the English from advancing on the Swedish frontier and the iron mines.

6. I request you on no account to come to an agreement without previously asking for instructions, and to report immediately by telegram upon the results of the first conversation.

7. For your information only: Negotiations concerning the Swedish desires under 3. (b) above have been carried on here for some time without results with Military Attaché Dannfelt,⁸ Commercial Counselor Vinell, and banker Wettermark.

RIBBENTROP

⁷ Document No. 150.

⁸ Colonel Curt Juhlin-Dannfelt.

No. 184

205/142198-99

The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Sweden

Telegram

URGENT

SECRET

No. 493

BERLIN, May 1, 1940.
RM 164 g.

For the Minister personally.

With reference to my telegram No. 479.¹

1) Supplementary to my previous telegram I would once more emphatically point out that both our negotiators, Major General von

¹ Document No. 183.

Uthmann and Counselor of Legation Dankwort must, of course, in the discussion with the Swedish War Minister, declare our wishes with the strongest emphasis. The present general situation, especially our military successes in Norway, as well as the well-understood interests of the Swedes themselves, above all the interests of the Swedish Army, which the War Minister has to represent as against possible opposing tendencies in the Cabinet, certainly provide the prerequisites for an energetic presentation of our demands.

2) In the event that the discussion with the Swedish War Minister does not, in spite of this, lead without further difficulty to a result agreeable with our wishes, I am considering whether it would not be advisable for me myself to meet the Swedish Foreign Minister. I could then finally settle the question of German transports through Sweden with him, and in addition I could discuss with him in a friendly manner German-Swedish relations in general, and also the future economic structure of affairs in the Baltic area. As I cannot at the moment leave German territory I should like to invite Foreign Minister Günther to meet me at a place to be agreed upon on the German Baltic coast. It would certainly be hardly possible to keep such a meeting secret. It could however easily be represented to the public in such a manner that Swedish neutrality would not be compromised. It will of course be understood that the meeting could not lead to a possible modification of the friendly German-Russian relations.

3) I request you to refrain for the present from sounding M. Günther about such a meeting; at first give it consideration only and report to me by telegram what attitude the Swedish Government is, in your opinion, likely to adopt toward this idea.²

Foreign Minister

² The German Minister in Sweden reported in telegram No. 671 of May 3 the course of discussion at the first meeting between the German negotiators and Sköld (205/142208-09).

In telegram No. 672 of the same day the Minister replied to the suggestion of a meeting between Ribbentrop and Günther indicating that such a proposal would receive serious consideration from the Swedish Government, but that there were a number of practical difficulties (30/22244).

The German texts of these telegrams are printed in *Norges forhold til Sverige under krigen 1940-45*, vol. I, pp. 254-258.

No. 185

100/65043-44

The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram ¹

MOST URGENT

ROME, May 1, 1940.

No. 801

For the Foreign Minister personally.

¹ Marginal note: "Sent by special courier."

Ciano asked me to call on him this evening in order to communicate the following to me:

As a result of the appointment made yesterday the American Ambassador was received by the Duce today in the presence of Count Ciano; he informed the Duce of a message from President Roosevelt without leaving anything in writing. On the pretext of not having fully understood everything, Ciano was, however, able afterwards to have a look at the notes which the Ambassador used for his oral report, and on the basis of this was able to set down in writing the essential contents of the message. In this connection he emphasized that paragraphs 3 and 4 in which Roosevelt expatiates on the consequences of an extension of the conflict reproduce the text verbatim but said he could also vouch for the rest of the contents.

He said that Mussolini had drafted a reply at once which had already been telegraphed to Washington and would probably be handed over by the Italian Ambassador tomorrow morning. The Duce had been very annoyed at Roosevelt's message and had felt the whole of the Ambassador's visit to be so importunate that he had told him, Ciano, afterwards that he would not in future receive any Ambassador—except the German one—in order to receive such a message or any other letters. Phillips, the American Ambassador, had also incurred the Duce's particular displeasure in that, as the Duce had learned, although accredited as Ambassador to an ally of the Reich, he had not prevented his daughter from going to France recently and enlisting for six months or a whole year as an auxiliary with a motor transport unit.

Ciano suggested that I send the documents to Berlin by special courier in order to bring them to the notice of the Führer as soon as possible.

I agreed with him that the Duce's reply left nothing to be desired on the score of plain speaking.

MACKENSEN

P. S. Count Ciano's memo, which gives the substance of Roosevelt's message, and the text of the reply to be given to Roosevelt orally by the Italian Ambassador in Washington tomorrow, are enclosed herewith in the form in which Count Ciano made them available to me.³

³ Not printed (100/65045-50). The texts of Roosevelt's message to Mussolini and Mussolini's reply, together with Ambassador Phillips' report of his conversation with Mussolini and Ciano on May 1, are printed in *Peace and War: United States Foreign Policy, 1931-1941* (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1943), pp. 519-522. Cf. Ambassador Phillip's memoirs, *Ventures in Diplomacy* (Boston, 1952), pp. 267-268.

No. 186

4469/E087805-12

*Vidkun Quisling to Adolf Hitler*¹

OSLO, May 1, 1940.

EXCELLENCY: The development of the situation in my country moves me to write to Your Excellency.

I await with great anxiety the consequences that in my opinion will inevitably result from the resignation of our national Government, which was proposed to me by Herr Habicht and Dr. Bräuer. My objections to the solution proposed at that time have since proved to be well founded. The reports which Your Excellency has received make it unnecessary for me to go into historical reminiscences again. Today the appraisal of the situation from my point of view is to the effect that the hopes placed in the establishment of the Administrative Council have not only not been fulfilled but have led to bitter disappointment. The legalization on the basis of the Norwegian Constitution which was intended to induce the King to give up his resistance and sanction the Administrative Council for Norway as constitutional has proved to be fictitious. The Administrative Council is composed of men from circles that were always friendly to England and only for opportunistic reasons pretend that they are today, as also formerly, loyal to Germany. They are all under the leadership of a man who is a well-known Freemason and not more than 3 weeks before the entry of your troops took a public stand against Germany. The wish expressed by Your Excellency that the integrity of my movement and my person should not suffer any injury through the resignation of the national Government is not being respected by these men. People are permitted to abuse my men in the country as traitors and to oppress them on all sides and to attack my person and political attitude violently in the press. From my knowledge of the mentality of my countrymen I see here the beginning of a development running directly counter to everything that I had the honor to submit to Your Excellency in December as my political aim.² Norway will perhaps be pacified outwardly in the foreseeable future. I myself will in consistent prosecution of my aims do all I can to hasten an absolute pacification. A genuine internal pacifica-

¹ This copy of Quisling's letter to Hitler was enclosed in a letter of May 20 from Schickedanz to Grand Admiral Raeder, which stated:

"By order of Reichsleiter Rosenberg I take the liberty of also sending you herewith a copy of a letter of M. Vidkun Quisling to the Führer. I obtained the copy of the letter shortly before my departure by plane from Oslo on May 2. The letter itself was to be forwarded to the Führer through the Reichskommissar for the Occupied Norwegian Territories, Terboven. Whether that has been done, I do not know. Reichsminister Lammers has likewise received a copy of this letter from me." (4469/E087804)

² See vol. VIII, document No. 448.

tion of Norway, however, can be brought about only through our movement. In order that Norway may be made friendly to Germany it must become national in our sense. A slow subjugation of the forces opposing us and Germany requires an extraordinary amount of time. Our position will be consolidated very quickly, however, if we can control certain means of exerting influence. But my plan of branding the opposition to the German occupation from the outset as a Marxist-liberalistic crime committed in the pay of the Western Powers has today been paralyzed in its convincing force. The Administrative Council is a purely administrative body within the occupied areas. The people regard it either as an organ subservient to the German authorities or as a body of Norwegians who using clever tactics as a matter of realistic politics are exhausting every possibility offered by an inevitable fate in order to counteract the evolution under my leadership, which they fear. In each case it is stated with satisfaction that there is now only a single constitutional Norwegian Government, namely that sanctioned by the King. Whether the King has emigrated or is staying with the British in the northern part of the country, makes no difference here to Norwegian public opinion. The people have become reconciled to resigning themselves until the war is over and the Germans withdraw. In accordance with the motto, "Never speak of it, always think of it," preparations are now being made for cultivating a hatred of Germans, which is assuming all the greater proportions inasmuch as a systematic liberal Anglophile propaganda for decades successfully fought first Prussian militarism and now National Socialist imperialism and the suppression of individual liberty. The direct and constant influence of the Western Powers has now declined sharply as a result of the present German control and is limited to listening to enemy radio stations, etc. But the weeds once sown are not being rooted out; on the contrary, those who helped to sow them are now employed again as the gardeners.

I have never maintained that my political program today has a majority in Norway. Behind me is a small but determined minority which represents the real interests of the people, and with that I tried on April 9 to put my policy into effect. The abandonment of this first attempt brought with it simultaneously the fall of the only Norwegian Government that would have been able to attract wider circles of Norwegians and bring them into the government of the country without diluting my aims. Then the old Government which had fled would have been done for and in the end its members would actually have played the role of émigrés without rights and not that of the righteous who had been driven out.

I believe, however, that it is still possible today to save everything and I take the liberty of submitting some proposals to Your Excellency:

1) I will expand my movement intensively, within the framework of the tactics indicated by the situation that exists today. The Reichskommissar and I are in agreement on the procedure.

2) I request that I may within the framework of the Administrative Council fill two positions with two of my people. They are: the Justice and Police Department and a new Press and Propaganda Agency which would be established. That would mean a quite gradual penetration of the executive apparatus in the Norwegian administration with reliable people of the national movement.

3) The systematic assembling of representatives of Norwegian economic and cultural life and preparation for the formation of a national government under my leadership. I request permission to present to Your Excellency in the form of a memorandum the ideas guiding me with respect to the details of this matter.³

I cannot make any proposal regarding the time for the formation of such a new government, since that depends on the general development, which Your Excellency alone can perceive. Should the occasion arise, I will then request instructions. A suitable settlement of the relationship between the Reichskommissar and the national Government of Norway would in my opinion not be difficult to find.

From such a settlement I anticipate that even before the end of the war the attitude of Norwegian public opinion toward Germany, which is today taking a threatening development, will be transformed through full use of the propaganda apparatus into one of understanding and friendship and will open the way for a strong constitutional union of all Germanic countries.

Accpet, etc.

V[IDKUN] Q[UISLING]

³ No reply to this request has been found.

No. 187

APA Reel No. 290

Vidkun Quisling to Stabsleiter Schickedanz

PRIVATE—PERSONAL

OSLO, May 1, 1940.

DEAR HERR SCHICKEDANZ: Since I spoke to you in Berlin some time ago about the threatening political situation in Scandinavia, which constituted a serious danger to Germany, I am now anxious to present my ideas to you again in all frankness, seeing that the events which I predicted have actually occurred.

As you know, I explained at the time that the German Mission in Oslo would be completely entangled by the ruling cliques, with the

Nygaardsvold-Koht Government at their head. I stated that the Nygaardsvold Government was absolutely insincere toward Germany and that no faith whatever was to be placed in a real neutrality as respects England. In the interest of our two countries I was concerned about preventing Norway from being used as a military concentration area against Germany. As you know, my political aim is a free Germanic federation [*Bund*] under the leadership of Germany. Since Norway occupies the key position in Scandinavia, a national policy which is suitable for Scandinavia and which will make it possible for Sweden as well as Denmark and Finland to join this greater Germanic federation voluntarily must first be carried out in Norway. These ideas alone formed the moral basis for the action which I discussed in Germany with the Führer.

Now, after the joint action had succeeded to the extent that England's plans in Norway were frustrated and I had actually formed the government and had all reasonable prospects of exercising the governmental authority successfully, I was after a few days forced by Herr Habicht and Dr. Bräuer to resign and that in a manner which was anything but considerate, for not only did these men negotiate behind my back with the anti-German cliques but I was forced, although it was known that I do not by any means have an adequate command of the German language, to conduct the last, decisive negotiations on April 15 alone, without my trusted co-worker and interpreter, Hagelin.¹ I was not given the opportunity although I urgently requested it, to speak once more with the Führer and Chancellor, which I regret most keenly, for I am convinced that the Führer would have decided in my favor, particularly in view of the great aim of a Germanic federation under German leadership, for there was actually no compelling reason in the interest of Germany for bringing about our fall. That Dr. Bräuer was no match for the cunning of the Norwegian clique was already known, and Herr Habicht, who in the first place is poles apart from the Norwegian mentality as such, of course could not possibly give a correct judgment after spending only a few hours in Oslo. That he nevertheless did pronounce a judgment indicates little sense of responsibility in the face of such a difficult and crucial question. The German military, too, unfortunately took a negative attitude toward me from the first day and tried to obstruct our work everywhere. They permitted the people who had already misinformed Dr. Bräuer to give them one-sided information. In brief, after men who knew nothing about Norway and who refused to be told anything by me had been active

¹ On these negotiations see document No. 118.

here, that which was inevitable happened and I resigned, although not voluntarily.

You will understand that this has brought me and my movement into an especially difficult position. The entire action, in so far as Norway's relationship with Germany is concerned, has now been shunted off on a completely wrong track, and the moral basis for my action has thereby been taken away from me. I and my people are now being labeled and insulted here as traitors. I am excluded from any influence, while the German agencies in Norway work together with the very same circles that have already deceived Germany once. It is certain that these circles will also continue trying to deceive the Germans, and how clever they are is shown by the fact that the Freemason Christensen, who as late as March 19, 1940, attacked Germany very sharply in *Aftenposten*, managed under the German occupation to maneuver himself into the position of chairman of the Administrative Council after my resignation. In these circumstances you will understand why I consider myself betrayed, and I might mention only incidentally that the English Norwegian-language radio transmitter applied to me the saying: "The Moor has done his duty, the Moor may go."

Actually, however, this is not only a question of my person. What is far worse is that the attainment of the great aim, namely the voluntary union of Scandinavia and Germany in a large Germanic federation has now been rendered difficult, if not altogether impossible, in case conditions develop in the direction that has been taken. This federation is attainable only if Norway takes the first step, and Norway will never take this first step unless the old party cliques are eliminated. The opportunity to place at the helm a national government which is willing to bring about the great Germanic union is a unique one now and will probably never return. From this point of view I regret exceedingly that the nationalists have been completely eliminated from the politics of Norway. The old anti-German circles are now cooperating with the German authorities, and we, the nationalists, who contributed decisively toward putting Germany in Norway shortly before an actual occupation by the British, are shoved aside and treated as troublesome suppliants. This situation is not only grotesque but also dangerous, for it will have a very baneful influence on the national circles in Sweden and Denmark. You may be certain, my dear Herr Schickedanz, that what is now happening in Norway will be quite decisive for the future of the Germanic peoples. Only a cooperation of the best national forces of Germany and Norway can ensure that the great aim of a voluntary federation of the Germanic peoples under the leadership of Germany will be

attained. I hope very much that the crucial hour which is now upon us will not be allowed to slip by.²

With the highest consideration, I remain,

Yours,

VIKUN QUILSING

² In Rosenberg's diary (Nuremberg document No. 1749-PS), in the entry for May 7, he recorded:

"Sch[ickedanz] has been back from Oslo again since Saturday [May 4]. He was welcomed by the Quisling people as a rescuing angel. The situation again is that our friends are being treated badly by incapable officials. The record of the interview with Habicht is astounding. Q[uisling]'s letter to Sch[ickedanz], in which he describes himself as betrayed, shows how the situation was bungled in the last hours. . . .

"... Lammers has read the record and Quisling's letter and is astounded. He will show them to the Führer himself. The Führer is himself very much disillusioned about the way the Norwegian question has gone . . ."

No. 188

30/22267-70

*The Minister and Plenipotentiary of the German Reich in Denmark
to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

No. 428 of April 30

COPENHAGEN, April 30, 1940.

Received May 2—12:35 p. m.

With reference to your telegram No. 408 of April 22.¹

The Danish Foreign Minister today sent me the following draft of a circular instruction to Danish Missions abroad on the political situation:

"On April 10 the Danish Government was enlarged so that it now includes representatives of all the four large political parties. Thus the widest possible basis has been created for the conduct of the affairs of the country in the present state of affairs. When the German troops marched in, the German Government stated that it did not intend, either now or in the future, to infringe the territorial integrity and the political independence of the Kingdom of Denmark. It recognized Denmark's basically neutral attitude and gave an assurance that it did not intend to use Danish territory as a basis for operations against England, as long as it was not compelled to do so by measures taken by England and France. On this basis both Governments have reached an agreement for honest and loyal cooperation for the solution of all problems arising out of the new situation. The Danish Government and the Rigsdag are agreed that good and understanding cooperation with the German representatives is in Denmark's interest. The Danish Government has control of all the affairs of the country. In so far as is demanded by considerations for the

¹ Document No. 151.

security of the German troops during their stay in Denmark special agreements will be made with the German authorities. In accordance with the proclamations of April 9 made to the people by the King and the Government, the civil servants are assisting in carrying out cooperation with the German authorities in the best manner possible. This presupposes mutual consideration and understanding. The treatment of all major questions or questions of principle will be arranged through the Danish Foreign Ministry. Complete calm and order continue to prevail throughout the country. Thus German-Danish relations have developed extremely well, and on both sides there is the desire to continue this favorable development. The Danish Government is aware that rumors are circulating which give a false picture of the conditions. You are requested to contradict these rumors on the lines of the above. The interruption of channels of trade across the North Sea and the Atlantic Ocean, imposed by circumstances on Denmark and the other Northern countries necessitates an extensive redirection in Danish foreign trade. At the normal quarterly negotiations of the Danish-German Government Committee in Copenhagen from April 18 to 20, it was agreed to increase the export of agricultural products to Germany to such an extent that Denmark could thus find a market for her surplus of these products. The negotiations will be continued in Berlin this week with the aim of securing a corresponding increase in the goods which Denmark receives from Germany, in so far as this is possible. The same German representatives are taking part in the negotiations as before. Germany is endeavoring to give consideration to Denmark's economic requirements as far as possible. It will, however, be necessary to open negotiations at the same time with a number of neutral countries on settling the conditions of payment, and on consolidating and extending trade connections with those countries with which there are no obstacles in the way of transport. A more detailed instruction will be sent to you immediately. In the case of some countries, it is intended to send trade delegations."

The draft is in keeping with the Danish mentality and with the usual style of the Foreign Ministry in its instructions to Missions under its jurisdiction. Foreign Minister Munch composed it personally for the most part, after I had rejected previous drafts as unsatisfactory. The present draft recognizes that the present situation is based on German-Danish understanding, and that no differences exist between the two countries. The Foreign Minister realized the basic importance of this instruction and submitted it to the Council of Ministers for approval before sending it to me. I reserved my opinion and ask for instructions by telegram.²

RENTHE-FINK

² For these instructions see document No. 193.

No. 189

F8/0087-0088

Memorandum by the Foreign Minister

BERLIN, May 2, 1940.

RM 15.

I received the Swiss Minister¹ today and, referring to the telegram² from Minister Köcher in Bern, I told him that if Switzerland granted the *agrément* for a new Minister of the Polish Emigré Government, this would result in our recalling our Minister and in our no longer being represented by a Minister in Bern. Germany was constrained to regard this as an unfriendly act since an independent Poland no longer existed and this pseudo-government in Angers had no legitimate basis whatever. On the contrary, if these gentlemen of the pseudo-government were to show their faces anywhere in Poland today they would be lynched in a few minutes.

The Minister promised to report at once to his Government to that effect.

I then pointed out very seriously to the Minister that we would not put up with any more abuse of the German people by the Swiss press, but would reply suitably in the German press. As it was, we had shown angelic patience in this matter, and I could only urge him to make very serious representations to his Government on these lines. Germany for her part had never in any way given Switzerland grounds for abusing Germany. Germany did not interfere in Swiss affairs, but she must also insist that Switzerland refrain from interfering in any way in German affairs, and from continuously making adverse criticism of German conditions or actions. I also told the Minister that the Führer had been extremely indignant yesterday about the matter of a new Polish Minister in Bern and had expressed himself very unfavorably about the Swiss press.

I added in conclusion that I had always desired good German-Swiss relations and I could only give his Government the good advice to adopt an entirely new course in their relations with Germany as soon as possible. I regretted having to speak in this way to the Minister who had undoubtedly come to Berlin with the best intentions of settling matters amicably, but he must admit that so far his efforts had

¹ Hans Frölicher.

² Not printed (2126/462673). In this telegram (No. 358 of Apr. 29) Köcher reported that, after confirming that the Swiss Government was about to give the *agrément* to a newly appointed Polish Minister, he had warned the head of the Swiss Protocol Department that such a step would mean "formal recognition of the Polish phantom government and would call forth an appropriate reaction in Germany."

not in any way improved matters between our countries. I expressed the hope that from now on a complete change would be brought about.²

RIBBENTROP

Minute for the Foreign Minister's Secretariat:

To be transmitted by telegram⁴ to Minister Köcher, Bern, for information.

² Weissäcker recorded on May 14 (183/86096-97) that the Swiss Minister, on instruction from his Government, had informed him that "In order to comply with the request expressed to Herr Frölicher by the Foreign Minister, the Swiss Government would not grant the *agrément* to a Polish Minister for the time being."

⁴ Sent to Bern as telegram No. 307 of May 3 (3918/E051030-31)

No. 190

F17/206

*Benito Mussolini to Adolf Hitler*¹

ROME, May 2, 1940.

FÜHRER: I assume that you are already acquainted with the documents which I have had transmitted to you, namely Reynaud's letter and my reply,² the Pope's letter and my reply,³ and Roosevelt's oral message and my reply.⁴ I would draw your attention in particular to Roosevelt's message and its obviously threatening character, which may explain to you the somewhat drastic tone of my reply.

The English decision not to allow ships to ply in the Mediterranean⁵ any more has left us completely indifferent and has at all events proved that the Mediterranean is not absolutely essential to Great Britain.

I must tell you that the mood of the Italian people is quite plainly hostile to the Allies and will be even more so after the speech which the Minister of Transport⁶ is to make shortly. There is no need for me to tell you that we are following the phases of the war in Norway with interest and enthusiasm, and I am convinced that the French-English attempt which was primarily made for publicity purposes can be regarded as having failed. This situation will be fraught with grave consequences.

¹ Translated from the German translation which was submitted by the Italians to the German Foreign Ministry. There are minor discrepancies between this German translation and the Italian text published in *Hitler e Mussolini: lettere e documenti*, No. 22.

² See documents Nos. 172 and 173.

³ In telegram No. 800 of May 1, sent by special courier on May 2 (100/65063-67), Mackensen forwarded copies of a letter, dated Apr. 24 from the Pope to Mussolini, and Mussolini's reply dated Apr. 30.

⁴ See document No. 185.

⁵ Britain announced on May 1 that all British shipping would be diverted from the Mediterranean and would pass via the Cape instead of the Suez Canal.

⁶ Giovanni Host Venturi.

I have ordered the 1916 class to be called up on May 15 and further personnel will subsequently be called to the colors, so that by the summer we shall have 2 million men ready.

Please, Führer, accept my heartfelt and comradely greeting.

MUSSOLINI

No. 191

230/152193-97

The Legation in Bulgaria to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

URGENT

SOFIA, May 3, 1940—3:15 a. m.

No. 160 of May 2

Received May 3—1:25 p. m.

The following is a report of conversations on English economic warfare¹ which I had in Belgrade:

1) *Foreign Minister.*

On my making a statement regarding the attitude which we expected from neutral countries and particularly from Yugoslavia with respect to English economic warfare, Cincar-Marcović explained that from the beginning of the war, the Yugoslav Government had been determined not to allow trade with Germany to be disturbed. After the London Conference of Ministers² there had, anyhow, been no new English pressure. The English Minister³ since his return had called on him only once and had not made any new demands in connection with the economic war and the activities of the newly established English Purchasing Company. The English Purchasing Company, had not, at any rate up to the present, made itself noticeable. Nor has the activity of the Company in Yugoslavia any prospect of success, as Yugoslav industrial circles are aware of the fact that the economic improvement in the past 6 years is almost exclusively due to Germany, and that the German market is of decisive importance for Yugoslavia also in the future. In reply to my question the Foreign Minister confirmed that should the activities of the Purchasing Company, contrary to expectation, through buying-up and an artificial rise in prices cause a disturbance in German-Yugoslav economic relations, Yugoslavia would in that case take appropriate measures to prevent this. At the end of the conversation he again gave the binding promise that Germany could rely absolutely on the Government taking care that the exports to Germany would be maintained at their previous level and according to circumstances even increased within reasonable limits.

2) *Minister President.*⁴

¹ See document No. 74 and footnote 1.

² See document No. 148, footnote 2.

³ Owen St. Clair.

⁴ Dragiša Cvetković.

The Minister President had been informed by the Foreign Minister about the conversation of the previous day and he himself, at the beginning of the interview, stated of his own accord that he fully confirmed the attitude adopted by the Foreign Minister and expressly assured me that Yugoslavia was determined to maintain complete neutrality also in the economic field and to fulfill loyally her obligations to Germany. He emphasized, as the Foreign Minister had done, that Germany's economic importance for Yugoslavia was generally recognized and appreciated in the country. Earlier measures of the Government, especially the appointment of an Ore Commissioner to assure Germany of her copper and lead supplies, had shown that Yugoslavia was strong enough to carry out her policy in practice; in the future he would also continue to give his personal attention to the copper question. With regard to further increasing Yugoslav exports to Germany he was somewhat more cautious than the Foreign Minister and was of the opinion that this depended naturally also on the domestic situation. I replied that we, of course, knew that the result of the harvest, for example, could lead to a certain decrease in exports, but first of all it should be made clear that any reductions must not be due to English and French measures. The Minister President recognized the justification of this point of view. Later in the conversation he complained very much about the strong English and French pressure, in which the French worked more in the political and propagandistic spheres and the English in the economic field.

3) *Minister of Economics.*

Andres assured me that he would always advocate the safeguarding of German economic interests. The Purchasing Company had not been very noticeable. A director of this Company named Chester had called on him some time ago and told him that the English were prepared to buy everything. He [the Minister] had adopted a negative attitude in this conversation and since then the Company had not made any appearance. No business had been transacted.

4) *Deputy Governor Belin of the National Bank.*

Belin, who has just returned from London, gave me an account of his negotiations. The English had agreed to satisfactory contingents for the import of raw materials to Yugoslavia and fortunately they had not made the grant of these contingents dependent on any Yugoslav declarations regarding trade with Germany. In answer to my question regarding supervision over the retention of imported raw materials, Belin admitted in (group missing) a statement which the Foreign Minister made to me the day previously, that this supervision was exercised by a procedure which existed even before the war in Yugoslavia and which at any rate banned the re-export of raw materials acquired with free foreign exchange to countries with clearing. The English were satisfied with this. Belin said that his negotiations were regarded here in general as a great success; it hadn't been easy for him, however, as the English feared (group missing) further demands had not been raised at all. Belin regarded the activities of the Purchasing Company very skeptically. Up to the present the English had displayed themselves so clumsily that any threat of the slightest importance to Germany's trade need not be feared.

5) Pilja, Secretary of State in the Foreign Ministry, who for years has dealt with economic questions in the Foreign Ministry and in particular looks after the German-Yugoslav economic relations, assured me, referring to his well-known activities in Germany for many years, that he would, as chairman of the delegation for negotiations with Germany, continue to be mindful in future of the further normal development of German-Yugoslav trade. He then gave me a similar report as Belin had done on relations with England. Pilja emphasized especially that the English had not tried to place any restrictions at all on Yugoslavia in connection with the export of her own products.

6) *Prince Regent.*

Prince Paul was obviously at pains to show himself particularly accommodating and to dissipate the suspicion which repeatedly appears against him. After I had set out the reasons which caused the German Government to consider it right at the present moment to get in touch again with the Governments of the southeastern states regarding the community of views on the attitude to be adopted against English economic warfare, the Prince declared that the Yugoslav Government and he himself would give the unqualified guarantee that trade with Germany would not be disturbed. Yugoslavia's political line was absolutely clear. It was in the country's own interest to follow that line strictly. In Yugoslavia they would not forget that England and France in past years had never complied with the numerous requests of Yugoslavia for the intensification of trade relations. He was convinced that in the future the geographic ties with the great German neighbor would remain decisive for the direction of Yugoslav economic interests. In Yugoslavia they had always gratefully recognized that Germany from the beginning of the war had dealt with economic questions in a generous way while fully safeguarding her own interests.

The Prince then spoke for some time about his (one word missing) [visit] to Germany to which he looked back with particular pleasure. He asked that his greetings be conveyed to the Führer. Later the Prince brought the conversation around to the situation in Rumania and Russia. Finally the Prince said that he was especially grateful to the German Government for providing an opportunity through my mission to confirm again in direct discussion that there was agreement in views between Belgrade and Berlin.

II. The general impression was that the Government and the Prince Regent were obviously at pains to dispel any German apprehensions. I also believe that they really intend, in the economic sphere at least, to preserve neutrality. On the other hand sympathies in the country are very divided and the attitude of Italy has been followed with growing mistrust in the past few weeks. Apart from this Yugoslavia is clearly under heavier Allied pressure than Hungary, which pressure at the moment is primarily operating on the alleged Italian danger. Further report orally.

CLODIUS
RICHTHOFEN

No. 192

F17/194-199

Adolf Hitler to Benito Mussolini

MAY 3, 1940.

DUCE: Since the last report¹ which I sent you, Duce, events have proceeded according to our expectations. Unfortunately the tempo was almost too fast. I had a slight hope that the English would allow themselves to be lured into holding on to their positions in central Norway somewhat longer so as to allow the affair to develop gradually into one where British prestige was at stake. There could not have been a better opportunity of gradually decimating the British fleet by daily attacks. Regrettably, however, the English landing troops ran away almost faster than we could follow them. The result is that the whole of Norwegian territory south of the Trondheim Fjord is now firmly in our hands. There may still be small detachments of Norwegian soldiers wandering about in remote mountain valleys or on plateaus. We paid no attention at all to them at first in view of the larger tasks confronting us. However, they are now being disarmed, in so far as they are not coming forward themselves and handing over their arms which is certainly the case for the most part. Thus the occupation of this territory is proceeding according to plan. All the railways are in our hands. Fairly large sections are in operation. It has now been possible to employ so many railway engineer troops and engineers that traffic can be completely resumed in a few weeks. With the continuous arrival of fresh units—the 7th Division has been almost completely disembarked and the first contingents of the 8th and 9th Divisions have arrived—the whole of the country will now be placed under systematic control. Attacks on our airports will thus also be made more and more difficult for the English or will cause them greater losses. A start has already been made on the construction of a number of new airports. The existing coastal batteries have been manned everywhere and put in working order. Fresh heavy batteries have arrived and are at present being installed at numerous points. English losses in submarines in the Kattegat and Skagerrak will force them in a short time to abandon this area for good as a theater of operations for their submarines.

At the moment the most comprehensive preparations are being made for an attack on the English ports of debarkation situated north of Trondheim. I hope that this time we shall succeed in closing the trap before the English are able to withdraw. But apart from

¹ Document No. 168.

that the booty is already enormous; for we succeeded in capturing almost the whole of the British landing troops' material. At the moment we are examining not only an enormous number of most important English documents but also their equipment, arms, and ammunition.

As for the documents, you will perhaps be amused to learn, Duce, how we came into possession of the most important box. We have to thank the English radio for this!

When the English landed in Andalsnes, they considered it their duty to send forward a brigade immediately to assist those forces which, as they thought, were holding the position in Hamar and Elverum and bravely resisting us Germans. Thus the 148th Battalion of the brigade was sent forward by train and reached the district around Lillehammer. As our aircraft had meanwhile completely destroyed the railway, road, and telephone connections between Dombaas and Andalsnes, the British commanding officer who was advancing at the head of his band of heroes had not the slightest notion of the events which had meanwhile taken place in the theater of war ahead of him. As shortwave transmitters generally scarcely function in these deep valleys, the only source of information was the British radio. The good colonel was therefore relieved to hear from the British radio that English and Norwegians jointly were not only offering successful resistance near Hamar and Elverum but also that, over and above this, they had even repulsed the German troops. So he marched gaily on at the head of his band and entered Lillehammer. He had with him a tin box marked: "Strictly Secret! Not to be taken into the frontline!" containing all that the enemy must not see or get hold of in any circumstances. As, thanks to the English radio he was under the impression that there were still brave Norwegian and British units successfully engaging us Germans at least 120 kilometers ahead of him, he naturally felt exceedingly reassured, believing himself to be a long way from the front, and entered Lillehammer and immediately looked for quarters there so that he and his brave Englishmen, who were still suffering badly from the after effects of seasickness, could go to bed at once. German shock troops then awakened him somewhat rudely and took him into custody together with his military Ark of the Covenant.

To be sure, the little lieutenant certainly had not the slightest notion what sort of a catch he had made with his shock troops. It was not realized until some hours afterwards that it had been a successful stroke of the kind which rarely occurs in the history of war.

To sum up, I may tell you, Duce, that operations in central and southern Norway are practically completed, and that the attack on the British and French units north of Trondheim will now be launched at once.

I want to thank you, Duce, for your letter of May 2,² and the documents which I have also received in the meantime. Your reply to Paul Reynaud³ was more than a joy to me. I do not know how often I have read it over, although it only consists of a few sentences. Only it is such a wonderful contrast to this French gentleman's whining accusation. I find your replies to the Pope and Roosevelt also marvelous. I think, however, that the recurring undertone of threats in Mr. Roosevelt's telegrams, notes, and inquiries is ample reason for seeing to it that the war is brought to an end as soon as possible. I note with great pleasure how much the Italian people and especially the Italian press are sharing our struggle in spirit. I am aware that this is an important factor in understanding many of the steps taken by the Allies. By doing this, Duce, you are doing much to lighten my burden even now. The call-up of the 1916 class will also help in this. I do not think that people in Paris, in particular, are looking forward to this summer with any great feeling of confidence. Paul Reynaud's pathetic letter may well have been due to the mood occasioned by this.

Please accept, Duce, my cordial greetings together with the assurance of my unshakable faith in the successful outcome of this war.

Yours,⁴

P. S. I have just received a report that after overcoming slight Norwegian resistance the advance guard which has been feeling its way northward since yesterday evening has caught up with the retreating English forces. Thus the territory north of Trondheim has been abandoned by English forces. This is a pity, but it makes no difference to our success.

² Document No. 190.

³ Document No. 173.

⁴ Hitler's signature does not appear on the copy of the letter in the Foreign Ministry files.

No. 193

247/164075/1

The State Secretary to the Legation in Denmark

Telegram

No. 451

BERLIN, May 8, 1940.
zu Pol. VI 1222.¹

The Foreign Minister approves the draft of the circular instruction to the Danish Missions abroad.²

As for the intended dispatch of Danish trade delegations which is mentioned in the concluding sentence, we consent on the self-evident condition that the instructions for such commercial treaty negotiations be issued in the closest agreement with us and only with our approval, as must be the case anyway in view of the transportation situation.

Please communicate this to M. Munch simultaneously with our approval.³

WEIZSÄCKER

¹ Pol. VI 1222: Not found.

² See document No. 188. The Danish text of the circular telegram as sent on May 6 is in the Danish Government's publication *Beretning til Folketinget* . . . vol. v, *Bilag*, pp. 180-181. On May 8 Woermann sent a circular telegram to the German Missions at Buenos Aires, Mexico City, Rio de Janeiro, Shanghai, Tehran, Tokyo, and Washington giving the substance of the Danish circular telegram and adding:

"The foregoing ideas in the Danish circular instruction may be used for guidance in your conversations. Knowledge of the dispatch of the circular instruction of the Danish Foreign Ministry to its Missions is to be treated as confidential also as concerns the Danish representative there." (247/164092-93)

³ Typewritten note on the margin: "The last sentence was inserted at the instance of Ambassador Ritter."

No. 194

2423/512054-56

The Ambassador in Argentina to the Foreign Ministry

No. 962

BUENOS AIRES, May 8, 1940.
Received June 5, 1940.
Pol. IX 984.

POLITICAL REPORT

Subject: The development of Argentina's neutrality.

Argentina's policy of neutrality, whose general principles were laid down in a Government decree immediately on the outbreak of war,¹ the aim of which was described to me at the time both by President

¹ Decree No. 40412M 295 of Sept. 4, 1939. The Spanish text of this, together with a German translation, were forwarded to Berlin by Thermann as annexes (8867/E618449-52) to report No. 2640 of Oct. 5, 1939 (2423/512013-16).

Ortiz and Foreign Minister Cantilo² as a policy of real impartiality toward the belligerent powers, has meanwhile, and especially in recent weeks, been somewhat weakened. Even though it is not yet possible to speak of a deviation from the intention not to participate in the war, Argentina's neutrality has, nonetheless, in consequence of the statements and actions of the Government undergone a change in significance which is becoming more and more clearly perceptible at the present time.

During the months which followed the declaration of strict neutrality of September last year, a whole series of Government measures indicated honest intentions of ensuring the maintenance of neutrality in the most diverse spheres of life not only formally in foreign relations, but also at home and in public opinion. This comprised the policy of the Government toward the blacklists,³ regulations against political incitement on the radio, the ban on officers commenting on war events in publications, and the decision of the Ministers not to attend personally charitable or other functions of one or other of the belligerent parties. The reason why neutrality properly understood in this sense could not be applied to the press is the fact that the Government cannot and will not risk making any change in the democratic principle of uninhibited freedom of opinion. Nevertheless, the Foreign Ministry in particular used to dissociate itself regularly from outbursts in the press which we were bound to make the subject of protests.

However, the attitude of Dr. Cantilo, the Foreign Minister, subsequently left scarcely any doubt as to which side in the war he and the leading members of the Ortiz Government felt drawn. The continued tacit recognition of the Polish "Minister" here was already the official manifestation of an unsympathetic criticism of Germany's political conduct, which then became clearly apparent during the Russo-Finnish war. Although Argentina's motion for the expulsion of Russia from the League of Nations in Geneva was formally directed solely against Russia, nevertheless in substance it was, with its equally vehement political and ideological criticism, also directed against the Reich. On similar lines, there was put into effect the aid to Finland introduced at the League of Nations and propagated here by the British and French, the charitable nature of which was overshadowed by the political significance. The Government itself did not hesitate to deliver 50,000 tons of wheat for Finland on conditions which made it tantamount to a gift, accompanied by appropriate announcements inspired by "democratic ideals."

² Records of these conversations have not been found.

³ The Argentine delegation to the Pan-American Conference in Panama had been instructed to raise and protest the question of "black-lists," according to Thermann's report cited in footnote 1.

Foreign Minister Cantilo made himself even more clear, after our military measures in Denmark and Norway had become known, by his well-known statement⁴ that Argentina did not recognize conquests of territory by force and that, although she did not intend to condemn Germany's action merely on her own behalf, she was however prepared to support any measures to this effect. The inter-American protest no doubt hinted at here has not materialized so far. However, the Minister's statement already reflected a certain deviation from neutrality as a concept of absolute impartiality toward the belligerent states.

For Dr. Cantilo it was ideologically only a short step from here to his speech at the National Academy of History commemorating the Pan American Union. As has been reported,⁵ in it he coined the phrase which has already become a slogan here, namely that neutrality is not indifference; it does not mean nonparticipation nor does it merely stand for a fiction. With this the decisive word had been said; it meant nothing other than that he, the Government, and the section of the population supporting them were turning away from Germany and giving their sympathies to the other belligerent side.

This speech which coincides with the delivery, amounting to a gift, of 20,000 tons of wheat to Norway, which this time is not due to international relief measures but to a spontaneous decision by the Argentine Government, has now indeed become the subject of bitter public polemics, carried on not only by a pro-German newspaper like the *Pampero*, but also by publications of the Left Wing in domestic politics which do not sympathize with us in any way. The Radical and Socialist politicians, who are not favorably disposed toward the Foreign Minister, obviously think the moment has come for stimulating the Radical trend which domestic policy is taking under President Ortiz by means of attacks on the Foreign Minister who is closely associated with the National Democrats. For this they can put forward two effective arguments: Firstly, the Argentine people's desire not to be drawn into this war by imprudent statements made by responsible men; and secondly, the appeal to the Government first to remedy the distress and grievances among their own people before thinking about charitable acts of a politically dangerous nature in respect of other people and states.

This development now presents the strange spectacle of our ideas being championed by the Left Wing which is thoroughly opposed to us ideologically, while the Government, at any rate the responsible

⁴ This statement was made by Cantilo at a press conference of Apr. 12 and reported by Thermann in telegram No. 353 of Apr. 13 (8867/E618453) and report No. 767 of Apr. 16 (8867/E618454-55).

⁵ The relevant part of this speech had been relayed to Berlin by Thermann in report No. 914 of Apr. 30 (8867/E618456-58).

Foreign Minister, yielding to its own personal sympathies and to British economic pressure is giving the idea of neutrality a meaning which no longer accords fully with its own solemn proclamations.

The Embassies in Rio de Janeiro and Santiago de Chile and also the Legation in Montevideo are receiving copies of this report.

THERMANN

No. 195

8824/E614156-57

The Chargé d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

URGENT

WASHINGTON, May 4, 1940—3:51 p. m.

No. 837 of May 4

Received May 5—3:05 p. m.

Inf 6550.

With reference to your telegram of May 2 (Number not given), see telegram No. 468 (Inf 67 g).¹

I. In accordance with instructions by the above telegram our agents have again taken up most energetically the question of costs in the negotiations with the publishers. So far the following arrangement has been arrived at: The special representative of the Deutscher Verlag has arranged with the American publishers Howell and Soskin to print and publish the Warsaw documents² at once on a large scale as a special brochure, for which sales to the amount of up to 100,000 dollars have been guaranteed. The publishers have begun printing. As a result of the unusually high fees, it has been possible to secure the services of two of the most distinguished American scholars and research workers on war guilt questions, who will write a suitable introduction and synopsis of the subject matter, in order thus to explain to the American reader the significance and far-reaching importance of these documents.

II. On their own responsibility the American publishers do not dare to put the Warsaw documents into circulation except through the book trade in the numbers requested by you; those numbers are larger than is usually customary here for best sellers among similar political books. They fear countermeasures by the Government, particularly by the American secret state police. In order to relieve them of this risk organizations must be brought in to acquire large numbers of the Warsaw documents from the publishers, and then, for their part, to circulate them at their own risk. Suitable agents are

¹ Not printed (2858/551479). In this telegram Ribbentrop stated that the propaganda activities with reference to the Polish documents appeared unsatisfactory, and requested suggestions as to how wide distribution could be achieved without compromising the Embassy.

² See documents Nos. 24, 26, 31, and 158.

at work and are unremitting in their efforts to negotiate with appropriate organizations. The responsible heads of these organizations and the confidential agents thus expose themselves to very great risk. For this reason I feel justified in giving them guarantees of protection in each case. For instance, that we are prepared to indemnify them for any loss or damage suffered through American counterintelligence [*Abwehr*] by paying for traveling expenses and a stay in Germany for the duration of the war. Confidential agents are traveling around the United States on instructions from the Embassy. I shall report regularly on the result of their negotiations regarding this second part of the program for circulation. Although I have conducted all negotiations with the greatest caution, nevertheless there is still the danger of the Embassy being compromised.

III. For purposes of camouflage please have the following telegram dispatched by the Deutscher Verlag immediately and en clair. (See telegram No. 343 of April 4):³

"To Dr. Manfred Zapp,⁴ Gladstone Hotel, 114 East 52nd Street, New York City. With reference to our transatlantic telephone conversation of April 22 I request you to conduct negotiations energetically with the interested American publishers with a view to publication of an American edition of the documents in question. You are authorized to sell the copyright for the U.S.A. to the publishers and, if need be, to assume the sales guarantee as well. We shall confirm this telegram by letter and shall inform you of any particular wishes."⁵

THOMSEN

³ See document No. 31, footnote 7.

⁴ Representative of Transocean News Service in the United States.

⁵ In a minute of May 6 (2858/551489) Altenburg noted that a telegram en clair had already been dispatched to Dr. Zapp as suggested. On May 8 the Embassy in Washington was further instructed, at Ribbentrop's direction, to handle the matter with special care (telegram No. 487: 2858/551486).

No. 196

176/84722-23

The Embassy in the United States to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

TOP SECRET

No. 835 of May 4

WASHINGTON, May 4, 1940—6:06 p. m.

Received May 5—9:45 a. m.

For the OKM for Fetzner.

Hertslet¹ has telegraphed as follows from Mexico on May 2 for transmission with the knowledge of Minister Freiherr Rüdert.²

Mexico is the focal point of the continental interests of the U.S.A.'s foreign policy. In domestic politics the American Government is

¹ See document No. 13, footnote 1.

² German Minister in Mexico.

expecting contributions to the Democratic party's election funds as a result of a strong gesture against Mexico's policy of expropriation. Mexico takes the line of appealing to the good neighbor policy, and exploiting public feeling in the U.S.A. which is opposed to interfering with Mexican democracy in favor of a monopoly group. This explains public statements by the Mexican Government against the Chamber of Deputies [sic] and in favor of democracy. The U.S.A. is attempting through the Dies Committee to prove the existence of Communist and National Socialist plots in Mexico, which would be sure to bring about a change in the attitude of the American public. The situation has become threatening in the last few days through the stupidity of German agents here. For details I refer you to the report from the Legation here to the Foreign Ministry.¹ The activities of agents should be organized differently here, since the Mexican Government is prepared to afford every kind of clandestine support for Germany. The reasons for this are: The President² expects from the German victory the strengthening of Mexico's political position in relation to the U.S.A. and the solution of her financial difficulties. I propose that inquiries for Intelligence Foreign Department [*Abwehr/Ausland*] be made directly to the Minister or to a confidant who is in contact with the Mexican Government. The expulsion by the Mexican Government of any enemy or U.S.A. agent whose activities can be proved is possible. I strongly support the latest report from the Legation.

Naval Attaché³
THOMSEN

¹ This situation had been reported by Rüdert in telegrams Nos. 178 of Apr. 4 (1725/401203) and 195 of May 2 (1725/401222-23).

² Lázaro Cárdenas.

³ Vice Admiral Witthoefft-Emden.

No. 197

B21/B005558-59

The Chargé d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

WASHINGTON, May 4, 1940—7:27 p. m.

SECRET

Received May 5—9:50 a. m.

No. 841 of May 4

With reference to your telegrams Nos. 471 (P 8230) of May 3, 475 (P 183 g), 477 (P 8238), and 478 (P 8274) of May 4.¹

With a view to publicizing English plans for the extension of the war² I have caused the following measures to be taken:

1) The substance of Press Department circular telegram P 8217 of May 3³ has been sent today to all American news agencies and to the most important American Cabinet Officers [*Ministern*] as the Embassy's "Berlin Bulletin."

¹ None found.

² This is presumably a reference to German White Book No. 4. See document No. 138, footnote 3.

³ Not found.

2) Contact will be made tomorrow with one of the best-known columnists (living in Philadelphia).

3) I have been able to discuss the English plans inconspicuously with the Russian, Japanese, and Spanish Ambassadors who are certain to repeat them here.

4) On Monday the 6th I am guest speaker at the well-known political club for members of the press, the "Overseas Writers" club, and shall have an opportunity of speaking on the subject before influential and important journalists.

5) I am endeavoring to induce isolationist Senators and Representatives to make statements or speeches on these lines in Congress or on the radio.

6) Thanks to the expenditure of considerable funds, a well-known American weekly newsletter will publish an appropriate editorial in its next edition.

7) Consulates throughout the country have received relevant instructions.

8) Our news agencies and editors have been advised and will, if necessary, immediately report any reaction in the American press.

9) I recommend that the request for an interview by the North American Newspaper Alliance syndicate be urged by you to this end. (See telegram No. 817 of May 2.⁴)

THOMSEN

⁴ Not found.

No. 198

5668/E411385-89

The Legation in Bulgaria to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 163 of May 5

SOFIA, May 4, 1940.

Received May 7—9:45 a. m.

W IIIa 2244.

I. Conversations¹ are in the main concluded; I give below the most important points:

1) *The Foreign Minister.*

As was to be expected, Popov, who for many years has been on particularly close terms with us, agreed to all the points of my statement regarding the attitude which Bulgaria has to adopt in combatting English economic warfare. He likewise agreed with my statement that we expected of Bulgaria, which was not a neutral but a friendly state, that all export surpluses over and above the volume exported heretofore and which could in any way be spared, should go primarily to Germany. English and French pressure is obviously weaker than in Yugoslavia. The English Minister² did not make any fresh demands on his return from London; the purchasing organization³ has not appeared as yet.

In the conversation on political matters which followed, Popov described Bulgaria's anxiety about the attitude of her neighbors. Turkish troop concentrations in Thrace and suspicious Rumanian

¹ See document No. 74 and footnote 1.

² George W. Rendel.

³ See document No. 74.

troop movements in the Dobruja were disturbing; Yugoslavia's attitude was not clear; Greece was not dangerous from a military point of view, but could become a theater of war any time through foreign influence. Turkey's diplomatic activity was exceedingly irksome for Bulgaria. Popov repeatedly assured me, however, that Bulgaria would continue to resist the wooing by the Balkan League. Only recently she had again declined economic cooperation. Popov was especially anxious to learn something from me about the Russian and Italian attitude. The whole attitude of the Foreign Minister was rather depressed. A detailed account will be given personally.

2) *The Minister of War.*

Like almost all Bulgarian officers, General Daskalov feels that Germany is the only natural ally, and in the future, as in the past, he will direct all his efforts toward developing closer economic relations with Germany, in order to assure the continued rearmament of the Bulgarian Army, which is only possible with Germany's help. In view of the fact that in the present situation an attack on Bulgaria may be expected any time, the General is very uneasy about the unsatisfactory supply of ammunition. Like the Foreign Minister he emphasized Bulgaria's absolute determination to fight in the event of any attack on the country. He urged me, however, to send German artillery ammunition at once by the Danube route as he considered the route through Yugoslavia and Rumania too dangerous.

3) *The Minister President.**

The Minister President, who is an amiable man, but as Minister for Education and Professor of Archaeology not very conversant with questions of foreign policy, confined himself substantially to reiterating in the name of the whole Bulgarian Government the statements made to me by the Foreign Minister.

4) *The King.*

The discussion lasting 2½ hours with King Boris was by far the most interesting conversation I have had during my visit. In connection with our last discussion in June^b 1939 the King explained in detail the line he intended to follow in Bulgaria's foreign policy. As in Bulgaria, too, developments tend more and more toward the King alone making decisions, at any rate on matters of foreign policy, it is in the last resort only his opinion that counts. The King proceeds from the assumption that, now as ever, Bulgaria can realize her national aspirations only on Germany's side. Bulgaria is, however, so weak militarily that she should remain neutral as long as possible. Should an attack take place, she would defend herself by all available means. In all the neighboring states the position was uncertain. As soon as peace in the Danube Basin was disturbed from outside, Bulgaria would have to bear heavy onslaughts. But the Bulgarian people expected of him that this war would not end without Bulgaria having realized at least one of her national aspirations. Southern Dobruja was the minimum. With respect to the Bulgarian people, who were still strongly attached to Russia emotionally, the conclusion of German-Russian treaties had made it much easier for him to pursue a foreign policy of alignment with Germany. The King inquired particularly about German-Italian relations and showed the greatest satisfaction at my definite statements on Italy's

* Bogdan Filov.

^b Actually on July 11, 1939. See vol. vi, documents Nos. 656 and 673.

absolute solidarity with Germany. He considered the situation in Yugoslavia as not at all clear. As regards Rumania he was particularly interested in whether King Carol's position was now secure. He thought it dangerous if at this moment a strong hand did not remain at the helm in Rumania. The question whether Russia will attack naturally preoccupies him very much. Like Csáky * on behalf of Hungary, he declared that in this event Bulgaria would not march.

When I explained my special mission to the King, he confirmed the statements made in his name by the Foreign Minister and the Minister President and added some information of his own about the English attitude. It worried him that the English had been so quiet, particularly of late. He had received the English Minister on his return from London. The latter had not put forward any demands, either as regards economic warfare or anything else. He feared that this apparent calm might mean that the English had abandoned the kind of diplomatic pressure employed so far as being inadequate, and that they now had something else up their sleeve in the southeast. He referred to disquieting reports of English naval movements and plans in the Mediterranean. Tomorrow he would be receiving the English Ambassador in Ankara,† who is here on a visit, and was hoping then to get perhaps a clearer picture.‡ On the whole, the King's observations revealed great concern at Bulgaria's exposed position and the uncertainty about immediate developments. I shall supplement this report orally.

5) *The Minister of Finance.*

Bojilov, who for years has been the real director of Bulgarian economic policy and who has himself conducted economic negotiations with Germany, remarked that the Germans after many years of co-operation surely knew his attitude. He had deliberately aligned the economic policy of the country completely with that of Germany. He gratefully acknowledged that Germany had always helped him, and he would, of course, take care that particularly in time of war the course followed up to the present would not be disturbed by British machinations. The purchasing organization had not yet put in an appearance. Anyway, such an overwhelming proportion of Bulgarian exports went to Germany that a disturbance was out of the question.

6) *The Minister of Commerce.*

The new Minister of Commerce * who has only been a few months in office, expressed himself in the same terms as Bojilov. The English had made no attempt of any kind to influence him of late. The English Consul General had merely called on him once, some time ago, to say that England was prepared to buy everything that Bulgaria would otherwise deliver to Germany. When questioned on this, the Minister of Commerce confirmed explicitly that the Englishman had made his offer in a form pointedly directed against Germany. This is interesting because, according to other information, in other countries the English are said always to have spoken in general terms only of an offer to buy. The Minister of Commerce declared that he

* Cf. document No. 182.

† Sir Hughe M. Knatchbull-Hugessen.

‡ On the basis of information from the Bulgarian Foreign Minister, Richthofen reported on Knatchbull-Hugessen's visit to Sofia in telegram No. 164 of May 8 (585/242580-81).

* Zagorov.

had replied that Bulgaria was bound to fulfill her obligations toward her best customer and could not therefore entertain the offer. Since then nothing more had been heard from the English. He added that the possibility of obtaining raw materials by means of limited deliveries to England must, in the Bulgarian interest, remain open.

II. The general impression is that the important political figures, above all the King, consider as the only possible foreign policy one of alignment with Germany. Over and above this, all interested parties are fully aware that through the developments of recent years Bulgaria's economy has become inseparably linked with the German market. Hence, in their own interests, the Bulgarian Government will resist to the utmost any attempt to upset commercial relations with Germany. Statistics prove that so far this has been successful. On the other hand, there is no doubt that the Bulgarians feel very weak and isolated, and anticipate any further political or military pressure with great anxiety. The military strengthening of Bulgaria is one of our most urgent tasks in southeast Europe.

CLODIUS
RICHTHOFEN

No. 199

956/301025

*Unsigned Memorandum*¹

Subject: Draft of the reply of OKW to the letter OKH/Gen St d H/Gen Qu Nr. 1167/40 g. K. of May 3, 1940.²

For reasons of national and ethnic policy the Führer has ordered that companies of the SS are to be transferred to Denmark at a given time.

The task of these companies is to attract volunteers from Denmark by their recruiting appeal and to influence them for the idea of a community of Germanic peoples, and gradually to win them away from their connections with the Western Powers.

The date of transfer of the SS companies will be ordered by the Führer. Until then there is no intention of recruiting volunteers, or in particular of setting up recruiting offices in Denmark.

The task of these SS units is a purely political one and has nothing to do with military duties.

Billeting and command arrangements for the SS units should only be determined when the need arises.

These measures are to be put before the Danish Government by the German Plenipotentiary. The OKW is requesting the Foreign Ministry to instruct the Plenipotentiary accordingly.³

¹ From the files of Minister Renthe-Fink. A marginal note at the top of the page reads: "Received on May 6 from Colonel Wagner. F. [Renthe-Fink?]." Marginal note at the bottom of the page: "Transmitted by Lieutenant Colonel of the General Staff Böhme on May 6, 1940, 11:00 a. m. Rossmann."

² OKH letter of May 3: Not found.

³ Not found.

No. 200

265/172261-62

The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 300 of May 6

ANKARA, May 6, 1940—6:00 p. m.

Received May 6—11:40 p. m.

A high-ranking official of the Foreign Ministry said the following to Minister Kroll obviously with reference to the question I put to M. Numan (concluding sentence of my telegram No. 294 in May ¹):

1. It was Turkey's most ardent wish that Italy should continue to stay out of the war.

2. In the event of Italy entering the war, Turkey could not disavow her obligations under the pact. Should Italy, however, attack neither the Balkans nor Turkish territory, Turkey would confine herself to making a few ports with coaling facilities on the Aegean Coast available to Allied warships in return for financial aid and arms deliveries received, but would herself refrain from any kind of warlike action. Turkey hoped that in this way the Balkans and the Near East would virtually be spared from war; this information confirms M. Massigli's statement that Turkey was not to be forced into any offensive warlike action. Ambassador Terentiyev assesses the situation here quite similarly. They are expecting here an Italian assurance that, in the event of Italy's entry into the war, Turkey and the Balkans would be kept out of the hostilities as long as Turkey refrained from any offensive action and kept the Straits closed. In such a case Turkey would still honor the letter of the Anglo-French-Turkish Treaty with respect to the obligation to assist but would, in practice, keep out of the war. Terentiyev emphasized repeatedly that Turkey should be supported in this attitude and strengthened for resisting any further Allied pressure. In the end, the common aim of German-Russian policy to restrain Turkey from effective participation in the war would be achieved by this. In reply to my question what the Soviet Union's attitude would be if Italy entered the war Terentiyev said that, provided hostilities did not spread to the Balkans and the Black Sea area, the Soviet Government would regard the Italian-Turkish conflict as a matter for these two countries and would not take part in it. I should be grateful for instructions as to whether the question was discussed in Rome on the lines suggested in my report No. A 2053 of April 25 ² and how it is being viewed there.

PAPEN

¹ Not printed (265/172257). In this telegram of May 3, Papen reported a conversation with Menemencioğlu about the possibility of warlike developments in the Mediterranean. The concluding sentence of this telegram reads as follows: "To my further question, whether Turkey would remain outside the war, in case Italy were forced into a decision by the Allies and in case her actions were not directed against Turkey's sphere of influence, Numan replied that he considered this out of the question."

² Not found.

No. 201

173/84290-91

Memorandum by the Director of the Economic Policy Department

URGENT

BERLIN, May 6, 1940.

Subject: Deliveries of antiaircraft guns to Holland.

On May 3 and 4, the Dutch Minister referred in telephone conversations to the representations he had made on April 29¹ respecting the delivery of additional 3.7-cm. and 2-cm. antiaircraft guns. To the reply that a decision could not have been arrived at yet, he announced that he would repeat his inquiry on May 7.

On the basis of the report, as shown in the attached memorandum of May 2, the Foreign Minister had given instructions that he was to be approached once more in this matter on May 8.

I suggest that it be agreed on principle to release the 33 pieces of 2-cm. antiaircraft guns for the Netherlands Indies. The steamship by which the Netherlands Government wants to dispatch 20 of these pieces to the Netherlands Indies is leaving Genoa shortly. The High Command of the Wehrmacht agrees to their release and delivery and considers it highly desirable to reach a decision now as to whether the antiaircraft guns for the Netherlands are to be released or not, for, should the reply be in the negative, it would like to dispose of the guns elsewhere.

Submitted to the Foreign Minister together with the memorandum of May 2 with the request for approval.²

WIEHL

[Enclosure]

BERLIN, May 2, 1940.

Subject: Deliveries of antiaircraft guns to Holland.

The Dutch Government has a claim, according to contract, to the delivery of:

a) Twenty batteries of 7.5-cm. antiaircraft guns. Two batteries were delivered at the end of 1939, one battery in February 1940, leaving 17 batteries, i. e., 68 pieces still to be delivered.

b) Five batteries of 3.7-cm. antiaircraft guns. One battery was delivered in March 1940, leaving 4 batteries, i. e., 16 pieces still to be delivered.

c) Thirty-three 2-cm. antiaircraft guns for the Netherlands Indies. So far none delivered.³

On April 29 the Dutch Minister made urgent representations relative to the delivery of additional 3.7-cm. antiaircraft guns and of all the

¹ See the enclosure to this document.

² No reply to this memorandum has been found.

³ Cf. document No. 4.

thirty-three 2-cm. antiaircraft guns. He pointed out that the guns were finished, the firms ready to deliver them, the military authorities were agreeable to the deliveries, the decision therefore rested solely with the Foreign Ministry. The Dutch Government urgently requested the release of the materials.

Suggestion

a) to do nothing in the case of the 7.5 antiaircraft guns since the Dutch Minister has not reverted to this,

b) in the case of the 3.7-cm. antiaircraft guns to deliver an additional battery of four guns. The OKW will probably be agreeable to this if the Foreign Minister considers the delivery desirable,

c) agree in principle to the release of the thirty-three 2-cm. antiaircraft guns for the Netherlands Indies. Of these, 20 to be shipped forthwith via Genoa. The Dutch acceptance officer has stated that cargo space has been prepared for these in a steamship sailing from Genoa shortly. The OKW agrees to this release and delivery.

Herewith for submission to the Reich Foreign Minister through the State Secretary.

WIEHL

No. 202

205/142227-29

The Minister in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

STOCKHOLM, May 7, 1940—2:45 a.m.

SECRET

Received May 7—7:25 a.m.

No. 711 of May 6

For the Foreign Minister.

With reference to my telegram No. 698 of May 5.¹

¹ In telegram No. 698 of May 5 the German Minister reported that at the first conversation between the German negotiators and Sköld (see document No. 184 and footnote 2), no offer of additional arms deliveries had been made because Sköld had refused to enter into any discussion of transport of arms and munitions to Norway, stating that only the Foreign Minister was competent to deal with this problem affecting neutrality (30/22217).

Ritter on May 6 recorded that Göring had called him to inquire about the negotiations in Stockholm. "In that connection the Field Marshal said that he was opposed to even a single rifle being delivered to Sweden if Sweden did not comply with the German wishes." (319/192751-52)

Negotiations were going on at the same time in Berlin between Göring and the Swedish intermediary Dahlerus, who on May 6 had a conference with Göring at Karinhall. At this conference Göring made demands for transit of arms through Sweden to Narvik and asked that a delegation empowered to make an answer be sent to Berlin. On Dahlerus' return to Stockholm it was decided to send a delegation to Berlin, which should make a negative answer. This answer was given on May 11 on behalf of the delegation by Admiral Tamm. No records of these conferences have been found in the files of the German Foreign Ministry, but accounts of them by Dahlerus and Häggblöf are printed in *Transiteringsfrågor . . . April-Juni 1940*, pp. 184-192, 310-318.

In a review of the question of arms deliveries prepared for the Foreign Minister on June 25 (205/142449-50) it was stated that "at the beginning of May there was imposed an embargo on the export of war material to Sweden. By direction of the Foreign Minister Swedish requests in connection with negotiations on this matter were to be treated dilatorily."

I. A discussion lasting about an hour took place today at the Swedish Foreign Ministry, in which Secretary General Boheman and Counselor Häggblöf, both of the Foreign Ministry, and Colonel Kellgren as the representative of the War Minister, took part. Our delegates made full and emphatic use of the arguments in paragraph 5) of your telegram No. 479² and paragraph 1) of your telegram No. 493.³ On the orders of the Foreign Minister, who is ill, Secretary General Boheman replied that the Swedish Government wished, in accordance with all declarations made by the Government up to the present, in all circumstances to interpret neutrality—as had already been done in the World War of '14-'18—in such a manner that delivery of war material or transit of war material could not be allowed to any participant in the war of the Great Powers. Unconditional adherence to this point of view had previously caused Sweden great difficulties in '14-'18, when there was the question of sending arms and ammunition from England to Russia by the route via Sweden. At the beginning of the present European war too, the Swedish Government had refused export to England of some fifty 4-cm. antiaircraft guns of the Bofors firm which had already been ordered and paid for. In the same way the passage to England of a battery of guns manufactured in Hungary, which were at Göteborg as transit goods when war broke out, had been refused. The Swedish Government was determined to adhere to this standpoint, and therefore regretted that it was not able to meet our wishes for the transport of arms and ammunition to Norway.

II. Besides other arguments, attention was drawn in detail and with greatest emphasis by the German side to the attitude of the Swedish Government during the Russo-Finnish conflict, to the public announcements of neutrality by leading Swedish statesmen, and also to Sweden's well-understood interest in defense.

Boheman replied that the Swedish Government had always made a clear distinction between its traditional neutrality in the war of the Great Powers, and the special Swedish attitude to the Russo-Finnish conflict, when a declaration of absolute neutrality had never been made. If one wished to be truly neutral one must either supply war materials to both parties or to none of the nations at war. Furthermore, Sweden believed that she could successfully and by her own efforts defend her territory against possible English attacks in the north of the country. A serious threat to Norrland⁴ from Narvik was the less likely since the area around Narvik was not an adequate base of operations for the English, while Sweden had all the lines of communication with the hinterland at her disposal.

² Document No. 183.

³ Document No. 184.

⁴ The northern part of Sweden.

III. Counselor Häggblöf supplemented Boheman's remarks by referring to the discussions in Berlin mentioned in telegram No. 479,⁵ paragraph 1). He explained that the Swedish Government believed that, in view of the attitude adopted by the Swedish delegation in Berlin, we considered the matter closed. In any case the German side had at that time, out of regard for the Swedish point of view, decided to refrain from sending trains of ammunition with the supplies going through Sweden; and in Berlin the counterdemand had only been that [Sweden] refrain from supplying Norway with arms, which Sweden had complied with in spite of urgent Norwegian requests.

IV. To our questioning, Secretary General Boheman repeatedly declared that the rejection of our desire for transit had been caused by the Swedish Government's desire for strict neutrality; it would therefore be maintained, but it was confined to the transit of war materials. To our further question whether the transit of railway transport of provisions, etc., to the occupied areas in Norway would therefore be allowed, Boheman replied that there was nothing to prevent the sending of single carloads and of individual freight shipments in normal international railway traffic, while Häggblöf emphasized that the sending of provision trains to Narvik had been an isolated case which should not create a precedent.

V. The impression of our negotiators is that offers of further German deliveries of arms are not regarded by the Swedish Government as compensation for modification of its neutrality policy.

WIED

⁵ Document No. 183.

No. 203

233/156190

The Ambassador in Argentina to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 451 of May 7

BUENOS AIRES, May 7, 1940—10:06 p. m.

Received May 8—7:15 a. m.

At the beginning of a long conversation the Foreign Minister, on instructions by the President, warned me with respect to German propaganda which is being carried on too vigorously in Argentina, thereby endangering internal peace. The Foreign Minister drew particular attention to the *Pampero*, allegedly subsidized by the German Embassy, which I strongly denied, and to the very numerous pamphlets distributed throughout the country. I replied that these pamphlets, the contents of which were regularly derived from official announcements, were our only means of combating enemy propaganda, since the whole of the press, especially that in the capital, refused to

accept German news with the exception of official reports from the German High Command and either did not print other official announcements at all or else only in a very abbreviated form and mostly with headlines distorting their meaning. Justice demanded that both sides should be heard. The Foreign Minister would not admit this and persisted with his assertions regarding disturbances of the peace, also mentioning the Falklands in this connection, whereupon I stated that this question had been brought up for discussion solely in Argentine quarters.

I then complained to the Minister about the fresh defamatory campaign against the German element here under the slogan *Quinta Columna*, which he described as not to be taken seriously. I emphatically drew attention to the absolute loyalty of the whole of the German element in Argentina as was expressly proved at the Patagonia trial.¹

Finally, in accordance with telegram No. 303 of April 10² I expressed our willingness to pay in installments the cost of interning the crew of the *Graf Spee*, at which the Minister evinced great pleasure. A further report on this will follow.³

Thermann

¹ As the result of the publication in the Argentine press of an alleged report to the Colonial Policy Office of the NSDAP on the collection of secret intelligence in preparation for a German annexation of Patagonia, Alfred Müller, deputy Landesgruppenleiter for Argentina, had been arrested on Mar. 31, 1939. Müller was released on May 6, 1939, but various aspects of the case occupied the Argentine courts for some time thereafter. Material on this incident has been filmed on serials 238, 2551, and 6584.

² Not printed (8864/E618309).

³ The financing of the cost of the Internment of the crew of the *Graf Spee* in Argentina was referred to by Thermann in telegrams, No. 698 of June 25 (341/199503) and No. 1074 of Sept. 18 (8864/E618375). Further material has been filmed on serial 8864.

No. 204

357/203979-80

The Foreign Minister to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union

BERLIN, May 7, 1940.

Received May 10.

Enclosed you will find two copies of two memoranda¹ which will be presented by our Legations in The Hague, Brussels, and Luxembourg to the Governments there on the day and hour to be indicated to you orally by the courier.² Until the démarche ordered below has been accomplished, the memoranda and these instructions are to be kept strictly secret and not mentioned even to any member of the Embassy.

¹ See documents Nos. 214 and 215.

² Interlinear note in Schulenburg's handwriting: "10.5.40 5:45 [a.m.] German summer time."

I request that after receipt of these instructions you enter on the copies of the attached memoranda—on the last page, beneath the text—the date of the day *before* that on which you deliver the copies to the Government there, preferably with typewriter, or else in ink.

About 7 o'clock in the morning, German summer time, on the day mentioned to you by the courier, I request that you ask for an appointment with M. Molotov and then, in the course of the morning at the earliest hour convenient to him, hand him a copy of the memoranda. I request that you tell M. Molotov that the Reich Government, in view of our friendly relations, is anxious to notify the Soviet Government of these operations in the West, which were forced upon Germany by the impending Anglo-French push on the Ruhr region by way of Belgium and Holland.

For the rest, I request that you use the viewpoints and arguments to be found in the memoranda themselves.

I request that you report by wire immediately concerning the reception accorded your mission.^a

RIBBENTROP

^a See document No. 226.

No. 205

2281/480458-59

The Foreign Minister to the Ambassador in Italy

BERLIN, May 7, 1940.

Received May 10—3:30 a. m.

Enclosed you will find copies of two memoranda¹ which will be presented by our Ministers in The Hague, Brussels, and Luxembourg to the Governments there on the day and hour to be indicated to you orally by the courier.² Until the démarche ordered below has been accomplished I request you to keep the memoranda and these instructions strictly secret and not even mention them to any member of the Embassy.

I request that after receipt of these instructions you enter on the copies of the attached memoranda—on the last page, beneath the text—the date of the day *before* that on which you deliver the copies to the Government there, preferably with typewriter, or else in ink.

On the day which the courier names I request you to call on Count Ciano at 5:45 a. m., German summer time, and hand him the memoranda. When announcing your visit I request you merely to say that your instructions are (presumably jointly with him?) to hand these memoranda and the attached personal letter³ from the Führer

¹ See documents Nos. 214 and 215.

² Marginal note in Mackensen's handwriting: "May 10, 5:35 German time."

³ Document No. 212.

with its enclosures⁴ to the Duce in person by 6 a. m., German summer time, at the latest. With reference to your recent request to be given as free a hand as possible when fixing the time for handing over such personal messages,⁵ I must request you in this instance to insist on seeing the Duce personally and on the documents being in his hands at 6 a. m. at the latest.

When making your *démarche* to Ciano and also to the Duce I request you to make yourself familiar with the substance of the memorandum which speaks for itself and furthermore conduct your conversation according to the Führer's letter.⁶

You will report to me personally by telephone⁷ on the way the *démarche* is received.

RIBBENTROP

⁴ A memorandum by Counselor of Embassy Plessen, dated Rome, May 10 (2281/480457) indicates that the enclosures were copies of the reports cited at document No. 214, footnotes 2 and 3.

⁵ No record of such a request has been found.

⁶ Marginal note: "Contents of which I only learned from the Duce who translated it into Italian sentence by sentence for Count Ciano in my presence. M[ackensen] May 10."

⁷ Marginal note in Mackensen's handwriting: "Carried out at 7 o'clock in the morning."

No. 206

3998/E058187

The Ambassador in Belgium to the Foreign Ministry

A 960

BRUSSELS, May 7, 1940.

Received May 8.

Pol. II 1669.

Last Sunday¹ at Charleroi, Pierlot, the Belgian Minister President, made a lengthy speech to the Christian workers organized within the Catholic party, which has aroused great attention among the Belgian public and has met with general approval.

An interesting point about M. Pierlot's speech, of which I enclose a press cutting,² is perhaps that it was made with full knowledge of events in Norway. It shows that even the defeat of the Allies and their withdrawal from Norway has had no effect on the attitude of the Belgian Government. The Minister President repeated the old ideas in new terms. He underlined with particular emphasis the determination with which Belgium would meet any aggressor and pointed out how well Belgium was armed.

For the rest the speech reaffirmed the unshakable will of the Belgian Government to continue the policy of neutrality. Belgium could be brought to abandon her policy of neutrality only by an attack on her frontiers or by some equally significant act, since this would be incompatible with the security and dignity of the country.

v. BÜLOW-SCHWANTE

¹ I. e., May 5.

² Not reprinted.

No. 207

73/52352

Unsigned Minute

[Undated.]

M. T. I., the official Hungarian news agency, is tonight distributing a report published in the Belgrade newspaper *Politika* from the latter's Budapest correspondent according to which the news is circulating in Budapest that Germany had approached Hungary for permission for transit of her troops. The official Hungarian news agency reproduces this report without comment, which at 11 p. m. already appeared in the early morning editions of the newspapers over the initials M. T. I.¹

¹ Marginal note: "Führer's decision: The Hungarians should be called upon at once to issue a denial of their own accord. Hewel. May 8, 1940. 3:20 p. m."

The text of a proposed denial which had been telephoned from Budapest was submitted to the Foreign Minister on May 8 by Senior Counselor Schmidt of the Press Department (73/52353-54).

No. 208

173/84301

Memorandum by an Official of Political Division I

BERLIN, May 8, 1940.

e. o. Pol. I M 6582 g.

At 7:40 p. m. Captain Gregor of the Luftwaffe operations staff reported as follows:

A German aircraft on reconnaissance over the Channel developed engine trouble. The aircraft was in distress and lost height considerably. Consequently it tried to reach its base by the quickest route and found itself at 4:40 p. m. today over Dutch territory south-west of Rotterdam. As it flew in it was fired on by Dutch aircraft. In spite of damage, the aircraft succeeded in reaching its base.

Upon the incident being reported to the Führer, he ordered and requested that the Foreign Ministry be instructed to convey to the Netherlands Government by this evening the German Government's regret for the violation of the frontier.

Submitted herewith to the Reich Foreign Minister with the request for authorization to convey appropriate instructions to the Legation at The Hague by telephone.¹

V. D. HEYDEN-RYNSCH

¹ The Minister in The Hague reported in telegram No. 368 of May 8, 8:58 p. m.: "Instructions carried out. The Foreign Minister thanked me very much for the thoroughly correct disposition of the incident." (173/84302)

No. 209

173/84300

Memorandum by an Official of Political Division I

BERLIN, May 8, 1940.

The OKW transmits the following supplementary information:

The Netherlands:

- 1) On May 7 leave was canceled for the armed forces and for workers in war industries.
- 2) Extensive restrictions on railway traffic were ordered as from May 8.
- 3) Announcement that from May 11 to 13 no ships are permitted to put in to the Meuse and Rhine estuaries.
- 4) All Dutch freighters now in Germany are being recalled.
- 5) Air traffic has been stopped as from May 8.
- 6) Troop movements by truck in the direction of the frontier.

The foregoing are intelligence reports.

The reasons given for these measures are alleged German troop concentrations and an alleged English demand for permission to land 40,000 men.

V. D. HEYDEN-RYNSCH

No. 210

449/222707-08

Memorandum by the State Secretary

St.S. No. 348

BERLIN, May 8, 1940.

The Greek Minister called on me today in a rather nervous state. He took the news of the Western Powers' intentions to extend the war less seriously than a possible repetition of events in Scandinavia. He thought that Germany, perhaps in conjunction with Italy, might forestall the suspected intentions of the Western Powers and for her part draw the Balkans, in particular Greece, into the theater of war.

I did not allay the Minister's anxiety but threw the blame entirely onto England and France.

The Minister said that only a few days ago an assurance was received in Athens from the Western Powers that they meant to leave Greece unmolested. The Government did not, in fact, think that the British and French had any intentions of disembarking. The strong language of the Italian press, however, and that of German newspapers during the last few days showed that we were expecting the Western Powers to stage a second Salonika which we could then forestall with the usual suddenness.

I told M. Rizo-Rangabé he should indeed first ask himself who could actually gain by the Balkans going up in flames: we or the Western Powers?

He should explain to me further what the meaning was of British shipping being diverted from the Mediterranean around the Cape of Good Hope, the Allied battle fleet assembling near Alexandria, Malta being evacuated and blacked out and, above all, official British statements actually foreshadowing an extension of the war to the Mediterranean. I received with thanks the information that there was no fear of the Allies in Athens; this freedom from worry would perhaps be more justified if despite the guarantee¹ received from the Western Powers the latter were officially informed that any British-French attempt at debarkation would be met by force of arms. I understand nothing better than Greece's wish to remain aloof from the clash of arms. This wish would indeed be fulfilled if the Western Powers abandoned their plans for extending the war. This abandonment should not, however, merely emerge from pious assurances by British diplomats but rather from tangible evidence on the conduct of the war by the Western Powers. Should the Minister be able to furnish me such evidence now or later, I would be grateful.

In conclusion I brought the conversation round to the situation within Greece, to M. Politis'² statements which were friendly to the Western Powers and to similar matters.

WEIZSÄCKER

¹ This refers to the declarations made by the British Prime Minister and the President of the Council of French Ministers on Apr. 13, promising support for Greece and Rumania in case of a threat to their independence; *Parl. Deb.*, 5th ser., H. of C., vol. 846, col. 13; *Documents on International Affairs, 1939-1946* (London, 1951), vol. 1, p. 202.

² In a telegram sent on Apr. 9 from Athens Minister Erbach reported that he had questioned the State Secretary of the Greek Foreign Ministry about certain statements of former Greek Minister Politis which had been reported by the Agence Havas (449/222700).

No. 211

141/126574

The Ambassador in Belgium to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

BRUSSELS, May 9, 1940—8:07 p. m.

No. 247 of May 9

Received May 9—7:00 p. m.

The military measures taken by Holland on Tuesday,¹ the reasons for which are not clearly discernible from here, caused some uneasiness in Belgium yesterday. Having examined the situation, however, the Belgian Government did not consider any particular steps of a military character to be necessary. In reporting on yesterday's meeting of the Council of Ministers the press reports that Belgium is prepared for all eventualities, and that the situation is being viewed calmly and with equanimity by the Government. BÜLOW

¹ I.e., May 7. See document No. 209.

No. 212

9917/E694560-63

*Adolf Hitler to Benito Mussolini*¹

BERLIN, May 9, 1940.

DUCE: When you receive this letter I shall already have crossed the Rubicon.

The information which we received some days ago about the conversation between Chamberlain and Reynaud² is undoubtedly exact. It emanates from the same source which provided us with the first concrete information about the impending operation by the British against Norway. I can therefore personally vouch for the exactness of the contents.

In spite of this the conviction within me has been reinforced that just as in the case of Norway a grandiose false maneuver is involved here too which is certainly aimed at inducing me to withdraw troops from the decisive front.

In the last few days there has been an increase in the number of reports that England, having learned from her experiences in Norway, is now resolved to carry out a surprise occupation of a certain number of important military bases in Holland. For this purpose England has demanded of the Dutch Government that it agree to the landing of British troops on its territory and to the occupation of airfields. The attitude of the Netherlands Government is uncertain. In any case they will not offer serious resistance. Their ties with British interests are too strong as is also the influence exerted by British money.

Halifax's speech yesterday³ suddenly let us know that the Norwegian adventure was to be regarded as having been abandoned in order to continue the struggle in another place. Troops have already been embarked or are being embarked at numerous places on the English coast. It is absolutely out of the question that their destination is the Mediterranean.

You can see for yourself, Duce, the true sentiments and attitude of Holland and Belgium from the documents which I am enclosing for you herewith.⁴ The record of the threatening events of the last few days is still required to make them complete.

The military situation is clear.

¹This document is translated from a photostatic copy of an Italian version of the letter found in a collection of Italian Foreign Ministry documents brought to Lisbon during World War II. The originals were later returned to the Italian Government. No German text of this document has been found.

²The report referred to has not been found.

³In the House of Lords. For Halifax's statements in his speech of May 8, see *Parl. Deb.*, 5th ser., H of L, vol. 116, col. 345-346.

⁴Apparently a reference to the enclosures mentioned in document No. 205 and footnote 4, thereto.

It will be impossible in future to cut Germany off from the north and deprive her of supplies of ores.

An attempt to attack the German Western Front from the Rhine to the frontier of Luxembourg is likewise out of the question. Any similar attempt would be drowned in a sea of blood.

Nor would it be possible to end the war in the Allies' favor by cutting Germany off from her sources of petroleum supplies since, as a result of our domestic measures directed toward autarky and our Four Year Plan, we shall already be in a position to supply our own requirements in the course of this year.

The only possibility for France and England to hope for a success would be to destroy the Ruhr or at least to paralyze production there.

From the beginning, all Anglo-French military plans have been directed toward this objective.

As, judging from the situation, we have been threatened since yesterday by immediate danger, I have therefore decided today to give the order to attack on the Western Front at 5:35 a. m. tomorrow to ensure the neutrality of Belgium and Holland, above all by military measures.

I beg you, Duce, apart from any feelings, to understand the force of the circumstances which compel me to act.

It is a question of life or death for my people and the Reich for the next 500 or 1,000 years.

I should be failing in my duty if I did not fulfill what my judgment and necessity demand of me.

I hope that I shall be successful in creating shortly that situation to which I referred at our last meeting.⁵

I will keep you informed as to the operations and you will thus be in a position to consider in complete freedom the decisions for which you deem it advisable to assume responsibility in the interests of your people.

With the greetings of an old comrade,

Yours,

A. HITLER

⁵ See document No. 1.

No. 213

413/215786-87

Führer's Directive

FÜHRER'S HEADQUARTERS, May 9, 1940.

Pol. I 552 g. Rs.

THE FÜHRER AND SUPREME COMMANDER OF THE WEHRMACHT

Subject: Administration of the occupied territories of France, Luxembourg, Belgium, and Holland.

1) The authority conferred on the Commander in Chief of the Army to exercise executive power in the theater of operations, extends also

to the widening of the theater of operations resulting from the advance of the German troops beyond the Reich frontier in the west.

2) The Commander in Chief of the Army will set up a military administration for the territories of France, Luxembourg, Belgium, and Holland which are to be occupied. The implementation of the military administration will be delegated to military departments designed for this purpose. The executive bodies will be appointed by the Army.

3) The military administration will be so conducted as to avoid giving the impression that it is intended to annex the occupied territories. The provisions of The Hague Convention on Land Warfare will be observed. The population will be protected and economic life maintained.

4) Hostile acts by the population (guerilla warfare, sabotage, passive resistance, stopping of work as a political demonstration) will be suppressed with the utmost severity.

5) The frontier between the German Reich and the occupied territories of France, Luxembourg, Belgium, and Holland will be closed to nonmilitary passenger and goods traffic as soon as the German troops begin to march in. Exemption from this frontier closure will be subject to the decision of the Commander in Chief of the Army and the departments authorized by him. These are to be restricted to a minimum at first.

The frontier closure will also apply to leading personages and representatives of the highest Reich authorities and departments of the Party. Ordinarily applications for entry permits by these departments will be transmitted through the High Command of the Wehrmacht.

ADOLF HITLER

No. 214

413/215794-805

*Memorandum of the German Government to the Royal Belgian Government and the Royal Netherlands Government*¹

BERLIN, May 9, 1940.

MEMORANDUM

The Reich Government has for a long time had no doubts as to what was the chief aim of British and French war policy. It consists in the spreading of the war to other countries, and of the misuse of their peoples as auxiliary and mercenary troops for England and France.

¹The Belgian Ambassador in Berlin, Vicomte Davignon, states in his *Berlin 1936-1940: Souvenirs d'une mission* (Paris and Brussels, 1951), pp. 236-248, that at 5:45 a. m. on May 10, he was summoned to the Foreign Ministry where somewhat later the German memorandum was handed to him by von Ribbentrop.

On the presentation of the memorandum to the Belgian Foreign Minister in Brussels, see document No. 221.

The latest attempt of this sort was the plan to occupy Scandinavia with the help of Norway, in order to set up a new front against Germany in this region. It was only Germany's last minute action which upset this project. Germany has furnished documentary evidence of this before the eyes of the world.

Immediately after the British-French action in Scandinavia miscarried, England and France took up their policy of war expansion in another direction. Thus, while the retreat in flight of the British troops from Norway was still going on, the English Prime Minister announced that as a result of the altered situation in Scandinavia England was once more in a position to go ahead with the transfer of the main weight of her Navy to the Mediterranean, and that English and French units were already on the way to Alexandria. The Mediterranean now became the center of English-French war propaganda. This was partly to gloss over the Scandinavian defeat and the great loss of prestige before their own people and before the world, and partly to make it appear that the Balkans had been chosen for the next theater of war against Germany.

In reality, however, this apparent shifting to the Mediterranean of English-French war policy had quite another purpose. It was nothing but a diversionary maneuver on a large scale to deceive Germany as to the direction of the next English-French attack. For, as the Reich Government has long been aware, the true aim of England and France is the carefully prepared and now immediately imminent attack on Germany in the west, so as to advance through Belgian and Netherlands territory to the region of the Ruhr.

Germany has recognized and respected the inviolability of Belgium and the Netherlands, it being of course understood that these two countries in the event of a war of Germany against England and France would maintain the strictest neutrality.

Belgium and the Netherlands have not fulfilled this condition. They have attempted hitherto to maintain the outward appearance of neutrality, but in practice both countries have shown a one-sided partiality for Germany's opponents and have furthered their designs.

On the basis of the evidence before it and particularly of the attached reports from the Ministry of the Interior of March 29, 1940,² and from the German High Command of May 4, 1940,³ the German

² This report is not printed (413/215837-60). Extracts from it are printed in *Trial of War Criminals Before the Nuernberg Military Tribunals Under Control Council Law No. 10, Nuernberg, October 1946-April 1949*, vol. XII, pp. 1208-1210. The German text is in *Dokumente der Deutschen Politik* (Berlin, 1943), vol. VIII, pp. 104-119.

³ This report is not printed (413/215808-36). An abbreviated version, in translation, is printed in German Library of Information, *Facts in Review* (New York, 1940), vol. II, No. 21, pp. 204-208. The German text is in *Dokumente der Deutschen Politik*, vol. VIII, pp. 119-142.

Government has established the following:

1. Since the outbreak of war the Belgian and the Netherlands press have even surpassed the English and French papers in their hostile expressions of opinion regarding Germany. This attitude, in spite of continuous remonstrances by the Reich, they have not altered up to date. In addition to this, leading personalities in the public life of the two countries have in the last few months on an ever-increasing scale expressed the opinion that the place of Belgium and the Netherlands was at the side of England and France. Many other occurrences in the political and economic life of Belgium and the Netherlands stress this tendency further.

2. The Netherlands in association with Belgian authorities have in most flagrant violation of the most elementary obligations of neutrality lent themselves to supporting the attempts of the English Secret Intelligence Service to bring about a revolution in Germany. The organization, formed on Belgian and Netherlands soil by the Secret Intelligence Service and enjoying the most widespread support by Netherlands and Belgian quarters even in the highest circles of the civil service and the General Staff, had no other aim than the removal of the Führer and the German Government, by all and every means, and the setting up of a government in Germany willing to bring about the dissolution of the unity of the Reich and to assent to the formation of a powerless federal German state.

3. The measures taken by the Royal Belgian and the Royal Netherlands Governments in the military sphere speak even more clearly. They give irrefutable proof of the real intentions of Belgian and Netherlands policy. They are, further, in most decided contrast to all declarations made by the Royal Belgian and the Royal Netherlands Governments to the effect that they would with all their strength and on every hand prevent any use being made of their territory, either for the marching through of an army or as a base of operations on land, on the sea, or in the air.

4. Thus, for example, Belgium has fortified exclusively her eastern frontier against Germany, while on her frontier facing France no fortifications have been constructed. Repeated urgent representations made by the German Government were indeed on each occasion replied to by the Royal Belgian Government with a promise that this state of affairs directed only against Germany would be remedied, but in practice nothing happened and all promises in this direction remained unfulfilled. On the contrary Belgium has until quite recently worked exclusively and unabatedly on the completion of her fortifications against Germany, while the western border of Belgium is open to Germany's enemies.

5. A similarly open and exposed invasion gateway for the British air forces is the Netherlands coastal area. The German Government has continually provided the Royal Netherlands Government with evidence of the infringements of Netherlands neutrality by English aircraft. Since the outbreak of the war English airmen have almost daily appeared over German territory coming from the direction of the Netherlands. One hundred and twenty-seven such English flights were identified indisputably in all details, and brought to the attention of the Royal Netherlands Government. Actually, however, the number is much greater; it amounts to many times over the number of the

cases notified. Similarly, in all these further instances of flights there is no doubt about it but that the aircraft were English. The great number of flights, and the fact that no effective countermeasures were taken by the Royal Netherlands Government, clearly show that the English air force systematically used Netherlands territory as a starting point for its operations against Germany, with the knowledge and indulgence of the Royal Netherlands Government.

6. Still more blatant evidence of the true Belgian and Netherlands attitude, however, are the strategic movements of the entire mobilized Belgian and Netherlands troops directed solely against Germany. Whereas at the beginning of September 1939, the Belgian and Netherlands troops were distributed fairly evenly on their frontiers, a short time afterwards, simultaneously with the increasingly closer cooperation between the Belgian and Netherlands General Staffs, and the General Staffs of England and France, the western frontiers of these countries were completely stripped of troops, and all the Belgian and Netherlands troops were concentrated on the eastern frontiers of both countries, with their fronts toward Germany.

7. This massing of Belgian and Netherlands troops on the German frontier was undertaken at a time when Germany had no troop concentrations whatsoever on her frontiers with Belgium and the Netherlands, but when England and France, on the other hand, were forming a strong, motorized invasion army on the Franco-Belgian border. In other words, Belgium and the Netherlands removed their own troops from these endangered western boundaries to place them on the eastern boundaries, which were entirely free of German troops, at a time when their neutrality seemed increasingly threatened in the west by the attitude of England and France, and by the massing of English and French invasion troops, which would have given them every reason for strengthening their defenses there. Only then did Germany take countermeasures, and then also on her side placed troops on the Belgian and Netherlands borders. The Belgian and Netherlands General Staffs, however, by these sudden measures, contradictory in themselves to every military rule, exposed their true attitude. Their procedure can be understood, however, by the knowledge, that these measures were taken in the closest previous understanding with the English and French General Staffs, and that the Belgian and Netherlands troops never considered themselves to be anything but the vanguard of the English and French invasion army.

8. Evidence in the hands of the German Government shows that English and French preparations on Belgian and Netherlands territory for attack against Germany are already far advanced. Thus for some time now all obstacles on the Belgian border toward France which might hinder the entry of the English and French invasion army have been secretly removed. Airfields in Belgium and the Netherlands have been reconnoitered by English and French officers and extensions effected. Belgium has made transport facilities available at the frontier and recently advance parties of the headquarters personnel and the units of the French and English invasion army have arrived in various parts of Belgium and the Netherlands. These facts, together with further information which has accumulated in the last few days, furnish conclusive proof that the English and

French attack against Germany is imminent, and that this attack will be directed against the Ruhr through Belgium and the Netherlands.

The picture of the Belgian and Netherlands attitude, as presented by these indisputable facts, is clear and unequivocal. Both countries have from the outbreak of war, contrary to the statements given out by their Governments, secretly placed themselves on the side of England and France, and thus of the Powers which had decided to attack Germany and had declared war on her. Although the situation was pointed out to the Belgian Foreign Minister in all seriousness several times from German quarters, it did not make the slightest difference. On the contrary, the Belgian Defense Minister recently made a public declaration in the Belgian Chamber which unequivocally contained the admission that all steps necessary for joint action against Germany had been agreed upon between the General Staffs of Belgium, France, and England. If, in spite of this, Belgium and the Netherlands continue to proclaim publicly a policy of independence and neutrality, it can, in the light of established facts, only be regarded as an attempt to conceal the real intentions of Belgian and Netherlands policy.

In this situation, the Reich Government can, however, no longer doubt that Belgium and the Netherlands are resolved not only to permit the impending Anglo-French attack, but to favor it in every way and that the agreements of the General Staffs of these two countries with the English and French General Staffs are designed exclusively to serve this object. The argument put forward on the part of Belgium and the Netherlands that this is not their purpose, but that the very fact of their helplessness has forced them to adopt this attitude toward England and France, cannot be recognized as sound. Above all, it does not alter the facts of the situation for Germany.

In this struggle for existence forced upon the German people by England and France, the Reich Government is not disposed to await idly the attack by England and France and to allow them to carry the war by way of Belgium and the Netherlands into German territory. It has therefore now issued the command to German troops to ensure the neutrality of these countries by all the military means at the disposal of the Reich.

The Reich Government adds to this announcement the following:

The German troops do not come as enemies of the Belgian and Netherlands peoples, for the Reich Government has neither desired nor brought about this development. The responsibility for it falls upon England and France, who have prepared in every detail the attack against Germany from Belgian and Netherlands territory, and on the Belgian and Netherlands Government departments who have allowed and favored it.

The Reich Government further declares that Germany has no intention of encroaching by these measures, either now or in the future,

on the sovereignty of the Kingdoms of Belgium and the Netherlands, nor on the European or extra-European possessions of these countries.

The Royal Belgian and the Royal Netherlands Governments, however, today still have it in their power at this last moment to ensure the well-being of their peoples, by seeing to it that no resistance is offered to the German troops. The Reich Government hereby calls upon these two Governments to issue without delay the necessary commands to this effect. Should the German troops meet with resistance in Belgium or in the Netherlands, they will use all means to overcome it. The responsibility for the consequences arising therefrom and for the bloodshed then unavoidable will have to be borne exclusively by the Royal Belgian and the Royal Netherlands Governments.

No. 215

115/117958

Memorandum of the German Government to the Government of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg

BERLIN, May 9, 1940.

The Reich Government is reliably informed that England and France, in the course of their policy of spreading the war, have decided to attack Germany in the near future through Belgian and Netherlands territory. Belgium and the Netherlands, who in violation of their neutrality long since secretly took the side of the enemies of Germany, not only do not intend to prevent this attack but to favor it. The facts which go to prove this have been stated in detail in a memorandum which is being handed ¹ to the Royal Belgian Government and the Royal Government of the Netherlands a copy of which is enclosed herewith.²

In defense against the imminent attack, the German troops have now received the order to safeguard the neutrality of these two countries with all the power at the disposal of the Reich.

The offensive, decided upon by England and France with the consent of Belgium and the Netherlands will also involve the territory of Luxembourg. To repulse the attack the Reich Government has therefore been forced to extend its military operations to Luxembourg territory also.

It has been known to the Grand Ducal Government of Luxembourg that the Reich was prepared to respect the neutrality and integrity of Luxembourg, provided the other Powers which are neighbors of the Grand Duchy would also take the same attitude. Negotiations for agreements to that effect between the Powers concerned, which seemed to be almost completed in the summer of 1939, were then broken off by France.³ This breaking off of the negotiations by France is explained

¹ Another copy of the memorandum, also in the Foreign Minister's file, has the word "today" inserted here (115/117961-62).

² Document No. 214.

³ On these negotiations see vol. v, documents Nos. 499, 500, 508, and 505.

by the military decisions now taken by her together with the other enemies of Germany, an explanation which does not need any further illustration.

The Reich Government expects the Grand Ducal Government of Luxembourg to take account of the position created solely by the guilt of Germany's enemies, and to take all the necessary measures to prevent the Luxembourg population causing difficulties for the German military operations in any way. The Reich Government, on its part, gives the assurance to the Grand Ducal Government of Luxembourg that Germany has no intention, now or in the future, to interfere with the territorial integrity or political independence of the Grand Duchy.

No. 216

1922/481344-46

The Chargé d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry

No. 904

WASHINGTON, May 9, 1940.

Received May 27 (a. m.)

Pol. VI 1481.

Subject: The United States and Greenland.

With reference to your telegram No. 469 of May 3.¹

As I have repeatedly reported by telegram,² the question of the status of Greenland has become an acute question for the United States since the German occupation of Denmark. On April 12, President Roosevelt pointed out that Greenland belonged to the Western Hemisphere, and instructed the American Red Cross to provide the population of Greenland with medical supplies etc., from America, if supplies from Denmark ceased.³ Lord Lothian, the English Ambassador, stated for his part on April 16 that in contrast to Iceland, Greenland undoubtedly came under the Monroe Doctrine, and he also said that if it became clear that Germany intended to seize these Danish possessions, England or Canada would occupy both islands.⁴ He hinted that the occupation of Greenland would be undertaken from Canada in order to avoid any conflict with the Monroe Doctrine. Lord Lothian had obviously received an assurance from the State Department that the United States would not regard an occupation of Greenland by Canadian troops as a violation of the Monroe Doctrine.

¹ This telegraphic instruction informed the Embassy in Washington that according to information received from Copenhagen, the Danish Government had some anxiety lest the United States should use the opportunity to extend its influence to Greenland (1922/481340-41).

² e.g., in telegram No. 685 of Apr. 18 (1900/427900-01).

³ See the *New York Times*, Apr. 13, 1940.

⁴ See Royal Institute of International Affairs, *Bulletin of International News*, vol. xvii (1940), p. 566.

On April 26, von Kauffmann, the Danish Minister in Washington, announced the setting-up of an American-Danish-Greenland Commission with its headquarters in New York. The task of this commission is to supply the population of Greenland with those goods which under normal circumstances were exported from Denmark to Greenland. Besides several university professors the other members of the Commission are two former American Ministers to Denmark, namely Mrs. Ruth Bryan Rohde and Dr. John D. Prince.

As the German News Agency [DNB] in New York has already reported by telegram, the establishment of an American Consulate at Godthaab was announced on May 1. It will be staffed by two junior officials of the American Foreign Service. The text of this announcement by the State Department is enclosed (enclosure 1).⁵ It does not appear from it that Denmark was consulted before the Consulate was set up. On the contrary the reason given in the announcement for America's step is as follows: "Since communication between Copenhagen and Greenland has been interrupted, direct consular representation has been deemed advisable by the United States and by the Greenland authorities."

America is interested in Greenland for two reasons:

1) She wishes principally for strategic reasons to prevent the transfer of Greenland from Denmark to another European owner. 2) She is trying herself—should such a change of ownership threaten—to obtain control of the island, which is above all of importance for trans-Atlantic air traffic.

For these reasons isolated demands were made by the American press after Germany's entry into Denmark for the establishment of an American protectorate over Greenland. As an example, I submit a leading article from the *Washington Times Herald* of April 16 (enclosure 2).⁶ On April 18, Congressman Hamilton Fish introduced a resolution in Congress which was to give the President the power to enter into negotiations with the Danish Government for the purchase of Greenland.

A detailed article on America's interest in Greenland, which appeared in the May number of *Harper's Magazine* is also enclosed (enclosure 3).⁶

THOMSEN

⁵ The text is in Department of State, *Bulletin*, 1940, vol. II, p. 473.

⁶ Not reprinted.

No. 217

141/120575-76

Memorandum by the State Secretary

St.S. No. 355

BERLIN, May 10, 1940.

After the Belgian Ambassador had been to see the Foreign Minister this morning, he came to me in order to put a telephone call through to his Ministry in Brussels.¹ In spite of personal efforts by the Reich Minister of Posts, it was still not possible to make the connection after waiting for about three-quarters of an hour because the Brussels exchange did not reply. Whereupon Count Davignon did not wait any longer and returned to his Embassy shortly after 8 a. m.

In the course of the conversation which took place during this period of waiting, Davignon referred more than once to the motives for the invasion as stated in our memorandum² and said that world opinion would not believe in our justification and that on the contrary our justification would count against us. In spite of deep emotion, Davignon spoke with moderation and reiterated that he felt in his heart no enmity toward the German people.

Time and again, I tried personally to lead Davignon back to the last two sentences of the German memorandum, in which the Belgian Government is urged to give the necessary orders for the cessation of all resistance. Davignon rejected my efforts in this direction with the remark that Belgium would be acting dishonorably if she failed to resist. The Belgian Government had often enough declared that it would resist any intruder by force of arms, and that statement it would now certainly make good. Davignon now replied to my urgent representation of the disastrous consequences to his country by saying that undoubtedly the fighting had already begun. There was therefore no point in discussing it any further. As soon as he had information from Brussels that the fighting had really started, he would ask for his passports.

Davignon mentioned in conclusion that one should convey his Embassy to Switzerland if things reached that stage.

Submitted herewith to the Foreign Minister.

WEIZSÄCKER

¹ Davignon's account of this interview is in his *Berlin 1936-1940: Souvenirs d'une mission*, pp. 244-246.

² See document No. 214.

No. 218

115/117964

Minute by the Director of the Political Department

BERLIN, May 10, 1940.

The Luxembourg Chargé d'Affaires, who was summoned at his residence by Attaché Jasper at 5:55 this morning, was brought to my

office at 6:25 a. m. to wait there until the Foreign Minister could receive him. Toward 7:45 a. m., an instruction from the Foreign Minister was given me by Attaché Hartdegen to hand to the Luxembourg Chargé d'Affaires ahead of time the memorandum intended for him¹ along with the three enclosures and to ask him to read it. I carried out this instruction immediately, without comment. M. Sturm then waited in my office until about 8:50 a. m. Toward 9 o'clock he was received by the Foreign Minister and then came back to my office to try from here to get into communication with his Government by telephone. Shortly after 9 o'clock I took leave of M. Sturm, who thereafter was entrusted to Attaché Jasper. When no success was had in making the connection Herr Jasper escorted M. Sturm back to his car at about 9:30 a. m.

WOERMANN

¹ Document No. 215.

No. 219

174/136304

The Embassy in Japan to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

TOKYO, May 10, 1940—1:27 p. m.

No. 416 of May 10

Received May 10—10:20 a. m.

For the Foreign Minister.

The following picture emerges from numerous discussions with authoritative persons in politics, in the Army, in the Navy, and in business during my fortnight's stay in Tokyo.¹

The Yonai-Arita Government continues to strive for a settlement with England and America. I consider the realization of this to be extremely unlikely in view of America's stubborn attitude and the clearly intensified anti-British feeling in the armed forces, among the people and in certain business circles. The latest German successes have made an extraordinarily deep impression here and have diminished England's influence in the Far East. The Russian Ambassador told me of his willingness for a Japanese-Russian settlement, but emphasized the distrust existing on both sides. In order to overcome this, our Embassy is endeavoring to promote personal contact between the Russian Embassy and influential Japanese.

In domestic politics the Cabinet's difficulties are again increasing, as its economic measures are inadequate. At the conference of provincial governors which is at present in session widespread distress and discontent were confirmed. A possible new government which, as the faction friendly to us hopes, would be led by Prince Konoye

¹ Heinrich Stahmer and the Duke of Coburg had stopped in Japan for a second visit on their return from the Duke's good will trip to the United States. Cf. vol. VIII, documents Nos. 567 and 630; also Stahmer's affidavit introduced as Exhibit No. 2744 at the International Military Tribunal for the Far East.

will at first have to confine itself to a solution of the China conflict and to urgent measures of relief at home.

In foreign politics it can be assumed that, independently of a possible change of Cabinet, the state of tension with England will increase or at least continue. The same applies to relations with America; both sides will try to avoid straining these to the point of war.

STAHMER
OTT

No. 220

115/117965

The Minister in Luxembourg to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 71 of May 10

LUXEMBOURG, May 10, 1940.
Received May 10—12:10 p. m.

With reference to Multex 45.¹

The Grand Duchess and all members of the Luxembourg Government have left the city of Luxembourg for an unknown destination. I have in consequence made the statement as directed to Secretary General Wehrer. Wehrer has no knowledge of the whereabouts of his Government and has promised to try to establish contact with his Government and to transmit the statement to it. He believes himself to be acting in accordance with the intentions of his Government in protesting against the violation of neutrality. For the rest he has placed himself at our disposal to deputize for the Government in establishing contact with the occupying power.

In these circumstances I suggest that Secretary General Wehrer be recognized as the sole Government representative entitled to negotiate, a task for which he seems qualified and which he is also prepared to undertake.

RADOWITZ

¹ Circular telegram No. 45 has not been found. A note in the Foreign Minister's file on Luxembourg (115/117963) reads: "Circular telegram No. 45 of May 10, 1940 to Brussels, The Hague, and Luxembourg regarding entry of German troops—see file 'Belgium.'" The Foreign Minister's file on Belgium has not been found.

No. 221

109/114789

The Ambassador in Belgium to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

Unnumbered

BRUSSELS, May 10, 1940.
Received May 10—1:05 p. m.

I have just called on Foreign Minister Spaak and delivered the statements contained in the telegraphic instructions.¹ Spaak replied

¹ See document No. 220, footnote 1.

that he would send me a written memorandum at once, the text of which he read out to me hurriedly. The memorandum accuses Germany of having invaded Belgium for the second time in 25 years without her having given any cause for this. Belgium is at war with Germany from now on. On receipt of the memorandum I shall transmit details by wireless.²

M. Spaak stated in addition that the Embassy and its staff would be protected by the Belgian Government, but that the entire staff would have to be gathered together in the Embassy building, as only on that condition could the Belgian Government guarantee protection. Accordingly all members of the Embassy will be gathered together in the Embassy building. The Foreign Minister placed conveyance by special train via France (group garbled). The Foreign Minister requested me to inform Berlin that Brussels was an open city, that there were no troops in the city and that none would pass through it. I explained to the Foreign Minister that I had no means whatever of getting in touch with my Government and suggested his transmitting the information through the power in charge of Belgian interests in Berlin.

When aircraft flew over Brussels today members of the Embassy observed numerous explosions, even in the immediate vicinity of the Embassy, which might have been caused by bombs. The explosions were in residential districts where there were no military objectives.

BÜLOW

² See document No. 227.

No. 222

413/215759-80

The Minister in the Netherlands to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram en clair¹

No. 372 of May 10

ROME, May 10, 1940—12:42 p. m.

Received May 10—4:50 p. m.

For the Foreign Minister's personal attention.

With reference to your telegram of May 10 (RAM).²

Your instruction has been carried out with the Foreign Minister who replied: "The Royal Netherlands Government indignantly rejects the imputation that any kind of hostile agreement has been entered into by it with any foreign power against Germany."

¹ Marginal Note: "This telegram from The Hague was received here from Rome by open line. Telegram Control."

Six words were omitted from the first paragraph of this telegram as received on May 10. These words were supplied in a corrected copy circulated on the following day (413/215760). The translation has been made from the corrected copy.

² Not found. Cf. document No. 220, footnote 1.

"In view of the unprecedented attack directed without any warning against the Netherlands by Germany, the Royal Netherlands Government considers the Kingdom as being at war with the German Reich."

ZECH

No. 223

413/215865-66

*Note Verbale From the Belgian Embassy*¹

BERLIN, May 10, 1940.

zu Prot. A 8563.²

His Majesty's Embassy has the honor to protest most strongly against the act of aggression by Germany of which Belgium is the victim for the second time in 25 years.

On October 13, 1937, the Reich Government solemnly confirmed its decision to impair the inviolability and the integrity of Belgium "under no circumstances, and at all times to respect Belgian territory, except of course in the case that Belgium should take part in a military operation directed against Germany in the course of an armed conflict in which Germany is involved."³ Of her own accord Germany solemnly renewed this undertaking on August 26, 1939, on the eve of the present conflict.⁴

Since the declaration of October 13, 1937, Germany has frequently praised the correctness of the Belgian attitude. During the present conflict Belgium has not ceased to observe the most scrupulous neutrality. The Embassy of the King therefore rejects with indignation the tendentious arguments invented to meet the requirements of the case and set forth in the memorandum which was handed to the Belgian Ambassador by the Reich Foreign Minister at 6 a. m. on May 10.⁵

The Belgian Embassy would further draw attention to the fact that at the moment when war was threatening to break out, the King of the Belgians, in association with other Heads of State and more particularly with the Queen of the Netherlands, did everything to

¹The text of this document is in French. In a memorandum by von Halem of the Protocol Department of the Foreign Ministry it was stated that the Belgian note verbale was delivered by the Counselor of the Belgian Embassy, Count Berryer, at 3:20 p. m. on May 10 and the Netherlands note verbale (document No. 224) by the Counselor of the Netherlands Legation Bosch van Drakestein at 3:25 p. m. (413/215862).

The circumstances of the preparation and delivery of this note and of the note verbale of the Netherlands Legation are described in Davignon's *Berlin 1936-1940: Souvenirs d'une mission*, pp. 246-249.

²Prot. A. 8563: Not found.

³See vol. v, document No. 475.

⁴See vol. vii, documents Nos. 272 and 315.

⁵Document No. 214.

avert it; ⁶ last November he, together with that Sovereign, renewed his efforts to put an end to it.⁷

This new act of aggression by Germany, which is devoid of justification, will violently shock the conscience of the world. The Reich will bear the responsibility for it in the eyes of history.

In view of the foregoing, his Majesty's Ambassador requests the Foreign Minister to send him without delay the passports necessary for the Belgian Ambassador and his family, as well as for those members of his staff who are not of German nationality, and also for all the members of the Diplomatic Mission, their families and their non-German personnel.

(Seal)

⁶ See vol. VII, document No. 408.

⁷ See vol. VIII, documents Nos. 332, 336, and 356.

No. 224

413/215863-64

*Note Verbale From the Netherlands Legation*¹

BERLIN, May 10, 1940.
zu Prot. A 8563.²

I. From the information reaching the Royal Netherlands Legation it transpires that the German Wehrmacht has without any previous warning attacked the Netherlands and that the Netherlands Foreign Minister has informed the German Minister at The Hague that in consequence of this a state of war exists between the Netherlands and Germany. The Royal Netherlands Minister hereby lodges a protest against the above-mentioned act of aggression as energetic as that of his Government, and requests that passports be issued at once for himself, the non-German members of his family and household, for the members of the Legation and their families and households, as well as for the Legation personnel and their dependents.

II. German aggression against the Netherlands is devoid of any, even the slightest, justification. The Netherlands has most conscientiously maintained its neutrality which the German Reich Chancellor in various statements, the last on August 26, 1939,³ solemnly promised not to violate. It has refrained altogether from all military conversations with any other state. In the firm determination to defend its neutrality—from whatever side it might be threatened—it has therefore done nothing which might give offense to an impartial and honest judge. The Netherlands has always endeavored to work for peace as is to be seen from the offer of media-

¹ See document No. 223, footnote 1.

² Prot. A 8563: Not found.

³ See vol. VII, document No. 272, footnote 1, and document No. 313.

tion made by Her Majesty the Queen in concert with His Majesty the King of the Belgians in November 1939.⁴

Germany has, in violation of the most elementary principles of justice and morality, severed the centuries-old bonds of peace and friendship with the people of the Netherlands.

This German act of aggression will not fail to shock deeply the conscience of the world. The German Reich will have to bear the sole responsibility in the eyes of history.

⁴ See vol. VIII, documents Nos. 332, 336, and 356.

No. 225

109/114815

The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

URGENT

MADRID, May 10, 1940.

No. 1395 of May 10

Received May 10—5:20 p. m.

I immediately notified the Foreign Minister by telephone early today, while he was still at his residence, of the taking over of the protection of the neutrality of Belgium and Holland and the reasons why this course of action was necessary, and during the course of the morning I sent him the current Transocean reports containing the statements by the [Reich] Foreign Minister,¹ our memorandum,² the proclamation of the Führer, and the first army bulletin.³

In an interview of some length which has just taken place the Foreign Minister displayed the most complete understanding for our course of action and extreme optimism with regard to its prospects for success.

The Foreign Minister early today immediately (one group garbled) transmitted the information to Franco, who, on receiving the report said (his exact words): "The Germans have a good eye. They always pick the right place and time."

I will keep the Foreign Minister and the Generalissimo further informed currently.

Exercise of influence on the press has already begun. Our news bulletin tomorrow will include the above-mentioned official German statement as a supplement.

STOHRER

¹ The reference is to the statements by Ribbentrop in his conference with representatives of the foreign press. A memorandum of this press conference is on 413/215774-75, not printed.

² Document No. 214.

³ The proclamation of Hitler to the Army and the first military bulletin, as well as the Foreign Minister's statements and the German memorandum were circulated by DNB. Texts are in *Monatshefte für Auswärtige Politik*, May 1940, pp. 360-366. Translations of Hitler's proclamation and the Foreign Minister's statement to the press are in *Facts in Review*, vol. II, No. 21, pp. 201-202.

No. 226

357/203978

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

MAY 10, 1940—6:00 p. m.

No. 874 of May 10

For the Foreign Minister.

With reference to your instruction of May 7.¹

Instruction carried out with Molotov. M. received the communication in an understanding spirit and added that he realized that Germany must protect herself against British-French attack. He had no doubt of our success.

SCHULENBURG

¹ Document No. 204.

No. 227

413/ 215761

The Ambassador in Belgium to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

BRUSSELS, May 10, 1940.

Unnumbered

Received May 10—11:00 p. m.

The Foreign Minister's statement mentioned in the previous telegram¹ has just been received. Complete transmission is not possible owing to limited wireless facilities. The content is substantially as follows: Germany has once more perpetrated a criminal attack on neutral and loyal Belgium which is even more odious than that of 1914. Germany has violated the obligations of 1937.² The attack is devoid of all justification. Belgium is determined to defend herself. Her cause is the cause of justice and cannot be defeated. Having noted the details, I returned the statement to the Foreign Minister and declined to report it, because it is incompatible with the honor of the Reich and in downright contradiction to the German interpretation of the origin of the conflict.

Unsigned

¹ Document No. 221.² See vol. v, document No. 475.

No. 228

1900/427927

The State Secretary to the Legation in Denmark

Telegram

URGENT

BERLIN, May 10, 1940.

No. 468

e. o. Pol. VI 1332.

You are requested to urge the Danish Government, if it has not already done so of its own accord, to protest to the English Govern-

ment against the occupation of Iceland by English troops. At the same time the occupation of the Faroe Islands by England in April should also be mentioned. We wish reports of the protest to be published in the Danish press and on the radio.

Please report by telegram.¹

WEIZSÄCKER

¹ Renthe-Fink replied on May 25 in telegram No. 565 (1900/427931) that on May 17 the Danish Foreign Ministry had instructed the Minister in Bern to protest to Britain against the occupation of the Faroe Islands. A reply had been received from Bern on May 25 that the British Minister there had refused to accept any communication. With regard to a protest against the occupation of Iceland, a report from Reykjavik on diplomatic action by the Icelandic Government was being awaited. The Danish protest against occupation of the Faroes had been given publicity both in the press and on the radio.

In telegram No. 661 of June 12 (1900/427933-34) Renthe-Fink further reported that on June 10 a telegram was received from the Danish Minister in Reykjavik stating that the Icelandic Government had published its note of protest to Britain against the British occupation of Iceland on May 18. He quoted the text of the note and added that the Danish Minister President had promised to make a statement protesting in the name of the King.

A statement concerning Iceland was made by Minister President Stauning in the Folketing on July 4 and reported in Copenhagen Legation report No. Ausw./45 of July 19 (1900/427938-48).

No. 229

2097/453159-60

Ambassador Ritter to the Embassy in the Soviet Union

Telegram

No. 769

BERLIN, May 10, 1940.

W IV 2368.

With reference to your telegrams Nos. 829 of May 3¹ and 843 of May 5.²

In order to bring the petroleum agreement which is now so urgent for us to a conclusion please go to see M. Molotov and, continuing your conversation of May 5, say to him something along these lines:

1. We are ready to take the middle way proposed by Molotov.³ A price would be acceptable to us which was about 50 percent above the gulf price, as compared with 20 percent heretofore—that is, a price of 45,000,000 RM. instead of the 36,000,000 RM. offered by us. In case a quick conclusion of the oil agreement is not to be obtained with this concession, a price would be acceptable in the worst circumstances which is midway between our offer of 36,000,000 RM. and the Soviet offer of 71,500,000 RM.—that is, 53,750,000 RM. for the remaining amount.

¹ Not printed (8835/E614735-36).

² Not printed (2097/453158).

³ In his conversation with Schulenburg on May 5 (telegram No. 843 of May 5), Molotov said that the price for petroleum demanded by the Soviet was tied in with the price the Germans were asking for the cruiser *Lützow*. "The Soviet Government would make further concessions to us in the price of petroleum if we made concessions to them in the price of the cruiser and accepted 'the golden mean' proposed by the Soviet, that is, the price of 90,000,000 RM. A similar solution could then be found for the price of petroleum." In the Economic Agreement of Feb. 11 the Germans had agreed to deliver to the Soviet Union the cruiser ex-*Lützow*, but the price to be credited had not been set. See vol. VIII, document No. 607, footnote 5.

We are quite clear that this price in no way corresponds to the understanding about prices which had been jointly arrived at, and we could therefore accept this price for this year only without prejudicing the agreements for next year. We presume that the agreement is coming to a conclusion in a few days and that deliveries will be made as quickly as is technically possible.

2. We are ready to assent to the coal agreement in spite of the obvious discrepancy between the low price set for coal and the extremely high price set for petroleum. We can consider ourselves bound by the cheap price of coal only for this year, without prejudice to the price later on.

3. We are ready to meet halfway the price offered by the Soviet side in the negotiations concerning the cruiser *L[ützow]* which are taking place here. The present Soviet offer amounts to 90,000,000 RM., the German demand is for 109,000,000 RM. We are ready to close the deal for 100,000,000 RM., offering as much for this price as was originally included. This price is not defensible from the commercial point of view. The reduction in price results from a political decision and is at the expense of the Reich.⁴

The three points form a unified whole. Our concessions have validity only if the Soviet side concludes points 1 and 3 on the proposed basis.

For the further guidance of your conversation with Molotov I refer to the further telegraphic instructions of today.⁵ Please send telegraphic report.⁵

RITTER

⁴ A draft telegram of May 22 from Schnurre to the Embassy in Moscow (8835/E814761-62) stated that agreement had been reached that day on the outstanding points at issue in the *Lützow* negotiation, so that the ship could now be delivered to Leningrad. The final price obtained for the cruiser was not stated. The Russian negotiators, however, had been informed that the transfer of the ship could only take place after they had agreed on a petroleum treaty or accepted a previously discussed delivery plan. "The Russians seemed very much impressed by this communication, since they placed the greatest value on carrying out the transfer of the cruiser." See document No. 332.

⁵ Not found.

No. 230

4896/E254838

Memorandum by an Official of the Dienststelle Ribbentrop

MAY 10, 1940.

W 2507 g.

CONFIDENTIAL NOTE FOR GEHEIMRAT SABATH

Subject: Spanish Air Force Commission.

In the conversation which the Foreign Minister had with State Secretary General Barrón and Lieutenant Colonel Arranz on April 8,¹ 1940, economic questions were only lightly touched upon. The

¹ This is evidently an error. The Spanish Commission did not arrive in Berlin until May 1. See document No. 169.

Foreign Minister stated that the Reich had full understanding for the economic difficulties which the Spanish people had to overcome after so long a war. But Germany had learned from her own experience that the reconstruction of an economy must take place without outside credits and must spring from the country's own strength if it is to be effective and if national independence is to be maintained.

After the victory, Spain may be sure that the German victory will also be a victory for Spain, and if Germany at the moment is not able perhaps to fulfill this or that Spanish expectation with respect to deliveries it was, nevertheless, certain that after the defeat of the opponents of the Axis, Spain would have a large share in the rise of Germany and Italy.

At the reception for the Spanish Air Force Commission on May 4, 1940,² the Field Marshal [Göring] promised his guests far-reaching satisfaction of their wishes on condition that on the Spanish side guarantees were given that no single item of the German deliveries would fall into enemy hands. The Spanish Air Force Commission requested training aircraft, spare parts for aircraft, and machines to manufacture them.

ABETZ

² See document No. 330, enclosure.

No. 231

947/300271-73

Memorandum by the Minister to Denmark

BERLIN, May 10, 1940.

Dr. Fritz Clausen, the leader of the Danish National Socialists, takes much too one-sided a view of the expansion of the Danish Government.¹ It is understandable that Dr. Fritz Clausen, whose aim is to break the power of the Social Democrats and Radicals and to bring about the fall of the Stauning-Munch Government, would from his point of view have preferred it if the large opposition parties, the Conservatives and Left [*Venstre*] had remained in opposition and if he had found in them allies against the Stauning-Munch Government. However it could not be to Germany's interest to remove the Stauning-Munch Government now that it had shown itself to be adaptable to our wishes. As things were it was only able to survive because the leaders of the large opposition parties refrained from chal-

¹ An intelligence report of Apr. 21 (947/300300-01) sent by Heydrich to Ribbentrop on May 5 (927/300299) contained the following passage: "The leader of the Danish National Socialist Party, Dr. Fritz Clausen, has told an agent that it is incomprehensible that the German Government should permit the Danish Government to be increased by six ministers, each one of whom has been fundamentally opposed to Germany." At Ribbentrop's direction, Renne-Fink had been asked to comment on the report (947/300293).

lenging the Government's attitude on April 9, and entered the Government. As a result of this decision, the large opposition parties made themselves jointly responsible for the policy of April 9, which meant an important consolidation of the position gained by us.

On the other hand, the question as to whether the new Ministers were more or less pro-German had to play a secondary part. These Ministers, like the bulk of the Danish people today, are in themselves far removed from us ideologically and are fundamentally all opportunists. In the final analysis their sympathies will always be with anything that offers advantages to Denmark and with those who wield power. I cannot believe that we need fear serious resistance from them. But on the other hand we cannot expect them to be wholeheartedly with us.

It would be wrong in my opinion for us to interfere today in the disputes of Denmark's domestic policy. At present the National Socialists have a very narrow foundation. Furthermore, conditions in Denmark, particularly economic conditions, will become so difficult in the near future that it seems better to let the present Government suffer the odium for this. As we can give Denmark only very limited economic assistance for the present, a pro-German Government might easily be shipwrecked. It would then be blamed for all the misfortunes.

It is by no means the aim of German economic policy to favor the Stauning-Munch Government in any way. Its purpose, however, must be to get as much as possible from Denmark in these times which are so decisive for Germany. It may be true that it is awkward for the political course of the Danish National Socialists if the Danish Government can obtain increased market outlets and increased prices as a result of this, but while the war lasts, the interests of the German war economy and of the German food situation must take priority.

The chief task of the Danish National Socialists must at present be to rally all those elements which are striving for a revival and who see Denmark's future at Germany's side and to weld them into a strong movement, so that, when the time is ripe, they may have a broad basis among the population. At present, however, this moment has not yet come.

Since numerous authorities in Germany have connections in Denmark and in particular with the Danish National Socialists, it seems advisable to inform the German authorities in question of the above-mentioned policy of nonintervention in Danish party political disputes, a policy with which the commander of the German troops in Denmark also agrees.

RENTHE-FINK

No. 232

F17/198

*Benito Mussolini to Adolf Hitler*¹

ROME, May 10, 1940 XVIII.

FÜHRER: I thank you for the message you sent at the moment when your troops were receiving the order to march to the west.² As in the case of the campaign in Norway the press and action of the Party will guide the mind of the Italian people toward understanding the necessity with which you were faced.

I feel that time is pressing for Italy too, and I am deeply grateful for your promise to keep me informed of developments in the operations in order to put me in a position to make my decisions.

As for the Italian armed forces, the navy is ready and by the end of May two army groups in the east and west and also the air force and the antiaircraft formations will be ready.

It is superfluous for me to tell you that I am following the progress of your troops with confidence and in a spirit of comradeship.

MUSSOLINI

¹Translated from the official Italian text which was received in the German Foreign Ministry together with a German translation prepared by the Italians. (F17/192) There are minor discrepancies between this Italian text and that published in *Hitler e Mussolini: lettere e documenti*, No. 23.

²Document No. 212.

No. 233

8785/E612102-09

The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry

No. 433

TOKYO, May 10, 1940.

Received May 25.

Pol. VIII 632.

POLITICAL REPORT

Subject: Development of Japanese Foreign Policy.

- I. Relations with America and the visit of the High Commissioner for the Philippines to Tokyo.
- II. Relations with England.
- III. The Foreign Minister's speech with particular reference to relations with Russia.

I. Relations with America and the visit of the High Commissioner for the Philippines to Tokyo.

Since the breakdown of the negotiations between Admiral Nomura, Foreign Minister in the Abe Government and the American Ambassador here¹ there has been a complete deadlock in relations between

¹ See vol. VIII, document No. 496, and *Foreign Relations of the United States, Japan, 1931-1941*, vol. II, pp. 31-34, 40-43, 48-52.

Japan and the United States. The profound antagonism between these two Powers which proved insurmountable during these negotiations was, as I have reported, aggravated even further by recent events. These include the uncompromising negative attitude adopted by America to the formation of the Wang Ching-wei government,² the strong position taken by Secretary of State Hull on the Japanese Foreign Minister's statement on the Netherlands Indies,³ the hostile attitude of the American Navy, which is demonstrated by the strong concentration of American naval forces in the Pacific area, by the fleet maneuvers near Hawaii, by the plans for the further reinforcement of the American fleet, in the well-known statements of Admiral Taussig to the United States Senate,⁴ and, in addition, the continued moral, material and political support of Chiang Kai-shek's government. The law passed by the Philippine Parliament on May 2 limiting immigration from foreign countries to the Philippines to a yearly quota of 500 persons was felt as a further blow dealt by American policy at Japan, although the resolution was formally an act of the autonomous legislature of the Philippine Commonwealth. In a statement to the press the spokesman of the Japanese Foreign Ministry described the law as a particularly unfriendly act toward Japan and expressed the hope that the Philippine Government would, by virtue of the power to make exceptions granted in the law, see to it that the immigration of Japanese, who had contributed so much to the economic development of the Philippines, remained at its present level. Foreign Minister Arita himself also spoke to the same effect. The whole Japanese press strongly attacked the new Philippine law, laying the blame for it on the American Government. In fact, there can be no doubt that the law represents a protective measure against Japan, which with a yearly average of 2500 persons had hitherto provided by far the largest quota of immigrants to the Philippines. The statement made by the Philippine High Commissioner to Japanese press representatives, that legally the United States Government had no influence on the Philippine legislature and could therefore not be held responsible, was an excuse which convinced no one here.

All unfriendly gestures on the part of America, however, only seem to spur on to more insistent wooing those sections of the Japanese public who, in spite of all setbacks, are feverishly working for a settlement with America. In view of the threatening deterioration of the situation, their spokesman, Foreign Minister Arita, took the initiative

² Department of State, *Bulletin*, 1940, vol. II, p. 343.

³ See document No. 123, and Department of State, *Bulletin*, 1940, vol. II, p. 411.

⁴ A DNB dispatch of Apr. 22 from Washington (8785/E612100-01) reported that Rear Admiral Taussig, in a hearing of the U. S. Senate's Naval Affairs Committee, had stated that in his personal opinion, Far Eastern developments would under certain circumstances compel the United States into war with Japan, should the economic and financial pressure hitherto employed prove insufficient to maintain the integrity of China.

in order to resume the exchange of views with the American Ambassador and thereby not only to prevent a further deterioration but also to bring relations with America out of the dangerous impasse. This initiative was taken shortly before the visit of Mr. Sayre, the American High Commissioner for the Philippines, who arrived in Japan on May 2, and it was immediately connected by the press with this visit. The American High Commissioner's visits to Japan are in themselves a normal occurrence and are usually only for routine purposes. The whole arrangement of the visit showed that Mr. Sayre's stay was something out of the ordinary. The High Commissioner, who was received in audience by the Emperor, had three long conversations with the Japanese Foreign Minister at which Mr. Grew, the Ambassador, was present. The Foreign Minister also paid him particular attention socially. The Japanese Foreign Office and the American Embassy issued a joint communiqué in noncommittal terms on the result of the meetings stating that the conversations had served to clear up questions at issue and had therefore proved useful. The newspapers close to the Foreign Ministry discuss with their usual sedulous and calculated optimism the opportunities which they allege still exist for an understanding with America, whereas other newspapers express grave doubts and objections. The newspapers indulge in numerous speculations as to what was actually discussed at the talks. Thus, there was some mention of a possible renewal of the agreement on the Pacific possessions concluded between Japan, England, America, and France in December 1921,⁵ and even of an American-Japanese pact of nonaggression. These speculations, however, doubtless go far beyond the real significance of the talks. They fail to recognize that the two Powers are divided by the decisive problem of the China conflict which would have to be solved in a way acceptable to America before a general understanding between the two states is possible. As things stand today, however, a solution of the China conflict which would satisfy America would mean the abandonment of Japan's most vital aims in China and the renunciation of the "New Order in Eastern Asia."

In reality, it seems rather that after the failure so far of his efforts to bring about a more generous and conciliatory attitude on the part of his Government toward Japan, the American Ambassador tried to enlist Mr. Sayre as an ally, so that he could turn to his own advantage the influence of this man whose word naturally carries weight in Washington on Far Eastern questions. In view of Mr. Arita's well-known attitude, the Japanese Foreign Minister, needless to say, gladly accepted the part allotted to him in this game of the Ambassador's.

⁵ The Four Power Pacific Pact, signed at Washington, Dec. 13, 1921. See *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1922* (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1938), vol. 1, p. 33.

It afforded him the opportunity of establishing a slight contact with the American party to the talks which may later, under more favorable auspices, be further developed. There is no doubt that in all this the Foreign Minister and his henchmen were guided not only by their obstinate efforts to keep the door open in Washington as long as possible, but first and foremost by the hope that developments in Europe and Germany's increasing successes would divert America from Japan and the Far East. Here we have the same calculation as that which gives rise to the hope entertained by these cliques for a possible settlement with England, namely that the enormous pressure of Germany's expanding power will force not only England, but America as well to adopt a more accommodating attitude toward Japan and thus enable Japan to reach a favorable settlement with the democratic powers. This idea was probably also behind the exchange of views with Mr. Sayre which, in any case, certainly did not lead to any concrete results or even to any agreements. This impression is also confirmed by the statement made at the press conference on May 8 by the spokesman of the Foreign Ministry who is particularly servile to America. Mr. Suma stressed the purely private, personal, and informatory nature of the exchange of views which had dealt mainly with the problem of China, only very slightly with the Philippines and not at all with the Netherlands Indies. It was to be hoped that the talks would contribute to a better understanding of Japanese policy in the United States, but that it would be a mistake to expect any political results from them. The further treatment of questions at issue between Japan and America was exclusively in the hands of the American Ambassador here. Mr. Sayre has in the meantime returned to Manila. It is understood that Mr. Arita will have further conversations with the American Ambassador, who has temporarily postponed his proposed visit home. The result of these efforts also will, in the final analysis, depend on which trend gains the upper hand in Japanese foreign policy, a question which in turn will be decisively influenced by developments in Europe. The boldness and grandeur of Germany's political and military actions have made a very deep impression here. As a result of Germany's successes, the national forces of Japan and the Japanese Army in particular are less than ever inclined to a rotten peace with the Anglo-Saxons which would only last until these Powers could again pursue their old imperialistic aims in the Far East. This point of view was unequivocally confirmed to me again recently by authoritative representatives of the Army.

II. *Relations with England.*

The aim of English policy toward Japan is still to prevent Japan from entering into closer cooperation with Germany at the cost of limited local concessions in China and by economic enticements and

threats, but for the rest to leave the defense of the Western Powers' position in the Far East principally to America. The policy of separate small concessions in China, however, continually encounters difficulties, because so far England is not prepared to abandon her fundamental standpoint, while on the other hand the individual questions at issue always derive from unsolved questions of principle. This can be seen particularly clearly in the negotiations on the Tientsin silver,⁶ which are still dragging on. The British Ambassador has talks on this subject at regular intervals with the Japanese Deputy Foreign Minister, which are usually followed by a statement by the spokesman to the effect that there is a prospect of early agreement. There is no doubt that on this question which is in itself of little importance England would like to reach an agreement with Japan, but for this, in accordance with her fundamental principles, the consent of Chiang Kai-shek's government is required, and this has been refused. Of particular interest in this connection was the statement by the spokesman of the Chungking government on May 7, which not only categorically adhered to the view that England by herself could not dispose of the silver stored in Tientsin, but revealed in particular that England had given a formal undertaking to Chungking not to make any arrangements regarding it without the consent of the Chinese National Government. This statement had the effect of sounding a warning, and was obviously intended to make impossible any further concession by England on the silver question.

It remains to be seen whether England will violate her commitment and, against the Chungking Government's declared wish, come to an agreement with Japan. Even if she did so, however, all the signs indicate that England would not achieve the abandonment by Japan of the blockade of the British Concession in Tientsin. Under the influence of the Army, the Japanese Government has left the question of ending the blockade to the express decision of the China Army. As reported, however, the Army is resolved to open up the question of foreign concessions in China as such, and therefore does not seem willing to allow itself to be bribed not to seize the English Concession in Tientsin by Britain's accommodating attitude in the silver question.

III. *The Foreign Minister's speech, with particular reference to relations with Russia.*

On May 4, the Japanese Foreign Minister gave a lecture on the basic principles of Japanese foreign policy to the "International Society" here, most of the members of which are elderly Japanese diplomats. The speech contained for the most part only Mr. Arita's

⁶ The point at issue was the fate of nearly \$4,000,000 in silver bars and bullion deposited by the Chinese National Government in the Chinese Bank of Communications within the British Reservation at Tientsin. This had remained unsettled in the Anglo-Japanese Tientsin Agreement of July 24, 1939. See vol. vi, document No. 715, footnote 2.

well-known arguments that Japan must concentrate all her strength on a solution of the China conflict and for that purpose must avoid friction with other Powers. Japan must support with all means available to her the new Chinese Central Government under Wang Ching-wei. This should be realized especially by those who only looked for the shortcomings and weaknesses of this Government. Japan must try to eliminate existing differences and disputes with other Powers; this was the guiding principle of Japanese foreign policy. This applied in particular to relations with America which were at present bad. It was the Foreign Minister's task to see that no further strain was put on these relations. At this point the Minister sharply criticized the so-called "radicals" who were demanding a strong and energetic policy against America.

The statements about Russia were particularly significant. Although the Minister said that his aim was to reach an understanding with Russia, he nevertheless at the same time gave an extremely unfavorable review of Russo-Japanese relations in the last few years. Russia, he said, had always talked of peace but at the same time prepared for war. At present also, Japan must take care that Russia did not pursue a policy of compromise only until she felt herself strong enough for the final clash. These words reflect the deep distrust of Japanese policy toward Russia, which is doubtless reciprocated by the latter. Furthermore, Arita's remarks again prove that the present leaders of the Japanese Foreign Ministry are still chasing after the phantom of a settlement with America and only pursuing with reluctance, in spite of its manifest advantages, the understanding with Russia which many people recognize as necessary and possible.

Particularly characteristic of the frame of mind of the Foreign Minister and those who share his views was a retrospective consideration of the *Asama Maru*⁷ incident, which, he said, proved the "Japanese people's lack of experience" in matters of neutrality. Only this lack of experience could explain the storm of indignation, stirred up by the "radicals", which had then swept through the whole people. These remarks show the complete lack of insight into and terrifying incomprehension of their own people's feelings which is shown by the present leaders of the Gaimusho⁸ and by the coterie behind them. The nationalist press, which sharply attacked the Foreign Minister for the aimlessness and weakness of his program, consequently reacted particularly violently to these comments on the *Asama Maru* case. In

⁷ A British cruiser intercepted the Japanese liner *Asama Maru* on Mar. 20 35 miles from Tokyo, boarded her and removed 21 German technicians en route from the United States to Germany. After strong Japanese protest, the British authorities agreed to release 9 of the captured men to Japanese custody, as not being of special value as technicians.

⁸ The Japanese Foreign Ministry.

particular the *Hochi* has asserted that Mr. Arita by his remarks betrayed Japan's national honor.

The Embassy at Shanghai and the Legation at Hsinking are receiving copies of this report.

OTT

No. 234

2332/486591

The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

No. 429 of May 11

Tokyo, May 11, 1940—8:30 a. m.

Received May 11—11:30 p. m.

Pol. VIII 577.

The Foreign Minister just invited me to call and said that the Japanese Government was anxious lest the inclusion of Holland in the war disturb the status quo in the Netherlands Indies. Japan is most interested in its maintenance for commercial-political reasons and for preservation of peace in the Pacific. The Japanese Government has already given its view on this matter in the Foreign Minister's press interview of April 15.¹ He handed me the English text of this statement with the request that it be immediately transmitted to the German Government. He will make the same communication later today to the British and French Ambassadors (the statement was conveyed to the American Government immediately after its publication).

The statement is identical with that already transmitted in report No. 383 of April 19; ² in view of its importance I am repeating it with telegram No. 430.³

In subsequent conversation the Foreign Minister mentioned the military reports which have thus far arrived from Belgium and Holland and specially praised the rapidity of the German advances.⁴

OTT

¹ See document No. 123.² Not printed (2332/486584-87). The Japanese Ambassador had handed a copy of the statement to Woermann on Apr. 20. See document No. 123, footnote 2.³ Not printed (2332/486592).⁴ See document No. 262.

No. 235

159/82175-76

The Legation in Denmark to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 487 of May 11

COPENHAGEN, May 11, 1940—12:40 p. m.

Received May 11—2:45 p. m.

With reference to my telegram No. 434 of May 1.¹

The following emerges from a report by the Danish Minister in Washington to the Danish Foreign Ministry: The American Govern-

¹ Not printed (159/82174).

ment had several times assured the Danish Minister that it would support Greenland remaining with Denmark. The condition for this was autonomous administration of Greenland by local governors for the duration of the German occupation of Denmark. The American Government would send Consul Penfield and Vice Consul West as official representatives to Greenland. At the same time Reddy, a delegate of the American Red Cross was to go to Greenland to study possibilities for American relief later. The Governors in Greenland had notified the American Government direct of agreement to this, and wished on their part also to send a commission to America. Minister Kauffmann believes that America's intentions are honest. In order to preserve Danish influence as much as possible in the present circumstances, he had established in New York a Danish-American Greenland Committee to help him. Its members were three Danish administrative officials and seven American Danes. The Foreign Ministry told me that it did not welcome American interest in Greenland at all, but neither the Danish Government nor the Minister in Washington had the opportunity to take effective countermeasures. The Danish Government will arrive at further decisions, as soon as a report has been received in Copenhagen from the Greenland experts who have been assigned to the Danish Legation in Washington and who will leave Copenhagen in a day or two.² The Soviet Chargé d'Affaires mentioned to Hensel³ certain fears that American influence in Greenland would become too strong, which in his opinion could not be in Germany's interest either.

HENCKE

² A further report from the Legation in Copenhagen on May 23 (1922/431347-51) on the subject of the American attitude on the Greenland question added that the journey of these Greenland experts, who had already started from Copenhagen, had been halted as the American Government had withdrawn visas for them.

³ Counselor Herbert Hugo Hensel, of the Legation staff.

No. 236

B21/B005579-81

The Embassy in the United States to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

SECRET

No. 922 of May 11

WASHINGTON, May 11, 1940—8:08 p. m.

Received May 12—2:15 p. m.

For OKW Foreign Department, Chief of the Army General Staff via Attaché Branch of the Army, Chief of the Luftwaffe Operations Staff via Attaché Group Air. Reports up to 11 p. m. Central European time on May 11.

The following picture has emerged from contacts with the Commander [*Oberbefehlshaber*] of the American Army and from talks with the responsible officers who advise the State Department and President Roosevelt, as well as from a meeting with Woodring, the Secretary of War.

I. Besides the Secretary of State, the responsible Commanders of the Army and Navy, that is to say, the General Staff, are this time also playing a decisive part in the decisions made by the President.

II. An early entry into the war by the United States of America can be ruled out as long as the Western Hemisphere is not directly threatened or the United States of America does not feel her security endangered by the activities of agents and the like. Thus it is again confirmed that the argument spread abroad from here that the United States of America would certainly or very probably decide to enter the war if England were threatened, is a slogan designed to influence policy. This state of affairs and the facts concerning the lack of preparedness in the matter of armaments have been explained in my reports since 1939, for instance in telegram No. 843 of May 4.¹

It is again evident in the decisions reached by the General Staff and the President that decisions regarding the Atlantic front are substantially influenced by the position in the Pacific. This becomes the more obvious, the less mention is made of Japan in statements by the President and in the largely controlled press. The desire is in all circumstances to avoid creating the impression in Japan that the United States views the military situation in the Pacific with considerable anxiety; this is in fact the case.

III. It has been pointed out to me by the leading officers in the General Staff that a substantial deterioration in the general attitude toward Germany is feared in consequence of the attack through Holland and Belgium. For the time being however, it is known to the General Staff that the people, even those Americans of Danish or Norwegian descent, had not been too unfavorably influenced against Germany by the measures taken in Norway.

IV. The more firmly the desire to keep out of the war is represented to Roosevelt, the more the opinion gains ground, at the same time, that the United States must be armed in keeping with the importance of the Monroe Doctrine and the policy concerned with the Western Hemisphere. As Pittman, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, remarked in my presence at a private gathering, the defeat of England was expected "as a consequence of the Führer's genius and the unique organization of the German Wehrmacht" and it is thought that, if not in the immediate future, certainly in a few years, "the power of the Führer may reach out toward the

¹ Not printed (B21/B005560-62).

Western Hemisphere." One must be armed for this "by no means certain but nevertheless possible event." I have repeatedly reported in detail on American armaments and their special features, as well as on the inadequacy of American economic preparations for war, and I would at present not even interpret the very considerable increase in the American armed forces as an indication of an offensive trend, especially as effective rearmament takes time and is, in the main, dependent on the adjustment of the country's economy to the requirements of rearmament.

V. The American General Staff regards events in Holland and Belgium as the expression of the Führer's intention of bringing about a decision. As usual in the case of events on our western front, one is completely in the dark here as to what the English and French are doing. Together with me, people here have followed the reports at hand with sympathetic understanding. The officer responsible for the formation of political opinion in the War Department sums up the general view with the words that, practically speaking, since 1914, i. e., for 26 years, Germany has been in a state of war for the defense of her independence and that it is in this light that coming decisions are awaited.

BÖTTICHER
THOMSEN

No. 237

5570/E399399

The Legation in Yugoslavia to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 371 of May 12

BELGRADE, May 12, 1940—10: 50 p. m.

Received May 13—2: 15 a. m.

W 2525 g.

A further secret protocol ¹ supplementary to the Secret Protocol of October 5, 1939 ² was signed today. The metal and ore deliveries under the terms of the agreement are secured and increased to the extent that the arrears will be made up. The copper supplies during May will be 4,500 tons. The other negotiations are taking their normal course.

Landfried will arrive in Berlin on Monday night.

LANDFRIED
HEEREN

¹ The texts of this supplementary protocol and of a letter confirming agreements on copper and lead deliveries, addressed to the chief German negotiator, State Secretary Landfried of the Economics Ministry and sent by Yugoslav State Secretary Pilja are not printed (8498/E597123-27). Amendments were recorded in letters exchanged on May 17 and May 31 (8498/E597128-31).

² See vol. VIII, document No. 117, footnote 4.

No. 238

108/112153-56

Ambassador Ritter to the Embassy in the Soviet Union

Telegram

No. 779

BERLIN, May 12, 1940.
W 2516 g.

With reference to my telegram No. 769 of May 10.¹

When the February Agreement² was concluded, both sides were unanimous that the complete carrying out of the Agreement would only be possible if reciprocal contracts of delivery were concluded in the shortest possible time. We have gained the impression from the Soviet purchasing negotiations in recent weeks that the Soviet negotiators are not proceeding in such a manner as to achieve the agreed object of an early conclusion of the contracts. On the contrary, the impression gained is that the negotiations are being dragged out, as a result of which the fulfillment of the Agreement is seriously jeopardized. This is often the case with just those articles which actually could be delivered within the first 6 months—for instance, the delivery of armor plates (for which an inquiry was received only a few days ago) measuring apparatus and optical equipment, in connection with which we have noted particularly dilatory conduct of negotiations on the Soviet side. To be specific, the following facts are pointed out concerning Soviet methods of negotiation:

(1) Negotiators deal arbitrarily with German firms without knowing their productive capacity and capabilities. The Ministry of Economics is prepared, by consultation and allocation within Germany, to avoid weeks of useless negotiation, and to direct the work of the Soviet negotiators at once into the right channels.

(2) The Soviet negotiators submit specifications which either arrive late or are inadequate. Sudden requests for alterations call for new construction work involving loss of time. In many cases German and international stipulations are completely departed from.

(3) German offers are answered late or not at all.

(4) The pre-war prices agreed in principle are not observed and are replaced arbitrarily and without justification by reduced prices offered by the Soviet side. This is the case for example with steam boilers, heavy diesel machines, electrical equipment, and merchant ships, and also applies in the field of war equipment.

(5) The acceptance of goods delivered is carried out in a petty manner and often contrary to German and international standards. The Soviet negotiators often do not possess sufficient authority to conclude contracts, and hence consultations with Moscow are necessary involving loss of time.

(6) In the case of war equipment, the negotiators demand, supposedly as a condition for concluding contracts, that valuable techni-

¹ Document No. 229.

² See vol. VIII, document No. 607.

cal data should first of all be handed over or prepared free of charge. The Soviet side only presses energetically for conclusion of contracts where especially high grade German deliveries are concerned. Hence, in the case of war equipment, contracts have only been concluded for 9 million RM. worth of extremely valuable aircraft.

(7) In spite of official references to the fact that large firms such as AEG and Siemens are only able to make limited deliveries and that, on the other hand, numerous smaller electrical firms are in a position to undertake the agreed deliveries, the Russians insist on deliveries from large firms.

(8) The Soviet side is solely responsible for the difficulties in delivering coal as, contrary to treaty obligations, Soviet shipping space is not made available in Gdynia. If the Soviet side attaches importance to obtaining the quota of coal laid down under the treaty, an unconditional requirement is that the Soviet should make shipping space available. Soviet statements that no Russian shipping space is available are inconsistent with the recent statement of a trade representative^a here that the Soviet merchant fleet needed timber cargoes for the west in order to utilize their cargo space.

II. In reply to Soviet representations that the conclusion of contracts should be expedited on the German side, Field Marshal Göring gave orders that the due execution of the Agreement should be furthered by all available means and that even important German interests should be set aside.⁴ All German firms are complying with this instruction. We for our part must expect that the Soviet negotiators will also receive a similar definite instruction in order that the immediate conclusion of contracts may not be prevented by petty and dilatory Soviet tactics.

III. Soviet deliveries.

Here, too, in spite of months of negotiation, contracts are still awaiting conclusion, especially in the case of petroleum, iron, scrap, ores, and raw materials from third countries. The unjustified Soviet wishes in respect to prices are the chief obstacle preventing Soviet deliveries to Germany from being carried out as contemplated. The deliveries which have actually been made to Germany up to the present are still far below those undertaken by the Soviet under the Credit and Trade Agreements, and in no wise fulfill the Soviet promise of economic assistance.^b

Please make use of the above data with Molotov and point out that the carrying out of the Agreement will be jeopardized if clear instructions are not given to the Soviet negotiators and Soviet organizations for the conclusion of contracts and early execution of deliveries.⁵

RITTER

^a No record has been found.

⁴ See document No. 32.

⁵ No report from the Moscow Embassy on how this step was carried out has been found.

No. 239

F17/187-91

Adolf Hitler to Benito Mussolini

THE FÜHRER'S HEADQUARTERS, May 13, 1940.

DUCE: Pray accept first of all my grateful thanks for the understanding which you showed¹ for the pressure under which we were forced to act. Your personal attitude, which, as I know, is also that of your party, press and public opinion is a factor which is operating greatly to our advantage.

Today, I can give you, Duce, a general survey of the results of our initial operations. I should like to preface it with the assurance that here, just as in Poland or Norway, our opponents, lacking direct successes, will naturally have recourse to the most nonsensical lying reports. I consider this policy stupid, for it will be repudiated by reality in the shortest possible time.

The following are the events of the last few days.

The attack began on the front between Groningen and the southern tip of Luxembourg. This is therefore an air line of about 450 km. Since yesterday morning advance troops have also been working their way forward in turn toward the Maginot Line at various places on the front between the Moselle and the Rhine.

The first 3 days' offensive on the above-mentioned 450 km. front resulted in a breakthrough at all the frontier and fortified positions. Parts of these were extremely strong installations whose powers of resistance were greatly strengthened by the integrated system of rivers and canals. In spite of this, the whole of northern Holland, that is the province of Groningen, has already been occupied, the Issel position breached or opened up, and gaps made in the Grebbe Line at several important points. Independently of these, however, paratroopers and airborne troops have also been dropped between The Hague, Rotterdam, Dordrecht and Norddeich. These formations planted some 120-130 km. in front of our lines have fought with unprecedented bravery; they safeguarded the bridges which they occupied, gained ground and repulsed all attacks by the Dutch and probably by several smaller English units also.

Since last night they have been joined by the vanguard of the first armored and motorized units, who had overcome great obstacles and resistance. Infantry divisions are proceeding by the same route by forced marches. Contact has thus been established and the fortress Holland breached from within. South of this the Juliana Canal, the Meuse, the Willems Canal, the Meuse and Scheldt Canal and the Albert Canal have been crossed. German units are here converging on Antwerp.

¹ See document No. 232.

The most difficult problem, Duce, was the crossing of the Meuse and the Albert Canal near Maastricht. This sector is covered on its flanks by the fortress of Liège which was greatly strengthened and enlarged after the World War. Already the Meuse is a difficult obstacle. But west of this the Albert Canal, which in parts is up to 60 m. deep, provides an absolutely first-class artificial reinforcement. All the bridges over it had been prepared for demolition. The bridges, moreover, were under fire from the Eben-Emael fort, the strongest defensive works on the whole of the western front. The Maginot Line has no fort similar to this in extent and armor. This fort and the bridges over the Albert Canal, which actually can not be replaced in a short time, were subjected to a lightning attack at 5:30 a. m. on May 10. The fort was silenced a few minutes later. Of the three bridges over the Albert Canal two are completely undamaged and the Belgians were only able to damage the third slightly. Only the Dutch succeeded in blowing up the bridges in Maastricht as the result of an unfortunate failure on our part. However this was less important, for these could at once be replaced by military bridges. The attack on the fortress of Liège itself began simultaneously with this. It was broken into, block by block and fort by fort, and I have just received the report that the swastika flag is flying over the citadel at Liège. The divisions which had meanwhile been thrown across the Meuse and the Albert Canal hurled back the Belgian units and repulsed French counterattacks. They will begin an offensive in a westerly direction immediately on being brought up to strength.

South of Liège thickly wooded country, which was extremely strongly fortified and prepared for demolition by months of work, had to be broken through. The area through which we had to fight our way has a depth of 100 km. in the air line from the German frontier to the Meuse south of Namur. This area was so penetrated in the fighting that last night sections of the spearheads reached the Meuse, and other sections were encamped a few kilometers away. Since this morning the bulk of the divisions have been linking up everywhere. Luxembourg was overrun on the first day. French advance posts in the southern part of Luxembourg and Belgium were attacked and thrust back to the Maginot Line. In this way, Duce, the necessary cover has been created for the further operations by the northern wing against the Dutch and Belgian coasts.

These are the territorial results of the first 3 days!

The material results: A large number of Dutch and Belgian divisions were attacked, partly overrun and partly destroyed. French attempts to delay or hinder developments in the situation by sending forward their armored and motorized units were repulsed everywhere. The number of prisoners already runs into tens of thousands.

In the air: On the morning of May 10, 72 French airfields were attacked, some being damaged and some destroyed. Since then our Luftwaffe has been striking at the deployment of many troops in uninterrupted sorties, has destroyed more and more airfields and already gained complete mastery in the air during the first day. Apart from aimless bombing attacks at night it is no longer possible for the French or English air forces to be employed effectively—especially in the daytime. I may give you an example: The moment the bridges outside Maastricht were rebuilt, an enormous stream of German troops began to move forward across them and the bridges over the Albert Canal. Here the English and French air forces really began destructive attacks and indeed twice: the first time with 16 aircraft; all 16 were shot down, 8 by fighters and 8 by antiaircraft fire. The enemy air force was not able to hinder or interfere with the deployment or advance of our troops in any way. Isolated attacks on German cities and also on the Ruhr—which incidentally are denied by the English because of their cowardly fear of our reprisals—were grievous for individual victims but were completely unimportant from the economic or military point of view. The losses sustained by the French, English and Belgian air forces in the first 3 days of the fighting amount to at least between 1,100 and 1,400 aircraft. Numerous airfields have been destroyed and their hangars wrecked. The ground organization can be regarded as damaged and in part smashed.

At sea: Here above all our aircraft have inflicted further heavy losses on the English in continuous attacks.

The ranks of the British Navy have been visibly thinned particularly in destroyers and cruisers.

So far our own losses on land and in the air are extraordinarily slight. There is no comparison between them and those of the enemy.

This, Duce, is the situation, as it stands today. Pray accept my thanks for the letter which you addressed to me in these historic days and comradesly greetings from

Yours,

ADOLF HITLER

No. 240

328/195404

Memorandum by an Official of Political Division I

IMMEDIATE

BERLIN, May 13, 1940.

At 7:30 p. m. Colonel von Geldern of the OKW, Foreign Department [*Abt. Ausland*], transmitted to me the request of the High Command of the Army, in which the OKW concurred, that we should refrain from regarding ourselves as at war with Luxembourg. The conduct of the Luxembourg armed forces had been perfectly correct; there had been no acts of sabotage. The Foreign Minister had already been informed of the request.

Colonel von Geldern asked for the opinion of the Foreign Ministry.¹ I informed Under State Secretary Woermann and Senior Counselor Albrecht of the above by telephone.

NOSTITZ

¹ For the opinion of the Foreign Minister, see document No. 257.

No. 241

464/226278-80

The Minister in Uruguay to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

No. 96 of May 13

MONTEVIDEO, May 14, 1940—1:30 a. m.

Received May 14—3:00 p. m.

With reference to my Report A 161 of April 10 and telegram No. 87 of April 25.¹

1) Guani has given further proof of his good intentions. The Chilean Minister² told me about a conversation 3 weeks ago in which Guani described to him the difficulties involved in maintaining true neutrality in face of pro-English influence. He also stated that the question whether Germany or England was responsible for the war would have to be studied very carefully. Uruguay's press was, in any case, behaving irresponsibly toward Germany in the question of guilt. For his part he remembered a conversation between Beneš and himself in Geneva, when England had sabotaged the proposal for obligatory submission to arbitration, to the effect that England was in this way preventing a real pacification in Europe. He was always reminded of this personal experience whenever England asserted that the war guilt was Germany's. The Chilean Minister added that this would have been unthinkable as coming from Guani 4 months earlier. This shows that for the time being Guani is adhering to the change of course as described in telegram No. 87, and this not only in domestic affairs which have no international repercussions.

2) The present situation is being discussed unfavorably in public here. The major part of the press is demanding either the convening of the Asamblea General (Senate and Chamber) with a view to breaking off relations or else a strong Pan-American declaration against Germany. There are isolated reports that Guani has taken the initiative for the latter move. This has hitherto been interpreted in the

¹ Neither printed (2336/487082-84; 487079-81). This report as well as the telegram referred to emphasized that the Uruguayan Foreign Minister Guani, during the last few months had stiffened in his attitude toward Britain, while trying at the same time to improve relations with Germany.

² Joaquín Fernández.

country as an attempt by Guani, by means of a relatively noncommittal declaration, to remain at the helm in face of an excited public in order to avoid aggravating the situation. I learn, however, from a reliable source that the press report regarding Guani is for the time being only a trial balloon by the pro-Allied side which is very active at present.

In particular I learn in this connection that President Roosevelt has made the following suggestions to the Argentine Foreign Minister:

a) that Argentina should improve her relations with England by granting extensive credits (Argentine interest in selling the maize harvest, for which England has so far not made any tonnage available).

b) that North and South America should jointly impose a moral embargo on Germany accompanied by a severe condemnation of Germany (from another reliable source I have received indirect confirmation in the form of a suggestion said to have been made by the U. S. Ambassador ³ to Cantilo that in future the U. S. A. and Argentina should jointly recognize the English black list). Cantilo has approached Guani with a suggestion to that effect with a view to bringing about a joint action. Guani refused saying that the moment did not seem opportune to him, but he was prepared to study concrete proposals, if necessary.

3) It remains to be seen how far Guani will further be able to maintain this attitude. A further press campaign, more extensive than hitherto, would be desirable. I may possibly have the opportunity of inducing the major part of the opposition press to make a radical change in its policy regarding foreign affairs for the duration of the war; in this way, the Government would be relieved of substantial internal pressure on its foreign policy. But the price of this is not inconsiderable; a separate telegram will deal with this.⁴

4) Meanwhile, as a result of the reserve maintained by Guani, who, despite close personal relations with the Belgian and Dutch royal families (Guani was Uruguayan Minister in Brussels and The Hague during the World War and the period following it), has intentionally omitted sending a telegram of sympathy, the pro-Allied wing, in the course of this day, has mobilized the Senate and Chamber. Both houses have voted for a secret session to hear a report by Guani. The Senate has, furthermore, passed a resolution expressing sympathy with Luxembourg, Belgium, the Netherlands, and other "victims." The Chamber has, moreover, passed a resolution demanding a preliminary investigation into the party's activities. I have started countermeasures. It remains to be seen how far Guani will be able

³ Norman Armour.

⁴ Nothing further found.

to assert himself in face of pro-Allied pressure, especially as the *Tacoma* plan⁵ of action has still not made any further progress.

LANGMANN

⁵The German merchantman *Tacoma* had been interned by Argentina in connection with the sinking of the *Graf Spee* in December 1939. In telegram No. 87 of Apr. 25 (see footnote 1), Langmann had reported a suggestion by Guani that the *Tacoma* should be sold to an Uruguayan concern and its crew released from internment. Langmann had subsequently negotiated on this basis; "such a sale" he reported "which is regarded by the Legation not as a shipping matter but as a political matter offers one of the few possibilities for our winning over politically influential circles."

No. 242

582/242011-12

The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

ROME, May 14, 1940—12:40 p. m.

TOP SECRET

Received May 14—2:45 p. m.

No. 875 of May 14

For the Foreign Minister personally.

As soon as the special courier arrived with the Führer's letter¹ I met Ciano in the Palazzo Chigi at one o'clock in the morning and in view of the early hour and the Duce's urgent request only to be awakened in cases where an immediate decision was essential, I arranged with Count Ciano that I should go with him this morning to deliver the letter at the Palazzo Venezia at the earliest possible hour and for this purpose to call for him at the Palazzo Chigi at 8:50 a. m.

The Duce received us at once, first read the letter over to himself and then translated it sentence by sentence into Italian for Ciano, asking me to point out the moves on a map which lay ready to hand, showed that he was profoundly impressed and singled out for Ciano as the most important piece of information in the letter the statement that mastery in the air was already assured. That was decisive for further developments in the course of which he foresaw a great battle west of the Maginot Line. It would be harder work than in Poland but success was not in doubt. He would reply to the Führer personally and inform him of the steps which Italy would take in consequence of the present situation.

During the conversation lasting over half an hour hundreds of people, mostly students, assembled in the Piazza Venezia and at times their demonstrations made conversation almost impossible, finally obliging the Duce to appear on the balcony for a short time.

It seems to me very significant that early this morning in the Palazzo Chigi, that is, even before he knew the contents of the Führer's let-

¹ Document No. 239.

ter, Ciano under the impact of other reports here of the progress of operations expressed himself for the first time favorably regarding active intervention by Italy. I knew, he said, that he had never pressed for this hitherto and I knew the reason. But *the moment* had now come. They would not wait more than 10 to 14 days. Italy would be able to throw into the scales two factors which were of importance to us, not so much the army, whose assistance an army such as ours did not need, but a really first rate factor, namely the navy which had now reached maximum efficiency and was ready for battle at once, and also the air force, especially the fighter aircraft, although in many respects this was perhaps not on the same level.

MACKENSEN

No. 243

B21/B005585-87

The Chargé d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

WASHINGTON, May 14, 1940—3:19 p. m.

TOP SECRET

Received May 15—3:00 a. m.

No. 930 of May 14

Official American attitude on the German advance through Holland and Belgium is epitomized in Roosevelt's speech on the 10th of this month,¹ in his declaration of sympathy for the Belgian King on the 11th,² and in Hull's two speeches yesterday.³ On my instructions DNB telegraphed detailed excerpts from all these statements.

To sum up, the following may be said:

The extension of the war to Holland and Belgium, for which we are generally made morally responsible here, has made a deep impression on the American Government and on the American public, and, in the words used here, has so greatly narrowed down the moral and political ground on which we can operate here in America that only a tight-rope walker could keep his balance on it.

Nevertheless, in comparison with this, all statements by the American Government have been expressed in cautious and reserved terms and only the experienced observer can detect therein Roosevelt's tremendous fury (group garbled) at not seeing any possibility at present of helping the Allies in their fateful struggle.

¹ For the text of Roosevelt's speech of May 10 to the Pan-American Scientific Congress, see *The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt*, vol. ix, pp. 184-187.

² For the text of Roosevelt's telegram to King Leopold III see *The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt*, vol. ix, p. 189.

³ Hull's speeches of May 13 were addressed to the American Society of International Law and to the Pan-American Scientific Congress. For texts see Department of State, *Bulletin*, 1940, vol. ii, pp. 532 and 537, respectively.

Roosevelt's anti-German hands are tied for three reasons: Military developments in Scandinavia and the Netherlands took place with such lightning rapidity that no time remains to the American Government to attempt anything in the way of active support for the Allies. Besides this, any direction of American foreign policy actively in favor of the Allies is hampered by his own election campaign, and Roosevelt must be careful in this respect (group garbled) not to expose himself to attack by his domestic political opponents. The third reason is the inadequate military preparedness and armament of this continent in comparison with its economic resources and moral and political importance, which precludes any effective large-scale support for the Allies. Here again the American Government finds itself in a dilemma, because the substantial increase in American rearmament which is obviously being planned must naturally at the same time limit America's capacity as an arsenal for the Allies.

These three reasons which hamper an effective foreign policy by Roosevelt in Europe are still further strengthened by America's foreign policy commitments in the Pacific. The fact of England's being tied down in the North Sea and the Mediterranean demands increased watchfulness by the United States regarding possible Japanese plans.

As far as can be judged at present, American foreign policy must for the moment be confined to keeping a careful watch on developments in Europe and the Far East, and she will be able to decide on any more extensive actions only if military developments in Europe, perhaps through warfare of position in Western Europe, provide sufficient reasons for it, and if German military measures, especially against the civilian population of these countries, could be exploited with the object of extensively influencing American public opinion, which is sentimental and easily roused. Only then will Roosevelt be in a position to consider in detail the question of political measures against Germany, such as, perhaps, the rupture of diplomatic relations. At present no measures by America of a very serious nature are to be expected, hence Allied efforts regarding American support are in the main concentrated on the speeding up of deliveries of aircraft, which I do not need to go into in further detail here, as well as on the relaxation of the American credit embargo. In this connection the most varied plans are being considered and publicized. It cannot, however, be assumed that the Allies will be successful with this before the American election is over and the elected President has gained more freedom of action in the fields of foreign and domestic policy.

THOMSEN

No. 244

1571/380316

The Director of the Political Department to the Embassy in Italy

Telegram

URGENT

No. 565

BERLIN, May 14, 1940.

zu Pol. VII 1002 g.¹

The Embassy in Ankara has reported by telegram :²

"The Allies are making desperate efforts since the start of the western offensive to draw Turkey into the war and thus divert strong Italian forces from a possible operation against southern France. The Turks have so far resisted tenaciously. Nevertheless, the Allied Ambassadors here are hoping to succeed eventually at least in achieving the breaking-off of diplomatic relations with Germany and, thereby, a prestige victory by making use of articles 4 and 5 of the Anglo-French-Turkish Treaty. The reassuring declaration of Rome to Turkey which I have suggested is therefore becoming very urgent."

End of telegram from Ankara.

The Foreign Minister requests your opinion on this by telegram³ but without approaching the Italian Government. This statement of opinion should be given in conjunction with your observations which we requested earlier on the dispatch from Ankara of April 25⁴ and telegram from Ankara of May 6⁵ (see instructions by dispatch Pol. VII 394 of May 6 and Pol. VII 416 of May 8⁶).

WOERMANN

¹ Pol. VII 1002 g. : Not found.

² Telegram 321 of May 12 (1571/380315).

³ Document No. 245.

⁴ Not found.

⁵ Probably document No. 200.

⁶ Neither found.

No. 245

1571/380322-23

The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 877 of May 14

ROME, May 14, 1940—11:00 p. m.

Received May 15—5:30 a. m.

With reference to your telegram No. 565 of May 14,¹ and instructions Pol. VII 394 of May 6, and Pol. VII 416 of May 8.²

As we have so far avoided an exchange of views with the Italian Government on Italian strategical plans in the Mediterranean and

¹ Document No. 244.

² Neither found.

Balkans in the event of Italy's entry into the war and as the Italian Government has not informed us of its intentions either, I am only able to express my opinion of Italy's policy toward Turkey on the basis of an assessment of the general situation here.

Should Italy decide to embark on an offensive war in the eastern Mediterranean the first consideration apart from the possibility of an attack against Yugoslavia would be the occupation of certain Greek islands at the mouth of the Adriatic Sea, in order to ensure control of the Adriatic by Italy. Furthermore, it must be taken for granted that full use will be made of Italian bases in the Dodecanese which, as is known, have especially of late been tremendously fortified. Italy will not, however, be able to confine herself to the defense of the Dodecanese but will be forced to exploit to the full their strategical importance. Under the terms of the Anglo-French-Turkish Treaty, Turkey would be obliged to render full assistance to the Western Powers in the first-mentioned eventuality. Full utilization of her bases in the Dodecanese, which will be absolutely necessary for Italy, will in all probability bring Turkey automatically into the arena as Italy's opponent, especially if, as can be seen from Ankara telegram No. 300 of May 6,^a Turkey will make her ports with coaling facilities on the Aegean Coast available to Allied warships, thus providing the Allies with a jumping-off point for attacks on the Dodecanese. I, therefore, consider it most improbable that the Italian Government will restrict its military freedom of movement, which it absolutely needs for crushing English-French hegemony, to such a degree that it will give Turkey the extensive assurances proposed by Herr von Papen, which would naturally have to cover the Balkans as well as the Dodecanese. The opinion of the Italian Ambassador in Ankara that it should be the continued aim of German-Italian efforts at all events to keep Turkey out of the conflict is almost certainly shared here. In order to achieve this aim the Italian Government will probably endeavor, if necessary by joint action with the German Government, to exert an intimidating influence on the Turkish Government rather than to have its hands tied by assurances.

Even if the Italian command refrains from offensive action in the Balkans and eastern Mediterranean for the time being, the Italian Government will in all probability not decide to give any assurances to Turkey for the aforementioned reason that it will thereby give up its freedom of movement.

MACKENSEN

^a Document No. 200.

No. 246

8589/E802710-11

Führer's Directive

CHEFSACKE

HEADQUARTERS, May 14, 1940.

TOP SECRET MILITARY

The Führer and Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht

WFA/Abt. L Nr. 33 002/40 g. K. Chefs.

By officer only

DIRECTIVE No. 11

1) The course of the offensive thus far shows that the enemy has failed to recognize in time the basic idea of our operation. He is still bringing up strong forces to the Namur-Antwerp line and seems to be neglecting the sector in front of Army Group A.¹

2) This situation and the rapid forcing of the Meuse crossings in the Army Group A sector have produced the first prerequisite for achieving a great success on the lines of Directive No. 10² by a thrust executed in a northwesterly direction north of the Aisne with a concentration of the strongest forces. The troops fighting north of the Liège-Namur line will then have the mission of tying down and diverting as strong an enemy force as possible by an attack with their own forces.

3) On the north flank the power of resistance of the Netherlands Army has proved to be stronger than was anticipated.. Political as well as military considerations require that this resistance be broken *speedily*. It will be the mission of the Army to bring about rapidly the collapse of fortress Holland by means of adequate forces from the south in conjunction with the attack against the eastern front.

4) All available motorized divisions are to be brought into the operational area of Army Group A as quickly as possible.

The armored and motorized divisions of Army Group B³ must also be released as soon as operational actions are no longer possible there and the situation permits and be brought up to the left attacking wing.

5) The mission of the Luftwaffe will be to concentrate strong offensive and defensive forces for employment in the sector of Army Group A as the point of main effort, in order to prevent the bringing up of additional enemy forces to the offensive front and to support this front directly.

¹ Army Group A under Colonel General von Rundstedt was attacking in the central part of the front, along the Meuse.

² Not found.

³ Army Group B under Colonel General von Bock, of which the Sixth Army was a part, was attacking on the northern portion of the front, in Belgium and Holland.

In addition, the rapid conquest of fortress Holland is to be facilitated through a deliberate weakening of the forces hitherto operating before the Sixth Army.

6) The Navy will operate within the framework of the possibilities open to it against sea communications in the Hoofden and in the Channel.

ADOLF HITLER

No. 247

464/226285-87

Memorandum by the State Secretary

St.S. No. 366

BERLIN, May 14, 1940.

I asked the Argentine Ambassador to call on me today in order to have a serious talk with him on Argentina's attitude toward Germany and in particular on the fact that the Argentine Foreign Minister had issued a statement the day before yesterday ¹ which is tantamount to the abandonment of the absolute neutrality maintained hitherto.

I began by reminding Señor Olivera of how as late as the Conference at Lima ² his country had adopted an independent attitude and one which was very much appreciated by us. Argentina had proved at that time that she would not allow herself to be taken in tow by anti-German machinations camouflaged as Pan-Americanism. But recently certain tendencies had been observed in Argentina's policy which deviated from that hitherto adopted.

First of all, at the American Lawyers' Conference in Montevideo ³ the Argentine representative introduced a motion which was anti-German in tendency, that is to say, it proposed that ships belonging to belligerent countries which are lying in American ports should be given a suitable time limit for leaving, and on the expiration of this time limit be restricted in their freedom of movement.

Señor Olivera attempted to present this incident as the academic performance of a nonpolitical jurist. The incident, he said, had in fact not the slightest connection with any political move directed against Germany, an explanation which I naturally did not let pass unchallenged since, after all, legal experts at such conferences did not work in a vacuum but on instructions from their governments.

I then continued by saying that at the beginning of April, on the occasion of the occupation of Norway, Argentina had sounded various

¹ Thermann had reported on Cantillo's statement in telegram No. 478 of May 13 (233/156194-95).

² This refers to the Eighth Pan-American Conference held at Lima Dec. 9-27, 1938.

³ This conference met July 18-Aug. 4, 1939, and then reconvened Mar. 6-19, 1940. See Department of State, *Bulletin*, 1940, vol. II, p. 631.

American States as to whether a Pan-American demonstration should be made against it.⁴ After his Government had not succeeded in this, it had now once more put forward, by means of the Foreign Minister's well-known statement of May 12, the amazing suggestion that the American States should abandon the former conception of neutrality which had become a fiction, and enter into a state of "nonbelligerency." I told the Ambassador that it was incomprehensible to me how precisely Argentina, which had during the last war preserved what was acknowledged to have been a neutral attitude and since then had cultivated her traditional friendship with Germany, could come forward and take the initiative in this way, thereby giving support to the interventionists in the United States.

I was obliged to go into considerable detail in the discussion on this point, since the Ambassador, who incidentally did deserving work in the last war for Argentina's correct attitude toward Germany, sought with remarkable eloquence to represent the statement made by his Foreign Minister as purely a repetition of an academic speech recently delivered by him which had no political designs and was not directed against anyone. I requested the Ambassador to ask Buenos Aires for an explanation of the reasons which might have induced his Government now, all of a sudden, to take the lead within the Pan-American group in departing from true neutrality. I conducted this conversation in a serious and emphatic manner.

The Ambassador, moreover, attempted also to excuse the propaganda for "nonbelligerency" by the fact that, after all, Italy had also expressly declared herself to be "nonbelligerent." The Ambassador could not deny that in the case of America "nonbelligerency" was the same policy as that of Italy, but in a reverse direction.

In conclusion the Ambassador assured me of the absolutely good and genuine intention of his Government toward us, a policy for which he had been working for 25 years and the abandonment of which would at the same time constitute a break in his own life's work.

A further point in the conversation worth noting is perhaps that the Ambassador of his own accord repudiated most definitely the idea that his Government might be acting under North American pressure.

On the other hand Señor Olivera put forward this time also his idea, with which I was familiar, that Germany's military arm, which was again stretching out so powerfully these days, might possibly even reach as far as America.

WEIZSÄCKER

⁴ This had been reported in Buenos Aires telegram No. 479 of May 13 (223/-156196-97). See also document No. 194.

No. 248

328/195407-08

Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department

BERLIN, May 14, 1940.

Subject: Luxembourg.

According to telegram No. 79 from Luxembourg, a copy of which is again enclosed,¹ the Legation there takes the view, and rightly so, that Luxembourg according to the Constitution of Luxembourg cannot itself create a state of war. It adds that neither has anything been done so far on the part of Luxembourg which could have caused a state of war. From here too, Luxembourg affairs have so far been treated in such a manner as not to prejudice the issue in any way. In particular, when a Secretary of the American Embassy on May 13 brought a message that the American Government had assumed protection of Luxembourg interests, the Protocol Department expressly declared that it could not define its position regarding the question of assuming the protection of interests. Whether the American Government acted on its own initiative or whether perhaps the Luxembourg Government started this move from France is not yet clear.

A Havas report stating that the Luxembourg Government had appealed to the French Government for aid is not confirmed. On the other hand Havas reports from Paris on May 13, that the Grand Duchess of Luxembourg replied by telegram to a telegram from the President of the French Republic, in which she expressed implicit confidence in the victory of the just cause which France was defending and continued: "We are convinced that France will soon liberate my innocent and dearly loved country from the afflictions of barbarism which have befallen the country."

The Grand Duchess and her family and most of the members of the Government certainly left Luxembourg after the entry of the Germans on May 9. Secretary General Wehrer has, however, been instructed by the Chamber to continue to carry on with Government affairs. As the telegram from Luxembourg shows, Wehrer has declared his readiness to cooperate loyally with us.

On May 13 the High Command of the Army transmitted the request here that we should refrain from regarding ourselves as at war with Luxembourg.² The OKW associated itself with this request. The Foreign Ministry liaison officer with the High Command of the Army has moreover stated that the Quartermaster General considered the Wehrer Government suitable, and asked what the attitude of

¹ Not printed (328/195406). In the telegram Radowitz referred to the provisions of articles 32 and 37 of the Luxembourg Constitution of 1919 in support of his contention.

² See document No. 240.

the Foreign Ministry was.³ The Quartermaster General, moreover, does not intend to treat Luxembourg as an enemy country, but to keep her on a "loose rein" as in the case of Denmark. What does the Foreign Ministry think of this?

It is suggested that for the present, we, for our part, do nothing to bring about a state of war. The Quartermaster General's point of view that the Wehrer Government should be considered as opposite numbers and that Luxembourg should be treated on the pattern of Denmark might well be endorsed. As long as the Wehrer Government does not associate itself with the manifestly hostile attitude of the Grand Duchess, this might be ignored for the present in our relations with Luxembourg.

Consequently our Minister would be left in Luxembourg. Neither would there be any objection to the continued presence of the Luxembourg Chargé d'Affaires in Berlin. (There is a special memorandum on this point.⁴)

Submitted herewith to the Foreign Minister via the State Secretary with the request for a decision.⁵

WOERMANN

³This communication was recorded in a Nostitz memorandum of May 14 (109/114864-65).

⁴Not printed (328/195410).

⁵See document No. 257.

No. 249

418/215780

The Legation in the Netherlands to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram en clair

RIM, May 15, 1940—1:15 a. m.

Received May 15—2:55 a. m.

The following communication was picked up from a Dutch broadcasting station by Luftwaffe headquarters E 15/XI.

To the Foreign Ministry, Berlin, for submission today, May 14, to Reich Foreign Minister and State Secretary.

Today, May 14 at 7 p. m., Dutch time, the Dutch General Schurmann came to see me and made the following statement:

"I have to inform Your Excellency that the Dutch armed forces, with the exception of the troops in Zeeland, are surrendering to the advancing German troops." I took cognizance of this information. Following upon this the High Command of the Dutch armed forces requested OKW Berlin, through the Air Attaché, Lieutenant General Wenninger, to send fully empowered representatives of the German troops in Holland to General Headquarters at The Hague to discuss measures for the maintenance of security, calm, and order.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL WENNINGER
German Legation

No. 250

73/52870

The Minister in Hungary to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 301 of May 15

BUDAPEST, May 15, 1940—4: 20 p. m.

Received May 15—7: 50 p. m.

In response to my questioning, the Deputy Foreign Minister¹ told me in strict confidence that the guiding motive in the decision to mobilize parts of the Hungarian Army,² apart from the necessity for training reservists from the upper country³ who had previously served only in the Czech Army, had been that in the event of any request from Germany, they would not be as unprepared as they were at the time of the entry into Carpatho-Ukraine. Hence they wished to keep the Hungarian Army at a high level of preparedness as long as the European situation remained tense. Troops were to be in such a position that they could be concentrated swiftly on the northern part of the Hungarian-Rumanian frontier.

ERDMANNSDORFF

¹ Baron Vörnle.

² Erdmannsdorff had reported in telegram No. 295 of May 11 that Csáky had told him of plans to hold large-scale maneuvers which were to include army units recruited from the former Czechoslovak areas, brought up to mobilization strength. Csáky also assured Erdmannsdorff that Hungary had no aggressive designs of any kind. (73/52365)

³ The northern districts along the Slovak border which Hungary had received under the Vienna Award in November 1938.

No. 251

464/226293-94

The State Secretary to the Embassies in Chile and Brazil and the Legation in Mexico

Telegram

MOST URGENT

No. 147 to Santiago de Chile

No. 448 to Rio de Janeiro

No. 228 to Mexico

BERLIN, May 15, 1940.

e. o. Pol. IX 757 Ang. I.

The German entry into Holland and Belgium has led to two moves in America:

1) The Argentine Foreign Minister has proposed¹ that the American States should abandon their former conception of neutrality which has become a fiction and enter into a state of "nonbelligerency."

2) The Uruguayan Foreign Minister has suggested a joint protest²

¹ See document No. 247.

² This was done in a telegram sent to the Foreign Minister of Panama on May 13 for transmission to the other American Republics. See Department of State, *Bulletin*, 1940, vol. II, p. 541.

by the American Republics against the German entry into Holland, Belgium, and Luxembourg and against the violation of the neutrality of these countries.

The Argentine proposal seems at first not to have met with any sympathy in Washington and may be regarded as dead for the time being; on the other hand, the Uruguayan proposal, which is probably inspired by the U. S. A. itself, has found greater response. North American government circles have already expressed their full approval. The Panamanian Foreign Minister³ has forwarded it to all the American Governments for their opinion, which will probably be favorable. The importance of such a purely academic joint protest will be essentially in the field of propaganda; but at the same time it means further success for the efforts of the United States to commit the whole of the American continent more and more to the anti-German policy pursued by Washington.

If the success of such a move is not considered completely out of the question at your post, please take the necessary steps in strict confidence and in an appropriate manner with the Government to which you are accredited to prevent joint action of this kind from materializing.

On the occasion of such a step one ought to mention also that taking a definite position on Germany's action in Belgium and Holland at present would be rather premature, since we shall shortly further corroborate, with the aid of fresh evidence, the allegations of incomplete neutrality by Belgium and Holland already made in our memorandum.⁴

WEIZSÄCKER

³ Narciso Garay.

⁴ Document No. 214.

No. 252

175/136916-17

The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 712 of May 15

BUCHAREST, May 16, 1940—1:00 a. m.

Received May 16—5:30 a. m.

With reference to my telegram No. 683¹ concerning the conversation with Court Minister Urdareanu.

At today's audience the King told me that Rumania's future depended solely on Germany. He asked whether we had any complaints, whereupon I informed him that a certain amount of anxiety was being

¹ Fabricius seems to have referred to the wrong telegram. Telegram No. 683 of May 12 deals exclusively with a reshuffle of the Rumanian Cabinet (175/136909). However, in telegram No. 679 of May 11, Fabricius reports a conversation with Urdareanu in the course of which he was informed that the King wished to speak to him (175/136907-08).

noised abroad as to whether Rumania would actually deliver the promised quotas of petroleum. I drew attention to the big increase in the amount of petroleum taken by the English and English vassal states from Constanța in comparison with last year. The King replied that Rumania would definitely deliver the full quotas to Germany and care had been taken to ensure that English purchases did not interfere with us in any way. I reported to the King the difficulties which had arisen through the lack of provision of tank cars on the Orșova route and the requisitioning of tugboats on the Danube by the Rumanian Government. The King promised to alleviate matters. On the question of propaganda, he requested restraint so that there should be no polemics here between the belligerents, which his Government intended to prohibit in all circumstances. We could in general be satisfied with the press. I drew the King's attention to a number of grounds for complaint of a secondary nature. He praised our music propaganda in particular and the opening of the cultural institute under Gamillsheg.

During a discussion on our great successes in the west, he acknowledged with admiration what had been achieved, without however expressing any opinion himself or becoming enthusiastic. The King confirmed that Crutzescu was going to Ankara as Ambassador and praised his boyhood friend Romalo, as Minister for Berlin. The King gave the impression of being alert and was very frank during the three quarters of an hour conversation; he had the highest praise for our deliveries of arms to Rumania and his only anxiety is that, after all, he may still be drawn into the war, which in his opinion only Germany can prevent.

FABRICIUS

No. 253

2422/511883-84

The Chargé d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL
No. 948 of May 16

WASHINGTON, May 16, 1940—4:47 p. m.
Received May 17—4:20 a. m.
Pol. IX 785.

Roosevelt's rearmament message,¹ on the military-political significance of which the Military Attaché is reporting simultaneously,² may well be, according to confidential information, the first step to further demands for rearmament rendered necessary by the rapid obsolescence of all types of arms.

¹ For the text of Roosevelt's message to Congress of May 16, see *The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt*, vol. ix, pp. 198-212.

² See document No. 254.

The mood in the country has been prepared for such supplementary expenditure by intensive propaganda; nevertheless in his message today, Roosevelt was obliged to justify these increased armaments by emphasizing the necessity for putting the U. S. A. in a state of preparedness against attack. As in the past, the American people cannot be expected to acquiesce in any aggressive designs going beyond this, such as for instance, giving military support to the Allies by sending troops to theaters of war outside America. The necessity for maintaining and continuing deliveries of aircraft to the Allies is also justified by Roosevelt by the increase of the American defense potential resulting from this.

Admittedly, as a result of the efforts which are being made with all available means, and which have been successful, many Americans are beginning to believe in the danger of a German attack on the Western Hemisphere, either direct or by infiltration through Latin America after a possible Anglo-French defeat. This biased and naive belief is being daily fed by press propaganda in which the situation in the Pacific is deliberately ignored or belittled. Hence the President's message also brings in the necessity for joint defense of the whole Western Hemisphere and emphasizes the solidarity of all 21 nations in this respect.

I think that an official German declaration similar to that made at the time of the German advance into Belgium and Holland,* to the effect that we were not interested in the colonial possessions of these two countries, would have a most salutary effect on the alarmist mood here. This declaration would state that we

- a) are not interested in the English or French colonial possessions in the Western Hemisphere;
- b) will always respect the sovereignty of the Latin American States.

Such a declaration would make a deep and lasting impression here on the American people, as well as taking a lot of wind out of the sails of the President's policy.⁴

THOMSEN

* Marginal note in Dieckhoff's handwriting: "With this Thomsen probably means the German radio and press commentary concerning the occupation of Curaçao and Aruba?" Cf. Shepardson, W. H., and Scroggs, W. O., *The United States in World Affairs, 1940*, Council on Foreign Relations (New York, 1941), pp. 120-121.

⁴ Marginal notes: "St[ate Secretary]. Herr U[nder] St[ate Secretary] Woermann. Such a declaration could be made in an interview with the Foreign Minister and I think that would take the wind out of the President's sails. D[ieckhoff] 17/5."

"Pol. IX compare with minute on working copy. W[oermann] 18[5]."

This working copy has not been found. On the proposal for such an interview see also document No. 269 and footnote 1.

No. 254

B21/B005604-07

The Embassy in the United States to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

SECRET

WASHINGTON, May 16, 1940—9:07 p. m.

No. 949 of May 16

Received May 17—1:10 p. m.

For OKW Foreign Department, Chief of the Army General Staff,
Chief of the Luftwaffe General Staff.

**MILITARY-POLITICAL ASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION UP TO 8 P. M.
CENTRAL EUROPEAN TIME ON MAY 16**

I. Because the facts have not changed, the President's statements to Congress on May 16¹ have not altered my opinion, expressed again and again in my reports since the beginning of 1939, regarding the possibility of active intervention in the war by the United States of America. Americans must now themselves admit that they cannot intervene outside America before the middle of 1941, either with an adequate army or with an air force of any importance, and that in 1940, even with the most strenuous efforts, they will not be able to supply aircraft to the Allies in such numbers as to have any decisive effect on the relative strength. It is now being admitted, though in veiled language, that there is grave anxiety about the situation in the Pacific.

II. Accordingly, there has also been a change in the propaganda by word of mouth and in the press carried on for the last 12 months by American and English wirepullers. The idea consistently pursued is that Diplomatic Missions and press representatives here should send certain military and political information "from reliable sources" to their governments, whose policy is intended to be influenced in this way.

As recently as May 12 and 13 an imminent entry of the United States of America into the war was threatened, since America could not remain inactive should the Allies be defeated; the intention was to influence Rome, Tokyo, and Moscow according to a method in use for months, and it was hoped that it would be possible to intimidate Germany. Public attention was to be diverted by means of propaganda fanfares from the fact that, militarily, America can do nothing and that German initiative has deprived American propaganda of its initiative. Now they are mentally behind the times.

Henceforth propaganda by word of mouth and the influencing of public opinion under Roosevelt's leadership is being carried out on the following basis:

a) The potential strength of the United States is so great that by developing the American armaments industry and by converting

¹ See document No. 253, footnote 1.

peace-time industries to the demands of war, decisive help can be given to the Allies and America can quickly be put in a position to fight. But with all this the public is not told that the gearing of industry to the point of making decisive deliveries of war material requires many months, and that authoritative quarters in the United States do not believe that the Allies have this much time left. Nevertheless, relying on the stupidity and shallowness of the world, it is hoped through this propaganda, fortified by pompous declarations by the President, to influence Rome, Tokyo, and Moscow, and to convince the world of the definite and potentially great strength of the United States of America, which, however, it will take time to develop.

b) Japan will be held in check by the fleet concentrated near Hawaii.² The politicians are not quite clear in their minds as to the practical possibilities of this holding in check, but they imagine that they can intimidate Japan. On the other hand the General Staff recognizes the almost insoluble problems of an attack on Japan.

Of late it has been suggested to representatives of foreign powers here through propaganda by word of mouth, that America will soon try by concessions to Japan to achieve a settlement in the Pacific Ocean and thus secure freedom of action for herself in the Atlantic Ocean.

This, like all political gossip in Washington, the city with the poisoned political atmosphere, is being hawked around everywhere in all seriousness, even at the Russian Embassy.

It is often astounding how foolishly even the Navy, Army, and Air Force Attachés at the Embassies accept the statements of the American press and propaganda by word of mouth particularly in regard to the productive capacity of American industry, above all of the aviation industry, and how inaccurately their respective Governments are informed.

III. The decisive factor is that for the last 5 days the General Staff has been playing a leading part in the (word apparently missing, presumably: plans) to be worked out for American military and foreign policy, even though the activities of political babblers have by no means been eliminated. Facts, and not political fancies, are now dominant. The plutocrats are talking of a big decisive battle imminent between Brussels and Sedan, and are consoling themselves with the hope that now the tide will turn in favor of the Allies. The General Staff, however, is receiving information which greatly weakens its confidence in an Allied victory. More and more pictures are appearing in the papers showing the Führer in the field. In the circle of the representatives of the 48 American states who were meeting near Washington in their capacity as guardians of Washington's country house, the national shrine, the historical connection between Frederick the Great and Washington was brought to life again to the sympathetic plaudits of the audience by a lecture given by a German; and the 13 volumes

² See document No. 233.

of the King's works acquired by Washington 150 years ago were again exhibited in his library.

The opinion of Senator Pittman, who described the Führer as a genius, is gaining ground. Seriously-minded people are inquiring how social problems are being solved in Germany. All this is just the beginning for the American people who are confused by vague and unwholesome propaganda; but nevertheless it may be the harbinger of a new mode of thought of which the first, often clear, indications reveal themselves in contact with the army and people, but seldom through reading newspapers.

IV. The wirepullers and Jews are apprehensive of the spread of these ideas. They are trying to stir up the people against Germany and for this they have two effective weapons:

a) The alleged threat to the Western Hemisphere after a German-Italian victory, on the assertion that Germany would acquire Greenland, the Bermudas, the Azores, and Cape Verde Islands, and would inherit English and French possessions in the Caribbean, thus endangering the Panama Canal, and, furthermore, that through the power of totalitarian ideology, she would gain decisive influence in the South American countries which would be directed against the United States.

b) Suggestions and accusations that Germany is employing secret agents or carrying on espionage. They well know that the mere suspicion of espionage can set the officer corps and the General Staff against Germany, and can bring those circles where people still think objectively into uncompromising opposition to Germany.

However, as long as they do not, by these means, succeed in killing objective thinking among the American people, and in eliminating the influence of objectively-minded circles, and above all of the General Staff, Americans will not go beyond a policy, approved by the General Staff, of building up the American armed forces and increasing production in the American armaments and aircraft industries. It is an all-important point that from now on this increase of production will be promoted by government subsidies and no longer left to private initiative only.

BÖTTICHER
THOMSEN

No. 255

582/242013

The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

URGENT

No. 892 of May 16

ROME, May 16, 1940—10:00 p. m.

Received May 16—11:45 p. m.

Ciano asked me to call on him this evening in order to inform me of yesterday's démarche by the American Ambassador. Mr. Phillips

had called on him very urgently and requested to be received at once by the Duce, to whom he had a message to deliver from his President. Ciano had replied that the Duce would naturally receive the President in person at any time, but that his Ambassador could only address himself to the Foreign Minister who was the proper authority to receive such messages. Though obviously disappointed Phillips had then confined himself to handing him the message. He had forwarded it to the Duce and on the latter's instructions had then confined himself to informing the Ambassador by telephone that the Duce had read the message attentively.

Ciano handed me the text of the message which he described as an opus consisting of sentimental Christian observations, and he pointed to the note "midnight"¹ not without a smile.

The Duce regarded the whole message as being of no importance, but wished to bring it to the notice of the Führer.

I am giving the text in the supplementary telegram by teletype.²

MACKENSEN

¹ On the date line of President Roosevelt's message.

² Not printed (582/242014-15). For a printed text see *Peace and War: United States Foreign Policy 1931-1941*, p. 526. Cf. William Phillips, *Ventures in Diplomacy*, pp. 272-273.

No. 256

464/226291-92

*The State Secretary to the Embassies in Chile and Brazil and the Legation in Mexico*¹

Telegram²

MAY 16, 1940.

Pol. IX 757.

- 1) With reference to our telegram No. 147 to Santiago.³
- 2) With reference to our telegram No. 228 to Mexico.³
- 3) With reference to our telegram No. 448 to Rio.³
- 1) and 3) marked : for the Ambassador, 2) marked : for the Minister.

When you carry out the démarche which you are in any case to make in an appropriate manner, you should once more draw the attention of the Government to which you are accredited to the German memorandum⁴ together with its annexes, which already gives incontrover-

¹ It is indicated on the document that this instruction in its entirety originated with Ribbentrop who had sent its text from the Special Train the same day.

² Reply telegrams Nos. 102 from Santiago (464/226317-18), 504 from Rio de Janeiro (464/226312-13), and 245 from Mexico (464/226340) indicate that this instruction was sent to Santiago as telegram No. 149, to Rio de Janeiro as telegram No. 452, and to Mexico as telegram No. 230.

³ Document No. 251.

⁴ See document No. 214.

tible proof of English and French aggressive designs on the Ruhr through Belgium and Holland, as well as of the complicity of the two countries. Further irrefutable documentary proof, which has meanwhile fallen into the hands of German troops, will be published shortly. When making your confidential démarche, point out to the Government there in an appropriate manner that, as regards the move made by the Uruguayan Government,⁵ it is undoubtedly doing the bidding of the U. S. A. Government which, since it has no backing in its own country, would like to misuse other American States. The U. S. A. Government is trying to arouse feeling especially in the other American States by the argument that the American continent is being threatened by Germany. I request you to underline the absurdity of this argument and to point out that states with which Germany maintains friendly relations ought not to lend themselves to such propaganda tricks which spring from the personal hatred of certain members of the U. S. Government toward the Reich Government. Germany will be compelled to regard participation in the démarche of protest as a decidedly unfriendly action, for which she has given no cause whatever. I further request you to emphasize once more that it is not, as the Uruguayan Foreign Minister maintains, a question of a German invasion but of thwarting an invasion systematically prepared by England and France. The attitude of the remaining American States to the Uruguayan proposal cannot yet be ascertained. Arrangements have been made for similar démarches⁶ to the remaining American States.

WEIZSÄCKER

⁵ See document No. 251 and footnote 2 thereto.

⁶ Multex telegram No. 53 of May 17 (464/226308; 8863/D618232-34) informed the other Missions in South America of the contents of document No. 251 and instructed them to make similar démarches.

No. 257

115/117971

The Foreign Minister to the State Secretary

Teletype

MAY 16, 1940.

In dealing with Luxembourg please proceed according to the following basic points of view:

1) The Luxembourg Government and the Grand Duchess have left the country and fled to Paris. Furthermore, the Grand Duchess has made statements publicly in which she has taken a directly hostile attitude toward Germany.

2) In these circumstances, Luxembourg is, on principle, to be treated as an enemy country, although she has not offered resistance to the entry of German troops. Luxembourg territory is militarily occu-

pied territory, which is to be treated on exactly the same footing as the occupied Netherlands. A position like that of Denmark is out of the question.

3) There is no longer a Luxembourg Government recognized by us. Neither must there be any mention of a "Wehrer Government." As long as his behavior justifies it, M. Wehrer, may be regarded as the representative of local Luxembourg authorities, and individual problems could de facto be dealt with through him. Everything is to be avoided, however, which could imply recognition of M. Wehrer as the representative of a Luxembourg Government.

4) In general it should be noted that the future fate of Luxembourg must not be prejudiced by German measures of any kind.

RIBBENTROP

No. 258

8895/E621606

The Deputy Director of the Legal Department to the Legation in Yugoslavia

Telegram

No. 354

BERLIN, May 17, 1940—11:30 a. m.
zu R VIII 1711.¹

With reference to your telegram No. 367 of May 11.

It is necessary to refrain from anything which might give the impression that we too are affected by the war panic in the southeast. In these circumstances there is, to be sure, no objection to the return of a few individual Reich nationals and their families who can be spared there, provided they start their journeys quite inconspicuously and the number of those returning does not exceed the normal amount of travel. I request you, however, not to take any measures for the evacuation of Reich nationals from Yugoslavia.

ALBRECHT

¹ R VIII 1711 is telegram No. 367 of May 11 which is not printed (8895/-E621606). In this telegram Heeren pointed to the danger that increasing Yugoslav chauvinism might result in outrages against German residents and requested authorization for preparing the return to Germany of those Reich nationals who could leave easily and whose presence in Yugoslavia was not necessary. This copy of Heeren's telegram bears the following handwritten marginal note: "Nothing at all is to be undertaken. R[ibbentrop]."

No. 259

205/142265-66

Memorandum by the State Secretary

CONFIDENTIAL
St.S. 369

BERLIN, May 17, 1940.

This morning I invited the Swedish Minister to see me before his departure by air for Stockholm, and in accordance with instructions

told him the following: Further to his conversation of yesterday with the Foreign Minister¹ I was now able to tell him that the transport to Narvik which had been discussed involved 3 trains of 30 or 40 cars each. The contents of the trains would be artillery, antiaircraft guns, ammunition, probably also articles of clothing, engineering and signalling equipment with, possibly, an inconspicuous escort. The cars would be sealed, so that the Swedish authorities would not be put in the awkward position of having to examine the contents. As the Minister has already been informed, Narvik is a position of no importance for the outcome of the war. It was quite certain that if the German force occupying Narvik should have to withdraw, the railway line from the Swedish frontier to Narvik would be destroyed in such a manner that there would be no question of Swedish export to Narvik for the benefit of any other country for a considerable time. In spite of this it would, judging from my experience, affect the Führer with his soldierly nature most unfavorably if the Swedish Government, unduly exaggerating its neutral feeling, did not fulfill the wishes mentioned above. Such an attitude on the part of the Swedish Government would be the more incomprehensible since the interests of Sweden and Germany were identical in this question. I reminded him of the recent crossing of Swedish territory by British airplanes in the region of Narvik. I urgently advised the Minister to do everything to induce his Government to make a decision in accordance with our desires, and to do so with due speed. I advanced my arguments insistently but amiably.

The Minister did not wish to give me a guarantee beforehand on the decision of his Government. He did, however, very well understand the urgency of my request and hoped to be able to give an answer tomorrow, the 18th, in the evening, either personally on returning to Berlin by airplane, or by some other way.²

M. Richert asked a further question, namely whether the figures mentioned by me, 3 trains of 30 or 40 cars each, represented an isolated German request, or whether soon, perhaps next week, there would be

¹ Richert was summoned to a conference with Ribbentrop on May 16 at a hotel in Godesberg, which he noted was the same one Hitler had used during his negotiations with Chamberlain and Daladier in September 1938. Ribbentrop wished to discuss the question of transit of military supplies to Narvik. Richert's account of this interview is in *Transiteringsfrågor . . . April-Juni 1940*, pp. 212-215.

Grundherr in a memorandum of May 17 recorded what Kordt had told him by telephone about the subjects discussed at the interview. Ribbentrop had also brought up the question of unhindered traffic on the route Stockholm-Trondheim, German transit traffic on the routes Oslo-Göteborg-Trelleborg, the return through Sweden of German destroyer crews from Narvik, and discrimination against German vessels in Swedish ports (30/22186). The German text of Grundherr's memorandum is printed in *Norges forhold til Sverige under krigen 1940-45*, vol. I, pp. 280-281.

² For the Swedish reply see document No. 268.

new demands. I replied that I had only been told of the one mentioned. I believed therefore that it was only a matter of this one, but could not of course give an assurance that absolutely and during the whole of the further developments the question of further supply would never be brought up again.

Concerning a few further points which I touched upon with the Swedish Minister, see the additional memorandum.²

WEIZSÄCKER

¹ In memorandum St.S. No. 370 of the same day Weizsäcker recorded that he also discussed with the Swedish Minister the return of German destroyer crews from Narvik, easing of regulations for granting transit visas for travel between Germany and Norway through Sweden, and discrimination against German vessels in Swedish ports and against German travelers in Sweden (220/148902). The German text of Weizsäcker's memorandum No. 370 is printed in *Norges forhold til Sverige under krigen 1940-45*, vol. I, pp. 278-279.

No. 260

413/215719

The Minister in Luxembourg to the Foreign Ministry

Telephone Message

MAY 17, 1940—1:30 p. m.

The Senior Field Commander, General Gullmann, has today addressed the following written communication to Secretary General Wehrer in Luxembourg:

"According to information from the Army Group, Luxembourg is proclaimed an enemy country as from the evening of May 16, 1940. This fact will be communicated to the American Ambassador in Berlin on the morning of May 17, 1940.¹

"The Wehrer Government will *not* be recognized as the government of the country; it may, however, continue to work with the German Military Administration as the representative of local authorities.

"I request you and the Secretaries [*Regierungsräte*] of your former Government to continue your work in the above sense.

"Henceforth the authority to issue orders devolves, with immediate effect, on the military commanders. Signature, The General Field Commander."

I request instructions.²

RADOWITZ

¹ To the record of this telephone message was appended a minute by Woermann as follows: "Yesterday the American Chargé d'Affaires had already received a preliminary communication to the effect that we regard Luxembourg as an enemy country and that he would receive a further communication on the subject. According to agreement this is to be done today by the Protocol Department."

² See document No. 267 and footnote 3.

No. 261

2332/486607

The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

No. 450 of May 17

Tokyo, May 17, 1940.

Received May 17—4:24 p. m.

Pol. VIII 594.

With reference to my telegram No. 448 of May 17.¹

At today's press conference the Foreign Ministry spokesman said that England, France, and Holland had now notified the Government here of their attitude to the question of the Netherlands Indies.² By the statement, which is known to you,³ Japan had originally intended only to make her own position clear, without asking for reactions from the Governments concerned, but, nevertheless, it was expected that Germany, too, would soon give assurances similar to those of the other three Powers. The spokesman's remarks as well as hints in the press during the last few days show that it is the Government's intention to pin Germany down to the status quo in order to minimize the danger of a conflict but particularly to counteract the increasing attacks of activist circles closely associated with us, which are opposed to Arita's policy of renunciation [*Verzichtspolitik*]. I recommend that a statement on our attitude be withheld; I shall report again after the close of confidential talks.⁴

OTT

¹ Not printed (2332/486606). In this telegram Ott reported that the French Ambassador had informed the Japanese Foreign Minister that France was in full agreement with Japanese policy to maintain the status quo in the Netherlands Indies.

² In telegram No. 437 of May 14 (2332/486601) Ott had reported that "the British Ambassador had stated to the Japanese Foreign Minister that England would respect the status quo of the Netherlands Indies."

³ See document No. 123.

⁴ See document No. 280.

No. 262

2332/486608-09

Memorandum by the State Secretary

St.S. No. 371

BERLIN, May 17, 1940.

Pol. VIII 598.

The Japanese Ambassador called on me this afternoon at his own request. I told him that if he had not himself requested to see me, I would myself have asked him to come, as his projected visit to the Foreign Minister¹ could not take place because of the latter's absence at the moment.

¹ No further record concerning this projected visit has been found.

Mr. Kurusu was at once satisfied with this. He immediately went on to the problem of the Netherlands Indies, which he said he would like to discuss with me quite openly, frankly, and unofficially. He mentioned the now familiar statement of April 15 by Arita,³ the Japanese Foreign Minister, and established that I was informed about Ambassador Ott's conversation with Arita on May 11.⁴ He did not go into further details of the problem itself or of the Japanese attitude to it; he said he did not need to explain that Japan required undisturbed business activity and political calm in the Pacific. Mr. Kurusu then went on to say that it was not his Ministry but rather public opinion in Japan which was extremely agitated about the Netherlands Indies. This agitation was reflected in dispatch after dispatch calling upon the Embassy here to state its attitude and now also to arrange for a conversation at the Foreign Ministry. As a result of the outbreak of war between Germany and Holland and especially of the unexpectedly quick capitulation of the Netherlands Army, matters had reached a point where Japanese public opinion expected that either Germany herself or a new Netherlands Government of pro-German tendency might come forward with a declaration that would prejudice the issue of the Netherlands Indies or even announce their annexation. Mr. Kurusu hastened to add that he himself thought this idea quite mistaken, nor did his Government believe anything of the kind, but, as he had said, his instructions induced him to lay the above-mentioned matter before me quite unofficially and frankly.

The Ambassador wished me, in turn, to make a statement. Had it not been for the instruction given to me to maintain complete reserve,⁵ I might perhaps have expressed myself more clearly. Thus I confined myself to the following brief remarks: I said I might compare the present state of the Netherlands Indies to the center of a typhoon where, as he knew, there was calm as the contending air streams neutralized each other. There was, moreover, no need for me to explain to Mr. Kurusu where the real opponents of Japanese interests were. He was well aware of the fate which war at present had brought to the Netherlands possessions in the West Indies.⁶ I said that I would, of course, inform the Foreign Minister at once of what Mr. Kurusu had just told me. In conclusion, the Ambassador asked that Tokyo be given a statement of Germany's views on the problem, either through himself or through Ambassador Ott.

³ See document No. 123 and footnote 2.

⁴ See document No. 234.

⁵ Record of such instructions has not been found. In the files, however, is a draft telegram initialed on May 17 by Woermann, stating that "Germany had full understanding for the economic interests of Japan in the Netherlands Indies and hoped that the war would be kept away from that area;" but the draft was marked "canceled." (2332/486599-600)

⁶ On May 10 British and French troops had been landed at Curaçao and Aruba.

I am submitting a proposal for the German statement separately.*
Submitted herewith to the Foreign Minister.

WEIZSÄCKER

* See document No. 273.

No. 263

1571/380326-27

The Director of the Political Department to the Embassy in Italy

Telegram

No. 587

BERLIN, May 17, 1940.

For the Ambassador personally.

The Ambassador in Moscow on May 6 telegraphed as follows.¹

"On account of the May Day celebrations which lasted several days it was only today that I had an opportunity to discuss with M. Molotov the relations between the Soviet Union and Italy. This time, too, M. Molotov displayed great reserve and he again emphasized that Italy would have to give concrete proofs of her good will in some form or other and thereby create an occasion for steps to be taken by the Soviet Union. When I repeatedly referred to the positive statements which Mussolini had made to the Foreign Minister, M. Molotov finally asked me whether he could inform his Government to the effect that the Italian Government through the good offices of the Foreign Minister has expressed its willingness to normalize relations by the dispatch again of ambassadors on both sides.

"I thought it advisable to answer this question in the affirmative. M. Molotov stated that he would now submit this matter again to his Government though intimating that the Soviet Government was not in a hurry with respect to this issue. Nevertheless I shall remind M. Molotov of it at the next opportunity. After that the conversation turned to the negotiations with the Yugoslav delegation here² and in this connection M. Molotov stated that it was a question of purely economic issues within a modest framework on the basis of the clearing. In this connection M. Molotov asked what our position was with regard to these negotiations.

"I would like to make the following observations: As far as can be ascertained from here the origin of Italian-Soviet tension was the veto issued by Italy last September in Sofia against the Bulgarian-Soviet negotiations.³ A similar source of danger to Italian-Soviet relations might arise from the present negotiations of the Soviet Union with Yugoslavia in case the opinion of the Italian Government has actually not been asked previously."

End of telegram from Moscow.

¹ This was Moscow telegram No. 842 (103/112146-47) sent in reply to document No. 177.

² According to a Belgrade telegram of Apr. 17 (230/152176), the Yugoslav Foreign Minister informed the German Minister that Yugoslavia wanted to normalize her relations with Russia by conclusion of a trade agreement and that a Yugoslav delegation would shortly go to Moscow to negotiate such an agreement.

³ Cf. vol. VIII. document No. 247.

The Foreign Minister requests a telegraphic report 'on whether further mediation activities in the question of the Russian and Italian Ambassadors are advisable.

WOERMANN

⁴ See document No. 279.

No. 264

4531/E144240

Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Economic Policy Department

BERLIN, May 17, 1940.

W 2604 g.

The Embassy in Ankara has reported that its economic negotiations with the Turkish Government have progressed to such an extent that the conclusion of an agreement can be expected shortly, provided that small quantities of arms will also be delivered. The intended agreement aims at a delivery of German goods to the value of 40 million RM and a reciprocal supply of Turkish goods worth 60 million RM, whereby Turkish goods to the value of 20 million RM are earmarked for the payment of the existing clearing balance. Furthermore, the agreement is to achieve the removal of the very annoying difficulties arising from old Turkish orders for delivery placed with German industry (guarantees of down payments and deliveries, penalties for the nonfulfillment of contracts).

Although, in principle, arms are not to be supplied to Turkey the interested departments—the Foreign Ministry, the Ministry of Economics, and the Ministry of Food and Agriculture—have agreed in a departmental conference in view of the purpose to be attained that the delivery of sixty to seventy 3.7-cm. antitank guns together with ammunition to the value of one million RM, which the OKW has stated to be possible, should be approved for the following reasons:

1. Delivery is to be effected at the earliest eight months after conclusion of the contract, that is to say, at the beginning of 1941. In all probability the political situation will have changed so much by then that the delivery will either offer a welcome opportunity for selling or, on the other hand, will have become absolutely impossible. It would, therefore, seem justifiable to make a promise of delivery to the Turkish Government now.

2. The delivery to the value of one million RM is so small that from the military point of view it is hardly of any importance.

Submitted herewith to the Foreign Minister through the State Secretary with the request for a decision.¹

CLODIUS

¹ Telegram No. 228 of the same date sent to Ankara over Clodius' signature listed the types and quantities of military equipment which the Embassy was authorized to promise to the Turks (9885/E693528-28). In the case of arms deliveries, however, the consent of the absent Foreign Minister had still to be obtained. Telegram No. 234 of May 19 informed the Embassy in Ankara that the Foreign Minister had given his consent (9885/E693529).

No. 265

2281/481338-41

The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry

TOP SECRET

No. 2455

ANKARA, May 17, 1940.

Received May 21.

Pol. II 1115 g.

POLITICAL REPORT

Subject: Italy's entry into the war and Turkey.

With reference to my telegram No. 300 of May 6,¹ to the instructions issued in the meantime by the Foreign Minister, and your information telegram No. 224 of May 15,² I would not like to neglect presenting to you again, more clearly than was possible in my telegraphic reports, the view held here.

The question to be decided is whether and what possibility exists of keeping Turkey out of the war, i. e., to paralyze her powers, if Italy enters into the conflict. It need not be pointed out that this question is of decisive importance for the course of the war in the Mediterranean and Near East. It may even be said that carrying on war in this sphere of Anglo-French hegemony without coordination with us could rob the German Army of final victory despite its heroic efforts and successes.

The supreme importance which the Allies place on Turkey was confirmed for me only yesterday by the Swiss Minister. In a conversation on the present difficult situation of the British Empire the British Ambassador had said: "These fears all exist, but as long as we have Turkey, our position in this part of the war theater is completely secure."

The desire of leading political circles to keep out of the conflict grows with the increase in German successes. This chance must be exploited in any circumstances. The problem is concentrated around the question: Can Italy conduct her war against the hegemonic position of England-France in the Mediterranean without bringing the Balkans and Turkey into her field of operations and without in this way giving up important advantages for the achievement of victory?

According to the view here, this question can be answered with "Yes."

The aim of the Italian operations will have to be first of all to hit the main opponent, i. e., England, in the Eastern Mediterranean so that Italy can restore communications with her colonial empire. When Herr von Mackensen in his assessment of the situation discusses the possibility of Italy having to attack Yugoslavia, and of necessity, to take possession of some Greek islands in order to dominate the

¹ Document No. 200.

² Not found.

Adriatic,³ we here consider this view wrong. For the war will not be decided in minor theaters of war, and it would be of little advantage in the absence of compelling strategic needs to get involved with more opponents. The Adriatic can be blocked between Otranto and Valona without it being necessary to have the Greek islands, and possible claims on Yugoslavia would settle themselves after victory.

Herr von Mackensen is also of the opinion—but it is not clear whether he is giving the opinion of Italian circles or only his personal view—that the strategic importance of the strongly built-up Dodecanese makes it impossible to forego conducting war against Turkey. According to opinion here the strategic importance of the Dodecanese lies in the fact that a possible transport by sea of Weygand's army through the Aegean Sea could be completely prevented by submarine and aircraft bases in the Dodecanese. It is admitted that the so-called passive strategic exploitation of the Dodecanese could not be maintained if the Turkish Government decided to allow the British-French fleets to use the air and sea bases on the coast of Asia Minor. But this opinion of a high official in the Foreign Ministry expressed in my telegram No. 300 of May 6,⁴ cannot be regarded as authoritative for Turkish decisions. It appears rather quite possible that Turkey will not make available such bases and will remain completely neutral, if she is certain that she will not be attacked from the Dodecanese.

In Herr von Mackensen's view the Italian Government would not be in a position to give reassuring declarations to that effect. He regards it as much more likely that it will attempt, together with the German Government, to exercise strong and intimidating pressure on Turkey, rather than have its hands tied by assurances. With respect to this, the following is to be said:

Turkish-Italian relations are such that attempts at intimidation by the Italians would only achieve the opposite of the desired result. As is known, Turkey regards Italy as her hereditary enemy, and in spite of her unfavorable position would not hesitate for one moment to go to war against Italy if her interests demanded it.

Our greatest trump in this interplay of forces was, up to the present, the pressure of the Soviet Union on Turkey and, in consequence of this pressure, the possibility that the Turkish Government would get out of her Mediterranean responsibilities through the Russian clause.⁵

³ Cf. document No. 245.

⁴ Document No. 200.

⁵ This refers to Protocol No. 2 of the Anglo-French-Turkish Treaty of Oct. 19, 1939. The text of this Protocol reads as follows:

"At the moment of signature of the Treaty between France, the United Kingdom and Turkey, the undersigned Plenipotentiaries, duly authorized to this effect, have agreed as follows:

"The obligations undertaken by Turkey in virtue of the above-mentioned Treaty cannot compel that country to take action having as its effect, or involving as its consequence, entry into armed conflict with the Soviet Union.

"The present Protocol shall be considered as an integral part of the Treaty concluded to-day between France, the United Kingdom and Turkey."

See League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. cc, pp. 167-175.

In spite of my continuous efforts in this direction the position here has completely changed. There is no doubt that the Russians have given the Turks binding assurances with respect to a Russian entry into the war. I learn from the most authoritative Turkish circles that no anxieties exist on account of Russia. As I have reported,⁶ the Military Attachés of both countries with the approval of the two Governments have traveled to the Caucasus border region in order to see for themselves that neither by the one side nor the other are attacks in preparation. I cannot judge whether by means of Berlin-Moscow conversations it might be possible to place Turkey again under strong Russian pressure. Viewed from here, I have the impression that the Russians wish to keep out of the conflict as long as possible. Terentiyev has just shown me in *Pravda* and *Izvestia* semiofficial articles, which it is true strongly support our present campaign and contain a serious warning to "neutrals" not to enlarge the theater of war on England's account. I doubt, however, whether these articles alone will be sufficient to reestablish the necessary pressure on Turkey. In effect therefore, if it is desired to intimidate the Turkish Government, there remains only German pressure.

From the present political situation I draw the conclusion that the way suggested by Herr von Mackensen promises no success. It will rather be a question of the Italian Government considering carefully, while preserving all the strategic advantages, the possibilities for smashing the English-French combination, which Turkey regards as the pivot of her position of power in the Eastern Mediterranean, and in this way paralyzing Turkey.

In view of the decisive importance which this question will have for the whole outcome of the war, it is recommended that agreement of the General Staffs of the Axis Powers on the way to deal with it should be obtained in proper time.⁷

PAPEN

⁶ Report not found.

⁷ This Ankara report was sent to the Embassy in Rome on May 31, (2281/-481387) with particular reference to Rome telegram No. 986 of May 27, printed as document No. 324.

No. 266

1571/380828

The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

URGENT

TOP SECRET

No. 903 of May 17

ROME, May 18, 1940—12:20 a. m.

Received May 18—2:00 a. m.

Ciano informed me in the course of today's conversation that he had just forwarded to the Duce a message from Churchill which had been

handed to him by the British Ambassador. It was a good will message couched in general terms and in which perhaps the only point of interest was that the English Prime Minister spoke of the possibility of an English defeat, when he asserted that, even if she were beaten on all continents, England would prevail in the end with the help of America and indeed not only that of the United States but of "all the Americas."

He was quoting from memory since the Duce had the letter. He would, however, forward me the text ¹ and also the Duce's reply,² which would, however, consist of scarcely more than three sentences.

In this connection Ciano mentioned that the Duce had decided to address also a few sentences to Roosevelt over and above the somewhat too informal treatment of Roosevelt's message,³ which had hitherto consisted in a telephone message to the American Ambassador here to the effect that the Duce had read the message attentively.⁴ He was intending to enter into the spirit of Roosevelt's message to the extent of making the basis of his reply,⁴ which would of course only be quite a short one, a Biblical quotation which seemed very appropriate for this purpose.

MACKENSEN

¹ Mackensen sent the text of Churchill's message in telegram No. 915 of May 19 (1571/380329-30).

² Reported in Mackensen's telegram No. 916 of May 19 (1571/380331).

³ See document No. 255.

⁴ Mussolini's reply dated May 18 was reported in Rome telegram No. 917 of May 19 (1571/380333). For a printed text see *Peace and War: United States Foreign Policy, 1931-1941*, p. 536.

No. 267

115/117972-73

The Minister in Luxembourg to the Foreign Ministry

Telephone Message

LUXEMBOURG, May 18, 1940—1:45 p. m.

Regarding the statement by the Luxembourg Government Commission referring to the statement by the Senior Field Commander on May 17¹ that Luxembourg is regarded as an enemy country:

The Secretary General of the Luxembourg Government has addressed the following communication to the Senior Field Commander, Major General Gullmann, in reply to the letter communicated by telephone on May 17 to Secretary General Wehrer bearing the same date:

"I have the honor to acknowledge receipt of the declaration delivered to me on May 17, 1940, according to which Luxembourg is regarded as an enemy country.

"I have brought this declaration to the knowledge of my colleagues and the members of the special committee appointed by the Chamber of Deputies. With their agreement I have the honor to make the fol-

¹ See document No. 280.

lowing statement: The declaration delivered to me on May 17 has come as a most painful surprise to the members of the Government Commission and of the Committee of the Chamber. It is contrary to the assurance given explicitly in the Reich Government's memorandum of May 10, 1940, that Germany does not intend, either now or in the future, to violate the territorial integrity and political independence of the Grand Duchy.² It is furthermore in contradiction to the actual situation which has developed on the basis of agreements between the German military authorities and the Luxembourg authorities. Following the discussions which President of the Chamber Reuter and I had with you and his Excellency Herr von Radowitz, I was instructed by a unanimous vote of the Chamber to assume the conduct of affairs. You took cognizance of the decision of the Chamber and you yourself, Herr General, as well as General Aulet, informed me that the solution thus arrived at would guarantee cooperation between the German military authorities and the Luxembourg Government Commission.

"I informed the Chamber of Deputies and the Council of State of the concurrence of the military authorities, upon which these two legislative bodies again unanimously approved the mission confided to me.

"In these circumstances your declaration was certain to cause the utmost surprise, all the more as the people of Luxembourg have behaved quite peaceably and have not committed any hostile act which could have given rise to any kind of complaint.

"The Government Commission, set up by the Chamber of Deputies to continue the conduct of affairs, is satisfied that it has never in any way given cause for the measure taken by the Army Group, which is extremely hard on a country which has always meticulously discharged its international obligations. The unarmed neutrality of the country, which is laid down by treaty, combined with the fact that no real resistance was offered to the German action makes it impossible to regard Luxembourg as an enemy country. The Secretary General of the Government; The President of the Government Commission."

RADOWITZ ³

² Document No. 215.

³ A message from Kordt on the Foreign Minister's Special Train, received at 6 p. m., May 19, directed: "The Foreign Minister is of the opinion that no answer should be made to Wehrer's communication." (115/117974)

No. 268

220/148905-08

Memorandum by the State Secretary

CONFIDENTIAL
St.S. 375

BERLIN, May 18, 1940.

The Swedish Minister came to see me again this afternoon, having flown to Stockholm after lunch yesterday and having spent the night until 2 a. m. partly at the meeting of the Swedish Cabinet and partly with the Swedish Foreign Minister.¹

¹ Richert's telegraphic report and also his longer written report of this interview are in *Transieringsfrdgör* . . . April-Juni 1940, pp. 227-231.

The answer which the Swedish Government returns to the Reich Government's two questions put to it through the Swedish Minister, is as follows:

1) The Swedish Government regrets that it is unable to comply with the requests made by us with regard to the transport of arms to Narvik.

2) The free passage of the 2,000 men of the German destroyer crews in the Narvik area is permitted. The German Minister in Stockholm will receive information to that effect this afternoon. The Swedish Minister gave the following reasons for the two decisions made by his Government:

Soon after the beginning of the German action against Denmark and Norway, the Swedish Government, together with the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Swedish Riksdag and the Riksdag as a whole, decided upon strict neutrality. Even then, as was known, the point of view had been adopted that during this conflict the transit of war material through Sweden would not be permitted. On April 12 the Swedish Minister President announced this to the world, emphatically denying rumors to the contrary.² Our Military Attaché in Stockholm, too, had been informed to this effect by the Swedish War Minister.³

The Cabinet meeting of last night had now come to a decision which followed the same line. In this decision the point of view of international law had not actually been the prime consideration. Rather the decisive factor had been the relations of the Swedish people with the Norwegian people. In Norway they had again and again until the last moment almost begged Sweden for arms. The Swedes had returned a resolute refusal. If another decision were now to be given to our requests in respect to Narvik—where Germany had, after all, not only English and French, but also Norwegian opponents—this would not be only a violation of the definitively accepted principle. In view of the small and restricted position it would certainly not be possible to keep the transit of arms to Narvik secret. This would however be an almost dishonorable procedure in the eyes of the Swedes. It would cause the greatest disquietude and burden the Government with a scandal which, in view of Nordic common feeling, they would not be able either to shake off or to bear.

That this decision by the Swedish Government did not spring from doctrinairism, the German Government could see from the fact that Sweden was complying with the German desire that the 2,000 men of the German destroyer crews, who should, of course, according to inter-

² See Editors' Note, p. 142.

³ This had been reported by the Military Attaché in telegram No. 696 of May 5 (205/142218-19).

national law be interned, would be allowed to travel through unhindered. This decision too had not been made by the Swedish Government without misgiving, but it could tolerate it more easily because this act was only indirectly to the disadvantage of Norway.

M. Richert summarized his information as follows: The decision in the first question was negative, since any other would have been directed against the Norwegian brother nation. The decision in the second question was positive, although not neutral, since it was in Germany's favor.

Minister Richert believed that the way in which the transport of the destroyer crews was to be carried out had already been discussed this morning in Stockholm between the Swedish Government and the German Legation. (I will communicate directly with our Legation in Stockholm and assure myself of this.⁴)

M. Richert also added the following: The German Foreign Minister had opened the discussion with him. M. Richert was at any time prepared to visit Herr von Ribbentrop once more on his present mission to inform him of the decision and give the reasons for it. According to instructions he remarked, however, that the Swedish Foreign Minister himself was also very willing to come here and explain the Swedish attitude in the question under discussion, as well as examine any other questions.

I asked the Minister whether in the question of the transport of arms the identity of German and Swedish interests had played any part in the Cabinet's discussions. The Swede could give no indication as to this. I further told him that the reaction of feeling to his message here would be exactly that which I had foretold yesterday.⁵ I appreciated the trouble to which M. Richert had gone to achieve a speedy answer to our request. I also asked him whether his Foreign Minister was sufficiently mobile [*beweglich*] to see the Reich Foreign Minister in the west of Germany, should this prove necessary. M. Richert thought he could answer this in the affirmative, although Minister Günther would, without doubt, for various reasons prefer a meeting in Berlin. Finally M. Richert asked once more that our Government should show understanding for the points of view represented by him.

Submitted herewith to the Foreign Minister.

WEIZSÄCKER

⁴ In telegram No. 826 of May 18, received in Berlin at 11 p. m., the Minister in Stockholm reported that the Swedish Government had agreed to the transport of the destroyer crews (205/142268). A subsequent telegram (No. 847 of May 21: 205/142279) from the Naval Attaché in Stockholm stated that 2500 crew members were to be so transported.

⁵ See document No. 259.

No. 269

2423/512040

The Ambassador in Argentina to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

No. 515 of May 18

BUENOS AIRES, May 18, 1940—8:50 p. m.

Received May 19—5:20 a. m.

Pol. IX 808.

In view of the extreme nervousness prevailing in almost all the countries of South America and the unmistakable exasperation here with the *Quinta Columna* and the support given by it to our designs on parts of South America, for example in Misiones in Argentina or in Patagonia, an official German declaration by a person with authority, rejecting as an infamous calumny all designs of this sort imputed to us and emphasizing that Germany is merely demanding the return of her former colonies and has no designs for conquest in South America, would certainly have a reassuring effect.

As has already been reported to us fairly frequently, the term "German Colony in Argentina" is being grossly misused by our opponents here just as in Brazil.

Identical texts to Montevideo, Rio de Janeiro, Santiago de Chile and Lima.¹

THERMANN

¹ Handwritten marginal note: "The matter has been dealt with in the Director's conference. P[ress Department] has been informed. To be filed. F[reytag] 21/V." No record of this conference has been found. The files contain the draft of an interview (2423/512042-48) prepared by Freytag, Megerle, and Sallet. This draft interview was apparently submitted to Ribbentrop by teletype on May 20 by Welzsäcker (464/226327) with a positive recommendation. Handwritten marginal notes on the cover note to this draft (2423/512041) show that Ribbentrop nevertheless rejected the idea and that the material prepared for the interview was used by Dr. Megerle for an article, "The Fifth Column," in the *Berliner Börsenzeitung* of May 25, 1940.

No. 270

464/226325

The Chargé d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 965 of May 18

WASHINGTON, May 18, 1940—8:50 p. m.

Received May 19—6:20 a. m.

As already reported by DNB, the American Government has at Uruguay's suggestion immediately stated its readiness to take part in a joint protest by the American States against the German entry into the Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxembourg and has expressed its full

agreement with the text of the declaration as drafted by Uruguay.¹ The text of the declaration is being sent from Montevideo today.

On the other hand, the United States has not accepted a proposal by Argentina to change American neutrality into a state of "nonbelligerency." In the first place, an amendment of the American Neutrality Law would be necessary which cannot be expected during the present session of Congress. Furthermore, America is afraid that in the event of individual South American States not taking part in the Argentine plan, the picture of a common and harmonious front in the Western Hemisphere might be spoiled.

The American Government does not expect any effective assistance for the Allies from a mere change of status. If the neutrality of the Western Hemisphere should one day be abandoned, it is argued here, then this will be done by joint consultation and the logical step would be from neutrality to belligerency.

THOMSEN

¹ The German Minister in Panama reported on May 18 in telegram No. 116 (464/226323) that all the American Republics had accepted the proposal by Uruguay. For the text, released to the press on May 19, see Department of State, *Bulletin*, 1940, vol. II, p. 568.

No. 271

73/52878-80

The Director of the Legal Department to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram en clair

SPECIAL TRAIN HEINRICH, May 18, [1940].

For State Secretary von Weizsäcker personally.

1) The text of the Führer's letter in reply to Count Teleki is as follows:

The Führer's Present Headquarters, May 14, 1940.

Your Excellency: With reference to your letter of April 17¹ I have instructed the Reich Foreign Minister to study in detail the Royal Hungarian Government's proposal, which you communicated to me, to convene a meeting of representatives of Hungary, Italy, and Germany for the purpose of discussing the attitude of the three Powers toward possible new developments in the Balkans and also to consult the Italian Government at the same time. As a result of this examination I should now like to inform you of the views of the Reich Government on this problem. The general criteria determining German policy toward the Balkan States derive automatically from the fact that as a matter of principle Germany naturally cannot act in contradiction to her own interests and that furthermore she will take no action in the Balkans without her ally Italy, and finally she is determined to conform to the Pact of Non-Aggression and Friendship which she concluded with the Soviet Union last autumn. Germany is determined to

¹ See document No. 135.

concentrate all her forces on the single objective of victory over her enemies in the struggle for existence which has been forced upon her, and it continues to be in Germany's own interest to see that, if at all possible, peace in the Balkans is not disturbed. Italy's interests lie entirely in the same direction, as has been ascertained afresh by the joint discussions on the subject.² Neither would the Soviet Union, in our opinion, favor any violent changes in the Balkans. Germany, which is pursuing exclusively economic interests in the Balkans, accordingly desires to maintain good relations both politically and economically with all the states there. The rumors spread abroad by the enemy powers, who are continuously endeavoring to impute to Germany the intention of taking military action in the Balkans, are completely wide of the mark. It is plain that Germany's enemies are only making such attempts in order either by creating an atmosphere of nervousness to tie down German troops in the Balkans and foment acts of sabotage against the vital economic lines of communication of the Axis Powers, or if need be to camouflage their own aggressive intentions by this means. I am furthermore convinced, however, that the policy of the Axis which aims at maintaining peace in the Balkans in the last analysis corresponds also to the interests of Hungary. Just as I believe that friendly collaboration with Germany and Italy has already brought not unsubstantial advantages for Hungary so far, a Hungarian policy in conformity with the German-Italian attitude will also, it seems to me, in future not only demand no sacrifices from Hungary but also continue to work to the benefit of the Hungarian people. A policy which in the present situation should seek to initiate or favor new developments in the Balkans, and which might lead to a heightening in the general tension, would perhaps be calculable in its beginnings, to be sure, but not in its outcome. In these circumstances I think it would be risky to arrange at present a meeting of German, Italian, and Hungarian representatives to discuss Balkan questions which would certainly excite international public opinion considerably. These misgivings are shared by the Italian Government. Therefore the latter also takes the view that in the present situation a meeting with such an obvious purpose should be avoided in the common interests of the three Powers. However, I am pleased to hear that Your Excellency intends to come to Berlin with Count Csáky, the Hungarian Foreign Minister, in the near future.³ Although, as a result of events which have occurred in the meantime, I am unable at present to foresee when I shall be in a position to welcome Your Excellency here, I have instructed the Reich Foreign Minister to keep in touch with you regarding this and then when the time comes to arrange the details.

Please accept, Your Excellency, the expression of my highest consideration.

Adolf Hitler

2) The Reich Foreign Minister requests you to hand a copy of the foregoing letter to Ambassador Alfieri, as he promised the latter

² See document No. 165.

³ Weizsäcker recorded on Apr. 22 that he informed the Hungarian Minister that the Foreign Minister had agreed to a visit to Berlin by Teleki and Csáky in the second half of May (73/52326). On May 23, however, Erdmannsdorff was informed by Dörnberg that the visit would have to be postponed on account of the military operations (73/52432).

when they met today.⁴ Furthermore, he requests that the full text of the letter be telegraphed⁵ to the Embassy in Rome at once and requests you to inform Count Ciano immediately, so that, as has already been agreed upon, the latter may inform the Hungarian Minister in Rome orally to the same effect.

GAUS

⁴Dino Alfieri, newly appointed Italian Ambassador to Germany, had been received by Ribbentrop who told him that Hitler was too busy to see him at the moment but that the Ambassador should start his duties officially without having presented his credentials to the Führer; see Dino Alfieri, *Due dittatori di fronte* (Milan, 1948), pp. 26-29.

⁵According to notations on the Foreign Ministry copy, this instruction was received in Berlin at the Foreign Ministry on May 18, 11:30 p. m. and was sent as telegram No. 604 to Rome over Weizsäcker's signature on May 19, 12:16 p. m. (73/52381-86). A marginal note on the copy from the files in the Embassy of Rome indicates that the matter was taken up with Ciano on May 20 (2281/-481347-51).

No. 272

F12/244-248

Adolf Hitler to Benito Mussolini

THE FÜHRER'S HEADQUARTERS.

May 18, 1940.¹

DUCE: A week has now elapsed since the beginning of the offensive. I will give you quite briefly a picture of the situation as it appears today.

1) The offensive which was launched between Luxembourg and Groningen in Holland is now piercing all the essential systems of fortifications and fieldworks on the whole of the front except for that section lying between Maubeuge and Dunkirk.

This last section is however unimportant, because it is already completely cut off.

2) Holland is completely occupied by German troops. The islands of Zeeland are almost completely in our hands, the island of Walcheren, which is the last one before Antwerp, offered to surrender last night.

3) Belgium. Belgium has lost the whole of her canal system; the Dyle position which lies in front of Brussels and connects Antwerp with Namur has completely collapsed; the English and French are withdrawing in disorder everywhere; advance troops reached Brussels last night; the city is already surrounded on a wide front toward the south; the fall of Antwerp is imminent. The southeastern fortifications of Antwerp were penetrated in the course of yesterday, a number of forts are already in our hands. Three forts in Liège are still holding out but are not hampering us and we are having them

¹According to Rome telegram No. 913 of May 18 the letter was handed at 7 p. m. that day to Ciano who promised to have it transmitted to the Duce immediately (2281/480532).

watched by a few companies. I am not using time or material to deal with this any further. The same applies to Namur. West of Namur we have already thrust forward as far as Charleroi and have surrounded it on the north and south.

4) The Belgian territory situated to the south of Charleroi and Liège is completely occupied by us, as is Luxembourg. French troops were thrown as far as the Maginot Line everywhere.

5) The Maginot Line itself in its extension from south of Carignan to near Maubeuge has been pierced on a front of over 100 km. and left far behind us.

6) The Luftwaffe has gained complete mastery in the air. There is now hardly any interference by enemy aircraft in the daytime. There are scattered incursions at night with a small number of bombs dropped. The military or economic damage done is nil. Except for the victims of a French air raid on Freiburg in Breisgau, the number killed by enemy air attacks on the territory in our rear still does not amount to 40 people.

7) The Dutch Army has ceased to exist. The Belgian Army has been largely smashed.

Many French and English divisions have been most heavily hit and partly reduced to disorder, so that they no longer represent any serious fighting force.

8) As far as the damage to their rear transport system permits, the French are endeavoring to establish a new defensive or offensive front as the case may be. I am keeping an eye on this. The miracle of the Marne of 1914 will not be repeated!

Our losses, Duce, are extraordinarily slight when set against the successes obtained.

This is briefly the situation at the moment, the result of 8 days' fighting. The spirit of the Army and the Luftwaffe, their courage in face of death and their discipline are outstanding.

Pray accept the cordial greetings of a comrade.

Yours,²

² Hitler's signature does not appear on the file copy of the letter.

No. 273

174/186306-10

The State Secretary to the Foreign Minister's Secretariat

BERLIN, May 18, 1940.

Please forward at once by teletype to the Foreign Minister in his Special Train text of

1) the enclosed minute on Japan's démarche ¹ regarding the Netherlands Indies,

¹ See document No. 262.

2) the telegram to Tokyo relating thereto. This should take priority over everything else.

[Enclosure]

MINUTE

St.S. No. 372

Subject: Steps taken by Japan regarding the Netherlands Indies.

1) A statement of Germany's attitude now seems to me necessary. Arita asked Ambassador Ott to call on him before asking the British and French Ambassadors and, it seems, dealt with the three representatives of the Great Powers in the same way.² The manner in which Mr. Kurusu, the Ambassador here, expressed himself³ should not be allowed to pass quite uncontradicted either. England, France, and Holland have replied or stated their position⁴ and America has done so earlier.⁵ The fact that a German reply is still outstanding has been mentioned in Tokyo in the press conference there.

2) Our reply should

a) stress the direction from which during the war an attack by the Great Powers on the Dutch East Indies threatens, i. e., from our enemies and from the U. S. A.,

b) not entirely debar the German Navy from the possible use of hiding places in the Netherlands Indies. (The OKW would, of course, be told that such hiding places should not be used without prior consultation with the Foreign Ministry),

c) contain nothing which might prejudice any later decision on the Netherlands East Indies, nor prevent this bone of contention from being thrown among the Pacific Powers during the war.

3) The enclosed draft has accordingly been drawn up. A conversation on these lines with Ambassador Kurusu is recommended.

Herewith to the Foreign Minister.

WEIZSÄCKER

[Subenclosure]

Telegram

BERLIN, May—1940.

With reference to your telegram No. 429 of May 11.⁶

The Japanese Ambassador here also referred to the subject of the Netherlands East Indies, although only informally.⁷ He mentioned the agitation of public opinion in Japan and the idea that, now that Holland had capitulated, Germany or a new pro-German Netherlands Government might make some statement about the future or even

² See document No. 234.

³ See document No. 262.

⁴ See document No. 281.

⁵ Department of State, *Bulletin*, 1940, vol. II, p. 411.

⁶ Document No. 234.

about the annexation of the Netherlands Indies. Kurusu, to be sure, made no *démarche*. He maintained that the Japanese Government itself naturally harbored no suspicions. We cannot help noting, however, that Arita apparently spoke on exactly the same lines to all the Ambassadors of the Great Powers, and first of all to you, just as if the threat to Japan's interests came not so much from our opponents as from us.

I now request you to resume your conversation of May 11 with Arita and to inform him orally and in friendly terms roughly as follows, provided the statement envisaged by you in telegram 450⁷ is not in conflict with this:

For some considerable time now we have been following Japan's natural anxiety about developments in the Netherlands Indies. Even before the Netherlands was openly involved in hostilities with Germany, our enemies were making their influence felt more and more in her colonies. We repeatedly found ourselves obliged to protest, in order to call a halt to the servility of this colony with respect to the interests of the Allies. This forging of links would undoubtedly have been intensified if the English had not felt that a certain measure of consideration was due to the U. S. A. which is their political partner and at the same time their rival in that area.

The German Government therefore readily understood the Japanese Foreign Minister's finally giving his well-known interview on April 15; ⁸ we regarded it as being addressed to the Great Powers represented in the Pacific area either by territorial possessions or by naval forces, and warmly welcomed it.

The action recently taken by the Allied armed forces against Netherlands possessions in the West Indies ⁹ has indeed proven that the distrust of the methods of the Allies and of their collusion with the U. S. A. was justified.

We therefore also welcomed the new warning to the Allies which had now been communicated to us. We shared Japan's interest in preventing the war from spreading to the Indo-Pacific area and particularly in maintaining the status quo in the Netherlands Indies, i. e., in preventing any political, military, or economic encroachment in that area by those Powers, namely by the Allies and the U. S. A., who as experience has shown, use every opportunity there to disregard and harm Japanese interests.¹⁰

⁷ Document No. 261.

⁸ See document No. 123.

⁹ See document No. 262 and footnote 5.

¹⁰ Cf. document No. 280.

No. 274

178/84827

The Minister in the Netherlands to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

THE HAGUE, May 19, 1490—2:29 p. m.

No. 47 of May 19

Received May 19—4:55 p. m.

Mood in Holland: Great bitterness about the Government and the Queen who have left the country; hatred against the Netherlands National Socialists, because it is alleged that in the hour of battle against a foreign enemy they turned, arms in hand, against their own people; indignation with England which had sent no help of any kind and had left Holland in the lurch.

Feeling as regards Germany surprisingly good, which is attributable primarily to the correct demeanor of German military authorities and to the unimpeachable bearing of all the German soldiers.

The Netherlands civil service and private industry, of which I have seen a great deal in the last few days, are prepared to cooperate loyally, provided we do not admit Netherlands National Socialists to the Government. Skillful German military administration would have it in its power to win over Holland to us, also spiritually, for the next generation.

ZECH

No. 275

582/242020

Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department

BERLIN, May 19, 1940.

On his initial visit today Ambassador Alfieri expressed his conviction to me that Italy would enter the war soon. Mussolini would find the appropriate moment.

Signor Alfieri then told me about his farewell audience with the Pope. Mussolini had given him instructions for this visit which had been embarrassing for him, but which he as a soldier had, of course, carried out. Mussolini was not only angry about the Vatican's attitude toward Italy but especially about that toward Germany. He had said to him, Alfieri, "Go to your Pope and tell him that if he changes his attitude, well and good, but that difficulties will arise if he does not do so." He had been instructed to protest in particular against the Pope's three telegrams.¹ The Pope had been greatly taken aback. He had explained that he had edited these telegrams himself and had intentionally avoided using both the words "Germany"

¹ On May 11, Pope Pius XII sent messages of sympathy to the King of the Belgians, the Queen of the Netherlands, and the Grand Duchess of Luxembourg.

and "invasion." Alfieri had rejected this explanation which he described as a piece of ecclesiastic dialectics. The Pope had been amazed that the attitude of the *Osservatore Romano* was complained of, and had promised to give instructions once more that it should not take definite sides with England and France.

The Ambassador was, on the whole, of the opinion that it was in the interests of both Germany and Italy to be on good terms with the Vatican at least for the duration of the war. What happened after the war remained to be seen.

WOERMANN

No. 276

F12/243

*Benito Mussolini to Adolf Hitler*¹

ROME, May 19, 1940.

FÜHRER: I thank you for having found time during a pause in the tremendous victorious battle to send me a communication on the progress of the operations. I repeat that these operations have been followed not only with interest but with enthusiasm by the Italian people who are now convinced that the period of nonbelligerency cannot last much longer. I intend to give you important news on this subject in the next few days.

I assume that your Foreign Minister has already informed you of the messages² which were sent to me by Roosevelt and Churchill recently and of my replies; but all this is only of relative importance now.

I send you my most comradely greetings.

MUSSOLINI

¹ Translated from the official Italian text which was delivered to the German Foreign Ministry together with a German translation prepared by the Italian Government (F12/242).

² See documents Nos. 255 and 266.

No. 277

1947/435831-37

The Minister in Iran to the Foreign Ministry

No. B 938/40-G.E./Z.

TEHRAN, May 19, 1940.

Received May 29, 1940.

Pol. VII 463.

POLITICAL REPORT

Subject: Effects of the war situation on the relation between the Soviet Union and Iran.

As is known, the "Treaty of Commerce and Navigation between the Iranian Empire and the USSR," which was initialed in Moscow

by the Soviet Union and the Imperial Iranian Government, was signed in Tehran on March 25 of this year.¹ As provided in the Treaty, the Soviet Union has meanwhile sent a trade delegation to Tehran which has been commissioned to arrange for the exchange of goods between the Soviet Union and Iran.

The negotiations conducted by the head of the Soviet trade delegation, Alekseev, in closest cooperation with the Soviet Embassy here have so far produced no practical results. Both the Soviet and the Iranian sides are dissatisfied with the course of the conversations.

Foreign Minister Aalam, to whom I spoke about these negotiations on the occasion of my last visit, complained about the attitude of the Soviets who, by exploiting the somewhat constrained position of the Iranian Government, are demanding such high prices for the goods desired by Iran that the Iranians are unable to consider them.

On the other hand, both the Soviet Russian Ambassador Filimonov and M. Alekseev said to me they had the impression that the Iranian side was deliberately trying to prevent the conclusion of transactions. Furthermore, it may be gathered from remarks passed by the Soviet Counselor of Embassy and the Military Attaché to members of the Legation on other occasions that the Soviet side is deliberately trying to create the impression of a certain malevolence on the Iranian side.

I do not think that the Iranian Government is causing difficulties in the negotiations with the trade delegation because it is really unwilling to establish any trade relations. On the contrary, I am of the opinion that there is actually a demand for excessive prices as mentioned by the Iranian Foreign Minister and that it is the Soviets who are looking for excuses not only to prevent the conclusion of commercial transactions but, beyond this, not to allow a really friendly atmosphere to arise between the two states. Indeed, political, and not economic, reasons are decisive for the Soviets.

It is necessary to be clear about the fact that the Soviet Union, following with eager attention Germany's successful fight against her enemies, will on her part draw conclusions for her own policy from the progress of the war. Any weakening of England on the battlefields in the west will automatically harm the English position in Iran, thus also the position of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company which is vital to the British Empire. The Soviet Union is fully aware of this fact. It sees how the possibility of taking advantage in Iran of an English defeat is opening up more and more.

The Soviets' concept is illuminated in a flash by one sentence which,

¹ For the text, see *Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy*, vol. III, pp. 424-435.

according to a Pars agency report, is found in an article in *Izvestia* on May 16. The paper says, among other things, the following:

“Any rational arguments as to the legality or illegality of measures against small states in an era when the imperialist Great Powers are waging a life and death struggle can only be regarded as naive.”

This concept could one day be applied to Iran by the Soviet Union even in the event that the British and French do not invade Iranian territory and the Soviet Union is thus deprived of its right to march in, as laid down in article 6 of the “Treaty of Friendship between Persia and the Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic of February 26, 1921.”² In this must be sought the real reason why the Soviet Union is not disposed to create a truly friendly atmosphere with Iran, despite all the existing friendship and economic treaties.

There is however, another reason for the attitude of the Soviet Union which is of vital importance to this great federation of states: It is the attainment of the old Russian goal to have access to the warm waters.

For practical purposes the Soviet Union has the use of only one important port on the open seas: Murmansk. All other large ports of this mighty state—among them also Vladivostok—are situated on inland seas or in sea areas which, from the point of view of political power, are dominated by foreign states. Istanbul and the Dardanelles which have been the aim of Russian desires for centuries no longer play this part today. Possession of the Straits would be of little help to the Soviet Union, since it knows that even the Mediterranean has now become an inland sea dominated by those who possess its approaches. It is today no longer worth while for the Soviet Union to fight a war for the sake of the Dardanelles, the satisfactory outcome of which to be sure would make it a riparian country of the Mediterranean but otherwise would not give it access to the open warm oceans.

A glance at the map shows that the shortest route from the Soviet Union to the warm oceans would be through Iran. Moreover, this, the shortest route, has for transport the great advantage of a railway line which is in excellent condition.

The trans-Iranian railway runs from the Port of Bandar Shah, situated on the southern shore of the Caspian Sea, via Tehran into the Karun Valley through the center of the region where the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company has concessions to Bandar Shapur on the Persian Gulf.

This important main line of communication will receive a new branch line in 1941, namely the direct railway link between Tabriz and Tehran. Tabriz is today already linked with Tiflis by a railway line

² For the text, see League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. ix, p. 383.

built by Russia via the frontier crossing-point of Djulfa and is thus connected with the railway network of the Soviet Union. Another important Russian railway line running from Baku into the Aras Valley, except for a stretch of 120 km. to Djulfa, is today ready for operation.

Germany must in her foreign policy take seriously into account this Soviet Russian expansionist drive to the Persian Gulf and in good time arrive at a clear conception of all the consequences arising from this, in order to define her own attitude toward this problem.

The Shah and the members of his Government are, without a doubt, clearly aware of the dangers which threaten Iran from the Soviet Union. They also know that in the event of a defeat of England the position of the country in relation to the powerful neighbor in the north would become very much more difficult owing to the end of English counterpressure.

The Iranian Government must, therefore, pin all its hope on the Reich which it will expect, at the appropriate time, to exert a moderating influence on Moscow.

The most vigorous opponent of a Soviet expansion to the Persian Gulf is Italy. According to what the Italian Minister^{*} here told me a few days ago in a frank conversation, this state regards the sea around the Arabian peninsula as its special sphere of interest. It is an old political aim of Fascist Italy to gain decisive influence over the whole of the Arab world, including the states situated in the center of the Arabian territory.

In the same way as Italy resisted the wishes of Tsarist Russia for possession of the Straits, so will Fascist Italy oppose the wishes of Soviet Russia for access to the Persian Gulf. In doing this, Italy is undoubtedly harboring the idea of obtaining decisive control of the Iranian oil. Since, however, the Greater German Reich has also, without a doubt, considerable interest in Iranian oil, it is necessary that the two allied powers agree on their attitude on this question.

Germany will have to assume the leadership in the settlement of all these questions which are important for the new order in the Near and Middle East.

In my opinion the interests of the Reich will best be safeguarded by a free, independent, and militarily strong Iran, which is linked with the Greater German Reich by close political and economic ties.

Should Iran become part of the Soviet Union, the latter would gain a predominant place in the sphere of petroleum which would, in practice, be tantamount to a position of monopoly. The picture would not be very different if, through the concession forced upon Iran by the Soviet Union to maintain military bases on the Persian Gulf, Iran was to become a state dependent upon the Soviet Union. Nor will

^{*} Luigi Petrucci.

the Soviet Union with its large oil resources be as much interested in the Iranian oil as in the access to warm waters. No one will, in the long run, be able to ignore the understandable aspiration of the Soviet Union to obtain such access.

It should, therefore, be the aim of the policy of the Reich, to divert the Soviet Union's expansion drive from Iran and steer it in another direction where there is less of a clash with the interests of the Reich. For instance, access through Afghanistan, British Baluchistan, and Baluchistan to the Indian Ocean would meet Soviet Russian wishes and would not injure the *common* interests of Germany, Italy, and Iran.

Until the completion of a railway line from the terminus of the Soviet Russian railway on the Afghanistan frontier to the Indian Ocean, Iran would have to give the Soviet Union a free port zone in Bandar Shapur. I am raising all these questions as early as this in order to point out that it is necessary to determine in time the direction of our own advance. Germany must avoid being caught unawares by events which, once they have occurred, could be changed only with difficulty.

ETTEL

No. 278

230/152216-17

The Minister in Yugoslavia to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 396 of May 19

BELGRADE, May 20, 1940—2:30 a. m.

Received May 20—5:45 a. m.

The present mood in Yugoslavia:

1. The victorious campaign of the German armies in the west is being followed by the whole population with breathless suspense and is regarded not only as a tremendous German success but also as a simultaneously important strengthening of Italy's position, whose entry into the war is expected daily. This has produced in large sections of the population an almost panic-like fear of sudden operations by Italy in the direction of Dalmatia and southern Serbia which, according to an opinion widely held here, would also involve intervention by Germany from the north.

2. Given this general mood, it is easy for enemy propaganda to convince the national-chauvinist elements (Sokol, Narodna Odbrana, Četniks, and others) that Italy and Germany are the enemies of tomorrow and that it is essential now to do everything possible to prevent the formation of a "fifth column" of these powers within the country. As large groups of civil servants and the Army are also

greatly impressed by this incitement, the normally severe security police regulations for aliens and the military security measures are frequently given a particularly anti-German character in their execution. This increases the general nervousness even more and provides fertile soil for the propagandistic efforts of the Western Powers to upset German-Yugoslav relations by provoking incidents.

The Government which itself, to be sure, is not free from mistrust toward Italy, and does not regard a conflict with Germany (in case of a demand for marching through) as completely out of the question either, is at last beginning to see the danger which is bound to result from the hitherto slack attitude toward the anti-German propaganda of incitement and has decided to take firm action against instigators of unrest. Naturally, they will not be able to prevent a few isolated incidents and encroachments even in the future, but I do not fear any serious danger for Volksdeutsche and Reich Germans living here. In the case of an outbreak of war the situation would, of course, change at once. The Germans here would then be exposed to an immediate and serious danger.

In view of this situation it seems to me urgently desirable, politically, to avoid everything that could give enemy propaganda an opportunity of provoking incidents. As long as the present mood prevails travel to Yugoslavia should be curtailed as far as possible, nor should any cultural functions be held which would give anti-German elements an opportunity to provoke incidents. Such reserve would also be expedient in other respects since, with the mentality as it is here at the present moment, everything is judged from a purely political aspect. It seems to me urgently desirable, however, by adopting cool reserve also in the cultural sphere to demonstrate clearly to the authorities here our displeasure at their present slackness in preventing anti-German propaganda.

HEEREN

No. 279

103/112161-62

The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

URGENT

SECRET

No. 923 of May 20

ROME, May 20, 1940—8: 51 p. m.

Received May 20—10: 10 p. m.

With reference to your telegram No. 587 of May 17.¹

In today's conversation with Ciano I broached the subject of the present state of Russian-Italian relations and asked him whether the Italians desired a continuation of the Foreign Minister's mediation

¹ Document No. 263.

activities in the question of the Ambassadors. Ciano replied that he would talk to the Duce about the question. Of his own accord he could say that normalizing Rome-Moscow relations now as before was in the line of Italy's policy, and in such a normalization—he was not thinking of anything more—settlement of the questions of Ambassadors was a part. However, Moscow could not expect that Rome would take the first step in an issue which only arose through Moscow's responsibility. One should not forget that the departure of the Russian Ambassador had taken place in aggravated circumstances since the date for an initial audience with the King had already been set. A few harmless student demonstrations in front of the Russian Embassy were no sufficient reason for taking such a step.² He himself had then purposely waited a whole month until he ordered that the Italian Ambassador in Moscow be put on leave. The least which the Russians would have to do now would be to request the *agrément* for a new Ambassador who, as far as he was concerned, could even be Helfand; moreover, he was not on bad personal terms with the latter and even liked to make conversation with him because he was always amusing, although he did consider him a crackpot. I interpret this remark in such a way that even the request for the *agrément* could induce the Italians to let the Italian Ambassador return to Moscow. Ciano's statement that in press matters relations had been normal for some time also seems to indicate that he would be willing to go along if the Russians would make some accommodations. Nor did he deny that normalization would be useful in the interest of common German-Italian relations. We agreed that I would first wait for his information on the result of his talk with the Duce and would report about it³ before further instructions to Count Schulenburg are sent by the Foreign Minister.

MACKENSEN

² See vol. VIII, document No. 494.

³ See document No. 344.

No. 280

234/156935-37

The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Japan

Telegram

No. 412

BERLIN, May 20, 1940.

For Ambassador Ott with reference to telegram No. 450.¹

For the present the following may be stated regarding the statement of the Japanese Foreign Minister Arita.

¹ Document No. 261.

1) According to your report on the conversation with the Japanese Foreign Minister on that occasion he merely informed you of his press interview, without requesting a statement of our attitude.²

2) Since then it has been stated in the Japanese press and also in the [Japanese] Foreign Ministry's press conference that the other states have made a declaration agreeing with the standpoint of the Japanese Government, while Germany has so far not stated her views.

3) In the meantime the Japanese Ambassador in Berlin called at the Foreign Ministry ^a and stated that he had been asked by his Government to have a conversation at the Foreign Ministry about the question of the Netherlands Indies, and in the course of this conversation, which he described as unofficial, told the State Secretary that his Government would welcome a German statement on the question.

I therefore request you to make roughly the following statement at your next visit to the Japanese Foreign Minister :

The Reich Government took note at the time of the interview given by the Japanese Foreign Minister which he reported to you. As no statement by Germany was asked for, and as there was no reason for Germany to state her attitude on this question, no such statement was therefore made. The Reich Government only gathered from press reports during the last few days and from a visit to the Foreign Ministry by the Japanese Ambassador in Berlin that Japan would welcome a statement by Germany on this question. From its standpoint, therefore, the Reich Government would like to make the following comments :

The conflict between Germany and the Netherlands arose from the fact that England and France intended to launch an attack on the Ruhr through Dutch and Belgian territory. This attack had been planned by the Anglo-French General Staff with the Dutch military authorities. In order to counter this threatened invasion, the Führer had summarily decided to occupy Holland and to ensure the protection by the German Wehrmacht of Dutch neutrality against Anglo-French encroachments during this war. This German-Dutch conflict was an exclusively European affair and had nothing to do with overseas questions. Germany, therefore, had no interest in occupying herself with such overseas problems, in which she continued to regard herself as disinterested. You might also mention casually in your conversation that Germany fully understands Japan's anxiety over events in the Netherlands Indies. The action of the armed forces of the Western Powers against Netherlands possessions in the West Indies ^a after the outbreak of hostilities between Germany and Holland had sufficiently proven that the distrust of the Western Powers and of their collaboration with the U. S. A. was justified. In contrast to this policy of the other Great Powers, Germany had always pursued a policy of friendship toward Japan and she believed that in the past this policy had promoted Japan's interests in the Far East.

^a See document No. 234.

^b See document No. 262.

^c See document No. 262, footnote 5.

Please make these statements orally to the Japanese Foreign Minister. A detailed publication is not advisable but there is no objection, in view of the recent inquiries at the press conference, to Japan's putting on record ⁵ that Germany has stated her disinterestedness on the question of the Netherlands Indies.⁶

RIBBENTROP

⁵ In telegram No. 474 of May 22 (2332/486614) Ott replied that he had that day made a démarche as instructed to Arita, and the spokesman for the Japanese Foreign Ministry had issued a communiqué in which Germany was stated to have declared for *désintéressement* in the Netherlands East Indies question.

⁶ In memorandum No. 377 of May 21 Weizsäcker recorded that he had informed the Japanese Ambassador in Berlin of the substance of this telegram to Tokyo (234/156928).

No. 281

73/52398-94

The State Secretary to the Legation in Hungary

Telegram

PRIORITY

BERLIN, May 20, 1940.

SECRET

No. 415

I. The Führer has replied as follows to Count Teleki's letter ¹ which reached him some time ago and the essential contents of which are presumably known to you:

[Here follows the text of Section 1) of document No. 271.]

II. The Foreign Minister requests you when you next meet the Deputy Foreign Minister to speak to him in a friendly manner about his recent statement ² that the decision to mobilize parts of the Hungarian Army was also motivated by the desire not to be as unprepared in the event of a request being made by Germany as at the time of the entry into Carpatho-Ukraine. As it is evident from the Führer's letter to Count Teleki that Germany is above all interested in the maintenance of peace in the Balkans and we do not desire any complications at present, we should be grateful for information as to what has actually caused this partial Hungarian mobilization.³

WEIZSÄCKER

¹ Document No. 135.

² See document No. 250.

³ On May 17 Woermann had recorded having expressed to the Hungarian Chargé d'Affaires, the German Government's surprise over the explanation of Hungary's mobilization measures which was given to Erdmannsdorff (73/52373). On May 21, Erdmannsdorff replied to this instruction in telegram No. 321 (73/52406) and told of Osáky's explanations. See also document No. 284.

No. 282

413/215676-78

Führer's Directive

FÜHRER'S HEADQUARTERS, May 20, 1940.

Pol. I M 7832 g.

THE FÜHRER AND SUPREME COMMANDER OF THE WEHRMACHT

Subject: Delegation of power to issue orders in the Netherlands.

1) With the coming into effect of my decree of May 18, 1940, relating to the exercise of governmental powers in the Netherlands,¹ I shall withdraw the mandate given to the Commander in Chief of the Army for the exercise of executive power in those Netherlands territories which are to come under the Reichskommissar.

After that, military authority in the occupied Netherlands territories will be exercised by the Wehrmacht Commander in the Netherlands. He will be directly responsible to me and will receive my instructions through the High Command of the Wehrmacht.

2) The Wehrmacht Commander in the Netherlands will exercise territorial authority. He will be responsible for the internal military security of the country and for safeguarding it against unexpected danger from without. He alone will represent the interest of the Wehrmacht with the Reichskommissar for the occupied Netherlands territories.

3) The authorities established in the Netherlands and the troops of the branches of the Wehrmacht are under the Wehrmacht Commander from the territorial point of view. In other respects they come under the Commanders in Chief of their respective branches.

4) Defense of Netherlands territories and the conduct of the war from Netherlands territories falls within the duties of the Commanders in Chief of the Wehrmacht branches.

In the event of an unexpected threat to Netherlands territory from enemy landings, the Wehrmacht Commander is authorized, pending further instructions, to issue to the forces of the branches of the Wehrmacht in the Netherlands the necessary orders for unified defense against the enemy attack.

5) Requests from the Wehrmacht which have to go through the civil authorities will be addressed by the Wehrmacht Commander to the Reichskommissar for the occupied Netherlands territories. When the Commanders in Chief of the Wehrmacht branches have to present requests to the civil authorities, these will be forwarded through the Wehrmacht Commander. If, in a matter of urgency, they contact the Reichskommissar direct, then the Wehrmacht Commander is to be consulted.

¹Text in *Reichsgesetzblatt*, I, 1940, p. 778; also in *Monatshefte für Auswärtige Politik*, June 1940, pp. 440-441.

In the event of a military threat to Netherlands territories, the Wehrmacht Commander is authorized to order all the necessary defense measures, even such as would come within the scope of the civil administration. Here, too, he will, as far as possible, transmit his orders through the Reichskommissar.

ADOLF HITLER

No. 283

4469/E087795-803

*Unsigned Note for the Führer and Chancellor*¹

BERLIN, May 20, 1940.

Subject: Developments in the Norwegian Affair.

The situation which is developing can be seen from the text given earlier to Reich Minister Dr. Lammers of the conversation between M. Quisling on the one hand and Under State Secretary Habicht and Dr. Bräuer on the other,² as well as from the letter from Quisling likewise delivered to Stabsleiter Schickedanz.³ Habicht told Quisling that political necessity made it imperative to drop M. Quisling; after all the Führer had once done the same to *him*. If M. Quisling refused to accept this situation, then he would just be passed over. I now enclose a recent letter from Reichsamtsleiter Scheidt,⁴ as well as a letter from Reichskommissar Terboven.⁵

In the above-mentioned record Quisling was promised by the German side that Scheidt would continue to be retained as liaison between the German authorities and Quisling. I submitted the same request by Quisling to the Führer and understood the Führer to agree to Scheidt being taken on by Terboven. It is apparent from Scheidt's letter that Reichskommissar Terboven has told Quisling—contrary to the truth—that Scheidt has now been given another assignment and will return to Germany. It is obvious from Quisling's letter to me⁶ that this has given him the impression that I recalled Scheidt on my own responsibility in order to employ him in Germany. Quisling, therefore, now looks on me as also one of the instigators of the breakdown in the negotiations which, in the form with which the Führer

¹ The initials "R/M" appear at the end of this document. Presumably it was prepared by Rosenberg.

² A record of these conversations appears in document No. 118.

³ This is apparently a reference to the letter of May 1 from Quisling to Schickedanz, document No. 187.

⁴ Not found. A memorandum by Scheidt of May 21 on his experiences in Norway, indicating that he had been directed by Terboven to leave Norway on short notice, is filmed as 4467/E087482-92.

⁵ In a letter of May 11, Terboven informed Rosenberg that Scheidt's assignment in Norway had reached its natural conclusion (4467/E087498).

⁶ A letter of May 12 from Quisling to Rosenberg commended Scheidt and requested that he be retained in Norway as a liaison with the Quisling movement (4469/E087772-74).

is acquainted, have been going on since the middle of last year. Reichskommissar Terboven writes me that through his appointment the work of Reichsamtsleiter Scheidt has reached "its natural conclusion"!

May I be permitted to make the following points in relation to this general situation: For the whole 7 years, only a few people apart from myself, the Aussenpolitisches Amt [of the NSDAP], and the Nordische Gesellschaft⁷ which was commissioned and backed by the Amt, took any real interest in Northern problems. It can be said that except for some visits by Scandinavian trade representatives which were sponsored by government departments, personal and ideological contacts and one might say spiritual education were provided by the Aussenpolitisches Amt with the help of the Nordische Gesellschaft. Every year more and more representatives of Scandinavia assembled in Lübeck, some of whom had never before met each other.

The idea of Pan-Germanic cooperation was further intensified by the numerous visits of researchers and artists, as well as of businessmen. It was clear to us that nothing much could be done directly in a political way against the ruling class of democratic kings and parties, but that on the cultural-ideological side preparations could be set on foot. Irrespective of everything else, it certainly required courage on the part of M. Quisling and his coworkers, mostly officers, to fight the pro-British tendencies, particularly strong in Norway, and Marxist domination. Thus personal confidence has grown from personal acquaintance of many years' standing. And Quisling, Colonel Sundlo (Commandant of Narvik), Major Hvoslief⁸ and several others have, through me, confidently placed their honor as officers of Germanic stock in the hands of the Führer, sustained by the idea of a Pan-Germanic league under Germany's leadership. They were, in the midst of all the enemies of Germany, the only people openly friendly to her. They had received no support during these 7 years. And the Führer knows best of all how difficult it is to carry out a change among a contented people for the benefit of a revolution that is challenged everywhere. Irrespective of what political decision on Norway's future may have been made, on close observation I have a definite feeling that here are men of Germanic stock, devoted to the Führer, who are being hindered in the full development of their activities. Through Terboven's appointment persons have, to a great extent, been brought in as collaborators who took no interest in Scandinavian questions during these years and are not equipped with any knowledge or presumably any very deep understanding to enable

⁷ Regarding previous work of the Nordische Gesellschaft in the Scandinavian countries, see vol. v, documents Nos. 427-429, 431, and 432.

⁸ Major Hvoslief had been named by Quisling as Minister of Defense in his Government.

them to form an opinion with regard to these members of the racial group in the north. Even the reproach which was levelled at Quisling that his followers did not go out into the streets with banners flying to welcome the German troops, is repugnant to every feeling of race psychology.

In the past we have always criticized the Germans for treating *friends* of Germany badly, thereby hoping to win over opponents. I am convinced that what has happened here in Norway, and is still going on, represents the same sort of thing. The manner in which Reichskommissar Terboven is now dismissing Reichsamtseleiter Scheidt, who has personally rendered great service in the whole matter of warning the Führer about the intrigues of the English and of the Norwegian Government, also appears to me to be intolerable and ungrateful.

By falsely informing Quisling that I had a new assignment for Reichsamtseleiter Scheidt as my Amtseleiter, Reichskommissar Terboven's action in getting rid of Scheidt is at the same time, as it were, put on my shoulders. Terboven told *me* in his letter, without mentioning his communication to Quisling, that now Scheidt's activity had come to a natural end.

After such action it will not be at all difficult later to establish that there was no really growing pro-German movement of any consequence in Norway and that, therefore, the structure of a Reichskommissariat would, for its head, have to be turned into a life-long Reich protectorate.

Quisling is doing what he conceives to be his duty toward pan-Germanism, but feels embittered and cheated. Nevertheless, he is working without voicing any complaint on the development of his scheme in unquestioning obedience to the Führer. All that which he with his coworkers, given different treatment, could otherwise be doing wholeheartedly and voluntarily, is now being done with inward aversion to a number of persons. This view of their treatment cannot fail to become known, nor can the knowledge of it fail to reach friends of Germany in all countries.

The task, springing from a great Germanic idea, of gradually acquiring voluntarily the valuable resources of the Scandinavian peoples, is already menaced in embryo by such treatment. As a result, the Führer's magnanimous gesture of freeing all prisoners cannot be properly turned to account and such action can completely frustrate painstaking efforts toward arousing the northern peoples' consciousness of their common destiny and toward a new mission in common for both Germany and northerners of Germanic stock.

Reichskommissar Terboven has avoided making the slightest contact with me or Gauleiter Lohse as director of the Nordische Gesellschaft, but on the contrary, has been at pains to call in only such people

as have had nothing whatever to do with all the efforts, toil, and achievements of these 7 years of work in the north.

This attitude is shown all too plainly by the manner in which Reichsamtseleiter Scheidt is being dismissed and I feel it my duty to acquaint the Führer with this fact.⁹

Scheidt has just arrived in Berlin. On Friday, May 17, 1940, he had been informed by an assistant of the Chief of the Security Service that he was to leave Oslo on May 18.

⁹ On June 20 Rosenberg sent a letter to Lammers enclosing a memorandum to be placed before the Führer in which he renewed his criticism of the handling of the Quisling movement by the German authorities in Norway (4468/E087577-82).

In a memorandum dated June 15, 1940, entitled "Political Preparations for the Norwegian Operation," and intended for the Führer's Deputy, Rosenberg gave an account of German preparations for the occupation of Norway, emphasizing the role of the Aussenpolitisches Amt. The memorandum was presented in evidence at Nuremberg as document 004-PS, exhibit GB-140. The German text appears in *Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal* (Nuremberg, 1947), vol. xxv, pp. 26-34, and in *Förspelet till det tyska angreppet på Danmark och Norge den 9 April 1940*, pp. 315-322; in English translation in *Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression*, vol. III, pp. 19-27, and *Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuernberg Military Tribunals Under Control Council Law No. 10, Nuernberg October 1946-April 1949*, vol. XII, pp. 1124-1131.

No. 284

FF/267-262

The Hungarian Minister President to the Führer and Chancellor

BUDAPEST, May 20, 1940.

YOUR EXCELLENCY: Please accept, Your Excellency, my sincerest thanks for your letter of the 14th¹ of this month. The Royal Hungarian Government and I appreciate receiving this letter all the more because we know that in fateful hours of decision Your Excellency found time to compose this letter and inform us of the German Government's views on Balkan questions.

My letter was dated April 17.² I concur with Your Excellency's opinion that a conference of representatives of the three Powers which would excite international public opinion would not be appropriate just now since it would heighten the tension in an atmosphere pregnant with suspicion and misunderstanding.

The Royal Hungarian Government has not altered its opinion which it communicated to the Reich Foreign Minister last September,³ and to the Royal Italian Foreign Minister in April this year,⁴ namely that in deference to the wishes of the two Great Powers who were disposed in a friendly way toward us, we are willing to postpone our efforts to achieve our legitimate claims to restitution for the wrong

¹ Document No. 271.

² Document No. 135.

³ See vol. VIII, document No. 30.

⁴ See document No. 40.

done to us in the dictated peace of Trianon, which impaired the viability of the Hungarian nation, until such a time as we would not interfere with the interests of the friendly Great Powers and the tactical pursuit of such interests. Although on the basis of reliable information the Hungarian Government had formed the impression that we might satisfy our national demands, especially in the east, with sword in hand, we fully appreciate the present importance of maintaining the state of peace since we never lose sight of our community of interests with the Axis Powers.

We have, therefore, as I have already had the honor to hint in my letter of April 17, also upheld the idea of the maintenance of peace in the Danube Basin, despite the realization that every month indeed almost every day lost is strengthening the defensive and also the offensive power of our potential enemy and particularly increasing the strength and extent of his fortifications.

Just as Germany is pursuing a German national policy in all things, so we too are pursuing a national policy which is in keeping with the character of our people and does justice to the rights and interests of our citizens who speak other languages. Just as in the case of the German nation which has confidently taken upon itself alone the task of striving for its honor and prestige and with such spiritual strength goes from victory to victory, it is also for us a duty of honor deeply rooted in our soul to restore, above all by our own exertions, the conditions for the existence of our country of which the dictated treaty of Trianon deprived us, and ourselves to liberate our fellow countrymen and the many other former nationals remaining loyal to us, and to be prepared to fight as well as to work for our honor and future. If in keeping with our comparative size and power we as a small country, in contrast to Germany, lean for support on our bigger friends in our policy and its aspirations, this cannot and should not detract in the slightest from this duty of honor. Indeed there is bound up with this the desire that our friends, inspired by similar feelings of their own, should also recognize and appreciate this determination to make sacrifices in this matter of our honor. For the highest and real values of a nation are only those for which it has itself fought.

Reverting to the question of the peace which is to be maintained at present in the Balkans and the adjacent Danube Basin, I can assure Your Excellency that we shall remain loyal to the decision once taken, and in view of the present state of affairs we have no intention for our part of causing any disturbance to the peace and quiet of the Danube and Balkan areas.

We wish to continue to fulfill our national tasks parallel with the interests of the Axis Powers since our friendly collaboration with the Axis Powers has hitherto brought not insignificant advantages.

As the Reich Government has been informed by Count Csáky and also through military channels by way of our General Staffs which are engaged in a keen exchange of views, we have brought up to war strength the two army corps, the 8th at Košice and the 2nd at Székesfehérvár, which have been reinforced for the most part from the newly regained territories and are therefore in greater need of training, the Carpatho-Ukrainian mountain brigade, and also two motorized and two cavalry brigades which recent experience showed to be likewise still in need of training. As the Government of the only state in this part of Europe which since the demobilization after the occupation of the Carpatho-Ukraine has not adopted any mobilization measures whatever, and has kept perfectly calm despite the nervousness noticeable in all the other neighboring countries, we could not leave our country with so little protection and so unprepared for eventualities in the midst of countries which were doing nothing but continuously augmenting the effective strength of their armies, building fortifications, and calling up men. We have not however increased the strength of the frontier guards. Our General Staff is only taking certain precautions, e. g., reinforcing bridges, which cannot cause any sensation or international alarm, but these do not only serve our own interests but actually those of the Axis Powers also. Only a change in the situation in this part of Europe might force us to take possible further measures, precisely in consideration of the interests of the great countries who are our friends. There rests indeed a historical responsibility of the greatest magnitude, not only on the Government but on the whole present-day generation of our country. But the gravity of this responsibility, if properly recognized, will restrain us from all frivolity and also always keep alive our feeling of responsibility toward our friends.

Inspired by this feeling of responsibility I should also like to take the opportunity of drawing Your Excellency's attention today, despite the great task of the moment which is claiming all your energy, to the extent of Russian troop concentrations against Rumania as well as on our northeastern frontier and also to the Pan-Slav menace. I have the honor to enclose a map⁵ of these Russian troop concentrations drawn by our General Staff. The troop concentrations conceal various dangers both to peace in this part of Europe in general and to the state of affairs in Rumania—problems which are of close and vital interest to us—all of them possibilities which we cannot contemplate with indifference.

With reference to the actively resurgent Pan-Slavism and the way

⁵ Not found.

it is spreading, I have the honor to enclose for Your Excellency a detailed memorandum * based on authentic information and showing that communism is changing its aspect, at least to some extent, and that the ramifications for influencing the soul of the Slav peoples already extend to the Adriatic and to Bratislava.

I would like to ask Your Excellency to give this question your attention if and as soon as you have the time. Despite the calm and confidence with which we are looking forward to general developments, I can nevertheless detect, especially here, elements of disquiet and danger, not only for our Fatherland but much further afield.

In connection with this question, which can not only shape the immediate future but the entire future of Danubian and Balkan Europe, I must in conclusion revert once more to the responsibility which, as I have already observed, rests not simply on the Government alone but also on the whole of our present day adult generation.

Our nation has always been politically-minded. It is conscious of its responsibility. Traditionalism is rooted deeply in its soul. Thus it clings to its thousand-year-old frontiers, the boundary wall defending its native soil. But the country, the people, and its traditions were only able to maintain themselves through the centuries because we have always been political realists too. What we have in mind at present is not a simple and complete return to pre-1919 conditions. It is rather such a new order as will reconcile our vital territorial and political interests with the conditions and genuinely recognized interests of the other countries concerned, and also with our own potential strength. During an informal conversation with His Excellency the Duce in April this year, I explained to him these principles which testify to our understanding and readiness to compromise, but of course I added that there were limits to our readiness to make sacrifices as regards compromise solutions and that we must meet with a similar readiness on the part of the other side to make sacrifices.

When at the end of the fighting the time comes for a new order in Europe and, similarly also in the Danube and Balkan area, which, in the interests of all nations must be a well-considered new order establishing peace for a long period, we are confident that the Axis Powers will support us by word and deed so that we may make our decisions at the proper time and in the best way.

Pray accept, Your Excellency, the expression of my special consideration.

TELEKI

* Not printed (73/52418-29).

No. 285

136/74135

The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 1505 of May 20

MADRID, May 20, 1940.

Received May 21—12:20 a. m.

In a lengthy conversation on the political situation, during which I was able at once to utilize the instructions contained in your in-formatory telegram Multex No. 58 (Pol. II 1075 g),¹ the Spanish Foreign Minister expressed less concern than previously on the possibility of Spain becoming involved in the war. The Minister said that in the present circumstances even Italy's expected entry into the war would not necessarily draw Spain into the conflict. After the recent German victory, France and England had even less interest in having Spain as an opponent, which would immediately be the case should any encroachments take place in Tangier, in the Moroccan Zone, at Gibraltar, or in the Balearic Islands, etc.

The Minister said further that he expected a speedy and, for us, victorious end of the war and that he therefore also confidently looked forward to the future of Spain.

If, however, contrary to expectation, the war should be a long one, he believed in ultimate intervention by America; in that case he feared there would be a revolution in Portugal induced by England and an attempt from Portugal, with American assistance, to reconquer countries and territories until then occupied by us. This could then lead to a catastrophe for Spain.

STOHRER

¹ Not printed (6507/H071001-05). This telegram set forth the line to be taken to counteract enemy propaganda.

No. 286

103/112163

The Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

URGENT

Moscow, May 21, 1940—1:23 a. m.

No. 944 of May 20

Received May 21—4:20 a. m.

For the State Secretary and the Attaché Section OKH.

(1) Reports received from a good source during the last few days, make it appear that considerable Soviet troop concentrations are taking place on the Rumanian front. The railways in West Ukraine, especially Lwów-Kiev, have been taken over for troop transports. The Moscow-Kiev expresses are suspended.

(2) Apparently there are concentrations in the Kiev-Vinnitsa area. The area around Kharkov is also mentioned. The Dniester front itself seems less strongly occupied.

(3) I have arranged the following: Schubuth¹ was sent to Kiev to return on the 21st; the Bulgarian Military Attaché is setting off today for Kiev, Zhmerinka, Tiraspol, Bucharest, and Odessa. In Bucharest he will contact the German Military Attaché to report on the journey. Please notify the latter. News of the departure of the Turkish Military Attaché here for the Caucasus front is incorrect, nor has he been granted permission to go on leave to Ankara. If I receive no order to the contrary I shall set off on May 25 by rail and air for Baku, Tiflis, Sochi, and Odessa for a fortnight.²

KÖSTRING
SCHULENBURG

¹ Captain W. Schubuth, Assistant Military Attaché.

² Reports from the various Attachés on these trips have not been found.

No. 287

897/291886

*The Deputy Director of the Political Department to the Embassy
in Chile*

Telegram

SECRET

No. 153

BERLIN, May 21, 1940—4:30 p. m.
e. o. Inf. 113 g.

For the Ambassador personally.

By using democratic and humanitarian catch phrases and pretending that there is imminent danger of a German attack, the American Government is at present obviously striving to create a sort of united front of Latin American States against Germany. We do not overestimate the importance of these tendencies, but are wondering whether there are means of opposing them in Latin America itself, possibly by emphasizing more strongly existing disagreements between the U. S. A. and these countries.

Please send a telegram¹ giving your views and possible suggestions. You are requested to destroy this instruction after reading it.

HABICHT

¹ Document No. 304.

No. 288

247/164104

*The Minister and Plenipotentiary of the German Reich in Denmark
to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

URGENT

No. 537 of May 21

COPENHAGEN, May 21, 1940—8:20 p. m.
Received May 21—9:00 p. m.

For Geheimrat Luther.

The government crisis has been overcome for the present, but Sehested's efforts to overthrow the Stauning-Munch Government and

to form a government of the Farmers' party still continue, as he assumes on the basis of reports from Germany that he can count on German support. To avoid the difficulties of having to work with a Bach-Sehested Cabinet, which although pro-German, would, from its very composition, be not fully capable of functioning, and in which Danish National Socialists would not be represented, it would be desirable to inform Sehested through his connections, that such incomplete combinations [*Kombinationen*] would not be welcomed by us.¹

RENTHE-FINK

¹ No reply has been found.

No. 289

1889/425947-49

The Chargé d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

URGENT

WASHINGTON, May 21, 1940—8:48 p. m.

TOP SECRET

Received May 22—6:20 p. m.

No. 979 of May 21

[Pol. I M 7430 g.]¹

For the State Secretary.

With reference to your telegram No. 79 of January 27.²

The information from the Wehrmacht conveyed in the above-mentioned telegram relating to the nonexistent mission of the agent Hausberger is not in accordance with the facts. The above-mentioned man has received instructions from the Wehrmacht to continue his activities and to avoid Washington and the Embassy. Thus my instructions to him have for the present been rendered pointless. A wireless operator also arrived 2 months ago but so far he has not succeeded in establishing wireless communication with the Wehrmacht.

On receiving these fresh indications of the activities of agents of the Wehrmacht in the U. S. A. and after thorough investigation, I established the following facts:

The agent von Hausberger who has been trained in Germany in the use of all kinds of explosives is again receiving orders via Portugal from Major Osten instructing him to establish contact with American citizens of German descent, whose names have been given to him, and to train them successfully as saboteurs. He has begun his activities and has found out that the German-Americans introduced to him are quite unsuited for the purpose in mind. Nor is it impossible that agents provocateurs are among them. Anyhow the circle of people is becoming wider and thus the danger of being unmasked is constantly

¹ The file number is supplied from a note on another document (1889/425950).

² See vol. VIII, document No. 569, footnote 4.

increasing. That activities are only to start in the event of an emergency is of no account whatever as regards political consequences.

I cannot warn too urgently against this method. The example of 1917 shows that American public opinion was incited to war far less by German submarine warfare than by alleged and actual cases of sabotage. If an instance of this kind were to come to the knowledge of the American Government now, it would have an easy job in making tremendous capital out of it. I recall the exaggerated accounts of the New York spy trial³ and the trial of Schachow and his associates in the Canal Zone.⁴

The agent Hausberger is fully aware of the dangers attending his activities but is carrying out the orders of his superiors. It is probable that he is already under observation by the American authorities who endeavor by every means to uncover incidents of this kind, or even to invent them if necessary. The American public is systematically being kept keyed up by reports from America and Mexico of German spy activities and fifth-column methods in the United States.⁵ Even successful activities in case of emergency on the part of agents of the Wehrmacht bear no relation to the political damage which would be irreparable. This is also a lesson learned from the World War. Economic loss can only be infinitesimal in view of the enormous productive power of the United States of America.

If I do not receive instructions to the contrary, I shall, in agreement with the armed forces Attachés, who share my views, issue the following order to Hausberger:

- 1) To cease all activities at once, including reporting to the Wehrmacht.
- 2) To leave New York and, if possible, the United States, with his family.
- 3) To sever his connection with the Wehrmacht.
- 4) In the name of the Wehrmacht to order the other agents to cease all activities.

I will pay the fares of the above-named and his family out of Embassy funds as he has used up the Wehrmacht money and at present is living only on the meager earnings of his wife.

As I have definite indications of the activities of other agents (for instance the quite unsuitable pompous Baron Maydell),⁶ I consider

³ Four Germans were convicted in a New York Federal District Court on Dec. 2, 1938, on charges of military espionage and sentenced to 2-6 year terms of imprisonment.

⁴ Schachow and an associate were convicted on Jan. 20, 1939, on charges of espionage in the Panama Canal Zone and sentenced to 2-year terms of imprisonment. See vol. IV, document No. 504, and footnote 6.

⁵ The German reads: *Die amerikanische Öffentlichkeit wird systematisch durch Nachrichten über deutsche Agententätigkeit und Fifth Column-Methode in den Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika und Mexico aus, in Erregung gehalten.* It is possible that the sentence was somewhat garbled in transmission.

⁶ See vol. VIII, document No. 569, footnote 4.

it of urgent importance that the Wehrmacht refrain entirely from every kind of activity on the part of agents in the United States of America, and I would appreciate it if appropriate influence were brought to bear in the matter.

THOMSEN

No. 290

205/142282-84

Memorandum by the State Secretary

SECRET

BERLIN, May 21, 1940.
e. o. Wg. 2694 g.

THE NECESSITY FOR CARRYING OUT DELIVERIES OF ARMS TO SWEDEN AS
AGREED BY CONTRACT

1) In the year 1940 we will, in accordance with agreements in effect, receive some 9 million tons of highest grade iron ore (5.4 million tons iron content) from Sweden. This result, which was achieved in the latest negotiations, is especially remarkable since the shipments via Narvik, which in the last few years amounted to about 5 million tons and represented about half of the total import, will not this year take place. The carrying out of these deliveries is entirely dependent upon a positive and friendly attitude on the part of the Swedish Government and of the Swedish economic circles concerned; and beyond that upon a concentration of the whole economy of the Swedish people on this program. In the carrying out of this gigantic production and delivery program disturbances at many points would be possible at all times without our being able to prove sabotage or conduct not in accordance with the contract. In order to maintain these deliveries, which are decisive for the German conduct of the war, it is therefore necessary in the circumstances to preserve the positive attitude which exists at the moment and which has been shown by the Swedes in the previous discussions and in practice; we must also fulfill those obligations on our side, which from the Swedish point of view are regarded as important and decisive, especially as we must go extremely far in our demands on Sweden (day and night work, release of iron ore workers from the Army, greatest possible utilization of means of transport by sea and rail).

2) Among the most important counterparts to which Germany has bound herself are the deliveries of war equipment which were partly agreed upon by the two Government Committees on January 27, 1940,¹ and partly contracted for directly by German firms with the

¹The exchange of notes and the annexes embodying these agreements are not printed (4476/E087956-59). The agreement set forth the method whereby Sweden was to pay the first 25 million RM due on German arms deliveries.

approval of the competent German authorities. The details of this agreed delivery program in so far as it still remains open, can be seen from the enclosure.² The approval of the Foreign Minister and the military authorities was obtained at the conclusion of the above-mentioned agreements.

3) The value of the war equipment yet to be delivered amounts to about 48 million RM. This amount will be to a large extent paid in gold; the rest is indispensable for financing the import from Sweden of ore and other raw materials important for the war.

4) From the latest discussions with Swedish Government authorities and from conversations with important Swedish persons, a certain anxiety on the part of the Swedes is evident that on the reopening of navigation at Luleå the northern Swedish production areas and the transport routes by land and sea will be exposed to English air attacks. The Swedish Government is firmly determined to resist such possible English attempts with all means at its disposal. It is in our interest to provide Sweden with high-grade war equipment for this eventuality.

In view of these considerations weighty for the German conduct of the war, it is requested that the delivery ban be lifted³ and the equipment which must be delivered in fulfillment of the agreements entered into be released.

Herewith to be submitted to the Foreign Minister, with a request for decision. The question is urgent in view of the commencement of ore shipments and the Government negotiations which begin on May 27 in Berlin.⁴

WEIZSÄCKER

² Not printed (205/142285-86).

³ See document No. 202, footnote 1.

⁴ The Foreign Minister's reply has not been found.

No. 291

91/100204

Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department

BERLIN, May 21, 1940.

I mentioned to the Irish Chargé d'Affaires today the protest which our Minister in Dublin had made (telegram No. 239 from Dublin) respecting the speech of de Valera.¹ Mr. Warnock had already been

¹ De Valera in addressing a Fianna Fail convention at Galway on May 11 and referring to the invasion of Belgium and the Netherlands had said: "Today these two small nations are fighting for their lives, and it would be unworthy of this small nation if, on an occasion like this, I did not utter our protest against the cruel wrong which has been done them."

Hempel on May 16 (91/100196) was instructed to protest against these remarks and in telegram No. 239 of May 14, received in Berlin on May 16 (91/100200) he reported that he had already done so.

informed by his Government, and expressed himself in a similarly apologetic manner as the deputy of the Irish Foreign Minister had done to our Minister. The Chargé d'Affaires added the remark that Ireland wished to maintain neutrality toward all Powers and said personally that Ireland, in the last war against England, had struck too early. This mistake would not be repeated. In view of the German successes the question, however, was whether Ireland would not come too late.

WOERMANN

No. 292

8818/E618983

Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Legal Department

IMMEDIATE

BERLIN, May 21, 1940.
e.o. R 10473.

U[nder] St[ate] S[ecretary] Gaus today transmitted to me the following directive from the Foreign Minister concerning the handling of American relief for occupied Polish territories:¹

- 1) In no circumstances are Mr Hartigan or other negotiators to be given anything in writing.²
- 2) Visiting times in the General Government for American representatives are to be reduced to a minimum.
- 3) All measures are to be taken only in full agreement with Governor General Frank.
- 4) In the future a more negative attitude is to be taken toward offers of relief, and it can be pointed out that we are taking care of the Poles ourselves.

This directive, which is based on a report to the Führer, takes precedence over requests of home departments which are concerned with the improvement of the food situation. The decisive consideration is that in carrying out foreign relief in Poland there inevitably arises the danger of paving the way for or facilitating illegal traffic or the exchange of information.

ALBRECHT

¹ See document No. 144.

² Albrecht had proposed in a memorandum of May 18 to the Foreign Minister that Hartigan be sent a letter, a draft copy of which was attached (8818/E618980-82), based on the consideration that "for political reasons it might be advisable to make possible Hoover's action in so far as there are no objections in principle on the part of Germany." (8818/E613977-77A)

No. 293

2110/456733

Memorandum by an Official of Economic Policy Division V

BERLIN, May 21, 1940.
e. o. W 2711 g.

According to information received from the Special Train, the Foreign Minister has discussed with the Führer the question of arms de-

liveries to Finland.¹ The Führer has decided that arms deliveries to Finland are at present out of the question. It could not be foreseen at the moment when this attitude might undergo a change.

The OKW, War Economy and Armaments Office (Commander Koch) and the Ministry of Economics (Ministerialrat Ludwig) have been informed by telephone of the Führer's decision.

VAN SCHERPENBERG

¹ The inquiry to Hitler evidently derived from a meeting of the Commercial Policy Committee on May 16, the Minutes of which reported the following points on Finland (5382/E361672-73):

"Herr Schnurre reported on his conversations with the Finnish Government in Helsinki and on the agenda for the forthcoming negotiations with Finland.

"Finland will resume in full the copper deliveries of 11,000 tons net annually; there is even some prospect that these deliveries may be further increased by 50 percent. It will probably become necessary, in return, also to supply war material to the Finns at least in a limited amount. The military aspect of the question will be studied by the OKW, as soon as details of the Finns' wishes are available. Meanwhile, the Foreign Ministry will ascertain whether the authoritative quarters have any objections, on political grounds, to war material being supplied to Finland."

No. 294

418/215715

Memorandum by the Consul General at Amsterdam

BERLIN, May 21, 1940.

Subject: Constitutional status of the Netherlands Government.

Prior to my departure from Amsterdam (May 17) the Secretary General of the Netherlands Ministry for Economic Affairs described to me as follows the constitutional status of the Netherlands Government at the time:

Since all the ministers together with the Queen had left the country, governmental authority was vested in General Winkelman, Commander in Chief of the Army. Under him a board had been constituted of the Secretaries General from the different ministries (a Secretary General corresponds approximately to a German State Secretary). A board of this kind was not alien to the Netherlands Constitution for there had already been one in earlier periods of history. The board of Secretaries General received its instructions from the Commander in Chief. It had been empowered still by the old Government to cooperate with the German occupation authorities and also to take instructions from them, provided these instructions were not directly contrary to Netherlands interests. All the members of the board were prepared to cooperate most loyally with the German occupation authorities and intended to interpret the directives given them by the old Government so liberally that far-reaching cooperation either with the German authorities or according to their instructions will be possible.

In the event of the Commander in Chief of the Army's resigning his functions for any reason or of his being relieved of his functions, the board of the Secretaries General was prepared, in so far as this was desired or ordered by the German occupation authorities, to remain in office, in which case it would then, to a certain extent, represent a kind of cabinet of officials which would be at the disposal of the German occupation authorities.

The Secretary General, however, made the reservation that the board would not submit to the orders of a Nationaal-Socialistenbond (Mussert party) government which might perhaps be formed by the Germans or under German protection.

BENZLER

No. 295

173/84331-33

Note by the Director of the Special Party Section of the Foreign Ministry

BERLIN, May 21, 1940.

1) *Regarding Holland*

The Foreign Minister has telephoned from his Special Train and given me the following instruction:

On the occasion of his conversation with Reich Minister Seyss-Inquart the Foreign Minister arranged with him to place Herr Benzler at his disposal as representative of the Foreign Ministry and to appoint him to his staff in the Netherlands. Herr Benzler is therefore subordinate to Reich Minister Seyss-Inquart.

It has further been agreed that the Foreign Ministry will place at Reich Minister Seyss-Inquart's disposal one official each from the Protocol, the Press, and Information Departments, and from Kult R (Broadcasting) Department.

The question whether Reich Minister Seyss-Inquart wishes to have an expert on economic matters is still to be clarified. These officials will be subordinate to Reich Minister Seyss-Inquart, as must be clearly explained to them.

The Foreign Minister has instructed me together with Herr Benzler to discuss these questions with Reich Minister Seyss-Inquart as soon as he comes to Berlin (probably next Thursday). The outcome of the discussion is to be set down in writing.

The Foreign Minister wishes Minister Count Zech to be recalled *at once* and to return to Berlin immediately from The Hague.

An arrangement is to be made with Reich Minister Seyss-Inquart regarding the possibility of members of the Legation staying on.

Should the question arise, the Foreign Minister would agree to part of the Legation staff remaining in The Hague. He only asks that a written agreement be made about this with Reich Minister Seyss-Inquart, giving a list of names, and that in view of the shortage of middle grade officials, only a few be retained there.

The Foreign Minister wishes to be informed about the written confirmation before dispatch.

2) *Luxembourg*

The Foreign Minister has given instructions to recall Herr von Radowitz from Luxembourg at once, and to instruct him to proceed immediately to Berlin and to report to the Foreign Minister on the present state of affairs in Luxembourg, in particular on the military commander's orders regarding political competence. The members of the Legation are to place themselves at once at the disposal of the military commander, but are in no circumstances to exercise any kind of political function any more. Should members be approached with orders in this connection, the Foreign Minister requests that an immediate report be sent to him.

3) *Norway*

The Foreign Minister announces that the Führer has ordered that all officials and employees of the Foreign Ministry are to be withdrawn from Norway. He has already inquired of the Führer whether those officials and employees whom Reichskommissar Terboven intends to take over are to remain in Norway. The Führer's decision is still outstanding but will be communicated to me today by the Foreign Minister.

The Foreign Minister has instructed me to fly to Oslo tomorrow, or, at the latest, the next day with the Amy [sic], to inform Reichskommissar Terboven of the Führer's decision and to consult with him about the departure of the officials and employees, or, as the case may be, to arrange for some to remain. Should the Führer's decision be to the effect that all officials and employees are to leave, I am, if possible, to bring them all back with the Amy.

With the approval of the Foreign Minister I shall today advise Reichskommissar Terboven by telegram of my visit.

Submitted herewith to State Secretary von Weizsäcker. The Foreign Minister has instructed me to inform you immediately and requests you to transmit the instructions to Count Zech and Herr von Radowitz and also to the members of the Legations who are remaining behind.

Special Party Section
LUTHER

No. 296

2190/472783-87

*Unsigned Memorandum*¹

BERLIN, May 25, 1940.

Subject: My conversation with M. Mussert on Tuesday, May 21, 1940, at The Hague.

I met Count Ansembourg, leader of the NSB [*Nationaal-Socialistenbond*] Group in Parliament, at the house of Counselor of Legation Wickel on May 21, 1940, at The Hague. Count A. was commissioned at the same time by party leader Mussert to maintain contact with the German authorities. As M. Mussert was himself in The Hague on that day to confer with General Winkelman, Count A. arranged a meeting at my hotel.

M. Mussert appeared to be very pleased at my coming, and said so. He answered my questions willingly and first of all described the effect of the persecution of the NSB. There had been mass arrests of party members and also shootings. Mussert and Count Ansembourg escaped arrest by spending many days in hiding. A brother of Mussert's who was serving as engineer-commander of an army unit after the entry of the Germans was murdered by his soldiers, who had been stirred up against him, just because he bore the name of Mussert. M. Rost van Tonningen, a leading party member, was carried off by the Dutch and English presumably to England, together with a number of other leading NSB members.

According to Mussert the NSB now numbers 40,000 registered members, to whom could be added for the whole of the Netherlands about 200,000 followers and sympathizers. The organization of the party was good since it was represented in almost every place in the Netherlands.

M. Mussert expressed profound indignation at the method in which the Netherlands authorities discriminated against his movement by having it accused of treason in an officially organized whispering campaign. Members of the NSB were alleged to have maintained relations with German authorities at home and abroad and to have given active support to the German parachutists, airborne troops, etc.

M. Mussert drew attention to the most urgent necessity for clearing the NSB of this monstrous suspicion. This indispensable rehabilitation must be made publicly by both Germans and Dutch. Unfor-

¹In a memorandum of May 25 for the attention of the Foreign Minister (2190/472779-82), Luther, the head of the Special Party Section of the Foreign Ministry, stated that he had sent Likus to Holland to get in contact with Mussert and that Likus would present his report in person. This document appears to be Likus' report.

For an account of an interview between Likus and Mussert in Berlin on Apr. 22, 1939, see vol. vi, document No. 249.

unately, the Dutch broadcasting, which is under German control, has refused to broadcast an honorable amend in this connection. Mussert therefore requested me to inform the Reich Foreign Minister of the facts of the case and to effect the rehabilitation of the NSB without delay, as this was a prerequisite for the possible inclusion of the NSB in the future development of the Netherlands.

When questioned as to the future plans of his political movement and their relation to the Reich, M. Mussert replied :

He had always been convinced that Belgium was nothing but the "département du Nord de la grande patrie française." Belgium consisted of two racial sections which were unnaturally bound together. Belgium had no right to existence in her present form. The Netherlands housed 14 million people in a minimal space, so that there were 250 people to the square kilometer. A reasonable delimitation of the frontier between Belgium and the Netherlands could only lie along the general line from Liège to Dunkirk.

Mussert described the political situation in the Netherlands created by the appointment of Reich Minister Seyss-Inquart as a kind of interregnum. It was, however, indispensable, that the NSB, which was by far the most important National Socialist party organization, should be given a proper share by establishing two experts in political key positions. Here he had in mind the appointment of members of the NSB to the Ministries of the Interior and Justice. For the rest, the NSB placed itself, its experience, and its resources at the disposal of the Reichskommissar in a spirit of willing cooperation. In addition Mussert would build up the NSB during the period of the interregnum. In the absence of any knowledge of the future intentions of the German Reich regarding Holland, he visualized the goal of his movement as the creation of a greater Netherlands closely in line with the German Reich in the political, economic, and cultural spheres.

M. Mussert expressed the request to be received by the Foreign Minister if this could be arranged before the arrival of Reichskommissar Seyss-Inquart and also, if possible, by the Führer, in order to become acquainted with the broad outlines of future German foreign policy, and, with the aid of suitable maps which he had prepared, to assist in the future shaping of the land at the delta of the Rhine, the Meuse, and the Scheldt. This material showed by means of six maps the historical, political, and ethnographical development of the Netherlands for the last thousand years. M. Mussert remarked with confidence that this material was very informative and would interest the Foreign Minister and the Führer. Continuing, he requested me to present his respectful compliments to the Foreign Minister and to tell him that the NSB owed its continued existence, and Mussert and his collaborators their lives even to the swift entry of the German troops.

In conclusion M. Mussert asked me to maintain direct contact with him unless this was already established through Counselor of Legation Wickel and Count Ansembourg.

In addition to my conversation with M. Mussert alone, I also spoke to his delegate, Count Ansembourg, and in both conversations gained the definite impression that the NSB, which in the past had been mortally hated by the Dutch Government, was also not being understood and treated by the German civil and military authorities in the manner it had expected as an emphatically National Socialist movement. For this reason both requested me to use my good offices with the German authorities to secure a better understanding of the NSB whose program was the same as that of the NSDAP.

A detailed account of conditions and suitable immediate measures in favor of the NSB are contained in the enclosed copy of an exposé which the NSB delivered to the German Legation in The Hague on May 21.²

In conclusion M. Mussert asked to be informed regarding a date on which he could be received and suggested the headquarters of the Nationaal-Socialistenbond at Utrecht for the next conversation on Dutch territory.³

² Not printed (2190/47288-89).

³ In his memorandum of May 25 for the Foreign Minister (2190/472779-82, see footnote 1) Luther said:

"The question must now be decided as to whether the conversations with Mussert are to be carried on on behalf of the Foreign Minister or whether the whole problem should be turned over to Reich Minister Seyss-Inquart. In that connection it may be mentioned that Reich Minister Seyss-Inquart, according to his statement, has a directive from the Führer to have a government formed in Holland at a suitable time which would if possible be oriented toward National Socialism."

Luther recommended that Mussert be received by the Foreign Minister and asked for instructions. Instructions on the matter have not been found.

No. 297

136/74136-37

The Embassy in Spain to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

TOP SECRET

No. 1523 of May 21

MADRID, May 21, 1940.

Received May 22—2:40 a. m.

For the Attaché Group, Luftwaffe Operations Staff. Same text to the Foreign Ministry.

The Spanish Minister for Air telephoned three times today asking for information about the situation. In the evening he asked me to come and see him and told me confidentially that he had received a private report from Rome that Italy would enter the war tomorrow or the day after. He also told me that at his farewell visit, Marshal Pétain had said that only regular French front-line troops could hold

up the German offensive, that the reserve troops were poor and the lines of communication were completely unreliable.¹ The provincial authorities were pawns of the Popular Front, and Reynaud was just as unsatisfactory as his predecessor. On saying goodbye to the Minister for Air the French Air Attaché, too, had been a completely broken man. When asked whether he thought that Italy would enter the war, Yagüe had answered in the affirmative. The French Air Attaché had then asked about Spain's attitude. Yagüe had replied that Spain hoped to be able to maintain her neutrality. On being asked whether Spain would mobilize, he had said that this was not certain. Yagüe also said that French troopships full of white troops had passed the Balearic Islands on May 18. At the same time units of the English fleet, probably intended as protection for the troopships, had been sighted to the east of the Balearics. Yagüe supposes that unreliable French troops are being transferred to Algeria and assumes that troops hitherto stationed in Algeria would be brought to France. In speaking of England, Yagüe used very strong terms such as traitors, cowards, etc. The power of England must be annihilated once and for all and no one would be more grateful to Germany for doing this than Spain. In conclusion, he congratulated Germany and in particular the German Luftwaffe both in his own name and in the name of the Spanish Government on their extraordinary successes.

KRAHMER
STOHRER

¹ Marshal Pétain had been named Vice-Premier on May 18. A comprehensive appraisal of Pétain's ambassadorship in Spain and of his attitude toward the present situation was sent by Stohrer in report No. 2237 of May 21 (not printed, 3471/E017944-46).

No. 298

136/74138-89

The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

TOP SECRET

No. 1524 of May 21

MADRID, May 22, 1940.

Received May 22—2:40 a. m.

The Spanish Foreign Minister has just read to me the following urgent telegram from the Spanish Ambassador in Paris which arrived this evening:

"The French Minister Ybarnégaray wishes to visit the Generalissimo on behalf of the French Government to discuss the Mediterranean question, as Spain is the only proper channel through which to establish contact between France and Italy. He is the bearer of a proposal regarding the freedom of the Latin seas which would mean the disappearance of the servitudes of Gibraltar and Suez, as England does not require the Mediterranean for her communications in view of the

route round the Cape. On the basis of this freedom, lasting peace could be restored in Europe. The Minister intends to travel by air and asks that his request be passed on and that he should be given more exact details of his reception."

The Spanish Foreign Minister has sent the following telegram in reply:

"Although Spain is very well disposed toward the peace idea pursued by M. Y[barnégaray] the visit of a French Minister to Spain might give rise to a misinterpretation of Spanish neutrality in the eyes of the world and could only be accepted if the success of this step, which is difficult at the present moment, could be counted on with certainty. We will, however, examine its prospects discreetly, taking into consideration the high aim pursued."

The exchange of telegrams has also been communicated by the Foreign Minister to the Italian Chargé d'Affaires.¹

The Minister made the following comments to me regarding the French move and Spain's reply:

1) The peculiar proposal for a settlement of the Mediterranean question perhaps reveals not only an attempt by France to prevent Italy from entering the war, but also her inclination to conclude a separate peace.

2) The Spanish answer leaves all doors open for taking up the question broached by the French, should we or Italy wish to do so either now or later.

3) If this is not desired, the Spanish Government does not intend to return to the French proposal.

4) At a time when tremendous events indicate an alteration not only in the map of Europe, but in that of the whole world, a separate settlement of the Mediterranean question appears inexpedient.

I request instructions if necessary.²

STOHRER

¹ Stohrer added in telegram No. 1559 of May 24: "The Foreign Minister told me that the Italian Government had replied to the communication about the French feeler reported in my previous telegram saying that it was grateful for the interesting information and considered the Spanish answer a good and suitable one." (186/74149)

² Instructions not found.

No. 299

1889/425945-46

*The Chargé d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry*¹

Telegram

TOP SECRET

No. 988 of May 22

WASHINGTON, May 22, 1940—8:12 p. m.

Received May 23—8:15 a. m.

[Pol. I M 7431 g.²]

For the State Secretary.

Continuation of No. 979 of May 21.³

¹ Marginal note in Ribbentrop's handwriting: "[For] F[ührer]."

² The file number is supplied from a note on another document (1889/425950).

³ Document No. 289.

I have until now been under the impression that the activities of the agents of the Wehrmacht in the United States were, according to instructions, only to begin in case of emergency, that is to say, after the rupture of relations or a declaration of war.

That this is not so can be seen from statements by an agent who was worried by doubts as to the expediency of his activities and informed an official of the Consulate General at New York that:

- 1) He had received instructions from Major Osten to organize sabotage in the United States of America.

- 2) He was cooperating with a number of subagents.

- 3) He had with their help already successfully carried out a number of acts of sabotage (among others a small explosion in a munitions factory; the sinking of a steamship of the "Red Star" Line at the pier at Baltimore).

The agent in question uses as signature the pseudonym "Bergmann," lives near New York, was formerly director of the Mondial Film Company in Vienna, and refers to his acquaintance with Consul General Wiedemann⁴ with whom he wishes to be put in touch in order to persuade him to intervene. I have not yet found out Bergmann's real name. From the personal description (artificial leg) sent him in writing, Wiedemann has not been able to establish his identity.

Bergmann says that he has come to the conclusion that, by the acts he has been instructed to carry out, the opposite will be achieved to what is intended, especially as the subagents introduced to him are, for the most part, good-for-nothing gossips. The object of his talk with Wiedemann was to be:

- 1) To release him from his assignments.

- 2) To stop all sabotage at once.

It was his opinion that when his activities were discovered, America's entry into the war would be inevitable, and that the material damage which at best could be inflicted upon the American war economy would be of no importance whatever.

I have no reason to doubt Bergmann's statements that acts of sabotage are already being perpetrated in the United States. I cannot gauge the size of the network of agents; judging by the two cases of Hausberger and Bergmann, however, it seems to be a case of a regular organization.

If my chief task is to prevent by all the means at my disposal the entry of the United States into the war, and to cultivate the few valuable contacts we still have here, it is practically being sabotaged by the activities of the agents of the Wehrmacht described above. These activities are the surest way of bringing America into action on the side of our enemies and of destroying the last vestiges of sympathy for Germany. I cannot discern any political or military advantage in it. The armed forces Attachés share this view absolutely. I

⁴ German Consul General at San Francisco.

would also draw particular attention to General Bötticher's telegram No. 681⁵ of April 18 to the Chief of the General Staff.

THOMSEN⁶

⁵ Not found.

⁶ In a memorandum of May 25, 1940 (1889/425950), Heyden-Rynsch noted the Abwehr's denial that any orders had been given for sabotage actions in the U. S. A. No agent under the name of Bergmann was known.

No. 300

2007/453165-67

Memorandum by Ambassador Ritter

BERLIN, May 22, 1940.

The Russian deliveries are still far from satisfactory, especially in the case of petroleum, in view of the present high consumption in the west. The German Embassy in Moscow has repeatedly and strongly intervened for the speeding up of deliveries.¹ The results are, however, unsatisfactory.

I therefore consider that new and energetic steps are necessary in Moscow. I propose that, to this end, I should go to Moscow for a few days together with Herr Schnurre and Dr. Schlotterer, Ministerialdirigent in the Ministry of Economics. It would guarantee the success of this step if the Foreign Minister decided to address another letter or personal message to M. Stalin as he did once before with such marked success. A draft is appended.

Apart from this immediate reason, I consider it profitable to maintain personal contacts between the Foreign Ministry and Moscow through periodic visits.

The visit could either be treated with all possible reserve by the press or given some emphasis by it, whichever the Foreign Minister decides. I consider the second course to be the right one, especially after the Soviet statement of yesterday on the Soviet-British economic talks.²

To be submitted through the State Secretary to the Foreign Minister for decision.

Ritter

[Enclosure]

BERLIN, May—1940.

DEAR M. STALIN: I addressed a personal message to you in January of this year³ asking you to use your good offices in overcoming the

¹ See document No. 229.

² Reported in DNB No. 143 of May 22 (8838/E615077-81). A translation of this Tass statement is in *Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy*, vol. III, pp. 450-452.

The visit of Ritter to Moscow, as proposed here, did not take place. See document No. 347, and footnotes 1 and 3 thereto.

³ Actually on Feb. 3. See vol. VIII, documents Nos. 594 and 600.

difficulties which at that time stood in the way of an early conclusion of the Economic Agreement between the Soviet Union and Germany. I am grateful to you for the fact that these difficulties were overcome at that time.

I address myself to you again today in the same spirit of cooperation in political and economic spheres. The Soviet Union's deliveries of raw materials and foodstuffs are not taking place at the speed I had expected, and was entitled to expect, according to the agreements and promises which were made. I am not seeking to establish which side is responsible for the delay. That is not important. But what is important is that the brief summer and autumn months should not pass without the easier transport facilities having been exploited to the utmost. In the winter, as the experience of the last winter has shown us, the deliveries will anyhow again fall to lower levels as a result of difficulties of transport. The request which I am addressing to the Soviet Government is therefore to unite with the Reich Government in directing every effort toward increasing transport to Germany to the maximum during the next few months.

This applies first and foremost to the transport of petroleum products. Germany's military activity in the west is at its peak. You will understand that in these circumstances it is especially important to the Reich Government to obtain a maximum of airplane gasoline, automobile gasoline, and other petroleum products in the coming weeks.

In addition, Germany is interested in early deliveries of metals. The present agreements and promises on this are known to you. Deliveries of metals so far do not come up to these promises. The Reich Government would be grateful to the Soviet Government if the latter would give this question also its special attention and support in view of the particular importance of metals in war.*

If I give petroleum products and metals priority at this juncture, this naturally does not mean that Germany does not expect that the the maximum transport facilities will be utilized also for all other raw materials and food stuffs. If all business details are perhaps not yet complete in respect of any particular class of goods this is no reason for transport delays. Business details are not the important

*In a memorandum of May 30 (1228/334510-12), Ritter recorded that in a conversation on that day Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Trade Krutikov had assured him on instructions from his Government that deliveries of copper, nickel, and tin as scheduled under the Economic Agreement for the first 12 months would be made to Germany in the next few days (*in den nächsten Tagen*) and that the Soviet Government had made this decision because it assumed that because of increased military activity in the west these metals were now needed urgently.

Upon being asked whether "in the next few days" meant that these deliveries would be begun "in the next few days" or that the entire amount scheduled would be delivered in that time Krutikov replied the entire amount would be delivered in that time.

thing. We can soon reach agreement over them in a manner fair to both parties.

As is to be understood, and as you will have been satisfactorily informed by reports from People's Commissar Tevosyan on his conversations with the competent German authorities, everything possible is being done on the German side also to meet the Soviet wishes for prompt delivery. You may rest assured that, if you have wishes in this respect, I will approach them in the same helpful spirit as prompts this present letter to you.

I send you my regards, M. Stalin, in the hope that the personal connections established between us last year which have been so profitable for our two countries may in this way be strengthened and maintained.

Yours very sincerely,

Signature of the Foreign Minister

No. 301

4496/E105427

*The Foreign Ministry to the Foreign Department of the High Command of the Wehrmacht*¹

Special Delivery Letter

BERLIN, May 22, 1940.

Pol. IX 842.

The German Embassy in Buenos Aires telegraphs as follows under May 21:²

"The general situation has become extremely tense as a result of the incitements on the radio, especially against the *Quinta Columna*. With a view to preventing further aggravation of the situation, which might jeopardize the continuation of diplomatic relations, it seems to me undesirable, first, for acts of sabotage to be perpetrated on the Argentine and South American mainland or within the 300 mile zone, and second, for our naval forces to engage in any belligerent activities within the 300 mile zone."

The Foreign Ministry would appreciate an opinion.³

By order:
MACIEJEWSKI

¹ This letter, except for the last sentence, was sent for information also to the Intelligence Department of the High Command of the Wehrmacht and to the Naval War Staff.

² Telegram No. 523 (4496/E105426/1).

³ See document No. 483.

No. 302

2332/486626

The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 479 of May 23

Tokyo, May 23, 1940—8:00 a. m.

Received May 23—4:25 p. m.

Pol. VIII 615.

With reference to my telegram No. 474 of May 22.¹

¹ See document No. 280, footnote 5.

The whole press publishes under large headlines yesterday's communiqué by the spokesman of the Foreign Ministry on the declaration of Germany's disinterestedness in the question of the Netherlands East Indies. The newspapers are unanimous in emphasizing that Germany's attitude differs fundamentally from the declarations by England, France, and Holland,² who had stated their agreement with Japan's point of view regarding the maintenance of the status quo in the Netherlands Indies. In contrast to this, Germany's disinterestedness could be regarded as a kind of *carte blanche* for Japan. Germany had thus stated that she would also support Japan in the future. I also refer you to DNB Tokyo 187 and 191.³

OTT

¹ See document No. 261.

² One of these is probably 9901/E693986; the other not found.

No. 303

175/136980-31

Memorandum by an Official of Political Division I

BERLIN, May 23, 1940.

Pol. I M 7330 g.

The High Command of the Wehrmacht stated at noon today that the Rumanian Military Attaché¹ this morning on instructions from his Chief of General Staff² brought up the following for discussion at the Attaché section of the High Command of the Wehrmacht:

1) The Rumanian General Staff had called him up and instructed him to state that Rumania had precise information that Russian troops were being concentrated on the Dniester and in Galicia. There were quite definite reports that these troops were reinforced and were moving forward from the interior. It was feared that an attack on Bessarabia would shortly take place. The Russians were saying that this was a countermeasure to Italian measures to be expected in the Balkans.

2) The Rumanian General Staff refers to the cooperation in Bucharest with Major Wagner³ and the satisfactory cooperation which exists in general and urgently requests information soon as to what the German High Command knows about these measures (figures confirmed) and how we assess them from the military and political point of view. If need be it would also be desirable to ensure redress by means of intervention. Great unrest prevails in Rumania, which is having an adverse effect on the country's internal developments, including deliveries.

3) The Military Attaché conveyed officially that Rumania would accept battle with the Russians; there were sufficient troops as well as fortifications.

¹ Coland Titus Garbea.

² General F. Tenescu.

³ Representative of the Intelligence Department; see document No. 346.

4) The Military Attaché would today at once speak to the Russian Military Attaché,⁴ from whose conversations he knows how much Russia fears the German Wehrmacht. He also intended to speak to the Italian Military Attaché.⁵ The High Command of the Wehrmacht Foreign Department [*Abt. Ausland*] has submitted the matter to the Foreign Ministry, as it is to be regarded as essentially political.⁶

V. D. HEYDEN-RYNSCH

⁴ General Maxim Purkajev.

⁵ Major General Efsio Marras.

⁶ Typewritten marginal note: "To the Foreign Minister's Secretariat with the request for immediate transmittal to the Special Train. A proposal on the position to be taken will follow." For this proposal see document No. 308.

No. 304

897/291894-96

The Ambassador in Chile to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 108 of May 23

SANTIAGO, May 23, 1940—3: 59 p. m.

Received May 24—12: 50 a. m.

Inf. 7390.

With reference to your telegram No. 153 of May 21.¹

A statement on Germany's political aims in America—now lacking—as suggested by the Missions in Rio de Janeiro,² Buenos Aires,³ and Lima,⁴ has also been proposed by pro-German deputies on the occasion of the deliberations in the Congress on neutrality. At that time I replied that we had already made such statements repeatedly. I suggest:

1. To point out the dependence of the Chilean economy on German and other European markets.
2. Exploitation by American capitalists (in Chile, copper).
3. Regarding the political value of being accommodating in the question of the sale of ships,⁵ which is of the greatest importance to Chile, frequent and detailed reports have been made.
4. Greatest possible exploitation of discontent in the oppressed areas under American domination (the Philippines, Puerto Rico).
5. Distribution of literature in the Spanish language which describes the struggle of the American States against the military power of the U. S. A. or its economic imperialism. The same in the sphere of the film. If necessary, producing of such films.

¹ Document No. 287.

² Not found.

³ See document No. 269.

⁴ Not printed (229/154176).

⁵ This refers to a request by Chile to purchase several German ships which were in Chilean ports at the outbreak of the war. The request had been first reported in Santiago telegram No. 111 of Sept. 4, 1939 (197/88217) and since then had frequently figured in communications between the Foreign Ministry and the Embassy in Chile.

6. In view of the distrust of German propaganda and of the difficulties in placing Transocean items, which are known to you from my reports, we shall not be able, in my opinion, to get along without newspapers controlled by us (carefully camouflaged) and also without a movie theater, and a distributing company. For the time being, propaganda to be channeled via Spain as much as possible.

7. Methodically supplying—for distribution—the Embassy with books from the United States of America which can be exploited in any way against American imperialism, as, for instance, Millis, *Road to War*.

8. In all publications slated for distribution in Chile, there should be no attacks of any kind on the fetish "democracy"; rather "imperialism" or "plutocracy." Nor should there be any anti-Semitic remarks, not even the addition "Jew" in mentioning names: Such statements have a provocatory effect here, but on the other hand, numerous Jewish emigrés are making the best propaganda against themselves. The hatred of the Jews is growing. The draft of this telegram will be destroyed after dispatch.

SCHOEN

No. 305

8821/E614081-82

The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

ROME, May 23, 1940—8:50 p. m.

TOP SECRET

Received May 23—10:00 p. m.

No. 955 of May 23

Pol. I M 7680 g.

For the personal attention of the Foreign Minister.

I am reliably informed by an unimpeachable source that on the 16th of this month the American Ambassador in London¹ received telegraphic instructions from Roosevelt to deliver a message of reply to Churchill, which deals as follows with various requests presented by the latter in a personal letter to the President.²

1) It would be possible to hand over 40 or 50 destroyers of the old type, but this is subject to the special approval of Congress which would be difficult to obtain at present. Besides in view of the requirements of national defense it is even doubtful whether they could be spared. In addition, in Roosevelt's view, even given approval on the part of the United States, it would take at least 6 or 7 weeks before the ships could take up active duty under the British flag.

2) As regards supplying the Allied Governments with the most modern type of antiaircraft guns, everything possible was being done.

¹ Joseph P. Kennedy.

² For the text of this exchange between Churchill and Roosevelt, see Winston S. Churchill, *Their Finest Hour*, pp. 24-25.

3) If British Plenipotentiaries received appropriate instructions at once to discuss with the responsible authorities in Washington questions relating to the manning of and supply of ammunition for the antiaircraft guns, America would be ready to give most favorable consideration to the matter, always, of course, with due regard to the requirements of her own national defense.

4) The British Plenipotentiary has already made contact with the responsible American authorities regarding deliveries of steel; the President believes that satisfactory results have already been achieved.

5) The President would examine Churchill's suggestion of a visit by an American squadron to an Irish port.

6) As Churchill knew, the American fleet was now concentrated at Hawaii, where it must in any case remain for the moment.

Finally the President promises to define his attitude toward further questions in the Churchill letter as soon as he is in a position to do so.

I am sending the documentary evidence for this report by the next reliable opportunity.^a

MACKENSEN

^a Not found.

No. 306

205/142329

The Minister in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

SECRET

STOCKHOLM, May 23, 1940—9:45 p. m.

No. 864 of May 23

Received May 24—1:45 a. m.

Secretary General Boheman of the Swedish Foreign Ministry in a conversation with Dankwort on another subject, spoke of the position at Narvik. He remarked that during his visit to London in April he had asked Churchill personally whether England had designs upon the Swedish iron-ore mines or what else the English remaining in this area could mean. Churchill replied that England had no plans of that kind. If Sweden was on England's side, occupation of the iron-ore area by England would not be necessary, if Sweden turned against England, then occupation action would be impossible. This estimate of the Swedish determination for defense entirely agreed with the actual state of affairs. Danger of sabotage against the Porjus power works, which were particularly exposed to danger, scarcely existed, since the security service functioned extremely well. It would of course be best, Boheman continued, if developments led to Germany's leaving the Narvik area one day to Sweden, for it was primarily a zone of Swedish economic interests. This conversational remark was parallel with ideas which have been expressed in officers' circles of the troops which have for a long time been stationed in Norrland. I would also refer to similar utterances by leading Swedish shipowners, about which I reported in my C 1321 on May 22.¹

WIED

¹ Not found.

No. 307

464/226343-44

Circular of the State Secretary

Telegram

Multex No. 68

BERLIN, May 23, 1940.

The joint protest¹ by the American States against our action in Holland and Belgium which has been proposed by Uruguay, has not been forwarded to us either by Panama or by any other State, as is already known to you from the statement by Secretary of State Hull.² The impression created by the resolution of protest makes it, however, seem advisable to show a certain amount of reserve in social intercourse with the American Governments. The Foreign Minister, therefore, requests you in intercourse with the Government at your post to show cool politeness and otherwise to do what is customary but no more.

Identical text to all Missions in the Americas.

Acknowledge receipt.

WEIZSÄCKER

¹ See document No. 270, footnote 1.

² In the files is part of a DNB report, marked May 22 which reads: "Upon further questioning Hull replied that the Pan American Union did not intend to transmit the recently adopted joint protest in a formal note to the Reich Government." (9891/E693595)

No. 308

175/136932

The State Secretary to the Foreign Minister

Teletype

SECRET

BERLIN, May 23, 1940.

No. 48 to the Special Train "Heinrich"

zu Pol. I M 7330 g.¹

Attention Senior Counselor Kordt for the Foreign Minister.

Reliable reports that military measures are being taken by the Russians on the Rumanian-Russian frontier have been increasing in the last few days.² This view is supported both by the Military Attaché in Moscow³ and now by information from the Rumanian General Staff.⁴ See moreover the enclosure to Teleki's letter.⁵

In the opinion of the OKW troop concentrations and military preparations on the Rumanian-Russian frontier should now be regarded as certain.

¹ Pol. I M 7330 g.: Document No. 303.

² Such a report was given in Bucharest telegram No. 761 of May 22 (175/136929).

³ See document No. 286.

⁴ See document No. 303.

⁵ See document No. 284 and footnote 6 thereto.

With reference to the inquiry made by the Rumanian General Staff to the OKH (transmitted by telephone under Pol. I M 7330 g.) the following proposals are made for dealing with the matter while bearing this point in mind.

1) The OKH should make a more reassuring statement to the Rumanian General Staff on our assessment of the situation.

2) The information from the Rumanian General Staff should provide the occasion to raise the question with the Italians. This would naturally be only one part of the conversations on the main objectives of Italian policy in the Balkans.

3) The Ambassador in Moscow should be instructed to raise with the Russians the matter of the military preparations on the Rumanian-Russian frontier with a view to obtaining reassuring promises.*

Submitted herewith to the Foreign Minister.

WEIZSÄCKER

* See document No. 322.

No. 309

371/208170-74

Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department

MOST URGENT

BERLIN, May 23, 1940.

I. Developments in Slovakia have in the last few days taken a turn which has been in the making for some considerable time and which seems to make immediate German intervention advisable.

Sano Mach, who always, and particularly since his last visit to Germany, has been one of our best friends in Slovakia, has not only been removed from his post as head of the Propaganda Office but also from the leadership of the Hlinka Guard.¹ On May 19 eighty leaders of the Hlinka Guard adopted in Ružomberok the unpublished resolution, a copy of which is attached,² in which they unanimously support the policy pursued by Mach of a rapprochement with Germany. It is stated in this resolution that the High Command of the Hlinka Guard had decided "to take such measures as are necessary for removing the dangers." This resolution furnished the last impetus for Mach's dismissal.

Čulen, whose personality is at least very much in question and whose wife is said to be of Jewish origin, has been appointed as his successor in charge of the Propaganda Office. According to reports from Frauenfeld³ (brother of the Gauleiter) who was sent to Bratislava to set up the Propaganda Office, Čulen has continually since May 10 made disparaging remarks about Germany's successes in the

¹ Actually Mach remained as head of the Propaganda Office but gave up leadership of the Hlinka Guard. (Woermann memorandum of May 31: 371/208146-47)

² Not printed (371/208175).

³ Eduard Frauenfeld had arrived in Bratislava on March 13. His periodic reports to the Foreign Ministry are filed on serial 3011.

west and has stated that he is convinced of England's final victory. The leadership of the Hlinka Guard has been taken over by Galan who is likewise a tool of Kirschbaum, the Secretary General of the Hlinka Guard, the latter being also unfavorably disposed toward Germany.

That Durčanský is not pro-German has long been known. Various quarters are in possession of incriminating material against him which is being summarized here and will be submitted.⁴

II. The change of policy in Slovakia means a move away from Germany, at least the pursuit of a policy which does not align itself with Germany but wants to leave open all possibilities. There are indications which are brought to our attention time and again, particularly from the Hungarian side, that certain elements in Slovakia are acting in concert with the Soviet Union.⁵ Moreover, it is said that Durčanský and his agents are collaborating with Beneš. Durčanský and Mach are equally disliked in Hungary. Mach has publicly laid himself more open with respect to Hungary than has Durčanský, and it has even been suggested that his removal might be a concession to Hungary. In the circumstances, however, this is not to be assumed.

III. According to reports, the matter has already been brought to the notice of Reichsleiter Bormann through the Gauleitung of Lower Danube [*Niederdonau*] as being particularly urgent, and he is said to have the intention of making as soon as possible a report to the Führer on the state of affairs in Slovakia and the necessity for immediate redress.

IV. The deterioration in the situation has been constantly watched here. It was intended to bring about a decision on the relevant questions during the contemplated visits of Tiso and Tuka, but since the reception of one of these persons is out of question for the immediate future, the developments of the last few days make an early intervention necessary.

V. It is proposed, therefore, that immediate action be taken which should have the following points as its aim:

a) The rehabilitation of Mach which could be achieved either by reinstating him in his former functions or, better still, by appointing him Minister of the Interior. Durčanský is at present both the Minister of the Interior and the Foreign Minister and has therefore a position of great power.

⁴ A detailed report of this was sent to the Foreign Ministry by the Security Police and SD on June 6 (3011/588218-32). According to a Woermann memorandum of June 10, it was to be submitted to Ribbentrop by Killinger, together with other material (371/208122).

⁵ Such evidence was presented, for instance, in the memorandum on the Pan-Slavist danger which was enclosed with Teleki's letter to Hitler of May 20. See document No. 284.

b) The removal of Durčanský which need not be brought about absolutely at once and simultaneously with Mach's rehabilitation but should be ensured as the final aim.

c) The removal of other anti-German, particularly also Jewish, elements within Slovakia as well as in the Slovak Foreign Service.

d) In return a declaration that Germany will continue to abide by the Treaty of Protection⁶ and that all rumors of handing over Slovakia to Hungary or of a division between Germany and Hungary were pure invention.

It is further proposed to have these demands put forward in Bratislava to Tiso and Tuka by a special delegate who would in this connection either be speaking in the name of the Reich Foreign Minister or in the name of the Führer.

The persons to be considered for such a task are :

State Secretary Keppler, or
Under State Secretary Habicht, or
Governor Wächter, at present in Kraków.

These three persons are well acquainted with conditions inside Slovakia.

It would be best if the person to be appointed, together with Minister Barnard, would call on the Reich Foreign Minister himself before carrying out his commission.⁷

For the Foreign Minister
through the State Secretary :⁸

WOERMANN

⁶ See vol. VI, document No. 40.

⁷ Woermann, discussing the situation with Černák, the Slovak Minister, on May 25, said that Mach's resignation might be interpreted as an anti-German move in connection with a reshuffling of the Cabinet in a direction hostile to Germany. Woermann urged Černák to see that no new faits accomplis were created within the next few days (Woermann memorandum: 371/208164). The same day Woermann also instructed Bernard by telephone (371/208161) to prevent new faits accomplis, particularly the resignation of Tuka which was threatening, according to Bratislava telegram No. 164 of May 24 (371/208165-66).

⁸ See document No. 336.

No. 310

91/100208-09 ;
91/100211-12

The Minister in Eire to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram¹

SECRET

No. 261 of May 23

DUBLIN, May 23, 1940.

Received May 24—3:05 p. m.

The feeling here under the influence of our march into Belgium and Holland, except for outspoken Irish nationalist elements, has noticeably deteriorated at present, especially in Church circles, which even without this have been strongly influenced against Germany by the

¹ This telegram was transmitted in several sections.

recent attitude of the Pope, at least among the higher clergy. The impact of our victories has (group garbled) as far as I could observe, given Irish nationalism up to the present no real impetus.

I have found no indication of any imminent English attack on Ireland. I assume that the serious difficulties to be expected here in the case of an attack and the political reaction in the U.S.A. are particularly feared by England at present and that therefore only in an emergency, e. g., suspicion of being forestalled by Germany, would she attack.

De Valera, in my judgment, is still the only recognized political leader of larger stature who has the nationalists firmly in hand. He will maintain the line of friendly understanding with England as far as it is at all possible, on account of geographical and economic dependence, which will continue even in the event of England's defeat, as well as his democratic principles, even in face of the threatening danger of Ireland becoming involved in war. Voluntary political concessions which would violate neutrality thus far appear unlikely. In the case of an attack by England, de Valera would indeed hardly be able to do other than to offer resistance by a call for national unity. The strength of the resistance would be largely determined by the strength of the reaction in the Irish nationalist group.

On² the other hand he would not call on the hitherto limited circles of Irish nationalists who hope for German assistance, but would rather attempt to localize the conflict and set all wheels in motion in the U.S.A. Wide circles of the populace and particularly the Church would support him in this resistance. The danger of internal disturbances on the part of the I[rish] R[epublican] A[rmy], which might obtain a large increase in members, would not be sufficient against the strong resistance of de Valera.

Continuation follows.³

Any German assistance, especially a simultaneous proclamation of the liberation of Northern Ireland as a German war aim, a matter in which in itself there is, in my opinion, no German interest, would probably give the anti-English nationalist movement a powerful impetus.

At the present time the possibility of German intervention in Ireland before Britain intervenes is widely discussed here. Such action would in my opinion, and possibly even with the best political-diplomatic preparations, meet with strong resistance which de Valera would organize with spontaneous (group missing) wide masses of the people. I believe that he would then, supported by automatically forthcoming English assistance, proceed ruthlessly against the

² The paragraph beginning here was received May 24, 9:25 p.m.

³ The continuation of this telegram, marked "Urgent," was sent on May 25, and received at 11:30 a.m. on that day.

opposing radical nationalists. I would further expect, in such a case, strong reaction in the U.S.A. including the majority of the Irish element there.

In the present situation, there must, in my opinion, also be borne in mind the possibility that de Valera, exploiting England's dangerous position, will take up again more strongly the realization of his main aim, namely the return of Northern Ireland. He has been working in the U.S.A. for a long time for support to this end. Pressure on England might be thought of in the first place as being exercised in such a way that he would point out to the English that there was again a great danger in Ireland becoming involved in the war as long as no decisive step has been taken in settling the Northern Ireland question. I even think that it might be conceivable that the French Government could be interested. Any successes would greatly strengthen de Valera's position in the case of future difficulties, and could strongly, and perhaps decisively, influence conditions in England's favor and probably bring England political advantage in the U.S.A., which perhaps has a hand in the game. I shall report again if there are concrete signs of such a development. Up to the present there are only a few facts which call for increased attention.

In the Irish Army, which is quite likely permeated with elements in close contact with the I.R.A.—as is said to be the case especially among the volunteers—feelings are clearly divided. I recently heard from a reliable source that the Army, together with the nationalist population, would be prepared to carry on strong resistance in the form of guerilla warfare against an English attack. I assume at the same time, however, especially in the case of a German intervention in advance of one by England, that, apart from sections of the volunteers, it would be on the whole, a reliable tool in the hand of the Government and would obey its orders.

HEMPER

No. 311

19/12111-14

The Embassy in the United States to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

URGENT

TOP SECRET

No. 999 of May 23

WASHINGTON, May 24, 1940—1:52 a. m.

Received May 24—8:30 p. m.

For 1) Chief of the Army General Staff; 2) Chief of the Luftwaffe General Staff.

Evaluation of the military-political situation in the United States up till noon on May 23.

1) The (group garbled) President's rearmament message¹ and Lindbergh's statement² have led to the realization of the United States' inadequate military preparations. With this, the forces opposing the United States' entry into the war have been strengthened, especially since leading the nation without decisive influence of the armed forces is no longer conceivable. In coming decisions the representatives of the General Staff will influence the President toward adopting an independent attitude with respect to the Allies, as long as they think that Germany has no plans up her sleeve against the United States. Freemasons and Jews are no longer the sole rulers in the executive branch of the United States. They tried by mean tricks and spitefulness to belittle Lindbergh, the spokesman for the real America, and have thus succeeded in getting his views discussed everywhere today.

The assumption that Roosevelt will drag his country into the war, should the Anglo-French coalition prove too weak, is not borne out by the course of events. I have contested the idea for years, and I say again that the United States will only enter a war, or rather that we could only lose the confidence and understanding of the circles who will play an important part in the developments in the future, in particular also during the years following the conclusion of peace, if the Americans feel themselves attacked.

Any activity by agents which is in any way directed against the interests of the United States would be interpreted as such an attack, and would destroy outright all hope of recapturing the confidence of those circles which are indispensable to us now and in future. And the activities directed against the United States by German agents in Mexico, which are now being hinted at in the press, could probably not do much harm to the United States, but would greatly endanger German interests. I have to report these things once more because my attention has just been drawn to these points in all seriousness by a prominent general who has helped me for years, and even before that it was pointed out to me by the most competent authorities that the United States would never have entered the war in 1917 had not German espionage and sabotage engendered mistrust and hatred against Germany among the people.

In the United States personal contacts and frankness are the deciding factors. On this basis alone I have, during the years preceding the notorious spy trial of 1938,³ with the approval of American official quarters arranged for hundreds of visits by German representatives of the Luftwaffe and the aircraft industry, even to the most secret establishments, and I have thereby carried out in every detail

¹ See document No. 253, footnote 1.

² The *New York Times* of May 20, 1940, contains an account of the speech by Col. Charles A. Lindbergh to which reference is apparently made here.

³ See document No. 289, footnote 3.

the orders of the Commander in Chief of the Luftwaffe, and at the same time formed numerous contacts of a scientific and personal nature, and furthermore, through my contacts and not through secret channels, I have introduced scientists and engineers sent here by the late General Becker ' to all branches of industry and factories, even to secret processes developed by the American Army. The old relationship of trust was, to a certain extent, built up again after 1938. Thanks to my connections I have always sent exhaustive reports, of which, up till now, not one has contained an error of any importance. On my visits to Germany in 1936 and 1937 I personally uttered repeated warnings and I now do so again. The Jews and Freemasons who exploited the 1938 trial against Germany are again at work to create an incident with which to put into Roosevelt's hands the implements for his re-election and for the destruction of the influence of that American element which is so valuable to us.

2) My reports have repeatedly shown how this American element is helping us and has stood by us in recent months. What military writers particularly the admirers of German aviation and the friends of General Udet ' (Al Williams ') say, and what Lindbergh proclaims with great courage, is certainly the highest and most effective form of propaganda. I will only mention the fact that Al Williams has since shattered the English propaganda campaign and shaken English prestige, and that Baldwin ' is just now opposing the propaganda to the effect that Germany will be defeated by lack of motor fuel. The slightest sign of activity on the part of German agents would dash the weapons from the hands of these men.

3) It is the same as regards relations with the American Army. The developments of the last few days are welcomed because they have opened the eyes of the people to the significance of the armed forces and have pushed the influence of the politicians into the background. For decades the Army has suffered incredible pettiness and absurd lack of freedom under democratic supervision. It is just as if a fresh breeze of the German spirit were blowing across to America from the battlefields of northern France and Belgium.

4) People are already beginning to become resigned to the idea of the defeat of France and the overthrow of England, perhaps even to the destruction of the English Empire. It is true that the propagandists are suggesting in the newspapers that, in certain circumstances, an ambitious Germany might seize the English fleet and

' General of Artillery Becker, Chief of the Ordnance Department (*Waffenamt*) of the Army High Command, 1938-39.

' General of Aviation Ernst Udet, Director General of Air Force Equipment (*Generalluftzeugmeister*), Feb. 4, 1938-Nov. 17, 1941.

' Alford J. Williams, Jr., writer on aviation for the Scripps-Howard newspaper group and former naval aviator.

' Hanson W. Baldwin, military and naval correspondent of the *New York Times*.

become a very unpleasant factor in the Atlantic Ocean for the United States. On the other hand those circles with economic interests are taking the consequences of a German victory into account in order to save what they can out of the situation for the United States, or to make the best of it in some other way. Roosevelt is said to have already commissioned his top-level economic advisors to work out economic plans which would take into consideration a possible German victory. If the dangers to their confidence, which I have hinted at, are avoided by us, I foresee that in the post-war period too those circles that for years have championed the cause of Germany will gain the upper hand. Should an incident occur they will be deprived of their influence for years and, in proportion, the influence of Freemasons and Jews will increase. That is, after all, the American mentality.

BÖTTICHER
RESENBERG

No. 312

8589/E802718-15

Führer's Directive

CHEFSACHE

HEADQUARTERS, May 24, 1940.

TOP SECRET MILITARY

The Führer and Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht
WFA/Abt. L Nr. 33 028/40 g.K.Chefs.

By officer only

DIRECTIVE No. 13¹

1. The next aim of the operations is the destruction of the French, English, and Belgian forces which have been encircled in Artois and in Flanders through a concentric attack by our northern wing and the speedy occupation and securing of the Channel coast there.

It will be the mission of the Luftwaffe to break all resistance by the encircled forces of the enemy, prevent the escape of the English forces across the Channel and secure the south flank of Army Group A.

The fight against the enemy air forces is to be continued at every favorable opportunity.

2. The operation of the Army to destroy the enemy forces in France, which is to follow as quickly as possible, is to be prepared in three phases.

1st Phase: A thrust between the sea and the Oise to the Lower Seine below Paris with the object of accompanying and protecting the later main operation with weak forces on the right flank.

If the situation and the available reserves allow, efforts are to be made even before the conclusion of the battles in Artois and in Flanders to take possession of the territory between the Somme and

¹ Directive No. 12 has not been found.

the Oise by a concentric attack in the direction of Montdidier and thereby prepare and facilitate the later thrust to the Lower Seine.

2nd Phase: An attack with the bulk of the Army, including strong armored and motorized forces in a southeasterly direction past Reims on both sides with the object of defeating the bulk of the French Army in the triangle Paris-Metz-Belfort and of bringing about the collapse of the Maginot Line.

3rd Phase: A supplementing of this main operation at the appropriate time, by a secondary operation with weaker forces which will break through the Maginot Line at its weakest point between St. Avold and Sarreguemines in the direction of Nancy-Lunéville.

In addition, depending on the development of the situation, an attack across the upper Rhine may be planned provided that not more than 8 to 10 divisions are to be committed in it.

3. *The mission of the Luftwaffe.*

(a) Independent of the operations in France, the Luftwaffe—as soon as sufficient forces are at its disposal—will be given complete freedom to carry on the fight against the English homeland. It is to be opened with a devastating attack in reprisal for the English attacks against the Ruhr area.

Targets for attacks will be determined by the Commander in Chief of the Luftwaffe according to the principles contained in Directive No. 9² and the supplements thereto which will be issued by OKW. The date and the proposed plan of operations are to be reported to me.

The fight against the English homeland is to continue even after the beginning of the Army's operations.

(b) With the beginning of the main operation of the Army in the direction of Reims, it will be the task of the Luftwaffe, in addition to maintaining air superiority, to give direct support to the attack, to destroy newly arriving enemy formations, to prevent regrouping, and in particular to secure the west flank of the offensive front.

As far as necessary, cooperation is to be given in the break through the Maginot Line.

(c) Further, the High Command of the Luftwaffe will consider by what means the air defense can be strengthened in areas which at present are being most heavily attacked by the enemy, through the use of additional forces from areas which previously have been less endangered.

In so far as the interests of the Navy are affected hereby, the Commander in Chief of the Navy will participate.

4. *Missions of the Navy.*

Previous restricting regulations are rescinded, and the Navy will be given complete operational freedom in the waters around England and off the French coast.

² Vol. VIII, document No. 399. A supplement to Directive No. 9, based on the new situation following the occupation of Norway and Holland and in anticipation of the conclusion of operations in Belgium and Northern France, was issued by OKW on May 26; not printed (8589/E602719-21).

The Commander in Chief of the Navy will submit a proposal for delimiting the sea areas in which the combat measures permitted for the blockade may be applied.

I reserve to myself the decision as to whether and in what form a public announcement of the blockade shall be made.

5. I request the Commanders in Chief to submit to me orally or in writing their plans based upon this directive.

ADOLF HITLER

No. 313

413/215682-84

Memorandum by an Official of the Economic Policy Department

BERLIN, May 25, 1940.

W II 3571.

Subject: Discussion at the Foreign Ministry on May 24, 1940, on economic questions arising from the occupation of Holland.

On May 24 Minister Clodius convened a meeting at the Foreign Ministry in order to afford Staatsrat Wohlthat the opportunity for a discussion with the competent economic departments before his first visit to the Netherlands in his capacity as Bank Commissioner in the Netherlands.

Those present were: Consul General Benzler, Amsterdam; Ministerialdirektor Walter, Reich Ministry for Food and Agriculture, Chairman of the Government Committee for the Netherlands; Ministerialrat Roth, Ministry of Economics; Assessor Scheidtmann, Ministry of Economics; Director Rex, Reichsbank; Senior Counselor Sabath, Foreign Ministry; Counselor of Legation Freiherr von Maltzan, Foreign Ministry; Temporary Minister Bene, Milan, as future representative of the Foreign Ministry with Reichskommissar Seyss-Inquart.

Herr Walter reported on the state of economic relations with Holland and their probable development in the immediate future. At present clearing payments are balanced. With the new situation imports from Holland will probably rise considerably while our exports will fall. Very soon therefore the question of dates of payment will arise in Holland, if we keep to the clearing agreement. The Dutch will have to see to it that their exporters receive their money. The amounts necessary for this must be advanced by the state in the Netherlands. This financing will require at least 100 million Dutch guilders, i. e., the amount which the additional imports will probably reach during the current year (75 million for agriculture, the balance for industry). Normally imports amount to about 200 million RM yearly.

Up till now about 60 million RM have been transferred yearly in capital transactions. The transfer account was kept supplied through orders from the Dutch public authorities. As reconstruction in the Netherlands should bring large orders, and, on the other hand, transfers can be canceled or reduced, further amounts for the payment of imports would become available here.

Herr Benzler amplified Herr Walter's statements. He reported that the Dutch officials for economic affairs were ready to cooperate with us. M. Hirschfeld, who was still a vital asset for us, had already declared his readiness also to finance Dutch exports to Germany in the event that the clearing arrangement continues.

Herr Wohlthat explained his mission and his plans. While the military authorities (Lieutenant Colonel Veltjens) had the task of securing supplies of strategic raw materials such as petroleum, tin, rubber, regardless of payment and Dutch essential industrial requirements, he was commissioned by Field Marshal Göring and Reich Minister Funk to deal with questions of controlling currency and industry with a view to reviving or maintaining the Dutch national economy, taking into account the particular characteristics of the people, the special economic structure of the country and its unique international ramifications. So far no decisions have been taken by any side. His visit was for the purpose of establishing the first contact with influential Dutch industrialists and of examining the situation on the spot, after which he would return immediately in order to report to the Field Marshal. He mentioned the following points in particular:

- 1) Conversations with the president of the Nederlandsche Bank and the Bank of the Netherlands Indies; investigation of the relations of private banks with Germany and with other countries;
- 2) Cover for the Dutch guilder (up to now almost 100 percent gold), regulation of note circulation, laying-down of a definite ratio between the Dutch guilder and the RM, restrictions on payments. Aim: to stabilize the Dutch guilder and maintain the people's confidence in the currency.
- 3) The question of the Dutch guilder abroad and the foreign exchange balances in Netherlands banks.
- 4) Circulation or withdrawal of the occupation-marks [*Reichskredit-Kassenscheine*] and their rate of exchange.
- 5) The question of the price level, cost of living, possible credit expansion through the projected financing of exports (possible bridging over by drawing on the Tredefina-Kredit).
- 6) Transfer abroad of the head offices of Dutch companies; compulsory depositing of the shares of such companies is being considered.

Herr Clodius summarized the result as follows: There were two courses:

- 1) To keep the Dutch economic structure intact, to maintain the currency, to permit the national economy to function independently and in this way to turn the Dutch economy to our advantage. Various

degrees of this are, of course, conceivable, but first and foremost the exigencies of the German war economy must be satisfied. Furthermore, efforts must be made through the Dutch firms to gain influence in their subsidiary companies in other countries (Rumania, petroleum).

2) Alternatively, to drain off raw materials and foodstuffs to the greatest possible extent, without regard for the survival of Dutch national economy or the possible consequences which might ensue—such as unemployment—leaving the setting up of a new order until after the conclusion of peace.

Herr Clodius put on record that all those present declared themselves in favor of the first course, also on behalf of the departments they represented.

Herr Bene and Herr Benzler, speaking for themselves, also expressed approval of this view.

In conclusion, Herr Wohlthat expressed the wish that the special bodies who were fully experienced in the work of the previously existing Government committees, should get together in The Hague as soon as possible to lay down the framework of the future economic structure.

VON MALTZAN

No. 314

91/100214-15

The Minister in Eire to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

TOP SECRET

No. 269 of May 24

DUBLIN, May 24, 1940.

Received May 25.

The Irish radio this evening gave a detailed account of the arrest of the Irishman, Held. In the search of the house, plans of Irish ports and defense establishments, transmitters, \$20,000, a secret code, a parachute of unknown type, insignia of the German Luftwaffe, German World War decorations, a military cap, and a black tie of German origin were said to have been found in the room occupied by the German, Brandy. He had come on Sunday and asked for lodging. According to Held he disappeared shortly before the house search. Brandy was a relative of a deceased German of the same name who formerly lived here. I note that the latter is said to have been suspected of espionage. I warned about Held in telegram No. 181 of April 1.¹ Since he collaborated with the provocateur Hamilton, there is a possibility of English provocation instigated through Hamilton, which might also be aimed at me, in order to destroy Irish neutrality. I consider the following conjecture conceivable and will use it in so

¹ Not found.

far as it is possible and advisable: The supposed Brandy is a British agent and was sent to the credulous Held, whom the Englishman knows through Hamilton. Held, who is in fact pro-German, received Brandy. Brandy disappeared after leaving the incriminating material. The English also know about W. D.² Cf. my telegram No. 245 of May 18.³ They then set the police on Held. It is an act of vengeance by Hamilton against me and Held. I also wish to point out that the daughter, Edith, together with the late Brandy mentioned above, was poisoned a year ago and taken unconscious to the hospital; presumably it was an attempt at suicide on account of spurned love for the Englishman. She then went to Germany. The first hearing will be on May 31. The English radio has, surprisingly, not said anything so far. Until the matter becomes somewhat clearer I think it would be advisable for the time being not to discuss it on the German radio.⁴

In the visit to Boland which is planned for tomorrow I shall express suspicion of renewed provocation by the English (calling attention to previous provocation by Hamilton) and, if necessary, I shall express the firm expectation of a satisfactory attitude on the part of the Irish Government. I note that in the night before May 24 there were numerous house searches also among Germans.

I request very detailed instructions as soon as possible in order that I may regulate my attitude accordingly.⁵

HEMPEL

² From Hempel's telegram No. 224 of May 6 the initials would appear to refer to a case involving a certain Weber concerning which the Minister had been negotiating (91/100188).

³ Not found.

⁴ In telegram No. 271 of May 25 Hempel further stated: "In view of the Held affair I would recommend that mention of the question of Northern Ireland on the radio be postponed for the time being or be considerably toned down." (91/100215)

⁵ Hempel reported further in telegram No. 272 of May 25: "The wife of Stuart, lecturer at the University of Berlin, has been arrested under strong suspicion of complicity in the concealment of Brandy. The affair has thereby turned unmistakably against us and this upsets all pretexts of English intrigues. Today's conversation with Boland revealed a most serious view, especially of the support of subversive activity against the Irish Government. I now fear a critical undermining of our position here, which is indicated among other things by an unsparing, though objective, publication of all details. Since Stuart had friendly relations with us—as he also had with other Irish families, however, which are by no means suspect—my personal position is also seriously involved. I fear indiscreet statements in Stuart's letters. Exploitation in England and the U. S. A. is inevitable. Brandy has apparently not been apprehended as yet." (91/100217)

For reference to the activity of Francis Stuart in Germany, see vol. VIII, document No. 465, footnote 4.

The Foreign Ministry's reply to Hempel's telegrams Nos. 269 and 272 is document No. 361.

No. 315

486/231882

The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

URGENT

MADRID, May 25, 1940.

SECRET

Received May 25—2:45 a. m.

No. 1565 of May 24

The Spanish Foreign Minister communicated to me the contents of a telegram from the Spanish Ambassador in Paris in which the latter reports a conversation with Marshal Pétain.

When the Ambassador pointed out the very serious statements of the French Premier which are known to you,¹ the Marshal replied that this description was true and the situation was extremely grave; a month ago there might still have been the possibility of a settlement (*arrangement*).

When the Ambassador objected that P. "embodying the moral power of France," could perhaps still find a solution if he were the leader of France, the Marshal said that he did not think "that the Führer would ever listen to his voice"; this would be the case only in the United States.

The Foreign Minister added that on Franco's instructions he had wished to inform me at once of this report from the Spanish Ambassador in Paris in case the German Government was at all interested in establishing contact with Pétain in this way.²

STOHRER

¹ This may be a reference to Reynaud's address in the Senate on May 21 on the military situation. Text in translation in *Keessing's Contemporary Archives, 1937-1940*, pp. 4062-63.

² No reply to this telegram has been found.

No. 316

175/136934-37

The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

BUCHAREST, May 25, 1940—10:30 p. m.

No. 790 of May 25

Received May 26—6:30 a. m.

With reference to my telegram No. 751 of May 20.¹

The Court Minister asked me to call on him. Iron Guard member Sima had stated during the interrogation that a high official in the

¹ Not printed (175/136922-23). It reported that Horia Sima and another Iron Guard member had been arrested on Rumanian territory after having slipped out of Germany with forged passports and were being charged with planning terroristic acts. Gafencu and Urdareanu had asked that Germany put a stop to abuse of the right of asylum by the Iron Guard.

close entourage of the Reich Foreign Minister had told him this: Germany had no confidence in Rumanian policy of neutrality; there might be a change any day; therefore he should set out [*losfahren*] with Iron Guard members to commit acts of violence in Rumania, where he would find 60 men with all that is necessary, in order to provoke disorder.

The protocol of the interrogation which the Court Minister had in front of him was brief, and allegedly it concluded with the remark that this was only the beginning of Sima's statement and that they would get out of him still more.

Then the Court Minister spoke in the most agitated manner about the King's willingness for close cooperation with Germany which already was producing results in the economic sphere; he did not understand what interest Germany could have today in eliminating the King and himself.

To my question, whether he actually believed what the police quoted here from an alleged interrogation of Sima, since obviously these were, after all, unheard of accusations against the Reich Government and the Foreign Minister, Urdareanu replied that he also had not wanted to believe it at first but that they had new proofs since yesterday: From a tin receptacle he took a submachine gun; 30 of these were said to have been found in a tank car, built in. He showed me a sketch of how they had been built in and said reproachfully that this tank car was discovered on a railway track that belonged to the German refinery Petrolblock. All this as well as the arrival of two more Guard members from Germany who had also been arrested indicated a plan, conceived on a large scale. For the sake of its good relations with Germany, the Rumanian Government did not want to exploit this matter any further, for I could surely visualize how public opinion and the world press would get excited [*hochgehen würden*] if anything became known about these incidents. In the sharpest manner, I replied to the Court Minister that I considered completely false the connection which he was establishing between the arrival of the Guard members and the discovery of the arms. Did he actually establish when the tank cars had arrived, and whether it was really a matter of German arms? He claimed that he had not extended the investigation into this in order to keep the secret. I characterized his assumptions as incorrect, and his conclusions therefore as false, too. As for public opinion, it was already unfavorable to us to such an extent, due partly to the talking of officers and officials (I cited two incidents in this connection), that the publicizing of occurrences which were not true could only result in further tension, which Rumania ought to avoid in her own interest. The Court Minister repeated that the Government did not intend to publicize the occurrences. He said we

had promised the Rumanian Government at the time to grant asylum to Iron Guard refugees only on the condition that the latter would not undertake anything against the friendly Rumanian State.² The Iron Guard members had now forfeited this [asylum] and he was asking us again, either to expel the Iron Guard members or to take care of them in some other way.

I promised him to transmit his request to my Government. Moreover, I would inquire about the origin of the arms, though having but little hope of finding out anything more specific.

From the conversation with the Court Minister emerges the concern felt by him and the King with respect to a new action of the Iron Guard. He admitted that during the last few days when it became known that an action was imminent, a large number of arrests had taken place in the country. "We must defend ourselves," said the Court Minister, "but we do not understand Germany with whom we want to cooperate more than ever." Thus, he clings to the idea that it was we who brought Sima here.

II. Gafencu asked me to see him today and took up the same topic. I immediately expressed my indignation at the fact that they wanted to involve the Foreign Minister in such matters. As was well known, party and state in Germany would not use such methods of warfare even if it was intended to take action against Rumania; I had seen no indications of any such intentions anyway. Thereupon Gafencu expressed his astonishment over the arms shipment. I replied that I had made inquiries in the meantime. The representative of the German intelligence who cooperated with the Chief of the Rumanian Secret Service was not able to tell the latter any more than that the arms had been brought in for the protection of the German petroleum enterprises, probably a month ago, when there was still a threat of English sabotage acts in the petroleum region. Thus, on Germany's part it was an act of defense and not intended sabotage, assuming that the arms originated with us at all, which was not even yet established. Gafencu continued: He knew Germany and the Führer, and he knew that the revolution which Germany had experienced and which was now shaping a new Europe could not bypass Rumania without leaving some traces. For a time he had hoped that Rumania would have to make her contribution only at the conclusion of peace. He had now the impression that Rumania would be brought into the picture even earlier. With reference to the view which he had expressed to me earlier (see report g 42/40 of May 23 ³), he was requesting us once more to give a hint as to the policy which Rumania ought to pursue toward Soviet Russia, and how she could establish closer contact with us in general. In this connection he remarked that the King

² See vol. VIII, document No. 120.

³ Not found.

was a person who wanted the best for the country and who was absolutely ready to cooperate in the problems of the future according to our ideas. We should really make a reply as to how this could be done. We had to realize that a Russian war would impede Rumanian and Russian petroleum deliveries, if it did not make them impossible altogether. Gafencu's great seriousness and concern was noticeable to me.

When I told him that rumors had reached me to the effect that the King had expressed in Paris his sympathy and regret that he was unable to help the French, and that the King was in continuous communication with Paris in general, Gafencu replied that this was highly improbable, because it differed completely from the King's policy, emphasized by him.

I request telegraphic instructions for the guidance of my conversation in the question of the members of the Iron Guard.⁴

FABRICIUS

⁴ On May 27 Weizsäcker in a teletype for the Foreign Minister commented on this Bucharest telegram, saying that no officials of the Foreign Ministry had been in contact with Iron Guard members in Germany and that other German personalities and organizations concerned had also denied the existence of such contacts. Weizsäcker then suggested that Fabricius be instructed to convey this information to the Rumanian Government and to express Germany's indignation over these charges (175/136938-39). Such instructions have not been found. Cf. document No. 346.

No. 317

F12/235-241

Adolf Hitler to Benito Mussolini

THE FÜHRER'S HEADQUARTERS.

May 25, 1940.

DUCE: Days of great historic moment have passed since my last letter to you.¹ I have not written to you about this yet since such weighty decisions and measures, as have now become possible, always ran the risk of setbacks. But this danger has now definitely passed. The numbers of the infantry units pouring in through the breaches made by the armored and motorized divisions are now so great—and are increasing hourly—that any attempt to bring about a turn of fate would only lead to further and even greater setbacks for the English and French commands. Before I gave the order for the final breakthrough toward the Channel, I was of the opinion that even at the risk of the evacuation or withdrawal of some Anglo-French forces there would nevertheless have to be a lull in our advance. In the 2 days thus gained, we succeeded in repairing the roads, which were in part terribly devastated, to such an extent that thanks to the formation of large transport groups there is no more fear of any

¹ See document No. 272.

supply difficulties. Similarly, the infantry divisions which were striving onward in forced marches were now able to link up again with the armored and motorized units which were surging forward. The military dilettantes of the press of our Western Powers of course saw this at once as a slackening in German pressure. Duce, only a fraction of the number of German infantry divisions has so far made contact with the enemy. Of the armored units 3 divisions have so far only had slight skirmishes, 2 further armored divisions have as yet had virtually no contact with the enemy. Of the motorized divisions a number of crack units have also made no contact with the enemy. They will not be sent into action until today or tomorrow. Furthermore, the success gained has justified the measures which have been taken. At the moment the front toward the south is very strongly reinforced while in the north we have already advanced beyond Calais. Since this morning all the armies are preparing to attack again an enemy whose powers of resistance are beginning to wane. In the zone now encircled there are

- 1) 20 Belgian divisions or the remnants of them,
- 2) 13-14 British divisions, or, likewise, the remnants of them,
- 3) At least 28 French first-line divisions and at least 10, but probably more, French reserve divisions. That is to say, therefore, the combined Dutch, Belgian, French, and English forces will in a few days have lost about 60 percent of their total strength. Of the British troops, there can scarcely be two divisions left on the Continent, apart from badly trained reserves south of the Zone surrounded by us. Of the French, there are at the most 60, a large proportion of which however, have already been heavily hit. A German offensive front of about 165 divisions will shortly be arrayed against this maximum of 60 divisions which France and England still possess at the moment, part of which is tied down on the old front either on the Maginot Line or in the Alps.

Air superiority has been completely achieved in so far as the French air force is concerned; as regards the English air force, it is so far secured that protection of the Continent against English air attacks is guaranteed at all times.

As for the morale of our enemies, Duce, the following may be said:

- 1) The Dutch: They offered much stronger resistance than we first expected. Many of their units fought very bravely. However, they had not the appropriate training or any experience of war. Thus they could generally be overcome by German forces which were often numerically greatly inferior.
- 2) Belgium: The Belgian soldier on the whole also fought very bravely. His experience of war is to be rated as considerably greater than that of the Dutch. At the start his tenacity was amazing. It is now failing visibly, now that he realizes that his function is essentially to cover, if at all possible, the English withdrawal.
- 3) The English soldier: The English soldier has the qualities which were typical of him during the World War. Very brave and dogged

in defense, clumsy in attack, miserably led. Arms and equipment are first rate, the organization of the whole is bad.

4) The Frenchman: Very marked differences become apparent in the French when their military ability is evaluated. There are very bad units side by side with excellent ones. On the whole the difference in quality between the active and nonactive divisions is extraordinarily noticeable. Many of the active units have fought desperately, the reserve units are for the most part obviously not equal to the impact of battle on morale. For the French, just as for the Dutch and Belgians, there is of course in addition the realization that they are fighting to no purpose for objectives which have hardly anything in common with their own real interests. In the same way, their morale was very adversely affected by experiencing that wherever possible the English were striving in the main to spare their own units, preferring to leave critical spots to their allies.

As far as the German armed forces are concerned, Duce, the successes gained justify the favorable opinion I have always held of them. This applies in striking fashion to our Luftwaffe, to the excellent armored units, but especially to a valiant and always reliable infantry. The artillery, too, has fulfilled all expectations.

The German Army and the German Luftwaffe are emerging from this fighting completely unimpaired as regards material and personnel. They have, however, been enriched by additional experience and an extraordinarily strong feeling of self-confidence.

In this connection I should like to point out that a small band of heroes has been fighting in Narvik since April 9 under the most difficult conditions in snow and ice and on the most meager rations and in addition hampered by being forced to go carefully with every cartridge against a vastly superior enemy. But we have now succeeded in pushing forward the construction of our northern advanced air bases to such an extent that it will shortly be possible to help this valiant little band of warriors by means of uninterrupted air attacks. We intend to see that these fiords gradually become more and more a graveyard for British ships. On land, too, these men will then receive support from the most modern dive bombers.

It is not possible to say how long Allied resistance will last in the encircled zone. The mass of our heavy and heaviest artillery which has been brought up, the guarantee of abundant supplies of ammunition, and also the employment of fresh infantry divisions will now permit us to proceed with brutal force on this front. It will probably collapse in a few days under the weight of the attacks now beginning.

General Weygand² will not be able to do anything about this. But he will receive the same thanks from the degenerate parliamentary rascals as did his predecessor, Gamelin. When I think, Duce, that precisely M. Reynaud is one of the chief culprits in this catastrophe,

² On May 19 it was announced that General Weygand was succeeding General Gamelin as Allied Commander in Chief.

and when on the other hand I keep in mind the treatment and the fate meted out by these parliamentary Democrats to those who are nevertheless still patriotic soldiers, and the fate in store for them in the future, then I am filled with immeasurable contempt for a system and an era which hands over the fate of great nations to these inferior products of nature. The arrest and shooting of true patriots in these countries can lead to nothing but their collapse. I can understand opposition being resisted in one's own country. But the thought of patriotic members of one's own opposition, who have proved by their previous conduct their boundless love for their own people, being delivered up to a foreign power from a desire to be rid of them and with tacit consent that they are to be shot by Senegalese, is so repulsive, that I have a profound feeling of spiritual solidarity with these victims, although reason is bound to tell me that by robbing themselves of their most valuable blood these nations are anyhow only destroying themselves. It seems that Degrelle and Mussert have also been shot,³ one in the citadel at Lille, the other at Abbeville, along with many others. If this proves to be true, it will only be proof that the fall of this régime is at hand, just as the murder of Codreanu⁴ meant more to Rumania than the mere extinction of a member of the opposition.

Duce, you will understand my feelings, for somewhere above the community of the mediocre there is a solidarity or at least a feeling of sympathy between exceptional men.

Accept, Duce, my most sincere and comradely greetings.

Yours,⁵

³ In telegram No. 650 of May 28 the Foreign Minister's Secretariat instructed Ambassador Mackensen on Ribbentrop's behalf to inform Ciano and the Duce "with reference to the Führer's last letter, that Mussert was not shot but that his brother was, as were a number of Dutch National Socialist party members. Mussert himself had been in hiding and thus was able to save himself." (2281/481369)

On May 31, Hitler stated to the Italian Ambassador that latest intelligence confirmed the fact of Degrelle's execution. Hitler went on to describe in circumstantial detail the treatment alleged to have been meted out to 73 Dutch National Socialists, Belgian Rexists and other prisoners. (Noack memorandum of May 31: F8/0094-98). For documents relating to Degrelle's subsequent activity, see vol. x.

⁴ Celia Codreanu, leader of the Rumanian Iron Guard was killed on Nov. 30, 1938, allegedly while trying to escape. See vol. v, document No. 260.

⁵ Hitler's signature does not appear on the file copy.

No. 318

449/222713

The Director of the Political Department to the Legation in Greece

Telegram

No. 252

BERLIN, May 25, 1940.

zu Pol. IV 1182 g.¹

Drafting Officer: Senior Counselor Dr. Heinburg.

¹ Pol. IV 1182 g.: Not found.

For your strictly confidential information.

With reference to your telegram 212.²

The Greek Minister expressed his great anxiety on May 24³ about the war spreading to Greece in the event of Italy entering the conflict. He heard repeatedly, though not from the Greek Government but from other quarters, that in this case Italy would occupy parts of Greece.

According to secret information it seems that the Minister has also expressed his anxiety to the Greek Government and suggested that the latter consider whether it should not seek Germany's protection in order to avoid Italian occupation.

WOERMANN

² Not printed (449/222712). This telegram of May 15 reported that in spite of assurances from the Italian Minister in Athens, the Greeks were distrustful of Italian intentions.

³ This conversation was recorded by Woermann in a memorandum of May 25 (449/222719).

No. 319

3918/E051035

Memorandum by the Minister in Switzerland

BERN, May 25, 1940.

During my discussion today with Federal President Pilet-Golaz he said that he had no sympathy with the French in their present situation because they themselves were responsible for it. He stated further that the diplomats were really to be pitied because they, too, had been affected by the panic. He had been glad to see that I had always kept calm, and he requested that if I should burn my archives at some time I should not do it in the garden that led to the street; he had seen this in the case of another Legation and he had to tell me that that had not made a very edifying impression. Otherwise the situation for him today was exactly as difficult as 2 weeks ago, but there was no acute danger.

We then spoke about the propaganda of the English and French which was the main cause of the panic. Pilet-Golaz thereupon stressed that a disturbing influence had been exerted also by us, on the other side of the border, and the radio was mainly to blame for the restlessness among the people. Pilet-Golaz then said that we would understand very well how to be effective by means of the radio, whereas France was not effective at all and England was only now beginning to gain an influence on the psychology of the other nations.

When I remarked that the panic was mainly being fanned by England and France in order to get Switzerland involved in agreements with the Allies, Pilet-Golaz replied: As long as I am the Federal President we shall not let ourselves be promised any help except that

which we expressly ask of somebody else at the moment in which Switzerland is attacked.

KÖCHER

No. 320

B14/B001889-90

The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

ROME, May 26, 1940—2:40 a. m.

TOP SECRET

Received May 26—3:50 a. m.

No. 980 of May 25

For the Foreign Minister personally.

Immediately on the arrival of the special courier I handed the Duce the Führer's letter¹ at 7:51 p. m. in the presence of Anfuso, who was deputizing for Ciano. The Duce read the letter out to us, accompanying it with a continuous commentary and, from the impression I gained, it made an even deeper impression on him than the previous one.² The figures given for the surrounded enemy divisions seemed considerably to exceed what he had assumed to be the case hitherto. He described as completely justified and extremely interesting the characterization of the individual soldiers of the various enemy armies and read most of this through twice. He underlined the "miserable English leadership" with loud laughter. His approval both of the comments on Reynaud and the observations on the fate of Degrelle and Mussert were also emphatic. He spoke of the "band of heroes" at Narvik with admiration and although a strategic and (group apparently missing) was involved which was not important for the final decision itself, nevertheless the persistence of the little band was depriving the Allies of a cheap opportunity of making propaganda capital out of the evacuation as they would doubtless have attempted to do with a great flourish, an idea which he has already expressed in an earlier letter to the Führer.³

The Duce, who was clearly in an excellent mood and who on greeting me expressed his admiration for the events in the west in the most cordial manner, will reply to the Führer without delay. He would, he added, make an important communication on this occasion.

As I left, the Duce confirmed personally once more that his reaction to the feelers put out by the English, described in telegram No. 977⁴

¹ Document No. 317.

² Document No. 272.

³ This was the letter referred to in document No. 168, footnote 1.

⁴ Not printed (B14/B001887-88). According to this telegram, Anfuso had told Bismarck that the British and French Governments, through their Missions in Rome, had recently suggested the opening of negotiations on easing Allied blockade measures against Italy. A British delegation had arrived in Rome and proposed the complete lifting of all blockade measures. The Duce, however, "taking into consideration the total political situation, had decided to reject the English offer."

and reported today, was an entirely negative one. He regarded these merely as further proof of the weakness of the English.

MACKENSEN

No. 321

78/52485

The Minister in Hungary to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

URGENT

BUDAPEST, May 26, 1940—2:00 p. m.

SECRET

Received May 26—4:50 p. m.

No. 332 of May 26

At the performance of German guest artists yesterday, the Foreign Minister told me for my personal information that it had been decided to bring the third and fourth corps at Szombathely and Pécs also up to war strength but to leave them in their permanent headquarters for the time being. He had expressed misgivings about these measures since he would have liked to prevent the alarm which might be caused especially by the mobilization of the Pécs corps which was stationed near the Yugoslav frontier. However the Chief of the General Staff had justified the necessity for this with new disturbing reports from the Russian-Rumanian frontier, where during the last 48 hours Russian soldiers were being issued with maps of Bessarabia. Csáky does not believe there is any immediate Russian danger, but that on the other hand there should be secret discussions between the competent German and Hungarian military authorities regarding present and possible future measures. The Army had strict orders to refrain from giving any provocation. The frontier guards were not being reinforced. It was merely a question of caution and the desire to be ready for immediate action if required.

Csáky requested that the whole of this information should be kept strictly secret. In accordance with the wishes of the Chief of the General Staff he had not informed the Italian Minister.

ERDMANNSDORFF

No. 322

1632/389918

The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 982 of May 26

Moscow, May 26, 1940—7:28 p. m.

Received May 26—9:15 p. m.

Pol. IV 1671.

With reference to your telegram No. 856 of May 25.¹

¹ Not printed (1632/389913-14). This telegram which was sent under Nos. 637 to Rome and 856 to Moscow repeated for information intelligence sent by Erdmannsdorff in Budapest telegram No. 325 of May 23 (3566/023626-27).

I asked Molotov yesterday what was to be thought of the persistent rumors about the concentration of Soviet troops on the Rumanian frontier, and of a projected Soviet-Bulgarian military alliance, etc. Molotov replied that all these rumors were devoid of any foundation.

There is certainly no doubt that Soviet troops have been reinforced in southern Russia, the Crimea, and the Caucasus. So far there have been no signs that Soviet preparations go beyond defensive precautionary measures.

SCHULENBURG

No. 323

B14/B001897

The Embassy in Italy to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

ROME, May 27, 1940—8:40 p. m.

No. 985 of May 27

Received May 27—9:50 p. m.

For Army General Staff, Attaché Branch.

Roatta says that the Duce has not yet approved his visit for staff talks.¹ By June 20 troops on the Alpine front, the Po Army and overseas will be 100 percent mobilized, the remaining troops 60 percent mobilized. There are no measures against Yugoslavia and Greece nor any designs² on them.

RINTELEN

MACKENSEN

¹In a memorandum of May 20 Heyden-Rynsch recorded a report from the Military Attaché in Rome that Roatta was ready to leave for Germany as soon as Mussolini gave his consent (F2/0480).

²Cf. documents Nos. 245 and 328.

No. 324

B14/B001898

The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 986 of May 27

ROME, May 27, 1940—11:15 p. m.

Received May 28—1:00 a. m.

With reference to my telegram No. 877 of May 14.¹

The opinion put forward in my previous telegram that it was also in conformity with Italian intentions to keep Turkey out of the Mediterranean conflict is confirmed by recent reports from a reliable source according to which Italy has no intention of attacking Turkey.

Since we are interested in preserving Turkish neutrality, I would ask you to consider whether we should not enter upon an exchange of

¹Document No. 245.

views with the Italian Government as to what more Berlin and Rome could possibly do to enhance Turkey's intention of remaining neutral, which has again been strengthened by the German victory. In this connection, however, we should in my opinion still avoid suggesting Italian assurances to Turkey for, as explained in my previous telegram, the Duce is certainly not willing to have his hands tied regarding Turkey.²

MACKENSEN

² On May 31 Ribbentrop gave instructions for a reply to this telegram (B14/B001927). This reply, sent as telegram No. 688, read as follows: "Joint German-Italian action for the purpose of strengthening Turkey's intention to remain neutral seems to us neither expedient nor necessary in the present situation. Further developments will in all probability of their own accord cause Turkey to keep out of the war. Ribbentrop."

Woermann informed Ambassador Papen of this instruction in telegram No. 268 of June 3 (265/172295), referring at the same time to document No. 265.

No. 325

73/52436

The State Secretary to the Foreign Minister

By teletype en clair

BERLIN, May 27, 1940.

To the Foreign Minister through the Foreign Minister's Secretariat. According to telegram 332¹ from Budapest, Count Csáky has not informed the Italian Minister of the mobilization of two more army corps which has taken place. In this way the Hungarians are making us partners in acting mysteriously with respect to the Italians. I therefore request your approval for the following telegram to be sent to the Minister in Budapest:

"With reference to telegram No. 332.

"Please tell Csáky as soon as possible that we consider it as a matter of course that, having after all informed the Italian Minister of the mobilization of the first two army corps he should also inform him now."²

WEIZSÄCKER

¹ Document No. 321.

² The proposed instruction was sent to Budapest as telegram No. 451 of May 29 (73/52437).

No. 326

4386/E083195

The Ambassador to the Holy See to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 63 of May 27

ROME (Vatican), May 27, 1940—9:45 p. m.

Received May 28—2:45 a. m.

I hear in strict confidence that the opinion was voiced in the State Secretariat today that the best thing would be for France to conclude a

separate peace and that England should be left to fight on alone. It does not seem out of the question that this statement is the result of an audience which Poncet, the French Ambassador at the Quirinal, had with the Pope yesterday. Contrary to normal practice the news of this audience has not been made public, at least not yet.

BERGEN

No. 327

2931/567013-14

Memorandum by the State Secretary

BERLIN, May 27, 1940.

Pol. VIII 658.

I enclose a memorandum by Counselor Knoll on a Chinese suggestion for German mediation in the Sino-Japanese conflict.

As the Japanese Government has promised its full support to the Government of Wang Ching-wei which was established on March 30,¹ and as a Japanese delegation is at present negotiating with the Government in Nanking, I do not consider the present moment suitable for an initiative by Germany. Failure of the negotiations in Nanking, which is considered even by Japanese circles as not being out of the question, may change the situation in the near future; but at present no development of this kind can yet be discerned with certainty.

I suggest therefore, that the Chinese be given an answer putting them off without discouraging them altogether.²

Submitted herewith to the Foreign Minister.

W[EIZSÄCKER]

[Enclosure]

BERLIN, May 23, 1940.

zu Pol. VIII 658.

MEMORANDUM

Dr. Ting, the Chinese Counselor of Embassy in a conversation outside the Foreign Ministry on May 21, which he arranged himself, referred to a suggestion he had made last October³ regarding German mediation in the Chinese-Japanese conflict. Although he was again speaking personally and confidentially, he desired a formal and confidential answer to his suggestion, which, if it were in the affirmative, would certainly be welcomed by Chiang Kai-shek. Mr. Ting said that Chiang Kai-shek would welcome peace with Japan if the terms were tolerable. It was important that Japan should give up her proposal

¹ See document No. 29.

² Marginal note: "Yes. R[ibbentrop]." In a memorandum of May 29 (8784/-E612093) addressed to Woermann, Sonnleithner passed on Ribbentrop's instructions that the Chinese were to be given a noncommittal answer without finally discouraging them.

³ See vol. VII, document No. 201.

for an anti-Comintern pact between China and Japan, for a pact of that kind would only give Japan an opportunity of interfering in China's internal affairs. Apart from that Mr. Ting said nothing about possible conditions. I remained noncommittal during the conversation but promised to submit Mr. Ting's new suggestion to the Foreign Minister.

Two memoranda on Mr. Ting's suggestion of last October⁴ are enclosed.

KNOLL

⁴ These were copies of Knoll's memoranda of Oct. 5 and Oct. 8, 1939, printed in vol. VIII as documents Nos. 201 and 217.

No. 328

1247/887400

Memorandum by the Representative of the Foreign Ministry With the High Command of the Army

HEADQUARTERS, May 27, 1940.

As was agreed, General v. Toppelskirch spoke to the Commander in Chief about our concern with regard to an Italian operation in the direction of Yugoslavia and the danger of Russian intervention in Bessarabia resulting from it. Colonel General v. Brauchitsch replied:

1) The Führer had told him recently that he hoped to be able to limit the Russian ambitions in the direction of Bessarabia. Yet he (v. Brauchitsch) had the impression that already in the Moscow conversations of August 1939 Bessarabia had been abandoned, analogous to the manner in which the Baltic States were abandoned.

2) With respect to Italy Colonel General v. Brauchitsch yesterday told the Foreign Minister personally that he should see to it that chaos did not develop in the Balkans owing to Italy's attitude.

In the opinion of General v. Toppelskirch it is not possible, for the moment, to induce the Colonel General to make another démarche (either with the Führer or with the Foreign Minister). Owing to the pressure of business at the moment, I have not yet been in a position to report directly.

Respectfully submitted to the State Secretary.

v. EITZDORF

No. 329

4081/060618-14

Minute by Ambassador Ritter

BERLIN, May 30, 1940.

On May 27 before the opening of the German-Swiss economic negotiations,¹ I asked the Swiss Minister and Herr Hotz, the leader of the

¹ The purpose of these negotiations was to reach a new agreement to replace the German-Swiss Commodities and Clearing Agreement of July 5, 1939, due to expire on June 30, 1940.

Swiss delegation, to come and see me and told them the following in the presence of Minister Hemmen.

I did not wish to interfere in the current economic negotiations. I had asked them to come to see me because of my present special assignment, i. e., economic warfare and war economy. The Swiss gentlemen would understand that we had at this time to conduct all economic negotiations under this heading. Under this heading Switzerland today seemed to us like a huge armaments plant which was working almost exclusively for England and France.

I wished to discuss two points with them. First, I wished to ask them whether the Swiss Government was willing to disclose to us the text of the treaties recently concluded with England and France.² We ourselves had no objection to the text of the treaties concluded with us also being disclosed to the other side. After some explanations and excuses, Herr Hotz said he would reply to these questions shortly.

The second point was coal. To be sure, we did not know the full contents of the recent Swiss treaties with England and France. But from what we did know it was clear to us that we could not allow another kilogram of German coal to be used in Switzerland in future for the manufacture and shipping of industrial products destined for England or France. We did not want to suggest or dictate to Switzerland by what means this was to be ensured. We wished to give the Swiss Government the opportunity of making such proposals. But in doing so one thing would have to be made certain, that was, that our objective should be achieved 100 percent. Neither could the Swiss Government rely on our permitting the present state of affairs to continue up to the expiration of the existing agreements, namely until the end of June. The prerequisites for the present German-Swiss agreements have been so substantially modified by the agreements of Switzerland with England and France that we would if necessary have to modify unilaterally our deliveries of coal. Both gentlemen were somewhat taken aback by this statement. Using examples they tried to show that Germany could nevertheless be quite satisfied, even after the Swiss agreements with England and France. I did not let this pass however. We had to look at the present position primarily from the point of view of war economy, and from this point of view we considered that England and France had been given preference in a partial manner. I requested a very speedy reply on this point as well.³

RITTER

² Agreements on the conditions of wartime trade were signed by Switzerland, France, and Britain on Apr. 28.

³ See document No. 377.

No. 330

124/122622-30

Ambassador Stohrer to State Secretary Weizsäcker

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

MADRID, May 27, 1940.

DEAR WEIZSÄCKER: I could not help noticing on a number of occasions that this or that authority in Germany has a false conception regarding Spain's conduct and attitude during the war. The reason for this can only be that the reports from the Embassy (and not only my own but also those by the Attachés of the services) do not penetrate to all the authorities—*some even very high authorities*—in Germany responsible for evaluating and dealing with Spanish affairs. This has been shown again recently in the following two cases:

(1) When Field Marshal Göring received the commission of the Spanish Air Ministry¹ recently he reproached the Spaniards on their political attitude; see enclosed minute by the General Staff of the Luftwaffe (passages marked in red). Owing to the presence of the Air Attaché of the Embassy, Colonel Krahmer, the matter could, however, fortunately be put right at once. The head of the Air Commission, General Barrón, gave further explanations (passages marked in blue). Had the Air Attaché not been there, it might very well have been disastrous, as the Field Marshal had obviously not been informed of the great concessions made on numerous occasions by the Spaniards in the military and political spheres and reported by the Attachés of the services as well as by myself, nor of the attitude of Franco and his chief Ministers which I have time and again reported nor, finally, of the distressed conditions which have forced the Spaniards into the treaties with France² and England³ to which we had objected.

(2) I hear that an office headed by Admiral Schuster in Berlin is dealing with questions of economic warfare in neutral countries. The impression exists in this office too that Spain is acting in an extremely unfriendly way toward us, and is supplying our enemies, but not us, with strategic raw materials, etc., while the reports by Staatsrat Wohltat and me on the above-mentioned distressed conditions in Spain are apparently unknown to this office. This has led, as I hear, to unjustified attacks upon Spain and recently also to attacks upon the Embassy and Foreign Ministry which were made in various conferences where this office was represented. This is said to have been the case, as I am reliably informed, particularly a short while ago at a conference at which the Foreign Ministry was not represented. It is known in the Foreign Ministry that the Reich Economic Ministry adopted a strong attitude against the trade agreement⁴ which Herr Wohltat concluded in December. There are signs that this attitude continues although, according to the official minutes,⁵ the Field Marshal stated that the attacks upon the agreement were unjustified. From all this it appears that the office of Admiral Schuster is not sufficiently in-

¹ See document No. 169.

² See vol. VIII, document No. 572.

³ A trade and payments agreement between Spain and the United Kingdom had been signed in Madrid on Mar. 18, 1940. The text is printed in Spain No. 1 (1940), Cmd. 6188.

⁴ See vol. VIII, document No. 482.

⁵ See vol. VIII, document No. 679.

formed about these facts and assumes that Spain leans toward our enemies and that the Foreign Ministry and the Embassy were not able to prevent this, and are not able to do so now. Here also enlightenment appears to be urgently necessary.

I am writing today to Herr Wiehl suggesting to him that he arrange for a member of this staff to make a journey to Madrid in order to acquaint himself correctly with the situation on the spot.*

My request is that as far as possible the reports on the political situation and on the attitude of the Spanish Government, etc., transmitted by me and also by the Attachés of the services should be sent to *all* authorities which in any way deal with Spanish affairs and that the position taken by the staff of Admiral Schuster, which obviously can be submitted to the *highest* authorities, should be examined to see whether it does not conflict with the view of the Foreign Ministry. I have heard that this staff has already prepared the draft of a proposal *to the Führer* for the interministerial committee commissioned to carry out the economic warfare measures, in which the introduction presents the relations between Germany and Spain as if Spain had been a failure in her political and economic attitude toward Germany in this war. *Speed* is, therefore, necessary if worse is to be prevented.†

With kind regards and Heil Hitler.

Yours ever,

STOHRER

[Enclosure]

SECRET

BERLIN, May 8, 1940.

General Staff of the Luftwaffe
5.Abt.Nr. 308/40 g.Kdos. (VII/L)

MINUTE CONCERNING THE APPOINTMENT OF THE STATE SECRETARY IN
THE SPANISH AIR MINISTRY, GENERAL BARRÓN, WITH THE FIELD
MARSHAL ON MAY 4, 1940

Present:

The Field Marshal
General of the Luftwaffe Udet
Lieutenant General Bodenschatz
State Secretary, Major General Barrón
Lieutenant Colonel Arranz
Lieutenant Colonel Carmona
Colonel on the General Staff Krahmer, Air Attaché Madrid
Major Gripp as interpreter.

After General Barrón had conveyed the greetings of the Spanish Air Minister, General Yagüe, he presented to the Field Marshal a

* Such a letter was written on May 30 (324/194099-101).

† Weizsäcker replied to Stohrer on June 10 and assured him that he had never noticed any general dissatisfaction with Spain's attitude, nor had he ever heard any unfriendly remarks about the work done by Stohrer and the Embassy (124/122634).

request for support from Germany in the building up of the Spanish Air Force.

In reply to the Field Marshal's question as to what kind of help Spain had in mind, General Barrón said that

1) the German planes on hand as a result of the activity of the Condor Legion would have to be made fully serviceable again by the delivery of spare parts and

2) German help was requested in the building up of Spain's aviation industry.

Field Marshall Göring said that there could hardly be any doubt that Germany, especially the Luftwaffe, had helped Spain on a large scale in the Civil War and that he would gladly help now too; however, there were very great difficulties in the way.

One of these difficulties was the problem of transportation. He had heard that Spain was not fulfilling the commitments she had made to Germany to deliver raw material on the grounds that there was no possibility of conveying these raw materials to Germany.^a So if that was not possible, it could not be assumed that there would be fewer difficulties on the opposite route of delivery of spare parts and equipment from Germany to Spain.

General Barrón replied that this problem was being studied and it was felt that a practicable way would undoubtedly be found in collaboration with Italy. In this connection General Barrón requested in general that Germany bring influence to bear on Italy in favor of this problem.

General Barrón stated further that this problem had not yet been settled in all its details, however, because Spain first requested a *basic policy* decision as to whether Germany was prepared to help Spain and whether the Spanish Air Force could definitely prepare itself for close collaboration with the German Luftwaffe in the future.

The Field Marshal stated in reply that he was not certain whether Spain really believed in a German victory. For example, if German submarines entered a Spanish port in order to obtain necessary supplies, they would be interned; the German merchant vessels had also not met with the accommodating attitude on the part of Spain which had been expected. Spain's conduct was "super-neutral." He had the impression that Franco did not want to incur the displeasure of our enemies and that he was deliberately taking a friendly attitude toward England and France. He did not have the impression that the leaders in Spain believed in a German victory but rather that, on the contrary, they thought the power and resources of the Western Powers were so great that Germany would not be able to win this war. He was disillusioned and indignant over the attitude of Spain.^b

^a This sentence was underlined in red.

^b The foregoing paragraph was underlined in red.

While these words were being interpreted into Spanish, the Air Attaché reported to the Field Marshal that at least one submarine had received supplies with the knowledge of Spain, that the Spaniards permitted German meteorological service planes to fly with Spanish insignia, that the La Coruña radio station was operating for our Luftwaffe, and that the Spanish Air Ministry had always been friendly toward Germany.¹⁰

Before General Barrón could reply to the above-mentioned words of the Field Marshal, the latter continued, saying he knew that General Yagüe was standing loyally with Germany, that he was operating meteorological and direction-finding stations for us, and that there could be no doubt about the pro-German attitude of the Spanish Air Force. He would like to know, however, what the attitude of the Chief of State, General Franco, and the other leaders of Spain was.

General Barrón replied that he was not a diplomat but a soldier and could only speak as such. He could assure the Field Marshal that General Yagüe and the Spanish armed forces believed in a German victory and were on the German side.¹¹ Undoubtedly there were still people in Spain who were inwardly "red" and therefore pinned their hopes on the Western Powers; such people were unfortunately still found also in individual ministries. It had not yet been possible in the single year since the close of the war to remove all unreliable elements, especially since the war losses in lives amounted all in all to about 2,000,000. It was still an urgent task for the Spanish Government to consolidate the internal political situation thoroughly. That was possible only by means of work and bread. Spain, however, had no adequate supply of bread and no oil of her own production. She had been compelled to make trade agreements with France and England merely in order to make it at all possible to feed the Spanish people.¹² In reply to a question interposed by the Field Marshal, General Barrón said: As a result of the Civil War the coming harvest too was insufficient. Far too little land had been cultivated owing to the lack of manpower; they were therefore still dependent on imports. With reference to the oil question, of equal importance for nutrition, it was stated that the new oil harvest could not be brought in until November of this year and thereafter.

The Field Marshal took note of this predicament and inquired in detail about the number of planes in Spain¹³ (according to General Barrón 1,300, including 800 war planes), how many of them were German models, and what the status of the aviation industry and its production capacity were.

¹⁰ The foregoing paragraph contains underlinings in blue.

¹¹ This sentence contains underlinings in blue.

¹² The preceding four sentences are underlined in blue.

¹³ The foregoing words in this sentence are underlined in red.

Upon inquiry, General Barrón said that foreign offers to deliver planes and establish factories in Spain had indeed been received, but collaboration with Germany was preferred. In this connection the Field Marshal urgently recommended to the Spaniards that such an agreement be concluded with the U. S. A., for every plane delivered to Spain by the U. S. A. could no longer benefit the Western Powers. The French and the British did not have enough equipment for themselves and therefore had to buy in America. If Spain were to negotiate with the Western Powers about the delivery of aviation equipment, she might expect to receive the oldest and the most unsuitable plane models.

The Field Marshal then asked whether Spain was willing to buy individual, highly developed American planes and make them available to Germany as models, that is planes of the same type as those being delivered to England and France. In that connection it was stated that Germany could release to Spain the foreign exchange necessary for such purchases. General Barrón said that Spain would willingly effect such purchases and asked to be informed which plane models were desired.

The Spanish State Secretary then asked that 2-3 Spanish Air Force officers be permitted to go to Germany as soon as possible in order to fly the new Messerschmidt planes here. The reason given for the request was that at the moment Spain was still undecided whether to build single-engine or twin-engine fighter planes for her Air Force on exclusively German or exclusively Italian models, or, as contemplated for political reasons, on models of both countries. On inquiry, General Udet told the Field Marshal that while no such permission had hitherto been given, he had no objections to it.

On the question of the delivery of spare parts from Germany for the planes of German origin in Spain, the Field Marshal laid down the condition that these spare parts be transported from Italy by Spanish *warships* (*not* by Spanish naval transports which did not sail under a battle flag). It would have to be made absolutely sure that spare parts did not fall into the hands of our enemies, who were only waiting for such a favorable opportunity in order to make a number of German planes in enemy hands serviceable for flying again. This had to be prevented in all circumstances.

General Barrón promised that Spain would take all the precautionary and security measures necessary to bring the desired spare parts safely to Spain.

General Barrón then emphasized again that the confidence in a German victory which permeated the Spanish Air Force from the highest headquarters down was indicated especially by the fact that all foreign offers for the Air Force had been disregarded ¹⁴ and that they

¹⁴ The foregoing part of the sentence contains underlinings in blue.

requested German help for building up their Air Force. He repeated the request for delivery of spare parts for the German planes in Spain, help in the development of the Spanish aviation industry and close, trustful collaboration between the German and Spanish Air Forces, now and in the future. The Field Marshal replied that he was willing to help the Spaniards in the fulfillment of their wishes.¹⁵

By order:
Signature

¹⁵ In a letter of May 20 (4896/E254358-60) the Economics Ministry informed the Foreign Ministry that certain decisions with regard to the Spanish requests for military aviation equipment had been arrived at in an interdepartmental conference on May 17. The principal decision was to supply Spain in the course of the next 12 months with aviation material, including spare parts to the value of 9 million RM, to be paid for by Spanish deliveries of mercury, wolfram, and wool to the same amount. These decisions were communicated to the Embassy in Spain in a Foreign Ministry instruction of June 8 (4896/E254367-70). This instruction stated, however, that certain modifications of these decisions had become necessary in the meantime. Among other things, the Embassy was informed "strictly confidentially" that the original dates set for delivery of the spare parts "could no longer be adhered to with certainty due to the increase in Germany's own needs."

No. 331

109/114954

Minute by an Official of Political Division I

BERLIN, May 28, 1940.

Pol. I M 7583 g.

Senior Counselor von Etzdorf has just rung up (11:20 a. m.) to make the following communication:

Upon instructions from the King of the Belgians, a Belgian General presented himself yesterday evening to General von Reichenau¹ and offered him the capitulation of the Belgian Army.

Moreover a wireless message of the French Navy has been intercepted according to which Belgian ships are to be forbidden to leave French ports; Belgian ships on the high seas are to be captured.

On instructions from the Commander of Army Group B,² Counselor of Legation Werkmeister has just telephoned Herr von Etzdorf and conveyed the following proposal from the Commander of Army Group B:

The Palace of Laeken, which is stated to be in good repair, is to be assigned to the King of the Belgians, the following factors being decisive for this plan: The King of the Belgians has not fled to France or England, that is, into the camp of our chief enemies, as he could have done. He remained with his Army and in every respect adopted

¹ Colonel General von Reichenau was Commander of the German Sixth Army.

² Colonel General von Bock. The Sixth Army was a part of Army Group B. Counselor of Legation Werkmeister was liaison officer of the Foreign Ministry with Army Group B.

a brave soldierly demeanor. Moreover he had not asked the Belgian General to express any wishes regarding his own person. In the opinion of the Commander of Army Group B all this warrants special consideration being shown toward the person of the King.

The Commander of Army Group B requests an opinion from the Foreign Ministry on his suggestion, if possible, in the course of today.²

V. D. HEYDEN-RYNSCH

² See document No. 335.

No. 332

8835/E614771

Minister Schnurre to the Embassy in the Soviet Union

Draft Telegram

BERLIN, May 28, 1940.
zu W 2804 g.¹

With reference to your telegram No. 992 of May 27.¹

Yesterday Krutikov was informed in writing of German acceptance of the coal treaty. Krutikov thereupon this morning transmitted in writing Soviet acceptance of the petroleum treaty.²

SOHNURRE

¹ Not printed (8835/E614769).

² On May 26 Schnurre had informed the Embassy in Moscow that the cruiser *Lützow* was leaving that day to be turned over to the Russians (telegram No. 862: 8835/E614768).

No. 333

109/114957-58

The Foreign Minister to the Head of the Auslandsorganisation in the Foreign Ministry

By Teletype

SPECIAL TRAIN, May 28, 1940.

I am in complete agreement with your suggestion of May 20¹ to free the Reich Germans interned in the Netherlands East Indies and West Indies by carrying out severe reprisals on Netherlands territory. I consider it right, however, not to threaten with reprisals first, but to carry them out at once, and then to notify the Netherlands central authorities in the East and West Indies of the completed action through the competent protecting power.

I request you to get in touch at once with the Reichskommissar for Holland, Seyss-Inquart, through the representative of the Foreign Ministry, Minister Bene, and in my name to take appropriate meas-

¹ In a memorandum of May 20 to Ribbentrop Bohle had suggested, as a reprisal for the internment of German citizens in the Netherlands East and West Indies, that Dutch citizens in Germany and in the Netherlands be arrested. (9829/E691848)

ures as far as the general directives given him by the Führer permit. I would consider it the correct thing to organize the reprisals in such a way that for every German man, woman, and child interned in the Netherlands Indies one Dutch man, woman, or child is arrested at once. The persons to be interned would be taken from the Dutch circles hostile to us, in particular from Court circles and the aristocracy, and perhaps also precisely from those finance and business circles with large possessions in the Netherlands Indies. It stands to reason that here regard must be had for the interest of the Four Year Plan in cooperation with influential Dutch business people. This is a matter for the Reichskommissar to decide.

I assume that the number of Reich Germans interned in the Netherlands colonies is sufficiently well known to you, and I request you to report to me on this point by telephone, before you get in touch with the office of the Reichskommissar. According to the number I will then tell you what suggestions you are to make to the Reichskommissar about the number of Dutch to be interned. For should it be a case of a very large number of German internees, we should perhaps, in order not to interfere too seriously with Dutch interests, have to be content with a smaller number, but then of the more influential people.

You will later keep me posted on the further developments in the matter.²

RIBBENTROP

¹In a memorandum of Apr. 8, 1941 (173/84619-22), Albrecht of the legal department recorded that 700 Netherlands nationals were at that time interned in Germany, of whom 100 had been interned "when the reprisals of May 1940 were carried out." Details concerning the reprisals are contained in documents filmed on serials 9828 and 9867.

No. 334

418/215674

Führer's Directive

FÜHRER'S HEADQUARTERS, May 28, 1940.

Pol. I M 7832 g.

1) The authority of the Commander in Chief of the Army to exercise executive power in the occupied Netherlands territories will cease at 12 noon on May 29, 1940.

2) At the same moment my decree of May 18, 1940,¹ relating to the exercise of government authority in the Netherlands, and the regulation which I issued on May 20, 1940,² pertaining to the delegation of powers to issue orders in the Netherlands, will come into force.³

ADOLF HITLER

¹ See document No. 282, footnote 1.

² Document No. 282.

³ This directive was promulgated to the Wehrmacht in an OKW order of the same day, which stated that the Führer had appointed General of the Luftwaffe Christiansen as Wehrmacht Commander in the Netherlands (413/215674).

No. 335

109/114955

Minute by an Official of Political Division I

BERLIN, May 28, 1940.
zu Pol. I M 7583 g. Ang. II.¹

Drafting Officers: Counselor v. d. Heyden-Rynsch.
Secretary of Legation v. Grote.

In reply to the inquiry by the Commander of Army Group B regarding the assignment of a residence to the King of the Belgians,² the Foreign Minister's Secretariat on instructions from the Foreign Minister states that the Foreign Ministry has no say in the matter. It is exclusively a matter for the Führer. The Foreign Ministry is to keep out of the affair. The Foreign Minister desires that the OKW be informed accordingly and requests immediate notification that his instructions have been carried out.

The Foreign Minister's instructions have been passed to Herr von Etzdorf, who will in turn transmit them to Army Group B. The Foreign Minister's Secretariat has been advised that the instructions have been carried out.

HEYDEN-RYNSCH

¹ Pol. I M 7583 g.: Document No. 331.

² See document No. 331.

No. 336

371/208156

Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat

BERLIN, May 28, 1940.

The Foreign Minister requests that Minister Bernard be instructed by telephone as follows:

1. To inform Minister President Tuka of the communication made to President Tiso by him (Bernard) today.¹

2. To advise Minister President Tuka not to take any action for the moment but to tell Tiso that he would later take a definitive position with respect to the whole situation which he would still like to think about.

3. To inform Minister President Tuka that the Foreign Minister personally would attend to the matter within the next few days.²

Respectfully submitted to the State Secretary.

BRUNS

¹ According to a memorandum by Bruns of the same day Bernard had been instructed to inform Tiso that he had been called to Berlin to render a report and to advise him at the same time to delay any decision on a possible reshuffling of the Cabinet until after his return (371/208155).

² Cf. document No. 407.

No. 337

3832/E044061-68

The Minister in Switzerland to the Foreign Ministry

No. 2779

BERN, May 28, 1940.

Received May 31.

Pol. II 1953.

Subject: Efforts by the Federal Government toward further allaying anxiety.

The Federal Council has issued instructions dated May 25 to the civilian population concerning acts of sabotage and parachutists. I am submitting the text of the instructions in enclosure No. 1.¹ These instructions aim at bringing back to their proper proportions the fantastic ideas held by the people of a sort of general guerrilla war against parachutists; that is to say that cooperation by the population can only consist in observing and reporting, but not in actually fighting, such troops. The military authorities cannot be exonerated from their share of responsibility for the creation of the recent wild-west fancies. By setting up local defense units, even though this was ultimately done rather skillfully, by distributing ammunition in the interior of the country and by other similar measures, but above all by insufficient measures against a press which delighted in agitating for a savage war to the hilt, a situation had ultimately arisen which made possible the panic of "voluntary evacuation" of a fortnight ago, which has already been reported several times.² The most serious thing about this was that this panic, which was undoubtedly due to French and English machinations, had been spread through the lack of judgment of highly placed officers in the Army General Staff itself, and that for at least 24 hours the responsible authorities had not shown the requisite presence of mind.

The above-mentioned efforts of the Federal Council to bring the people back to a sense of reality, at least in regard to the parachutists, may well have been the result of a conversation I had with the Federal President on May 24,³ during which I again pointed out that the Swiss Government simply could not allow things to go on drifting in this way.

¹ Not reprinted.

² Basel telegram No. 9 of May 15 (not printed: 183/86104); Geneva report No. 1254 of May 16 (not printed: 3832/E044059-60); Bern report No. 2555 of May 17 (not printed: 3998/E058190-95).

³ No record of this conversation has been found.

A further sign that these representations did not fail to make an impression is a communication from the Army Staff to the press which now also draws public attention to an order by the General regarding the behavior of military personnel toward foreigners. The clumsy wording of this statement, which, for example, speaks without any justification of "foreign political personages," is a slight indication of the difficulties still encountered in the Army Staff in the drafting of such communications. (Enclosure No. 2.⁴)

Into the same category of a growing understanding of the situation by the central authorities belongs, above all, the increased tightening of press censorship, together with inspired articles drawing attention to the necessity for an attitude of greater "distance" also in reporting. Such efforts, it is true, are at present only discernible in the better known papers, while they have not so far prevailed in the purely cantonal and above all, the French-Swiss press. It is precisely the last-mentioned which at the moment, it must be admitted quite naturally, is very strongly under the influence of its pro-French sympathies.

All this is the result of our military successes, and its further development depends on the continuance of these successes and is in no way in itself immune to setbacks. Nevertheless, it must be recognized as the beginning of a possible change of heart.

In connection with this, it is interesting to take a look at the consciously hostile anti-German camp, which up to now has held such a strong position among the Swiss public. The almost desperate manner in which the Marxist press is joining in the official wooing of Italy by Switzerland speaks volumes. One of the two Masonic lodges in Basel sent a circular letter recently to its members on the line of action to be taken in the event of evacuation. A copy of this circular letter can probably be procured. The lodge drew attention to the danger threatening from the arch enemy of Freemasonry, into whose hands valuable information had unfortunately fallen during his operations so far. The brothers in Basel were instructed to destroy at once most carefully all Masonic writings and material in their homes. The secret papers and other articles on the lodge premises had already been placed in safety in the interior of the country. In the event of possible evacuation every Freemason was to carry only his identity card on him, so that the brothers could establish each other's identity.

KÖCHER

⁴ Not reprinted.

No. 338

5556/E395581-84

*The Special Representative for Economic Questions at the Legation
in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry*

SECRET

BUCHAREST, May 28, 1940.

Tgb. No. 156

Received June 1.

I. C. 4 R

W 2891 g.

Subject: Signature of the Oil Pact.

I enclose the "Agreement regarding the exchange of German war material and Rumanian petroleum products,"¹ hereinafter referred to shortly as the "Oil Pact" which I signed yesterday. In addition to the Oil Pact, the aide-mémoire of March 6, 1940² and the supplement of May 27, 1940³ are enclosed.

As results of the Oil Pact the following particulars are mentioned:

(1) In the exchange of German arms for Rumanian petroleum the prewar prices apply for arms as well as for petroleum. The increase in the petroleum prices, which on the conclusion of the preliminary agreement of March 6, 1940,⁴ was about 150 percent compared with prewar prices, is thereby rendered ineffective for Germany by special arrangement; while in the months of March and April Rumanian petroleum on the average for all kinds costs f. o. b. Constanța 9600 lei, we pay, from March 1, on the average only 3826 lei; and that means f. o. b. at all Rumanian ports and free to all frontier railway stations. This is equal at an agreed exchange rate of 50 lei (excluding the 2 percent commission of the National Bank) to an average price of RM 76.52 per ton including freights on Rumanian lines and inclusive of all fees. For all deliveries of war material the Rumanian side claimed, and very emphatically upheld, the rate of 44.75 lei. I agreed to special treatment for part of the Polish booty up to an amount of about RM 30 million, so that for this part of the Polish booty a price of RM 85.50 per ton of petroleum results. Compared with an average price in July 1939 f. o. b. Constanța of RM 71.60 per ton without charges, the new average price of RM 76.52 including freight and charges is 6.78 percent higher. From this increase, however, fees and charges amounting to about 2 percent are to be deducted, which now are chargeable to the Rumanian side. Further, from this increase the saving on freights is to be deducted, which we obtain by avoiding the substantial freight charges to Orșova, to the Russian frontier and to the Hungarian frontier. Under the present conditions with regard to transport rates,

¹ Not printed (2182/471756-59).

² Not printed (2182/471760-61).

³ Not printed (2182/471762-63).

⁴ Not printed (5556/E395528-32).

this means a saving of about 15 percent in favor of Germany. Taking these facts into consideration it can be asserted that the Oil Pact prices which have now been fixed do not exceed the prewar prices.

(2) The problem of the lei financing of German petroleum purchases has been solved by the Rumanian Government placing at our disposal during the next few months an average of 1,100,000,000 lei. The threatened interference with our supplies through stoppages in the clearing and the lack at times of large lei sums in cash for purchases is thereby overcome. As the German petroleum purchases no longer take place through the clearing system but by special barter of arms for oil,⁵ we also avoid making the German petroleum purchases an additional burden on the German-Rumanian clearing arrangements.

(3) The Oil Pact by the preliminary agreement of March 6, 1940, and in its present final form had already frustrated the attempts of the enemy powers to throttle German petroleum purchases by extraordinary price increases at a time when the war situation had not been clarified to such an extent as it is today.

As the petroleum imports into the Protectorate are included in the Oil Pact and the petroleum importers of the Protectorate as well as the German petroleum importers pay the full current prices, a credit balance in crowns will accumulate in Prague in favor of the German Reich equal to the value of the additional German deliveries of arms made under the Oil Pact. I request therefore that steps be taken right away to open a special crown account in favor of the German Clearing Bank [*Deutsche Verrechnungskasse*] in Prague for petroleum supplies from Rumania; this can be used in accordance with the regulations governing the already existing special account for German petroleum imports from Rumania at the German Clearing Bank.

I shall send a comprehensive report later.⁶

HERMANN NEUBACHER

⁵ This was later changed by a German-Rumanian agreement of Oct. 1940, according to which German petroleum imports were henceforth again to be handled within the German-Rumanian clearing system (5556/E395613-20).

⁶ Such a report has not been found.

No. 339

B14/B001906-07

The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Minister

Telegram

MOST URGENT

No. 995 of May 28

ROME, May 29, 1940—1:20 a. m.

Received May 29—3:00 a. m.

For the Foreign Minister personally.

Count Ciano asked me to call on him this evening in order to inform me of his conversations with various heads of Missions during the last

24 hours, the subjects of which he described as being particularly interesting from the psychological point of view. For the purpose of speedy transmission I shall give the information in several parts:

1) The American Ambassador had urgently desired to speak to him yesterday evening and had made the request to be received by the Duce immediately for the purpose of delivering another message from Roosevelt. Ciano had replied that, as he had told him once before, the Duce declined to receive the heads of foreign Missions personally, but he himself was ready to accept the message for transmission. After some hesitation the Ambassador had read the message to him, on the contents of which he, Ciano, had written a minute for the Duce from memory (it follows here in translation):

"On behalf of the American people the President had been anxious to emphasize the wish that the Mediterranean should be spared from the war. Nevertheless he was aware that Italy desired and needed to satisfy certain legitimate national aspirations. On the basis of this he proposed that the Duce should tell him what these desires and aspirations were. He would then, in his turn, inform the French and English Governments accordingly. In the event of it being possible to reach an agreement on the basis of these proposals, he would demand pledges from France and Great Britain that they would both adhere to these conditions on the conclusion of peace and also allow Italy to take part with equal rights with the other belligerents at the peace conference, while Mussolini would for his part have to guarantee not to aggravate conditions as time went on and to maintain neutrality for the duration of the war." Ciano went on to say that he had delivered the message to Mussolini immediately and had then informed the Ambassador that while grateful for the kind intentions, the Italian Government could not adopt Roosevelt's ideas. It was true that there were certain Italian desires and national aspirations to be satisfied, but Italy was furthermore bound to the Reich by an alliance and therefore had no intention of entering into hasty negotiations which might interfere with the possibility of honoring her commitments.

Ciano went on to say that he had further told the Ambassador and had given him quite plainly to understand that Italy was in no way disposed to sacrifice her political freedom of action in favor of a cheap bargain. Italy wished to reserve her own freedom of judgment and action, and he could only affirm that any further offers of this kind would meet with the same negative treatment. Anyone who persisted in spite of this did not know Fascist Italy.

Ciano concluded by saying that the Ambassador took note of these statements without making any further reply.¹ Continuation follows.

MACKENSEN

¹ Ambassador Phillips' account of this conversation is printed in *Peace and War: United States Foreign Policy 1931-1941*, pp. 537-538. Cf. William Phillips, *Ventures in Diplomacy*, pp. 274-275.

No. 340

B14/001908-09

The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

ROME, May 28 [sic], 1940—1:48 a. m.

No. 996 of May 28

Received May 29—3:15 a. m.

For the Foreign Minister personally.

Continuing No. 995 of May 28.¹

Ciano went on to say that Poncet had very urgently asked him for an interview yesterday evening.

Its subject would be of interest to us as being indicative of the mood prevailing in France. The Frenchman first protested against recent Italian measures requiring a visa from the Italian authorities for Frenchmen leaving the country. Ciano had retorted that this was merely Italy's answer to a similar measure regarding Italians leaving France. Poncet had stated that he knew nothing of such a measure on the part of his Government. The whole protest was obviously only a pretext for the Ambassador to obtain the interview with Ciano. The Ambassador had then launched into a most bitter attack on the French Government and attempted to bring the conversation round to possibilities of satisfying Italian desires without war. Ciano had replied that it was too late for such talks. They had had time enough for them, but Italy had forever met with only a frosty "Jamais" even during Poncet's own tenure of office. He would merely remind him of the savage response in Paris to his speech in the Chamber² on the natural aspirations of the Italians; he was convinced that if he—Ciano—ever entered into such talks, the Ambassador would even to-day offer him nothing but two seats on the board of directors of the Suez Canal, where he could place a couple of discarded Ambassadors. The Frenchman had denied this most emphatically and stressed that the Italians could have all they wanted. When Ciano asked what the position was in detail, for example regarding Tunis, Somaliland, Algiers, and Corsica, François-Poncet retorted that this could all be discussed. Somaliland was not worth mentioning, and likewise Tunis could be discussed, only Corsica being a French département and thus a part of France itself, could no more be discussed than say "a person who was otherwise seriously ill" would voluntarily have a sound leg amputated. Ciano had retorted that even if he served him up Tunis, Algiers, Corsica, and Nice on a platter, he could only say no, because there was only one thing for Italy now and that was war. Poncet appeared to be profoundly impressed and had left the room in a

¹ Document No. 339.² On Nov. 30, 1938.

mood of deep dejection. He—Ciano—had immediately reported the conversation to the Duce, who had fully endorsed his reply. Continuation follows.

MACKENSEN

No. 341

B14/B001910

The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

ROME, May 29, 1940—3:00 a. m.

No. 997 of May 28

Received May 29—4:30 a. m.

For the Foreign Minister personally.

Continuation of No. 996 of May 28.¹

At his own request the Yugoslav Minister was received by Ciano this morning and again expressed great concern about rumors of Italy's hostile designs on Yugoslavia. He had given the Minister the same answer as he had given recently, namely, that when Italy entered the war against France and England she would do so "by the front door and not by the back door."

Ciano told me in addition that he had found great agitation against Yugoslavia in Albania, and that in certain quarters propaganda in favor of the large number of Albanians living outside the country on Yugoslav territory was exceedingly violent. However on his recent tour he had exerted a settling and calming influence.

Continuation follows.

MACKENSEN

¹ Document No. 340.

No. 342

B14/B001911

The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

ROME, May 29, 1940—2:30 a. m.

No. 998 of May 28

Received May 29—3:45 a. m.

For the Foreign Minister personally.

Continuing No. 997 of May 28.¹

Following on the interview with the Yugoslav, Ciano this morning received the English Ambassador in response to the latter's most urgent request to be received. At first Percy Loraine had come "still very high and mighty" to protest against Italian officials having suddenly suspended the negotiations which had been in progress for some time with an English commission on certain technical questions

¹ Document No. 341.

regarding the blockade.² Ciano had told the Ambassador in reply that this was indeed the case and that instructions to this effect had been issued on Sunday, for in view of the present situation it was a matter of complete indifference to Italy what England did in this respect. The settlement would now come about by other means. When the Ambassador, obviously taken aback, replied that this would cause much bloodshed and it was surely not necessary to settle matters in such a way, Ciano had retorted that he was unable to share this view and that a settlement by force of arms was unavoidable. The Ambassador then remarked that this statement was of importance for establishing responsibility for coming developments. At this Ciano had remarked that the question of responsibility might perhaps be of interest to the democracies. Italy was now only interested in the question of how she would win the war. The Englishman had thereupon taken his leave obviously profoundly impressed.

Continuation follows.

MACKENSEN

² Cf. document No. 320 and footnote 4.

No. 343

B14/B001912-13

The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

ROME, May 29, 1940—3:40 a. m.

No. 999 of May 28

Received May 29—5:05 a. m.

For the Foreign Minister personally.

Continuation of No. 998 of May 28.¹

With reference to the information he had given on conversations with the French and English Ambassadors Ciano remarked that Italy's attitude toward the two Powers had now been made unequivocally clear. He was working with all the means at his disposal for Italy's immediate intervention on our side. On being asked by the two Ambassadors when Italy was likely to draw the necessary conclusions from her attitude, he had replied that the time could not be measured in months or even in weeks either. He added to me that time was precious "in view of apocalyptic events in the west." I told him that 2 days ago the Duce had spoken to me of the "next day" as the date for entering the war.² Ciano's comment was that he too was working with all the means at his disposal toward accelerating this entry but military authorities were repeatedly trying to influence the Duce in favor of some delay. I confirmed that it had also come

¹ Document No. 342.

² On May 26 Mackensen reported in telegram No. 981 that Mussolini whom he saw during an athletic event told him "that now had come the moment for him also and 'within the next few days' he would strike the blow." (B14/B001896)

to my ears that at present Italian military quarters were talking about June 20 as the earliest date. Moreover, the Duce had himself told me that of all the Italians he was the most impatient and I could well imagine that in view of the fantastic speed of developments a day might come when one would have to say "too late." Ciano said that he too was now worried about this. If one went by the military men one would never be ready. Swift action was now indicated. His statements to the two Ambassadors, which are tantamount to a declaration of war, seem to me to confirm that for his part he will do his utmost to accelerate developments. He described the situation as it is now developing since the capitulation of the Belgians as the proper moment for emerging from the status of nonbelligerency.

Ciano concluded the conversation on the date for Italy's entry into the war with the comment that he had reason to assume that a letter from the Duce to the Führer³ which was in preparation would contain an indication of the date.

MACKENSEN

³ Document No. 356.

No. 344

B14/B001914

The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

No. 1000 of May 28

ROME, May 29, 1940—3:50 a. m.

Received May 29—5:05 a. m.

For the Foreign Minister personally.

At the conclusion of this evening's conversation, Ciano brought the talk round to Italo-Russian relations saying he had a report from his Chargé d'Affaires in Moscow on a conversation with Count Schulenburg. With the approval of the Duce he could tell me that if the Reich Foreign Minister still set such great store by the normalization of Italo-Russian relations, as I too had explained to him,¹ the Duce was fully prepared to make his own contribution to this and settle the question of Ambassadors on the lines of the report he had received in such a way that Moscow and Rome would send their Ambassadors back to their posts—perhaps even within the next few days—simultaneously and without any fuss. After all, apart from the press campaign, as far as Italy was concerned there was no obstacle to this method of settling the matter which, in addition, would get round the question as to who should make the first move. As regards the public, each side could confine itself to announcing the return of the Ambassador to his post by means of simultaneous communiqués. Ciano added that he would be glad to meet the wishes of the Reich Foreign Minister in this way.

MACKENSEN

¹ See document No. 279.

No. 345

175/138946-47

The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT
No. 808 of May 29

BUCHAREST, May 29, 1940—3:30 p. m.
Received May 29—11:15 p. m.

The success of German troops in the west and the beginning of the destruction of the Western Powers have led the King to the decision to align himself more closely with us.

The Minister President summoned me last night and received me in the presence of the Court Minister and the Foreign Minister. He said that by instruction of the King he had to make a communication to me as a sequel to the conversation which he had had with me in Predeal. The King had wished to give a special personal note to his communication through the presence of the Court Minister.

The Minister President began with an account of the good relations between Germany and Rumania which had been further developed in the economic sphere especially since the great economic agreement of March 23, 1939.¹ After the outbreak of the war Rumania had also given numerous proofs of her good will by the conclusion of individual agreements, and by the securing of the Danube and of the petroleum areas against enemy sabotage, as well as by deliveries of petroleum from enemy refineries.

Germany also had stated that she desired peace in the Danube region, and in this respect the interests of both parties coincided. However, the troop concentrations in Hungary and in Soviet Russia were now a subject of serious concern on the part of the Rumanian Government. In the interest of the development of mutual efforts based on the preservation of peace and order in the southeastern area, the Rumanian Government felt obliged to draw the attention of the German Government to the dangers which could result from military measures on Rumania's western and eastern borders. The Rumanian Government in assuring us again of its will to peace on the basis of its independence and national unity is inquiring of the German Government in which other spheres it might yet enter into a closer cooperation with Germany.

A memorandum² about these statements of the Rumanian Government has been handed to me and will be taken to Berlin by Minister Martius by plane.

In connection with this the Minister President explained that closer cooperation should be effected not only in all economic fields but in

¹ See vol. VI, document No. 78.

² Dated May 28, not printed (175/138950-52).

all fields. It would be possible first to satisfy our wishes for improved transport facilities through close cooperation; but beyond that they wanted to have proposals as to how the German Government visualized the future preservation of the southeastern area.

The Court Minister, who afterwards had asked me to dinner together with Minister Romalo, commented on the wish for cooperation by saying that the King no longer spoke of neutrality, but that the balance was tipping in the direction of Germany.

The King wanted to have our proposals. To my remark that proposals surely would have to be initiated by the Rumanians, the Court Minister replied: The Government did not know what Germany's intentions were in the southeast. If the Reich wanted peace, it could certainly tell Rumania how existing tensions could be overcome without arms and blood. Naturally, it would be necessary to take into account public opinion to a certain extent. Nevertheless, the King, who sincerely desired a rapprochement with Germany, was firmly determined, and in the Cabinet Council of the previous day he had expressed himself very clearly to that effect. The Minister President, emphasizing the great significance of the action, expressed to me also the King's wish that I personally should transmit his communication to Berlin. I replied that the Foreign Minister was not in Berlin at present and that first of all I had to wait for his instructions.

FABRICIUS

No. 346

F17/118-118

Minister Killinger to the Foreign Minister

TOP SECRET

BERLIN, May 29, 1940.
26 g. Rs.

I have the following to report regarding the situation in Rumania:

In consequence of Germany's great successes in the west, the King is realizing more and more that there is no purpose in his being aligned with the Allies. He knows that England and France will no longer be able to help him in the event of warlike complications. Although emphasis is repeatedly laid on the maintenance of the strictest neutrality, pro-French forces are at work to restrain the King from a rapprochement with Germany. The pro-German forces headed by General Moruzov, the Chief of the State Police, are constantly gaining ground. Moruzov enjoys the confidence of the King. The Rumanians know of course that precisely now we urgently need their petroleum, and relying on this they hope that Germany will succeed in restraining the Russians from an attack on Rumania.

I had the opportunity of conversing with General Moruzov for 5 hours. He described to me the Rumanian attitude as the pro-Germans would like it to be, as follows:

I give the following as proof of our loyal attitude toward Germany:

1. We are emphasizing and maintaining strict neutrality.
2. We feel ourselves economically bound to Germany. All our other so-called friends have deceived us. They never helped us after the World War but only exploited us. Germany has helped up and we have helped her with our raw materials and agricultural products.

We therefore want to continue cooperating closely with Germany in the economic sphere and have therefore kept our agreements with Germany, even when Germany got into arrears with her payments.

3. We are delivering oil and gasoline as far as we possibly can. If the expected amounts did not reach Germany this is due to:

- a. the hard winter and consequently the freezing of the Danube,
- b. the floods which reduced oil transport,
- c. the lack of transport facilities, for which we are not to blame,
- d. the attempt to throttle gasoline production in the English refineries, principally the Astra Romana, which supply about 50 percent of the total production. We have forced them to make deliveries by various means in favor of Germany. We assume that deliveries will reach 90,000 tons in the month of May.

5. [sic] We are cooperating very closely in intelligence work with Admiral Canaris in order to prevent acts of sabotage.

6. We have found weapons and know to whom they belong.¹ We assume that they are intended for use in the prevention of acts of sabotage. We have not made an issue of it and have hushed everything up on orders from the King. If other circles wanted to make this into a great affair of state, this was not the fault of those of us who desired friendship with Germany. I prevented this on orders from the King.

7. In spite of the drastic new laws relating to foreigners, which indeed resulted from the measures against sabotage since the Giurgiu incident,² we wish to afford all Germans the greatest possible relief. Dr. Wagener [sic]³ of Canaris' official [*legale*] Intelligence Department only needs to give us their names. All difficulties will be removed at once.

8. I have written to Admiral Canaris to say that the King has authorized me to make the following statement:

- a. If the Allies attack Rumania we shall ask Germany for protection.

- b. Should it be the intention of the Allied Powers to attack, we shall immediately inform Germany of any plans of attack in order that German troops may not arrive too late.

These further points emerged from the conversation:

The King would welcome it if Germany would state now in the press and on the radio that relations with Rumania were of the best and that

¹ See document No. 316.

² See document No. 116.

³ Cf. document No. 308.

Germany did not wish to see any interference with the agreements embodied in commercial treaties. Rumania would take up this propaganda.

He, Moruzov, regarded the arrival of the two legionaries, Sima and Patrascu,⁴ as an independent action and did not believe that anyone in Germany was behind it. I explained to him that the strictest orders had been given that there were to be no dealings of any sort with members of the Iron Guard. Furthermore frontiers could not be hermetically sealed to determined persons in wartime. People who had not been caught at the frontier had also entered Germany.

I asked: What is your stand on the Bulgarian question?

Answer: Rumania need have no fear of Bulgaria. Bulgaria can do nothing alone.

Question: And Hungary?

Answer: Hungary cannot take any action against Rumania unless Germany wants it.

Question: And how would Rumania react to an attack by Russia?

Answer: If Russia attacks, Rumania will fight. The fight is hopeless. If the Russians approach our oil we shall destroy it or sell it to Germany. The Germans can then decide what is to be done. Also if Germany attacks us we shall destroy the oil. (In this connection it should be noted that preparations have actually been made for this.)

I replied: I regard both the possibilities you have mentioned (an attack by Russia or Germany) as very improbable.

He replied: All the better then.

He asked me to discuss these matters with Admiral Canaris and the Foreign Minister. He would also be glad for the Führer to be told about them.

When I asked M. Moruzov whether all that he had told me was also the opinion of the King, he replied: Certainly.

It should further be noted that:

Moruzov is fully aware that Germany is in a difficult position with regard to Russia. Germany can of course express her wishes to her friend, who has kept her free [from attack] in the rear, but cannot present any demands. All these questions would not arise if we no longer needed Rumanian oil. As long as this is the case, however, we must ensure that peace continues to prevail in the Balkans. Intervention by Italy in Yugoslavia, thus from the west, would most probably result in intervention by Russia in Rumania from the east.

In my opinion there is no danger threatening from the Allies who are too deeply committed. Through our organizations together with the Rumanians we shall master British and French saboteurs. Should sabotage actually be attempted it will only be a case of pinpricks. Actually there have been no further cases at all of sabotage since the case at Giurgiu.

⁴ See document No. 316.

There ought to be a discussion on how to overcome the major danger of the destruction of Rumanian oil, that is, by attack from the east by Russia and from the west by Italy.

After a fresh study of all the possibilities I am still of the opinion that if the Rumanians destroy the oil themselves, this cannot be prevented.

V. KILLINGER

No. 347

384/210963-64

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

Moscow, May 29, 1940—7:10 p. m.

No. 1006 of May 29

Received May 29—10:10 p. m.

With reference to your telegram No. 877 of May 28.¹

The reported agreement of the Soviet Government to the sending of Cripps appears credible, since the Soviet Government has always taken the position that it was of interest to it to learn what the British Government had to tell it, and that economic agreements with England were in harmony with the neutral position of the Soviet Union. In addition, the Soviet Union is interested in obtaining rubber and tin from England in exchange for lumber.

There is no reason for apprehension concerning Cripps' mission, since there is no reason to doubt the loyal attitude of the Soviet Union toward us and since the unchanged direction of Soviet policy toward England precludes damage to Germany or vital German interests. There are no indications of any kind here for belief that the latest German successes caused alarm or fear of Germany in the Soviet Government. All the assertions of the foreign and especially enemy press to the contrary are desperate attempts to sow distrust between Germany and the Soviet Union, to start a diplomatic activity against Germany at any cost in view of the precarious situation of the Allies, and to exploit this as propaganda for their own people.²

The selection of Cripps as British Plenipotentiary appears unfortunate in view of the attitude in Moscow: The Soviet Government pre-

¹ In this telegram Welzsäcker, at Ribbentrop's behest, had asked for an evaluation of the London radio announcement that the Soviet Government had agreed to receive Cripps and to reopen trade talks. The Embassy was further informed that the Foreign Ministry was considering "speeding up the projected dispatch of Ritter and Schnurre to Moscow for economic discussions so they could arrive there at the end of the week and carry on conversation before Cripps could arrive." This plan, however, had not yet been cleared with the Foreign Minister. (8835/E614770)

² In a circular telegram sent earlier on May 29, for information, to the principal Diplomatic Missions abroad, Welzsäcker had stated that contrary to enemy reports German-Soviet relations were "very good" (384/210965-66).

fers to negotiate important matters with a prominent representative of the foreign government.

As I see it here a trip by Ritter and (group garbled) at the present time would have to avoid looking like a race with Cripps. The advisability of the trip would also have to be considered from the point of view of whether we would (group missing) anything new to offer the Soviet Government.^a

SCHULENBURG

^a In a draft telegram of June 1 (8835/E614778) to Moscow, Clodius stated that the proposed journey of Schnurre and Ritter to Moscow had been abandoned.

No. 348

220/148916

Memorandum by the State Secretary

St.S. 390

BERLIN, May 29, 1940.

The Swedish Minister told me today that we had sent rather a large number of "medical" personnel through Sweden to Narvik. Up to now it had been about 300 men. The Swedish Foreign Minister asked us if we would refrain from further requests for the passage of groups of medical personnel.

WEIZSÄCKER

No. 349

366/206752-53

The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in the Soviet Union

Telegram

MOST URGENT

BERLIN, May 30, 1940—4:40 a. m.

No. 889 of May 30

Received May 30—10:00 a. m.

For the Ambassador personally.

As a sequel to previous exchanges of opinion on normalizing Russian-Italian relations,¹ Mussolini has informed me² that he is wholly prepared to contribute his part to such a normalization and accordingly to settle the question of the Ambassadors in such a manner that Moscow and Rome would simultaneously and perhaps even within the next few days let their Ambassadors return to their posts without any further formalities. On the Italian side there was nothing which would prevent this form of a settlement, which moreover bypasses the question as to who makes the first move. As regards the public both sides could confine themselves to announcing the return of the Ambassadors to their posts by means of simultaneous communiqués.

Please bring the above immediately to M. Molotov's attention and urge him especially to accept now Mussolini's suggestion. In my

¹ See vol. VIII, document No. 669.

² See document No. 344.

opinion the Russian communiqué could be best phrased to read that the Italian Ambassador had returned to his post in Moscow and that simultaneously the Russian Ambassador in Rome had also resumed his duties. In case the Soviet Government should agree to this idea it would be desirable if it would inform you right away of an acceptable date for the two Ambassadors to assume their duties and the communiqués to be published so that I may inform the Italian Government accordingly. I suggest that you inform the Italian Chargé d'Affaires there in a strictly confidential manner.

RIBBENTROP

No. 350

B14/B001918-19

The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

ROME, May 30, 1940.

TOP SECRET

Received May 30—8:50 p. m.

No. 1007 of May 30

For the Foreign Minister personally.

Ciano urgently requested me to call on him at 1:30 today in order to read to me the manuscript of the letter¹ to the Führer which the Duce has written from beginning to end in his own hand and asked me to maintain the strictest silence as to its contents. Apart from the Duce, the contents were known here only to himself and the Cabinet secretary to whom he had entrusted the enciphering in my presence. The manuscript was being transmitted to Alfieri in cipher without delay, and he had already been notified of its impending dispatch so that he would be able to deliver the letter to the Führer at the Führer's headquarters today or tomorrow morning at the latest.

Regarding the question as to what direction Italian operations will take, it seems to me noteworthy that Ciano did not say a word about England or English possessions, but emphasized more than once with what fury he and the Italians would hurl themselves on the French. With the Duce's approval he himself would assume command of a bomber squadron at once with presumably Pavolino² as Ambassador³ and would also find other comrades in arms from Abyssinia there. As the squadron was stationed nearby at Viterbo he did not need to be completely separated from his department. Muti, the sec-

¹ Document No. 356.

² Possibly a reference to Alessandro Pavolini, veteran Fascist, Minister of Popular Culture.

³ The text of the draft in the files of the Rome Embassy reads "observer" (9863/E692872-73).

retary of the party, would likewise go to the front at once and presumably assume command of an air force unit in Sicily.

Finally, with the request to convey them to the Führer on behalf of the Duce, Count Ciano handed me six maps on which the present deployment of forces on the fronts which concern Italy is marked in by the Italian General Staff according to the position this morning. I shall forward the figures in supplementary telegrams⁴ and submit the maps themselves at the next available safe opportunity.

MACKENSEN

⁴These figures were listed in telegram No. 1008 of the same date (B14/-B001920-21).

No. 351

220/148928

The Minister in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

URGENT

STOCKHOLM, May 30, 1940—9:05 p. m.

No. 910 of May 30

Received May 31—3:15 a. m.

Further to my telegram No. 909 of May 30.¹

In a conversation with me today Foreign Minister Günther mentioned his fear that the position at Narvik might remain as the only point which might disturb German-Swedish relations as a result of possible German desires concerning the supply of war materials or of reinforcements, which Sweden would remain unable to meet owing to the principle of neutrality which she had consistently observed. In order to prevent such a thing, the Swedish Government would regard it as desirable for the Narvik area to be to some extent neutralized by the withdrawal of the troops of all combatants. It would then be best if Swedish troops were to take over the protection of neutrality there. The Swedish Government had already begun to make inquiries in England on this subject, to which there was as yet no answer. Minister Richert had had instructions to discuss the matter with Germany also.²

WIED

¹ Not printed (220/148922). The German text is in *Norges forhold til Sverige under krigen 1940-45*, vol. I, pp. 291-292.

² The Swedish Minister in Berlin had taken up the question of the Narvik area in an interview with Weizsäcker on May 29 (Weizsäcker memorandum St.S. 389, 220/148917-19). The Swedish Minister's reports on the interview are in *Transiteringsfrågor . . . April-Juni 1940*, pp. 262-264.

Woermann recorded a further inquiry on the subject by the Counselor of the Swedish Legation on June 2 (205/142355) and by the Swedish Minister on June 8 (30/22158).

No. 352

136/74152

The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 1630 of May 30

MADRID, May 30, 1940.

Received May 30—9:20 p. m.

With reference to my telegram No. 1555 of May 24.¹

The Spanish Foreign Minister informed me that the French and English attitude toward Spain has radically altered. The French and English Governments have offered Spain large quantities of grain. The French Government has promised to arrest Negrín² and to dissolve all Red-Spanish associations in France. France has also at last released for transport to Spain the German goods stored in Genoa and paid for before the beginning of the blockade. The Spanish Government will now send several ships of the Spanish Navy to collect the goods in Genoa.

STOHRER

¹ Not printed (136/74148). This telegram reported a conversation with the Spanish Foreign Minister about difficulties arising in connection with Spanish imports of grain from France.

² Juan Negrín, Spanish Socialist leader, President of the Council of Ministers of the Spanish Republic 1937-1939.

No. 353

321/193232-33

Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department

BERLIN, May 30, 1940.

On instructions from his Government the Lithuanian Minister called on me today to discuss the step taken by the Soviet Government regarding Lithuania (already known here through DNB from Tass report put out from Moscow on May 29¹).

M. Škirpa related the facts as follows:

On May 25 Molotov drew the attention of the Lithuanian Minister to several instances which had occurred involving the disappearance in Lithuania of members of the Soviet Russian Army. Molotov demanded immediate measures for the prevention of these provocative acts, and expressed the hope that the Lithuanian Government would take appropriate steps so that the Soviet Union for her part would not have to take action. M. Molotov handed the Minister a written statement to this effect.

The Lithuanian Government replied after a few days by a note in which it stated its willingness to take the necessary steps at once.

¹ DNB report No. 151 of May 30 is not printed (1875/424210-12).

On May 28 Loktionov, Deputy Commissar for National Defense, who has general charge of matters affecting Soviet troops in the Baltic States, arrived in Kaunas. On May 30 he called on the Lithuanian Foreign Minister and mentioned the two cases referred to in the Tass report, according to which two Russian soldiers had disappeared and had later returned, as well as a third case, in which a Soviet soldier had disappeared and on being apprehended by the Lithuanian authorities, had committed suicide. The Lithuanian Foreign Minister expressed his readiness to make a joint investigation of the cases at once. The Deputy Commissar replied, however, that he had only been instructed to carry out investigation in the cases himself; the rest was then a matter for his Government.

M. Škirpa did not present a definite request in raising the matter. He expressed concern, however, lest some other designs of the Soviet Government might be behind these Russian demands, especially in view of the publicity given them in very strong language by both radio and press. He asked whether we had any indications of this, to which I replied in the negative. I told the Minister that, so far, we only knew of the incident through the Tass report. Should we receive reports from our Embassy in Moscow and our Legation in Kaunas containing new aspects, I would inform him.

M. Škirpa took advantage of this opportunity to make the request, which he had done once before, to be informed about the background of the Russian demands on the Baltic States which had been put forward shortly after the conclusion of the German-Soviet Russian Treaty.³ He added that he was doing this without instructions from his Government. I told him that I had no knowledge of the events myself.³

WOERMANN

³ See vol. VIII, documents Nos. 130, 141, 142, 168, 174, 182, 190, 254.

⁴ In Moscow telegram No. 1021 of May 30 (432/219528) Schulenburg reported that the Soviet step with respect to the Red Army soldiers who had disappeared had "caused a sensational stir in political and diplomatic circles here. It is believed that the present demands could be the first move toward energetic Soviet action against Lithuania and possibly also against the other Baltic States." On May 31, as reported in telegram No. 1028 (432/219526), Schulenburg spoke to Molotov about the Lithuanian matter. "Molotov stated that the abuses criticized by the Soviet Government will have to be absolutely stopped. I asked whether in his view a settlement *could* be brought about. Molotov replied that he hoped it would be possible provided the Lithuanian Government showed good will." In a further report of June 5 (432/219513) Schulenburg enclosed a memorandum of a conversation with the Estonian Minister in Moscow (432/219511-12), who had said he thought the Lithuanian difficulty could be settled; Schulenburg had replied that he "had heard nothing which contradicted this view." In his report Schulenburg commented on evidence that the Soviet Government was acquiring considerable sums of Baltic States currency, from which he thought it "could be concluded that the Soviet Government intends to make extensive expenditures in these countries (for building barracks, airfields, etc.,) but does not have in mind at present the destruction of their existence as states."

No. 354

830/280872-80

Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Economic Policy Department

TOP SECRET

BERLIN, May 30, 1940.

Subject: Aspects of the economic organization of the peace.

This memorandum assumes that the final victory has been won, and that, therefore, England accepts all German conditions.

I. With regard to the future economic organization of the world there arise three essential problems:

- 1) the Greater German economic sphere,
- 2) the German colonial empire,
- 3) the reconstruction of German foreign trade after the war.

Under 1) The Greater German economic sphere:

The economic inclusion of Holland, Belgium, Luxembourg, and Norway in the Greater German sphere can take place independently of whether they remain independent states or not. The most radical measure in this connection would be a customs and currency union. A customs union alone is not sufficient as long as foreign exchange restrictions are retained and form the decisive factor in organizing the international exchange of goods. From the point of view of German economy the customs and currency union with the above-mentioned four countries is possible. The inclusion of the sources of raw materials in Norway, Belgium, and Luxembourg is a great gain. With the favorable state of business which can be expected to continue after the end of the war, disadvantages for German industry are hardly to be feared, and can, in any case, easily be overcome by means of a planned economy. All four countries are certainly areas which must import wheat. This, however, would not be of decisive importance, since we may expect a development of increasingly closer economic relations with Russia and the Southeast.

In establishing a uniform currency, the most difficult problem will be the maintenance of monetary unity between the Netherlands and the Dutch Indies. The settlement of the international debt relations of the above-mentioned countries, which is in itself very complicated, will be simplified by the fact that there exist capital obligations in the first place to England and France.

Some tables, showing the most important figures of the production and foreign trade of the three countries and the way in which the production of these countries and of Germany supplement each other, are enclosed.¹

¹ Enclosure not found.

Under 2) The German colonial empire:

The creation of a German colonial empire in Africa, to include all German colonies and the Belgian Congo, would enable Germany largely to close the gaps in its supplies of raw materials. Cotton and wool, rubber and various ores, are the main exports of the areas mentioned.² A survey of the production and export figures, and of the German demand, is enclosed.³ It must be remembered in this connection that production has been neglected, above all in the Belgian Congo.

The economic unity between these colonial territories and Germany could be ensured by a customs union or at least by customs preferences on the one hand and by a common currency on the other. In this case too the more efficacious measure would be the common currency. It is, however, irrelevant whether, for internal reasons or in order to keep separate the budgeting and finances of the motherland and the colonial empire, a special currency is created or the Reichsmark directly introduced. It is above all important that there should be no foreign exchange control between the motherland and the colonial empire and that, in this connection, a unified economic area should be created.

Under 3) Reconstruction of German foreign trade after the war:

It may be assumed that the economic tasks outlined in sections 1) and 2) will fully employ the whole economic strength of the German people, and more than that, it will even strain it considerably. It would therefore not be expedient at the moment to consider further close links in Europe, such as customs unions or the like. This is also not necessary, since the conditions for a favorable development, precisely for trade with the European countries, exist in any case.

There follows a short survey grouped under countries and groups of countries:

Russia

The further development of the close economic relations with Russia will be one of the most important tasks. Here our position will be considerably more favorable than it has been up to now. Russian demand will remain the same as it is now, our power to produce will have become considerably greater, so that it will be much easier to meet this demand. Conversely, the opening up of large new sources of raw materials for Germany will make us less dependent than before upon the supply of Russian raw materials.

Italy

Between the new Italian Empire with its enlarged colonial possessions in North Africa and the Greater German Reich with its

² There are handwritten question marks over the words "cotton," "wool," and "rubber" and there is also a marginal note in Ritter's handwriting which reads: "Coffee, tea, cocoa, tobacco, vegetable oils."

³ Enclosure not found.

colonial empire an increase on the present exchange of goods of about 800 million marks per annum may be expected. Our position with respect to Italy will also be much more favorable than previously. The Italian need for industrial finished goods and above all for capital goods will considerably increase. The Italian demand for coal also will increase rather than decrease as Italy will probably find no coal in her new territories. On the other hand we shall be less dependent on Italy than previously, as we shall find tropical fruits or similar products in our own colonies and also because some raw material supplies which we have previously obtained from Italy, we shall probably be able to obtain within our own borders (e. g., hemp,* rice). Our need for mercury and bauxite will, however, probably be as great as before, as neither of these is found in the new German territories.

Southeast Europe

Southeast Europe will, then as now, remain for Germany an important basis of raw materials and food and an important market for German industrial products. Its importance as a source of supply for raw materials will decline somewhat, while its importance as a grain and fodder supplier will yet increase considerably. Competition in the Southeast is hardly to be feared anymore; we have in these countries now already more than 50 percent, partly even up to 70 percent, of their foreign trade. These figures will increase further through the incorporation of the new German territories. Italy, the only serious economic competitor, will probably be diverted by other tasks. In any event it would do no harm if Italy should somewhat increase its share in the trade.

The Near East

It is to be assumed that Turkey, which is apparently no longer enjoying her latest political escapade, will be absolutely ready to resume the close connection of her economy with Germany. In the other countries of the Near East we had up to the present to consider mainly Russian, French, and English competition. Since the settlement has been made with Russia and the French and English influence in this area after the war will have fallen considerably, it is to be expected that we shall be able to continue building up our economic position in these countries without disturbance, which position we had greatly strengthened in the past few years. The question of the petroleum interests in the Near East still requires special study. The solution will largely depend first on the future political formation of this area and further on whether we decide to induce England or France to cede or sell to us certain participations in third countries in which Germany is particularly interested (see section II No. 1).

* There is a question mark in handwriting over this word.

Northern Countries

Finland and the three small Baltic countries are geographically and economically so dependent upon us that, in the economic field, we shall automatically receive everything which we do not have to leave to Russia for political reasons.

Close economic ties with *Sweden* are important. This can probably best be assured at first by delivery treaties valid for several years under which Sweden will undertake to supply us with the greater part of her ore and timber^{*} exports. In the foreseeable future we shall probably still need ore and timber in very large quantities. Securing the Lorraine and northern French mines for German sources of supply and the incorporation of territories in the east will not basically alter anything.

The treatment of Denmark is not very easy. In the first place it will be psychologically and politically wise to take into consideration to a certain extent the fact that Denmark has not opposed us and to bring the country into a customs and currency union only of its own free will. Through skillful handling it should, however, be possible to persuade Denmark as to the advantage of entering this customs and currency union which would surround her like a wreath. The entry of Denmark, moreover, will be a certain liability in so far as Denmark is the main consumer of fodder which cannot be provided in the Greater German sphere (about one million tons annually which must be supplied from Southeast Europe, Russia, and in artificial form from overseas).

England

Despite all the political developments, German-English trade, and above all trade with the English motherland, before the World War as well as in the years after the war has in general developed well and shown stability in times of depression. In all probability this development will also continue after the war in the not too distant future. If England retains India and the three great Dominions remain loyal it will be of great importance to make at least a breach in the English preference system (Ottawa) by means of an extensive Anglo-German agreement. With respect to a demand for the complete abolition of the Ottawa system it would have to be considered that especially after a lost war the English would probably regard this system as one of the last links binding the old Empire together.

France

The future development of German-French trade relations depends in the first place on the treatment of the territories containing the mineral deposits in Lorraine and northern France. If these territories are taken into the Greater German economic sphere, German-

^{*} There is a question mark in handwriting in the margin opposite this word.

French trade will probably fall considerably, especially as French agricultural products on the German market could be replaced to a great part by products from the German colonies. If the mineral deposits are not incorporated in the Greater German economic sphere then binding long term delivery agreements must be made with France in a more definite form than those with Sweden.

Japan

The development in the past few years has shown in increasing measure that the intensification of German-Japanese economic relations has been largely at Germany's expense. This will probably not change at first in the future but in view of the small part which Japan will play in the total expansion of German economy in the future, it can be accepted, if this is desired on political grounds.

China

As soon as the consolidation of China makes only some little progress and as soon as political conditions permit Germany to work the Chinese market more intensively, China will become a large and interesting market.

United States

We shall be in a position after the war to treat the United States very coolly economically. The change in the raw material situation to our advantage will make us largely independent. Whatever copper, oil, and cotton we shall still have to obtain from there we shall be able to pay for without great difficulty by the sale of German industrial products.

South America

The political agitation against Germany in South America which at present is at its height will after the victorious conclusion of the war make room for a great disenchantment. Then all the conditions will exist again for the further development of our promising trade with South America, which in the past few years had shown a particularly strong growth. Any important change in the structure of this foreign trade will hardly be necessary.

To sum up it can be said that the foreign trade of the Greater German Reich after the war will probably be much greater in value and volume than before the war. Its shrinking with respect to the outside naturally caused by the incorporation of certain territories will be more than balanced by the fact that we shall take over the foreign trade of these incorporated countries and that the economic strength of the Greater German Reich will have a productive capacity which will enable us, to an extent much greater than previously, to meet the desires of foreign countries for goods. The broadening of our raw material basis will be an important factor in the increase of German productive capacity as well as in the improvement of our general position with regard to trade policy in negotiations with third countries.

II. In addition to the basic questions dealt with in the foregoing section I, a number of other points in the economic and financial spheres must be cleared up on the conclusion of peace. The authors of the Treaty of Versailles, as is well known, understood perfectly how to secure economic and financial advantages under the Treaty in the most varied fields, completely ignoring the private rights of German nationals. I assume that we shall deliberately, and precisely in contrast to the Treaty of Versailles, not repeat this example. Accordingly, therefore, the confiscation of enemy property in Germany and in the territories occupied by German troops will not be considered. Similarly in the ordinary sphere of commercial policy we would not compel the enemy countries to grant Germany most-favored-nation treatment one-sidedly for a fixed period (under the Versailles Treaty it was 5 years).

Even if we are guided by the great principle that retribution in this respect shall not be exacted, we shall still in special areas have to make a number of separate agreements. I give the following examples:

(1) The sale of English and French interests in third countries, which are of particular interest to us. In this category are, for example, lead mines owned by the English and copper mines by the French, both in Yugoslavia, as well as the petroleum wells owned by the English and French in Rumania.

(2) The restoration of German tonnage at least to its pre-war standard by the surrender of the corresponding amount of English and French tonnage.

(3) The abolition of the still existing extensive dependence of German news agencies, apart from wireless communication, on England and France (Telegraph and Overseas Cables, etc.).

These are for the time being suggestions; the details can be examined as soon as the time has arrived for other ministries and offices to be brought in for the preparatory work.

III. If the end of the war brings with it a somewhat fair distribution of the world's raw materials and to a certain degree at least removes the one-sided debt liability of certain groups of states created by the abnormal development of the last 25 years, we shall then have the prerequisites for a solution of the international currency problem. It goes beyond the scope of this memorandum to deal with these questions more fully here, particularly as they cannot be settled in the peace treaties with the individual countries. Attention must in any event, however, be drawn to the fact that authoritative German personalities must in good time decide whether Germany in connection with the peace negotiations should also take the initiative to settle the international currency problem. In this connection it would have to be taken into account that a really effective new distribution

of the gold of the note-issuing banks of the world could not be achieved by the peace settlement, because at the present time about three-quarters of the known gold holdings in the world (i. e., without Russia) are in the United States.

CLODIUS

No. 355

141/126588

Minute by an Official of the State Secretary's Secretariat

[Undated.¹]

Senior Counselor von Etsdorf dictated by telephone the following telegram from Counselor of Legation Werkmeister, Foreign Ministry representative with Army Group B, from Brussels:

Rumors are circulating in political quarters here that the Belgian Government in Paris intends to depose the King and proclaim a republic. The Government accuses the King of having behaved not like a Belgian, but like a German. Large sections of the population here are hoping that the King will make a public statement relieving the members of the Cabinet of their posts and that the Germans will enable him to form a new Cabinet which will work hand in hand with the German occupying authorities.

Supplementary to the report sent through by telephone this morning,² the Italian Ambassador³ informed Counselor of Legation Werkmeister that his suggestion to have the Belgian Cardinal Primate see the King so that he might exhort the Belgian people to range themselves behind the King was fully approved by the Nuncio here. The Cardinal was prepared to make such an exhortation.

Herewith submitted to the State Secretary.⁴

SIEGFRIED

¹ Presumably May 30. See footnote 2.

² Apparently a reference to a report of a telephone call from Etsdorf at mid-day on May 30 describing a conversation between Werkmeister and the Italian Ambassador in Brussels in which the latter had made the suggestion that the Cardinal Primate should be allowed to visit the King (141/126584). The report was forwarded to the Foreign Minister on his Special Train.

³ Marchese Giacomo Paulucci di Calboli Barone.

⁴ A telegram from the Foreign Minister's office aboard his Special Train was received at the Foreign Ministry at 9:25 p. m. on May 30 for forwarding to Werkmeister (413/215692). It contained instructions as follows:

"The Foreign Minister asks that in connection with your report about the visit of the Italian Ambassador and about the views prevailing in political quarters in Brussels, you adopt an entirely noncommittal attitude. You are not authorized to undertake any initiative on your own part, to give any sort of statement, or to make any political decisions whatever. You are requested for the future to report on all happenings, just as in the past. In case any decision must be made, it must be made solely by the Foreign Minister personally.

"Report immediately that instructions have been carried out."

No. 356

F12/224-225

Benito Mussolini to Adolf Hitler

ROME, May 30, 1940.

FÜHRER: I thank you once more for the message ¹ which you sent me and in which I found the information concerning the courage of the soldiers of the different armies particularly interesting.

In the meantime I have received news of the capitulation of Belgium and I congratulate you on this.

I have delayed my reply to you for some days because I wanted to announce to you my decision ² to enter the war as of June 5. Should you consider that I ought to wait a few days longer for the sake of better coordination with your plans, you will tell me so; the Italian people are however impatient to be at the side of the German people in the struggle against the common foe.

During these 9 months the efforts made in the field of military preparations have been significant. Today there are 70 divisions whose striking power is good; of these, 12 are overseas (220,000 men in Libia, 100,000 in Albania). Italian East Africa has 350,000 men available—Italians and natives—who are not included in the figures given.

As I have told you earlier, the Navy and Air Force are already on a wartime footing.

I shall assume supreme command of all the armed forces. If I had the means I could form another 70 divisions, for there is no lack of manpower.

From the political point of view I consider it necessary not to extend the conflict to the Danube Basin and the Balkans, from which Italy too must draw those supplies which she will no longer be able to obtain from beyond Gibraltar.

I think that a statement on these lines which I shall make at an appropriate moment will have a reassuring effect on those nations and will render them impervious to any possible moves by the Allies.

Once this is established, our General Staffs will take the requisite steps for the development of the operations.

While awaiting a reply from you, pray accept, Führer, the expression of my comradely friendship.

MUSSOLINI

¹ Document No. 317.

² Mussolini had announced and explained this decision in a meeting with the Chiefs of Staff of the Italian Army, Navy, and Air Force held on May 29. See *Hitler e Mussolini: lettere e documenti*, pp. 43-47.

No. 357

F12/217-221

Adolf Hitler to Benito Mussolini

THE FÜHRER'S HEADQUARTERS, May 31, 1940.

DUCE: The information which you have just imparted to me in your letter¹ has moved me most profoundly. If there could still be anything which could strengthen my unshakable belief in the victorious outcome of this war, it was your statement. Our two régimes will not only set the pattern of the new Europe, but above all they will together be strong enough to safeguard and preserve the results of their struggle for a long time to come.

You wish me, Duce, to give you my views on the intended date for your entry into the war and whether its postponement for a few days might be in our common interest.

In this connection I should first of all like to give you a conclusive picture of the state of the operations at the moment.

The battle against the British Expeditionary Force and the remnants of the French 1st, 9th, and 7th Armies will be over today, tomorrow, or the day after tomorrow at the latest. Apart from the Dutch and Belgian Armies at least 52 French and English divisions have been hit by the catastrophe. Of the English Expeditionary Force one division was not in this zone at all, but had been installed with small detachments north of Saarbrücken along the Maginot Line. It had been withdrawn from there and is now probably the only British division in France which is anywhere near complete. Part of a British armored division which was in Flanders has escaped and is at present also south of the Aisne or the Somme. Everything else which England sent to the Continent has been defeated and destroyed. For some days they have been attempting to save what men can be saved with every conceivable kind of ship even down to rowboats. Their losses in this are enormous. Only a small percentage of battered defenseless and unarmed men are reaching the English coast.

Of the French divisions in this zone some parts may perhaps have escaped right at the beginning of the fighting. But all in all by far the bulk of all active French divisions can be regarded as completely wiped out, and the same applies to a large number of reserve divisions.

It is not possible at present to form any idea of the numbers of prisoners or the extent of the captured war material. It may give you some idea, Duce, when you hear that five complete infantry divisions had to be detailed by us only to move this immense mass of prisoners.

¹ Document No. 356. Mussolini's letter was handed to Hitler by Ambassador Alfieri on the morning of May 31 (F8/0004-0006). See document No. 317, footnote 3.

There is no need for me to assure you, Duce, that further operations will follow in the shortest possible time, but in view of the vast area covered several days will be required for organization.

If, Duce, you could postpone your date for 3 days at the most, this would have the following advantages: Our Luftwaffe has now reconnoitered new operational airfields of the French Air Force pretty accurately and ascertained the strength of these forces. In conjunction with other measures they will again attack these French air bases during the next few days and, if possible, utterly smash them. If, as a result of action already embarked upon by Italy or for fear of such action being imminent, France should transfer her Air Force at the last minute, then this might nullify our operation while you, Duce, would not be able to obtain immediate information about the new operational airfields to which some of the remnants of the French Air Force are certainly still being transferred. Otherwise I am hoping at any rate to be able to put the French Air Force out of action once and for all in the course of next week. But once they have fled again it requires days of searching to find out their new hiding places.

These are the reasons why I would request you to consider whether it might be possible to postpone your entry into the war until about the end of next week, say until June 6 or 8. The 7th would of course do as well, but it is a Friday and may perhaps be regarded by many—at any rate there are such among the German people—as an unlucky day on which to begin. But, Duce, no matter which way you decide, even the mere fact of your entering the war is an element calculated to deal the front of our enemies a staggering blow.

In this connection I should like to assure you that I am happy that you yourself are assuming supreme command of your armed forces. On the basis of my own large experience I regard this as the most important prerequisite for success.

Similarly, I fully endorse your view that it cannot but be desirable for us to keep the Danube Basin and the Balkans out of the conflict, if this is at all possible. I am likewise of the opinion that such a declaration by you, Duce, will remove this element of danger. The crushing defeat of France—and this seems to me to be the most decisive factor of all—is of necessity bound to secure for you, Duce, and for your country political hegemony as a power in the Mediterranean—a hegemony which already exists by force of geography.

Please inform me, Duce, of the final date you have chosen and which I will keep as a strict secret known to only a few. I can then give my General Staff instructions at once—apart from sending the Luftwaffe into action—to take further steps and establish liaison with your officers immediately.

I should however point out to you once more, Duce, that if for any particular reason—say the keeping of the date secret, etc.—you think

you would prefer to go into action on the 5th, this date too will, of course, be acceptable to me.

Should you, Duce, find it necessary or even expedient for you yourself to see me and speak to me personally at any time, I am, of course, prepared to arrange a meeting with you immediately.

I now greet you, Duce, in loyal comradeship secure in the consciousness of great joint success.

Yours.²

² Hitler's signature does not appear on the file copy.

No. 358

413/215685-87

The Foreign Ministry Representative With Army Group B to the Foreign Minister

Telegram en clair

SECRET

HNOX, May 31, 1940—11:25 p. m.

Received June 1—4:30 a. m.

To the Foreign Minister's Special Train.

With reference to your instructions by telegram No. 801 of May 31.¹

Army Group B has just reported by telegram as follows to OKH:

In accordance with permission granted him the Italian Ambassador yesterday called on the King of the Belgians and has given the following account of his interview with him. Counselor of Legation Dr. Werkmeister was present at the interview. The Ambassador began by emphasizing that he knew the Führer personally, and that during the interview he had been careful to bear in mind what he surmised to be the Führer's intentions regarding Belgium. Moreover, he pointed out that he had already received instructions from the Duce 2 months ago to "help" as much as possible in Belgium, and he emphasized several times that he was entirely at our disposal for any soundings or inquiries. Should the replies he had made to the King not accord with our interests, he requested to be informed as soon as possible as he could put matters right at once. In any case he personally wanted to keep our confidence and that of the King of the Belgians. He requested that his remarks be treated as strictly confidential.

1) To a question by the King as to whether the Ambassador thought his course of action had been correct, the Ambassador replied in the affirmative, at the same time expressing his admiration to the King for his attitude.

2) To an inquiry as to what the Belgian people were thinking of the King's attitude the Ambassador declared that the majority of the peo-

¹ Not found.

ple and the army were solidly behind the King. A minority among the bourgeoisie and aristocracy was wavering in its attitude. A small section of the upper classes disapproved of the King's attitude.

3) The Ambassador replied to the King's inquiry as to what the world thought of his attitude by saying that he understood from Italian radio reports that the Italian people and Government were full of admiration for him and endorsed his attitude to the full. He could say the same of Hungary. Judging from the German press and radio he thought he could also infer that the German Government respected the King as a brave soldier and would certainly not do anything to render his present position more difficult.

4) The Ambassador had informed the King that French and English troops had looted extensively and had, without gaining any military advantage, for instance, blown up a number of bridges in Brussels. The King was indignant at this conduct.

5) The King said he desired, above all, to retain his people's confidence and therefore to avoid giving the impression that he wished to reign at all costs under German pressure [*"sous la pression d'Allemagne"*]. He hoped that Germany would do nothing to separate him from his people. In this connection the Ambassador had remarked that the situation in Belgium had undergone an almost incredible change in the last few weeks. The people despised the English, and, conversely, admitted the demeanor of the German Army to be correct and magnanimous. Germany had won a great moral battle in Belgium which seemed to him more important than a military success.

6) The King further informed the Ambassador that in order to justify his attitude he was considering the dispatch of a message to two neutral persons, namely the Pope and Roosevelt, in which he would explain his attitude quite dispassionately since the bitterest reproaches were being made to him by the French Government as well as by the former Belgian Government. The Ambassador did not oppose this idea and, what is more, he informed us that he considered it a good one.

7) During the interview the Ambassador also informed the King that the Cardinal Primate endorsed the King's attitude and that he was prepared, after an interview with the King, to exhort the Belgian people to range themselves without exception behind him.

8) The King told the Ambassador he had wished to live in a small country-house in the neighborhood of Brussels, as he felt he was a prisoner of war. The Ambassador, however, told him that he considered the accommodation in the Palace of Laeken arranged for by the Germans more dignified, and therefore more suitable, upon which the King did not revert any more to his request.

9) The Ambassador said finally that he had found the courage to say quite frankly to the King, who was inadequately informed about radio reports from Paris, that the Paris Government was accusing

him of treachery and that the Belgian writer, Maeterlinck, had even stated that the German blood in the King's veins was making itself felt again and that Judas was the right name for him. The King replied to the Ambassador in this connection that he had more than once endeavored to rally the Belgian Government round him. They had however not met his wishes and had left the country.

10) Finally, the Ambassador suggested that as soon as possible German reports be broadcast in French and Flemish to the Belgian people who at present obtained their news solely from French reports issued hourly. The German broadcasting station in question, for example, Cologne or Luxembourg, should however, for reasons of expediency, announce itself as the Brussels station. The impression gained from the Ambassador's account suggests that he is taking it for granted that Germany will leave inviolate national independence and the sovereign rights of the King, but that we would presumably, for reasons of military security, have to be in control of the Channel coast and Antwerp. On being asked whether he would report to his Government on his interview with the King he replied in the negative since, at the moment, it was primarily of exclusive interest to us.

Headquarters Army Group B

WERKMEISTER

No. 359

108/112194

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

Moscow, June 1, 1940—4:36 a. m.

No. 1080 of May 31

Received June 1—8:23 a. m.

With reference to your telegram No. 889 of May 30.¹

Today I discussed in detail with Molotov the question of normalizing Soviet-Italian relations. Molotov again raised considerable objections and drew attention in particular to the fact that Italy had so far done nothing positive to show her good will. I put it to Molotov that the normalizing of relations between two countries, both of which had a close relationship with Germany, could not but be to the advantage of all three. The Soviet Government ought therefore not to reject the hand offered by Mussolini.

It was only after urgent representations that I succeeded in getting Molotov to state his readiness to submit to his Government once more the arguments I had put forward.

I did not fail to point out that a speedy decision in this matter was in our joint interest.

SCHULENBURG

¹ Document No. 349.

No. 360

F9/0369-0870

The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

ROME, June 1, 1940—3:10 p. m.

TOP SECRET

Received June 1—4:40 p. m.

No. 1020 of June 1

For the Foreign Minister personally.

As reported by telephone, I handed the Duce the Führer's letter¹ at 10:40 a. m. in the presence of Ciano. The Duce read it through himself and his comment at the end was "important, extremely important." Then he read out the Italian translation to Ciano and me. He summarized the Führer's description of the present state of the British and French forces in the words: "Smashed, completely smashed." His first reaction to the Führer's observations on the question of the date was to assert that this once again proved the Führer's comprehensive strategic genius. He, the Duce, to be sure was essentially a man who adhered strictly to plans once made and dates once fixed, especially since everyone here was gradually coming to reckon with imminent entry into the war; the man in the street was expecting this to happen from one moment to the other. But after all, even if he waited until the 8th, it was only a question of a few days, and for reasons explained to him by the Führer, it seemed expedient to wait that time; the superstition regarding the 7th was also prevalent in Italy and one must take such popular prejudices into account, childish though they were. He would in any case speak to Badoglio and other military advisers immediately and see whether a delay of 3 days would fit in with military measures already set on foot. He hoped to be able to dispatch a reply to the Führer tomorrow morning at the latest and would then again use the same channels as for his last letter, namely a telephone message in cipher through Alfieri.

Regarding the Balkan question he confirmed afresh and with emphasis that he was not contemplating any action against Yugoslavia and Greece. (In connection with this remark, Ciano reported to the Duce that he had again made a similar reassuring statement to the Yugoslav Minister that very morning.) When he spoke to his people from the balcony at the hour of decision he would make an appropriate statement in which he intended to mention Turkey and Egypt also. Moreover a political trend aiming at drawing away from England had recently been noticeable in certain circles in Cairo.

The Duce then spoke of his Navy, which he again described as being 100 percent ready for action. The first few of his 120 submarines had sailed for the Atlantic yesterday evening, other ocean-going sub-

¹ Document No. 357.

marines (he mentioned 6 or 8) were at Massaua destined for the Pacific, others were in the Dodecanese, while the rest had orders to make for their bases. Of the 4 battleships at his disposal the two 35,000-ton ships, the most modern of any navy, would also be in commission in a very short time.

The Duce then spoke about Roosevelt's fourth message of yesterday, on which I am reporting separately² on the basis of information previously given to me by Ciano, and stated that just like the various recent moves by the British and French Ambassadors,³ these messages showed clearly the moral decline on the enemy's side; visibly excited and raising his voice considerably he added that these childish attempts only proved that Roosevelt did not know him, for actually each such attempt to exert pressure only strengthened his determination for war, and even provided one more reason for him to strike now. When Roosevelt spoke of American interests in the Mediterranean he, the Duce, could speak with equal justification about Italian interests in the Caribbean Sea!

The Duce was obviously pleased with the words in the Führer's letter which referred to his decision to assume personal direction of the whole of the operations. With regard to the Navy he had instructed Cavagnari⁴ to inform our Naval Attaché. The Friedrichshafen talks⁵ had laid the foundations for cooperation. Directly after me the Duce received Marshal Badoglio and General Pricolo⁶ who were already waiting in the anteroom.

MACKENSEN

² See document No. 363.

³ See documents Nos. 340 and 342.

⁴ Chief of the Italian Naval Staff.

⁵ In June 1939. See vol. VI, appendix on Italian-German Staff talks.

⁶ Chief of Staff of the Italian Air Force.

No. 361

91/100218

The Director of the Political Department to the Legation in Eire

Telegram

TOP SECRET

BERLIN, June 1, 1940—5:20 p. m.

No. 179

zu Pol. I 663 g. Rs.¹

For the Minister personally.

With reference to your telegrams Nos. 269² and 272.³

I. For information only.

Inquiries made of the competent authorities have revealed that B[randy] was actually entrusted with special missions directed ex-

¹ Pol. I 663 g. Rs.: Not found.

² Document No. 314.

³ See document No. 314, footnote 5.

clusively against England and was to make use of personal connections with the Irish. Any activity directed against the Irish Government was expressly forbidden.

From a group of certain Irish personalities subversive plans against the Irish Government were frequently submitted, and probably also to B., but they were always rejected.

II. Instructions for guidance in your statements to the Government there are reserved.

III. Please destroy this telegram after you have read it.

WOERMANN

No. 362

19/12144

The State Secretary to the Embassy in the United States

Telegram

MOST URGENT

SECRET

No. 596

BERLIN, June 1, 1940—7:05 p. m.

zu Pol. I M 7430 g.¹

7431 g.²

With reference to your telegrams Nos. 979¹ and 989 [988].²

Upon inquiry the military authorities have expressed themselves as follows on the facts given in the two telegrams:

"1) No instructions for sabotage in the U. S. A. have been given by the Wehrmacht to Hausberger or to anyone else. Statements to the contrary are lies.

2) They agree to Hausberger being sent out of the U. S. A.

3) Baron Maydell has not been in the U. S. A. for some time. There is no intention of employing him in the U. S. A. again.

4) No one by the name of Bergmann (with an artificial leg) is known. Probably an agent provocateur.

5) For compelling military reasons the procurement of intelligence from the U. S. A. cannot be dispensed with. The political objections to sabotage in the U. S. A. expressed by the Foreign Ministry and the Embassy are fully shared by the OKW and have always been taken into account."

Supplement: OKW has quite definitely agreed that no instructions of any kind for sabotage in the U. S. A. have been given nor will any be issued.

WEIZSÄCKER

¹ Pol. I M 7430 g.: document No. 289.

² Pol. I M 7431 g.: document No. 290.

No. 363

B14/B001981-32

The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

ROME, June 1, 1940—7:15 p. m.

TOP SECRET

Received June 1—8:30 p. m.

No. 1022 of June 1

On the way from the Chigi to the Venezia today Ciano told me that yesterday the American Ambassador had again delivered orally a message,¹ actually the fourth, from President Roosevelt for the Duce, without however insisting again on being received by the Duce personally. Ciano read me the brief notes which he had made from information given by the Ambassador on the intended message for the audience which he was to have with the Duce. According to these, the message contains a reference to American interests in the Mediterranean which are alleged to lie in the effect which hostilities in the Mediterranean would have on United States trade relations, and furthermore it contains another reference to the bloodshed entailed by Italy's intervention and, even though automatic American intervention is not threatened, it is emphasized that hostilities by Italy might cause neutrals to resort to arms and that United States reaction would be to double her deliveries of war material to Italy's enemies. That meant, Ciano thought, an open admission that deliveries were already in progress, even though he regarded them as of little importance.

Ciano stated that in reply he had told the Ambassador, at first merely as his personal opinion, that the Italian Government was taking careful note of his statements, but nevertheless he did not believe that they could influence the Duce's attitude of which the Ambassador was aware. He would inform the Duce. The Duce's only reply to the report which so far had only been communicated to him by telephone had been one single sentence more or less as follows: "He should leave me alone," and he had then hung up the receiver.

When the subject came up during my subsequent audience with the Duce, he expressed himself in the manner described by me in my telegram No. 1020² of today. It should also be added that on the subject of the threat to double American deliveries of war material to the Allies, he pointed out laughingly that so far, according to information available to him, these supplies had amounted last month to a total of 150 aircraft.

MACKENSEN

¹ For the text see *Peace and War: United States Foreign Policy, 1931-1941*, pp. 538-540. For Phillips' report on his démarche with Ciano see *ibid.*, p. 544. Cf. William Phillips, *Ventures in Diplomacy*, pp. 277-278.

² Document No. 360.

No. 364

175/136963

*The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Rumania*¹

Telegram

No. 644 of June 1

BERLIN, June 1, 1940—10:00 p. m.

For the Minister personally.

With reference to your telegram No. 808.²

Please reply to the Rumanian Minister President with regard to the communication he made in the following sense:

I had noted with interest the ideas which actuated the Rumanian Government, namely, to bring about closer cooperation with Germany and a détente in the Balkans. However, I was not able to detect from the statements made by the Minister President whether the Rumanian Government had concrete ideas on the pacification of the Balkans which it desired. If the Rumanian Government wished to work for the pacification and a definitive solution of the problems in the Balkans, the question would naturally arise whether and to what extent Rumania might be disposed to agree to any revisionist demands by her neighbors, as for example by Russia in the Bessarabian question. Germany was for her part, as had repeatedly been emphasized, not interested in these questions in anyway. It must therefore be left to the Rumanian Government to define more precisely its views on this subject if necessary.

RIBBENTROP

¹ This instruction was sent by teletype to the Foreign Ministry from Ribbentrop's Special Train with the request for immediate transmission to Bucharest. Another copy of this document indicates that the instruction was received in Berlin on June 1, at 7:08 p. m. (175/136953)

² Document No. 345.

No. 365

8862/E618187-91

The Foreign Minister to the State Secretary

Teletype

No. 6

SPECIAL TRAIN, June 1, 1940.

Received June 1—10:30 p. m.

RS 2288.

I. Please have the following telegram sent to Ambassador von Thermann in Buenos Aires immediately over my signature.¹

I request you to call on the Argentine Foreign Minister at once, and if possible also on the President, and make the following statement to them on my behalf with the greatest emphasis:

¹ This telegram was sent as No. 455 of June 1 to Buenos Aires at 2:30 a. m. on June 2. It replaced a draft of June 1 (8862/E618136-37) submitted by Weizsäcker by teletype to Ribbentrop, stating that no action could be taken until the case had been examined.

1) The Reich Government is extremely surprised at the inflammatory agitation launched against Germany as a result of the sinking of the *S. S. Uruguay*.³ The whole nature of this inflammatory agitation in the press and speeches in Parliament reveals at first glance that it is out of all proportion to the importance of the loss of the steamship and is not even due to real excitement among the population at this loss, but that it is a case of artificial machinations of a most sinister kind which have been set in motion by anti-German elements.

2) In addition there is no evidence of any sort available that the steamship was sunk by German naval forces at all. We must, therefore, strongly protest against the fact that the Argentine Government has apparently from the outset intended to impute the sinking to German naval forces.

3) Likewise, we must most definitely reject as inadmissible Argentina's belief that she can, without more ado, proceed from the assumption that if there is a case of sinking by German naval forces at all, this has been done without justification. We have not been able to deduce anything from the statements by the President and the Foreign Minister, as reported by you, which might justify the charge of unwarranted sinking and in consequence the demand for satisfaction from Germany. When dealing with neutral merchant shipping, German naval forces adhere strictly to German prize regulations which are on all points in accordance with present international law. Should Argentina object in this connection that she does not recognize food as being contraband, you should reply that it was England and not Germany who started by declaring a hunger blockade. If Argentina wishes to complain about food being treated as contraband, she must therefore address herself to England.

4) From all the facts of the matter and in particular the completely unjustified manner in which the incident is at once being exploited in Argentina for an inflammatory campaign against Germany, we cannot avoid the suspicion that the sinking of the steamship was engineered by the enemies of Germany in order thus to undermine German-Argentine relations. It is not the first time that England has acted in this way (the *Athenia* incident⁴ and recent reports of English designs upon the American *S. S. Roosevelt*.)⁵ In this connection, please point out in a suitable manner that we have reasons to assume that enemy propaganda, which has unlimited financial means at its disposal and stops at nothing, seems to have found in influential persons in Argentina willing tools for its plans. Investigations which we have started will perhaps enable us shortly to furnish the Argentine Government with concrete details. Our suspicion seems all the more natural, as we did not consider it possible for the Argentine public to adopt such a one-sided attitude toward Germany after care-

³ In telegrams Nos. 552 of May 29 (8862/E618133/1), 563 of May 30 (8862/E618135), and 565 of May 31 (8862/E618144) Thermann had reported on the sinking of the Argentine freighter *Uruguay* by what was believed to be a German submarine. Ortiz had assured Thermann that the Argentine Government was doing its best to keep the agitation under control. There had nevertheless been demonstrations before the German Club and the *Deutsche La Plata-Zeitung* newspaper offices.

⁴ See vol. VIII, document No. 4, footnote 1.

⁵ In telegram No. 1005 of May 24 (19/12115) from Washington, the Embassy relayed a report from the Consul General at San Francisco of rumors that the *S. S. President Roosevelt*, engaged in repatriating American citizens from Germany, was to be torpedoed by the Allies.

ful consideration and of their own accord. This is not only at variance with the friendly relations between the two countries based on a long tradition and always promoted by us, but also with Argentina's political and economic interests which quite plainly call for the maintenance and continued development of such relations with Germany. We therefore most definitely expect the Argentine Government to take more vigorous action than hitherto against so inflammatory a campaign.

I request that in your report on the results of your démarche you state whether you see any possibility, and if so what, of counteracting inflammatory agitation of this kind more effectively than hitherto. You should, for instance, consider whether you could not circulate statements in the Argentine press, intimating that there are English and American wirepullers behind the inflammatory campaign who have apparently succeeded in winning over influential persons by bribery. The necessary funds for these and similar purposes can be placed at your disposal from this end without delay.⁵

End of the telegram to Buenos Aires.

II. I request you, furthermore, to ask the Argentine Ambassador in Berlin to call on you and likewise discuss the matter with him on the basis of the above instructions.⁶

III. Moreover, I request you, in accordance with the proposal from the naval command,⁷ to instruct our Embassy in Madrid⁸ to obtain and transmit the records of any interrogations held by the Spanish authorities of the rescued crew of the S. S. *Uruguay*.

RIBBENTROP

⁵ In telegram No. 576 of June 2 (8862/E618151-52), Thermann reported the carrying out of the démarche. He reserved the subject of means of counteracting anti-German propaganda for a further report. See document No. 401.

⁶ In a memorandum, St.S. No. 403 of June 3 (8862/E618155-56) Weizsäcker noted a long interview with Olivera, who attempted to elicit some remark which he could represent to Buenos Aires as a German concession. This Weizsäcker refused to give him.

⁷ Not printed (8862/E618138).

⁸ In telegram No. 734 of June 2 (8862/E618142-43) Ritter instructed the Embassy in Madrid to make inquiries on these lines. In telegram No. 1729 of June 5 (8862/E618164-65) Stohrer reported that the *Uruguay* had, on the outbreak of hostilities, been directed to Limerick. On May 27, she was stopped by a U-boat, her papers examined, the crew ordered to boats, and the ship sunk by bombs.

No. 366

B14/B001934

The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

TOP SECRET

No. 1025 of June 1

ROME, June 1, 1940.

Received June 1—10:50 p. m.

This morning Ciano told me that before I called, he had already been to the Quirinal to inform the King about developments, and even though all decisions were in actual fact made by the Duce, to prepare him, as etiquette formally required, for the fact that Italy's

declaration of war, which under the Italian Constitution had to be made by the King, was now imminent. The King had been very understanding and feeling as a soldier had approved the Duce's decisions without raising any objection, loyal to the military traditions of the House of Savoy, as Ciano added. In addition he was filled with a genuine hatred of the French, caused in part by the news that the French had solemnly struck off the name of King Leopold of the Belgians from the roll of the Legion of Honor. When I asked whether Italy really considered a formal declaration of war necessary, Ciano replied that in the prevailing circumstances, when everyone everywhere was expecting Italy to intervene from one day to the next, there was no military advantage to be gained from omitting to do this. If that had been the case, they would have dispensed with it. Thus it [declaration of war] did not do any harm and was rather useful when for example one thought of the attitude of the United States of America to such purely legal questions.

MACKENSEN

No. 367

830/280385-29

Memorandum by Ambassador Ritter

BERLIN, June 1, 1940.

To be submitted to the Foreign Minister.

Herr Clodius and I submit with reference to our oral presentation on May 29¹ the enclosed memoranda, in first draft, on:

1. *The Greater Economic Sphere,*
2. *The Future Exports of Greater Germany,*
3. *The Colonial Empire,*
4. *Should Ireland be Excluded or Included in a Blockade of England?*

We would greatly appreciate it if we could be informed after perusal of these memoranda, how closely we have therein approached the Foreign Minister's views. We could then after renewed discussion revise and amplify this first draft.

Statistics² will follow by courier on Monday.

RITTER

[Enclosure]

BERLIN, June 1, 1940.

I. THE GREATER ECONOMIC SPHERE

The possibility of a future greater economic sphere under German leadership is now taking shape. This sphere comprises:

¹ No record of this presentation has been found.

² Not printed (830/280402-19).

1. Greater Germany (including Bohemia, Moravia, and Poland) as its economic and political center.

2. Holland, Belgium, Luxembourg, Denmark, and Norway are to be incorporated in it in economic-political forms yet to be determined. The possible forms are a system of preferential tariffs, a customs union, a customs and monetary union, or an economic union. It would appear reasonable to put off the final decision regarding the economic-political form until clarification of the future status of these countries with respect to constitutional and international law, and even then to progress gradually from the easier to the more difficult phases of economic integration in order to mitigate the inevitable economic readjustments and difficulties in these countries. Nevertheless I believe that as soon as the military and political situation permits we should promptly advance to the definitive and final form of economic integration, i. e., the economic union. War, debasement of currency, and reconstruction will automatically lead to extensive economic and social changes in these countries. If we carry the proposed transformation in economic policy immediately to its ultimate phase at that time, this process will be accomplished in one clean-up or, rather, one reconstructive effort. The reverse procedure, a progression by stages from preferential tariffs through customs union and customs and monetary union and finally to economic union would lead these nations year after year from one readjustment to another. It would be best if they were given from the outset a definitive foundation on which to base their effort of reconstruction and readjustment.

3. Already incorporated into the greater economic sphere in fact, though not in any specific economic-political form, are the countries of the Danube area. Greater Germany already has a position of economic preponderance with respect to the imports and exports of these countries, accounting on the average for 50 percent thereof. In one instance this preponderance has already attained nearly 70 percent. With Holland, Belgium, Luxembourg, Denmark, and Norway incorporated into the greater economic sphere, this preponderance will automatically be increased by additional percentages. Moreover, this position will be further enhanced over the course of the years, as the potentialities for trade between the Nordic area and the Danube area neglected in the past are systematically developed.

No new economic-political forms are therefore needed with respect to the countries of the Danube area. Cultivation and further expansion of existing relations will suffice.

4. The remaining countries of the Nordic area, Sweden, Finland, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia, must be more firmly integrated in a practical manner similar to that of the Danube area. This has already been accomplished with regard to the three Baltic nations through

the recent treaties.³ These treaties assure Greater Germany a decisive economic preponderance even now. It will suffice for us to defend and maintain this preponderance in the face of the recently observed intensified activity of the Soviet Union. Just now we are at the beginning of economic negotiations with Sweden⁴ and Finland.⁵ The principal object of these negotiations is to lay the foundation now for a reorientation of these two countries away from the world market and overseas countries, and toward the greater European economic sphere and the Baltic. To accomplish this, advantage is being taken of the presently strong pressures, but on the other hand it will be necessary, by accommodation and perhaps even sacrifices in certain areas, to offer them a positive inducement for such a reorientation.

Such a greater economic sphere comprises approximately 200 million people. These people have for the most part a consumption and production capacity above the average.

This greater economic sphere will by and large be able to feed itself given average crops and provided that readjustment of agriculture in several countries, a step necessary in any event, is carried out and a constructive price policy is pursued. In the matter of bread cereals, potatoes, meat, and dairy products the greater economic sphere is self-sufficient. Grain for fodder will have to be imported from abroad to make up for a relatively small deficit. A large deficit exists in edible fats, and a lesser in sugar.

Generally lacking are tropical and subtropical vegetable raw materials and certain metals (cf. parts II, "Future Exports," and III, "Colonial Empire").

Two stipulations must be borne in mind for the peace treaties in this connection. One is to demand, in lieu of financial reparations in money, the free delivery of the required amounts of foodstuffs and raw materials over 3, 4, or 5 years (at a rate of about 3 to 4 billion reichsmarks a year). The second is transfer of rights and interests (ownership shares, securities) in industrial and transport establishments situated in the greater economic sphere, which belong to enemy powers or their nationals, e. g., the French copper mines in Yugoslavia, the Anglo-Canadian nickel mines in Finland, and the Anglo-French petroleum interests in Rumania. This would at the same time act as a potent means of economic cohesion within the greater economic sphere.

II. THE FUTURE EXPORTS OF GREATER GERMANY

There are no grounds for concern that the postwar exports of Greater Germany or the greater economic sphere will be insufficient to provide

³ See document No. 463, footnote 5.

⁴ See document No. 486 and footnote 4.

⁵ German-Finnish trade agreements were concluded on June 29, 1940. The text of the agreements is on film 9064/H221058-93. See vol. x, documents Nos. 62 and 74.

for the required imports of raw materials and some foodstuffs from abroad. German industry with its present enlarged capacity will be under great pressure to export after armament deliveries have ceased, even taking into consideration the catching up with previously deferred projects in Greater Germany and of reconstruction in the greater economic sphere. There will be a great demand in many categories of industrial goods throughout the world. The flow of German exports will therefore be quickly restored.

Arrangements for the necessary shipping space must if possible be made in the peace treaties.

England (the United Kingdom) will after conclusion of the peace resume its trade with Germany on the former scale, in as much as Germany is prepared to do so. Germany was England's best customer. By losing that customer England would be hurt more than if the opposite should happen. The same applies with some differences to several of the Dominions, e. g., South Africa and Australia (wool).

Italy and Spain, the countries of the Danube area and the Nordic area, South and Central America, and the Far and Middle East, will buy German goods just as they did before the war. Some of these areas might perhaps have difficulties paying promptly for German exports either in cash or in goods. In such areas commercial credits would therefore have to be immediately granted in order to assure Germany of these markets in which demand will be particularly great after the war (competition of the United States).

Trade with the Soviet Union in the absence of any change in the political relations will not decrease but rather increase.

A weakened France with a diminished colonial empire will be less capable and willing to absorb German exports. But then, exports to France had already ceased playing any important part in these past years.

Trade relations with the United States could scarcely grow worse in quantity and quality than they had been even before the war. There might be reason to expect, however, that after the war even the United States will be willing to take a more positive attitude toward an area possessing such a greatly enlarged capacity for consumption.

With Germany having a colonial empire of her own and as time goes by increasing the imports of tropical and subtropical vegetable products from her own colonies, the trade possibilities with several countries will gradually undergo certain changes and a contraction, e. g., with Brazil, in regard to coffee, cotton, and fancy woods. A decline of German exports to such countries, however, would not be a loss in the total balance because Germany would then derive the corresponding amounts from her own colonial empire or from her currency area.

III. THE COLONIAL EMPIRE

A colonial empire comprising the German colonies in Africa, Belgian Congo, French Equatorial Africa (and possibly British Nigeria), after a prolonged period of intensive development, could in a large measure supply the requirements of Greater Germany and of the greater economic sphere in tropical and subtropical vegetable raw materials and articles of luxury consumption, and in addition a large part of the copper requirements. Possibly some other mineral raw materials will also be found. In 10 to 15 years the colonies will be able to supply our entire needs for edible vegetable fats, which is very important because edible fats account for the largest shortage in the greater economic sphere. They will also supply all or part of the requirements in cocoa, coffee, tea, tobacco, cotton, rubber, fancy woods, tanning extracts, etc.

The prerequisite is a considerate policy toward natives and labor. The question of labor is the most difficult problem in this respect.

Reichsmark as currency.

In principle there are to be no customs between Greater Germany and the colonial empire. An exception, for revenue reasons, would probably be made in the case of articles of luxury consumption such as coffee, tea, and tobacco.

Temporary acceptance of Belgian and French colonial officials for a period of transition, until a staff of German officials has been trained.

Invitation to settlers of German origin in South America and other countries to move to the colonial empire.

A colonial empire of this kind is not adapted to large-scale settlement. Neither would this be necessary.

SHOULD IRELAND BE EXCLUDED OR INCLUDED IN A BLOCKADE OF ENGLAND?

I. Effect on England.

1. If Ireland remains outside the blockade, that is, if the line of blockade is drawn between Ireland and England, England would be cut off from one of its food bases. Ireland has until now supplied about 5 percent of England's food requirements, mainly meat and some dairy products.

Raw materials would not be lost to England because Ireland has until now supplied practically nothing. England would be unable, or relieved of the necessity, to supply Ireland with coal (hitherto an exchange of meat for coal).

2. If Ireland is included in the blockade, that is, if ships moving between Ireland and England are not attacked as part of the blockade measures, England would be able to continue obtaining the mentioned food supplies from Ireland for some time. The shipments, however, would probably be greatly curtailed before long because

Ireland would be compelled, after being cut off from its overseas source of livestock feed, to conserve its own diminished production primarily for home consumption. Ireland would in that case supply only as much food to England as she must in order to get an absolutely necessary supply of coal from England.

II. Effect on Ireland.

Ireland, if need be, would be able to feed herself for a long time by readapting some of her food habits. Ireland possesses almost no industrial raw materials and, particularly, no coal.

1. If Ireland remains outside the blockade, that is, if the line of blockade is drawn between Ireland and England, Ireland would be able to obtain livestock feed and raw materials from overseas, as in the past, provided she is able to find the required shipping space. Her food supply would therefore not be impaired. She would, however, be cut off from her source of coal. Obtaining a substitute supply from the United States would not be easy considering the lack of shipping space of her own. Being cut off from her English coal base is therefore likely to affect Ireland seriously.

2. Inclusion of Ireland in the blockade would cut her off from her overseas livestock feed base. Her food base would thus be contracted, but the country would not starve.

Being cut off from overseas raw material sources would in that case affect Ireland not very severely because the country is not highly industrialized. It would on the other hand be able to some extent to continue obtaining its coal supply from England.

Thus the outcome for Ireland is in either case that she can subsist in a pinch. If excluded from the blockade, her food situation would be more favorable, but she would lack coal. If included in the blockade, Ireland would still be able to get her coal, but in the matter of her food supply she would have to undergo certain adjustments and restrictions.

III. Considerations I and II view only the *economic* consequences in each case. From the *political* standpoint it must not be overlooked that inclusion of Ireland in the blockade would be a violation of Ireland's neutrality. Such a violation might give rise to the idea in Ireland that in an emergency Ireland was to some extent still linked to England for better or worse. This would also have repercussions in the United States in view of the strong Irish element there.

IV. The economic and political considerations lead to the conclusion that excluding Ireland from the blockade would be preferable.

The possibilities and effects from the standpoint of naval operations are a matter that can be judged only by the Navy.*

RITTER

* See document No. 396.

No. 368

205/142365

Minute by an Official of the Political Department

BERLIN, June 1, 1940.

Pol. I M 7831 g.

An agreement was reached between the German and Swedish Navies,¹ whereby the northern exit of the Sound would be secured against the penetration of submarines by a net barrier which would be laid by German personnel (in civilian clothing), using German material, even in Swedish territorial waters. The work will commence on June 4. The laying of the barrier will be announced by Sweden.

HEYDEN-RYNSCH

¹ The text of this agreement, reached on May 28, appears in the manual for use in the German Navy *Urkunden zum Seekriegsrecht 1. September 1939 bis 31. August 1940 zusammengestellt vom Oberkommando der Kriegsmarine 1. Abt. Seekriegsleitung* (Berlin, 1941), document No. 356, p. 294.

No. 369

19/12160

The Chargé d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

URGENT

WASHINGTON, June 2, 1940—3:23 p. m.

TOP SECRET

Received June 3—12:40 a. m.

No. 1060 of June 2

For the personal attention of the State Secretary.

With reference to your telegram No. 596 of June 1.¹

If the statements by Hausberger and Bergmann are lies, there remains to be explained:

a) From whom did Hausberger receive the explosives which I have secured.

b) Who is representing himself falsely as Major von der Osten, from whom both, independently of each other, allege that they have received sabotage instructions.

THOMSEN

¹ Document No. 362.

No. 370

F9/0365

The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Italy

Telegram

No. 16 from the Special Train

JUNE 2, 1940—9:00 p. m.

For the Ambassador personally.

In confirmation of the camouflaged telephone conversation I repeat it in detail as follows:

The Führer has decided to advance the date for certain military measures. The date of June 5 proposed by the Duce is therefore en-

tirely agreeable to him. A postponement of the date until the 6th or 8th as first proposed by the Führer is therefore no longer necessary. The Führer would like to leave the final determination of the date to the Duce, though June 5 fits perfectly into the framework of the German military operations. I requested you to inform the Duce of this at once and am expecting your cipher teletype message as arranged, regarding the final date after you have spoken with Mussolini.¹

RIBBENTROP

¹ According to a memorandum by Mackensen dated June 2 (2281/481870) Ribbentrop had telephoned him from the Special Train at 6:30 p. m. Mackensen conveyed this information to the Duce at 8:10 p. m. (see document No. 371) before he had yet seen the telegraphic version of this earlier telephone message.

No. 371

F9/0367-0868

The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

TOP SECRET

No. 1039 of June 2

ROME, June 2, 1940—11:15 p. m.

Received June 3—1:05 a. m.

For the Foreign Minister personally.

The Duce has just received me at 8:10 p. m., Italian time, in the Palazzo Venezia in the presence of Count Ciano and accepted the communication¹ which I was charged with delivering. He asked Ciano to read me the manuscript of his reply to the Führer² which, after being enciphered by Anfuso, was already back in Ciano's hands and which Alfieri is to deliver tomorrow. In this connection the Duce remarked that as he had told me yesterday,³ he fully understood the Führer's reasons for postponing the date for a few days and thought that these days would be useful even now, although the Führer had been able to take certain steps which made the postponement no longer seem so necessary. He himself had decided on the date mentioned in the letter for declaring war and for addressing his people, and on the following day for the commencement of hostilities. He wished to adhere irrevocably to this date, for which even the press communiqué, etc., had been prepared down to the last detail, especially as I was able to tell him that the Führer was giving him complete freedom of decision in the question of the date. There was a particular reason for his choosing the new date, namely that on the basis of a personal report from Marshal Balbo, who had arrived here today, he had decided to transfer an armored unit from Albania to Libia, which would take 4 days. After Balbo's exposition he had considered this indispensable, since he wished to avoid even the slightest setback

¹ See document No. 370 and footnote 1.

² Document No. 373.

³ See document No. 360.

in Libia which the Allies would always exploit to the full for propaganda purposes even though the future fate of the African possessions would never be decided on the spot but only on the European battlefields. This was the reason why he did not wish in any circumstances to expose himself to such a setback. One saw what ridiculous propaganda they were making even out of their glorious retreat from Flanders and the capture of the town of Narvik which had disappeared from the face of the earth, although the heights commanding it were still held by the brave Bavarians. He did not expect an attack so much from Tunis as from Egypt, as the English would doubtless attempt to advance from there for reasons of prestige. Besides, the Duce concluded, it would do their common cause no harm if the state of nervousness among the Allies as to whether, when, and where Italy would strike should last a few days (apparently one group missing) longer. This came under the heading "War of Nerves." He saw in his own people how the impatience to strike and the spirit of attack were increaaasing every day. If at the beginning of the war the Italians had been worried about "too soon," they were now worried about "too late." The Duce concluded with the remark that a short "all right, agreed" would be sufficient for him as the Führer's answer to his present letter.

Ciano, who, as we drove together to see the Duce, expressed the hope that influenced by my communication the Duce would return to the date of the 5th, did not insist on this during the conversation with the Duce, but told me afterwards, privately, that he too regarded the movement of troops from Albania to Libia, which was now in progress, as being very necessary. Besides he was itching to get into his plane.

The announcement of the new date follows in the supplementary telegram No. 1040 ⁴ which I have enciphered myself. MACKENSEN

⁴ Document No. 372.

No. 372

FR/0366

The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT WITH PRIORITY

TOP SECRET

No. 1040 of June 2

ROME, June 2 [sic], 1940—12: 45 a. m.

Received June 3—2: 00 a. m.

For the Foreign Minister personally.

With reference to my telegram No. 1039 of June 2.¹

The date of the declaration of war is June 10. Hostilities commence on June 11.

MACKENSEN

¹ Document No. 371.

No. 373

F12/215-216

*Benito Mussolini to Adolf Hitler*¹

ROME-BERLIN, June 2, 1940.

Message from the Duce:

"I thank you most sincerely for the message² which you sent me in answer to mine, which was delivered by Ambassador Alfieri. The victorious conclusion of the first phase of the war in Flanders has, . . .,³ ignited the enthusiasm of the whole Italian people. Regarding the date of Italy's entry into the war I fully appreciate the advantage of delay which allows your Luftwaffe to identify and destroy the French Air Force. This brief delay permits me⁴ . . . to take still better defensive precautions and . . . in all spheres. My program is as follows: On Monday, *June 10*, declaration of war and on the morning of June 11 the commencement of hostilities. Regarding a meeting I thank you for having proposed one, but I think it would be better for it to take place after Italy's . . .⁵ In the speech which I shall make a few hours after the declaration of war, I shall say that, true to her policy, Italy does not intend to extend the theater of war, and I shall name the Danube and Balkan countries including Greece and Turkey. Now I will express to you my wish to see at least a representative contingent of the Italian Army fighting side by side with your soldiers, in order to demonstrate in the field the affinity of arms and the comradeship between our revolutions. If you accept my offer I will send you a few regiments . . .⁶ consisting of courageous and . . .⁷ soldiers capable of offering resistance. Meanwhile I send you my most heartfelt greetings and best wishes for the success of our armed forces.

MUSSOLINI

¹ Only an incomplete translation of this letter has been found in the files of the Foreign Ministry. The dots indicating missing passages are found on the file copy. The missing passages are supplied below in footnotes which are based on a complete Italian text of this letter, published in *Hitler e Mussolini: lettere e documenti*, pp. 49-50.

² Document No. 357.

³ The published Italian text reads here: ". . . together with my own . . . [enthusiasm]".

⁴ In the published Italian text the sentence reads from here on: ". . . to perfect my preparations still more in all metropolitan and overseas areas".

⁵ The published Italian text reads here: ". . . entry into the war".

⁶ The published Italian text reads here: ". . . of Bersaglieri . . .".

⁷ According to the published Italian text, nothing is omitted here but the sentence there is phrased somewhat differently.

No. 374

2281/481877

The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Italy

Telegram

No. 2 of June 3

SPECIAL TRAIN, June 3, 1940—8:25 p. m.

Received Rome, June 3—7:25 p. m. [sic]

For the Ambassador personally.

Please inform Mussolini immediately:

The Führer expresses his thanks for the Duce's letter¹ and is in agreement with everything.

Please report by telephone when the instructions have been carried out.²

RIBBENTROP

¹ Document No. 373.

² It appears from Rome telegram No. 1045 sent on June 3 at 10:41 p. m. that Mackensen had reported earlier by telephone as requested, but no record of this telephone message has been found. According to the telegram, Mussolini had already been informed by Alderi of the Führer's reaction to his letter of June 2 and was "very satisfied with it" (2281/481378).

No. 375

2153/469355-56

The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 400 of June 3

ANKARA, June 3, 1940—10:00 p. m.

Received June 4—12:55 p. m.

I had requested an audience with the President for today in connection with the economic negotiations which I was unable to bring to a conclusion with the Foreign Minister due to the question of chromium. I explained to him [the President] in an hour's conversation how important it was particularly now to bring the long drawn out economic negotiations to a satisfactory conclusion. The conversation offered an opportunity for giving the President a clear picture of the military-political situation, the repercussions of the battle of Flanders and the good prospects for the next operation in France. The President was greatly impressed by our successes and seemed most disturbed about the impending intervention by Italy. I told him that I could not comply with his request to enlighten him about Italy's aims and designs. I could only assure him that the German Government and Italy were absolutely of one mind on the maintenance of peace in the Balkans and toward Turkey. With Italy fighting in the Mediterranean for her legitimate interests, there would be no reason whatever for anxiety about an extension of the war to the Near East. In view of the most likely early cessation of the war and the fundamental new order in Europe, I underlined the necessity for

Turkey to revise her relations with Germany. The President replied that despite their option for the Allies, his Government had always wished to maintain friendly relations with old allies. He urgently desired the conclusion of an economic agreement, also as a sign of Turkish good will. I had, however, complicated the question by absolutely insisting on the delivery of chromium. Without admitting that in this respect his Government was under obligations to the Western Powers, he said, however, that its hands were tied. Nevertheless, he supported the point of view that it would be better to conclude a restricted agreement than none at all and requested me in this case to continue my negotiations with the Minister. To elucidate the difficult position Turkey was in, he intimated that in view of assistance from the Allies, Turkey was compelled to restrict her trade with Germany.

Reverting to the world situation, the President expressed the opinion that through the great German successes it was indeed possible now to reach an honorable peace for all. I said that the Führer would certainly be prepared at any moment to reestablish European peace, provided the new order in Europe was secured. As to the fears expressed by the President regarding a future German world hegemony, I replied that these were quite unfounded and solely due to Allied propaganda. The Führer would not sacrifice the life of one soldier for aims far apart from the interests of the German people. Turkey may rest assured in this hour of grave decisions that she will also in the future have a true friend in Germany, if she will now confine herself to the safeguarding of interests truly her own. I have the impression from this conversation conducted in a very friendly way, that if in the event of Italy's entry into the war Turkey's sensitiveness was spared also in its psychological aspects, her continued neutrality could with certainty be counted upon.

As to the economic questions, I shall try now to conclude quickly an agreement on a smaller scale so as to achieve, at any rate, an arrangement about the liquidation of old contracts.

PAPEN

No. 376

1570/880117

The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 1694 of June 3

MADRID, June 3, 1940.

Received June 3—11:25 p. m.

Wilhelm¹ gave me a copy of a memorandum prepared for his chief dealing with a report by his Paris representative. According to this,

¹ The Spanish Foreign Minister, Col. Juan Belgbeder Atienza. On the use of code names for Spanish officials who supplied information to the German Embassy in Madrid, see vol. VIII, document No. 284.

the representative has had another long conversation with Marshal Pétain. The latter had said that a coup d'état would be necessary if he wanted to seize power in France, but this was a serious matter in France. The President of the Republic was merely a "servant of the political parties" who would do nothing if he [Pétain] demanded of him the transfer of his powers. They must therefore wait.

He was sorry that he had not returned to Paris a month ago; then he could have prevented the catastrophe in Belgium. Pétain believed that about a third of the Anglo-French army at Dunkirk had been able to embark there. He emphasized that the situation was extremely grave, if not desperate. He showed the Ambassador on a map the line from the Somme to the Maginot Line on which he thinks resistance is possible. The Ambassador reports, however, that Pétain's words did not sound very hopeful. Pétain complained about the lack of English help with regard to land forces. However, he praised the activity of the English Navy.

STOHRER

No. 377

4050/E065202-04

Minute by Ambassador Ritter

BERLIN, June 3, 1940.

Today the Swiss Minister told me the following: At our preliminary conversation¹ I had told him that we expected soon from the Swiss Government proposals on how it intended to guarantee that not a kilogram of coal was being used by the Swiss armaments industry for deliveries to England or France.

At the talks of the delegations the Swiss had now got the impression that perhaps an agreement would be possible on the basis that the Swiss armaments industry would deliver approximately equal amounts of armaments to both sides. He detected there a contradiction with my statement at the preliminary conversation, and he asked for an explanation as to what the Swiss Government should understand. I told the Swiss Minister that he was quite right. There was actually a contradiction. The delegation had apparently searched for the possibilities of a practical way out, since it knew what a severe blow it would be for Switzerland if German coal deliveries were suspended or even if the partial restriction which I had announced went into effect. If the German authorities participating in the examination of the various economic questions, and especially the questions of war economy, believed there was a practical way out which protected German interests, and especially the war-economy interests, I would not, after due examination of such a way out, reject this possibility. Naturally I could not have made such a proposal to Switzerland.

¹ See document No. 329.

At this opportunity the Swiss Minister remarked that in the course of the conversations between the delegations, the Germans had let fall remarks which had been understood by the Swiss as a political or even military threat. For example, something had been said to the effect that if they did not find the possibility of agreement here, the Swiss ought to assume that Germany attached no importance to trade with Switzerland. In addition this could have for the Swiss consequences of quite a different nature. I told the Swiss Minister that I was convinced that such a remark, if it had been made, was certainly wrongly interpreted by the Swiss. I wanted, however, to look into it.

I took this opportunity to reproach the Swiss Minister for the sins of the Swiss Government and of the Swiss public in the last 7 years.*

RITTER

* The German-Swiss economic discussions in Berlin were adjourned after failing to find agreement on most points. According to a minute of June 15 by Counselor Sabath of the Economic Policy Department, the coal embargo against Switzerland was put into effect on June 11 (9876/E693080). German-Swiss economic negotiations were resumed in Bern on June 15. Further documents on this subject will be printed in vol. x.

No. 378

F19/134-135

*Francisco Franco to Adolf Hitler*¹

JUNE 3, 1940.

DEAR FÜHRER: At the moment when the German armies, under your leadership, are bringing the greatest battle in history to a victorious close, I would like to express to you my admiration and enthusiasm and that of my people, who are watching with deep emotion the glorious course of a struggle which they regard as their own, and which is realizing the hopes that already burned in Spain when your soldiers shared with us in the war against the same, though concealed, enemies.

The great upheavals which Spain underwent in the 3 years of war, where to our own losses and wear and tear were added the innumerable losses inflicted in Red territory, have put us in a difficult position; it has been made even more difficult by the present war which forces us to develop in a world which is hostile toward us and hinders our recovery wherever possible to the great detriment of our military preparedness, so that we must perforce lag behind in industry as well as in the procurement of raw materials and motor fuels.

In this general situation we must also consider the special conditions of our islands and of the territories separated from the motherland [*Mutterland*] by the sea which have forced us to make our official attitude a neutral one, while we remain continually on the alert in order

¹ The file copy is in German and does not show a signature.

to ward off most energetically any attack which might, in connection with the expansion of the war, be launched against us by the eternal enemies of our fatherland [*Vaterlandes*].

I do not need to assure you how great is my desire not to remain aloof from your cares and how great is my satisfaction in rendering to you at all times those services which you regard as most valuable.

I have thought it right, in view of present circumstances, to choose General Vigón, Chief of the High General Staff and outstanding participant in the battles of our campaign, to bring you this letter since he can best inform you on the situation and on everything which touches and concerns our country.²

With my best wishes for the future and greatness of Germany, and with the expression of my unchanging friendship and regard.

² According to Madrid telegram No. 1796 of June 10, General Vigón was leaving for Germany that evening (136/74178). For his conversation with Hitler, see document No. 456.

No. 379

4386/E083201

The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 1698 of June 3

MADRID, June 4, 1940.

Received June 4—1:25 a. m.

With reference to my telegram No. 1694 of today.¹

From Wilhelm's memorandum referred to in my previous telegram it appears that the Spanish Ambassador in Paris also discussed the Italian question with Marshal Pétain. When the Ambassador asked whether the French Government had not made any proposals to avert this new and grave danger, the Marshal answered that all the members of the French Government were hostile to Italy and that, in fact, no serious proposal had been made to Italy. The Ambassador expressed his surprise at this; he remarked that the Anglo-French memorandum which had been handed to the Italian Ambassador by Daladier recently had referred only to matters of minor importance.² The Marshal admitted that the Ambassador was right.

STOHRER

¹ Document No. 376.

² Apparently a reference to the note of May 30; the text is printed in Raffaele Guariglia, *Ricordi 1922-1946* (Naples, 1950), pp. 456-457.

No. 380

77/58183

The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 1700 of June 3

MADRID, June 4, 1940.

Received June 4—1:25 a. m.

In a conversation with the Spanish Foreign Minister on the opening of a propaganda campaign by the Spanish Government in the press and among the public for the return of Gibraltar, the Minister said that national demands were, apart from Gibraltar, the acquisition of Tangier, French Morocco, and frontier rectification in Spanish Guinea. The Foreign Minister added, however, that these were the aims of Spanish national feeling. The Foreign Minister concluded by saying that he would regret it if Italy should wish to establish herself in these regions. Morocco in Spanish hands would be, for a friendly Italy, a sufficient guarantee that Italian interests would be respected.

STOHRER

No. 381

103/112202

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

Moscow, June 4, 1940—2:25 a. m.

No. 1061 of June 3

Received June 4—5:15 a. m.

For the Foreign Minister personally.

With reference to my telegrams Nos. 1030 of May 30¹ and 1051 of June 3.²

Molotov asked me to call on him this evening and told me the following:

The Soviet Government agrees to the Soviet Ambassador returning to Rome and the Italian Ambassador to Moscow without delay. The Soviet Ambassador would leave Moscow as soon as it was confirmed that the Italian Ambassador had left Rome.³

Shkvartzev was instructed to inform Ambassador Ritter yesterday evening that petroleum cannot be supplied owing to the present dis-

¹This is apparently an error. Telegram No. 1030 was dated as of May 31 and was sent June 1. It is printed as document No. 359.

²Not found.

³In telegram No. 1115 of June 10 (103/112215) Schulenburg reported on this matter as follows: "A press notice about the departure for Moscow of the Italian Ambassador Rosso and for Rome of the Soviet Ambassador Gorelkin was published today in the Soviet press in the form agreed upon. Gorelkin has departed by plane, going via Sofia."

turbed state of Italian-Soviet trade relations.⁴ Molotov told me in addition that an improvement in political relations would of course bring with it an improvement in economic relations.

SCHULENBURG

⁴ In telegram No. 1010 of May 30 (B14/B001922), Mackensen had transmitted a request from the Italian Transport Minister, Host Venturi, for German assistance in obtaining Russian petroleum for Italy. On June 1, Clodius telegraphed to the Foreign Minister's Special Train (2060/448137-38) that he himself, Ritter, and Schnurre had discussed the question of Russian oil deliveries to Italy with the Russian Ambassador and that at the same time Ambassador Schulenburg had been instructed by phone to take up the matter with the Soviet Government.

No. 382

103/112206

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

Moscow, June 4, 1940—12:25 p. m. [sic]

No. 1063 of June 3

Received June 4—5:15 a. m.

Molotov informed me today that Ambassador von Mackensen had stated to the Soviet Chargé d'Affaires¹ in Rome around May 25—in connection with the apparently imminent Italian entrance into the war—that all problems in the Balkans are to be solved without war, i. e., through mutual cooperation by Germany, the Soviet Union, and Italy.

Molotov requested information as to whether this statement by Mackensen actually reflected the opinion of the Reich Government and the Italian Government.²

Telegraphic instruction is requested.³

SCHULENBURG

¹ L. Helfand.

² In telegram No. 1065 of June 6 Mackensen said that if Helfand actually had attributed such a statement to him, it must be set down as "the product once again of his lively imagination. I have never spoken with him about a mutual cooperation by Germany, the Soviet Union, and Italy either in connection with the Balkans or in any other connection. In reply to his question whether Italy, upon entering the war, intended to take action in the Balkans, I replied that according to my impressions such an action was not to be expected, since Italy's interest like our own lay in keeping the Balkans quiet. As for the rest, the Balkan questions which remained unresolved after the war against the Western Powers was victoriously concluded could be settled merely by the exercise of the preponderant power of the victors without striking a blow." (B14/B001955-56)

³ See document No. 388.

No. 383

265/172801-02

The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

ANKARA, June 4, 1940—4:20 p. m.

SECRET

Received June 5—1:35 a. m.

No. 402 of June 4

1) My conversation with the Head of the State which I reported yesterday¹ had a surprising result. The Deputy Foreign Minister who was present has just informed me that the President had given the Foreign Minister formal instructions to conclude an economic agreement with us at the earliest date, with or without chromium. In connection with this the Deputy Foreign Minister explained that an agreement on chromium could perhaps still be reached since the President appreciated the importance of the goods which Turkey was to receive. The Foreign Minister had, however, decided to conduct the final negotiations himself which, owing to illness, could not take place for 2 or 3 days.

2) In a conversation on the political situation the Deputy Foreign Minister sounded me out on what would happen if Turkey were to break off relations upon Italy's entry into the war. I replied that a rupture in relations in any case meant war. Such a measure would be most unwise for Turkey, as it would merely be a gesture toward the Allies but would plunge Turkey into war. To a further question as to what would happen if relations were only broken off with Italy I replied this was bound to lead to war between Turkey and Italy from whose side we irrevocably (group missing). I would advise you to dispel any such illusions the [Turkish] Ambassador might have.

3) A new element in the situation to which I have already referred several times² is a further improvement in Turkish-Russian relations. It is reported from two independent reliable sources that Russia is supplying war material to Turkey. The British Consulate General in Istanbul has asked English subjects to seek safety in the interior of Anatolia within 3 days. The Italian Ambassador told me that he had instructions to keep Turkey in the dark regarding Italy's war aims until the day war is declared. There was fear of extortions if Turkey were given reassurances now. I have requested him to draw his Government's attention again emphatically to Turkish-Russian relations and to do everything possible at any rate to prevent Russia from entering the conflict. It must be assumed that in the event of Italy's

¹ See document No. 375.² See document No. 265.

entry into the war Turkey will mobilize at once, unless Italy clearly defines her attitude beforehand. Undoubtedly, this postponement of the decision to the last day presents certain elements of danger.

4) I suggest that you make the measure of the British Consulate General in Istanbul an occasion for asserting that such precautionary measures are completely unfounded, as no danger whatever to Turkish interests is to be expected.

PAPEN

No. 384

449/222722-25

*Memorandum for the Foreign Minister*¹

Teletype en clair

No. 124

BERLIN, June 4, 1940—8: 50 p. m.

For the Foreign Minister through his Secretariat.

I. Herr Deter, Manager of the Rheinmetall-Borsig Company in Greece, arrived here yesterday by air from Athens in order to convey to the German Government through these unofficial channels a wish of Metaxas. Herr Deter together with the Director General of the Rheinmetall-Borsig Company, Roehnert, saw State Secretary Keppler this morning who called Under State Secretary Woermann into this discussion. Herr Deter made a note for the files on the substance of his oral communication, the essential points of which are recapitulated here as follows:

“Berlin, June 31 [sic], 1940.

“As M. Metaxas told me in strict confidence, the Greek Government expects that hostilities are impending between Italy on the one hand, and England and France on the other, in which both parties will most probably occupy Greek islands and posts as bases.

“On Saturday, June 1st, at 10 a. m. the English Ambassador² in Athens called on M. Metaxas to inquire what position Greece would take in the event of such a temporary occupation. M. Metaxas made the following reply to the Minister which I have translated verbatim so that no misunderstanding can arise later. First of all it was pointed out that Greece had already once before rejected the English guarantee of Greece's sovereignty. The present reply was as follows:

‘Greece would give up neither the smallest port nor the smallest island to the English and French without resistance. Greece feels quite sure that the English and French would not demand such an occupation either. England and France should also know that if Italy were to attempt to occupy even a tiny part of Greek soil under any pretext, Greece would without any compunction whatever fight with all available arms.’

“M. Metaxas pointed out further that he had emphatically made it clear to the English Minister that in the event of Greece taking up arms conflagrations would also start up in all the Balkan countries

¹ Woermann's signature on the document has been crossed out.

² Charles Michael Palaioret, British Minister in Greece.

and Turkey would (in the case of Italy) along with Greece attack at once. It was, furthermore, clearly a fact that in such a conflict Russia would march into Rumania immediately which was neither in Germany's nor Italy's interest. Russia would also intervene in the other case in which Greece would defend her possessions against England and France. M. Metaxas let me know, in particular, that this information from Russia was absolutely reliable.

"M. Metaxas is of the opinion that Germany is fully informed on all these points, and he authorized me to convey to you that he is requesting Germany to consider most carefully whether she could not in the interest of the common German-Italian policy persuade Italy to keep away from the Balkans and especially not to violate Greek territory.

"M. Metaxas believes that the German Government realizes what the Greek Government has so far achieved politically and he is, therefore, counting on Germany's full understanding. So far the direct information from M. Metaxas.

"M. Metaxas had me informed through his right-hand man and supporter of his Government, M. Maniadakis, the Minister for Security, and particularly through his nephew, M. Papastathes, I must understand that as a political and military figure he could not word his request through me to Germany in any other way than had just been done. In reality, however, he was most keen that Germany announce *without delay* her protection of Greece's territory [*Bestandes*] and frontiers in this the eleventh hour for Greece, and the German Government may rest assured that this protection would be accepted with the greatest enthusiasm by the Greek Government and the majority of the Greek people.

"On Saturday June 1st at 11 a. m. the Italian Minister³ called on M. Metaxas to ask the same question and received a reply to the same effect. At 7:30 p. m. on the same day the Italian Minister and later at 10:30 p. m. the English Minister called on M. Metaxas again for a more explicit reply from Greece. M. Metaxas informed both gentlemen that he had nothing to add to his reply of that morning and he would stress emphatically that the rare case might arise in which Greece would have to defend herself by force of arms simultaneously against two parties at war with each other.

"M. Metaxas asked me to fly to Berlin at once with the request and information I had received in order to bring the foregoing to the notice of the German Government in an appropriate manner through Director General Roehnert. M. Metaxas had me make the commitment on word of honor not to let the German Legation in Athens know anything about this conversation and information, as he had very special reasons for this condition.

"M. Metaxas added that he could not openly make a request to Germany by which he would bring on hostilities against England, for two reasons: first of all, because he was not altogether sure of the German reply and secondly, in particular, because Greece had a tonnage of 2,100,000 tons of which 1.8 million was abroad permanently and could therefore be impounded by the British at once. Such a confiscation among other repercussions caused by the hostilities would inflict such heavy losses on the Greek people who were mainly depend-

³ Emanuele Grazzi.

ent upon their shipping that an internal revolution and possibly a fall of the present Government after lengthy preparations by the British would have to be reckoned with.

"M. Metaxas now requests the German Government to take this form of private communication as an occasion for declaring the protection of Greece (through official channels). He asked for understanding of his difficult position in which he could not take any other course. Deter".

End of Extract from Herr Deter's note.

II. The unusual channel through Herr Deter alone shows that Metaxas is hardly anticipating a positive reply; the fact that he wishes to have the Legation bypassed also goes to prove this. It seems also probable after the conversations Herr Deter had in this office that the initiative in this matter was, at least, not entirely on the Greek side but that Greece's wishes emerged from conversations which might have been started by Herr Deter.

There can certainly be no question of giving Metaxas a substantive reply to the wishes he put forward. The only question arising is whether Metaxas should be left without any answer at all. One might therefore consider authorizing Herr Deter to say in Athens that he had discharged his commission. He had gained the impression in Berlin that the problem did not present itself at all as Metaxas saw it, since an Italian attack against Greece was not anticipated in Berlin. At any rate, the Greek Government would surely fare best if it would openly declare itself on the side of the Axis Powers.

III. For business reasons Herr Deter will return to Athens by air on the morning of June 5. He has been told that he could not be given an answer by then and, if one was made at all, it would reach him through our Legation in Athens.

Submitted herewith to the Foreign Minister with the request for a decision.⁴

⁴ No record of a decision by the Foreign Minister has been found. See, however, documents Nos. 395 and 403.

No. 385

73/52447

The State Secretary to the Legation in Hungary

Telegram

No. 468

BERLIN, June 4, 1940.

zu Pol. IV 1263 g.

With reference to your telegram No. 342 of May 29.¹

¹ Not printed (73/52446). This telegram sent in reply to Weissäcker's telegram No. 451 (document No. 325 and footnote 1) explained Hungary's alleged failure to inform Italy of her mobilization measures. It reported a statement by Csáky that he did not want to transmit important information for Italy through the Italian Minister in Budapest, since the latter's telegrams "might also be read by persons not authorized."

Since according to your telegram No. 337 of May 27,² the Italian Government has been informed in the meantime by the Hungarian Minister in Rome about the additional Hungarian mobilization measures, you may desist from making the communication to Csáky which was set forth in telegraphic instruction No. 451.³ Nevertheless, at the next suitable opportunity, please point out to Csáky, referring to his remark reported in the last sentence of telegram 332,⁴ that we would appreciate it if the Hungarian Government would keep the Italian Government informed about its decisions and measures in the same way in which it keeps us informed.

For your personal information: We do not wish to be made by the Hungarians partners in acting mysteriously with respect to the Italians. Even less must it be permitted that the impression could arise in Rome that Csáky desists at Germany's request from giving this information to the Italians. Report by wire.⁵

WEIZSÄCKER

² Not printed (73/52444-45). It reported the instructions given to various Hungarian Missions to explain the mobilization measures to the respective Governments.

³ See document No. 325 and footnote 1.

⁴ Document No. 321.

⁵ Erdmannsdorff reported in telegram No. 367 of June 7 that the instruction had been carried out (73/52464).

No. 386

205/142390-91

Memorandum by the State Secretary

St.S. No. 407

BERLIN, June 4, 1940.

The Swedish Minister today returned to the subject of Narvik¹ and made the following statement to me about it:

The Swedish Government was now certain that the Allies were prepared to withdraw all their forces on land and sea and in the air from the whole of northern Norway, of course under the condition of reciprocity. The Swedish Government for its part, as had already been indicated, would be prepared to contribute to the realization of the plan, namely, to occupy with Swedish troops the area around Narvik which was to be evacuated by the combatants, after the foreign armed forces had withdrawn. A condition for Swedish participation was, however, that after the evacuation no further warlike action should take place in the north of Norway.

In reply to a question from me, as to where "the north of Norway" would in this case be held to begin, M. Richert said that the area concerned would be from the Sörfolden Fiord to the Norwegian-Finnish frontier (i. e., east of Kirkenes).

The Swedish Government believed that the plan might have a certain interest not only for Sweden but also for Germany. If this

¹ See document No. 351, footnote 2.

belief were shared by the German side, then the Swedish Government requested an early and fundamental statement of our attitude. In case of agreement everything further could be arranged through the Swedish Government. The Swedish Government would not offer any more detailed suggestions regarding methods.

M. Richert repeated Foreign Minister Günther's offer to come to Germany for direct discussion with the Reich Foreign Minister,² should we be prepared to consider the above plan more closely.

In order to make this plan somewhat more attractive the Minister finally told me that a Swedish iron ore transport expert had just informed him that even now the harbor installations at Narvik had been destroyed to such an extent that there could be no question of using Narvik as an export harbor without 1 to 2 years of reconstruction work.

I reminded the Minister that I had already at our first conversation expressed myself as very doubtful and skeptical about the entire suggestion, and today I was not in a position to speak differently. This was, however, my personal opinion, as I had not yet obtained an opinion from Herr von Ribbentrop, whom I had informed of our last conversation. I would, however, let the Reich Foreign Minister have the present statement of the case. What was new in this was the willingness of the Allies to leave the north of Norway which I interpret, rightly I am sure, as a sign that the Allies need the troops held there. Finally I expressed to M. Richert the definite hope that the Swedish Government had not represented the plan to the Allies as a German invention, which was not in the least in accordance with the facts.

Submitted herewith to the Foreign Minister.³

WEIZSÄCKER

² See document No. 268.

³ The decision of the Foreign Minister appears in a notation of Etzdorf, dated June 9 and reading as follows: "Sweden: Question of whether we would not be willing to transfer to them Narvik and rest of north Norway for pacification; i. e., for occupation. Alleged acquiescence of the Allies. Reannexation of 1905.

"Decision of the Foreign Minister: It is to be treated dilatorily." (1247/-337420)

No. 387

B14/B001950

The Embassy in Italy to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

No. 1056 of June 5

ROME, June 5, 1940—11:45 a. m.

Received June 5—2:15 a. m. [sic]

For Attaché Branch and General Staff of the Army.

On June 5 I was requested to call on Marshal Badoglio who, referring to Italy's impending entry into the war, stated that I would in

future receive all information through him and was to convey all communications from the German High Command to him personally. When I inquired about Italy's intentions, Badoglio replied that he could not yet give me any information at the moment. We could not expect a great deal from the Italian armed forces since the Army and the Air Force were not ready and there was a long frontier to be protected. He hoped that the war would be brought to an end with the same speed with which we had conducted the first phase.

RINTELEN
MACKENSEN

No. 388

372/208215

The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in the Soviet Union

Telegram

MOST URGENT

BERLIN, June 5, 1940—6:05 p. m.

No. 938 of June 5

Received June 5—11:00 p. m.

With reference to your telegram No. 1063.¹

Would you please let me have a further statement as to how, according to your impression, M. Molotov's inquiry regarding cooperation between Germany, Russia, and Italy on the Balkan question is to be interpreted and, in particular, whether Molotov considers such cooperation to be desirable, in what way it would in his opinion be achieved, and whether he thereby intends to commit Italy definitely to nonintervention in the Balkans.²

Please do not make further inquiries of Molotov.

RIBBENTROP

¹ Document No. 382.

² See document No. 392.

No. 389

3355/E009246-47

Ambassador Ritter to the Legation in Denmark

Telegram ¹

MOST URGENT

BERLIN, June 5, 1940.

W V 2070.

With reference to your telegrams No. 610 of June 2, ² No. 611 of June 3, ³ and No. 621 of June 4.⁴

¹ It appears from the reply (see footnote 7) that this message was actually sent by teletype.

² Referred to trade negotiations between Denmark and Switzerland (3355/E009248).

³ Referred to trade relations of Denmark with the Baltic States (3555/E022960).

⁴ Not found.

1) I request the Minister to call on the Foreign Minister at once and inform him as follows:

Our agreement to independent Danish economic negotiations had been made dependent on the condition specified in telegram 451 of June [May] 3.⁵ The procedure adopted by the Danish Government in connection with Latvia and Switzerland departs from this, as negotiations have already been opened without the Danish Government having obtained the previous approval of the subjects for negotiation which we consider essential. The Reich Government does not agree to this, and requests that these negotiations be postponed until German and Danish interests have been brought into line. The Reich Government requests that in future cases, the procedure agreed with the Danish Government be strictly adhered to.

2) I will be at Minister Bolt-Jørgensen's⁶ disposal on Friday morning. If your official duties permit, you are requested to be in Berlin at the same time for 1 or 2 days, so that Germany's attitude to Denmark's commercial policy can again be discussed in detail.

The démarche to the Danish Foreign Minister mentioned under paragraph 1 must be carried out before your departure.⁷

RITTER

⁵ Document No. 193.

⁶ Information concerning Soviet proposals for trade negotiations with Denmark had been transmitted in Clodius' telegram of May 24 to Copenhagen (3355/E009250). Bolt-Jørgensen, Danish Minister in Moscow, had returned to Denmark in connection with these proposals.

⁷ Renthe-Fink replied in telegram No. 627 of June 6: "The démarche on the subject of Danish negotiations for commercial treaties was carried out today. The desired result was achieved." (3355/E009245.)

No. 390

413/215672

Memorandum by an Official of Political Division I

BERLIN, June 5, 1940.

zu Pol. II 1313 g.¹

Pol. I M 8019 g.

Drafting Officers: Counselor v. d. Heyden-Rynsch
Secretary of Legation von Grote.

On the evening of June 1, the Foreign Minister's Secretariat forwarded for further action the following telegram received from the Special Train:

"Request report immediately as to who granted permission for the conversation of the Italian Ambassador with the Belgian King. Sonnleithner."²

¹ Pol. II 1313 g.: Not found.

² See document No. 358.

Thereupon the following telegram was dispatched at once to Counselor of Legation Werkmeister via the High Command of the Wehrmacht.

"The Foreign Ministry to Counselor of Legation Werkmeister, Representative of the Foreign Ministry with Army Group B.

"Acting on instructions from the Foreign Minister I request an immediate report through the speediest channel as to who granted permission for interview between the Italian Ambassador and King of Belgium. Heyden-Rynsch."

At the same time Herr von Etzdorf was requested by telephone to make inquiries for himself by telephone of Counselor of Legation Werkmeister.

Shortly before midnight Herr von Etzdorf reported by telephone that Major Manthey, Ic³ of Army Group B had told him that the Führer himself had sanctioned the interview. Army Group B had been informed of this by Colonel of the General Staff Hein, Chief of the Department for Army Affairs [*Abt. Heerwesen*].

The reply was at once communicated to Counselor Sonnleithner by telephone. Written confirmation was sent by teletype.

V. D. HEYDEN-RYNSCH

³ i. e., intelligence officer.

No. 391

486/231934

The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

TOP SECRET

No. 1727 of June 5

MADRID, June 5, 1940.

Received June 6—12:45 a. m.

With reference to my telegram No. 1694 of June 3.¹

General Yagüe has just given me the following report from Paris, said to come from a completely reliable source:

If the new German offensive is successful, and the German Army comes close to Paris, President Lebrun will resign in favor of Marshal Pétain. Marshal Pétain together with Weygand will tell the French people that the cause of the military catastrophe lies in the policy of the Popular Front and that a separate peace with Germany is essential.

STOHRER

¹ Document No. 876.
847875—56—38

No. 392

108/112208

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

Moscow, June 6, 1940—3:55 p. m.

No. 1079 of June 6

Received June 6—6:30 p. m.

With reference to your telegram No. 938 of June 5.¹

In the conference on June 3,² Molotov only asked for information without showing any intention of wanting to bind the German or Italian Government to anything. On the other hand, he showed clearly that the Soviet Government would be very pleased if Herr von Mackensen's statement reflected not only his personal opinion but actually the interpretation of the German and Italian Governments. The question as to how possible cooperation among the three in the Balkans would work out practically was not broached by M. Molotov.³

SCHULENBURG

¹ Document No. 388.

² See document No. 382.

³ In telegram No. 1094 of June 7 (108/112210) Schulenburg further reported: "During today's visit to Molotov he repeated his wish to have more precise information about Mackensen's statement. I responded that a reply had not yet come in, but I hoped to receive it shortly."

No. 393

175/136964-65

The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

URGENT

BUCHAREST, June 6, 1940—5:50 p. m.

SECRET

Received June 6—9:55 p. m.

No. 860 of June 6

With reference to my telegram No. 842 of June 3.¹

The Reich Foreign Minister's reply has been favorably received by the King. As I hear from Tatarescu and Gigurtu,² the Rumanian Government will hold discussions with the Russians in order to attempt to find a peaceful solution. They will communicate with us further in due course. The Minister President told me that he was expecting the appointment of a Russian Minister here shortly and was contemplating sending Gafencu to Moscow.

¹ Not printed (175/136962). In this telegram Fabricius reported that he had seen the Rumanian Minister President, as instructed in telegram No. 644 (document No. 364). The Minister President acknowledged again that Rumania "would have to satisfy certain revisionist claims of her neighbors," but he wanted to inform the King before discussing the matter further. He stressed the difficulties and the fact that "Germany could not after all be disinterested in who occupied the lower Danube."

² Jon Gigurtu had taken over the Foreign Ministry after Gafencu had resigned on June 2.

Bulgarian wishes for revision regarding the southern Dobruja could be met, but it was more difficult regarding those of Hungary. However the cession of frontier strips and simultaneous resettlement of population could be considered. It was imperative to produce something definite, not provisional.

As regards Germany, Rumania had the idea of enlisting more and more German cooperation in all fields, beyond the economic agreement. He would shortly approach us with (group missing).

A readiness to oblige can be detected in all measures taken by the State. For example Minister Căncicov has made the petroleum companies, including enemy companies, place their fleet of tank cars at the disposal of the Government for any transport.

Seven Englishmen and 3 Dutchmen, whom we had pointed out to the Rumanians as suspected saboteurs in the petroleum region, have been ordered to leave the country. The treatment of Reichsdeutsche in this region and in Transylvania, which was unfriendly after the discovery of weapons in the German petroleum cars,³ has again visibly improved. With the support of the Plenipotentiary of the Intelligence Department numerous instances of restrictions on travel and residence have been dealt with satisfactorily in close agreement with the Rumanian Intelligence service. Police measures against Volksdeutsche, which are becoming excessive, are still due at present to fear of a German invasion. Rumors of this and acts of provocation by young Volksdeutsche are making these police measures more severe. The telephone message from Berlin to the Legation on May 10, relating to the large-scale action was of course tapped and had a crushing effect, since it was assumed at the time that the action was directed against Rumania. The effect of dropping paratroops in Holland does not allay anxiety here that one day something similar might be undertaken against Rumania. This anxiety is being encouraged by enemy propaganda. The King is clinging all the more to the hope of closer cooperation with the Reich.

FABRICIUS

³ See document No. 316.

No. 394

259/169917

The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 1753 of June 6

MADRID, June 6, 1940.
Received June 6—11:45 p. m.

Regarding his first meeting with Hoare, the new English Ambassador, the Spanish Foreign Minister told me that the former had spoken quite openly about the possibility of the English Government moving

to Canada and had said that England was determined to continue the war even from there. On the whole, however, the impression made on him by Hoare had been politically one of depression.

STOHRER

No. 395

449/222726

Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department

BERLIN, June 6, 1940.

The manager of the Rheinmetall-Borsig Company in Greece, Deter, who is referred to in the memorandum to the Foreign Minister of June 4¹ today telephoned (!) me from Athens and said that after his return he had seen "the Chief," i. e., Metaxas. The latter told him that it would be sufficient for his purposes if he would receive a guarantee "like a bouquet" and would then simply say "thank you." Moreover, he, Deter, when he visited Berlin did not know that Greece already had Italian assurances. Considering this state of affairs it was really all the more unobjectionable if the Greek wish were complied with.

I gave a negative reply to Herr Deter's question, whether a decision had already been made.

Herr Deter furthermore requested that all the conversations be considered as not having taken place, in case nothing should come of the matter.

This conversation confirms the impression that the whole matter ought not be pursued any further.

WOERMANN

¹ Document No. 384.

No. 396

51/34824-25

The High Command of the Navy to the Foreign Ministry

TOP SECRET

BERLIN, June 6, 1940.

1/Skl. 7556/40 gKdos.

Subject: Intensification of Sea Warfare.¹

The Führer and Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht, cancelling the previous limiting orders, has given the Navy a free hand for the immediate and fullest conduct of the war with all arms in the waters around England and off the French coast to the extent of the

¹ Cf. vol. VIII, documents Nos. 352, 361, and 367; also "Führer Conferences on Naval Affairs," *Brassey's Naval Annual*, 1948, especially pp. 57, 71, and 77.

original U. S. A. combat zone ²—bounded on the east, however, by 3 degrees east. The Führer wishes, however, to make an exception in some form for Ireland, as otherwise Ireland, instead of being separated from England, will be forced into her arms.³ The Naval War Staff has been instructed to submit an appropriate proposal.

The new regulation means that in principle in this sea area U. S. A. ships, Italians, Spaniards, etc., may also be attacked.

The Führer agrees that neutrals are to be notified that German operations in the sea area around England and France will in future mean increased danger for all ships for which the German Reich must decline all responsibility, and it therefore gives warning of the dangers of traveling in the sea areas of the U. S. A. combat zone in its original extent.

In order to secure imports to Ireland, without thereby making a decisive breach in the effectiveness of the extended warfare against merchant shipping, it is proposed to make a special secret arrangement in this respect with the Irish Government somewhat similar to the one which now exists with Switzerland.⁴

The draft of a note to neutrals and a communication to the Irish Government are enclosed.⁵ It is requested that both drafts should be considered ⁶ and a discussion arranged with the Naval War Staff.⁷

The greatest speed is requested as the issue of orders on the lines of the new decision of the Führer to U-boats already at sea depends on the completion of these preparations.⁸

By order:
FRIEDE

² By a Presidential proclamation of Nov. 4, 1939, issued under the authority of new American neutrality legislation, American shipping was barred from certain areas around the British Isles and Western European ports, which were defined as combat zones. The text is published in Department of State, *Bulletin*, 1939, vol. I, p. 454.

³ See document No. 367.

⁴ For arrangements with Switzerland, see vol. VII, document No. 333.

⁵ These drafts are not printed (51/34322-23).

⁶ A Ritter memorandum of June 12 (not printed: 51/34326-27) refers to a Foreign Ministry draft in course of preparation.

⁷ Records of subsequent discussions between the Foreign Ministry and the Naval War Staff have not been found.

⁸ Concerning the action anticipated here see vol. X, documents Nos. 291, 292, 293, and 294.

No. 397

77/58135

The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 1770 of June 7

MADRID, June 7, 1940.

Received June 7—7:40 p. m.

Statements by the Spanish Foreign Minister, report No. 603 of May 22 from the Consulate at Tetuan to the Foreign Ministry ¹ and regular

¹ Not found.

reports from our Intelligence Department [*Abwehr*] reveal that the native element in French Morocco will soon be ready to revolt. It further appears from the two latter sources that the Arab Nationalist leaders are contemplating asking for Germany's protection in the event of a revolt.

I suggest that consideration be given as to how we should answer such an appeal or whether and in what way we should exert influence on the form and trend of a possible rising through those agencies which are in contact with the native element in French Morocco.²

STOHRER

² Weizsäcker replied in telegram No. 836 of June 13: "The Foreign Minister requests you to maintain complete reserve with regard to French Morocco. "Please inform the Consulate at Tetuan." (77/58136)

No. 398

1570/380119

The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

TOP SECRET

MADRID, June 7, 1940.

No. 1773 of June 7

Received June 7—8:45 p. m.

With reference to my telegram No. 1727 of June 5.¹

The Military Attaché has learned from a reliable source the following statements by the French Military Attaché here:

- 1) England has refused to send more troops to support France.
- 2) England has advised France to ask America for troops for assistance; London would support Paris in this.
- 3) France has rejected this proposal and has informed London that France would conclude a separate peace as soon as the Germans reached the gates of Paris.

STOHRER

¹ Document No. 391.

No. 399

3145/652918-21

Memorandum by the Director of the Economic Policy Department¹

BERLIN, June 7, 1940.

COMPETENCE FOR FOREIGN ECONOMIC RELATIONS OF THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES

The competence for the control of the foreign economic relations of the territories occupied by German troops (Poland, Denmark,

¹ Typewritten marginal note: "To Ambassador Ritter with the request for his signature in concurrence." Initialed "R[itter] 10/6."

Additional marginal notes: "No longer necessary. Cancel. W[iehl] 11."
"This copy for my files. Carbon copies to be destroyed. W[iehl] 13."

Norway, Holland, Belgium, Luxembourg) has not been expressly defined. The administrative measures adopted vary for different territories:

a) In Denmark the Government of the country formally continues its independent existence. The civilian interests of the Reich are looked after by the Minister in his capacity as Reich Commissioner [*Reichsbeauftragten*]. No special orders have been issued regarding his powers.

b) In the General Government in Poland, in Norway, and in Holland a Governor General and Reichskommissars, respectively, were appointed by the Führer's decrees of October 12, 1939,² April 24, 1940,³ and May 18, 1940,⁴ "to ensure public order and public life in these territories." They are directly responsible to the Führer. However, as President of the Reich Defense Council and Commissioner for the Four Year Plan Field Marshal Göring also claims the right to give orders in economic questions. According to the Führer's decree of October 12, 1939, for the occupied area of Poland, he has the power to "establish law by decree." There is no provision of this kind in the Führer's decrees for Norway and Holland. It is known, however, that the Field Marshal has been accorded the right to give orders on economic questions for Holland,⁵ and subsequently wants to have it clearly established that he has it also for Norway.⁶

c) No orders have yet been issued for Belgium and Luxembourg. It is expected that similar arrangements will be made as in the case of Holland.⁷

II. The following is indicated regarding competence to control foreign economic relations:

a) Denmark is formally regarded as foreign territory. Formally the Danish Government controls independently its foreign economic relations with the Reich inclusive of the other occupied territories as it does with third states. In this however, as it recognizes itself, it is subject to the principles laid down by the Reich Government (Foreign Ministry, Reich Commissioner).

b) General Government Poland, Norway, and Holland are practically to be treated as home territory. The control of their economic relations with the Reich and with the other occupied countries (excluding Denmark) is a question of internal economics and does not come within the competence of the Foreign Ministry. On the other hand these territories are represented by the Reich Government in the control of their economic relations with third states (including Denmark), as in all other matters. This representation falls within the competence of the Foreign Ministry and the agencies set up for commercial policy (Commercial Policy Committee, Government Committees). The Governor General and the Reichskommissars respectively are, of course, deeply interested and can if necessary send

¹ Text in *Reichsgesetzblatt*, I, 1939, p. 2077.

² Document No. 162.

³ Text in *Reichsgesetzblatt*, I, 1940, p. 778; also in *Monatshefte für Auswärtige Politik*, June 1940, pp. 440-441.

⁴ By a Führer decree of May 19 (9873/E693053).

⁵ This was established by a Führer decree of June 5 (9873/E693052).

⁷ Belgium, occupied France, and Luxembourg were covered by a Führer decree of June 16 (9873/E693051).

representatives to the negotiating delegations, in the same way as the Reich Protector in Bohemia and Moravia does now. The Governor General for the occupied areas of Poland has already recognized this arrangement. So far in practice no case has arisen for Holland and Belgium.

c) Belgium and Luxembourg as in b), if the same administrative orders are given.

III. During a discussion in the Commercial Policy Committee, all departments, including the representative of the Four Year Plan, agreed with this view. It can therefore be assumed that no difficulties will arise in practice, and that the right claimed by the Field Marshal to give orders on economic matters will remain within his general powers of direction as Commissioner for the Four Year Plan.

Herewith submitted to the State Secretary for the Foreign Minister for information in case the matter should come up in any conversations with the Führer or with the Field Marshal.

WIEHL *

* Wiehl's signature has been stricken through.

No. 400

30/22154

The Minister in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

No. 986 of June 8

STOCKHOLM, June 8, 1940—11:00 p. m.

Received June 9—1:30 a. m.

On instructions from the Swedish Foreign Ministry, Baron Beck-Friis, Acting State Secretary at the Foreign Ministry, called on me at 8:35 p. m. today and handed me the following communication from the Norwegian Commander in Chief Ruge to the Norwegian Minister here.

(Group garbled) translation: "The King and the Government have left the country and have given me orders to cease hostilities. Please inform the German Legation in Stockholm at 8 p. m. today that I have received orders to cease hostilities and wish to get in touch with the German High Command in Oslo with a view to negotiations. Ruge."

End of communication from the Norwegian Commander in Chief.

The Swedish Foreign Minister added in reply to my request for further details that the King and the former Norwegian Government had left the country by sea with probable destination England. At any rate they had definitely not crossed into Swedish territory.

WIED

No. 401

8867/E618469-72

The Ambassador in Argentina to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 619 of June 8

BUENOS AIRES, June 8, 1940—11:38 p. m.

Received June 9—10:20 a. m.

Pol. IX 1032.

With reference to your telegram No. 447 of May 31 and my telegram No. 574 of June 1.¹

By way of a summary in broad outline of previous reports on the present situation here: Argentina is decisively influenced economically by England and culturally by France and is in the grip of an unbridled and very sensation-minded press.

I. England's economic influence is predominant; economic development began in the middle of the last century under English guidance, hence large enterprises such as railways, slaughterhouses, electricity, and waterworks and also a large part of the agriculture and cattle raising are in English hands. This economic influence is correspondingly turned to political advantage so that Argentina is decidedly an English sphere of interest. In accordance with a strong tradition important politicians and businessmen, directors and top executives or legal advisers to English enterprises here are thus dependent on England for their livelihood. This is true also for the present Government. Incidental financial advantages from elsewhere, for example, German banks and big enterprises are too insignificant. Consequently, the press and radio are influenced to the greatest possible extent by England which is spending sums running into millions.

II. In the cultural field authoritative circles are traditionally one hundred percent pro-French in outlook. The historical reason for this is the adoption of the ideas of the French Revolution when the state was founded, which took place at the beginning of the 19th century, in opposition to reactionary Spain, under the influence of this Revolution. Lively relations with France are maintained by regular visits which are favored by the fact that the French language is easy to learn. The influence of French culture emanating from Paris is predominant in art, contemporary design, the theater, fashion, etc.

Tendencies toward nationalism, lately on the increase, have not yet weakened this influence economically or culturally.

The prevailing liberal and democratic conception of the state and of an economy on the Anglo-French pattern lacks all understanding

¹ Neither found.

of nationalistic-fascist ideas, which are especially opposed by the powerful influence of the Roman Catholic Church and of Jewry.

English influence which in normal times is skillfully kept latent is now arrayed against us in full force.

III. All we have to oppose these powerful hostile forces with is :

1) Our purchases, which are however only a fraction of those of the English, in particular in the meat market which is of vital importance to important groups, and which have completely ceased since the outbreak of war.

2) In the cultural sphere there are pronounced pro-German groups among medical men here, a small number of whom are standing by us even during the present crisis.

3) Pro-German officers in the Army and Navy who, however, especially in the Army, are being gradually ousted by the Minister of War who is not very well disposed toward us.

4) In the sphere of press policy, apart from the *Deutsche La Plata-Zeitung* intended only for German circles, whose "Pagina Castellana" introduced shortly after the outbreak of war has made a considerable impression, there is only the Spanish evening paper *Pampero* founded after the outbreak of war, whose circulation is greatly increasing. The latter newspaper is thus the only publication here which puts across our point of view to the Argentine public. Furthermore, the radio and films are also influenced to a limited extent. The Transocean is unfortunately dependent on the authoritative press; also the air-service bulletin and White Books, the effect of which on a public which is not very keen on reading is limited.

5) The political influence of the Germans living here unfortunately is extremely slight, as large enterprises which had certain influence in normal times are now forced to exercise the greatest restraint on account of the blacklists.

IV. The following might help considerably to improve the situation which is not very satisfactory for us :

1) In the sphere of foreign affairs: The entry of Italy into the war in view of the strong Italian strain in the population here, which could still be substantially helped by the benevolent neutrality of Spain. In both cases there would be especially important repercussions on the Roman Catholic Church. Furthermore as I have suggested several times² a declaration by the Reich Government that we are not pursuing any territorial objectives of any sort on the South American Continent, a belief which is unfortunately held even by politicians who are to be taken quite seriously (see telegram of June 5 from the Legation in Lima³ with reference to Multex No. 82⁴). The whole of the campaign carried on under the slogan fifth column would thus suffer considerable damage. Finally the greatest possible restraint on the part of the organizations formed as substitute for the party, now dissolved, which must refrain at least for the duration of the war from any interference and activities in the life of the German community that might give rise to complaints to the Argentine authorities by Germans hostile to us.

² See document No. 269.

³ Telegram No. 172, not printed (229/154177-78).

⁴ Not found.

2) Further, I should like to make the following urgent proposals:

a) In the economic sphere with a view to stimulating Argentina's general interest in Germany and on the assumption that the war will end soon, we should enter into negotiations even now for the purchase of such goods as are easy to store and also do not deteriorate even during a lengthy period of storage, such as tinned meat, skins, wool, cotton, flax, and maize, to begin with to the amount of our clearing balance (see also report No. 271 of March 26⁵ and No. 409 of April 26⁶); as for frozen meat this is unfortunately impossible since there is no storage space for larger amounts here.

Furthermore, to win over influential persons by participation in a company which would be interested in doing future business with Germany, as has already been done successfully (*Orbimare*⁷). This method is entirely practicable, but admittedly costly, since only really influential persons are worth while and they are proportionately expensive. For this task which would have to begin at once half a million pesos would be required as an initial sum and could perhaps be raised by obtaining a credit from German banks or large German enterprises here which would be guaranteed in Germany. Instructions are requested.⁸

b) In the cultural field there is no possibility of developing cultural relations during the war. Our aim should be to maintain existing institutions which show relatively favorable results.

c) As regards press policy it is not possible to go far beyond measures already adopted: The big leading morning papers, the *Prensa*, *Nación*, and *Mundo* are completely inaccessible even for sums running into millions. There is no point in buying the gutter press. I am continuing my efforts aimed essentially at neutralization in the case of the evening paper *Razón*. The evening paper *Pampero* which meanwhile is satisfactorily increasing its circulation remains the representative of our interests, and should be maintained even at the sacrifice of large sums of money. There is great difficulty in obtaining newsprint, which is mainly under English-Canadian control; we have overcome this for the time being but considerable funds have been expended for this purpose owing to the rising cost of paper. Attempts have been made recently to prevent *Pampero* from appearing by buying up the firm where it is printed. If it comes to the worst, its continued existence would have to be ensured by acquiring a suitable printing shop or by the purchase of additional printing machinery with a view to printing it on the premises of the *Deutsche La Plata-Zeitung*. I assume that if it comes to the worst I am authorized to do this in accordance with the last paragraph of your telegraphic instruction No. 455 of June 1.⁹ A further threat is to be found in the bill which is before the National Congress containing restrictions on the freedom of the press. With a view to strengthening the general position of *Pampero*, urgent preparations are being made for setting up as the publishers an Argentine joint stock company in which an influential Argentinean will participate. Our influence in the field of radio is satisfactory but will possibly be restricted by the

⁵ Not found.

⁶ Not printed (341/190558-59).

⁷ An Argentine-German trade agency.

⁸ See documents Nos. 430 and 482.

⁹ Document No. 385 and footnote 1 thereto.

new Government regulation and attempts will accordingly be made to counteract this. For this purpose I request appropriation of the money which I requested for the cultural funds (see telegram No. 493 of May 14¹⁰).

The determining factor for all these proposals is your assessment of our position here: I gather from your instructions, in particular telegram No. 455 of June 1, that I am not overestimating its importance and hope that therefore my proposals are not too far-reaching.

THERMANN

¹⁰ Not found.

No. 402

1228/334518-19

The Foreign Ministry to the Representative of the German Foreign Ministry With the Reich Protector of Bohemia and Moravia

IMMEDIATE
CONFIDENTIAL

BERLIN, June 8, 1940.
zu Pol. V 1581 g.¹

Subject: Hetman Skoropadsky's² contemplated visit to the Reich Protector.

With reference to your report of May 27, 1940—5769/D. Pol. 5.¹

In view of German-Soviet relations, it appears advisable ~~for the time being~~³ to avoid anything which would be likely to arouse the Soviet Government's distrust in the Ukrainian question. Accordingly, the Foreign Ministry considers it important that the Ukrainian organizations in Greater Germany carry on no political activities. This also applies to former Hetman Skoropadsky and his movement. The importance of the Hetman movement has declined lately, to be sure, ~~in favor of the Ukrainian National Organization (U.N.O.), which was promoted by the competent German internal authorities,~~⁴ but even now the Hetman still has numerous adherents at his disposal outside Germany, especially in the United States and Canada, where several thousand Ukrainians have pledged their oath of allegiance to him and recognize his family as the hereditary dynasty.

The Foreign Ministry and the Secret State Police are continuously in contact with the Hetman, who has always maintained a loyal attitude toward Germany. To assure him and his family an income consistent with his position, a considerable allowance is paid to him regularly by the Foreign Ministry in addition to the monthly honorarium provided by the late Reich President Field Marshal von

¹ Not printed (1228/334517). In this report, Ziemke had reported Skoropadsky's written request to be received by Neurath. This had been refused. Ziemke asked, on Neurath's wish, for a speedy statement of the Foreign Ministry's attitude to Skoropadsky.

² Former Hetman in the Ukraine, by German appointment, 1918.

³ The words scored through were deleted from the draft instruction.

Hindenburg in 1928. Unfortunately relations with him have for some time been deteriorating, because the 73-year-old Hetman evidently considers it his main duty to attack and cast suspicion on the other Ukrainian groups, especially the above mentioned U.N.O.⁴

By order:
V. RINTELEN

⁴ The words scored through were deleted from the draft instruction.

No. 403

449/222727

Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department

BERLIN, June 8, 1940.

SS-Sturmbannführer Mayr, who had been in Athens on business of the Reich Main Security Office [*Reichssicherheitshauptamt*] and had just returned from there, called on me today to transmit to me the following on behalf of Herr Deter.

After his return from Berlin Deter had seen Metaxas' nephew and told him that he had carried out his mission in Berlin but he did not know what reply would be made from there. During the conversation it had become clear that Metaxas wanted from Germany only a guarantee against Italy but not one against England. Deter had characterized this as an incredible demand and asked the other party to this conversation to make further inquiries with Metaxas. Thereupon the latter had confirmed the version. Herr Deter had then left word that he considered that this absolutely ended his mission.

I told Herr Mayr that Herr Deter had called me on Thursday (June 6) from Athens¹ and given quite a different account of the matter. Herr Mayr had no explanation for this. He knew that Deter had telephoned me but thought that the latter had told me the same thing he had told him. Herr Deter also wanted to pass on the statement that far-reaching conclusions as to Greece's attitude could be drawn from this Greek reply.

I left Herr Mayr in no doubt that this kind of amateurish politics could only result in disaster. He seemed to share this view.

WOERMANN

¹ Document No. 395.

No. 404

8589/E602738-40

Führer's Directive

CHEFSACHE

FÜHRER'S HEADQUARTERS, June 8, 1940.

TOP SECRET MILITARY

The Führer and Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht

WFA/Abt.L. No. 33071/40 g. K.Chefs.

By officer only

DIRECTIVE No. 14

(1) The enemy is offering strong resistance against the right wing and the center of the Sixth Army.

(2) After hearing a report from the Commander in Chief of the Army, I approve the orders issued this morning by Army Group B:¹

(a) merely to pin the enemy down on the Sixth Army front,
(b) to place the XIV Corps on the left wing of the Fourth Army, and

(c) by increasing pressure with the bulk of the Fourth Army in a southeasterly direction and with the left wing of the Sixth Army in a southwesterly direction to defeat decisively the strong groups of enemy forces in front of the Sixth Army.

(3) In addition to this, I direct that:

(a) The fundamental idea of the whole operation as laid down in Directive No. 13² shall remain in force, i. e., to defeat the enemy forces decisively in the Château-Thierry-Metz-Belfort triangle and to bring about the collapse of the Maginot Line.

As the first part of the operation has not yet been completed and very strong resistance is being offered north of Paris, stronger forces than originally contemplated must for the time being remain along the lower Seine and opposite Paris.

(b) Army Group A will attack on June 9 in a southeasterly direction, as ordered in Directive No. 13.

(c) The Ninth Army will advance in a southerly direction toward the Marne. The XVI Corps (including the SS units and the SS Death's Head Division committed there) is to join it as quickly as possible. Strong reserves must follow on the boundary between the two Army Groups.

(d) I reserve to myself the decision regarding the direction which the thrust of the Ninth Army shall take later and as to whether the Army should be left with Army Group B or placed under Army Group A.

(4) *The mission of the Luftwaffe* is, supplementary to Directive No. 13,

(a) to support the concentric attack against the flanks of the main enemy forces in front of Army Group B;

(b) to patrol the strip of coast on the right flank of Army Group B and the territory southwest of the Bresle sector and also give it strong fighter protection;

(c) to help forward the attack of Army Group A at its point of main effort.

ADOLF HITLER

¹ Army Group B, then including the Fourth, Sixth, and Ninth Armies, had begun an attack on June 5 across the Somme and the Oise-Asne Canal against the area of the lower Seine, the region north of Paris and the lower Marne.

² Document No. 312.

No. 405

80/22158

The Minister in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

STOCKHOLM, June 9, 1940—9:05 p. m.

No. 988 of June 9

Received June 9—11:45 p. m.

With reference to my telegram No. 986 of June 8¹ and instructions received by telephone today from the office of the State Secretary:²

The Swedish Foreign Ministry which, according to instructions, was notified and asked for an explanation, gives the following information:

At 3:10 p. m. the Norwegian Legation here transmitted by telegram via Härnösand to Norwegian General Ruge the direct communication received from Oslo from General von Falkenhorst. The communication reads: All resistance is to cease by 4 p. m. today. One Norwegian negotiator each is to be sent at once to Narvik and Trondheim. Acknowledgement of receipt and General Ruge's reply are to be transmitted by radio to General Falkenhorst direct by 4 p. m.³

WIED

¹ Document No. 400.

² These telephoned instructions stated that German negotiators had been fired upon and asked for an explanation (22/13994).

³ The text of the articles of capitulation signed at Trondheim on June 10 is given in a Pol. I M memorandum of June 11 (80/22145-48).

No. 406

F12/212-214

Adolf Hitler to Benito Mussolini

THE FÜHRER'S HEADQUARTERS, June 9, 1940.

DUCE: I would now like to thank you by this means for your last communication.¹ I have already had you informed of my approval² of everything you proposed. Today, in addition to a brief report on the situation I must tell you how glad I am to have the opportunity of welcoming Italian comrades on our front. I know that those regiments of Bersaglieri are extremely good soldiers. Now, I should also like to give you, Duce, a few German regiments as a token of our comradeship in arms, and for this I actually had in mind Alpine troops, provided you can employ them on your front against France. Some have already distinguished themselves in Norway, others are fighting on the western front. There they have proved their mettle also. I should therefore be glad, Duce, if you thought it possible to employ them on your Alpine front, and would accept this as a token of our comradeship.

¹ Document No. 373.

² See document No. 374.

Since I did not know whether it would be possible for you further to postpone your operations for military reasons, I endeavored to bring ours forward by a few days. This we succeeded in doing. The air attacks on the big airfields in the Paris area and on the aircraft awaiting completion in the factories were a very great success. The French Air Force is now scarcely in evidence (apart from a few aircraft at night).

The big attack, which was designed first of all to bring up a concentration of French reserves, fulfilled its purpose. We succeeded in exploiting our initial successes to such an extent that I was able to supplement these operations by giving orders for another and even bigger attack. Fighting has been going on since this morning on a front of about 300 km. While writing this letter I have so far no reports on the results of today's attack, but our pressure is so strong that the whole of the French front will collapse in a few days' time. This is already the case in the first sector of the battle. Our units are only a few kilometers from Rouen and will probably reach the lower Seine during the day.

Meanwhile operations seem finally to have come to an end in Norway. The King of Norway and his Government have left the country. It is not known where they have gone. The Commander in Chief of the Norwegian forces in the Narvik area has asked for a truce and has ordered his units to stop fighting. For the last 2 days my little band of heroes up there have themselves been making attacks again and despite their numerical and other inferiority have driven back the enemy. The Luftwaffe has again damaged a cruiser. Part of the fleet penetrated to the Lofotens and closed in on the English aircraft carrier *Glorious*. It was sunk together with a destroyer, a submarine-chaser, a 22,000 ton transport, a 9,500 ton tanker and a few smaller vessels.

When this fighting around Narvik is finished, a small band of the bravest men under the leadership of a heroic officer whom I have known for many years will have achieved something rare in military history. Their personal efforts were just as great as their conquest of hardship, hunger, frost and all the sufferings connected with this. At times, this detachment was almost 1,000 km. away from the nearest main body of German troops. The only means of communication with them was by air. While I am writing this the spearhead of the operational troops, advancing in snowstorms over terrain which can only be negotiated with difficulty by a few mountaineers, is now barely 100 km. from Narvik as the crow flies. It is indeed only spirit and will power, Duce, which make men and which at the same time are their strongest weapons.

I greet you in sincere comradeship.

ADOLF HITLER

No. 407

F3/0490-0497

Memorandum by Minister Killinger

TOP SECRET

BERLIN, June 9, 1940.

REPORT TO THE FOREIGN MINISTER

Subject: Slovak Minister of the Interior and Foreign Affairs
Durčanský.

The existing material and the result of my discussions are so varied that if I wanted to put together all the details in one report it would become so voluminous that the picture of a general survey could hardly be gained from reading it.

Therefore I have summarized in a brief, telegram-style report all the reasons why Durčanský absolutely must disappear from the Government. The points covered therein are proven and valid. In case it is desired to learn details concerning one or the other of these points, enclosures are appended¹ to this report showing particulars.

In general:

Durčanský, perhaps, was once an honest revolutionary but once arrived in power immediately let himself be ensnared and influenced by circles who were in the position, through money, etc., to turn him against Germany. As I have already reported, these are Jewish-plutocratic circles, Masonic circles, circles subservient to Rome, and Czech and Pan-Slavic circles. There is the added fact that the English Intelligence Service—which, as is known, doesn't shirk any expenses to injure Germany—is probably behind all these forces. Time and again I have recommended to our own intelligence organization that it discover the identity of those circles. With a few exceptions, it hasn't been possible to determine this. In any event, it is established that Durčanský on the basis of his conduct and activity is a willing tool of these forces which are fighting Germany.

Durčanský began quickly to slide and was used as a willing tool by anti-German circles. This explains also the struggle which began between Sano Mach and Durčanský. Together with Minister President Tuka, Mach held firmly to the German line, and they condemned most severely the machinations of Durčanský and his supporters.

I had an opportunity to talk with Minister President Tuka for 2 hours. I have recorded my conversation with him in a brief special report (enclosure A).

Moreover, I had an opportunity to spend also 3½ hours with Mach, who had gone outside of Bratislava. I am of the opinion that the

¹ For enclosure A, see below. The other enclosures are not printed (F3/0498-0514).

crafty Durčanský has succeeded in convincing even pro-German circles of Mach's lack of ability. Before the meeting I heard judgments about Mach, partly good but for the greatest part derogatory. My personal impression is a positive one. Mach is loyal to Germany; he is intelligent, knows what he wants, and has the personality of a leader. Tuka judges him the same way. To be sure, he is unstable and is incapable of working steadily on small matters. This deficiency, however, would be remedied easily if he would attach to himself the right kind of collaborators or if collaborators would be assigned to him who would utilize and carry out his plans with respect to the technique of administration. If Tiso rejects Mach it is only because on the one hand he is being falsely informed by Durčanský, and on the other hand he knows that in his views Mach is not too close to the Church and not friendly to Rome.

At present there exists a nervous mood in Bratislava which is caused by Minister Bernard's absence and my sudden appearance there.² Durčanský is aware that Germany is going to take a step. For this reason he plays at the moment the part of the Germanophile and makes speeches, as for instance he did in Cadca in which he emphasized particularly his Germanophilia. In order to simulate this Germanophilia he has also ordered, as Minister of the Interior, that posters be put in business establishments in Bratislava, with the legend, "Jews not wanted."

In my opinion it is proven that Durčanský is a sharp, avaricious politician without character, who supports whatever is expedient at the time and who is unacceptable to Germany.

My proposal is as follows:

(1) Durčanský resigns as Minister of the Interior and Foreign Affairs.

(2) Minister President Tuka takes over simultaneously the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He issues the directives and appoints good collaborators to carry them out. He cannot be assumed to be able to carry a great burden of work.

(3) Sano Mach takes over the Ministry of the Interior.

The worst supporters of Durčanský will be removed from the Government and be replaced by those which follow the German line. I would not recommend that Mach proceed too radically. The largest part of the officials will make a full turn immediately.

(4) Germany appoints a commissioner with the Slovak Government who keeps an eye on all happenings and assists the individual members of the Government by word and deeds.

(5) The propaganda activity in the German sense is being further developed under the leadership of Frauenfeld.³ For this it is necessary to call in collaborators and to make money available.

² See document No. 336. No record has been found as to when Killinger's assignment was decided upon and what its exact terms were.

³ See document No. 309.

(6) Mach's debts will be taken care of. They amount to approximately 80,000 crowns, which is 8,000 reichsmarks or 3,000 dollars.

With regard to this I want to point out that these debts originated because Mach either helped friends or used the money for the Hlinka movement. For the position of commissioner with the Slovak Government I propose the following persons:*

In enclosure B a short curriculum vitae and evaluation of the persons in question.

Heil Hitler!

VON KILLINGER

[Enclosure A]

REPORT OF THE CONVERSATION WITH MINISTER PRESIDENT TUKA ON
JUNE 5, 1940

I had the opportunity of discussing the state of affairs in Slovakia for about 2 hours with Minister President Tuka.

I left Tuka in no doubt that the struggle between Mach and Durčanský had taken on forms which the German Reich could no longer watch inactively. Durčanský had adopted methods which not only undermined the prestige of the Slovak national state but also affected the German Reich. It was unbearable for us that Durčanský in his capacity as Minister of the Interior and Foreign Affairs was pursuing a policy which was practically anti-German and bordered on being pro-Allied.

Tuka was very frank with me and stated that he had never approved of this policy and was, therefore, strongly opposed to Durčanský. This had also been expressed outwardly by tendering his resignation when Mach was removed without his being notified.

He, Tuka, felt bound by his word to the Führer and would never depart from this line. There was only one thing for him, to keep faith with Germany despite all attempts of his opponents and all the enmity of Durčanský and those around him.

I am convinced that Tuka is sincere. He is willing to take up the fight against his opponents. Nevertheless, he is old and so weakened by his 10-year term of imprisonment that he is not in a position to fight this battle single-handed with the crafty Durčanský to the end.

He was, of course, reticent with me on certain questions. With his innate decency he believed he had, in a way, to protect Durčanský and did not speak quite openly when I asked him about cases of corruption with respect to Durčanský. He said that Durčanský, in his capacity

* The next few passages of the document are almost completely illegible. The persons suggested by Killinger, as ascertained from enclosure B (not printed: F3/0498-0505), were SS-Hauptsturmführer Erich Gebert, at the time economic expert attached to the Legation in Bratislava; Captain Nagel, representative of the German Abwehr in Slovakia; Hans Pehm, representative of the Danube Steamship Company in Slovakia and also official of the Auslandsorganisation.

as a lawyer, had been engaged in political business deals which we Germans, with our education, did not understand, but which were taken as a matter of course in the southeastern region. He considered it quite out of the question that Durčanský would accept bribes from anti-German quarters.

He denounced Durčanský's policy; that is to say, the not quite strict adherence to the Treaty of Protection and to the absolute alignment with Germany. As an old revolutionary and historian it was quite incomprehensible to him that young Slovak politicians could be so short-sighted. He is of the opinion that Slovakia would be digging her own grave by submitting to Pan-Slavic or pro-Allied ideas and machinations.

I am of the opinion that Tuka, who enjoys tremendous respect among the people, will gain the upper hand again when Durčanský and his circle have been ousted. If Durčanský stayed, Tuka would wear himself out in the ensuing struggle.

He did not give me a clear reply to my question what was to be done and said that he was not in a position to answer this question. It emerged from the whole conversation, however, that he would welcome it if Durčanský were frozen out which would create a clear situation.

On the basis of further conversations I had with people who know the situation in Slovakia the best solution would be if Tuka, as the Minister President, would at the same time take over the Foreign Ministry and if Mach were given the Ministry of the Interior.⁵

V. KILLINGER

⁵For further developments in the Slovak Government crisis see vol. x, documents Nos. 143 and 248.

No. 408

B14/B002001-03

The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

TOP SECRET

No. 1103 of June 9

ROME, June 10, 1940—2:00 a. m.

Received June 10—3:25 a. m.

For the Foreign Minister personally.

At 8 p. m., Italian time, I delivered the Führer's letter ¹ to the Duce in the presence of Ciano. He read out the Italian text to us and expressed his satisfaction. Ciano was able to supplement the information given in the letter about the present state of the operations by reports which had just reached him that Rouen and Compiègne had

¹ Document No. 406.

meanwhile fallen into German hands. The Duce said that the best answer to the Führer, whom he asked me to thank for his letter, was the answer he was going to give tomorrow. He ascertained from Count Ciano that the latter had acquainted me with the substance² of what he would be saying tomorrow, and that in particular he had informed me of the politically most important passages, addressed to other states.³ He added, that of all these countries, he disliked the Swiss by far the most, the true nature of whose attitude was again plainly expressed in the report on the "victory celebration" of the air-men of Payerne as forwarded by me in No. 1102 of today.⁴

During his further remarks which lasted about half an hour the Duce emphasized that he felt he was in a very good position at sea and in the air but that on land, too, he had in the so-called Po Army, which was stationed in the Verona-Mantua-Milan area, an excellent instrument which was organized down to the last detail under his personal supervision and was armed with the finest weapons and superbly equipped, and which he could send into action anywhere the Führer desired—and he even let fall the word England. He was quite willing to comply at any time with the Führer's suggestion for a personal meeting but did not wish to take him away from his higher duties as Supreme Commander at this juncture, but thought it would be well for Marshal Badoglio, Roatta, and Favagrossa⁵ to go to Germany shortly in order to coordinate certain matters; more especially an oral exchange of views between Favagrossa and us was important in order to know in what way we could help one another out. He, the Duce, had one thing above all to offer, and that was manpower. If he were to call up the whole class between 20 and 55 years of age, he would have 8½ (eight and a half) million soldiers at his disposal. On the other hand there was certainly a shortage of other things. But he was in a far better position than at the beginning of September when the country was still suffering from the immediate effects of the dreadful bloodletting of the Spanish war, which had not only drained him of almost inconceivable amounts of materials but also cost enormous sums of money and which following almost immediately on the Abyssinian campaign was tantamount to "bleeding them white." He had never published the figures for his losses so as to spare the excessive sensitivity of the Spaniards, for it was decidedly useful at the present moment to have

² This information was reported by Mackensen in telegram No. 1096 sent on June 9 (B14/B001992).

³ These passages were quoted verbatim by Mackensen in telegram No. 1096 of June 9 (B14/B001993).

⁴ Not printed (183/86151-52). It was based on a report from the Italian Minister in Bern about an alleged celebration at a Swiss air base on the occasion of the shooting down of three German planes by the Swiss Air Force on the frontier.

⁵ Under Secretary for armament in the Italian Ministry of War.

the Spaniards as one's friends, since they could and would be of great service to the common cause in many spheres—the servicing of submarines and so on. He had therefore also acquainted Franco of his impending decisions in a letter today.

The Duce, who was perfectly calm, took leave of me in the most cordial manner.

MACKENSEN

No. 409

136/74180

The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 1801 of June 10

MADRID, June 10, 1940.

Received June 10—5:50 p. m.

With reference to our telegram No. 1784 of June 8.¹

With regard to the rumor reported, which is spread about everywhere here, that the new British Ambassador² offered to cede Gibraltar to Spain, the Minister of the Interior has just declared to me that the news was pure invention. Moreover, the Minister of the Interior added spontaneously that it seemed to him unworthy of Spain that she should receive Gibraltar as a gift. Spain must take Gibraltar for herself at the right moment.

Further, the Minister of the Interior repeated to me the statement he had already made previously that he no longer believed in the necessity for Spain to enter the war more or less automatically, after Italy's entry into it.³ Spain would, however, vigilantly follow developments in order to intervene at the decisive moment.

STOHRER

¹ Not printed (136/74176/2). It reported rumors spread in circles close to the Government concerning an alleged British offer to cede Gibraltar.

² Sir Samuel Hoare.

³ Such a statement had been reported by Stohrer in telegram No. 1535 of May 22 (136/74144).

No. 410

F12/210-211

Adolf Hitler to Benito Mussolini

Telegram

THE FÜHRER'S HEADQUARTERS.

June 10, 1940—9:40 p. m.

DUCE: The historic decision which you announced today has moved me most profoundly. The whole German people is thinking of you and your country at this moment. The German Wehrmacht is glad to be able to stand at the side of its Italian comrades in battle.

Last September the rulers of Britain and France declared war on the German Reich without any reason. They turned down every offer of a peaceful settlement. Your proposal for mediation, Duce, was also received at the time with a brusque "No." While we have always been very closely linked together ideologically by our two revolutions and politically by treaties, the increasing disregard shown by the rulers in London and Paris for Italy's vital national rights has now finally brought us together in the great struggle for the freedom and future of our peoples.

Duce of Fascist Italy, accept the assurance of the indestructible community of arms between the German and the Italian peoples.

I myself send you as always in loyal comradeship my sincerest greetings.

Yours,

ADOLF HITLER

No. 411

19/12284

The State Secretary to the Embassy in the United States

Telegram

MOST URGENT

BERLIN, June 10, 1940.

SECRET

zu Pol. I M 7894 g.¹

No. 637

With reference to my telegram No. 596.²

To paragraph 4: As further investigations have revealed, the said Bergmann, whom the description fits, has been identified under another alias.

The military authorities say that in January 1939 he was employed in counterintelligence work against acts of sabotage directed at German ships, and was further active in the field of communist anti-war propaganda. It was stated categorically that there had been no instruction to carry out any sabotage in or against America.

The military authorities have requested that, in order to elucidate B[ergmann]'s version, which is incomprehensible here, his return to Germany be arranged for at once.

WEIZSÄCKER

¹ Pol. I M 7894 g: Not found. The journal indicates that it was an OKW communication—826/40 gkdos—of June 10.

² Document No. 362.

No. 412

283/156246-50

Memorandum by the State Secretary

St.S. No. 424

BERLIN, June 10, 1940.

After I had kept him waiting a few days the Argentine Ambassador called on me today once more regarding the *Uruguay* affair.¹ His visit

¹ See document No. 365.

again lasted an hour and a half. The greater part of the conversation consisted of professions of the unaltered friendly relations between the Argentine people, its Government and President, and the German Reich.

First the Ambassador dwelt at some length on the subject of the Argentine press and enlarged on all the constitutional, financial, and other considerations which had hitherto made it almost impossible for the Argentine Government to restrain the big metropolitan newspapers in Buenos Aires. The Ambassador did not deny that there was a systematic campaign of incitement against Germany in these newspapers, but maintained that any newspaper favoring Germany would have the same opportunities and freedoms as our opponents. He quoted examples of this and, without actually using the word, hinted that in his country one could get further by all kinds of bribery than by ordinary methods. In this respect he mentioned invitations to undertake lecture tours in Germany, the conferring of orders and decorations, titles, and the like. The Ambassador, however, admitted that it was quite logical for me to hold the Argentine Government itself responsible for Argentine publicity being predominantly biased against us and he then mentioned also that the Government's new powers against foreign influences would definitely make themselves felt in a salutary fashion shortly.

The Ambassador then touched upon the street demonstrations reported by Herr von Thermann; ² he compared their extent to that of similar anti-Allied demonstrations and maintained that both numerically and from the point of view of the importance of those taking part the incidents directed against us had been quite trifling and did not reflect the feelings of the people or of the Government in the slightest. If Senator Palacios worked and demonstrated against the Allies on a grand scale, that had some significance. The demonstrations against Germany, led by two 20-year-old rascals, could not really cause us any anxiety. The Government had instituted an exhaustive investigation into all these incidents and had come to the conclusion that our Embassy, no doubt influenced by reports from our fellow-countrymen over there, had not seen things in their proper perspective. Anyone who had heard of the many thousands who demonstrated on behalf of the crew of our *Graf Spee* or on the occasion of the funeral of the captain of the *Graf Spee* or who had deeper insight into conditions could really not assert that the population of Argentina was deviating outwardly or even at heart from the old friendship with Germany. The smashing of the windows of our *La Plata* publishing house was a matter that was just as unpleasant for the Argentine police as for us. The police could not however prevent

² See document No. 365, footnote 2.

every mischievous act. They were determined to do their utmost to suppress everything of this kind.

The burden of these profuse statements and assurances by Señor Olivera was that his Government would leave no stone unturned to remedy the complaints on which I had dwelt so long and in such detail during our last conversation.

I took note of these assurances given by the Ambassador.

In order to proceed from this to his real subject, Señor Olivera depicted the extraordinary opportunities of an economic and political nature in Argentina which will present themselves to Germany after victory. As it is less important in the present context I am omitting the details of this account, in which the Ambassador emphasized Argentina's intention to remain independent of the U. S. A.

Thereupon the Ambassador explained to me the incidents involving the sinking of ships in 1917,³ when two exactly similar instances had occurred which were perhaps only slightly more unfavorable for Argentina. In these two instances the Foreign Ministry had by a prompt and reasonable gesture assuaged the whole storm which had gathered in Argentina then as now. At that time the Argentine Government had protested more strongly than on this occasion, but the Foreign Ministry had stated without delay *that in the event* of Argentina's complaints being justified the German Government would not hesitate to give satisfaction. Olivera wished merely to remind me of this privately and to suggest that we really should adopt the same procedure again in order to deprive our common opponents of a line of argument.

Thereupon I told the Ambassador that after he had assured me of his Government's honest intentions of putting an end to the campaign against us as far as possible, I should now like to make the following statement to him regarding the case of the *Uruguay* :

The note which he had transmitted to us ⁴ contained a strong protest. Surely he must understand that we could not accept such a protest while we had only the biased account which the Argentine Government had furnished. The official report by the German warship allegedly involved was not at hand, if a German vessel were concerned at all. On the other hand, we had a number of reports on the incident which raised considerable doubt in our minds as to whether a German warship had been involved. We had received reports from Corunna that these doubts were prevalent there, too. Even the local Argentine Con-

³ For documents on this subject see *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1917*, supp. 1, pt. II (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1931) ; see in particular, pp. 275, 304, 309, 319, 322-323. That the Foreign Ministry itself was looking up these precedents in connection with the sinking of the *Uruguay* is indicated by a memorandum on German-Argentine negotiations in 1917 about the sinking of Argentine ships, which was submitted to Ambassador Ritter by Counselor Lohmann of the Legal Department on June 21 (233/156261-67).

⁴ On June 3 ; not printed (233/156223-27).

sul seems to share them. Furthermore it had come to our knowledge that on orders being given to stop, the radio operator of the SS *Uruguay* had sent out an S.O.S. giving the ship's position. The same radio operator had already done the same thing on other similar occasions.⁵ If that was correct this was a case of an unneutral act. Ships on which this sort of thing occurred thus exposed themselves to all kinds of danger. The German Government had reminded the Argentine Government of this some months ago. There was a discrepancy in the Argentine Government's own account of the affair. They assert in one place that the captain of the submarine gave the order to take to the lifeboats at once and only then interrogated the crew and examined the ship's papers. In another place the incident is given in the reverse order. Other information than that furnished by Argentina had come to our attention regarding the way in which the vessel was sunk. But what surprised us particularly was that according to the Argentine account the submarine bore the word "Wroch" on its conningtower. There was no word "Wroch" in German. Perhaps this pointed to the fact that it was actually a Polish submarine. In short, a series of particulars were at hand which made us doubly cautious and suggested that we should rely on those particulars which we received from German warships, but which were not at hand as of this moment. Once the vessels which might be concerned were back from sea, we would investigate the matter.

Once again and summoning up his South American eloquence the Ambassador, nevertheless, endeavored to induce me this time again to adopt the same procedure as in 1917. The present President who inclined toward Germany was in just such a position as President Irigoyen was in the last war. As we had thought it wise to pour oil on troubled waters then and, indeed, with the best of results, the President now in office was hoping for a similar action by Germany. The important thing was not a thorough examination of the legal data but an immediate political effect if we wished to utilize to our mutual advantage the period which must still elapse until the moment we received the report from the captain of the German warship.

I did not allow myself to be persuaded into promising such unilateral action and repeated how nonsensical it was to speak of the Argentine flag being insulted by the German Navy. Finally, the Ambassador no longer insisted on this. He only hoped that we would soon be able to reply to him in accordance with his suggestion.

Although I was familiar with events in 1917, I was not however acquainted with this reassuring pledge covering such an eventuality

⁵ In telegram No. 601 of June 5 (8862/E618171) Thermann reported from an employee of the line owning the *Uruguay* that radio operators on this line had been instructed to send out the English signal "S" repeated three times on sighting U-boats. The operator on the *Uruguay* was alleged to have followed this procedure on a previous voyage on the S.S. *Catherina*.

about which Señor Olivera spoke. Incidentally, immediately before the conversation with the Ambassador I learned that the submarine which sank the *Uruguay* had, in fact, just arrived back at its base. We shall, therefore, in a very short time be in possession of the data and then be able to decide how to proceed.⁶

WEIZSÄCKER

⁶ Weizsäcker recorded on June 26 that he had handed to the Argentine Ambassador a note dated June 25 which presented the German position on that matter (525/238081). The text of this note appears in the German naval manual *Urkunden zum Seekriegsrecht 1. September 1939 bis 31. August 1940 zusammengestellt vom Oberkommando der Kriegsmarine 1. Abt. Seekriegsleitung*, document No. 212, pp. 170-172. According to another memorandum by Weizsäcker of Aug. 2 (525/238091), he was handed by the Argentine Ambassador a note bearing the date of Aug. 1 which was to "close the *Uruguay* case." The tenor of the Argentine note was that although the sinking of the *Uruguay* was not justified, Argentina would not insist on her earlier demands as she did not want to continue the argument. Hope was expressed that Germany would recognize the friendly spirit in which Argentina had accepted the German note and hinted at a hope that after the war Germany might be willing to prove her friendly feelings toward Argentina by complying with Argentina's original demands. (525/238092-95)

No. 413

19/12246

The Chargé d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, June 11, 1940—9:28 a. m.

No. 1142 of June 11

Received June 12—10:35 a. m.

Former Attorney General Cummings,¹ has given a friend who is at the same time my reliable confidant the following account of a talk he had just had with Roosevelt.

1) In the present war situation the President will make use of every legal trick in order, by circumventing the Neutrality Law, to furnish the Allies with every possible material help.

2) Should the war last long enough to make it possible to build up American armaments and the American Army, he will place both on the side of the Allies.

3) Should the war end within a short period with a defeat of England and France, then America would "be sweet and polite and gracious toward Germany for 2 years;"² during these years America would build up her Army, Navy, and Air Force, regardless of cost and waste.

4) Should Germany at any time attack Canada or the West Indian possessions of England or France, this would mean immediate war with Germany, irrespective of the state of American rearmament.

I have no reason to doubt the authenticity of these statements; they are also worthy of note because the President thus lets it be known that he takes for granted a prolongation of his term of office, that is, his reelection.

THOMSEN

¹ Homer S. Cummings, U. S. Attorney-General, 1935-39.

² In English in the original.

No. 414

2931/567015

Memorandum by the Head of Political Division VIII

BERLIN, June 11, 1940.

zu Pol. VIII 658.¹

The Foreign Minister's reply ² was conveyed to Counselor of Embassy Dr. Ting of the Chinese Embassy on June 7 through the same channels by which he made his suggestion regarding possible German mediation in the Japanese-Chinese conflict. He was told that the Foreign Minister did not think that the moment had yet come when mediation in the conflict between Japan and China by a third state offered any hope of success. Mr. Ting replied that he, too, was of this opinion. He said he gathered from the answer that the Foreign Minister had at all events not turned down the idea in principle. It had been his, Ting's, intention to draw the Foreign Minister's attention to the possibility of a German initiative. He would naturally have liked to receive a definite promise of the German Government's willingness to mediate, as he could then bring his own Government round to the idea of this mediation for peace. He could not now pass on to Chungking the answer given him because his Government, disturbed by a Japanese radio announcement about an alleged official *démarche* by the Chinese Ambassador in Berlin regarding German mediation, had requested a report from the Embassy and had denied the Japanese announcement. By means of such fabricated reports the Japanese were at present trying to convince the Chinese in the occupied area that the Chungking Government was war-weary and incapable of continuing the struggle. For this reason the Chungking Government could not of its own accord seek mediation through a third power at present. Mr. Ting was told that nothing could be added regarding the attitude of the Foreign Minister as communicated to him. Mr. Ting asked us to keep the matter in mind.

KNOLL

¹ Document No. 327.² See document No. 327, footnote 2.

No. 415

321/198251-52

*Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department*¹

BERLIN, June 11, 1940.

The Lithuanian Minister called on me today to inform me of the

¹ A copy of this memorandum was sent on June 13 to the German Embassy in Moscow, to the Legations in Helsinki, Kaunas, Tallinn, Riga, Stockholm, and to the representative of the Foreign Ministry to the Governor-General for the occupied Polish territory in Cracow (432/219495-97).

further progress of the discussions with the Soviet Union.² After the Soviet Union had raised the question of the safety of the Soviet garrisons in Lithuania and had rejected the suggestion for a mixed commission to investigate the incidents, the Lithuanian Government had of its own accord taken a series of measures which it thought would satisfy the Soviet Union. It might perhaps be admitted that relations between the Soviet garrisons and the Lithuanian population had earlier been treated too casually. Restrictive and control measures had now been taken, and many arrests and house searches made, etc. It was known that no reply was received to the Lithuanian suggestion of sending the Foreign Minister to Moscow. It was, therefore, all the more surprising that not the Foreign Minister but Minister President Merkys was summoned to Moscow.

On June 7 Merkys had had his first conversation with Molotov. The latter had reproached him severely regarding the safety of the Soviet garrisons and in this connection presented a great many details of incidents. Molotov had in particular maintained persistently that Butayev, a member of the Red Army, who according to Lithuanian reports had committed suicide, had been shot by Lithuanians. He had expressed his dissatisfaction very plainly and stressed that the Lithuanian Ministry of the Interior was not equal to its task.

In a subsequent conversation on June 9, Molotov had brought up questions of foreign policy, which had increased Lithuanian fears regarding the course of the conversations. Molotov had maintained that a military alliance existed between the three Baltic States and as proof had referred to the frequent meetings of the chiefs of staff of the three countries and to other frequent conferences between Baltic personalities. Merkys had replied that there existed neither secret nor open agreements which could violate the letter or the spirit of the Agreement of October 10, 1939.³ There was the old political treaty between the Baltic States⁴ but no military alliance. Merkys had then himself expressed the wish to invite the Foreign Minister to the conversations. The latter had arrived in Moscow yesterday afternoon. M. Škirpa had not yet received any more recent reports. From the standpoint of protocol, everything had taken place in very polite form.

The Lithuanian Government still did not know what the intentions of the Soviet Union might be. The Lithuanian Government was prepared to do even more for the safety of the garrisons than it had done

² See document No. 353.

³ For English translations of the text of the agreement, see Department of State, *Bulletin*, 1939, vol. I, p. 705; *Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy*, vol. III, pp. 380-382.

⁴ The reference is to the Treaty of Mutual Understanding and Cooperation concluded between Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia on Sept. 12, 1934. See also document No. 463.

so far. If the Soviet Union now made broader political or military demands, the responsibility could not fall upon the Lithuanian Government. Thus far, the subject of Lithuania's relations with Germany had not been discussed during the foreign policy conversations. However, it was no doubt to be expected that the Soviet Union would raise questions in this respect, too. Here I interjected that there was nothing in German-Lithuanian relations which was not or should not be known by the Soviet Union.

M. Škirpa asked whether we had not instructed our Ambassador in Moscow to make inquiries. I replied in the negative and avoided further discussion of the matter with the remark that our Ambassador would certainly make a report of his own accord.

WOERMANN

No. 416

121/119590

The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 1838 of June 11

MADRID, June 11, 1940.

Received June 12—1:00 p. m.

Usually well-informed sources report on yesterday's Council of War in Paris:

Weygand said that the battle around Paris was lost; a separate peace must be concluded. Pétain agreed with this assessment of the situation. Reynaud and several other Ministers vehemently disagreed, accusing Pétain of treason and declaring that there could be no question of capitulation or a separate peace. They must withdraw, if necessary, behind the line of the Loire and if the worst came to the worst to the Pyrenees.

STOHRER

No. 417

19/12252-53

The Chargé d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

WASHINGTON, June 12, 1940—6:34 p. m.

TOP SECRET

Received June 13—6:10 a. m.

No. 1150 of June 12

In view of the German victories, the importance of which is strikingly emphasized by Italy's entry into the war, the ceaseless and unprecedented baiting by pro-Allied American circles and their spokesman, President Roosevelt, has created an anti-German atmosphere which can hardly be surpassed and is even beginning to penetrate Republican circles. Consequently the intervention hysteria in influential political circles is on the increase and is trying to soften up the Republican ranks also. There will therefore be violent discussions

at the Republican Convention in Philadelphia on June 24 concerning the wording of the Republican foreign policy electoral platform. The rapidly thinning ranks of the isolationists among the Republicans, as seen for instance in the change of course in foreign policy by the presidential candidate Senator Vandenberg, reported elsewhere,¹ must be supported in their struggle in Philadelphia. To this end a well-camouflaged lightning propaganda campaign might well prove useful, for which there are the following possibilities where German influence would in no case be visible to the outside:

1) A well-known Republican Congressman who works in close collaboration with the special official for press affairs will invite some 50 isolationist Republican Congressmen on a 3-day visit to the party convention, so that they may work on the delegates of the Republican party in favor of an isolationist foreign policy. 3,000 (three thousand) dollars are required.

2) In addition the Republican in question is prepared to form a small ad hoc Republican Committee which, as a counterblast to the full-page advertisement by the White Committee,² "Stop Hitler Now" would, during the party convention, publish in all the leading American newspapers a full-page advertisement with the impressive appeal "Keep America out of War."³

The cost of this would be about 60,000 to 80,000 (sixty to eighty thousand) dollars, of which half will, in all probability, be borne by his Republican friends.

In view of the unique opportunity I have accepted proposal 1). I request telegraphic instructions as to whether project 2) is of interest and if it is that the funds referred to be transferred.⁴ This telegram has been destroyed.

THOMSEN

¹ Telegram No. 1129 of June 11; not printed (19/12740-42).

² The Committee to Defend America by Aiding the Allies, under the chairmanship of William Allen White.

³ Such an advertisement appeared in the *New York Times* for June 25, 1940.

⁴ Cf. vol. x, document No. 91, where reference is made to the fact that "the promotion campaign" had been authorized by telegraphic instruction No. 666 of June 17; this telegram has not been found.

No. 418

174/186337-38

The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 560 of June 12

Tokyo, June 12, 1940—9:40 p. m.

Received June 12—8:00 p. m.

With references to your telegrams Nos. 483 of June 9 (BRAM) and 477 of June 8 Pp 955.¹

In view of the well-known attitude of the Yonai-Arita Cabinet and of press chief Suma, who is completely immersed in Chinese-Japanese

¹ Neither found.

affairs, the démarche suggested by Italy ² would undoubtedly have the opposite effect upon the Government. The present Government clique had secretly hoped that, as a result of Germany's action against Holland and Belgium, America would enter the war and would thus be forced to relax her pressure on Japan. As I have reported on various occasions, these ideas had also found their way into the pro-Government press. The Government's position was seriously shaken and the anti-American press campaign revived (see telegram No. 548 of June 8 on the Kuhara action ³) by the fact that America not only remained aloof from the war in Europe but even increased her pressure on Japan by leaving the fleet at Hawaii, by continued financial support to Chiang Kai-shek and particularly by an embargo on material and machinery vital to Japan. Even the attempted friendly overtures made by certain American politicians after Italy's entry into the war, which were reported in detail by the press here, have as certain editorials prove so far not been able to alter the mistrustful basic attitude of the press toward America's definite aims in the Far East.

Any German or Italian move which revealed anxiety about America's attitude in the near future would only give the Government and the Government press the cue for further wooing of America. Furthermore, just as in the *Asama Maru* case,⁴ the Government would attribute to us the intention of using Japan as a tool for our politics, an argument which in view of the well-known mistrust of the Japanese would not be without effect.

The Embassy is continuing its efforts to create Japanese ill feeling toward America by influencing the press and important political persons in any way which would appear suitable.

I myself have stated in numerous conversations with leading politicians, for example Konoye, Suetsugu,⁵ and Kuhara, that America's interests and activity (group garbled) in the Pacific area and that therefore a conflict between Japan and America is inevitable in the long run.

Ambassador Oshima and Shiratori ⁶ and circles close to them are working along the same lines in confidential collaboration with the Embassy.

² In a memorandum of June 4 (174/136328) for Ribbentrop, Schmidt recorded a conversation in which Zamboni, Counselor of the Italian Embassy, suggested, on instructions from Rome, that the two Governments should make a démarche in Tokyo emphasizing the desirability of an increased anti-American campaign in the Japanese press.

³ Not printed (3716/E036885). The reference is to Mr. Fusanosuke Kuhara, Japanese politician and industrialist known for his ultra-nationalist views. He was leader of the Seiyukai party.

⁴ See document No. 233, footnote 7.

⁵ Admiral Nobumasa Suetsugu, Minister of the Interior in the Konoye Cabinet, June 1937-January 1939.

⁶ Toshio Shiratori, Japanese Ambassador in Italy, 1938-1939.

The Italian Chargé d'Affaires will report to his Government on the lines of the above.

OTT

No. 419

4041/E064039-42

Memorandum by the Director of the Economic Policy Department

BERLIN, June 12, 1940.

W II 3972.

Subject: Report by Staatsrat Wohlthat on the situation in Holland.¹

CONFERENCE WITH MINISTERIALDIREKTOR WIEHL AT THE FOREIGN
MINISTRY ON JUNE 12, 1940

Those present:

Staatsrat Wohlthat

Ministerialdirektor Walter, Ministry of Food

Ministerialdirektor Berger, Ministry of Finance

Ministerialdirigent Bergemann } Ministry of Economics

Oberregierungsrat Jörges

Reichsbankdirektor Wilhelm

Colonel Becker, OKW—Military Economy and Armaments Office

Oberregierungsrat Kadgien, Four Year Plan

Minister Eisenlohr

Minister Clodius

Senior Counselor Sabath } Foreign Ministry

Counselor von Maltzan

Herr Wiehl opened the meeting by saying that this was not a meeting of the Commercial Policy Committee [HPA], since it was not competent for questions concerning German-Dutch relations and Herr Wohlthat's mission, on which he would now report, but solely for arranging conversations on economic matters between Holland and other states.

Herr Wohlthat outlined the special treatment of Holland ordered by the Führer as follows:

Holland was to remain a political and economic unit so that it might serve as a gateway to the world, especially with regard to the Netherlands Indies, and as a bridge to such opportunities as might present themselves on the conclusion of peace. On this account efforts were to be made to proceed in harmony and cooperation with the Dutch. These directives had also been specifically affirmed by the Field Marshal with regard to the objectives of the Four Year Plan. With this in mind he too had taken up his mission in Holland and so far had met with unqualified readiness to cooperate from all Dutch Government authorities. The fact must not be ignored, however, that ultra-severe measures such as, for instance, the imposition of a contribution, might easily give rise to crises which would of necessity lead to the resignation of one or other leading Dutch personage, thereby cre-

¹ Cf. document No. 313.

ating difficult personnel problems and possibly changing the relationship of trust, which has so far developed, into one of passive resistance. Thus, for instance, he had asked that some business men be removed from the list drawn up of prominent Dutch personages who had been singled out for reprisals;² the Reichskommissar had acceded to this request.

Herr Wohlthat dealt as follows with the question of currency:

The complete withdrawal of occupation currency [*Reichskreditkassenscheine*] from circulation was in our interest. Some 9 million RM had already accumulated in the Netherlands Bank. With the concurrence of the Reich Ministry of Economics and the Reichsbank, the rate for the guilder had now been fixed at 132.7 as compared with the rate for occupation marks, which was 150. A guilder account had been opened at the Netherlands Bank for the payment of occupation costs (German offices, construction of military installations, etc.). If the occupation marks were withdrawn it would be practical to furnish Reich treasury obligations as cover for these money issues. In this way the raising of contributions would be avoided, the settlement of and the decision concerning the meeting of war costs would be postponed until the conclusion of peace, and the continued cooperation of M. Trip, the president of the Netherlands bank of issue, would be secured.

Herr Berger opposed the issue of Reich bonds which would create a new liability for the Reich. According to The Hague Convention on Land Warfare, Holland was obliged, as a country at war, to bear the costs of occupation and the country must be adjusted to this as soon as possible. Therefore the Dutch should not be left in the dark on this point, but we should demand from them that from this moment on they bear the costs themselves and that they find ways and means for the financing. Otherwise we ought to continue the issue of occupation marks.

Herr Wilhelm supported Herr Wohlthat's proposal. The occupation marks were at too high a level, and besides it was wrong to have two rates which would leave the door wide open for racketeering. For the rest, it only meant a technical banking operation to cover the guilder issue which would render it possible to make the Dutch currency appear to be backed by the legal gold cover as before.

After lengthy discussions Herr Berger declared his readiness to procure the consent of the Reich Minister of Finance to the issue of Reich treasury obligations on the understanding that the Dutch were told at the next conversations on the subject that in accordance with The Hague Convention on Land Warfare, the occupation costs were being charged to them.

Herr Wohlthat spoke as follows regarding goods traffic, i. e., goods crossing the customs frontier:

The German-Dutch clearing arrangement was again in operation. In view of the considerable deficit which is to be expected in the

² See document No. 333.

balance of our trade with Holland, Dutch exports would have to be financed in advance. The Dutch authorities had already agreed to the Dutch Ministry of Finance granting extensive credits to the clearing bank from which payments would be made to Dutch exporters, even in the event of further increase in the balance of the clearing account.

As to the introduction of foreign exchange control, a system on the German model, but going somewhat beyond the German regulations, was being worked out at present with the Dutch. The stock of gold and notes at present in Holland was about 400 to 500 million RM. These were to be handed over, but securities, of which some 1.5 billions were in the Netherlands Indies, were only to be registered. In gold stocks there were :

228 million Hfl. in Holland
160 million Hfl. in the U. S. A.
600 million Hfl. in England
100 million Hfl. in South Africa

No person outside Holland could dispose of these gold stocks.

Only the equalization fund of 100 million Dutch guilders, which was abroad, had been transferred to the emigrè Dutch Government.

The labor question. With the expected unemployment in Holland and our great need for skilled labor, about 100,000 Dutch workers would probably be brought to Germany. For these people extensive transfer facilities were to be provided.

Pensioners. A considerable sum (over 100 million Dutch guilders a year) was paid out in the mother country by the Bank of Java in Amsterdam in pensions and for the servicing of capital on behalf of the Netherlands Indies. There was so far no intention of having this obligation discharged, which fell due for the first time on July 1, unless the Netherlands Indies made payments in some form or other, for instance by supplying goods for our account to Japan or Russia.

Replying to a question from Herr Clodius about the Rumanian Astra-Romana, Herr Wohlthat said that the shares were no longer in Holland. The Director General of Shell, however, would bring his influence to bear on Rumania to make deliveries to us.

Herr Eisenlohr warned against invoking The Hague Convention on Land Warfare in connection with the Dutch as this might easily turn out to our disadvantage.

He requested current reports on the state of Dutch credit balances abroad. Herr Wohlthat thought that nothing could be learned about this in Holland.

Finally Herr Walter broached the question of Dutch trade relations with other countries, for instance, with Scandinavia. It was not only in Dutch, but also in German interests, that trade in timber for ex-

ample be revived as soon as possible. To this end conversations must be had with the Dutch as to what they wanted to take, what they could supply and how payment was to be effected.

Herr Wohlthat considered it expedient that Ministerialdirektor Walter come to Holland for a while to make contact with the staff of the Reichskommissar and, by making use of his Dutch connections, to ascertain what could be done from Berlin for Dutch foreign trade. Herr Wiehl suggested that the Reichskommissar might apply for Herr Walter to make a visit of this kind.

WIEHL

No. 420

B14/B002024-25

Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Economic Policy Department

IMMEDIATE BY TELETYPE

BERLIN, June 12, 1940.
zu W 3050 g¹ II.

I. In accordance with instructions from the Foreign Minister, Ambassador von Mackensen has been charged with informing the Italian Government that the German Government agrees to General Favagrossa coming to Berlin for talks on Italian war material requirements.² According to a report telephoned from the Embassy, however, it has meanwhile become doubtful whether General Favagrossa can be spared from Rome at the moment, and in any case he has requested the Embassy to ask the German Government first of all to advise Rome to what extent they are able to meet the requests for raw materials put forward in detail in the meantime.³ The Embassy has been instructed 'to reply for the present that the examination of these requests will be expedited.

II. This afternoon, Ambassador Giannini, the Chairman of the Italian Government Committee, informed me through the Italian Embassy that in the Italian view the new situation required the immediate convening of the so-called Commission A (Cooperation for War Economy), the Chairmen of which are Giannini and myself and of which General Favagrossa is a member. As he, Giannini himself, and the members of the Italian delegation would find it very diffi-

¹ W 3050 g: Not printed (2060/448160-61). This was telegram No. 757 which went out the same day over Clodius' signature instructing the Embassy in Rome to tell Favagrossa that a speedy examination of Italy's requests was under way and informing the Embassy furthermore about the matters treated in the document printed here.

² See document No. 408.

³ Such requests had been reported in Rome telegram No. 1092 of June 8 (B14/B001980-81).

⁴ See footnote 1.

cult to leave Rome at the present moment he requested as a favor that the talks be held in Rome. The talks would only need to last for a few days.

III. According to information given by General Keitel to General Thomas, of which the Foreign Ministry was acquainted today,⁵ the Führer has made his decision and approves of talks being held with General Favagrossa, but the Italian requests are to be treated with caution for the time being. He reserved to himself any decision regarding promises to be made to Italy.

Here it must be pointed out that in comparison with the far reaching demands put forward in August 1939,⁶ which were impossible to fulfill, the requests now put forward by Italy keep to a certain extent within reasonable limits. However it will be possible to meet the new Italian requests only in part and to a limited extent.

IV. In view of this state of affairs I do not think it right to ask Ambassador Giannini and his staff to travel to Berlin now, contrary to the wish he himself expressed, because disappointment that this visit had not fully achieved the results for which he had hoped would then be more noticeable than if Commission A were to meet in Rome for a few days, as he had wished. It would still be possible while at Rome to obtain the Führer's approval before final arrangements were made.

To be submitted herewith to the Foreign Minister through the Director and the State Secretary with the request that the meeting of the Commission for War Economy in Rome be approved.⁷ On the German side, besides myself, a representative of the OKW and a representative of the Ministry of Economics would have to take part in the meeting.

CLODIUS

⁵ In a memorandum of June 12, from the file of General Thomas (introduced at the Nuremberg Trial of the Major War Criminals as document No. 1456-PS, but not included in the published collection) the following is recorded: "Italy: The Führer takes the position that, since Italy left us in the lurch in the autumn, there is now no cause for giving anything away. In any case the Italian wishes ought first to be examined in detail. Exchange of Bersaglieri regiments with Alpine divisions to be postponed."

⁶ Cf. vol. VII, document No. 301.

⁷ See document No. 480, footnote 1.

No. 421

F12/203-204

Memorandum by the State Secretary

TOP SECRET
St.S. 427

BERLIN, June 13, 1940.

Last night I telephoned the Foreign Minister as follows:

The Italian Ambassador has just handed me a letter from the Duce for the Führer. He requested me to forward it by the speediest means.

I promised to telephone it to the Foreign Minister for immediate transmission to the Führer.

The letter, the text of which follows by air courier today (June 13) reads as follows:

"Führer: I thank you for the telegram ¹ which you sent me after I decided to enter the war. It is almost superfluous to tell you that I shall wage war with the utmost vigor.

As to the exchange of troops as a proof of our comradeship, I propose that you should send me fifty 88-cm. antiaircraft batteries in order to improve the defenses of the most important industrial centers of Piedmont and Liguria, while I would send you a motorized division which is already standing in readiness and can proceed as soon as agreement is reached. Please inform me whether you accept my offer, in which case the General Staffs will propose the means of carrying it out.

I am ordering the mass bombing of southern France as a reprisal for the first bombing of Turin by the English in which the civilian casualties were 14 dead and 30 wounded.

As far as raw materials are concerned, you will see from the experts' reports that my demands ² are modest and that you will receive suitable return.

If there should be a lull, a meeting between us would be useful.

Please inform General Dietl, who is well known in Italy, that the Italians have followed with admiration his valiant resistance which forced the French and English to flee from Narvik.

I will keep you informed of the progress of the operations.

Pray accept, Führer, my comradely greetings. Mussolini."

Herewith to Senior Counselor Kordt enclosing the originals (one each in Italian ³ and German ⁴ for the Führer and Foreign Minister) with the request for dispatch by today's air courier.

WEIZSÄCKER

¹ Document No. 410.

² See document No. 420 and footnote 3 thereto.

³ Not printed (F12/207-208). There are a few significant differences between this Italian text and that published in *Hitler e Mussolini: lettere e documenti*, No. 27.

⁴ F12/202,200. This German translation follows closely the Italian text of F12/207-208.

No. 422

897/291875-77

The Chargé d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

TOP SECRET

No. 1169 of June 13

WASHINGTON, June 13, 1940—10:24 a. m.

Received June 14—12:55 p. m.

Inf. 169 g.

In view of the growing propaganda activity of pro-Allied circles to prepare America for intervention in the European war, it seems neces-

sary that we should now take special literary countermeasures at once, first of all by the publication of up-to-date books drawing public attention in America to the dangers of intervention.

I have therefore made contact through a suitable agent with the American literary agency of William C. Lengel. This double camouflage seems to ensure that only interested American isolationist circles will be in evidence. Five book projects from which I await great results as regards the enlightenment of American public opinion are described in detail below. The total expenditure for publishers, negotiations and guarantees for the authors would amount to about 20,000 (twenty thousand) dollars. Considering the important writers who are involved in this it can be assumed that several tens of thousands of copies of each of these publications can be disposed of without difficulty through the normal book trade, so that presumably no extra costs will accrue to us for printing and distribution.

The following are the publications under consideration :

1) A book by the world renowned author Theodore Dreiser, who is an isolationist and would perhaps be prepared to write a book in which the American people are warned against any kind of intervention in Europe.

2) A book or a series of articles from the pen of S. F. Porter, the American woman journalist and author, who has already submitted several articles to Lengel in which the catastrophic economic consequences are depicted from the housewife's point of view.

3) A series of articles, or a book, or both, by . . . Creel (beginning of the name, two groups, garbled) the publicist and former director of American propaganda during the World War, who writes against fifth column hysteria and American jingoism.

4) A book by the author and publicist Burton Rascoe, who wants to compile a list of arguments, based on post-war experiences, against America's entry into the war.

5) To enlist the most popular American novelist, Kathleen Norris, for a series of articles or a book with the title *War Crazy* in which a stand would be made against war hysteria. Norris is a pacifist. Distribution of her articles in the most important magazine with the largest circulation would be assured. All the above-mentioned, very well-known authors can be looked up in the American *Who's Who*. None of the authors knows who is behind the publisher's offer.

In order that these books may appear at the height of the election campaign, I request telegraphic instructions ¹ by return whether you are interested in this project, in which case I request transfer of the appropriate funds.

THOMSEN

¹ See document No. 455, footnote 2.

No. 423

136/74195

The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 1859 of June 13

MADRID, June 13, 1940.

Received June 13—2:00 p. m.

With reference to our telegram No. 1858 of June 12.¹

It has been announced in a Spanish decree that now that the struggle has been extended to the Mediterranean through the entry of Italy into the war with France and England, the Government has decided that Spain is to be a nonbelligerent in the conflict.

This declaration has, without doubt, been made in order to give Spain greater freedom during the war as regards the conduct of her foreign policy, also toward Germany.

STOHRER

¹ Not printed (136/74194). This telegram reported that Franco had promised the Italian Chargé d'Affaires that he would comply with Mussolini's wish, just conveyed to him, to the effect "that Spain should not issue a declaration of neutrality but rather one of 'nonparticipation in the war.'"

No. 424

265/172311

The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

ANKARA, June 13, 1940—2:35 p. m.

No. 428 of June 13

Received June 13—5:55 p. m.

The game has been won:

1) I have learned confidentially: The Council of Ministers has decided to fulfill its obligations but sees no reason for entering the conflict because of Italy's declaration of war. A statement will be made in the National Assembly this evening or tomorrow.¹

2) In order to intensify the political effect, we have just signed under date of August 12² the exchange of notes on the conclusion of our trade treaty to the amount of 21 million Turkish pounds on both sides but not including chromium and, therefore, exclusive of corresponding reciprocal deliveries. Details will follow.³

PAPEN

¹ See document No. 464.

² Marginal note: "Arrived like this. Should presumably read June 12."

³ See document No. 434.

No. 425

821/198254

The Minister in Lithuania to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

URGENT

KAUNAS, June 13, 1940—8:52 p. m.

No. 900 of June 13

Received June 13—11:35 p. m.

Minister President Merkys returned from Moscow yesterday without the Soviet Government having put forward definite demands so far. At the conversations Molotov, as I am reliably informed, merely made accusations against Lithuania, and did not, on a single point, acknowledge as justified Lithuania's attempts to vindicate herself, not even for instance in the matter of a military alliance with Estonia and Latvia, or of the exchange of Military Attachés between the Baltic States. Molotov had replied, (group garbled) to Merkys' question at the last meeting on June 11 as to what Lithuania should do, that this affair was suicide. The Cabinet had, therefore, after Merkys' return, made the decision that Skučas, the Minister of the Interior, should resign and that Povilaitis, head of the Security Department at the State Police headquarters, who was very unpopular with the Russians on account of his fight against communism, but who cooperated well with our policy, should be dismissed as from today. Foreign Minister Urbšys is to transmit this decision to the Soviet Government with the request to be informed whether they would thus consider the incident closed. It is not yet known when Urbšys will have the opportunity of carrying this out. The mood here is very pessimistic.

ZECHLIN

No. 426

121/119591-98

Memorandum by the State Secretary

St.S. No. 430

BERLIN, June 13, 1940.

The American Chargé d'Affaires has just handed me a note for the Foreign Minister. On account of an interruption of the telephone service to Baumschule,¹ I would like in this way to bring the contents of this note to the attention of the Foreign Minister. No other departments have been informed from here.

The text of the note follows: ²

No. 1147

Berlin, June 13, 1940.

Excellency: In confirmation of my telephone conversation today with Staatssekretär von Weizsäcker, I have the honor to inform Your Excellency that at two o'clock this afternoon the American Minister

¹ The Foreign Minister's field headquarters.

² In English in the original (413/215654-55).

at Berne telephoned the Embassy that at 11:30 a. m. today, Swiss time, he had received a telephone call from the American Ambassador in Paris, who asked that the following message be communicated immediately to the Government of the Reich:

"Paris has been declared an open city. General Hering, Military Commander of the Paris district, is withdrawing his Army which has been defending Paris. All possible measures are being taken to assure a security of life and property in the city. The gendarmerie and police are remaining, and the firemen are also remaining to prevent fire. General Dentz is remaining as commander of the Paris area, but without troops, simply with the gendarmerie and the police.

"Ambassador Bullitt is remaining in Paris with the Military and Naval Attachés, the Counselor of Embassy and six Secretaries of Embassy as the representative of the Diplomatic Corps. Mr. Bullitt hopes to be of any assistance possible in seeing to it that the transfer of the Government of the city takes place without loss of human life. This entire communication is made at the personal request of General Dentz."

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency the assurances of my highest consideration.

Donald R. Heath

End of note.

Supplement by the State Secretary:

1. The Chargé d'Affaires stated that this was not an official communication. He had not been instructed by his Government to hand it over. Allegedly, wire communication between Paris and Washington had broken down. The Chargé d'Affaires had, nevertheless, felt it his duty to transmit to the Foreign Ministry the communication given to him.

2. I told the Chargé d'Affaires the following:

The communication which he was making to the Foreign Ministry was vague in the extreme. It was made at the personal request of a French General and was therefore not an official communication from France either. The American Ambassador's role in the affair seemed to me extremely obscure. He described himself as the "representative of the Diplomatic Corps" in Paris and spoke of a transfer of the government of the city in which he hoped to be of assistance. The statements about measures planned by the French military authorities gave rise to many questions which, however, I did not wish to raise now.

3. The Chargé d'Affaires acknowledged these remarks and said that he would perhaps receive another, more precise official instruction from his Government. He asked me again what I thought about his communication.

4. I again told the Chargé d'Affaires that I could take no position. I also drew his attention to the fact that the opening words of his letter were misleading, in so far as I had only said on the telephone that I could not receive a communication by telephone on this subject.³

WEIZSÄCKER

³ No further communications on this subject have been found in the files.

No. 427

220/148935-36

*The Chief of the High Command of the Wehrmacht to the
Foreign Minister*

WFA/L (IV) No. 0132/40 geh. THE FÜHRER'S HEADQUARTERS.
Subject: Transit traffic through Sweden and Norway.

The High Command of the Wehrmacht requests you once more to enter negotiations with Sweden for the purpose of achieving unhindered transit traffic for all kinds of transport through Sweden to Norway.

The collapse of the Norwegian resistance removes, in the opinion of the High Command of the Wehrmacht, any pretext which the Swedes have advanced up to the present against the German demands.

On the other hand our need to send transports still remains, since the air route only allows the sending of small loads, and is besides, like the sea route, exposed to enemy countermeasures.

The High Command of the Wehrmacht is in the first place concerned with bringing up guns and ammunition for coastal fortifications and air defense in the Narvik area. Besides this, regular transport of goods for the supply of Narvik, Trondheim, and the Oslo area is necessary. The unlimited transport of members of the German Wehrmacht on Swedish railways is also urgently necessary for lightening the traffic by sea.

The Führer has given his sanction for these demands.¹

The High Command of the Wehrmacht therefore requests you to obtain their full enforcement as soon as possible.²

KEITEL

¹ This letter from the OKW was circulated in the Foreign Ministry under a covering note of June 16 by Heyden-Rynsch (zu Pol. I M 8452 g. Ang. II) and was accompanied by the following briefing note of the Wehrmachtführungsamt:

"L IV

Führer's Headquarters, June 18, 1940.

Subject: Demands on Sweden.

Now that the Norwegian capitulation has rendered untenable Sweden's argument for having to maintain her neutrality toward the Norwegian brother-people, it is proposed that the following demands on the Swedish Government be insisted upon by the Foreign Ministry:

1) The transit of all kinds of war materials through Sweden for the equipment of the German troops in Norway and for coastal defense.

2) The transit through Sweden of supplies for the German troops in Norway.

3) Permission for single members of the Wehrmacht in uniform to travel (on duty and leave journeys) through Sweden under simplified visa regulations. Special transit trains or cars might come into consideration for this.

The through travel and transport is to be demanded on the lines to Oslo, Trondheim, and Narvik.

After the final withdrawal of the Allies from Norway it may be possible to exert greater pressure on Sweden."

² See document No. 466.

No. 428

175/136971-72

The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 913 of June 13

BUCHAREST, June 14, 1940—2: 15 a. m.

Received June 14—6: 15 a. m.

With reference to my telegram No. 790 of May 25.¹

Foreign Minister Gigurtu has told me the following:

During a private discussion with the King yesterday on the development of relations with the Reich and the position which they intend to communicate to us concerning the substance of your telegram No. 644 of June 1,² (RAM's Special Train) the King suddenly reverted in a very anxious manner to the fact that the Reich Government is evading replying to his proposals on the treatment of members of the Iron Guard in Germany. He said that this was causing him grave concern for how could he initiate a policy of intimate relations with Germany in the manner of King Carol I if the Reich did not declare its readiness to take action against these terrorist elements.

The Foreign Minister urgently requested me to ask the Reich Government to take a position on this question.

As to the projected reply, it was intended first to emphasize the pleasure caused by the interest Germany had taken in future relations with Rumania and the détente in the southeastern region. The intention was to talk with Russia as soon as the Russian Minister arrived here. It was impossible to meet Hungary's wishes with regard to Transylvania; at the most there could be negotiations for an exchange of Rumanians and Hungarians. A settlement was not so difficult in the case of the Dobruja, but would perhaps not be mentioned for the time being. I described the latter as very unwise since the Dobruja question was simple and could not present any difficulty provided that a definite solution was found. The Foreign Minister admitted this. He remarked that it must be plain to us that the old parties who were always trying to score against the King's authoritarian régime would oppose too far-reaching revisionism and agitate against the King and the present Government. It was possible that there might be another Cabinet crisis even now. He suggested that we should support the King who was now determined to conduct a policy in accord with us. He would keep us informed of the state of the negotiations with Russia. There is again much talk at the moment of a Cabinet crisis. In my opinion it would be advisable if the present Cabinet pushes through the revision-

¹ See document No. 316.

² Document No. 364.

ist claims as a so-called pro-German Cabinet, since it will have to resign afterwards and an anti-German course will be adopted (similar to Marghiloman ³). This would then only be avoided if, after pacification has been effected in the southeastern region, we can offer Rumania something positive, e. g., a frontier guarantee and close cooperation in all fields, which is what the King and his Government are striving for. Until we have the final Rumanian reply it would not be worthwhile to take any definite position regarding this, but I do urgently request an opinion on the treatment of members of the Iron Guard.⁴

FABRICIUS

³ Alexandru Marghiloman became Rumanian Minister President in March 1918.

⁴ No reply to this request has been found.

No. 429

77/58138

The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

MADRID, June 14, 1940.

No. 1878 of June 14

Received June 14—10:35 a. m.

The Spanish Foreign Minister has just informed me that the Spanish Government has decided to place the town and zone of Tangier under military occupation in order to ensure the neutrality of Tangier.¹

STOHRER

¹ In telegram No. 1882 of the same day (77/58140) Stohrer reported that the occupation of Tangier had taken place that morning.

No. 430

2423/512064-65

The State Secretary to the Embassy in Argentina

Telegram

No. 502

BERLIN, June 14, 1940—4:15 p. m.

zu Pol. IX 1032 III.¹

With reference to your telegram No. 619 of June 8, section IV 2a.

You are authorized to spend for the purpose stated up to half a million pesos. Please make first use of deposit M. If money is withdrawn in excess of 25,000 RM, a telegraphic report is to be made so that replenishment of the fund can be taken care of. A further tele-

¹ Pol. IX 1032: Document No. 401.

graphic instruction with reference to the remaining questions dealt with in your telegram will follow.²

WEIZSÄCKER³

² See document No. 482.

³ Marginal notes: (1) "Senior Counselor Bergmann transmitted to me at 11:00 this morning the following instruction from the Foreign Minister: On the basis of the request made in telegram No. 619 of June 8 from Buenos Aires, a sum of money is to be sent to the Embassy, if necessary from the general fund. A report that this has been carried out is to be made to the Foreign Minister before 12:00 noon.

"The instruction of the Foreign Minister if it is a case of an immediate measure can only refer to section iv 2a, paragraph 2, of the telegram, in which the Ambassador requests half a million pesos (approximately 280,000 RM) to win over influential people in Argentina.

"Moreover, the telegram in which there are detailed suggestions for the development of our relations with Argentina, has been forwarded to other departments of the Foreign Ministry which might be interested in it.

"A memorandum by the Economic Policy Department with regard to economic questions is enclosed. The Press Department has taken charge itself of the section referring to press questions. F[reytag] June 14."

(2) "Senior Counselor Bergmann has replied to the Foreign Minister at 12:00 that the Embassy in Buenos Aires shall receive the telegram quoted here. F[reytag] 14."

(3) "The telegram has been drafted in consultation with Counselor Rieger and Regierungsrat Stempel. F[reytag] 14."

No. 431

265/172816

The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 437 of June 14

ANKARA, June 14, 1940—5:41 p. m.

Received June 15—2:00 a. m.

The Turkish Government has made the following statement:

As a consequence of Italy's entry into the war and upon requests by the English and French Ambassadors the Turkish Government has examined the situation and decided: Turkey's entry into the war in the present situation might possibly involve her in a war with the USSR. The Government has therefore decided to invoke Protocol No. 2 of the English-French-Turkish Pact¹ and to maintain its neutrality in the new conflict accordingly.

This statement is not to be published for the time being.

PAPEN

¹ See document No. 265, footnote 5.

No. 432

270/175538

The State Secretary to the Embassy in the Soviet Union

Telegram

No. 1003 of June 13

BERLIN, June 14, 1940—8:45 p. m.

Received June 14—11:30 p. m.

For the Chief of Mission or his representative personally. Top secret. To be deciphered personally. Special security handling.

From a strictly secret source with which you are acquainted it has come to our knowledge that the Soviet Minister in Stockholm, Mme. Kollontay, recently stated to the Belgian Minister¹ there that it was in the common interest today of the European powers to oppose German imperialism. It had become evident that the German danger was far greater than had been believed.

The Foreign Minister requests you, if opportunity arises, and without revealing the source, to discuss tactfully with Molotov the hostile attitude of Minister Kollontay toward Germany.²

WEIZSÄCKER

¹ Reginald Prince du Croy.

² Handwritten marginal note: "By order of the Ambassador to be filed, as settled by yesterday's Tass communiqué (telegram No. 1212) H[ilger] 24/6." For telegram No. 1212 of June 24, which repeated the Tass statement of June 23, see vol. x, document No. 11.

No. 433

8589/E602744-46

Führer's Directive

CHEFSACHE

FÜHRER'S HEADQUARTERS, June 14, 1940.

TOP SECRET MILITARY

The Führer and Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht
WFA/Abt. L Nr. 33083/40 g. K. Chefs.
By officer only

DIRECTIVE No. 15

1) Under the impact of the collapse of his fronts the *enemy* is evacuating the area around Paris and has also begun the evacuation of the fortified triangle of Épinal-Metz-Verdun behind the Maginot Line. Paris has been declared by means of wall posters to be an open city.

A withdrawal of the main forces of the French Army beyond the Loire is not excluded.

2) The relative strength of the forces and the condition of the French Army make it possible from now on to pursue *two operational objectives simultaneously*:

a) to prevent the enemy forces which are withdrawing from the Paris area or are on the lower Seine from setting up a new front,

b) to destroy the enemy in the area in front of Army Groups A and C¹ and to bring about the collapse of the Maginot Line.

3) For the continuation of the *operation of the Army* I therefore order the following:

a) The enemy forces on the lower Seine and in the Paris area are to be hotly pursued by an advance of the right wing of the Army along the coast in the direction of the mouth of the Loire and a sweep from the region of Château-Thierry toward the Loire above Orléans.

¹ Army Group C under Colonel General Ritter von Leeb occupied the southern portion of the front from near Saarbrücken to the Swiss frontier.

Paris is to be occupied as soon as possible with strong forces. The naval bases of Cherbourg and Brest, also Lorient and St. Nazaire, are to be occupied.

b) The forces of the center of the Army extending approximately to the region of Châlons are for the time being to be left in the general direction of Troyes; their armored and motorized divisions are to drive forward in the general direction of the plateau of Langres.

The infantry divisions will first proceed to the area northeast of Romilly-Troyes. Preparations are to be made for their later employment against the middle Loire.

c) For the other parts of the Army the previously assigned mission remains in force, that is, to destroy the enemy in the fortified area of northeastern France, to bring about the collapse of the Maginot Line, and to prevent the withdrawal toward the southwest of the forces committed there.

d) The assault group Saarbrücken will begin attacking on June 14 through the Maginot Line in the general direction of Lunéville. The date for the attack on the Upper Rhine is to be fixed as early as possible.

4) The Luftwaffe will have the following missions:

a) Attack from the air in order to maintain the rapid advance toward the Loire. These parts of the Army are simultaneously to be accompanied by antiaircraft forces for protection against air attacks.

An escape by sea is to be rendered impossible by destruction of ports and shipping on the northern coast of France.

b) The withdrawal of the enemy in front of Army Groups A and C is to be obstructed, the point of main effort being in front of the right armored wing of Army Group A.

Enemy railway transport toward and across the Neufchâteau-Belfort line to the southwest is to be prevented.

Simultaneously the breakthrough of the Maginot Line by Army Group C is to be supported.

The attack of the right wing of Army Group A and especially the penetration into the French fortifications are to be facilitated by anti-aircraft support.

ADOLF HITLER

No. 434

2153/469359-68

The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry

A 3067

ANKARA, June 14, 1940.

W III c 2145.

Subject: Conclusion of the Trade Agreement.

The preparatory work of establishing Turkey's list of requests was almost finished on June 1. Due to the departure of the Turkish leader of the negotiations to attend the Economic Conference in Belgrade, the subsequent negotiations on the text of the new trade agreement had to be interrupted for about a fortnight. In these circumstances and in view of the range of questions still to be dealt with, it could

not be assumed that agreement on the final text of the treaty could be reached before the end of another 2 or 3 weeks. It had been repeatedly pointed out to the Turkish Government during the last few months that we could not continue to keep in reserve the German products they desired, if a new treaty was not concluded soon. To postpone the conclusion by a further 4 or 5 weeks seemed unacceptable. In order to bring about a decision in principle, especially on the question whether Turkey was willing to permit the export of chromium in exchange for delivery of the war material offered, as well as whether Turkey in view of the critical political situation was at all prepared to resume economic cooperation with us on the basis of a new treaty, I had asked for an audience with the President, for my repeated conversations with the Foreign Minister on the question of chromium had proved completely negative and had not led to any definite result on the more general question of the conclusion of a treaty. Even though I did not succeed in reversing Turkey's hitherto negative attitude on the question of chromium because of the firm commitments she had entered into, my conversation with the President,¹ nevertheless, had the gratifying result that the Turkish Government was now instructed by the highest authority to bring the negotiations with us to an immediate conclusion. In order to give the conclusion of our economic negotiations the greatest possible political effect in the new political situation created by Italy's entry into the war, I decided to propose to the Turkish Government an exchange of notes in which the main points of the final agreement were, in principle, to be laid down. After some difficulties which, according to my information, were again attributable to the Foreign Minister, we succeeded in achieving final agreement on the substance of the notes and the appendices thereto on the evening of June 12.

The enclosed exchange of notes² states in section 1) the intention of the contracting parties to bring the negotiations to an immediate conclusion. The delegates of the two countries had received instructions to this effect.

The volume of trade in both directions is laid down in paragraph *a*) of section 2) at 21 million Turkish pounds each. It is stipulated in paragraph *b*) that the German deliveries according to lists A 1, B 1, and C 1, shall be counterbalanced by corresponding Turkish deliveries A, B, and C.

Particular difficulties were caused at the last moment by the suspicion on the Turkish side that Germany would in a short time buy up and export the Turkish products to be supplied under the treaty but fall into arrears with her own deliveries. Since Turkey had had similar experiences with us in the past (I recall the fact that the Tur-

¹ See documents Nos. 375 and 383.

² Not printed (2153/469364-67).

kish credit balance in the clearing account in 1937 amounted to 93 million RM) ³ and had also more recently changed, within a few weeks, from a debtor to a creditor in Italy and the Protectorate, the Minister President had instructed the Secretary General Numan Menemencioglu to apply a formula, according to which the German goods had first to arrive in Turkey before the Turkish exporter would be given permission to export Turkish goods to Germany for the equivalent amount. I have, of course, rejected this formula as unacceptable. Nevertheless, so as to allay Turkish mistrust and also to furnish security for ourselves that Germany would not get into credit for too high amounts, the formula contained in the exchange of notes was agreed upon.

The following remarks will explain in detail the three sets of lists attached as enclosures.⁴ In proposing the classification of the mutual deliveries into several lists, the Turkish authorities proceeded from the principle of exchanging German goods of special value to them for particularly valuable Turkish goods and thus to establish for themselves a certain guarantee that we would not buy up valuable Turkish goods and, on the other hand, hold back the delivery of German goods of value to Turkey. Accordingly, list A 1 contains German deliveries arising out of old contracts to the amount of 8,830,000 Turkish pounds which Turkey calls particularly valuable. In return for these, Turkey will deliver to an equivalent amount according to list A, Turkish products which are of the greatest importance to us. The following is to be said on the various items: As to grain, the German wishes could not be fully met, since the export of oats has been absolutely prohibited for some time now, stocks of other types of grain apart from barley are not available and the harvest prospects cannot as yet be assessed with any certainty. Furthermore, for the same reason it was not possible to meet in full the German wishes for the delivery of olive oil. To partly balance this, the item of oilseed was increased. Even so, in view of the extremely great efforts of the Allies, the Turkish Government's approval of these quantities could be obtained only against the concession of a delivery of pontoons to the amount of 582,434 Turkish pounds. I felt I could make this concession, especially as an immediate delivery is out of the question. As to the other items our wishes have, on the whole, been met.

List B 1 provides for the delivery of German products to the value of 2,151,828 Turkish pounds which were also contained in the Turkish list of requests but which Turkey considered to be less important, as well as further deliveries to the amount of 6,458,172 Turkish pounds of which details could not be given due to the lack of exact data. This amount, referred to as the "ceiling," will be used for deliveries

³ Cf. vol. v, document No. 545.

⁴ Not printed (2153/469369-73).

divided among eight different branches of German industry according to a list still to be agreed upon. The Turkish reciprocal deliveries are enumerated in list B.

List C 1 contains such orders placed with German industry which, according to the Ministry of Economics, could certainly be executed but were not contained in Turkey's list of requirements, as well as a "ceiling" amount of 1,976,613 Turkish pounds which will be divided according to the same criteria as that of list B.

It thus appears that deliveries on the basis of *existing* contracts to a total amount of 12,563,215⁵ Turkish pounds and further German deliveries to the amount of 8,434,785 Turkish pounds, sum total 21,000,000 Turkish pounds, are envisaged.

On the question of terminating old contracts, forfeiting guarantees, submission of compensation claims, etc., the Turkish Government has stubbornly insisted on avoiding a bilateral agreement since, for constitutional reasons, it is plainly unable to enter into such. It has, however, stated its readiness to take the necessary measures within its autonomous sphere through a resolution of the Council of Ministers to prevent forfeiture of guarantees for all contracts made with government and semi-government offices. I have explicitly confirmed this autonomous concession in a letter to the Turkish Foreign Minister, a copy of which is enclosed.⁶ As already mentioned, the Turkish Government, for compelling legal grounds, had to refuse the assumption of any commitments with respect to measures concerning contracts with private Turkish importers. It will, therefore, be left to the interested parties in Germany to come to an understanding with their Turkish importers. In its practical effect this may result in difficulties mainly regarding such contracts as were concluded with the Sümerbank here. I should like to assume, however, that in the end a solution satisfactory to all parties will be found with regard to these contracts, too, especially as in view of the general shortage of goods here the wish of the Sümerbank for continuing to receive from Germany replacements for their factories will probably afford the possibility of, conversely, exacting concessions from the bank. As to the remaining private contracts I am less worried, since no guarantees were furnished for most of them. At any rate I felt I could not allow the negotiations to fail because of this gap.

As to the question of a possible submission of compensation claims I have, without so far receiving any binding authoritative promise, nevertheless gained the impression that the Turkish Government has in this respect abandoned any previous intentions it might have had.

As was to be expected, [news of] the signing of the German-Turkish exchange of notes has spread like wildfire in the diplomatic and busi-

⁵ According to the figures given in the lists cited this should read 12,565,215.

⁶ Not printed (2153/469368).

ness circles of Ankara and Istanbul, especially during these decisive days for Turkey's future destiny. In view of the fact that the signing took place immediately after Italy's entry into the war and yet *before* the resolution of the Turkish Council of Ministers on the situation was passed,¹ it is taken as proof that Turkey desires to maintain her relations with the Axis Powers. The publication of the signing has, as I have learned, also had a splendid effect beyond Turkey's frontiers in the Balkan countries which are directly concerned.

PAPEN

P. S. As arranged with the Director General of the Economic Department of the Foreign Ministry, the negotiations on the agreement will start next Monday.

¹ See document No. 431.

No. 435

9255/E654871

The Director of the Economic Policy Department to the Legation in Greece

Telegram

No. 292

BERLIN, June 14, 1940.

Sent June 15—12:00 midnight.

e. o. W III a 2983.

Attention of Moraht also.

Please make it absolutely clear to the Government there that Italy's entrance into the war has created an altogether new situation so far as Greece's commercial policy is concerned and that Greece is thereby required to sell her products, except for Italy, exclusively to us. Her commerce with neighboring countries is so unimportant that it scarcely comes into consideration. In your negotiations please take into account also the fact that Greece economically is now altogether dependent on the Axis Powers.

WIEHL

No. 436

821/198271

The Minister in Lithuania to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

KAUNAS, June 15, 1940—1:00 p. m.

No. 94 of June 15

Received June 15—6:40 p. m.

Yesterday morning Molotov handed Urbšys a 9-hour ultimatum beginning at midnight consisting of the following three points:

1. Skučas, Minister of the Interior up to now, and Povilaitis, hitherto head of the Security Department, to be put on trial.

2. The Lithuanian Government to be reconstructed on a pattern acceptable to the Soviet Government.

3. The Soviet Union to have complete freedom regarding the number and disposition of its troops in Lithuania.

This morning, after a conference lasting 8 hours, the Lithuanian Cabinet decided to accept the ultimatum. The Cabinet has resigned. The reconstruction of the Cabinet has been entrusted to General Raštikis who has suggested to the Soviet Government that he should come to Moscow for negotiations there on points 2 and 3. Internal considerations in Lithuania are primarily responsible no doubt for the choice of Raštikis (his great following in the Army; after Merkys' exit the only personage who could be considered). Notwithstanding this, information reached the Legation some time ago that he was not unpopular with the Soviets either. Vitkauskas, a former army commander, has been selected for the post of Minister of War. Furthermore there is the possibility that the President will resign, as he feels he is not acceptable to the Soviet Union.

ZECHLIN

No. 437

91/100237-88/1

The Director of the Political Department to the Legation in Eire

Telegram

MOST URGENT

BERLIN, June 15, 1940—2:30 p. m.

TOP SECRET

zu Pol. II 1372 g.¹

No. 190

In reply to your telegrams Nos. 293 of June 4, 302 of June 7, and 303 of June 8.²

In accordance with your suggestion you are empowered to get in touch with the Irish Government in a confidential way regarding the Held-Stuart case³ before the trial starts and, in referring to reports on this case, make the following statement on the German Government's attitude:

The Irish Government must be clearly aware that the struggle between the German Reich and England was now entering upon its decisive stage. We were conscious of the fact that the measures we had to take for carrying out this struggle against England which had been forced upon us might also affect Irish interests. Just because of this, however, we considered it important to inform the Irish Government once again that our sole objective in the struggle was England. We believed that Ireland, whose enemy through history was known to be England, was fully aware that the outcome of this struggle would also be of decisive importance for the Irish nation and the

¹ Pol. II 1372 g: Not found.

² None printed (91/100230-31, 100233-35, and 100236).

³ See document No. 314.

final realization of its national demands. Given this situation, we believed that we could also count on the greatest possible understanding from the Irish Government, despite its neutral attitude, even if Ireland might in some ways be affected by our measures.

If your statements along this line meet with ready response you will be able to follow them up with the warning that matters such as the charge against Held should also be treated in a correspondingly careful manner by the Irish Government, and above all, in the press.⁴

WOERMANN

⁴ See document No. 473.

No. 438

321/193259

*Memorandum by an Official of the Press Department*¹

JUNE 15, 1940.

P XII.

At 4:25 p. m. Minister Zechlin stated by telephone that the Soviet Russian Government considered the Lithuanian acceptance of today's ultimatum inadequate,² and allowed its troops to cross the Soviet-Lithuanian frontier at 3 p. m. The Lithuanian troops have orders not to offer resistance. As the manner in which the invasion is taking place is not yet known, more precise information cannot as yet be given. For the time being only certain places are to be occupied, to wit, Kaunas, Raseiniai, and Felsche (? here Telschi [*Telšiai*] is obviously meant). The line west of the Memel is apparently not being occupied.

The mood of the Lithuanians can be described as perfectly calm, because neither press, nor radio is publishing anything about the invasion.³

¹ The memorandum is unsigned.

² See document No. 436.

³ Marginal notes: "Herr Reifegerste. Please ascertain whether RAM has knowledge of report. W[elzsäcker] 15."

"State Secretary. Upon inquiry Counselor Lohse states that all information on the subject has been submitted to the Reich Foreign Minister. R[eifegerste] 15/6."

No. 439

323/193854

The Minister in Latvia to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

RIGA, June 15, 1940—5:39 p. m.

No. 252 of June 15

Received June 15—9:50 p. m.

The following information has just been received from the Foreign Minister:

An attack took place last night on a guardhouse of the Frontier Guard brigade on the Latvian-Russian border. Details of the inci-

dents themselves are so far lacking. At dawn the house was found burnt out, two soldiers of the Frontier Guard and one woman shot dead, one woman and a child dangerously wounded, and it was learned further that ten soldiers of the Frontier Guard and a still unknown number of civilians were carried off into Russian territory. Munters added that it was not yet known in what form the Russians intended to present this affair to the outside world as an incident provoked by Latvia and what inferences they would draw from it. What he had told me were just the bare facts as known so far. He had not seen the Russian Minister since the incident. Latvia was prepared for visits by Ministers to Moscow as had been the case in Lithuania, but the difficulty here is that Ulmanis is both Minister President and State President, as well as being for a country like this an outstanding (group garbled) personality. His resignation, if forced by the Russians, would in the opinion of government circles plunge Latvia into complete chaos.

KOTZE

No. 440

321/193264

Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department

BERLIN, June 15, 1940.

The Lithuanian Minister called on me this afternoon in order to find out what we knew about the events in Lithuania. His own information tallied with the reports of the Lithuanian telegraph agency and the reports at hand from Moscow. The only new item was that the Soviet Russian Government had also turned down a Raštikis Government. It was not yet certain who would now be entrusted with the formation of a government. A high official of the Soviet Russian Foreign Commissariat had arrived in Kaunas together with the Soviet Minister in Lithuania who had returned from Moscow.

The Lithuanian Minister then inquired very cautiously whether the German Government had defined its attitude in any way toward the events or whether such might be expected. I replied that, of course, this had not yet been done. I was not aware whether it was to be expected at all.

WOERMANN

No. 441

2422/511913-14

The Chargé d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 1191 of June 15

WASHINGTON, June 15, 1940—7:32 p. m.

Received June 16—7:50 a. m.

Pol. IX 1097.

The opposition to the interventionist policy of President Roosevelt, in particular the isolationist Republicans, has realized with consterna-

tion the widespread and hysterical anxiety among wide circles of Americans which has been unleashed primarily by the "fifth column" propaganda. Hence they are trying to oppose this agitation and have succeeded to the point that the adjournment of Congress proposed for the middle of the month was postponed for the time being, against the wishes of the President, so that the Republican opposition has a better opportunity of watching the President's foreign policy and of opposing it.

In this connection speeches by Wendell Willkie have attracted much notice. He emerged a few weeks ago as the possible new Republican candidate for the Presidency, and is being supported by influential American business circles. Willkie supported the new Republican slogan: "America first and America for the Americans,"¹ so as in this way to set himself against any policy of direct intervention, especially the sending of an expeditionary force to Europe and even to South America. Now the former Republican candidate for the Presidency, Alfred M. Landon, who until now had supported Roosevelt's foreign policy, has taken the opportunity afforded by Roosevelt's latest speech² on foreign policy to the University of [Virginia at] Charlottesville to describe it as "a course taken on his own responsibility, that is in the direction of a war for which nation is utterly unprepared and to which a vast majority of the people are opposed."³ This evening, at the behest of the "Make Europe Pay War Debts" Committee, Senator Johnson⁴ (who fathered the Embargo on Credits Law) and Lindbergh are broadcasting⁵ to the whole country on the danger of American participation in the war.

It is to be hoped that these Republican moves will cause the decisions which are to be taken at the Republican convention at the end of this month to bring it home to wide circles of the American people that, in contrast to the Democrats, the Republican party is the peace party that will keep America out of the war.

I may add in strict confidence that the Embassy entertains the closest relations with the "Make Europe Pay War Debts" Committee through an agent.

THOMSEN

¹ In English in original.

² For the text of this speech of June 10 see *The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt*, vol. ix, pp. 259 ff.

³ In English in the original. See the *New York Times*, June 15, 1940.

⁴ Hiram W. Johnson, U. S. Senator from California, was credited with the loan embargo legislation known as the Johnson Act of 1934. A radio address of the nature referred to by Thomsen was made by Senator Edwin C. Johnson, Democrat of Colorado, on June 15. See the *New York Times* of June 16, 1940.

⁵ For text of Lindbergh's radio address see the *New York Times*, June 16, 1940.

No. 442

8896/E621612

*The Director of the Economic Policy Department to the Legation
in Yugoslavia*

Telegram

No. 436

BERLIN, June 15, 1940.

Sent June 16—1:10 a. m.

e.o. W III a 2984 I.

Please point out to the Government there in an appropriate manner, orally, that Italy's entry into the war has created a completely new situation for Yugoslavia with respect to trade policy. Yugoslavia must now depend on selling all her products to Italy and to us, as the slight trade with neighboring states plays hardly any part.

The extraordinarily high increase of exports to France about which you have already made representations,¹ and which has taken place despite the repeated declarations of the Yugoslav Government, cannot be repeated in future if only for transport reasons. In particular we are counting in future on the Yugoslav copper which has previously been supplied to France.

Minister Clodius, who has today flown to Rome² for a few days, will probably have an opportunity of discussing the matter with the Yugoslav chief negotiator who is there. Any necessary separate arrangements will then have to be settled by the Government Committees.³

It will in any case be advisable to make particularly clear to the Government there the present complete economic dependence of Yugoslavia on the Axis Powers.

WIEHL

¹ Heeren had given an account of these representations in report No. 676 WH 3 Frankreich of June 13 (9503/E669674-75).

² See document No. 480.

³ An extraordinary session of the German-Yugoslav Government Committees on economic questions was eventually held in Berlin July 15-31. The negotiations led to the signing of a Confidential Protocol of July 31 providing for intensified trade between Germany and Yugoslavia. A further exchange of letters between Pilja and Landfried, the chairman of the two Committees, under the date of Aug. 1 affirmed it to be self-evident "that Yugoslavia will make no deliveries to countries at war with Germany which would be apt to strengthen the military or economic power of these countries." (9505/E669892-912)

No. 443

407/214876-77

The Foreign Ministry to the Foreign Minister

Teletype

BERLIN, June 16, 1940.

To Baumschule¹ for Sonnleithner.

¹ Code name for the field office of the Foreign Minister.

With reference to the telegrams from Kaunas Nos. 96² and 97² of June 15 reported to you by teletype.

The Lithuanian Minister called up at about 2 a. m. today and said that according to a telephone report from Eydtkuhnen, President Smetona, accompanied by an adjutant and members of his family, as well as General Raštikis (who was rejected by the Soviets as Minister President) and his brother, Colonel Raštikis, with their wives, had arrived in Eydtkuhnen. The Minister, moreover, reported that a number of other prominent Lithuanian personalities were probably staying at the German-Lithuanian border and that they desired to enter Germany. Some of them would be in danger, should they fall into the hands of the Russians. The Minister requested that the German border authorities be instructed to let these personalities enter Germany. The official on [night] duty replied that he could not initiate anything independently in this matter and suggested making the request again in the morning.

By order of Under State Secretary Woermann I request instructions as to how to treat the application of the Lithuanian Minister. The question arises in particular whether former Interior Minister Skučas and the former director of the State Security Department, Povilaitis, who were to be tried in accordance with point 1 of the Soviet ultimatum, can be allowed to enter. Povilaitis, regarding whom inquiry has already been made there by teletype, has loyally cooperated with German authorities in fighting Polish intrigues.⁴

Night Duty Officer, Political Department

WEICK

² Telegram No. 96 sent from Kaunas at 6:30 p. m. (407/214884) reported on the progress of Soviet occupation of Lithuania and confirmed some of the statements Zechlin had reported earlier by telephone (see document No. 438).

³ In telegram No. 97 sent from Kaunas at 7:01 p. m. (407/214885) Zechlin reported that he had issued entry visas to President Smetona and a number of other Lithuanian officials and their families.

⁴ A memorandum by Grundherr of June 16 (407/214867) recorded that instructions from Ribbentrop, "that any sort of connection with Povilaitis should be immediately broken off," had been transmitted by telephone and in writing to the Reichssicherheitshauptamt that day at 12:05 p. m. On June 17 it was reported (Kaunas telegram No. 101: 407/214845) that Povilaitis and Skučas had been arrested.

No. 444

407/214887

Memorandum by an Official in the Foreign Ministry

BERLIN, June 16, 1940.

The High Command of the Wehrmacht (Colonel von Geldern) reports that it has received from the Counterintelligence Office in Königsberg, the following communication:

Tonight at 3 o'clock President Smetona with family and entourage crossed the "green frontier." He had given orders to the Lithuanian

garrisons of Mariampolė and Taurage to cross the frontier into Germany fully equipped and armed.

The High Command of the Wehrmacht requests instructions as to what action to take if the Lithuanian troops, which apparently have not yet arrived, should wish to cross the border.

VON KESSEL

No. 445

407/214878

The Foreign Minister to the Foreign Ministry

Teletype

Baumschule No. 56

JUNE 16, 1940—11:15 a. m.

1. I have already given orders through the Gestapo to intern the Lithuanian President, Smetona, with family and other functionaries who have crossed the "green frontier." This will be done by the Secret State Police.

2. If Lithuanian troop contingents ask permission to cross the German border, this request may be granted. The troops are to be disarmed and likewise to be interned.

3. It is reported that a Lithuanian Colonel offered to have his regiment cross the border. It is requested that the disarming and internment of any Lithuanian soldiers who might cross the border be done by the Wehrmacht in collaboration with the Border Police. In agreement with the State Police please take the measures necessary so that the border posts concerned may be immediately informed.

It is again pointed out that border crossings are to be permitted only upon request of the Lithuanians and that we, for our part, must not do anything to encourage such requests.

This communication is to be transmitted at once by the fastest route, orally and in written form, to the OKW with the request for further action.

RIBBENTROP

BERLIN, June 16, 1940.

Minute:

The transmittal to the OKW was made immediately in accordance with instructions. At the same time, the OKW was asked to see to it that in every case of a border crossing of Lithuanian troop contingents a report be made immediately to the Foreign Ministry.

V. D. HEYDEN-RYNSCH

No. 446

407/214886

Memorandum by an Official of Political Division I M

SECRET

BERLIN, June 16, 1940.

Pol. I M 8560 g.

The OKW, Foreign Branch, Major Krummacher, transmitted the following at 11:35 a. m.:

"ORDER OF THE FÜHRER

1. If Lithuanian troops cross the East Prussian border, they are to be disarmed. A further decision as to what is to be done with them should be awaited.

2. At present some German units are returning to their garrisons in East Prussia. They have received instructions not to undertake any maneuvers and to avoid anything which might look as if this return were in any way connected with events in Lithuania.

This is for your information so that possible Soviet Russian inquiries may immediately be answered in this sense."

VON GROTE

No. 447

1570/380120

*An Official of the Embassy in Spain to the Foreign Ministry***Telegram**

MOST URGENT

MADRID, June 16, 1940.

No. 1920 of June 16

Received June 16—5:20 p. m.

The Under State Secretary of the Foreign Ministry has just read me a telegram from the Spanish Ambassador in Paris, the contents of which are as follows: Yesterday's session of the French Council of Ministers at Bordeaux was a very stormy one. The violent statements of opposing views culminated in personal insults to members of the Cabinet.

Pétain and Weygand, among others, are definitely in favor of the immediate cessation of hostilities. The continuation of the war at all costs, if necessary with the transfer of the French Government to Algiers or America is advocated by Mandel, Campinchi, Monnet and other leftwing Socialists who are supported by England and who accuse the friends of peace of overthrowing the democratic republican regime.

Minister President Reynaud is already wavering.

The Spanish Ambassador further telegraphs as his personal opinion that a decision will be reached in today's resumed session of the Council of Ministers and that it will be for peace. The Ambassador thinks it likely that in this case the French Government will ask Spain to act as intermediary.

HEBERLEIN

No. 448

323/193859

Memorandum by an Official of the Political Department

Recorded on Sunday [June 16, 1940].

Minister von Kotze telephoned from Riga at 6:30 p. m.:

A Russian ultimatum was handed to the Latvian Government at 3 p. m. the substance of which as far as he then knew corresponded approximately to that presented in Kaunas.¹ A reply was demanded by 11 p. m. today.

The Cabinet had just met; as soon as he had any more information he would telephone again.

Minister Frohwein reported by telephone (6:45 p. m.) that a Russian ultimatum similar to that presented in Kaunas had been delivered at Tallinn with a time limit expiring at 9 p. m. today.

HEINBURG

¹ See document No. 436.

No. 449

406/214624

The Minister in Estonia to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

TALLINN, June 16, 1940—7:48 p. m.

No. 199 of June 16

Received June 16—11:20 p. m.

I learn in strict confidence that the Russians this morning delivered a memorandum in which, under a time limit expiring at 9 p. m. today, the following demands are made of Estonia:

- 1) Stationing of two Russian army corps at the discretion of the Russians, of which one part is to be at Tallinn.
- 2) Formation of a new government according to Russian wishes.

The reasons given are said to be: unfriendliness in implementing the treaty of alliance,¹ and anti-Russian intrigues.

FROHWEIN

¹ The reference is to the Soviet-Estonian Pact of Mutual Assistance of Sept. 28, 1939, the text of which is printed in English translation in Department of State, *Bulletin*, 1939, vol. I, p. 543. A German translation is in *Monatshefte für Auswärtige Politik*, November 1939, pp. 992-993.

No. 450

22/14001

Memorandum by the State Secretary

St.S. No. 436

BERLIN, June 16, 1940.

Telephone message to Baumschule.¹

To the Foreign Minister.

¹ Typewritten marginal note: "Transmitted to Baumschule by telephone at 11:30 p. m."

The Swedish Minister has just sent me the following note:

"The Swedish Minister has been instructed to deliver the following personal message from the King of Sweden to the German Reich Chancellor as quickly as possible:

'I have heard that plans are being considered which, among other things, propose to depose King Haakon and the royal house from the Norwegian throne. In view of these serious circumstances I hold it to be my duty personally to declare to you, Herr Reich Chancellor, that such a step would cause serious ill-feeling in the widest circles of the Swedish people and in the whole of the North. I wish by these means to call your attention to this before you have made your irrevocable decision, and I would also request you most urgently, Herr Reich Chancellor, to act with all the moderation which you consider at all possible toward the King of Norway and the Norwegian people. Gustaf.'

Berlin, June 16, 1940."
End of note.

WEIZSÄCKER

² The Swedish text of the note which was telegraphed to Berlin and the Swedish Minister's report on its delivery are in *Handlingar rörande Sveriges politik under andra världskriget: Frågor i samband med norska regeringens vistelse utanför Norge 1940-1943* (Stockholm, 1948), pp. 17-18. No reply has been found and in *op. cit.*, p. x, it is stated that none was received.

No. 451

321/193280-81

Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department

BERLIN, June 16, 1940.

The Lithuanian Minister called on me today to pass on information he had received. Compared with reports here at hand, the following facts are wholly or in part new:

1) Merkys is for the present still fulfilling the duties of Minister President. In consequence of President Smetona having crossed the frontier, he has likewise taken over the duties of President, in accordance with the terms of the constitution. Dekanosov, the People's Commissar now in Kaunas, has given no indication whether or not he acknowledges Merkys in this dual function for the interval.

Nothing is so far known as to the probability of a reconstruction of the Government.

2) A Lithuanian general is negotiating with the Russian Commanding General, Pavlov, the object being, on Lithuania's part, to find some sort of legal basis for the new military situation.

3) During the night the Minister was instructed by Kaunas to try to induce President Smetona to return to Lithuania. M. Škirpa then spoke by telephone to Smetona, who was in Eydtkuhnen. Smetona rejected the idea of returning because Russian interference in Lithuanian affairs is so far-reaching that his return would be useless. Besides this the President believes that he would be arrested at once on his return.

4) At first the Russians posted sentries in front of the Lithuanian ministries, but have withdrawn them; the radio, telegraph, and telephone services are quite free. It is true the Russians have been interfering in the general management of affairs but not in day to day matters. The Minister was personally of the opinion that this, too, was only a temporary situation.

Speaking with great emotion, M. Škirpa then said that in the report by the German press which gave only the Russian version, he had missed any sign of sympathy for Lithuania, and asked again if an opinion by the Reich Government had not been expressed on these events. I told him that I must refrain from any comment on the situation, whereupon M. Škirpa burst into tears and could not recover for some time.

WOERMANN

No. 452

828/198860-61

The Minister in Latvia to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

No. 257 of June 16

RIGA, June 16, 1940—11:35 p. m.

Received June 17—2:30 a. m.

The Cabinet has been in session with the President since the delivery at 3 p. m. of the Russian ultimatum, the separate conditions of which are still unknown, but which certainly include the resignation of Ulmanis and complete military freedom of action for the Russians. Although the session has not yet ended, I have just received confidential information from a reliable source that the ultimatum was going to be accepted and the original idea of resistance abandoned. The entry of Russian troops will take place in the early hours of June 17, as in the case of Lithuania. It appears that the Russians are no longer using the reported frontier incident¹ as a pretext at all, but in general the alleged conspiracy by the Baltic States against the Soviet Union.

(3 groups garbled) openly-expressed fears of internal differences and conflicts between army and militia, as well as of a rising of the mob, died down after the state of alert for the army had been countermanded and the call-up of the militia canceled. Pro-Russian circles are at the moment busily spreading the allegation that the action is directed exclusively against Germany and that before long it will develop into an offensive on German territory. As opposed to this I consider it more probable that while the action may be directed against Germany, it is due to growing anxiety in face of German superiority, and is of a defensive nature. They wish to have the territory of the Baltic States at their disposal for massing as large a number of troops as they desire and for the construction of defense works, but otherwise not to interfere with cultural individuality and to allow economic bodies useful to them for the supply of large cities to continue their activities as far as possible without interference. Please inform DNB and Europapresse (group garbled) of these contents as correspondents' reports are not getting through.

Please also inform OKH Attaché Department.

KOTZE

¹ See document No. 439.

No. 453

407/214861

The Foreign Minister's Secretariat to the Foreign Ministry

Teletype

Baumschule telegram No. 57 of June 16

Teletype to Herr v. Grundherr via Minister's Secretariat.

The Foreign Minister requests you to submit a report as soon as possible as to whether in the Baltic States a tendency to seek support from the Reich can be observed or whether an attempt was made to form a bloc. Please transmit your report by teletype.¹

SONNLEITHNER

¹ For the report see document No. 463.

No. 454

108/112211

The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in the Soviet Union

Telegram

No. 1007 of June 16

Foreign Minister's SPECIAL TRAIN.

With reference to your telegrams Nos. 1063¹ and 1094.²

Please reply orally to M. Molotov's question as follows:

1. As Mackensen reported upon inquiry,³ he did not make such a definite statement as was reported by the Soviet Chargé d'Affaires in Rome to the Soviet Government. He had, instead, stated during the conversation with the Chargé d'Affaires that in his opinion Germany and Italy were agreed that they were interested that the Balkans should remain quiet and that a settlement of the unsolved Balkan questions could probably be brought about more easily and without the use of force after the war.

2. The Reich Government was gratified that the war had not spread to the Balkans. Germany was, in principle, not interested there territorially, but only economically. Our attitude toward the Soviet Union in this question was finally and irrevocably established by the definite Moscow Agreement.⁴

3. Italy's attitude toward the Balkans was also made unequivocally clear by Mussolini's speech on June 10⁵ to the effect that Italy had no intention of drawing the Balkans into a war.

RIBBENTROP

¹ Document No. 382.

² See document No. 392, footnote 3.

³ See document No. 382, footnote 2.

⁴ See vol. VII, document No. 229.

⁵ Text in *Popolo d'Italia*, June 11, 1940, and in English translation in the *New York Times*, June 11, 1940.

No. 455

897/291880

Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat

BAUMSCHULE, June 16, 1940.

zu Inf. 169 g.¹

The Foreign Minister agrees to the adoption of the literary counter-measures against pro-Allied propaganda activities in the U. S. A. as proposed by Counselor of Embassy Thomsen. The necessary funds for this purpose are to be appropriated.²

Respectfully submitted to Under State Secretary Habicht.

SONNLEITHNER

¹ Document No. 422.² In telegram No. 664 of June 17 to the Washington Embassy, Thomsen's project was approved and \$20,000 allotted for this purpose (897/291882).

No. 456

F8/0104-0112

Unsigned Memorandum

Acoz, June 16, 1940.

CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE FÜHRER AND GENERAL VIGÓN IN THE PRESENCE OF THE FOREIGN MINISTER AT THE CASTLE OF ACOZ ON JUNE 16, 1940 ¹

To the thanks for his reception by the Führer, which General Vigón expressed at the outset, the Führer replied that he had recently been extremely pleased about the occupation of Tangier ² by the Caudillo, and especially about the fact that Spain had acted without talking.

General Vigón then gave a survey of the situation in Spain in order to explain the reasons why this country had not been able to range herself unconditionally on Germany's side at the beginning. She had, however, always been fully and entirely in sympathy with Germany, and this not for selfish reasons but because Germany was fighting against the same enemies who had opposed Spain in the Civil War.

The Führer here interpolated that he had helped Spain at that time because he had always known that Franco's enemies would also one day become the enemies of Germany.

In the further course of the conversation General Vigón mentioned certain fears on the part of the Spanish Government concerning intervention by the United States. If the war were for some reason to be prolonged, then it was to be feared that the United States would land either in Portugal or in Morocco in order to hasten to the Allies' aid. This would of course affect Spanish interests very greatly. Spain

¹ See document No. 378.² See document No. 429.

would have to meet this situation. In this event Spain counted upon material support from Germany.

The Führer said it was his purpose to establish a direct overland connection with Spain as soon as possible and added, in reply to a question from General Vigón as to whether this was also intended for the more distant future, that he only planned this connection for the duration of the war. When the war was at an end France would no longer interest us. If any attempts were made by enemy powers to land in -Portugal or Morocco, all Germany's forces would be at Spain's side.

In this connection the Foreign Minister pointed out that he had already declared to Vigón at noon * that from now on the Führer would not allow any Anglo-Saxons at all to land on the Continent during the war. The Führer confirmed this and emphasized, in order to clarify the position, that Germany had no interests of any kind in Morocco except economic ones.

To General Vigón's statement that at the end of the war Spain would entrust her interests to Germany, the Führer replied that he would be very pleased to meet Spain's wish in this respect. Germany was greatly interested in seeing that the dominant position of England and France, who were threatening the world, should this time be finally destroyed.

Upon General Vigón's further pointing out Spain's efforts to recover Gibraltar, the Führer replied that the ideal solution for Germany consisted in a reincorporation of Gibraltar with Spain. Just as he had been sincerely pleased by the occupation of Tangier by Spanish troops, so he also wished Gibraltar would fall to the share of a power standing outside the battleground of the great interests. For this reason Germany's attitude to this Spanish aim was one of full approval.

General Vigón further mentioned the desire of Spain to place the whole of Morocco under her protectorate. That the present situation was untenable could be illustrated by the fact that the Sultan of Morocco was, at least theoretically, at war with Germany and Italy, while his subject, the Khalif who was responsible for the Spanish-Moroccan Zone, was neutral. The Führer asked the Foreign Minister whether the Duce had not also already expressed the opinion with regard to Morocco that this territory should be awarded to Spain. The Foreign Minister replied that the Duce had indeed said something of the kind, but had not yet expressed himself quite so definitely on the question. For the rest he could only repeat what he had already told the General during the midday conversation, namely, that if the Führer, Mussolini, and the Caudillo were to get together, then a solution satisfactory to all parties would certainly be found.

* A memorandum of a conversation between Ribbentrop and Vigón held the same day does not mention such a statement by the Foreign Minister (F8/0099-0103).

When General Vigón thanked the Führer for his explanations, the Führer replied that he was, in the attitude he was taking, definitely allowing himself to be guided by the thought of the comradeship in arms of the Spanish war. Going on to Spain's general political aspirations, General Vigón came to speak of the conception of a Spanish empire. It was here a question of a purely spiritual and cultural matter of the common cultural orbit of Spain, Portugal, and the Ibero-American countries, in back of which were no political and material demands at all.

The Führer then continued by expressing his gratefulness for the attitude of the Spanish press and pointed out to Vigón the useful part which Spain could play, precisely because of her close relations with South America, in the enlightenment of South America as a counter-balance to the bad influence exercised by North America. To a remark by Vigón that there were no grounds for conflict between Germany and Spain at all, nor had they existed in the past, and that the two nations had once even fought against France together, the Führer replied that they had here the unusual case of two major powers which had never been at war with one another.

Vigón then came to speak of the attitude of the Roman Catholic Church toward Spain. Franco had had difficulties not so much with the Pope direct as with the Secretary of State Cardinal Maglione.

The Führer replied that the princes of the Church unfortunately forgot that if National Socialism, Fascism, or the Falange had not existed, the Roman Catholic Church in the countries concerned would no longer be in existence at all. Vigón replied that Franco had used the same arguments in a letter to the Pope and had made so great an impression with them that the Pope had decided to go more deeply into all these matters in a letter of reply. This too Maglione had prevented.

The Führer called it tragic that although France had carried out the separation of church and state, while a country like Germany paid a thousand million in taxes for the two confessions, the Vatican nevertheless had always been on the side of France. It was however clear that if Spain, Germany, and Italy continued to cooperate, the Roman Catholic Church, too, would have to alter her course because of the ascendancy of these nations which had been brought about by recent happenings.

Going into the further developments in France, Vigón declared that there was already now a government crisis in the French camp. The members of the French Government would probably, like the Red Spaniards, take the country's gold with them on their flight. The Führer agreed here and expressed the expectation that in this case, too, exactly as in Norway and elsewhere, the Government, forsaking its duty, would find a safe place for itself and the gold. Andalsnes had

been defended by the British just long enough for the Norwegian gold to be removed. The Führer then described in detail the entire dissolution of the French power of resistance which expressed itself in senseless, desperate acts like the destruction of bridges over rivers that were only 50 centimeters deep. The English and French soldiers, he affirmed, replying to a question by Vigón, were considerably worse than in the World War; this was, the General interpolated, the result of 20 years of Popular Front and democracy.

The Führer declared that France's resistance might perhaps be continued for some time yet, for political reasons. From the military point of view the matter was fully decided. The Maginot Line had been extensively breached both at Saarbrücken and on the Upper Rhine, and that with extremely small losses. At a wide breach on one front there had only been 1500 dead and wounded out of three corps. His own regiment in the World War had often suffered a loss of that size in a few days. Thus everything was pressing on to the finish. Perhaps capitulation would occur not all at once but piecemeal through the surrender of the various hopelessly surrounded French Army groups.

After a cordial word of farewell the conversation came to an end, having lasted about 45 minutes.

No. 457

121/119595

The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

MADRID, June 16, 1940.

No. 1923 of June 16

Received June 17—1:30 a. m.

With reference to our telegram No. 1920 of today.¹

The Foreign Ministry has just informed me of a telegram from the Spanish Ambassador in Bordeaux which runs as follows:

At today's session of the French Council of Ministers Pétain resigned as he could not remain in a government which could not reach a decision and which wished to flee the country. Minister President Reynaud asked Pétain to withdraw his resignation. Reynaud is meeting Churchill at Nantes at 4 o'clock this afternoon; a final decision is then to be made.

The French Minister Ybarnégaray told the Spanish Ambassador that it was certain that the present Government would resign and that a new government would be formed with Pétain, Weygand, and other politicians who were mentioned by name, who would ask for an armistice through the mediation of a neutral power.

STOHRER

¹ Document No. 447.

No. 458

406/214625-26

The Minister in Estonia to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

TALLINN, June 17, 1940—2:55 a. m.

No. 200 of June 17

Received June 17—7:40 a. m.

Shortly after 11 p. m. it was announced over the radio that the President had acceded to the Soviet Union's demand for the resignation of the Government and the quartering of additional Soviet Russian troops even in parts of the country which so far had not been garrisoned by them. In addition, a confidant of the President informed me at his request of the following points: The memorandum containing the Soviet Russian demands was delivered to the Estonian Minister in Moscow, and arrived here by telegram this morning. In justification of these demands, it accuses the Estonian Government of having continued the military alliance with Latvia unaltered and of having made military agreements with Lithuania. The Estonian Ministers, moreover, had shown lack of sincerity in the implementation of the Assistance Pact of October.¹ Upon acceptance of the ultimatum due to expire at 11 p. m. and in accordance with the demand by the Russians for the formation of a new government acceptable to them, the President, through the mediation of General Laidoner, approached the Soviet Minister here for information on Russian wishes as to the composition of the new government. The Minister was entirely without information and in order to obtain instructions he telephoned to Moscow. The number of the new troops and their deployment is so far unknown.

Prior to the Cabinet meeting the President had got in touch with me through a confidant to find out if I could enlighten him as to the political implications of the Soviet Russian move, to which I replied in the negative. In this connection the confidant conveyed to me the President's assumption that the Soviet Union probably wished to secure a pledge [*Faustpfand*] for the peace negotiations to be expected in the near future, since no substantial or plausible foundation for the demands could be found.

The confidant confirmed that the two commercial planes had been fired on by the Soviet Russians² and added that French diplomatic mail from Moscow was contained in the courier bag carried by the crashed plane. The bag had been picked up at sea by a Russian submarine.

FROHWEIN

¹ See document No. 449, footnote 1.² Documents on this incident have not been found.

No. 459

490/282198-99

The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

TOP SECRET

MOST URGENT

No. 1930 of June 17

MADRID, June 17, 1940.

Received June 17—10:05 a. m.

With reference to my telegram No. 1929 of June 17.¹

The Spanish Ambassador supplemented his report on the French peace move by the following telephone report:

At midnight M. Baudouin, the new Foreign Minister in the Pétain Government, telephoned asking me to come at once to the President's palace where he was awaiting me. I was received by M. Charles-Roux, Secretary General of the Foreign Ministry, and taken to Baudouin. The latter said that at this, the most critical and the saddest moment in the history of France, he wished to entrust a decisive mission to the Spanish Government, in particular to Generalissimo Franco, who was held in such high esteem by Marshal Pétain. As further bloodshed would serve no military purpose now, the French Government wished the Spanish Government to transmit to Germany with all speed the request to cease hostilities at once and at the same time to make known the peace terms proposed by Germany. I asked him to specify whether he meant terms for an armistice or peace terms, or both. He replied that armistice terms were, of course, always a temporary expedient (*circunstanciales*) and that the French Government was interested in knowing the peace terms. It should be understood that although France was in a state of complete military defeat and faced with a numerically superior enemy she could, nevertheless, not accept terms incompatible with her dignity and honor but would, in that case, prefer to yield to superior force and transfer her Government abroad. The Minister again stressed the extreme urgency of the message. I replied in a manner compatible with the serious nature of his statements and assured him that I would convey the message to the Spanish Government at once. At my request I was allowed to transmit the note and this statement by telephone from the Spanish frontier. Baudouin will be in his office awaiting a reply from 10 o'clock this morning.

End of the Spanish Ambassador's report.

STOHRER

¹ Telegram No. 1929 transmitted the text of a note received by the Spanish Ambassador at Bordeaux from the new French Foreign Minister Baudouin as follows:

"The French Government under Marshal Pétain requests the Spanish Government to act as speedily as possible as an intermediary with the German Government for the cessation of hostilities and to request conditions of peace. The French Government trusts that the German Government, as soon as it has received word of this request, will issue orders to its air forces to cease bombing cities. Baudouin, Foreign Minister." (121/119599)

No. 460

1892/426160

Memorandum by the State Secretary

SECRET

BERLIN, June 17, 1940.

St.S. No. 440

This afternoon, in accordance with a telephone call from the Führer's Headquarters (Herr Hewel), I told the Italian Ambassador on behalf of the Foreign Minister that Marshal Pétain had asked to be informed of our terms for an armistice and for peace.¹ The Führer urgently desired to speak first with the Duce, whom he would like to meet tomorrow or the day after, either in Munich or at the Brenner.

I would add that Herr von Mackensen for his part may possibly bring up the same question in Rome at the same time as I am telephoning Alfieri.

WEIZSÄCKER

¹ See document No. 459.

No. 461

490/282200

The State Secretary to the Embassy in Spain

Telegram

No. 850

BERLIN, June 17, 1940.

With reference to your telegrams Nos. 1929¹ and 1930.²

The Foreign Minister directs you to inform the Spanish Foreign Minister as follows, with the request that he should also inform the French Government.

"The Reich Government has taken cognizance of the statement by the French Government¹ transmitted to it by the Spanish Foreign Minister on June 17. The Führer of the German Reich will meet the Head of the Government of its ally, Italy, to examine together the situation arising out of the communication from the French Government. A further communication will then follow."²

End of the message to the Spanish Foreign Minister.

WEIZSÄCKER

¹ See document No. 459, footnote 1.

² Document No. 459.

³ See document No. 481.

No. 462

121/119612-14

Memorandum by the State Secretary

BERLIN, June 17, 1940.

By teletype for the Foreign Minister through the Foreign Minister's Secretariat.

In the following I submit a few points possibly to be considered in the armistice with France. In as far as the different points will not all be included in the actual armistice treaty, they could be laid down as a supplement to the treaty on the basis of a general clause. Agreement to be reached beforehand with Italy in accordance with the Pact of Alliance.

1. As far as the military clauses are concerned, proposals from OKW have presumably already been submitted.

2. In general, we must bear in mind that in contrast to the 1918 armistice, we have occupied the greater part of France or will probably do so. Consequently, there is no need for agreement in the treaty on, for example, the supply of locomotives, railway rolling stock, motor trucks, etc., as we can help ourselves to them. Instead, there should be some kind of undertaking by all French authorities to cooperate with us in maintaining the economic power of France. No resources should be utilized without authorization.

3. Immediate economic measures:

(a) All French sea and land frontiers to be completely closed to passenger and freight traffic.

(b) A ban on direct or indirect deliveries to the enemy powers.

(c) An embargo on French merchant ships or an obligation to hand them over.

(d) A ban on the use of assets in other foreign countries.

4. Capitulation should probably include all foreign units stationed on French soil.

5. The armistice should cover the following areas: Metropolitan France, Algeria, and all other French possessions, mandated territories, and colonies.

6. The immediate return of all German prisoners of war, and perhaps an offer to negotiate for the later return of French prisoners of war.

7. The immediate release of all Reich Germans arrested or interned, including nationals of the Protectorate and a special plan for their repatriation.

8. The cessation of war measures directed against German property. Orders to be given for measures necessary for the maintenance of such property and the prevention of deterioration until it can be returned.

9. The internment under German supervision of emigré Governments on French soil (this could also be done by us without French cooperation).

10. For the time being, no conditions which would lead for the moment to unsuccessful arguments with other States (for example, the handing over of French gold in the U. S. A.).

11. Cooperation of the French authorities in the repatriation, according to a special plan, of Alsatians and Lorrainers of German origin from the rest of France to Alsace-Lorraine.

12. German control of press and radio.

13. Duration of the armistice x days, Germany having the sole right to denounce it as in article XXXIV of the Armistice Treaty of November 11, 1918.

14. The treaty to be in the German language, and if trilateral, in the German and Italian languages.

15. To be concluded by the Foreign Minister or the military authorities?

WEIZSÄCKER

No. 463

1576/381714-16

The Head of Political Division VI to the Foreign Minister

Teletype

No. 285 to Baumschule

BERLIN, June 17, 1940—6:55 p. m.
e. o. Pol. VI 1759.

For Sonnleithner.

With reference to telegram Baumschule No. 57 of June 16, 1940.¹

I. The cooperation between the Baltic States of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania is based on the Treaty of Mutual Understanding and Cooperation concluded for ten years by these three States on September 12, 1934.² In addition, Latvia and Estonia signed a mutual defense pact on November 1, 1923.³ In practice, the political cooperation consisted mainly of semiannual conferences of Foreign Ministers and joint press conferences; on the other hand, there has often been an abundance of discord and rivalry within the Baltic Entente. Latvia and Estonia explicitly indicated their disinterestedness in the Memel and Vilna questions, which were important to Lithuania. The assertion, now made by Russia, that Lithuania had joined the Estonian-Latvian military pact, is, according to information available here, without any foundation. Because of the very similar economic structure of these countries, the economic cooperation between the three States, in spite of much effort during the last few years, made no appreciable progress. Since the conclusion of the Soviet Mutual Assistance Pacts with the Baltic countries in September–October 1939 there has been no closer cooperation in an anti-Russian sense among the Baltic States. In view of the occupation of their countries by Soviet Russian troops, the three Baltic Governments were aware of the dangers of such a policy.

II. For the same reason, there can be no question—during the last few months—of dependence in foreign policy on Germany by the Baltic States. The Lithuanian Government, to be sure, has probably not been quite certain until the last few days whether or not we were politically completely disinterested in Lithuania, so that in many circles, as for instance in the case of the Lithuanian Minister here, there was perhaps some hope that Germany would, in case of further

¹ Document No. 453.

² League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. CLIV, p. 93.

³ League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. XXIII, p. 81.

Russian demands, put in a good word for Lithuania in Moscow, although there was never, of course, any occasion given on our part for such an assumption.

On the other hand, our economic relations with the Baltic States have been strengthened very much since the beginning of the war. Regarding the great importance of the Baltic States to the war economy of the Reich, please see the attached memorandum from Minister Schnurre.

GRUNDHERR

[Enclosure]

BERLIN, June 17, 1940.

The economic importance of the three Baltic States for our supply of food and of raw materials essential for war has become quite considerable as a result of the commercial treaties concluded with these three States during the last year.⁴ In the course of the last six months, we have furthermore concluded secret treaties with all three States whereby the entire export of these countries, except the small part going to Russia and another small portion which goes to neutral countries, will be sent to Germany.⁵ That means for all three States about 70 percent of their total exports. German imports from the three Baltic States will in the current year amount to a total of approximately 200 million reichsmarks—comprising grain, hogs, butter, eggs, flax, lumber, seeds, and in the case of Estonia, petroleum.

The consolidation of Russian influence in these areas will seriously endanger these imports which are necessary to us. For one thing, the Russians will do their utmost to keep the raw materials, and especially food, at home for their own use. On the other hand, if part continues

⁴ For the treaty with Latvia, Dec. 21, 1939, see *Reichsgesetzblatt*, 1940, pt. II, No. 3, pp. 13 ff.; the confidential additional protocol and annexes are not printed (5920/E435292-313). For the treaty with Estonia, Oct. 7, 1939, see *Reichsgesetzblatt*, 1939, pt. II, No. 41, pp. 992 ff.; a confidential protocol on the results of German-Estonian economic discussions is not printed (9288/E659235-45). For the treaty with Lithuania, May 20, 1939, see *Reichsgesetzblatt*, 1939, pt. II, No. 23, pp. 789 ff.; the confidential protocol is not printed (9289/E659319-82).

⁵ This seems to refer to the following secret agreements: German-Latvian exchanges of letters of Dec. 15, 1939, concerning Latvian exports to third countries as well as the import of German finished goods into Latvia (9290/E659456-65); German-Latvian exchanges of letters of Jan. 11, 1940, on Latvian imports of coal from Germany and on transit through Latvia of Russian grain exports for Germany (9290/E659466-69); German-Latvian agreement of Mar. 23, 1940, on freight rates of German imports in transit through Latvia (9290/E659472-80); German-Latvian transit agreement of June 11, 1940 (9290/E659481-82); German-Estonian exchange of notes of Dec. 13, 1939, on deliveries of shale oil to Germany (9288/E659290-91); German-Estonian secret agreement on Estonian trade with neutral countries, signed Mar. 6, 1940 (9288/E659292-315); fourth additional agreement of Mar. 12, 1940, to the German-Estonian Treaty of Commerce and Navigation and the German-Estonian Trade Agreement (9288/E659246-88); first additional protocol to the German-Lithuanian trade agreement of May 20, 1939, and German-Lithuanian transit agreement concerning Lithuanian trade with neutral countries, both signed Apr. 17, 1940 (9289/E659383-449).

to go to Germany, they will make quite different demands in regard to deliveries of Germany products from those made in the past by the Baltic States, so that in effect the previous exchange of goods will break down. We were able to make the deliveries desired by the Baltic States much more easily, and in many cases, under the stress of circumstances, we were able to put these States off till later.

In contrast, the economic interests of the Soviet Union in the three Baltic States are of minor importance. The Soviet Union was able to secure only about 10 percent of the export trade of these countries for itself by means of treaties it recently concluded.

SCHNURRE

No. 464

265/172322

The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

ANKARA, June 17, 1940—8:22 p. m.

No. 442 of June 17

Received June 18—7:50 a. m.

The Government's statement¹ which was to have been made to the National Assembly today on the nonfulfillment of Turkey's obligation under the Pact of Alliance will not be issued. Obviously the Turkish Government feels that the collapse of France releases it from any obligation to make a statement on its attitude and dissolves the alliance. The President explained to the French and British Ambassadors in reply to their request for fulfillment of the obligation under the Pact of Alliance that Turkey had certainly entered into a mutual assistance pact as she had considered it below her dignity to have her security guaranteed by England, but that the Allies could today no longer fulfill this mutual assistance pact. Should Turkey be attacked in the course of developments she would naturally defend herself even if the Allies could no longer give her effective assistance. The President added that if the Allies could not show any understanding for this view held by Turkey, she would also be prepared to repay the loan granted to her.

PAPEN

¹ See document No. 431.

No. 465

407/214849

Circular of the State Secretary¹

Telegram

BERLIN, June 17, 1940.

Pol. VI 1673.

For information and orientation of your conversation.

¹ This telegram was circulated to all Missions.

The unresisted reinforcement of Russian troops in Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia and the reorganization of the Governments of the Baltic States, sought by the Russian Government to bring about more reliable cooperation with the Soviet Union, are the concern of Russia and the Baltic States. Therefore, in view of our unaltered friendly relations with the Soviet Union, there is no reason for nervousness on our part, which some of the foreign press has tried to impute to us in only too transparent a manner.

Please refrain during conversations from making any statement which could be interpreted as partisan.

Please acknowledge receipt.

WEIZSÄCKER

No. 466

205/142421

The State Secretary to the Legation in Sweden

Telegram

No. 705

BERLIN, June 17, 1940.

e. o. Pol. VI 1685.

Drafting Officer: Minister von Grundherr

For your information.

Minister Richert was sent for on Saturday¹ by the Foreign Minister,² who discussed with him the necessity for the transit of war equipment of all kinds, including arms and ammunition, through Sweden to Oslo, Trondheim, and Narvik, and also the facilitation of travel for members of the Wehrmacht on duty and on leave journeys now that the Norwegian capitulation has radically altered the situation for the Swedish Government. Minister Richert flies to Stockholm today to discuss the matter with the Swedish Government.³

WEIZSÄCKER

¹ i. e., June 15.

² Richert's report to Günther on this interview, which was held at a castle in Belgium, is in *Handlingar rörande Sveriges politik under andra världskriget: Transiteringsfrågan Juni-December 1940* (Stockholm, 1947), pp. 9-11.

³ The Minister in Sweden reported in telegram No. 1027 of June 18 that the Swedish Foreign Minister had informed him that Richert would bring an affirmative reply from the Swedish Government on June 19 (30/22134).

No. 467

19/12300

The State Secretary to the Embassy in the United States

Telegram

SECRET

BERLIN, June 17, 1940.

No. 668 of June 17

e. o. Pol. IX 1492 g.

For the personal attention of the Chargé d'Affaires.

Roosevelt's foreign policy has during the last few days suffered severe setbacks through Italy's entry into the war and the collapse of France. This is all the more embarrassing for the President as he had involved himself personally with Mussolini as well as Reynaud. Roosevelt's foreign policy in recent years has led to four great nations besides Japan, (Spain, Germany, Italy, and Russia) being slighted and insulted quite gratuitously, to small nations (for instance Finland) recognizing the worthlessness of American sympathy, and to great friendly countries like France and England, who were first goaded on to a warlike policy against Germany and now in the hour of need feel left in the lurch, being profoundly disillusioned. He has achieved this result and this heavy loss of prestige to the United States by his mistaken interference in European affairs contrary to established American tradition.

From reports from the U. S. A. I understand that the error of this policy is being more and more realized there. I recommend that you continue to have the above views spread over there by prominent Americans in a manner which you consider suitable.

WEIZSÄCKER

No. 468

171/134590

Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department

BERLIN, June 17, 1940.

Pol. VI 1703.

The Rumanian Minister, the Finnish Minister, and the Japanese Counselor of Embassy asked me today with reference to their close proximity to the Soviet Union for an opinion on the events in the Baltic area.

I replied that we had had no advance knowledge of the events, nor had we received any official communications on the progress of the action. We considered the occurrences there as a matter in which we had no part.

The Finnish Minister asked whether we had any information that the same fate was in store for Finland, to which I replied in the negative. M. Kivimäki remarked at this that, on the contrary, the Soviet Union had of late frequently shown signs of a friendly disposition toward Finland. The Minister then asked outright what Finland was to do if the Soviet Union made the same demands on her and he added immediately that he did not think the Finnish Government would capitulate as the Baltic Governments had done. I replied that I was not in a position to make a statement to him on this.

WOERMANN

No. 469

3680/E035149

Former Emperor Wilhelm II to Adolf Hitler

Telegram

DOORN, June 17, 1940.

Under the deeply moving impression of the capitulation of France I congratulate you and the whole German Wehrmacht on the mighty victory granted by God, in the words of the Emperor Wilhelm the Great in 1870: "What a turn of events brought about by divine dispensation."

In all German hearts there echoes the Leuthen chorale sung by the victors of Leuthen, the soldiers of the Great King: "Now thank we all our God!"¹

WILHELM I. R.²

¹ Marginal note: "Submitted to the Führer. June 24, 1940." The initial has not been identified.

² A draft reply dated June 25 reads: "His Majesty Emperor Wilhelm II, Doorn, Holland. I wish to thank Your Majesty for the congratulations expressed to the German Wehrmacht and to me personally on the occasion of the capitulation of France. I hope that this victory will soon be crowned with a peace which will assure the Greater German Reich the possibility of a full development of all the forces of the German nation. Adolf Hitler." (3680/E035150)

Marginal note: "Approved by the Führer. June 24, 1940."

No. 470

8614/E604160

The Ambassador in Brazil to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 615 of June 18

RIO DE JANEIRO, June 18, 1940—12:51 a. m.

Received June 19—8:15 a. m.

W VIII b 2263.

With reference to your telegram No. 533 of June 17,¹ and my telegram No. 602 of June 14.²

The journey to the United States of a Brazilian envoy is still looked upon as very uncertain here. The United States is, nevertheless, said to have offered very favorable financial terms.

Since the negotiations are obviously an operation forming part of America's intensive economic offensive directed against Germany which is to begin afresh, I request that I be authorized by telegram³

¹ Not printed (8720/E609736). In this telegram Pamperrien repeated to Rio de Janeiro a report in Washington telegram No. 1189 of June 15 (8720/-E609735) that a 10 million-dollar loan from the U. S. Export-Import Bank and investment of a further 7 million dollars for the projected Brazilian steel works had been under discussion in Washington. Brazilian envoys were to visit Washington to discuss the matter further.

² Not printed (8719/E609569A). It reported that the decline in cotton exports to Britain and France had seriously depressed Brazilian cotton markets and then pointed to the economic and political advantages to be gained, if Germany would now purchase 40-50,000 tons of cotton in Brazil and leave it stored there until the end of the war.

³ See document No. 498.

to communicate the following to the Brazilian Government or to the Federal President.⁴

1) We are prepared to purchase Brazilian products, especially coffee and cotton, immediately after the end of the war. In addition, if need be, we are even now prepared to sign contracts for purchase.

2) We are prepared and in a position to fulfill the contract for the steelworks⁵ within the normal period of delivery and agree, in principle, to accept Brazilian products in payment for this.

These communications are at the same time calculated to strengthen the political position of the Federal Council in face of the attempts to undermine it, which the Americans and the Allies are now making.⁶

PRÜFER

⁴Getulio Vargas.

⁵Tenders had been invited in 1938 from Krupp and the Vereinigte Stahlwerke for the erection of a steel works in Brazil. Material on this has been filmed on serials 8615 and 8616.

⁶A memorandum dated at Baumschule June 24 (8719/E609585), from Sonnleithner to Wiewl, conveyed instructions from Ribbentrop that a telegram be drafted in reply to Prüfer's No. 615, in which "the offers were to be treated in the most positive way possible, with further reference to Germany's economic capacity after the war."

Wiewl was further instructed to draft a telegram to the Missions in South and Central America instructing them to call attention to "the great economic expansion of the Reich which was to be expected, to the tremendous German capacity to purchase raw materials, and finally to the intention to take into account the present attitude of the above-named states in the regulation of our economic relations after the war." Instructions along these lines were sent as Multex No. 142 of July 2; vol. x, document No. 92.

No. 471

108/112228

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

Moscow, June 18, 1940—1:10 a. m.

No. 1167 of June 17

Received June 18—4:00 a. m.

Molotov summoned me this evening to his office and expressed the warmest congratulations of the Soviet Government on the splendid success of the German Wehrmacht. Thereupon, Molotov informed me of the Soviet action against the Baltic States. He referred to the reasons published in the press and added that it had become necessary to put an end to all the intrigues by which England and France had tried to sow discord and mistrust between Germany and the Soviet Union in the Baltic States.¹

¹ In a retrospective report dispatched from Moscow on June 20 (No. A2895: 432/219477-83), Schulenburg concluded with the following summary explanation of the Soviet action against the Baltic States: "It is correctly and generally known that France and especially England were very active in the Baltic States, and that certain circles—particularly of the press—allowed England and France a greater influence than could be desirable. In addition, however, it will have become known to the Soviet Government that, under the impact of German military successes, certain hopes arose in the Baltic States, especially in Lithuania. This circumstance, as well as the possibility of a quick ending of the war after the fall of Paris, presumably made it appear expedient to the Soviet Union to create accomplished facts with respect to relations with the Baltic States."

For the negotiations concerning the formation of the new governments the Soviet Government had, in addition to the Soviet envoys accredited there, sent the following special emissaries:

To Lithuania: Deputy Commissar of Foreign Affairs Dekanosov; to Latvia: Vishinsky, the representative of the Council of Ministers; to Estonia: regional party leader of Leningrad Zhdanov.

In connection with the escape of Smetona and the possible crossing of the frontier by Lithuanian army units, Molotov stated that the Lithuanian border was evidently inadequately guarded. The Soviet Government would, therefore, if requested, assist the Lithuanian Government in guarding its borders.

SCHULENBURG

No. 472

406/214628-29

The Minister in Estonia to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

TALLINN, June 18, 1940—1:20 a. m.

No. 204 of June 17

Received June 18—4:40 a. m.

The President asked me to call on him today and told me the following:

In the military conversations with Laidoner¹ the Russian demands have been extraordinarily increased. The Soviet Navy alone is demanding all dockyards in Tallinn, almost all the warehouses, the buildings of the War Ministry and General Staff, as well as the Technical College, two hotels, the largest cinema, numerous private houses, etc., all to be evacuated within 24 hours; at the same time the Russians say that the entire command (administration) of the Baltic fleet is to be transferred from Kronshtadt to Tallinn. In addition, the immediate surrender of all barracks and airports is demanded, as well as the disarming and disbanding of the Defense Corps. The composition of the new government is to be negotiated with the Soviet Commissar Zhdanov who is arriving here tomorrow. In the meantime occupation of airports, coastal batteries, etc., has been carried out today with incomprehensible haste.

As the reasons given for the Soviet Russian action are entirely unimportant and farfetched, it is purely an operation of force which obviously has to be completed quickly so as to establish a fait accompli, before the peaceful reconstruction of Europe planned by Germany. According to the Estonian Minister in Moscow it was preceded by long conversations between the English and French Ambassadors and Molotov. The former had obviously taken advantage of the feeling of weakness which the Russians were already experiencing in face of a victorious and unexpectedly powerful Germany, to goad Russia on to the speedy annexation of the Baltic States, hoping in this way to

¹ See document No. 458.

drive a wedge between Germany and Russia. He fears that, if the Soviet Union perceives no German resistance, it will continue to pursue, step by step, the course it has begun, until the Baltic States are completely incorporated and Bolshevized. On the other hand, in view of the great fear and respect felt by the Soviet Union for Germany, even the slightest expression of German interest in Estonia, or the Baltic States, would suffice to set a limit to the Russian advance at once.

The President asked me to submit these considerations to my Government and to suggest that the interest of the Reich in the Baltic States be expressed in Moscow as soon as possible at least in the sense that the framework of the Pact of Assistance of (group garbled) be preserved for the present, pending the general solution of European peace questions, and not to create at the last minute a fresh state of affairs.

I adopted a noncommittal attitude on the whole and promised to submit the suggestion to my Government.

Although the question can, of course, be judged in Berlin only within the framework of our foreign policy as a whole, I may be permitted on my part to point out that Russian occupation or, even Bolshevization, would prejudice important Reich economic interests in Estonia (oil, phosphorite, etc.). German industrial representatives are, for instance, already asking me now whether it is worth while continuing the preparatory work for obtaining phosphorite.

Please acknowledge receipt.²

FROHWEIN

¹Typewritten note at bottom: (Could also read: Request telegraphic instructions.)

No. 473

91/100244-46

The Minister in Eire to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

TOP SECRET

DUBLIN, June 17, 1940.

No. 320 of June 17

Received June 18—11:50 a. m.

With reference to your telegram No. 190 of June 15.¹

I carried out the instructions with Walshe today. The conversation, in which Walshe expressed great admiration for the German achievements, went off in a very friendly way. I started out by saying that I had reported on the Held affair and the reaction here, especially the increasing Irish fear of Germany. Walshe here interrupted and said that immediately after his return from London he had urged cautious handling of the affair. He, like Boland (to whom I made the same hint in the first conversation) (cf. my telegram No. 269 of May 24²) regards Held with the greatest mistrust, because

¹ Document No. 437.

² Document No. 314.

of his earlier connection with Hamilton and because of certain other questionable facts; it goes so far that he thinks it possible that activity as an agent for England is involved. Also the official at the Ministry of Justice who is handling the matter had a similar suspicion. W. thinks that, in general, it ought to be discussed as little as possible. I supported this view and on my part recommended caution in handling it.

In this connection, and staying closely by my instructions, I presented our view of what now as before appeared to me advisable. W.'s first reaction was the thought of a possible German landing, which would be a great misfortune. His following remark, to the effect that it would produce the best effect if we were to declare that we would not make a landing in Ireland, could only meet with a negative reaction on my part and I added that such a declaration was impossible in the present military situation. I pushed aside the question of a possible landing with the renewed hint that my statements represented the German reaction to the news about the Held affair, and by underlining once more the essential points of my detailed statements, I pointed up that, without affecting Ireland's neutral attitude, we expected complete and realistically wise understanding on the part of Ireland, in case of any collision between Irish interests and our measures. W. was thereupon more relaxed and added that they were cognizant of the possible difficulties which Ireland had to expect with a more vigorous prosecution of the war against England—for example, as a result of blockade, and drew the correct conclusions. With respect to the prevailing fear of Germany, W. stated again that fears of England occupied first place. As a result of the latest measures to increase the Army and its equipment, de Valera however has 90 percent of the people behind him and is substantially stronger. W. remarked that he hoped that the statement of the Führer in his interview with Wiegand respecting the absence of intention to destroy the British Empire,³ did not mean the

³ This refers to an interview given by Hitler to Karl von Wiegand, correspondent for the Hearst newspapers. The text was printed in the New York *Journal-American* on June 14, 1940; a German version is in *Monatshefte für Auswärtige Politik*, July 1940, pp. 533-536. A somewhat different text, "the authorized translation of Chancellor Hitler's statement," was printed in *Facts in Review*, vol. II, No. 27, pp. 282-283.

The War Diary of the Operations Division, German Naval Staff, contains the following entry for June 3, 1940:

"Karl v. Wiegand, representative of the Hearst press, has made the following statements to Armed Forces High Command:

"Germany should now offer peace on generous terms; an offer of peace by the Führer would find the most ready support in the U. S. A.

"If such a peace is not attained in 1940 he believes that the U. S. A. will then enter the war on the side of the Allies. Widespread circles in the U. S. A. are already inclined toward this course. The U. S. A. already plans to delay the outcome of the war, so that it can come in after a wartime winter.

"In the event of declaring war, the U. S. A. plans to induce all American States to break off their relations with Germany."

abandonment of Ireland. In this connection it interested him especially what I had told him about the importance of the outcome of the war for the final realization of Irish national demands. I suppose that de Valera will summon me after W. has informed him. I reserve a supplementary report.⁴

HEMPPEL

⁴ See document No. 506.

No. 474

2422/511916-17

*The American Chargé d'Affaires in Germany to the Foreign Minister*¹

No. 1176

BERLIN, June 18, 1940.

Received at the Foreign Ministry, June 18—1:45 p.m.

Pol. IX 1138.

EXCELLENCY: I have the honor to state that I have been instructed to communicate the following to Your Excellency in the name of my Government:

The Government of the United States is informed that the Government of France has requested of the German Government the terms of an armistice.

The Government of the United States feels it is desirable, in order to avoid any possible misunderstanding, to inform Your Excellency that in accordance with its traditional policy relating to the Western Hemisphere, the United States would not recognize any transfer, and would not acquiesce in any attempt to transfer, any geographic region of the Western Hemisphere from one non-American power to another non-American power.

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency the assurances of my highest consideration.²

DONALD R. HEATH
Chargé d'Affaires a. i.

¹ The original of this document is in English.

² A reply to this note is printed as document No. 72, in vol. x.

No. 475

8822/E614096-97

The Chargé d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 1209 of June 18

WASHINGTON, June 18, 1940—4:07 p.m.

Received June 19—6:40 a.m.

Pol. IX 1127.

Exploiting the fifth column panic, anti-German circles have replied to the successful efforts of German representatives in the United States and of German news agencies to enlighten the American public

about Germany, by staging a witch hunt against official German representatives in the United States. Almost every day the press prints reports of alleged transgressions of diplomatic and consular powers of which members of the German and Italian Foreign Services are said to be guilty. On instructions from the Federal Government, the secret Federal Police [*geheime Bundespolizei*] seems to be engaged in an exhaustive investigation, in particular of the propaganda activities of various members of the German and Italian services, in order to demand their recall in the event of sufficient material being found. According to press reports, this investigation is at present centered on the following members of our service, whose activities have already been frequently criticized.

1) Consul General von Spiegel, New Orleans, whom the Government of the State of Louisiana openly accuses of an unfriendly attitude toward the United States.¹ The Governor of Louisiana yesterday approached the State Department about instituting an investigation of Spiegel. (See telegram No. 1197 of June 16.²)

2) Consul Scholz, Boston, for alleged secret reports to party organizations and about the incident between his deputy and the *Boston Traveller*.³ The press reports that a representative of the Congressional Committee for the Investigation of Un-American Activities⁴ has now gone to Boston to investigate all Scholz's activities.

3) Consul General Wiedemann, San Francisco, who is said to have important secret assignments and who "gives the Embassy appropriate instructions."

4) Regarding the exceptional case of Handelsrat Westrick I refer you to my special reporting.⁵

Reports of the arrest of National Socialist party officials in Uruguay,⁶ and, in connection with this, the attacks on the German Minister in Montevideo, as well as the request by the Mexican Government

¹ Spiegel was quoted in a newspaper interview as saying that Germany would not forget that the United States was aiding her enemies. Later he said that his remarks had been confidential and that he had been misquoted. See the *New York Times*, June 19, 1940.

² Not printed (19/12292).

³ A letter addressed to the city editor of the *Boston Traveller* on the letterhead of the German Consulate in Boston and signed by an Attaché had stated that "this Consulate in the future must refuse to give your paper any information in whatever manner it may be." This was in protest against an editorial attacking Hitler and his war methods. See the *New York Times*, June 5, 1940.

⁴ The German original reads *Unterstützung* (support). Presumably *Unter-suchung* (investigation) was intended. The House Special Committee on Un-American Activities conducted extensive investigations into the activities of German Consuls in the United States. See its reports, *Investigation of Un-American Propaganda Activities in the United States* (76th Cong., 3rd sess., and 78th Cong., 1st sess., on H. Res. 282), Appendix, pt. II, ". . . Various Nazi Organizations and Individuals in the United States, Including Diplomatic and Consular Agents of the German Government", and Appendix, pt. VII, "Report on . . . Nazi Activities".

⁵ The precise reports to which Thomsen referred are not known. Various documents having to do with statements by Westrick which had appeared in the American press in April are filed on serial 9893. For a subsequent report on Westrick, see vol. x, document No. 287.

⁶ Minister Langmann in Montevideo reported on these arrests in telegrams Nos. 130 of June 18 (64/44304-05) and 134 of June 26 (65/44312-13).

which was undoubtedly demanded by the American Government, for the recall of Press Attaché Dietrich in Mexico,⁷ have attracted widespread attention here.

THOMSEN

⁷ Minister Rüdt in Mexico had reported the request for Dietrich's recall in telegram No. 317 of June 11 (176/84738).

No. 476

324/194072-73

The Director of the Economic Policy Department to the Embassy in Spain

Telegram

No. [856] ¹

BERLIN, June 17, 1940.

[Sent June 18.]

W II 4003.

W 3119 g.

I. The collapse of France may soon open up transport routes to Spain. Economic negotiations with Spain must then be begun immediately. It cannot yet be said whether at this stage arrangements with a long-term settlement as their objective may be made. It will probably be necessary to wait first for a further clarification with respect to requirements on both sides. It is necessary, however, to discuss the questions of the most urgent needs on either side and settlement of an exchange of goods on this basis, even though it be limited at first. Therefore, please draw the attention of the Spanish Government to this question now, so that it will prepare for negotiations in good time.

II. We assume that Spain, having declared herself a nonbelligerent state and having occupied Tangier, as well as in view of the new situation as regards the war, is no longer supplying France and England with strategic goods, and that in the coming negotiations we may act upon the assumption that these deliveries have ceased. If a continuation of deliveries to the enemy is intended (see your telegrams No. 1846 of June 12 ² and No. 1873 of June 13 ³), I request you to make suitable representations against this, in case you have no misgivings about such representations.

III. The supply of foodstuffs to Spain, acknowledged to be urgently necessary, cannot be made from Germany and southeastern Spain [sic]

¹ The telegram number and date of dispatch are taken from the reply, Madrid telegram No. 2019 of June 21 (324/194068).

² Not printed (136/74187). In this telegram Stohrer had reported on his efforts to induce Spain to delay delivery of strategic raw materials to France.

³ Not printed (136/74196). This telegram reported the impending departure from Bilbao of a British ship carrying a cargo of Spanish iron ore.

if France, as is to be expected, ceases to supply anything. Food-stuffs from the southeastern states are indispensable to Germany and Italy. Spain will, therefore, have to adapt herself to obtaining grain from overseas; this will be taken into account in our negotiations with Spain.

Please report by telegram.⁴

WIEHL

⁴ In his reply, telegram No. 2019 (see footnote 1), Stohrer reported that Beigebeder promised to impede shipments to England as much as possible. With respect to the last paragraph of the instruction Stohrer stated that Spain was not counting on deliveries from France and the southeastern countries and that next year Spain would need to import merely 2 million tons of grain as compared to 11 million during the current year.

No. 477

F2/0468

*Order by the Führer*¹

BERLIN, June 18, 1940.

Pol. I 730 g. Rs.

The newly formed French Government has informed the German Government through the intermediary of Spain that it intends to cease hostilities and requests to be informed of peace terms.² I shall give a reply after I have consulted with the Duce of Fascist Italy. The operations of the Wehrmacht are to be continued, and the defeated enemy is to be pursued with all vigor. The Army must make it a special point of honor to capture, as soon as possible, former German Reich territory up to the line Verdun, Toul, Belfort, as well as the coastal towns of Cherbourg and Brest and the Le Creusot armaments center.

*The Führer and Supreme Commander
of the Wehrmacht*
ADOLF HITLER

¹ The order was typed as a memorandum, and signed by Heyden-Rynsch, for circulation in the Foreign Ministry.

² See document No. 459.

No. 478

585/242590-91

Memorandum by the State Secretary

CONFIDENTIAL
St.S. No. 450

BERLIN, June 18, 1940.

The Bulgarian Minister¹ came to see me today with blunt revisionist requests by his Government. After some remarks of a historical

¹ Parvan Draganov.

nature on the frequent frontier changes and on the deplorable outcome for Bulgaria in 1919, he said that the Bulgarian Government relying on the long-standing brotherhood-in-arms with Germany and on their straightforward policy of the past 20 years, as well as on their passive attitude in the present conflict, hoped to have its present modest claims realized in the reconstruction of the face of Europe which was in the making. What it was hoping for and considered entirely justified morally was that amends for the wrong of Versailles should also be made to Bulgaria. What was fair for one ally of the World War must be fair for the other too. Leaving behind two maps² of which the smaller one is clearer, the Minister expressed the hope that access to the Aegean as in 1913, the southern Dobruja also according to the frontier demarcation of 1913, and the familiar slight rectifications of the Bulgarian-Yugoslav frontier would be conceded to Bulgaria. The most important claim was that concerning access to the Aegean, where an exchange of population between Bulgaria and Greece might be considered. The second most important claim was that to southern Dobruja, whose northern frontier was very carefully drawn. What Bulgaria wanted was from experience so limited that there could be no more claims for *revanche* by her neighbors.

I reminded the Bulgarian Minister how in the past months of the war he had repeatedly referred full of anxiety to the threatening dangers in the Balkans, and how I nevertheless had invariably exhorted him to remain calm.³ He must now surely admit that this calm was justified, to which M. Draganov agreed. I also told the Minister that we had not yet got as far as making peace. I could only regard his communication as preliminary and for purposes of information. Germany, as heretofore, was interested in the preservation of peace in the Balkans. In view of the close relations between Germany and Italy it would seem to me only natural if the Bulgarian Government were to bring its ideas to the notice of Rome as well (the Minister could not say whether this had already been done).

For his part M. Draganov thought that his Government's wishes could certainly be fulfilled by peaceful means. Finally, the Minister wanted a statement from me as to what I thought of his proposal. When I did not offer any opinion he asked me for my personal opinion at least, and this I also declined to give.

WEIZSÄCKER

² Not found.

³ Such conversations were recorded by Weizsäcker in memoranda St.S. No. 703 of Sept. 11, 1939 (585/242479) and St.S. No. 250 of March 23, 1940 (585/242561).

No. 479

F8/0118-0124

Unsigned Memorandum

RECORD OF THAT PART OF THE CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE FÜHRER AND THE DUCE IN MUNICH ON JUNE 18, 1940, WHICH WAS CONDUCTED IN THE PRESENCE OF THE REICH FOREIGN MINISTER, COUNT CIANO, COLONEL GENERAL KEITEL, AND GENERAL ROATTA

The private conversation between the Führer and the Duce had lasted nearly 2 hours when the Reich Foreign Minister, Count Ciano, Colonel General Keitel, and General Roatta were called in.¹ The Führer explained briefly that he had discussed the general situation with the Duce. As regards the case of France, the question at the moment was one of proceeding in such a way as to secure, if possible, a French government functioning on French territory as a party to the negotiations. This would be by far preferable to a situation in which the French Government might reject the German proposals and flee abroad, to London, to continue the war from there, quite apart from the unpleasant responsibility which the occupying powers would also have to assume, among others, in the administrative sphere. If they occupied the whole of France, an agreement with a French government in France would also be an advantage because of the French fleet. The Führer explained in detail what a great increase in strength the French fleet would represent for England, if it were to put itself at Britain's disposal. In certain categories the present strength of the English fleet would thereby be practically doubled or trebled, especially in the case of destroyers. Considering that a convoy protected by six destroyers could no longer be attacked by submarines, one could realize the great advantage which England would derive from use of the numerous French destroyers. It would, therefore, be best to try to reach agreement with a French government on neutralizing the fleet. This neutralization could be carried out by disarmament in French ports under German and Italian supervision, and as an inducement Germany might offer a guarantee that the entire fleet would be restored to France when peace was concluded. It was, however, doubtful whether France would put any faith in a guarantee by the Führer. She would perhaps be more ready to trust the Duce. In any case the French would be very suspicious, as they would probably always have in mind the methods applied by themselves at Versailles. It was probably out of the question that they would surrender their fleet unconditionally, therefore the remedy seemed to be the neutralization

¹ Before coming into this conference with Hitler and Mussolini, Ribbentrop and Ciano had discussed future Axis policies toward France and Britain. No record of this conversation has been found in the files of the German Foreign Ministry; see, however, *The Ciano Diaries*, entries for June 18 and 19, 1940, and Galeazzo Ciano, *L'Europa verso la catastrofe*, pp. 562-566.

of the fleet in a neutral country, for example Spain or Portugal. Because of Portugal's ties with England Spain would perhaps be the more suitable country, while Germany could not in this case recognize the United States as a neutral asylum for the French fleet. With the United States there was the danger that after some time the French Government might consider its own position to be more favorable and then offer its fleet for sale to America. A resale of the French fleet by America to England was, however, less likely as, among other things, the refusal by the United States to sell destroyers to Britain clearly proved that America wished to become the strongest naval power in the world. On the other hand, it would still have to be ascertained whether Franco would be prepared to undertake the not at all easy task of interning the French fleet. On this point, the Reich Foreign Minister, supported by Count Ciano and the Duce, expressed the view that Franco would probably accede to this request by Germany and Italy. The Führer went on to say that the French fleet must, above all, be prevented from reaching England. For this reason he had envisaged his proposal for neutralization. It would also be a favorable solution if the French fleet scuttled itself.

The Führer then went on to discuss in detail the terms for an armistice. By means of a map, he explained the occupation demands in particular detail. According to this, the occupation of French territory would be so arranged that the whole Channel and Atlantic coast, including the important ports of Cherbourg, Brest, Nantes, and Bordeaux would be secured against any outside influence by a wide belt of occupied territory. In the interior of the country, the occupation would be so arranged that at all events the railway line to Spain via Irun would lie wholly within the occupied zone. In addition, the Duce, at the suggestion of General Roatta, proposed that the Paris-Chambéry-Bourg-Modane railway line should be guaranteed by the French Government for freight traffic to Italy. Switzerland, too, would be completely cut off from France by a strip of occupied territory and would have to reconcile herself to adopting a more accommodating attitude in the transit question, as well as generally in her political attitude and in the press. The area to be occupied by Italy from the Italian frontier to the Rhone, including Toulon and Marseilles, was also discussed. Again at the suggestion of General Roatta the Duce demanded that the Ventimiglia-Nice-Portbou-Barcelona railway line should be placed at Italy's disposal.

In addition, the Führer said, the armistice must contain the usual conditions, for example, the surrender of arms, the return of prisoners of war (French prisoners, however, will not be released until a peace treaty has been concluded), cooperation of the administrative authorities, etc. At this point the Duce made the same demand

for disarmament of Corsica and Tunisia, while Ciano added in an undertone Djibouti.

In a short conversation with the Reich Foreign Minister Count Ciano agreed most heartily with the Führer's statements. He emphasized that the Führer was perfectly right in aiming at shortening the war as much as possible by reaching an agreement with a government functioning on French soil. If the French Government were to leave the country, very unpleasant complications might ensue.

With regard to the procedure it was settled after a lengthy discussion that Germany, through the mediation of Spain, should call upon the French Government to send a delegation to German Headquarters to receive the terms of the armistice. Italy's part in the proceedings should be safeguarded by the inclusion of a provision in the German terms to the effect that the armistice with Germany could not become effective until France had reached agreement with Italy as well.

When the Führer promised the Italians that Germany's armistice terms would be communicated to them at once, Ciano proposed that negotiations between Germany and France and Italy and France should be conducted concurrently. The Führer replied that he did not suppose Italy would wish to negotiate at the place where the German-French negotiations for an armistice would be held, but that for the rest Italy's part would be safeguarded by the condition mentioned above, namely, that the armistice with Germany would only become effective when agreement was reached between Italy and France. The Führer added in explanation that he had no intention of dealing with the French as they had done with us in 1918. He was prepared to make concessions on less important points, which might perhaps mean a great deal to the French. In this connection he referred to a possible wish on the part of France to have the city of Orléans in unoccupied territory. It was only on vital demands that he would not give way and for the rest the aim of his policy would be to reach agreement with a French government in France if this were at all possible.

If however the French Government were to refuse, then force must be the deciding factor and then Italy for her part would, of course, have to occupy a larger area in the south of France. Here General Roatta interjected that Italy was in the process of advancing.

The Duce spoke repeatedly of the part which the French fleet would play in the event of its going over to England. He did not think that in that case the fleet would leave the Mediterranean, but England would employ it against Italy there. He was, therefore, in complete agreement with the Führer that neutralization was the best solution.

In connection with the question of the fleet, the Führer again referred to England's plans. England was of the opinion that if she could hold out in the British Isles themselves for just one year, the war would be lost to Germany, for within that time she could count on the active cooperation of America. For the reasons mentioned above, namely, effective protection of convoys by destroyers, the French fleet was of the utmost importance for the possibility of survival of the British Isles. In more northerly areas it was often impossible during the winter months for the Air Force to operate for 10 to 14 days on end because of the winter. In addition, the English were in a position to send troops by sea to Morocco or to areas of the eastern Mediterranean from their numerous ports without its being possible to interfere with this from the air. An attempt to land on the continent could be frustrated, but not the embarkation of troops in England. All these considerations led again and again to the same conclusion: That, as already stated, the French fleet must be prevented from falling into English hands.

Following on this the Führer showed the Duce on a map the state of the military operations in France. The Duce showed special interest in those places at which strong French resistance had been reported. One such case, among others, was by the units hemmed in behind the Maginot Line, and the Führer concluded from this that there must still be considerable concentrations of picked troops there and that, therefore, a further military catastrophe could be expected in the next few days.

After a further exchange of views between the Führer and the Duce on the present military situation in France the following text of a communiqué was agreed upon:

At a discussion in Munich today the Führer and the Duce have agreed on the attitude of the two allied Governments to the French request for an armistice. The word "attitude" and the addition of the term "allied" to the Governments were the result of a proposal by the Duce.

No. 480

8339/E590076-79

Fifth Secret Protocol¹

W 3215/40 g.

In accordance with the instructions given to them by their Governments the chairman of the German Government Committee and the

¹This document resulted from a meeting of German and Italian Government Committees held in Rome June 15-18 (cf. document No. 420). In addition to the signing of the Fifth Secret Protocol there were also two exchanges of letters, one relating to insurance claims of persons repatriated from South Tirol (8339/E590085, E590087), the other relating to certain agreements under the Fourth Secret Protocol of Feb. 24 with respect to Italian tourist traffic into Germany (8339/E590088-89).

chairman of the Italian Government Committee for the adjusting of economic relations between the German Reich and Italy have with the aid of experts studied the question as to what extent mutual deliveries of important war materials can be increased as a result of Italy's entry into the war.

These discussions have led to the following result:

1) List C (German deliveries to Italy) appended to the Fourth Secret Protocol of February 24, 1940,² is extended as follows, the amounts already given in the aforementioned list being included:

Magnesium (July to October)	50 tons per month			
Optical glass	2	"	"	"
Glycerine	100	"	"	"
Toluol	500	"	"	"
Naphthalene	500	"	"	"
Zentralit [sic]	100	"	"	"
(if possible delivery of a further 50 tons per month)				
Diphenylanium	20	"	"	"
Animal charcoal or Lamp Black (carbon black)	50	"	"	"
Paraffin	20	"	"	"
(rising to 90 tons per month, if production increases according to expectation)				
Abrasives	50	"	"	"
(increase possible in the event of agreement regarding quality)				
Fire-clay and Kaolin, together	2000	"	"	"
Magnesite	350	"	"	"
Pitch coke	600	"	"	"
Graphite	100	"	"	"
(flaked graphite, provided that production increases in accordance with expectation)				
Cellulose for making sacks	800	"	"	"
Porcelain insulating material	0.5	"	"	"
Silicon carbide	25	"	"	"
(from August; increase to 100 tons may be possible)				
Propylalcohol	20	"	"	"
Cast Iron	5000	"	"	"
Steel	35,000	"	"	"

2) On the basis of the data supplied by Italy the responsible German departments will examine to what extent captured tires can be made available.

3) Italy will make a single delivery of 8,000 tons of aluminum oxide. Furthermore Italy will deliver 2,500 tons of aluminum oxide per month. Germany will deliver 800 tons of aluminum per month, of which 400 tons are remelting aluminum in accordance with the stand-

² Vol. VIII, document No. 634.

ard of quality set by the German Wehrmacht. Should the standards of quality set by the German and Italian armed forces not be identical the responsible departments will again consult each other.

4) List D (Italian deliveries to Germany) appended to the Fourth Secret Protocol of February 24, 1940, will be extended as follows, the amounts already given in the aforementioned list being included in the figures:

Hemp, codille and hackle hemp . . .	26,650 tons in the year 1940				
Hemp yarn and hempen cord	150	"	"	"	"
Bauxite	200,000	"	"	"	"
(if Italian production of best quality bauxite exceeds home consumption the surplus will be delivered to Germany)					
Zinc ores	45,000	"	"	"	"
(if possible 50,000 tons. In addition the 11,000 tons which were mentioned in the letter of February 24, 1940, from the Chairman of the Italian Government Committee to the Chairman of the German Government Committee, are to be delivered to the Reich.)					
Mercury	45,000	"	"	"	"
(further increase if the production situation permits)					
Sulphur	122,000	"	"	"	"
Boric acid	400	"	"	"	"
Raw silk, single, double and twined .	1,100	"	"	"	"
Spun silk, not dyed, single or twined .	450	"	"	"	"

5) The Italian side points out that in order to ensure the agreed annual deliveries it is desirable to deliver more than one million tons of coal in the summer months, which are favorable for transport, so as to offset the deficiency which is to be feared in the winter months. The German side points out that the agreed amount was already exceeded in May³ and will probably be exceeded also in June. It is agreed that both sides will do their utmost during the summer months to make increased deliveries.

Done in duplicate at Rome on June 18, 1940, in the German and Italian languages, each text being authoritative.

CARL CLODIUS
Chairman of the German
Government Committee

A. GIANNINI
Chairman of the Italian
Government Committee

³ In a telegram of June 6 (3968/E056326) Clodius had informed the Embassy that during May Germany had exported to Italy 1,050,000 tons of coal, which was 50,000 tons more than had been agreed. Simultaneously the Embassy was requested to draw Italian attention "to this quite unusual feat of organization during the western offensive."

No. 481

490/232213

The State Secretary to the Embassy in Spain

Telegram

PRIORITY

BERLIN, June 18, 1940—11:00 p. m.

MOST URGENT

No. 858

For the Ambassador.

With reference to my telegram No. 850.¹

The Foreign Minister directs you to make the following statement to the Spanish Foreign Minister at once, with the request that it be passed on to the French Government:

"The Reich Government is prepared to make known to the French Government the conditions for the cessation of hostilities. It proposes that the French Government should send Plenipotentiaries for this purpose. The Reich Government will announce the time and place for the reception of the Plenipotentiaries as soon as their names are communicated to it.

"The Reich Government wishes to point out now that it will only consider an agreement on the cessation of hostilities, if the French Government also reaches an understanding on this with the Italian Government. It is, therefore, proposed that the French Government establish contact with the Italian Government through the intermediary of Spain."

End of the communication to the Spanish Foreign Minister.

Please inform me by telegram of the time of carrying out your démarche with the Spanish Foreign Minister.²

WEIZSÄCKER

¹ Document No. 461.

² In telegram No. 1970 of June 19 (490/232214), Stohrer reported that he had carried out the démarche as ordered at 1:05 a. m. that day.

No. 482

2423/512072-73

Memorandum by the Head of Political Division IX

BERLIN, June 18, 1940.
zu Pol. IX 1032.

Subject: Telegram No. 619 of June 8 from Buenos Aires.¹

The proposals by Ambassador von Thermann made in section IV of the telegram have been dealt with as follows.

¹ Document No. 401.

Section IV 1. Italy's entry into the war and the declaration by the Reich Government that Germany has no intentions of aggression toward South America have been taken care of by the march of events and the interview given by the Führer.²

The Landesgruppe of the AO has been dissolved for a year. The greatest possible reserve has been urged upon the organization which replaced it. According to information from Counselor Gossmann, the Chief of the AO nevertheless intends to comply with Herr von Thermann's suggestion and to send a further instruction³ to that effect to the Landesgruppe.

Regarding 2a. On the basis of a conference within the Commercial Policy Committee, the Embassy has been given permission in a telegram from the Economic Policy Department⁴ to enter negotiations on storage purchases in the amount of 2-3,000,000 marks from our clearing account, assuming that this is expected to be especially successful politically. Before making a final commitment the Embassy should check with Berlin since the few technical questions such as insurance, etc., are still to be clarified.

With reference to paragraph 2 of section 2a, the Embassy has been advised to desist as much as possible from founding new companies as these are considered as a permanent burden on our commercial exchanges; the immediate payment of subsidies [*Nützlichkeitsgeldern*] would be preferable.

Furthermore, half a million pesos were telegraphically⁵ made available to the Ambassador for the purposes referred to by him.

With reference to 2c. The Embassy has been instructed by telegraph by the Press Department⁶ to examine whether the envisaged printing of the *Pampero* on the premises of the *La Plata-Zeitung* is politically advisable. Before taking final steps the Embassy should report once more.

With reference to the last sentence of section 2c the background is as follows. We have bought in South America a radio station which is to disseminate news in Argentina and the other La Plata countries. This station, however, is not in Buenos Aires but in Montevideo. In telegram No. 493 of May 14³ to which reference is made in this tele-

² See document No. 473, footnote 3.

³ Not found.

⁴ This was telegram No. 521 sent on June 18 over Wiehl's signature, not printed (341/199507-08). This instruction was the result of a decision taken after a discussion in the Economic Policy Committee on June 15 recorded in a Wiehl memorandum of the same day (341/199518-20).

⁵ Document No. 430.

⁶ An undated draft copy of such a telegram, signed by Senior Counselor Schmidt of the Press Department, is in the files (2423/512071).

gram an amount of 6,000 RM has been requested for the upkeep of this station. Kult R (Senior Counselor Rühle) has submitted a memorandum⁷ to that effect to *Pers. geh.* and requested approval for this amount. I have urged that a decision be speeded up.

Thus, all of Ambassador von Thermann's suggestions have been taken care of with the exception of the instruction by the chief of the AO which is not absolutely necessary and the approval of the money for the radio station in Montevideo.⁸

FREYTAG

⁷ Not found.

⁸ Marginal notes: "Discussed with Counselor Schirmer in the absence of Herr Rühle. A decision concerning the radio station in Montevideo has not yet been taken. I have requested that the matter be speeded up. Reply after one week. F[reytag] June 26."

"Counselor Schirmer told me today on the telephone that the money for the radio station in Montevideo has been approved. The Legation in Montevideo has been informed by telegram. M[aciejewski] July 3."

No. 483

2423/512078

The High Command of the Wehrmacht to the Foreign Ministry

No. 12162/40 geh. Ausl I g

BERLIN, June 18, 1940.

Pol. IX 1155.

Subject: The situation in Argentina.

1. Acts of sabotage on the Argentine and South American mainland.
2. Operations by German naval forces within the three-hundred-mile zone.

Reference: Foreign Ministry No. Pol. IX 842/II of June 15, 1940.¹

1) All activities (acts of sabotage) are forbidden in the South American States and the U. S. A.; no action will therefore be taken.

2) With reference to the appraisal of the situation by the German Embassy in Buenos Aires, no fresh instructions will be issued to the German naval forces, since they have already received orders to this effect.²

The Chief of the High Command

of the Wehrmacht

By order:

BÜCKNER

¹ Not printed (9857/E692866). This letter from the Foreign Ministry to the Foreign Department of OKW referred to the previous letter of May 22 (see document No. 301) and asked once more for information.

² Marginal note: "Counselor Maciejewski: Should we telegraph to Buenos Aires? O[ehland] June 24." In the files is a draft instruction to this effect which was to be sent to Buenos Aires over Rintelen's signature (2423/512079). The following marginal note is found below the text of this draft instruction: "For military reasons it does not seem advisable to inform our Missions of the instructions issued to our naval forces. It is therefore suggested that no telegraphic instruction be sent to Buenos Aires. H[eyden-Rynsch] June 25."

No. 484

216/147547-48

The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

Tokyo, June 19, 1940—10:18 a. m.

SECRET

Received June 19—9:30 p. m.

No. 594 of June 19

For the Reich Chancellery.

The head of the European Department of the Foreign Ministry told me in confidence that the Japanese Ambassador in Berlin had been instructed today to express to the German Government the Japanese Government's congratulations on Germany's success and to take this opportunity of pointing out Japan's particular interest in the future fate of French Indochina. The Ambassador is to repeat Japan's thanks for Germany's friendly attitude in the China conflict and is to stress at the same time that Japan believes she has rendered Germany considerable service during the war in Europe by pinning down American forces in the Pacific Ocean. The Ambassador has been instructed to suggest that the Reich Government, in appreciation of Japan's attitude, make a friendly gesture in respect to Indochina. When I asked what sort of gesture was expected, my informant replied that the Foreign Ministry had in mind a German declaration giving Japan a free hand in Indochina. According to the press, the Japanese Ambassador in Rome has received similar instruction.

As the pressure of public opinion on the Government to take action steadily increased as a result of the collapse of France, the Foreign Minister obviously decided on this step to save his policy and to prevent the otherwise inevitable fall of the Cabinet. The danger certainly exists that the Foreign Minister would turn any German *carte blanche* regarding Indochina to tactical use in his attempts at a settlement with America. Characteristic of the Foreign Minister's unchanged basic attitude is the fact, reported by a different channel, that he concluded a friendly agreement with England and France on the same day on (group garbled) in Tientsin.¹

From Tokyo's point of view a strengthening of Japan's power in the Far East by the incorporation of Indochina would undoubtedly be in Germany's interest. This would, on the one hand, enhance the prospects of a speedy ending of the China conflict, and on the other, would so intensify Japan's opposition to the Anglo-Saxon powers that the danger of an agreement would be removed for a long time. If, therefore, it is intended to give consideration to Japan's wishes, a

¹ Report not found.

formula would have to be found which would commit Japan finally and unconditionally to our policy. This could be achieved, above all, if Japan had to commit herself to taking immediate possession of Indochina. In this connection I am told in confidence by Army circles that the idea of occupying the strategically important Yunnan railway is being advocated there. If the Government should evade an offer couched in appropriate terms of a free hand in Indochina, and if this were made public, it could at least be expected that its position would be severely shaken and that probably it would be replaced by a government friendly to us.²

OTT

² See document No. 511 and footnote 2.

No. 485

121/119619

The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

MADRID, June 19, 1940.

No. 1975 of June 19

Received, June 19—2:00 p. m.

With reference to my telegram No. 1970 of June 19.¹

The Spanish Foreign Ministry telegraphs that our communication to the French Government regarding the appointment of French delegates for negotiations for an armistice² was handed to the French Foreign Ministry by the Spanish Ambassador in person at 6:25 a. m. today. M. Baudouin said that he would summon the other Ministers at once and asked the Spanish Ambassador to call on him again at 10 o'clock that morning to receive the answer.

This morning a note from the French Government also reached the Spanish Foreign Ministry, the contents of which are the same as those of the communication addressed to us regarding the opening of peace negotiations (see my telegram No. 1929 of June 17³). It will be handed to the Italian Chargé d'Affaires at once.⁴

STOHRER

¹ See document No. 481, footnote 2.

² See document No. 481.

³ See document No. 459, footnote 1.

⁴ In telegram No. 1978 of June 19 (490/232219) Stohrer corrected the information contained in the last paragraph. In the note the French Government asked the Spanish Government to inform the Italian Government that it was prepared to consider ceasing hostilities, and that for this reason the French Government had, on June 17, handed over to the Holy See for transmission to the Italian Government a copy of its note destined for the German Government.

No. 486

205/142481-32

Memorandum by the State Secretary¹

St.S. No. 452

BERLIN, June 19, 1940.

The Swedish Minister, who arrived here this morning by airplane from Stockholm, answered the questions put to him by the Foreign Minister concerning transport of materials and personnel through Sweden to Norway,² as follows:

Prinz Wied will have already telegraphed to us that he, Richert, was bringing with him an affirmative reply.³

Where the transit to Norway of goods of all kinds was concerned, this could be carried out without difficulty. In this connection it was pointed out that, in accordance with the regulations in Sweden concerning the transit of war equipment, special permission was required each time. This did not mean, however, that a special investigation would also take place; it was more a matter of formality to see that previous notification had each time been given in order to ensure immediate transport for the war material. In order to achieve as smooth and speedy a passage as possible, and also to ensure the most efficient distribution of the transports, especially when these were large, it would, in the opinion of the Swedish Government, be advisable in addition to open early discussions concerning available transport routes.

Where the transit of members of the Wehrmacht was concerned, the Swedish Government was prepared to begin discussions along the lines indicated by the Foreign Minister, in order to make the arrangements necessary in these cases. The Minister thought that these discussions could perhaps be most easily taken up by the Wehrmacht Attachés to the German Legation in Stockholm in order to agree on the most suitable routes, and the most efficient distribution into definite groups for the journey, etc.

At the end of his communication the Minister again emphasized that in the further discussions suggested by his Government it was only a matter of determining the most efficient ways and means of fulfilling our wishes and of harmonizing the formalities to be observed with the existing Swedish regulations, but that a special investigation in each case was by no means intended.

¹ Richert's accounts of this interview are in *Transiteringsfrågan Juni-December 1940*, pp. 14-16.

² See document No. 466.

³ See document No. 466, footnote 3.

I mentioned nothing to M. Richert about any other economic discussions soon to be opened in Stockholm, or of the date of them.⁴ He did not bring the conversation round to this either. A decision will however, in my opinion, now have to be made about this.

Submitted herewith to the Foreign Minister by teletype.

WEIZSÄCKER

⁴ These economic discussions were carried on in the period June 27–July 10, 1940. Amounts supplementary to previous agreements were fixed or adjusted for delivery of Swedish products to Germany and German exports to Sweden for the year 1940. A memorandum of July 10 (not printed, 819/192672–81) summarized the results of the discussions.

No. 487

B15/B002529

Memorandum by the State Secretary

St.S. No. 454

BERLIN, June 19, 1940.

The Swedish Minister spoke to me today about the collapse of France and then went on to ask what we thought England's attitude would be now.

When I replied that yesterday's speech by Churchill¹ did not give the impression that people in England had come to see reason, M. Richert said that last night he had read a very recent telegram from the Swedish Minister in London, which gave a different impression. The Swedish representative in London had observed on the contrary a return to sound common sense in authoritative circles in London.

Herewith to the Foreign Minister by teletype.

WEIZSÄCKER

¹ The reference is to the Prime Minister's statement in the House of Commons on June 18, which was then broadcast. Text in *The War Speeches of the Rt. Hon. Winston S. Churchill*, vol. I, pp. 198–207.

No. 488

790/272518

The State Secretary to the Foreign Minister

St.S. No. 455

BERLIN, June 19, 1940.

As announced,¹ the Spanish Ambassador this afternoon sent me a memorandum concerning Spanish claims in Africa and Spain's possible participation in the war.

In translation² the memorandum reads as follows:

"Since the Spanish Government considers the further existence of the French empire in North Africa, which was partly created by the

¹ In Madrid telegram No. 1971 which was received in Berlin in the early hours of June 19 (490/232215).

² The German translation is identical with one sent from the Spanish Embassy in Berlin (9883/E693484).

efforts of Spanish workers, to be impossible, it demands the territory of Oran, the unification of Morocco under a Spanish Protectorate, the extension of Spanish territory in the Sahara to the 20th parallel, and the extension of Spain's coastal territories situated in the area on the coast between the mouth of the Niger and Cape Lopez.

-----³

"Should England continue the war after France has ceased fighting, Spain would be willing to enter the war after a short period of preparing the public. In this case she would need some support from Germany in the form of war materials, heavy artillery, aircraft for the attack on Gibraltar, and perhaps the cooperation of German submarines in the defense of the Canary Islands. Also supplies of some foodstuffs, ammunition, motor fuels and equipment, which will certainly be available from the French war stocks."

Herewith submitted to the Foreign Minister by teletype.⁴

WEIZSÄCKER

³ The dashes are in the translation of the memorandum as sent from the Spanish Embassy. They do not indicate an omission but a break between the two paragraphs.

⁴ See vol. x, documents Nos. 3 and 16.

No. 489

490/232220-21

The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

Special Wireless Message, MADRID, June 19, 1940.¹

MOST URGENT

Received June 19—10:50 p. m.

No. 1984 of June 19

At 7:10 p. m. today the Under State Secretary in the Spanish Foreign Ministry handed me the following communication telephoned from the Spanish frontier by the Spanish Ambassador in Bordeaux: "At 10:15 a. m. the French Foreign Minister informed me of the following decisions taken with regard to the German note:²

The French Government nominates the following persons as Plenipotentiaries to receive the terms for the cessation of hostilities: General Huntziger, Ambassador Noël, Vice Admiral Le Luc, and General of the Air Force Bergeret, together with experts and secretaries, which will bring the total strength of the delegation to over 20.

In order that a completely independent decision may be reached, the French Government requests the German Government to order its troops to remain in the positions which they occupied at midday on June 19. If this is agreed to, the French Government would make no alteration in the present disposition of its troops.

¹ The hour of dispatch is not recorded on the telegram, but see document No. 490, footnote 2.

² See document No. 481.

Our Ambassador asked the Minister for an explanation of the last point saying that this might be interpreted as an armistice without stipulated conditions and that the negotiations might be complicated by this. The Minister replied, and authorized the Ambassador to state this officially, that it was only a desire to ensure freedom of movement for the French Government so that its organs should exercise authority in the country, and that in reality this request applied only to the district of Bordeaux which was the seat of the Government at present and which it wished to spare from hostilities for the reason mentioned.

Señor Lequerica, our Ambassador, emphasizes that he is making this statement with full official authorization."

End of the communication from the Under State Secretary.

A further telegram on the situation in France follows.³

STOHRER

³ Document No. 490.

No. 490

490/232222

The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

MADRID, June 19, 1940.

No. 1985 of June 19

Received June 19—11:50 p. m.

With reference to my telegram No. 1984 of June 19.¹

The communication from the French Government timed 10:15 a. m., reported in my previous telegram, regarding the French armistice delegation, arrived here very late, as the roads between Bordeaux and the frontier are overcrowded, and sometimes blocked.²

After handing over the French communication the Under State Secretary also read to me a further report by telephone sent from the frontier by the Spanish Ambassador in Bordeaux.

The Ambassador stresses that the French Government hardly has the situation in hand anymore now. Although Pétain is acting with great energy, there is the danger that if German troops advance further on Bordeaux and if the start of the armistice is delayed, the Reynaud faction, that is, the party which favors the continuation of the war from abroad, may gain the upper hand again. The Government would not be able to survive a threat to Bordeaux by German troops.

The Under State Secretary then also informed me privately of reports which had just arrived from the French frontier, confirming the

¹ Document No. 489.

² In telegram No. 2011 of June 20 (121/119639-40) Stohrer repeated the reasons here given for the delay in the transmission of the message from the French Government contained in telegram No. 1984 which, he stated, had been sent by radio from Madrid at 9:15 p. m. Stohrer had asked the Spanish Foreign Ministry to inform the French Government of the delay and the reasons for it.

increasing chaos. Conditions on the roads leading to the Spanish frontier were terrible. A revolutionary mood was increasing everywhere. There had already been outrages in many places. In Toulouse and other towns synagogues and Freemasons' lodges had been attacked and set on fire. ✓

STOHRER

No. 491

2931/567016-18

Unsigned Memorandum

BERLIN, June 19, 1940.
Pol. VIII 751.

Drafting Officer: Counselor Knoll.

Subject: Statements by the Japanese Ambassador on means of ending the conflict in China.

During a conversation on German-Japanese relations the Japanese Ambassador used the following words: "The conflict with China naturally cannot go on in the present way: Something must be done and done quickly." At the close of the conversation I reverted to this remark and asked: "Did you mean just now that military action was necessary for ending the China conflict or were you thinking of ending it by diplomatic means?" The Ambassador seemed glad of the opportunity of speaking about this and said:

"At one time I advocated declaring war on China; we could then have taken much more energetic measures against supplies to China by other countries just as England is doing in the war in Europe. Today it is probably too late for stronger military action. I was thinking just now of a diplomatic step. The two men who are of any importance in China today are Chiang Kai-shek and Wang Ching-wei. The one is perhaps stronger and more of a realist, the other more of an idealist. The one will not negotiate with us, the other will. In my opinion we will not be able to ignore Chiang Kai-shek if we want to make peace with China, and this opinion is shared by my friend Kawai¹ here and also by many of my fellow countrymen. My Government has now committed itself with Wang Ching-wei to such an extent that, if we want to be gentlemen, we cannot just push him aside. We must try to bring Chiang and Wang together again. We can hardly do this alone. We need an intermediary. Germany today is very strong; she is interested in the economic development of the Far East and has no direct political interests there. Do you not think that Germany could help us?"

I agreed that we were interested in the restoration of orderly conditions in the Far East but said that mediation between two belligerent parties was always a thankless task and we did not even know whether

¹Tztsuo Kawai, Japanese career diplomat, was in Europe and America on a special mission from November 1939 to October 1940.

the present Japanese Government would welcome a German move in that direction. Mr. Kurusu replied :

"I quite understand your first objection. As for the second, I do not share your opinion. The Japanese Government would, in my opinion, gladly accept Germany's help in this matter. Unfortunately, I cannot speak direct to the Chinese Ambassador here. He would certainly encounter the greatest difficulties with his junior colleagues. And yet I would like to get in touch with him. Could you not arrange talks, without our having to meet face to face? You know both countries and can talk with both representatives. I cannot discuss this with Herr Woermann. He is in too high a position and any action taken by him would involve the German Government. But perhaps you could help us. I should not like to give you any trouble but perhaps you could put out feelers at a suitable opportunity and then let me know; and the sooner the better!"

Whereas at the beginning the Ambassador had spoken nonchalantly, I had the impression at the end that the object of the preceding conversation had been to bring forward this request.

Submitted to the Foreign Minister through the Under State Secretary and the State Secretary with the request for instructions as to whether the Japanese Ambassador's suggestion should be acted upon.²

² The instructions requested here have not been found, but further documents on the Japanese request for German mediation will be printed in vol. x.

No. 492

19/12817-18

The Chargé d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

TOP SECRET

No. 1229 of June 19

WASHINGTON, June 19, 1940—9:17 p. m.

Received June 20—9:30 a. m.

With reference to my No. 837 of [May] 4.¹

The first stage has been completed in the propaganda campaign against Roosevelt's interventionist policy by the distribution of an American edition of the Warsaw documents. Suitable agents have taken up the first edition of 50,000 (fifty thousand) copies from the American publishing firm of Howell and Soskin and sent them to specially chosen persons, while tens of thousands of copies have been distributed to the American book trade. In this way the majority of the politically influential people, in particular all the Senators, Representatives and the entire press of the country are by now in possession of the Warsaw documents. Besides this, a suitable Congressman has ensured their inclusion in the official Ameri-

¹ Document No. 185.

can parliamentary publication the *Congressional Record*.² In addition, a prominent Senator will deal with the political significance of the Warsaw documents in a detailed speech to the Senate, particularly with regard to Roosevelt's interventionist policy during the sessions of the Republican Convention.

I think I can report that this propaganda campaign has been carried through with the success we envisaged while at the same time the present moment can be considered particularly favorable in view of the state of the election campaign. Thanks to the varied methods of camouflage and the extreme caution observed by our agents, it is to be hoped that up to now nothing has come to the knowledge of the American authorities which they could exploit for their own ends. Anyhow we have so far had no indications of this here. This telegram has been destroyed.

THOMSEN

² Five of the documents contained in German White Book No. 3 were inserted into the *Congressional Record* by Congressman J. Thorkelsen on Montana on June 20.

No. 493

19/12319-21

The Chargé d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

URGENT

WASHINGTON, June 19, 1940—10:54 a. m. [sic]

TOP SECRET

Received June 20—1:40 p. m.

No. 1230 of June 19

For the State Secretary.

With reference to your telegram No. 668 of June 17.¹

1) The reverses of Roosevelt's foreign policy are constantly being discussed by the Embassy and by the career officials at the head of our consular service throughout the country with suitable American personages.

2) An effective and particularly favorable opportunity for spreading as widely as possible a realization of the error of Roosevelt's foreign policy presents itself in connection with the Republican Party Convention, which takes place next week, and the election organizers [*Wahlleitung*] with whom I am in constant touch. As I have already reported elsewhere in strict confidence ² some 50 Congressmen will be going to Philadelphia to explain our views to the delegates at the party convention.

3) In addition to this, I have recently initiated the following propaganda campaign which is to be treated with the strictest secrecy.

¹ Document No. 467.

² See document No. 417.

In view of the hysteria among wide circles of Americans arising from their recognition of the danger to America that might result from a German victory, of the general anti-German mood, and of the mistrust of all German efforts at enlightenment, it will be particularly effective if American politicians themselves provide enlightenment regarding our political aims and the mistakes of Roosevelt's foreign policy. The special representative for press matters is therefore keeping in close touch with several Senators and Congressmen in order that their speeches may receive the widest publicity, whether they are made before Congress or direct to the American people on the radio. These speeches, whose aim is to prevent America's entry into the war and to ward off all attacks by interventionist politicians, will be printed each time in the official American parliamentary publication, the *Congressional Record* by these Senators and Congressmen, and then an edition of 50,000 to 1 million copies will be sent by them to specially chosen persons. In this manner German influence is not visible to the outside and, thanks to the privilege of free postage enjoyed by American Congressmen, the cost of this large-scale propaganda can be kept disproportionately low, since, at the very least, mail expenses amounting to many tens of thousands of dollars would be saved. Up to the present nearly a dozen such operations have been or will be carried out during the Republican party convention. The speeches will be submitted shortly. May I request that this be brought to the knowledge of the Information Department of the Foreign Ministry.

4) In all these operations and conversations I am constantly being given to understand that, in view of American public opinion and of influential political circles, Germany's greatest political victory now would be to achieve a separate peace with France. The course of the war in Western Europe has undoubtedly contributed toward weakening English prestige here in the same measure as it has increased respect for France's defensive struggle and decidedly added to the sympathy felt for France herself. Such a separate peace with France would be the greatest setback for Roosevelt's foreign policy and would contribute largely to cutting the ground from under his interventionist policy and making his reelection more difficult. As I know for certain, the fear of the conclusion of a separate peace with France is particularly strong in the State Department, because they see in such a peace the danger of a final split between England and France. Besides which, a French Government in exile would be considerably more convenient for the aims of American policy (prolongation of the war) than a stable government on French soil collaborating with Germany. This telegram has been destroyed.

THOMSEN

No. 494

406/214631-32

The Minister in Estonia to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

TALLINN, June 20, 1940—12:23 a. m.

No. 207 [sic] of June 19

Received June 20—6:00 a. m.

With reference to my telegram No. 207.¹

Contrary to expectations yesterday, Zhdanov arrived today after all, and was received by the President. A confidant of the President informed me in strict confidence that Zhdanov opened the conversation by asserting that Estonia had concluded a military agreement with Lithuania, to which the President replied that, as President of the country, he could declare authoritatively that this was not the case, and requested that this point not be referred to again. The President replied to Zhdanov's inquiry as to the proposed composition of the new government by saying that under the constitution he only appointed the new Minister President, who had then to form a government and could confer with Zhdanov as to its composition; he had Rei, until now Estonian Minister in Moscow, in view as Minister President. Asked whether the latter was acceptable to the Soviet Union, Zhdanov replied that he must first inquire in Moscow. For the rest, the conversation was unimportant, but passed off pleasantly, leaving in the meantime the impression that for the present neither the annexation nor the Bolshevization of Estonia was planned. In the event of a possible rejection of Rei, the President would propose Pung, President of the Council of State.

Information from Moscow has reached the President according to which Cripps repeatedly had long conversations with Molotov. English and French Legation circles here are saying that the Soviet occupation of the Baltic States is directed against Germany, that the Soviet Union is moving 3 million soldiers up to the eastern boundary of the German sphere of influence in order to force Germany to withdraw troops from the west and thus help the Western Powers. From all this rumor-mongering, the Estonians have come to the conclusion that the Russian occupation is really due to Anglo-French promptings in Moscow, and hope that Germany was opposed.

Agreement has now been reached between Laidoner and the Russian

¹ In telegram No. 207 of June 18, Frohwein had reported on Soviet troop movements in Estonia and had added: "In place of Zhdanov, Deputy Commissar of Foreign Affairs Dekanosov is expected to arrive here tomorrow to negotiate on the formation of the new government." (406/214630)

commander on the questions of the distribution and accommodation of Soviet Russian troops, in connection with which the Russians have considerably moderated their demands.

Apart from the shooting of an Estonian at night in the Võru district by a Soviet Russian sentry, there are no incidents to report in connection with troop movements.

An interesting point: Zhdanov drove from the station to the Soviet Legation and the President's palace in an armored car accompanied by two tanks.

FROHWEIN

No. 495

247/164121

*The Minister and Plenipotentiary of the German Reich in Denmark
to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram en clair

SECRET

COPENHAGEN, June 20, 1940—12:30 a. m.

No. 698 of June 19

Received June 20—1:30 a. m.

Also for Geheimrat Luther.

The latent domestic political crisis which has asserted itself, especially since the occupation, has recently become intensified. Under the influence of the recent fusion of the Danish National Socialists with the opposition LS-movement, the tension between them and the Government has increased. The Government is afraid, especially under the impact of Germany's overwhelming military successes, that we are secretly supporting the National Socialists and encouraging them to overthrow the Government by force at the first opportunity. Saying that he was speaking on the instructions of the Government, the Minister of Justice expressed this view today in a conversation with Vice President Kanstein,¹ and at the same time broached the question as to whether the present Government could rely on loyal and frank cooperation with the German authorities in the future. The Minister of Justice expressed the wish to have a clear answer from me. I intend to refute most energetically as Kanstein has already done the accusation that we are interfering in Denmark's internal political affairs, and in particular that we are encouraging a Putsch. As things are, it is not out of the question that an acute Government crisis will arise in the near future when we will be confronted with the question as to whether and to what extent we should exert influence for a reorganization of the Government. In spite of

¹ Police Vice President Kanstein had been appointed representative of the Foreign Ministry for internal administrative affairs in Denmark (30/22448-50).

the broadened basis of the DNSAP² as a result of the fusion, I still do not think the latter is strong enough to form the basis for a government. In my opinion our attitude toward the formation of a new government should continue to be one of wait and see as we are always in a position to overthrow a government which is not agreeable to us, and thus give the Danish National Socialists the time and opportunity to develop their position in the country. I request instructions by telegram.³

RENTHE-FINK

² The initials stand for the Danish National Socialist Workers Party.

³ No reply to this telegram has been found.

No. 496

490/282228

The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

MADRID, June 20, 1940.

No. 1989 of June 20

Received June 20—5:00 a. m.

With reference to my telegram No. 1985 of June 19.¹

The Spanish Foreign Minister asked me to call and see him at 1:15 a. m., this morning, to inform me of the following urgent telephone report from the Spanish Ambassador in Bordeaux:

"The situation is continually deteriorating. If an agreement is to be concluded with France, it appears necessary to do this as quickly as possible. The French Foreign Minister has just told me that in view of the fear and the danger that the Government will fall into the hands of the Germans if the latter advance further, it is intended to take the President of the Republic, the Presidents of the Chamber and the Senate, Vice President Chautemps and a few other ministers to Algiers tomorrow, June 20. Pétain is remaining in France. I have seen the Marshal, who has confirmed the above; it appears that the struggle between the elements loyal to England and the others is continuing. If Germany and Italy are interested in concluding a treaty with the French Government on French soil, I must again point out, as I did in my report of this morning, that a zone must be established in which the French Government can function freely and with security. The Marshal shares this view. The Foreign Minister, however, would like a stop to be put to hostilities everywhere tonight. If it is considered important to negotiate with France, action must be taken quickly. The Foreign Minister told me that he was finding only very little support."

End of the communication from the Spanish Ambassador.

STOHRER

¹ Document No. 490.

No. 497

490/232224

The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Spain

Radiogram en clair

MOST URGENT

BERLIN, June 20, 1940—9:35 a. m.

No. 869

RAM No. 212.

Please inform the Spanish Foreign Minister at once that at 8 a. m., Spanish time, today, the following wireless message was sent to the French Government in Bordeaux:

"The French Government is hereby informed that the Reich Government agrees to the sending of the delegation named and will send a further communication in the course of June 20."

Please also inform the Spanish Foreign Minister of the contents of the telegram for further transmission to the French Government.¹

RIBBENTROP

¹ In telegram No. 1993 of June 20 (8898/E621629) Stohrer reported that he had passed on the communication to the Spanish Foreign Ministry at 10:55 a. m.

No. 498

8719/E609576-77

The Director of the Economic Policy Department to the Embassy in Brazil

Telegram

No. 543 of June 20

BERLIN, June 19, 1940.

Sent June 20—3:30 p. m.

zu W VIII b 2263.¹

With reference to your telegram No. 615.¹

I. You are authorized to inform the Brazilian Government or the Federal President that we are prepared to take fairly large amounts of cotton, coffee, and other Brazilian products immediately after the war ends. The immediate signing of contracts seems practicable only for smaller amounts of cotton (see telegram No. 541²). Instructions regarding the steelworks will follow by telegram.³

II. A prerequisite for this statement to remain valid is, of course, that no substantial change is made in the present state of Brazil's neutrality. Please point this out in a suitable manner when making the statement.

¹ Document No. 470.

² Not printed (8719/E609569). In this telegram sent to Rio de Janeiro on June 19 Wiehl stated that on political grounds, Germany was interested in purchasing 30,000 tons of cotton.

³ In telegram No. 549 of June 20 (8719/E609578) Wiehl authorized Prüfer to make the desired declaration on the steel works delivery.

III. In this matter we are proceeding from the assumption that a statement of this kind and possible purchases are necessary in order to counteract English and North American influences. Please avoid giving the impression, however, that we have to run after the Brazilians because of anxiety over these influences. A continuation of trade relations with Germany is, moreover, at least equally in Brazil's interest, from whom neither England nor the U. S. A. will buy the goods formerly supplied to us, whereas we could also obtain these goods elsewhere, for example cotton from Russia.⁴

WIEHL

⁴Typewritten marginal note: "The Economics Ministry approves of the statement."

No. 499

121/119838

The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

MADRID, June 20, 1940.

No. 2006 of June 20

Received June 20—8:30 p. m.

The Spanish Ambassador in Bordeaux reports as follows:

1. Marshal Pétain requests that the *département* Basses Pyrénées not be attacked.

2. The French Government asks the Spanish Government to inform the Italian Government that the French Plenipotentiaries are empowered to negotiate with Italy in the same way and at the same place where they are to meet the German Plenipotentiaries.

3. It is thought in Bordeaux that the meeting will take place in the neighborhood of Tours.

4. The French Government will move to Perpignan this afternoon. (This report contradicts Marshal Pétain's request mentioned in paragraph 1. The Spanish Foreign Ministry therefore assumes that the decision of the French Government in Bordeaux was taken suddenly.)

5. There is still telephone communication between Bordeaux and Paris and Tours.

STOHRER

No. 500

121/119841

The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

MADRID, June 20, 1940.

No. 2013 of June 20

Received June 20—11:35 p. m.

A further report reaching the Spanish Foreign Ministry from the Spanish Ambassador at Bordeaux states: The French Government's plan to move to Perpignan has been abandoned. The French Gov-

ernment most urgently requests the Spanish Government to use its good offices to obtain an assurance from the German Government that the *département* Basses Pyrénées will not be attacked. The French Government will then establish itself there, presumably in Bayonne.

Bordeaux was declared an open city as from 9 a. m. today.

The Italian Chargé d'Affaires was similarly informed at the same time.

STOHRER

No. 501

2422/511923-25

*The Director of the Political Department to the Missions in
Latin America*

Telegram

Multex No. 114

BERLIN, June 20, 1940.

Pol. IX 1126 Ang. I.

I. According to a telegraphic report from the Legation in Havana dated June 18,¹ the conference of American Foreign Ministers planned for October is to take place at the suggestion of the U. S. A. as early as June 26. Confidential information indicates that the following proposals have been made for the conference discussions.

1. Neutrality:

The work of the Neutrality Commission * in Rio de Janeiro is to be given an effective and unanimous form. Respect for American neutrality and prevention of the activity of the belligerents within American territory are to be achieved by new measures.

2. Economic measures:

a. Replacement of European products by American ones in so far as possible.

b. Use of the interned tonnage exclusively for traffic between the American States in return for payment to be made only after the war, in order to avoid an economic strengthening of the belligerent state in question.

3. Maintenance of peace:

a. Creation of a commission for the study of continental defense on land and sea.

b. Restatement of continental solidarity and study of the formerly unsuccessful plan of a league of American States with the seat of the Secretariat-General in Washington.

c. The non-American states are to be prohibited from ceding their American colonies to non-American states or permitting them to be occupied by such states.

¹ Not printed (143/128971-72).

* This refers to the Inter-American Neutrality Committee established by the Panama Conference in the fall of 1939. It was composed of seven experts in international law and first convened on Jan. 15, 1940.

II. The following is observed regarding point 2:

a. Replacement of European products by American ones is in many cases impossible and where it might theoretically be possible it would run contrary to South American economic interests, since only European suppliers, particularly Germany, are in a position to take South American products in payment.

b. Although the Cuban Foreign Minister proposes to give effective form to the work of the Rio Commission, he is obviously thinking mainly of the internment of merchant ships of belligerents that have taken refuge in American ports as proposed by the Commission to all the American States. This proposal is directed exclusively against German (and now also Italian) ships. The Missions in the member states of the Rio Commission have already been instructed by telegram³ to register the sharpest protest against these plans on account of undoubted violation of international law. Please take all suitable steps against further pursuit of these plans by the Havana Conference and if necessary—re 2 *b*—do not leave any doubt that we would regard the use of German ships located in an American harbor by an American State without Germany's consent as an unneutral act not to be reconciled with the existing friendly relations. Moreover, treaties with most of the American countries exclude such use.

III. Please exert influence on the Government there in the sense of the statements under II *a* and *b* if the situation seems to make this advisable, and inform it further that we expect that no decisions will be made at the Conference that are aimed directly or indirectly against Germany.

Please report by wire,⁴ also regarding the press reaction during the conference. Confirm receipt.

IV. The same text to all Latin American Missions.⁵

WOERMANN

³ Not printed (235/157111-12).

⁴ A number of these replies are to be found on serial 143.

⁵ This instruction was sent to the Embassy in the United States for information as telegram No. 678.

No. 502

216/147549/1-49/2

Minute by the Director of the Economic Policy Department

BERLIN, June 20, 1940.

REGARDING TELEGRAM NO. 594 OF JUNE 19 FROM TOKYO
ON INDOCHINA¹

The appreciation of Japan for the friendly attitude of Germany in the China conflict comes rather late; our definite sacrifices for Japan (stoppage of war material deliveries to China and consequent renunciation of important Chinese deliveries of raw materials) have until now received no recognition from the Japanese, not to speak

¹ Document No. 484.

of any economic compensation. The demand of Japan for a friendly gesture from Germany is somewhat astonishing, in view of the attitude which Japan has adopted during the war in respect of economic relations with Germany.

In the event that this is going to be pointed out to the Japanese Ambassador, in the forthcoming conversation, the following examples might be cited:

1) Japanese shipping has from the outset and to the largest degree submitted to the English and French blockade controls.²

2) The German desires for transit of goods through Japan have for a long time not been complied with by the Japanese Government and only during recent months has some accommodation been made surreptitiously. In this manner a shipment of tungsten from Canton and a shipment of tin from Colombia were forwarded to Germany. The Japanese Government has just offered us out of its own stocks 100 tons each of tungsten and tin for free delivery. However, there still remain unfulfilled requests, for example an increase of Japanese shipping with Vladivostok, which is only served three times monthly by one Japanese steamer. Also further shipments of tin from Colombia have up to now been impossible owing to the refusal of the Japanese shipping companies.

3) In January of this year, Japan concluded a monopoly agreement with Manchukuo for the import of soya beans, without informing us, despite the fact that until now we have been the largest consumer, with, for example, 800,000 tons in 1938. Following our representations, Japan has until now given free only 70,000 tons for delivery from Manchukuo to us.

4) Japan still refuses the repatriation in small groups of the nearly 500 man crew of the *Columbus*³ from America for the reason that she regards the members of the crew according to English interpretation as active participants in the war, despite the fact that according to American interpretation they are called shipwrecked seamen.

5) It is true that Japan delivered to us her entire whaleoil production of 75,000 tons from the last catch. We know, however, from a confidential source, that she first offered the half of it to England and only decided on delivery to us when she received no satisfactory English offer.

Herewith submitted to the State Secretary.

WIEHL

² Cf. document. No. 50.

³ The German steamer *Columbus* was scuttled by her crew just outside United States territorial waters early in the war to escape capture by a British naval unit.

No. 503

174/186842-44

Memorandum by the Head of Political Division VIII

BERLIN, June 20, 1940.

On June 19 the Japanese Ambassador drew me into a conversation on the future of German-Japanese relations. He took as his point

of departure the forthcoming visit of the ex-Foreign Minister Naotake Sato¹ and seemed to be trying to make suggestions for the subject matter of the conversations with Mr. Sato. The Ambassador did not touch on current questions of German and Japanese policy.

The following is the gist of the Ambassador's remarks:

"Even in those Japanese circles which so far have had no contact with Germany, the realization is gradually dawning that Japan's salvation does not lie with the Western Powers, but that a rapprochement with Germany is of importance for Japan. One symptom of this is Sato's wish to come to Germany now. I am glad that he is thus taking the opportunity of getting to know the new Germany at first hand, and I feel sure that his visit will be a further contribution toward winning over to the idea of a rapprochement with Germany those circles which have hitherto stood aloof from Germany. At present Japan regards her most important task as being the development of her heavy industry. The light industry is, for the most part, fully developed; where this is not so, further development is of no real political significance and can be postponed. If, and I do not doubt this, close cooperation between Japan and Germany in the field of heavy industry is possible, Japan will increase her freedom of action with respect to the United States. I do not regard the question of supplies of raw materials from England and America as such a serious matter. The countries with raw materials are going to have difficulties in finding markets, especially if England should now blockade Europe. We, therefore, need not allow ourselves to be intimidated by threats of boycott. But when our industrial circles see Germany's great industrial development and realize that Germany is not only not lagging behind the United States, but has surpassed her in many spheres, they will, in view of the unfriendly attitude of the United States, gladly switch over to Germany. This change-over depends, as long as the present war lasts, on an improvement in Japanese-Russian relations. Togo and I are working vigorously for this, and Japan is coming to realize more and more that her future lies in the south and that the foe in the north must be turned into a friend. Certainly military circles are opposed to such a change, but in the meantime Oshima will have been active in enlightening them.

After the war the blocs Germany-Italy, Russia, Japan-China, and America will remain. It is important both for Japan and Germany that close relations between Japan and Germany should continue or should be established. I visualize the way to this end as being primarily in the aforementioned economic field. Germany should grant the Japanese bloc an adequate position in her postwar economic program."

If a conversation with Ambassador Sato is conducted on these or similar lines, we could tell him that the contribution we expect from Japan is that during the war she should show greater consideration

¹ Sato was at this time in Italy as the head of a Japanese delegation negotiating on economic matters. In telegram No. 971 of May 24 (152/82030) Mackensen reported Sato's acceptance of an invitation from the German Government to visit Germany for a week after the conclusion of his negotiations, and in telegram No. 1150 of June 17 (152/82017-19) Mackensen reported that he would arrive in Berlin on June 22.

for Germany's raw material requirements from Japan (oil products) and her overseas territories. It is precisely the argument that the countries with raw materials are having difficulties in finding markets which speaks against Japan's restraint shown so far in the transit question. Japan should not be afraid of a raw material boycott, nor should she put forward this fear as a pretext for not engaging in transit business for Germany.

Today, when Japan believes in a German victory, an assurance of deliveries for the development of her heavy industry after the war would probably lead to considerable accommodation on the question of beans (Manchukuo) and transit business.

KNOLL

No. 504

108/112282

Memorandum by an Official of Political Division I M

BERLIN, June 20, 1940.

Pol. I M 8806 g.

Colonel Brinkmann, of the High Command of the Wehrmacht, Foreign Department [*Abteilung Ausland*], states that the information has been confirmed that Russian troops have almost everywhere moved right up to the German frontier in the east. Vilkaviškis, Kretinga, and Palanga are places which have been named.

Detailed information regarding numbers could not be given, but mixed motorized units were involved in all cases.

HEYDEN-RYNSCH

No. 505

19/12881-82

The Chargé d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, June 20, 1940—8:03 p. m.

No. 1237 of June 20

Received June 21—7:55 a. m.

For the State Secretary.

1) The alleged Protestant pastor Wetklo from Dudenhofen, near Wetzlar, called here and said that he had come here recently by Clipper as number 1406 on instructions from the OKW Army Corps Headquarters at Wiesbaden. For camouflage purposes he represents himself as a representative of the *Rheinische Missionsgesellschaft*; according to him he is to plant confidential agents, and, allegedly on instructions from Wiesbaden, he requested advice from the Embassy about procuring or building a shortwave transmitter. He also wished to report his presence here so as to have the support of the Embassy in case of trouble with the American authorities.

I request information by telegram as to whether these particulars are correct.¹ In connection with this I repeat that all wireless communication which is not officially sanctioned has again recently been prohibited, and strict supervision of wireless transmission has been introduced as a result of fifth column hysteria.

2) With reference to (group apparently missing) from the Consulate General (group apparently missing) the American citizen Eddy Duenser from Feldkirch in Austria, who was sent allegedly by the OKW to the United States via Genoa on May 14. He was to receive precise instructions from the OKW from a person whom he would meet at a certain time and place in New York. As however this person did not turn up D. did not know what to do and therefore applied to the official representative. I request instructions.

If, for compelling reasons, the German military authorities cannot renounce this method of procuring information, these agents must be prevented at all costs, and especially under present conditions, from making contact with the police and with German Diplomatic Missions.

THOMSEN

¹ No answers to these requests have been found.

No. 506

91/100247-51

The Minister in Eire to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

TOP SECRET

DUBLIN, June 21, 1940.

No. 324 of June 19¹

Received June 21—11:30 a. m.

With reference to my telegram No. 320 of June 17.²

De Valera requested me yesterday to call on him for a lengthy conversation which was held in the presence of Walshe in a forthright and pleasant manner. I reiterated what I had told Walshe. As to the case of Held, I had the opportunity of expressing, without displaying too great an interest and keeping to the line pursued heretofore, our wishes for careful treatment, especially in public, which Walshe readily supported. De Valera listened to my statements with interest, but obviously attached principal importance to assuring me of Eire's continued adherence to strict neutrality. He explained that at the beginning of the war anxiety about English intervention had been uppermost in his mind but Irish neutrality had so far been respected by the English. This could, of course, change. Without any reference to the case of Held, he admitted that with Germany's closer approach anxiety had increased, as was understandable, concerning possible German intentions to use Ireland as a base for attacks on

¹ This telegram was transmitted in several sections.

² See document No. 473.

England by exploiting "the weak minority which was working against the Government's policy." He had repeatedly declared publicly, and had only in that way succeeded in obtaining the return of Irish ports from England, that Ireland would not become a point of departure for an attack against England. To this he would adhere. As he could assure me, however, he had explained to the English just as definitely that any English intervention on Irish territory would meet with the same determined resistance. Except for the minimum of loose connection with the British Empire provided for constitutionally, which was exclusively intended to facilitate the future return of Northern Ireland to the Irish State, and except for the strong economic dependence of Ireland on England, Ireland stands in exactly the same position toward us as toward England. With regard to the solution of the Northern Irish question he must, in view of the English-Irish power relationship, adhere to a peaceful solution, as only so could a permanent and tenable position be reached. If it came to an invasion then Ireland would inevitably become a battlefield for the belligerents. In an English invasion we would fight with Irishmen against the English, in a German invasion the English would fight along with the Irish. He was carrying out a completely realistic policy and regarded determination to resist any attacker to the uttermost as the only possibility to reduce the danger. In a discussion today on another subject, Boland referred to yesterday's conversation with de Valera and told me in strict confidence that English pressure for the abandonment of Irish neutrality—apparently accompanied by the bait of future concessions in respect of Northern Ireland—had recently increased again, but that de Valera had rejected all advances "most vehemently." As I recently heard from another source, de Valera is supposed to have made a similar statement to a prominent representative of the Irish Nationalists and also to have given this as a reason for the Army increase. Continuation follows.*

It is therefore very possible that de Valera is, in his usual clever way, exploiting incidents such as the case of Held which brought out the German danger, so as to be better armed also against English intentions and to strengthen his position against the largely anti-German Cosgrave opposition.

I am of the opinion that, compared with the unmistakable signs of panic following the Held incident, my conversations with Walshe and de Valera have at least had a somewhat relaxing and reassuring effect, and following the exhortation I expressed some weeks ago for the continuance of their understanding neutral attitude, the talks have been an encouraging influence. In my view there is a growing realization, at any rate on the part of Walshe and Boland, of the great and decisive importance even to Ireland of the changed situation in world

* The following section was received at 4:55 p. m. on June 22.

affairs and of the obvious weakness of the democracies. It remains to be seen what repercussions this will have on the future handling of the Held-Stuart case. According to reliable information I have just received, the material found is said to incriminate seriously because of their connections with Germany a number of reputable Irishmen whose political activities have so far been irreproachable; there is, at all events, a continued danger of further serious consequences and, as de Valera's statements also clearly indicate, grave anxiety about German intentions to use Ireland as a base for operations against England. This anxiety is constantly growing through alarming reports recently received from the Irish element in America.

In my opinion the recent efforts of groups in Northern Ireland working for England to undermine Ireland's neutrality by a gradual rapprochement, at first especially in the field of coordination of defense measures have, at present, no prospect of success. Lord Craigavon, whose position is indeed under attack by his own rank and file, is said, furthermore, to have rejected all advances for a rapprochement with the Irish State. In these circumstances the influence of the United States for a settlement of the Northern Ireland question, said to have been exerted by Roosevelt in a moderate degree solely for the self-seeking purpose of securing the Irish-American vote, is probably no longer being felt. In view of German strength, it seems to me that the idea of possible German action for the return of Northern Ireland would now also find ready acceptance in nonradical nationalist circles, among others, allegedly with the far-seeing influential Irish Cardinal MacRory. The defense forces of Northern Ireland are said to have been substantially strengthened, among other things, by the recruitment of Ulster Defense Volunteers.

Recruitment has been progressing. Fifty thousand applications have allegedly been received, particularly from groups of old liberation fighters. Despite the few reports I have received of growing pro-German feeling in the country and ostensibly also in the Army, my general impression is that the case of Held has, on the whole, also turned feeling against us.*

The fear of invasion, now primarily of a German one, with tragic consequences for the strength of the Irish nation, weakened by centuries of struggle, and also for the liberty which had been gained at great effort has, above all, shaken responsible thinking persons such as might fill leading positions, while on the other hand, radical nationalism has no recognized leader and seems to be losing in esteem.†

*A notation here indicated that the remainder of the telegram was very mutilated and that repetition had been requested.

†In telegram No. 196 of June 24 Weizsäcker sent the following instructions to the Embassy in Dublin: "The measures against England mentioned in instruction No. 190 of the 15th [document No. 437], which might also affect Irish interests, are not intended to include the landing of German troops in Ireland. In order to avoid misunderstanding you may give an intimation to this effect without stressing the point." (91/100252)

Despite the continuation of the unstable situation with elements of possible surprise (two groups garbled) and as a result of the recent call for the Army increase and the internment of political suspects, the creation of a parliamentary united front for the defense of liberty and neutrality has been furthered. The wishes of anti-German circles in the Cosgrave opposition, which were recently expressed again, for setting up a national cabinet in which the opposition would be represented have so far been rejected by the Government.

HEMPPEL

No. 507

490/232236

Memorandum by the State Secretary

St.S. No. 461

BERLIN, June 21, 1940.

The Italian Ambassador has just described to me the telephone conversations which he had with the Reich Foreign Minister during last night.¹

Alfieri then added the following: Count Ciano had sent him word this morning that the French Government, through the intermediary of Spain, had told the Italians that the same French armistice delegation which was meeting the Germans today was also authorized to negotiate with the Italians and at the same place where the negotiations with the Germans were taking place. Ciano did not wish to give special emphasis to this statement but merely to bring it to the attention of the Reich Foreign Minister so that he would be aware of it in making further arrangements. It seemed apparent that we intended to send the French delegation to Rome by air.

In this connection it was perhaps also of interest that Badoglio had informed the OKW through General Marras via military channels that he did not wish to see the French before Saturday evening, in order to gain sufficient time to prepare the armistice treaty which was to be proposed. Alfieri also wanted this information to be brought to the attention of the Reich Foreign Minister.

Herewith to the Minister's Secretariat with the request that the above be transmitted by the speediest channel thought suitable.²

WEIZSÄCKER

¹ No record of these conversations has been found.

² In a supplementary memorandum of the same date (490/232237) Weizsäcker recorded: "At 8 o'clock this evening the Italian Ambassador requested me to correct his statement of today concerning the start of the Italian-French armistice talks. The Duce did not wish not to receive the French delegation before Saturday evening at the earliest but, on the contrary, he would like this delegation to leave for Rome as soon as possible."

No. 508

121/119648

Memorandum by the State Secretary

SECRET

BERLIN, June 21, 1940.

St.S. No. 462

The Italian Ambassador has just asked me to transmit the following information immediately to the Foreign Minister.

Rumors have reached Rome that the French Government is about to move to Algeria. The French wanted to concentrate troops there in considerable numbers.

The Duce now wanted to suggest to Generalissimo Franco that Spain should immediately occupy the territory of French Morocco. The very important line of communications from Casablanca to Oran and Algiers would thus be cut.

Before the Duce advised Franco to do this, however, he asked to be informed of the Führer's opinion on this matter.

Herewith to the Foreign Minister's Secretariat with the request that it be forwarded to the Foreign Minister by the speediest channel thought suitable.¹

WEIZSÄCKER

¹ In a supplementary memorandum of the same date (490/232239) Weizsäcker recorded that Alfieri had informed him by telephone at 8 p. m. that the Italian Military Attaché in Madrid had ascertained that Franco did not have sufficient military forces at his disposal to occupy French Morocco. Alfieri had therefore been instructed to cancel his request for the Führer's approval of Mussolini's proposed advice to Franco.

No. 509

865/206108

Memorandum by the State Secretary¹

St.S. No. 465

BERLIN, June 21, 1940.

This afternoon I arranged with the Italian Ambassador to come and see me at the time when the completed text of the French translation of the contents of the German armistice terms arrived.² This took place at 4: 45 p. m.

On handing the German and French texts to Alfieri I added orally and emphatically that this was a secret document and that we asked the Embassy and the Italian Government to see that it received particularly confidential treatment. I said that I also wished to add that

¹ There is no signature on the file copy of this memorandum. No signed copy has been found.

² Only a French text of the proposed armistice terms has been found (68/46470-81). It is identical with the armistice treaty as signed, except for the changes indicated by footnotes to document No. 523.

these terms were a basis and nothing absolutely final. Alfieri took note of my oral remarks.

Submitted herewith to the Foreign Minister.

No. 510

59/39544

Memorandum by the State Secretary

St.S. 467

BERLIN, June 21, 1940.

The Japanese Ambassador opened his conversation with me today by asking whether a general congress would be called for the "new order" in Europe. In his opinion at least Germany-Italy, on the one side, and France-England on the other should be represented.

In reply I told Mr. Kurusu briefly that I knew nothing of any such plans. There would certainly not be a "Congress of Vienna" this time. We worked quickly and better on a bilateral than on a multi-lateral basis.

WEIZSÄCKER

No. 511

216/147555-56

Memorandum by the State Secretary

St.S. No. 468

BERLIN, June 21, 1940.

The Japanese Ambassador called on me today with a lengthy instruction from his Government, a literal translation of which he read to me.

He began with his Government's congratulations on the great victory achieved under the Führer's brilliant leadership in the struggle for a new order in Europe.

I thanked the Ambassador for the congratulations, promising to pass them on at once.

Kurusu then continued in accordance with his instruction and said: Just as Germany was doing in Europe, Japan was fighting for a new order in the Far East and indeed not only against Chungking but also indirectly against the powers behind Chiang Kai-shek. In this connection his Government greatly appreciated the understanding shown by Germany for Japan's cause. By pinning down the U. S. A. fleet in the Pacific, Japan had also helped us in Europe. Complete mutual understanding between Japan and Germany seemed of the greatest importance to his Government also in the future. (Kurusu attached special significance to this sentence.) Japan's most important aim was the maintenance of stability in the Far East. Japan had fought for this several times and she adhered to this aim, even at the present decisive turning-point in history. The maintenance

of the status quo in the Netherlands Indies was a matter of grave concern to Japan. Japan greatly appreciated the friendly attitude adopted by Germany toward this problem.¹ But still another problem, namely Indochina, arose from the development of the war in Europe. There was no need to underline Indochina's military, political, and economic significance to Japan. Thus, Indochina played a considerable part at present as a main supply route for war material to Chungking. The Japanese Army was making every effort to block this artery on Chinese soil. Japan earnestly hoped that, as in the case of the Netherlands Indies, the German Government would also understand Japan's anxiety on account of Indochina and would support Japan accordingly.

After reading this instruction Kurusu summed up his mission by saying that Japan could not remain disinterested in Indochina. He then said that for a long time Japan had been trying to get the French to undertake not to allow war material to pass to Chiang Kai-shek via Indochina. Although they had received promises in Paris, none of these had been kept.

On the last point I asked Kurusu why the Japanese Government itself had not taken care of the matter and stopped the supplies of French war material going there by sea. Kurusu said that would certainly have been the right thing to do, but the Japanese Navy and Japanese business had not risked such a course.

After a brief remark that the *démarche* just made by the Ambassador did not come altogether as a surprise to me, as it had already been announced the day before yesterday in the newspaper *Ashai*, I took due notice of the *démarche* and promised to transmit its contents to the Foreign Minister.

Submitted to the Foreign Minister.²

WEIZSÄCKER

¹ See documents Nos. 280 and 302.

² In response to this memorandum, Ribbentrop on June 24 (Baumschule telegram No. 86: 216/147558), requested Weizsäcker "to maintain a completely passive attitude in the event of further soundings about Indochina." On June 25 Weizsäcker wired Ott a summary of his conversation with Kurusu and, referring to Ott's telegram No. 594 of June 19, instructed him likewise to maintain a completely receptive attitude in case the Japanese should revert to the subject of Indochina (telegram No. 526: 216/147553-54). Cf. documents Nos. 484 and 514.

No. 512

66/46498-511;
4691/E226121-24

Unsigned Memorandum

Subject: The Armistice Negotiations at Compiègne on June 21 and 22, 1940.¹

¹ The memorandum, which is unsigned, was prepared by the interpreter, Paul Schmidt. Cf. his *Statist auf diplomatischer Bühne 1923-45* (Bonn, 1949), pp. 488 ff.

At 3:30 p. m. the Führer received the French armistice delegation led by General Huntziger in the presence of Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop, Field Marshal Göring, the Führer's Deputy, Colonel General Keitel, and the Commanders in Chief of the branches of the Wehrmacht. General Keitel opened the meeting by reading the preamble² to the armistice terms and then handed to the French delegation the German text of the armistice terms with a French translation.³ After the reading of the French translation of the preamble, the Führer left the conference coach, and the Armistice Commission then met under the chairmanship of Colonel General Keitel.

At the start of the deliberations, Colonel General Keitel pointed out that the document just handed over contained the terms on which the German Wehrmacht was prepared to cease hostilities with France. In order to enable the French delegation to study the document quickly the German delegation had also handed over a French translation of the terms. It must, however, be emphasized that the German text was the authentic one for the agreement.

General Keitel then asked General von Toppelskirch for a report on the powers of the French delegation. It appeared from this that although the French delegation had shown their authorization to the General, they wished to hand it officially direct to the chairman of the German delegation. When Colonel General Keitel asked whether the chairman of the French delegation had the authority to sign the armistice agreement on behalf of the French Government, he replied that, as could be seen from the text of his authorization, he only possessed powers to discuss the armistice terms with the German delegation and to submit French wishes, but that he could not sign without special instructions from the French Government in Bordeaux. When General Keitel then remarked that the French delegates had been designated as Plenipotentiaries and must therefore, in Germany's view, have the power to sign, Ambassador Noël, referring to the text of the authorization which had been handed over in the meantime, replied that the formula used there corresponded to that with which the German delegates had been authorized by their Government in 1918. Then, too, the German delegation had first had to refer back to the Government in Berlin for permission to sign.

Colonel General Keitel then called upon the French delegation to examine the German document. Near the conference coach there were facilities for the French delegation to study the German terms in quiet. Then the French delegation could decide whether they accepted the German demands or not. The basic provisions of the treaty were un-

² A copy of the preamble to the armistice terms has not been found in the Foreign Ministry files. It was published from a DNB release of June 21, 1940, in *Monatshefte für Auswärtige Politik*, July 1940, p. 522.

³ See document No. 509, footnote 2. For the agreed text of the armistice terms see document No. 523.

alterable and must either be accepted or rejected in the form in which they were put forward by the German side. The German delegation, however, was prepared to answer questions by the French delegation and to explain the interpretation of points which were not clear to them. General Huntziger replied that he could not give a final decision on such a serious question, which was of vital significance for the fate of France, without having consulted his Government. He therefore asked to be allowed to establish contact with Bordeaux, in order first to report that the French delegation had arrived in Compiègne and had begun negotiations with the German delegation. He must also report that he was negotiating only with a German delegation here, as the French Government, in ignorance of the situation, had assumed that simultaneous negotiations were also to take place with the Italians at Compiègne, and had therefore only appointed one French armistice delegation with powers to conduct both sets of negotiations. He therefore asked to be put in touch with Bordeaux by telephone.

Colonel General Keitel replied that a telephone line could not be put at his disposal, but that the High Command of the Wehrmacht was prepared to send a radio telegram to the French Government announcing the arrival of the French delegation. Regarding the question of negotiations with the Italians, he could inform him that the Italian-French negotiations would take place separately at a place to be designated by the Italian High Command following the signing of the German armistice agreement.

At the request of General Huntziger, he said he was prepared also to inform the French Government by radio telegram of these facts. General Huntziger and Ambassador Noël again put forward the request to be allowed to telephone to their Government, Ambassador Noël pointing out that in 1918 the German delegates had been granted not only a period of several days in which to decide, but also the possibility of contacting their Government by telephone.

The chairman of the German delegation persisted in his point of view and said that he was only prepared to dispatch the following telegram :

"June 21, 1940.

To the French Government, Bordeaux.

The French delegation has arrived here and has taken cognizance of the armistice terms.

Negotiations with the Italian High Command will not take place here but on Italian soil following the signing of the agreement between the German High Command and the French delegation.

After the conclusion of the treaty with the German High Command, the French delegation will be afforded facilities for proceeding by air to the place of negotiation specified by the Italian High Command.

The High Command of the Wehrmacht."

In the further course of the talks, the French delegation several times tried to bring up questions of procedure, but Colonel General Keitel repeatedly requested them first to examine the document itself. The French delegation finally decided to do so and the meeting was interrupted. Before this, however, General Huntziger had again made an urgent request for telephone communication with Bordeaux, and the German side promised to examine the possibility of establishing such communication while the French delegation was examining the German terms in the tent assigned to them for their deliberations. Colonel General Keitel again pointed out that a speedy conclusion that very day was a matter of urgent interest to France whereas the German Wehrmacht was in no hurry at all to sign the treaty. General Huntziger replied that he would not deny that it was France's wish to reach a speedy conclusion but that he must definitely discuss matters with his Government.

When the meeting was resumed under the chairmanship of General Jodl⁴ for Germany in the absence of Colonel General Keitel, General Huntziger stated that he had now taken cognizance of Germany's terms, which he described as hard and merciless. He noted from the accompanying map⁵ that more than half of France was to be occupied by German troops. He asked the German delegation whether the green line defining the zone of occupation was unalterable. In view of the love with which the French clung to their country and to their freedom, an occupation of this kind represented a terrible humiliation (*abominable humiliation*) for them. In addition it was an occupation to which no end could be seen, as nothing was known of the peace treaty itself. He therefore asked whether details of the peace terms could be given, otherwise France would be embarking on a course without knowing where it would end. The great German Army, whose soldierly qualities the French had always respected, had defeated France. He must point out that at the end of the last war France had not made the demand to occupy more than half of Germany. The German occupation amounted to definite oppression (*oppression définitive*). This condition was made infinitely harder by the fact that another country beyond the Alps, which had not defeated France, would possibly advance similar demands. Should this actually be the case France would in no circumstances submit. She would then take up the struggle again and fight to the bitter end. After all, the French Government still had the possibility of continuing the war

⁴ Nuremberg document No. 1810-PS, not included in the published series, is a collection of General Jodl's papers bearing on this meeting. Among them is a German translation of the French minutes of that portion of the meeting at which Jodl presided. This portion of the meeting is timed in these minutes at 6 p. m.

⁵ i. e., a map accompanying the draft armistice terms. No map accompanies this memorandum. The collection of Jodl papers mentioned in footnote 4 includes such a map, with the demarcation line indicated in green.

from the African colonies; the French fleet was undefeated, and the French Air Force too was still intact. He would say nothing more about Italy's behavior so as not to poison the atmosphere of the negotiations, but as he was speaking to soldiers he knew that in a case like this even things left unsaid would be rightly understood. As he was in ignorance of any demands which Italy might make for occupation, it was therefore impossible for him to put his signature to the German armistice agreement. There was a higher justice which must also be taken into account even in concluding an armistice treaty and France would not allow herself to be humiliated and dishonored. The German side had also stated—the Führer himself had said so—that they wished to conclude a just peace. A treaty in which Italy too would make enormous occupation demands, so that in the end nothing would be left of France, would, however, be in direct contradiction to this principle and would mean the oppression and humiliation of his country. After 1870 France had recovered slowly. This time, however, she was much harder hit. The German Army had conquered France; she must therefore submit to the consequences of her defeat. But with Italy things were very different, and here France would not accept the same terms. In conclusion General Huntziger apologized for having perhaps gone further, because of his deep emotion, than was fitting for him within the scope of these negotiations.

General Jodl replied that the German side had understanding for what the chairman of the French delegation had said, but to continue the discussion in this field would lead nowhere, for the Armistice Commission had not the power to make any alteration of the terms formulated by Germany. The announcement of peace terms must be reserved for the peace conference. As had been said, the German delegation could only give explanations and clear up obscure points. As for the comparison of the occupation demands with the French occupation of German territory in 1918, he must point out that the area now demanded by Germany was in any case almost completely occupied by German troops and that this occupation was rendered necessary by the struggle against Germany's other enemy, who wished to continue the war. If England ceased hostilities, a new situation would arise, which would perhaps make possible certain alterations in the contents of the armistice treaty.

Passing to article 3^o General Huntziger said that the French side naturally understood that Germany had the right to demand guarantees and that therefore they must resign themselves to the occupation. However, he asked for an explanation of what Germany regarded as the "extent absolutely necessary" of the occupation of the western coast after the end of hostilities with England. With regard to the occupation of Paris, he pointed out that the population of Paris was

* Cf. the agreed text of the armistice terms, document No. 523.

known to be very chauvinistic and that the occupation of this city by German troops would therefore certainly not be in the interests of a settlement between the two countries. On this point, too, he asked for more detailed explanation of German intentions.

In addition he pointed out that France could perhaps give other guarantees for the security of communications even without a heavy occupation of the coasts. He did not deem it necessary that German troops should be stationed in every village to safeguard these communications. Neither could it be in Germany's interest to detail some 100 German divisions to occupy French territory. France did not want to be drowned in a veritable flood of German troops.

General Huntziger further asked about the meaning of the "rights of the occupying power" in article 3. He assumed that purely civil administrative activity and jurisdiction would not be affected by the rights of the occupying power.

General Jodl replied that the formula chosen in article 3, "the rights of the occupying power", included all rights required by the German Wehrmacht to wage war against England. No formal legal interpretation was called for here. The only guiding principle was the inexorable law of the conduct of war against England. Apart from that, Germany had of course no interest in interfering in matters of internal administration, supplies, or jurisdiction. In so far as these functions of the French authorities were not in contradiction to the requirements of the military conduct of war, they would remain unaffected.

General Huntziger explained the meaning of his question about the rights of the occupying power by a practical example, asking whether, as a result of this wording, the German military authorities might be accorded the right to convert whole areas of French territory, especially near the coasts, into military camps, air bases, etc., and to evacuate the population by force for this purpose.

General Jodl replied that endless particular questions of this kind could be asked in this sphere but they were not decisive for the question of the acceptance or rejection of the German terms. They concerned separate arrangements which would be left for the Armistice Commission to decide.

General Huntziger interjected that by the German treaty the Armistice Commission had absolutely full powers and could quite arbitrarily make any decision which it thought right and that the question brought up above was therefore of basic and decisive importance for France for the acceptance or rejection of the armistice treaty. He must therefore ask to what extent this Commission had the possibility of taking such serious decisions. On the basis of the terms demanded by Germany, the Armistice Commission could for example decide to estab-

lish air bases in the occupied territory and particularly in Paris, which would of course attract English attacks. Thus France, although not waging war herself, would have to bear the brunt of war. She would be exposed to attacks without being able to defend herself. She would receive blows without having the least right to defend herself or to demand compensation.

General Jodl again pointed out that all these questions, especially those concerned with the protection of France against attacks, were matters which must be dealt with by the Armistice Commission, but which were not the subject of discussion here. Moreover, the Armistice Commission could not make decisions arbitrarily, but was bound by the provisions of the armistice agreement, beyond which it could not go. The discussion of these legal matters was not getting them any further. The only question at issue was whether France wished to continue to wage war or to cease hostilities. He must state with all emphasis that France must regard the armistice treaty as an unalterable fact and that there were no means of altering it. At present all that could be done was to clear up doubts and explain obscure points. Any attempt, however, to shift the trend of the discussion to the formal and legal sphere would not be doing justice to the gravity and the greatness of the present hour.

General Huntziger replied that he had understood the situation perfectly correctly, but he must definitely consult his Government, in particular with regard to the question of occupation, as he could not personally sign a treaty which contained such conditions. Ambassador Noël supported this request, pointing out that when the French Government was fully informed by the delegation about the situation, a whole series of other questions were certainly bound to be raised in order to remove all obscurities.

In the meantime General Jodl was informed that there was a possibility of establishing contact with Bordeaux by telephone. He therefore proposed to interrupt the meeting for the time being, to enable the French delegation to contact its Government.

Before the interval General Huntziger put a further question regarding the radio ban and said that while he understood that the German Government should demand guarantees that no help should be given to the enemy by radio in occupied French territory, yet the same object could be achieved by guarantees which the French Government was prepared to give, without the necessity for Germany to interfere in French broadcasting within the unoccupied areas.

A further question by the French delegation referred to the possibility of returning the evacuated population to their homes and places of work and also of setting transport in motion again. General Jodl replied that the German authorities had already taken active steps

to relieve the indescribable suffering among the French civilian population behind the German lines. As a result of the generous intervention of German relief organizations a catastrophe had been averted there.

General Huntziger then asked about the number of troops which would be allowed to France by Germany; this was a question of enormous significance for Marshal Pétain. The French Government needed troops to maintain calm and order in the country. After such a terrible crisis as France was now suffering, experience showed that there was the danger that the country would lapse into communism. The French Government intended to prevent that in all circumstances. For this they needed troops who would in no way be employed against Germany, but only for the maintenance of order within the country. Apart from the police, the gendarmerie, and the garde mobile, France needed between 120,000 and 130,000 men. They would be mostly infantry with some cavalry and certain special weapons would have to be allotted to the troops. In mentioning a figure of 120,000 to 130,000 men, he emphasized that he was not using a stratagem [*finassieren*] but was merely mentioning the number which France really needed. Thereupon the meeting was suspended.

When the conference was resumed,⁷ Colonel General Keitel stated that he could now give the final replies of the Germans to the questions asked by the French delegation in the preceding conference with General Jodl.

The question of the French delegation, as to whether the green line designating the area to be occupied by German troops which had been drawn on the map that was presented could still be changed or not, could be answered to the effect that basically the line was fixed and could no longer be altered. In the consultations of the Armistice Commission limited requests for changes might, possibly, be considered. This applied only to individual points, however. On account of the war against England the line must on the whole remain as fixed by the German delegation.

With regard to the request expressed by General Huntziger that a troop strength of 100,000 to 120,000 men be permitted in unoccupied France for the maintenance of internal peace and order, Colonel General Keitel gave his consent for a transitional period and subject to the approval of Italy, without prejudice, however, to the final determination of the troop strength permitted France.

As for the question of the French delegation regarding the depth of the occupation [*Besetzungsdichte*] or the replacement of occupation by guarantees of the French Government aimed at safeguarding the German communications, the originally contemplated form of complete

⁷ This portion of the memorandum is headed "Continuation of the memorandum on the armistice negotiations at Compiègne," and is unsigned.

occupation had to be retained. However, German troops would naturally not be stationed in every small place; rather, the occupation would be limited here, too, to what was [necessary] to secure its purpose, especially as regards the war on England. The German side had no interest in employing an unnecessary number of troops for the occupation.

In reply to a question of the French delegation about the settlement for the prisoners of war, Colonel General Keitel pointed out that this problem would be settled not in the armistice agreement but only in the peace treaty.

With regard to the prohibition against radio transmission he remarked that on the basis of consultations in the Armistice Commission this prohibition would presumably soon be superseded by radio censorship.

There could be no doubt as to the powers of the Armistice Commission. It was a mistake if the French delegation believed that this Commission could make arbitrary decisions without any limitation. According to the German view it was merely authorized to ensure the execution of the basic provisions of the armistice agreement and could in no circumstances go beyond the guiding principles laid down by this treaty.

In reply to a question of the French delegation about the strength of the occupation of Paris, Colonel General Keitel stated that the German Army kept an occupation force there only in the interest of peace and order. This would, however, in no circumstances be increased beyond what was absolutely necessary. For reasons of military discipline alone, which General Huntziger would certainly understand, the German High Command considered it undesirable to quarter more troops than absolutely necessary in a large city. Moreover, the armistice agreement provided for the possibility of a return of the French Government to Paris; this of itself indicated that also with respect to the occupation of the capital the Germans would act in such a manner that the authority of the Government and the orderly exercise of its powers would be ensured.

The chairman of the German delegation then informed General Huntziger that a telephone connection with Bordeaux from the conference coach at Compiègne could be established. In response to Huntziger's counterquestion whether the French delegation could not telephone from Compiègne itself or better still from Paris, the reply was that the connection had been made directly via Tours and therefore it was not possible to telephone from Paris or Compiègne itself. The conference coach was entirely at the disposal of the French delegation for telephone conversations with Bordeaux. During that time the German delegation would withdraw from the coach.

The discussions were then adjourned until Saturday, June 22, at 11 a. m., in order to give the French delegation opportunity to inform its

Government of the main points of the German terms, so that the French Government could decide that same night whether to accept or reject them. An hour before the beginning of the next session, that is, at 10 a. m., a telephone connection from the conference coach to Bordeaux would again be established to enable the French delegation to receive the decision of its Government. Since all the questions had now been answered and all doubtful points had been settled, the session tomorrow could only be a short one, in which the French delegation would merely have to announce the acceptance or rejection of the German armistice terms.

When the French chairman asked whether the German delegation was presenting an ultimatum with these statements, Colonel General Keitel replied that it was not a question of an ultimatum at all but of a very generous offer by the German delegation and that the expediting of the settlement was definitely more in the interest of the French than of the Germans.

The conference was thereupon adjourned until 11 a. m. the following day.

No. 513

66/46512-16

*Unsigned Memorandum*¹

RECORD OF THE TELEPHONE CONVERSATION BETWEEN GENERAL HUNTZIGER AND GENERAL WEYGAND DURING THE ARMISTICE NEGOTIATIONS AT COMPIÈGNE ON THE EVENING OF JUNE 21, 1940

General Huntziger at once asked to speak to Marshal Pétain or General Weygand in Bordeaux. Weygand came to the telephone and Huntziger told him that he was speaking from the railway coach which Weygand of course knew and that he would give him the German terms by telephone. Weygand said that there was no one in the office to take them down, as all the secretaries had already gone home. Did everything really have to be dictated? The text should be sent by air.

Huntziger said in the first place that he had not been able to learn anything about the peace terms. The German delegation had flatly refused to discuss them. He had simply been given an armistice treaty consisting of 24 articles and had been told that no alterations could be made in it but that, at the most, explanations of obscure points would be given. He had therefore asked various questions and he would also give the answers by telephone. The general impression which he and the whole French delegation had formed was that the

¹ The memorandum is undated. The interpreter, Paul Schmidt, stated that he was directed to listen to this conversation from a communications car in the vicinity (*Statistik auf diplomatischer Bühne 1923-45*, p. 489).

terms, although harsh, contained nothing which directly offended against honor. In particular one point, which he had discussed with Weygand before his departure, was not included in the terms. In this respect, things were quite different from what Weygand and he had assumed. Thereupon Huntziger dictated the separate articles by telephone to Bordeaux. Weygand repeated each sentence, apparently for a secretary sitting by him. He made the following comments on particular points:

Article 3: The German delegation had informed him that the "right of the occupying power" did not mean any interference in the internal administration or the regime in France.

He (Huntziger) had protested strongly against the occupation of French territory. Colonel General Keitel had told him that after the end of the war with England the situation could perhaps be eased and that, moreover, German troops would not be stationed in every little French place.

With regard to Paris, the German side had told him that the occupying force would not be decreased but neither was it to be increased. He thought that for the whole Paris area two German divisions would be involved. In addition the German side had orally and provisionally conceded an army of 100,000 men for France.

Article 5: would probably to a large extent not apply in view of this concession.

With regard to article 8, General Huntziger pointed out to Weygand the mention of the French colonial empire, saying that this was "certainly interesting." He also emphasized that on the conclusion of a peace treaty Germany did not intend to make any demands regarding the French Navy.

On article 17 Colonel General Keitel had said that Germany was prepared to solve the question of caring for the French population with the help of the Red Cross, as in this way the blockade could be circumvented, and the German side had also pointed out that in the areas occupied by Germany German relief organizations had averted a catastrophe for the civilian population.

On article 20, referring to the prisoners of war who were to remain in Germany until peace was concluded, Huntziger remarked that he had not received any assurances from the German delegation about the date when peace would be concluded, but he thought the Germans would not long delay the final conclusion of peace.

Furthermore, just now at the end of the meeting General Keitel had presented him with a kind of ultimatum for the acceptance or rejection of the armistice terms. Although it had not taken the form of an ultimatum its effect amounted to that.

When Huntziger asked whether the Italians had already replied to the French request for an armistice, Weygand answered that so far

nothing had been heard from them, and asked Huntziger to try to find out something through the intermediary of the German delegation.

In the further course of the conversation Huntziger then reported how he had energetically protested against the occupation and had stated quite definitely that France would on no account sign a similar treaty with Italy. He had been somewhat heated in certain of his remarks about Italy. Although outwardly the Germans had not shown the slightest reaction he had, however, had the impression that they shared the French opinion of the Italians. Moreover he had the impression that agreement already existed between Germany and Italy about the occupation of territories. Only he could get absolutely nothing out of the German delegation about this agreement. But even if Italy did perhaps impose unacceptable terms that need not prevent France from reaching agreement with the Germans now. If the Italian treaty were not signed, everything would become invalid in any case.

When Weygand asked about the general atmosphere Huntziger replied that the tone was rather harsh and that on such occasions a great deal of cordiality was hardly to be expected, but that toward the end of the negotiations the tension had relaxed. In conclusion Weygand again urgently requested that the text of the terms be sent to Bordeaux by air, for if the French Government were to make a decision, they must have the text of the original. The translation given by telephone was not sufficient; even the German Government must see that. Weygand [*Huntziger*] replied that it would hardly be possible to forward the text by air. The French delegation had compared the French version of the terms handed to them by the German delegation with the original German text and had ascertained that the translation was correct.

No. 514

174/186345-46

The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT

SECRET

No. 603 of June 21

Tokyo, June 21, 1940—8:30 p. m.

Received June 21—7:55 p. m.

With reference to my telegram No. 600¹ of June 19.

This morning's press publishes a statement by the Japanese Government that the French Government, accepting Japan's demand for

¹Not found. This number is possibly an error, since telegram No. 599 is already of June 20. Cf. document No. 484.

the cessation of all support to Chiang Kai-shek through Indochina, has declared its readiness to stop the transport of war material in the widest sense of the term to Chiang Kai-shek through Indochina. For the implementation of this commitment France agrees to a larger supervisory staff of Japanese military experts vested with far-reaching powers of control being sent to Indochina's main lines of communications.

I immediately inquired at the Foreign Ministry how this agreement was to be reconciled with the instructions to the Japanese Ambassadors in Berlin and Rome (see above-mentioned telegram). The head of the European Department explained that the instructions to the Ambassadors concerned the grand political solution for Indochina's future, whereas the agreement with France represented a local settlement of a single and for a long time urgent question of the conduct of war against Chiang Kai-shek. I pointed out the obvious contradiction in this interpretation.

I have the impression that the present Japanese Cabinet made the agreement as a deliberate continuation of its sufficiently well-known pro-Anglo-Saxon policy and with the ready cooperation of the Ambassadors of the enemy powers here, in order to represent it to the Japanese people as a success and thus to prove that the course of foreign policy followed so far was right. The enemy powers are now afraid of this attempt by Germany and Italy to attract Japan to the side of the Axis Powers by letting her have Indochina, and hope to eliminate this danger by the above-mentioned far-reaching concessions to Japan in Indochina. The attempt by the enemy powers to entice Japan, and in particular to keep alive the Yonai-Arita Cabinet, which is compliant to them although severely shaken, by means of allowing Japan certain successes in foreign policy, is also shown by the fact that England, at the instigation of Ambassador Craigie, is said to be prepared to make similar concessions in Burma. Since it is a case of voluntary concessions by France and England in Cochin China, America's approval may be expected, whereas action by Japan in Indochina based on German-Italian authorization would doubtless meet with objection from America.

I recommend that you express the greatest astonishment to Ambassador Kurusu that the Japanese Government, without regard to the two victor states, did not shrink from making such far-reaching agreements with France after her military defeat and her request for an armistice. The *démarche* regarding Indochina made simultaneously in Berlin and Rome in the name of Axis friendship renders this precipitate action doubly disloyal. The agreement proves anew the unreliable attitude of the Yonai-Arita Cabinet toward Germany and

thus the necessity of making any accommodation regarding Indochina dependent on firm adherence of Japan to the Axis Powers.²

OTT

² Telegram No. 526 of June 25, Weizsäcker to Ott (216/147553-54), contained the following instructions: "With reference to the last paragraph of your telegram No. 608: We have refrained from expressing to the Ambassador our astonishment concerning the agreements with France in order not to get further involved in the question." Cf. document No. 511 and footnote 2.

No. 515

176/186992-93

The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

URGENT

BUCHAREST, June 21, 1940—9: 18 p. m.

No. 956 of June 20

Received June 22—5: 30 a. m.

With reference to paragraph 3 of my telegram No. 913 of June 13.¹

The Foreign Minister informed me yesterday evening that after detailed consultation the King will make the contemplated reply to the Reich Foreign Minister's telegram No. 644² different in form, after all, from what he himself had proposed to the King. They had misgivings about committing themselves beforehand with Soviet Russia in the difficult questions of revision.

The Minister President requested me to call on him today and read out the following protocol to me in the presence of Gigurtu. (The text, drawn up by the King himself, follows in a separate telegram.³) He stated that this declaration meant a further step by the Rumanian Government toward a rapprochement with Germany. They wished to return to the policy of King Carol I; this meant cooperation with Germany in all fields. Lavrentiev, the Russian Minister, had arrived in Bucharest today. The Rumanian Government did not know what he was going to demand of them; if he also demanded Bessarabia as far as the Danube, Rumania would have to draw our attention to the danger thus threatening the Balkans. We could not deny our interest in keeping Soviet Russia away from the Danube. If Russia demanded bases, one had now to point to the sad experiences of the Baltic countries. Rumania could not abandon the population of Moldavia, the majority of whom were of Rumanian nationality, to Bolshevism and Russification. The Rumanian Government would consult further with us before taking any steps on its part.

In the King's new proposal to Germany expression is given to the desire to be informed of Germany's intentions in the southeast as

¹ Document No. 428.

² Document No. 364.

³ Document No. 516.

early as possible. They wished to use the same language here that Germany desires.

I remained entirely noncommittal.

FABRICIUS

No. 516

175/136994/95

The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

URGENT

BUCHAREST, June 21, 1940—6:00 p. m.

No. 957 of June 20

Received June 22—12:30 a. m.

With reference to my telegram No. 956 of June 21.¹

Following the communication which the Minister President on behalf of the Rumanian Government made to the Reich Government through his Excellency, Minister Fabricius on May 28,² and following the reply³ to the communication which was received, the Government of his Majesty believes it to be useful to furnish further specific statements with respect to its decision to strengthen and broaden the collaboration between Germany and Rumania.

The Rumanian Government considers this collaboration—required by the geopolitical situation of Rumania as well as by the New Order in Europe which is in the process of being established—as necessary in all fields.

The Rumanian Government considers that the same identity of interests which has linked the two countries in the past determines their relations today and will determine them still more profoundly tomorrow and will demand the speedy organization of this collaboration which presupposes a Rumania strong politically as well as economically; for Rumania's strength is the sure guarantee that she will be able to fulfill her role as guardian of the Dniester and the mouths of the Danube. On the other hand, the Rumanian Government understands that the conversations with the Government of the USSR which it will initiate in order to clarify Soviet-Rumanian relations do not impair, in any way, the basis of the future relations between Germany and Rumania.

If the Government of the Reich shares this viewpoint, the Rumanian Government is prepared to start the necessary action with a view of realizing relations of German-Rumanian collaboration.

FABRICIUS

¹ Document No. 515.

² Document No. 345.

³ Document No. 364.

No. 517

280/152254-55

The Minister in Yugoslavia to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 497 of June 21

BELGRADE, June 21, 1940.

Received June 22—5:30 a. m.

1) The change in the Ministry for Physical Training has taken place for domestic political reasons. Tomić, the previous Minister, at the last municipal elections took a stand in opposition to Croat leadership. His successor is Pantić, who was previously Consul General in Düsseldorf for many years and is regarded here as a staunch friend of Germany. In the Ministry which he has taken over he will of course have little possibility to exert political influence in the Cabinet.

2) The change of Ministers shows that Minister President Cvetković has succeeded for the time being in postponing the Government crisis and in persuading the Prince Regent that the continued existence of the Cvetković Government despite the new situation in Europe is acceptable in foreign policy and necessary in domestic policy. This is contrary to the opinion which is increasingly more general in political circles here that it is high time that Yugoslavia should adjust her foreign and domestic policies more clearly than has been done so far to the new predominance of the Axis of which the Cvetković Government was incapable in consequence of its internal weakness and the personal animosity between Cvetković and Stojadinović. In this connection, as has repeatedly been expressed to me by prominent politicians here, the fact that the internment of former Minister President Stojadinović,¹ who is here regarded as an exponent of a pro-Axis orientation of Yugoslav foreign policy, should be still continued in so ruthless a form is even today considered to be a challenge to the Axis Powers as incomprehensible as it is dangerous.

In this connection, circles which are to be taken absolutely seriously, even fear for the personal safety of Stojadinović.

3) As enemy propaganda, with the acquiescence if not indeed the cooperation of the authorities here, is casting suspicion on Stojadinović as being the Yugoslav Quisling and his continued internment is evaluated as proof of the secret doubts of authoritative persons here in the victory of the Axis Powers, there is the danger for (the word "us" is apparently missing here) of a loss of prestige if the present state of affairs continues. I recommend therefore that our press should, in a prominent place, express astonishment at the slow evolution of

¹ See document No. 140.

Yugoslav policy and, above all, at the treatment of Stojadinović, whose foreign policy has in these days been brilliantly vindicated. My Italian colleague fully agrees with this opinion.

HEEREN

No. 518

235/157188

The Ambassador in Brazil to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

TOP SECRET

RIO DE JANEIRO, June 21, 1940—9:35 p. m.

No. 624 of June 21

Received June 22—5:30 a. m.

[W 3237 g.]¹

President Vargas requested me to call on him unofficially today. The audience took place privately without the knowledge of Aranha, the Foreign Minister. The President began the conversation by stating that he very much regretted the deterioration in economic relations with Germany which had been caused by the war and in the continuation of which he saw Brazil's salvation. When I acquainted him with the offer made in telegrams No. 541 of June 19² and No. 543 of June 20³ received a few hours previously, he was obviously pleased and asked me to convey his thanks to Berlin. Experts would have to discuss the details. He then proposed, for his part, to examine even at this time whether both countries could not still reach definite agreement during the war to purchase specific kinds and amounts of goods from each other. I promised to transmit the proposal.

The President then emphasized of his own accord his full intention to maintain neutrality and his personal sympathy for the authoritarian states, referring at the same time to the speech⁴ he recently made. He openly expressed his aversion to England and the democratic system.

The concluding phase of the conversation centered on the position of Reich Germans and Volksdeutsche in southern Brazil. The President promised to redress abuses and encroachments by local officials. The agitation against the fifth column was due to the foreign propaganda of lies which was carried on particularly by Jewish emigrants and which he would not tolerate.

I request instructions⁵ by telegram as soon as possible regarding the scope of the economic negotiations.

PRÜFER

¹ This file number was derived from an unsigned memorandum of June 27 (8719/E609580-82).

² See document No. 498, footnote 2.

³ Document No. 498.

⁴ In an address delivered June 11 President Vargas had attacked "the sterile demagoguery of political democracy" and asked that virile peoples should remove the debris of old ideas.

⁵ See vol. x, document No. 40.

No. 519

2428/512082-84

The Ambassador in Argentina to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 681 of June 21

BUENOS AIRES, June 21, 1940—10:50 p. m.

Received June 22—8:55 a. m.

Pol. IX 1182.

On June 18 the United States Ambassador handed the Foreign Ministry here an invitation to the Inter-American Congress at Havana. Argentina has not yet accepted the invitation but will probably announce her acceptance even though reluctantly.

In this connection the Secretary General¹ of the Foreign Ministry informed me personally and in a friendly manner that the Argentine Government would in future as in the past adhere to a policy of complete freedom of action. The Government was pursuing a purely *Argentine* policy in which it would not allow itself to be influenced by any of the belligerent powers, nor by the U. S. A. or any South American countries. The U. S. Government had lately made many proposals which did not seem expedient to the Argentine Government. However, as is known, most of the Governments in South America, in contrast to Argentina, blindly followed Washington's political line. The Argentine Government would probably not very well be able to decline the United States' invitation to the Havana Conference, but it was aware that precisely because of its absolute adherence to the principle of freedom of action it would, at the Conference, encounter an atmosphere hostile to the Argentine point of view and be in a difficult position. The Argentine Government, however, was in a position to point out that it was maintaining excellent relations with all the belligerent states. This was particularly true, as the Secretary General emphasized, of German-Argentine relations.

The Secretary General here added the request that the Reich Government assist Argentina in asserting her point of view. Hitherto there had been an unresolved question for Argentina only in her relations with *one* Great Power, namely in her relations with England in respect to the Falkland Islands. Unfortunately, a dispute had recently arisen also in her relations with Germany, namely the sinking of the Argentine merchant vessel *Uruguay*.² As we were aware, the Argentine Government had striven to calm public opinion, in particular by pointing out that the Reich Government would require some time for investigation before it could reply to the Argentine note. These efforts to restore calm were, however, becoming more and more difficult.

¹ L. S. Casteneiras.² See document No. 365.

Interested parties were exploiting the incident of the sinking of the *Uruguay* to our detriment in the worst possible manner for propaganda purposes. The ship's crew was returning here in a few days' time which would give occasion for a fresh whipping-up of public opinion against Germany. To be sure, the Argentine Ambassador in Berlin had been informed *orally*³ at the Foreign Ministry that the matter was being investigated by us. He (the Secretary General), however, was asking us to consider whether we could support the efforts of the Argentine Government, which were in our interest, by having the Foreign Ministry send a *written* communication to the Argentine Ambassador in Berlin which would merely need to contain the statement that receipt of the Argentine note was acknowledged and that an investigation into the matter had been instituted. Should the Reich Government consider it possible to add in the note that the matter was being investigated "with care" or even "in view of the friendly relations between Germany and Argentina," this would be welcomed with particular gratitude here. The Secretary General hinted that such assistance would also be of advantage to the Argentine Government at the negotiations in Havana.

We did not fail to point out for our part that there was hardly any comparison between the question of the Falkland Islands and the case of the *Uruguay* and that the results of the inquiry would have to be awaited.

In fact the gesture by Germany suggested by the Secretary General, which does not commit us in any way, would no doubt be effective in view of the Argentine mentality. I would therefore advise that, if possible, the Argentine proposal be accepted.⁴

Identical texts have been sent to the other Missions in North, Central, and South America.

THERMANN

³ See document No. 412.

⁴ On further developments in the *Uruguay* case, see document No. 412, footnote 6.

No. 520

108/112238-39

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

URGENT

Moscow, June 22, 1940—12:59 a. m.

No. 1195 of June 21

Received June 22—5:30 a. m.

With reference to my telegram No. 1180 of June 20.¹

My Italian colleague gave me the following information today:

¹ Not printed (B14/B002043). This telegram reported that the Italian Ambassador was going to call on Molotov immediately in order to make the step of which Schulenburg gives an account here.

He had received instructions from Mussolini personally to call on Molotov and tell him that:

1) Italy not only wished to restore normal relations with the Soviet Union but also such as would be in accordance with the Italo-Soviet Treaty of Friendship of 1933 which was still in force.

2) Italy was prepared to enter into an exchange of views with Moscow on all questions of interest to both countries, and in particular on the Balkans question.

Signor Rosso had carried out these instructions yesterday evening. Molotov had been very much interested and had asked him to repeat point 2 word for word. He had then said he would inform his Government and notify him of their views in due course.

During the conversation,* the unsolved Balkan problem had come up, and in particular the claims being made by her various neighbors, including the Soviet Union, on Rumania. In this connection Molotov had said that the Soviet Union too wished for a peaceful settlement of the Bessarabian question, but that this problem was "very acute" and its solution could not be delayed much longer.

In conclusion Signor Rosso had asked Molotov whether the new British and French Ambassadors had told him many interesting things. Molotov had answered with a smile that M. Labonne had been very dejected, but Cripps less so. The French Ambassador had pointed out that the Soviet Union must surely be interested in maintaining the European balance of power. Molotov had replied that the Soviet Union was not interested in maintaining a balance of power such as had existed hitherto. The British Ambassador had first spoken of the British-Soviet economic negotiations which had made no progress for a long time and had then stated that the Soviet Union was entitled to a predominant position in the Balkans.

Molotov has so far described the Bessarabian question as not acute. I will speak to him on the matter during my forthcoming call on him which will probably be the day after tomorrow.³

SCHULENBURG

* For Rosso's account of this conversation, see Mario Toscano, *Una mancata intesa italo-sovietica nel 1940 e 1941*, pp. 30-36.

³ See vol. x, document No. 4.

No. 521

66/46517-20

Unsigned Memorandum

RECORD OF THE TELEPHONE CONVERSATION BETWEEN GENERAL HUNTZIGER AND COLONEL BOURGET, GENERAL WEYGAND'S ADJUTANT, AT 10 A. M. ON JUNE 22

Colonel Bourget, whom General Huntziger had great difficulty in understanding, so that he kept asking him to speak in a normal voice and not to accentuate unduly, said on behalf of Weygand that he had three different things to say.

First, a preliminary question about the French Government's request that the Bordeaux area be kept out of the hostilities. Marshal Pétain had addressed a personal appeal to the Führer on this point.¹ As the negotiations with Italy would certainly take several days after the conclusion of the negotiations with Germany, the utmost precautions must be taken to see that the seat of the Government was spared from hostilities and an attempt must be made before the negotiations were resumed to obtain a promise to that effect from the German delegation.

Huntziger replied that the German side would probably tell him that the best way to spare Bordeaux from hostilities would be to sign the armistice terms with Germany as quickly as possible. The Germans would probably not undertake any further obligation.

Bourget again asked that the text of the agreement be sent to Bordeaux by air. When Bourget again asked for a repetition of article 1, Huntziger pointed out that the German terms would only be valid provided agreement was reached with Italy.

Bourget then further requested the evacuation of Paris by the German troops, as the German Government itself recognizes the importance of Paris for French administration. In addition Paris must be linked up with the unoccupied zone by a kind of corridor.

There was no comment on articles 3 and 4.

Aircraft must be deleted from the list of armaments to be handed over under article 5. The French proposal was to destroy French aircraft.

There was no comment on articles 6 and 7.

Regarding article 8 the French Government proposed the following amendment for the first paragraph: "After demobilization and landing of ammunition under German or Italian supervision, the French warships will be taken to French African ports with half their peacetime complement."

There was no comment on articles 9 to 16.

The French Government proposed the insertion of an article 16a with the following text: "The position of foreign officers and soldiers who have served in the French Army or fought side by side with it, and also the position of foreign nationals who have sought asylum in France, will form the subject of a later agreement to be concluded on the basis of honor and humanity."

The French Government requests an addition to article 17, namely, that "the German Government undertakes to facilitate the transfer from the occupied to the unoccupied territory of all products and foodstuffs vital to the population."

¹ Not found. According to Paul Baudouin, such a message was sent at 9 p. m. on June 21, *Neuf mots au gouvernement* (Paris, 1948), p. 196.

No comments were made on article 18.

Regarding article 19 paragraph 2 (the clause referring to the handing over of German nationals) the French Government takes the view that this paragraph is dishonorable on account of the exercise of the right of asylum and therefore asks that it be deleted.

There were no comments on articles 20 to 22.

An amendment to article 23 was proposed, namely: "The signature of the French delegation is only valid if a treaty is signed with Italy too."

Huntziger pointed out that the meeting with the Germans was about to be resumed, but that the German side had stated that the questions discussed yesterday would not be raised again. Only new questions could now be raised. Moreover, the German delegation was increasing pressure for a final answer from the French Government.

In conclusion Huntziger said that he would not sign without express orders which should be sent by cipher telegram.

No. 522

66/46482-97

Unsigned Memorandum

RECORD OF THE SECOND DAY'S NEGOTIATIONS ON THE ARMISTICE AT COMPIÈGNE ON JUNE 22, 1940

When the meeting opened, General Huntziger said that he had transmitted the text of all the articles of the agreement by telephone to the French Government.¹ The French Government had discussed this during the night and had instructed him to put a few further questions.

Marshal Pétain had yesterday addressed a personal appeal to the Führer,² asking him to halt the German advance on Bordeaux for the time being, so that the French Government could conduct its deliberations in complete freedom, without having to act under any kind of pressure. No answer to this appeal had so far been received.

Colonel General Keitel replied that Marshal Pétain's appeal was known to him. He was prepared to consider the question as soon as the discussions on the armistice agreement had been concluded. General Huntziger replied that he assumed he was right in interpreting the words of the chairman of the German delegation to mean that consideration would be given the French request on the conclusion of the armistice treaty.

With regard to article 5 he could report that the French Government accepted the text, and only asked that military aircraft should be deleted from the list of war material to be handed over. France of

¹ Concerning the draft of the armistice treaty, see document No. 509, footnote 2. For the final text see document No. 523.

² Not found. See document No. 521, footnote 1.

course realized that these aircraft could no longer be used against Germany, but for the Air Force an obligation to hand them over was just as hard as for an officer to have to surrender his sword. To be obliged to surrender aircraft was a terrible punishment and an extreme humiliation for the French Air Force. He must even now in all frankness also point out that the crews of these aircraft would certainly not obey an order from their Government to surrender the machines to Germany. In order to settle this question the French delegation therefore proposed the following version: "Military aircraft, which do not come within the strength allowed to France, will be destroyed under German or Italian supervision."

Colonel General Keitel replied that this was a completely new question, which surprised him, as the German wording only constituted a "can" provision which, taken as a whole, meant in Germany's view a very great concession to France. The question as to how the French war material was to be finally disposed of was, moreover, to be decided by the Armistice Commission. Referring to Huntziger's statement that French aircraft crews would not obey an order of their Government, Colonel General Keitel asked the French delegation what guarantees France could give for the smooth carrying out of the provisions of the armistice agreement. General Huntziger answered that France would naturally carry out exactly all obligations signed by him. For that reason he had very frankly pointed out now the impossibility of carrying out the obligation to deliver over the military aircraft.

General Bergeret then handed over an appeal from General Vuillemin to Field Marshal Göring to cancel the obligation to deliver over French aircraft. Colonel General Keitel expressed his willingness to pass this appeal on to Field Marshal Göring at the close of the meeting, and asked whether the danger did not exist that the aircraft would be flown outside the country during the negotiations. General Huntziger replied that until the end of the armistice negotiations not a single aircraft would take off, as the Air Force was firmly under the control of its leaders. Only if the attempt were made to put the obligation to deliver over [the aircraft] into effect would the pilots refuse to obey.

General Huntziger proposed the following amendment to article 8, describing it as being of a formal nature: "After demobilization and landing of ammunition under German or Italian supervision, the French warships will be taken to French African ports with half their peacetime complement." General Huntziger gave as a reason for this request the fact that the French warships which were assembled in Atlantic or Channel ports would be exposed to British air attacks and that France was therefore trying to bring them to safety by directing them to African ports.

Colonel General Keitel replied that he regarded the arrangement contained in article 8 as a very generous offer on the part of the German Government and the German Wehrmacht. The putting into effect of the details, of which the safeguarding of the demobilized French fleet against air attack was one, was a matter for the Armistice Commission. He had to note with regret that the French delegation seemed to be losing sight of the generosity of the offer as a whole in trivial discussions on separate points. There was therefore no need for a formal amendment of the text of the treaty, and the German delegation refused the French request.

General Huntziger then proposed the inclusion of an article 16a with the following text: "The position of foreign officers and soldiers who have served in the French Army or fought side by side with it, and also the position of foreign nationals who have sought asylum in France, will be the subject of a later agreement to be concluded on the basis of honor and humanity."

After a lengthy discussion of the question of what category of persons this article was meant to cover and after the French side had stated that it involved persons who were of neither French nor German nationality, Colonel General Keitel summarized the German point of view by saying that the German delegation could see no reason for including a special article in the treaty and that they must regard it as an insult to the German Army if special provisions were requested for the treatment of prisoners of war, who were treated in Germany in strict conformity with international rules. The French delegation immediately cleared up the misunderstanding: It was not a question of prisoners of war but of military persons of non-German foreign nationality who were still with the French Army. The case of German nationals was dealt with separately in article 19. The German side stated that the German delegation had made no demand regarding this category of persons, and these foreign military persons would therefore not be subject to special treatment as compared with military persons of French nationality. There was therefore no need to include a special article and the question was to be referred to the Armistice Commission.

The French delegation asked for an addition to article 17 in the following terms: "The German Government undertakes to facilitate the transfer from the occupied to unoccupied territory of all products and foodstuffs vital to the population." As a reason General Huntziger pointed out the considerable supply difficulties in unoccupied French territory. If there were a surplus in any part of France occupied by Germany, it would be the right thing to transfer this to the nearest unoccupied territory. Colonel General Keitel emphasized that in the territory occupied by Germany, the

German Government had helped the unfortunate population by generous relief measures and would continue to do so. In these relief measures, however, one could not proceed according to general rules previously laid down, but must take different action according to the actual conditions on the spot. The French request would therefore be referred to the Armistice Commission. General Huntziger took note of the German statement on relief measures for the French population in the occupied territories. The French Government had made this request in order to have a means of calming the French people, whose agitation about the growing supply difficulties of the unoccupied territories was increasing. Ambassador Noël added that on the French side there were no illusions about the practical effects of such a provision; the French Government was mainly concerned with its psychological effect.

In the further course of the meeting General Huntziger asked for the deletion of paragraph 2 of article 19 (extradition clause) on the grounds that this clause was dishonorable because of the exercise of the right of asylum. Referring in energetic terms to the deep insults inflicted in 1918 by the Allies upon the German officer corps in the extradition question, Colonel General Keitel stated emphatically that the extradition article applied to the greatest warmongers, the German émigrés who had betrayed their own people, and had driven another [people] to disaster, and that the extradition of this category of persons—and this category alone—must be insisted upon at all costs.

General Huntziger further requested that German troops evacuate Paris when the French Government returned there, and that the city should be linked up with unoccupied territory by a corridor still to be defined. The French Government was prepared to give guarantees for Paris and its surroundings, but in view of the difficulty of working the machinery of the centralized French administration and government from any other place than Paris, they asked to be given the opportunity of functioning in Paris again. In any case it would probably be fitting to make very considerable reductions in the occupation of the Paris area and to bring about a kind of invisible occupation. Colonel General Keitel, again referring to the Führer's generous offer, replied that it did not seem to him out of the question that, at a later stage and according to how the situation developed, a solution for this question might be found, which would approximate the arrangement proposed by the French Government. This seemed to him altogether within the bounds of possibility. However, before the matter of the cessation of hostilities had been definitely cleared up, he could not go beyond the statement he had just made. The treatment of Paris would depend on

the development of the political situation within that metropolis. In any case, as had been said before, the German Government had no interest in keeping a larger number of troops in Paris than was absolutely necessary. Moreover, after the cessation of hostilities with England a new situation would arise and various questions could be reexamined. Furthermore, he had heard from reliable circles of the Paris population that people there were pleased with the restraint shown by the German troops. General Huntziger emphasized that he, too, must admit that the restraint of the German troops in Paris was excellent, and he hoped that in other parts of France also the German troops would be equally well controlled by their leaders.

Then General Huntziger asked for an amendment to article 23 as follows: "This armistice treaty will only come into force if the French Government and the Italian Government etc. . . ." After a short discussion it was established that this was merely a question of translation and that the German text could remain as it was. Moreover, the French chairman said that this article 23 made the success of the German-French armistice negotiations dependent on the success of the Italian-French negotiations. But the French delegation was in ignorance of something which the Germans probably knew—namely what terms Italy would impose. General Huntziger repeated most emphatically that whatever happened certain of Italy's terms would not be accepted by France. Although Italy had declared war on France, she had not waged war on France (*l'Italie nous a déclaré la guerre, mais elle ne nous a pas fait la guerre*) ; France in fact did not need to ask Italy for an armistice, for the armistice had actually existed since the day of the declaration of war. The German-French agreement, even if the French Government should agree to it, would fall through in case Italy made certain unacceptable demands at Rome. This would result in an unspeakable catastrophe. As regards Germany France accepted the consequence of the fact that the fortunes of war had decided in Germany's favor, but as regards Italy she refused to do so, and would then rather accept the worst consequences of this refusal. "We know that if an armistice does not come about, Germany will crush us and heap greater disaster upon us than hitherto." Despite this, France would not submit to certain conditions made by Italy but would prefer to throw what was left of her freedom of action into the balance. The Navy and Air Force were yet intact. Come what might, honor was of greater importance than life. General Huntziger then said he appreciated the willingness apparent on the German side to modify somewhat certain particularly harsh conditions, as shown by Colonel General Keitel's statements. If the French Government signed the agreement, it would also carry

it out loyally, but none of this would happen if the completely unjustified appetite of a certain country beyond the Alps were to be too great.

Colonel General Keitel replied that the German delegation had noted General Huntziger's statements on France's attitude to Italy. The German delegation was not called upon to make any statement on this. They could neither give advice to Italy nor direct her attention to definite points. Colonel General Keitel then pointed out again that in the present military situation there should be no delay in the French Government's decision. It must now be apparent in Bordeaux that further delay was not at all in the interests of the French people. The German Government and the German Wehrmacht for their part had no reason to cease hostilities. He therefore proposed a short intermission in the meeting during which he (the Colonel General) would clarify the obligation to surrender French aircraft in connection with General Vuillemin's appeal, and would try to find a wording for article 17 which would take the French wishes into account. He suggested that in the interval the French delegation inform the French Government and request an answer as soon as possible.

In conclusion the Colonel General said that, provided the French Government put its signature to the agreement, he could say that it was the Führer's intention to keep Bordeaux outside the sphere of military operations until hostilities could be stopped.

During the remainder of the afternoon a series of separate discussions between the German and French armistice delegations took place outside the conference coach, in the course of which the German delegation conceded to the French delegation the following additions to articles 5 and 17, which took account of the French requests.

For article 5: "the surrender of military aircraft can be dispensed with, if all military aircraft still in the possession of the French armed forces are disarmed and placed in safe custody under German supervision."

For article 17: "the German Government will take into consideration the vital needs of the population of the unoccupied territories."

It was further arranged that until agreement had been reached with the Italians the armistice convention was to be treated as strictly secret.

In a further telephone conversation with General Weygand, General Huntziger reported these German concessions, saying that the Germans demanded that he receive orders to sign from the French Government by cipher telegram. He again told Weygand that he did not want merely an authorization to sign but an order from the French Government to append his signature to the armistice treaty.

Weygand reassured him, and kept repeating that he would certainly have an order and not merely an authorization. Telephone communication with Bordeaux was interrupted several times on French territory. In a further conversation Weygand began by thanking Huntziger for his outstanding conduct of the negotiations and then asked him to record the statements made by the German delegation in a written protocol. The French delegation spent a considerable time discussing this instruction. Finally General Huntziger again telephoned Bordeaux and urgently advised against making this proposal to the German delegation as he was certain it would be refused and he hoped that he could perhaps obtain greater concessions in later negotiations if he did not insist on written confirmation now.

When the French Government's reply was further delayed, Colonel General Keitel decided to give the French delegation an ultimatum due to expire at 7:30 p. m. for acceptance or rejection. A document from Colonel General Keitel³ was handed to the French delegation in the coach in which he stated that after waiting for 5 hours he now demanded that the French delegation reach a decision within an hour. Should an answer not have been received from the French delegation by that time, he would leave and have the French delegation escorted back to the German front lines. This ultimatum was delivered at 6:30 p. m.

While a member of the German delegation was still translating Colonel General Keitel's letter for General Huntziger in the parlor car, he was again called on the telephone by Bordeaux and the French Government gave him the order to sign. At the opening of the meeting which followed General Huntziger said that at the moment when he had received Colonel General Keitel's letter, he had received a communication from his Government by telephone. In the name of the French Government he stated that the latter had decided to sign the armistice agreement. Before he himself proceeded to sign, however, he wished to make the following personal statement.⁴

"In signing the armistice convention on the orders of the French Government the French delegation considers it necessary to make the following statement:

Under the stress of the fortunes of war, France has had to give up the struggle in which she was engaged along with her Allies. Very heavy demands are made of her under conditions which stress even more the severity of these demands.

The French Government is justified in expecting that in further negotiations Germany will be guided by a spirit which will make it possible for two great neighboring peoples to live and work in peace."

General Huntziger then addressed himself directly to Colonel General Keitel who, as a soldier, could appreciate the difficult moment

³ Not found.

⁴ The French text of the statement is on 66/46469.

which was in store for the leader of the French delegation. Appealing to his feelings as a soldier, he said that the French delegation hoped that it would not one day regret the gesture which it was now about to make.

Colonel General Keitel took note of the French Government's decision to sign the armistice agreement and answered General Huntziger's personal remarks by saying that it was honorable for the victor to honor the vanquished.

Thereupon the armistice agreement was signed, and there were tears in the eyes of the French delegation.

In conclusion Colonel General Keitel expressed privately to General Huntziger in a few personal words his recognition of the courageous, loyal and skillful manner in which he had represented his country's interests at this difficult hour. General Huntziger said that he would never forget these words, he could say no more, his strength was exhausted.

Minister ⁵

⁵ The signature of interpreter Schmidt does not appear on the file copy.

No. 523

8899/E621634-41

German-French Armistice Treaty ¹

The following Armistice Treaty [*Waffenstillstandsvertrag*] has been agreed upon by Colonel General Keitel, Chief of the High Command of the Wehrmacht, appointed by the Führer of the German Reich and Supreme Commander of the German Wehrmacht, on the one hand, and the Plenipotentiaries of the French Government who are vested with full powers, General of the Army Huntziger, chairman of the delegation, M. Noël, Ambassador of France, Vice Admiral Le Luc, General Parisot,² Corps Commander, and General of the Air Force Bergeret, on the other:

¹ The term in the French text is *Convention d'armistice*. By a letter of June 29 (5235/E311298) the Foreign Ministry asked the German Armistice Commission at Wiesbaden to transmit a certified copy of the Armistice Treaty. Hencke replied by report No. 107 of July 6 (5235/E311299-300) that a certified copy could not be transmitted as the original treaty was kept at Hitler's Headquarters. Instead he enclosed a copy made available to the Armistice Commission by the OKW. It is this copy which has been printed.

The Armistice Treaty was published on June 28.

² General Parisot is not cited as a member of the French delegation in the draft of the armistice treaty. See document No. 509, footnote 2. His name does not appear in the French text of the Armistice Treaty given in the French Government's collection of documents, *La Délégation française auprès de la Commission allemande d'Armistice* (Paris, 1947), vol. I, p. 1.

1. The French Government will order the cessation of hostilities against the German Reich in France, in French possessions, colonies, protectorates, and mandated territories, and at sea. It will order French units, already encircled by German troops, to lay down their arms immediately.

2. In order to safeguard the interests of the German Reich, French territory north and west of the line marked on the attached map ^a will be occupied by German troops. In so far as the parts to be occupied are not yet under the control of German troops, this occupation will be carried out immediately after the conclusion of this Treaty.

3. In the occupied parts of France the German Reich will exercise all the rights of the occupying power. The French Government undertakes to support by every means orders issued in the exercise of those rights and to carry them out with the assistance of the French administration. The French Government will therefore immediately instruct all French authorities and offices of the occupied territory to comply with the orders of the German military commanders and to collaborate with them correctly.

It is the intention of the German Government to reduce to the extent absolutely necessary the occupation of the western coast after the cessation of hostilities with England.

The French Government is free to choose its seat of government in the unoccupied territory, or, if it so desires, to transfer it to Paris. In the latter case, the German Government promises the French Government and its central authorities every necessary facility to enable it to administer the occupied and unoccupied territory from Paris.

4. The French armed forces on land, at sea, and in the air are to be demobilized and disarmed within a period still to be fixed. Excepted from this are only those units which are necessary for the maintenance of internal order. Their strength and armament will be determined by Germany or Italy respectively. Units of the French armed forces in the territory to be occupied by Germany will be speedily withdrawn to the territory not to be occupied and are to be discharged. Before leaving, these troops will lay down their arms and equipment at the places where they happen to be at the time of the entry into force of this Treaty. They will be responsible for orderly delivery to the German troops.

5. As a guarantee that the armistice will be observed, demand can be made for the surrender intact of all guns, tanks, antitank weapons, military aircraft, anti-aircraft guns, small arms, transport material and ammunition of those units of the French armed forces which

^a No map accompanies the file copy of this document. Cf. document No. 512, footnote 5.

were fighting against Germany and which at the time of the entry into force of this agreement happen to be in territory not to be occupied by Germany. The extent of these surrenders will be determined by the German Armistice Commission.

The surrender of military aircraft can be dispensed with, if all military aircraft still in the possession of the French armed forces are disarmed and placed in safe custody under German supervision.⁴

6. The remaining arms, stocks of ammunition, and war material of all kinds in the unoccupied part of France—except those permitted for the equipment of the authorized French units—are to be stored or placed in safe custody under German or Italian supervision. In this connection the German High Command reserves the right to order all measures necessary to prevent the unauthorized use of these stores. Further manufacture of war material in unoccupied territory is to be stopped immediately.

7. In the territory to be occupied all land and coastal fortifications are to be surrendered intact with their arms, ammunition, equipment, stores, and installations of every kind. Plans of these fortifications, as well as plans of those already captured by the German troops, are to be surrendered. Exact details of explosive charges placed in position, mine fields on land, time fuses, gas barrages, etc., are to be supplied to the German High Command. These obstacles are to be removed by French troops at the request of the German authorities.

8. The French war fleet, with the exception of the part permitted to the French Government for the protection of French interests in its colonial empire, is to be assembled in ports to be specified and is to be demobilized and disarmed under German or Italian supervision. The choice of these ports will be determined by the peacetime stations of the ships. The German Government solemnly declares to the French Government that it does not intend to use for its own purposes in the war the French fleet which is in ports under German supervision, with the exception of those units needed for coastal patrol and for mine sweeping. Furthermore they solemnly and expressly declare that they have no intention of raising any claim to the French war fleet at the time of the conclusion of peace. With the exception of that part of the French war fleet, still to be determined, which is to represent French interests in the colonial empire, all war vessels which are outside French territorial waters are to be recalled to France.

9. The French High Command is to supply the German High Command with detailed information about all mines laid by France, as well as all harbor and coastal barriers and installations for defense and protection.

⁴ The last paragraph of article 5 was not contained in the draft of the armistice treaty. See document No. 522.

The clearing of mine fields is to be carried out by French forces to the extent required by the German High Command.

10. The French Government undertakes not to engage in any hostile actions with any part of the armed forces left to it, or in any other way, against the German Reich.

The French Government will also prevent members of the French armed forces from leaving the country and arms and war material of any kind, ships, aircraft, etc., from being moved to England or to any other foreign country.

The French Government will forbid French nationals to fight against the German Reich in the service of states with which Germany is still at war. French nationals who act contrary to this prohibition will be treated by German troops as *francs-tireurs* [*Freischärler*].

11. French merchant ships of all kinds including coastal and harbor craft in French hands are to be forbidden to put to sea until further notice. The resumption of merchant shipping will be subject to the approval of the German and Italian Governments respectively.

The French Government will recall French merchant ships which are outside French ports or, if this cannot be done, will order them to proceed to neutral ports.

All German merchant ships which have been captured and which are in French ports will be returned intact on demand.

12. All aircraft on French territory will be immediately prohibited from taking off. Any aircraft taking off without German authority will be regarded by the German Luftwaffe as hostile and treated as such.

Airfields and ground installations of the Air Force in unoccupied territory will be under German and/or Italian supervision as the case may be. Demand may be made that they shall be rendered unusable. The French Government is obligated to make available all foreign aircraft which are in unoccupied territory or to prevent them from continuing their flight. They are to be handed over to the German Wehrmacht.

13. The French Government undertakes to ensure that in the territories to be occupied by German troops all installations equipment and stores of the armed forces are surrendered intact to the German troops. It will further ensure that ports, industrial plants, and shipyards are left in their present condition and not damaged or destroyed in any way. The same applies to all means and routes of communication, in particular to railways, highways, and inland waterways, to the whole telecommunication service and to installations for marking channels for navigation and the coastal lighthouse service. It also undertakes to carry out all repairs necessary thereon as required by the German High Command.

The French Government will ensure that there are available in occupied territory the necessary technical personnel, the amount of rolling stock and other means of transport as under normal peacetime conditions.

14. All radio transmitting stations in French territory are forthwith forbidden to transmit. The resumption of transmissions from the unoccupied part of France will be subject to special arrangements.

15. The French Government undertakes to effect the transit of goods through the unoccupied territory between the German Reich and Italy to the extent required by the German Government.

16. The French Government, in agreement with the competent German authorities, will arrange for the return of the population to the occupied territory.

17. The French Government undertakes to prevent any removal of economic assets [*Werte*] and stocks [*Vorräte*] from the territory to be occupied by German troops into unoccupied territory or abroad. Such assets and stocks as are in the occupied territory may only be disposed of in agreement with the German Government.

In this connection the German Government will take into consideration the vital needs of the population of the unoccupied territories.⁵

18. The costs of maintenance of the German occupation troops on French territory will be borne by the French Government.

19. All German prisoners of war and civilian prisoners in French custody, including detained or convicted persons who have been arrested and sentenced for acts committed in the interests of the German Reich are to be handed over immediately to the German troops.

The French Government is obligated to hand over on demand all Germans in France, in the French possessions, colonies, protectorates, and mandated territories who are named by the German Government.

The French Government undertakes to prevent German prisoners of war or civilian prisoners from being removed from France to French possessions or abroad. Correct lists are to be supplied of prisoners already removed from France as well as of sick and wounded German prisoners of war unfit for travel, with particulars of their whereabouts. The German High Command will take over the care of German sick and wounded prisoners of war.

20. Members of the French armed forces who are prisoners of war in German hands shall remain prisoners of war until the conclusion of peace.

21. The French Government is liable for securing all objects and assets which, according to this Treaty, are to be surrendered intact, or held at German disposal, or the removal of which outside the coun-

⁵ The last paragraph of article 17 was not contained in the draft of the armistice treaty. See document No. 522.

try is forbidden. The French Government is obligated to make good all destruction, damage, or removal contrary to this Treaty.

22. The execution of the Armistice Treaty will be regulated and supervised by a German Armistice Commission acting under the instructions of the German High Command. Furthermore the Armistice Commission will be called upon to ensure the necessary conformity between the present Treaty and the Italian-French Armistice Treaty. The French Government will send a delegation to the seat of the German Armistice Commission to represent French wishes and to receive the executive orders of the German Armistice Commission.

23. The present Armistice Treaty will come into force as soon as the French Government has also reached an agreement with the Italian Government on the cessation of hostilities. Hostilities will cease six hours after the Italian Government has notified the Reich Government that this agreement has been reached.* The Reich Government will notify the French Government of this time by radio.

24. The Armistice Treaty will remain in force until the conclusion of the peace treaty. It can be denounced by the German Government at any time and with immediate effect, if the French Government does not carry out the obligations assumed by it in this Treaty:

This Armistice Treaty has been signed in the Forest of Compiègne at 6:50 p. m., German summer time, on June 22, 1940.⁷

HUNTZIGER

KEITEL

* The Ambassador in Italy reported in telegram No. 1202 of June 24, 7:55 p. m., that he had been informed by Ciano that the Italian-French armistice had been signed at 7:35 p. m. (365/206130).

⁷ The French text of the Armistice Treaty as printed in *La Délégation française auprès de la Commission allemande d'Armistice*, vol. I, p. 8, gives the time as 6:32 p. m.

Telegram No. 31 of June 22, 8 p. m., from Abetz' office in Paris to the Foreign Ministry and the OKW reported: "The armistice was signed at Compiègne at 6:52 p. m. The cease-fire will take place six hours after the signing of the armistice with Italy. OKW loudspeaker vans announced the news in Paris in a thundershower. The French press will give due publicity to the event." (365/206119)

No. 524

5235/E311301-06

*Unsigned Memorandum*¹

In the course of the negotiations the French side expressed wishes and raised questions on the following points of the Armistice Treaty and answers were given by the German side:

¹ This memorandum, bearing no date, was transmitted to the Foreign Ministry by Hencke as an enclosure to report No. 107 of July 6 from Wiesbaden, cited in document No. 523, footnote 1. In this report Hencke stated that he submitted a copy of "the explanatory notes to the Armistice Treaty (answers to French questions during the negotiations in Compiègne), which according to the Führer's instructions did not form part of the treaty, but were binding for the German side." (5235/E311299-300)

Article 2²

The French delegation tried to obtain a reduction of the extent of the occupied territory (green line).³ In particular they asked that Paris as the seat of the French Government be exempted from occupation and if possible that a corridor be left free between Paris and unoccupied territory. The French delegation also asked that the strength of the occupying forces be limited and that the occupation—especially in the case of Paris being occupied—be as “invisible” as possible.

The German side stated that the green line was in principle to stand, major alterations were no longer possible. In the negotiations of the Armistice Commission, however, limited special requests for an adjustment of the green line could be considered. In particular the German High Command was prepared to give consideration to a possible desire on the part of the French Government to choose Orléans as the seat of government and to exempt it from occupation. On the other hand, they could not agree not to occupy Paris.

The strength of the German occupation must depend on the requirements of the further conduct of the war by Germany and the maintenance of order in the occupied territories. It would be adjusted according to the development of the situation and the behavior of the population. We had no interest in keeping larger occupying forces in Paris than were absolutely necessary under these considerations.

Article 3

With reference to article 3, paragraph 1, the French side asked about the extent of the rights which Germany intended to claim as occupying power.

The reply was that the requirements of the conduct of the war against England must be the deciding factor for this. In that connection everything must be required that was militarily necessary. On the other hand, the German occupation did not intend to burden itself with civil administration and with caring for the population. In that respect the French authorities were to continue to carry on the administration.

With reference to article 3, paragraph 3, the German side confirmed that in the manner in which Paris was to be occupied, consideration would be given to the position and activity of the French Government if it was transferred there.

Article 4

Regarding the strength of the remaining French armed forces to be left in unoccupied territory, it was said that for a transition period about 100,000 men were to be allowed. This concession was not intended to prejudice in any way any later arrangement and was only valid if the Italian Government also agreed.

² Cf. document No. 523.

³ Cf. document No. 512, footnote 5.

The armament of the remaining French armed forces was not discussed. The leader of the French delegation merely said that they envisaged a composition mainly of infantry, with in addition some cavalry with special weapons.

Article 5

The new paragraph,⁴ added at the request of the French, regarding the treatment of military aircraft, is, from the course of the negotiations, to be taken to mean that the surrender of aircraft is not to be demanded if the French Government scrupulously adheres to its promise to prevent aircraft from leaving the country.

Article 8

The French delegation asked to be allowed to transfer the fleet to North African ports after all ammunition had been handed over and destroyed and the crews reduced by half. They expressed the anxiety that ships in Channel and Atlantic ports might be destroyed by English air attacks.

The removal to North African ports was refused and the text of the treaty was adhered to. On the other hand it was pointed out that the demand to direct the ships to their peacetime stations was a "should" provision [*"Soll"-Bestimmung*]. The Armistice Commission would reserve the right to order exceptions to this in cases where there was reason to do so.

Article 14

In reply to a question it was confirmed to the French delegation that no permanent encroachment on radio service within unoccupied territories was intended under article 14. The purpose of article 14 was to ensure supervision of radio service, in order to eliminate any radio operation to the detriment of the German conduct of the war.

Article 16

The French delegation suggested that supplementary provisions be included regarding the return of the population to their places of residence and work and for the reorganization of transport.

The answer given by the German side was that this was a question of execution which came within the competence of the Armistice Commission.

Article 17

The delegation's request to facilitate the supply of food and necessities of daily use, as far as stocks permitted, from occupied to unoccupied territory was granted by the insertion of the last sentence. In addition, regarding this it was stated that the exchange of these essen-

⁴The last paragraph of article 5, which was not contained in the draft of the armistice treaty.

tial goods would be arranged in a generous manner in accordance with prevailing conditions.

Article 19

The request of the French delegation to delete article 19, paragraph 2, in view of the right of asylum was categorically refused. It was pointed out that it was precisely a certain circle of traitors and emigrants who were among those mainly responsible for this war. The demand for extradition would be limited to these elements.

The French delegation further asked for the insertion of a clause stating that the treatment of foreign non-German soldiers who had served in or fought with the French Army and of foreign nationals who had sought asylum in France would be the subject of a later agreement based on honor and humanity. Poles, Czechs, etc., were meant.

In reply it was stated that soldiers who had fallen into German captivity and who according to military law could claim to be treated as prisoners of war would be treated as such. Foreigners in the unoccupied territory did not interest us for the present. No demands regarding them had therefore been made in the treaty. In so far as arrangements were necessary for their treatment, this was a matter for the peace treaty.

The question of the treatment of Czechs who were nationals of the Greater German Reich was not discussed further.

Article 20

Regarding the question of the release of French prisoners of war it was stated that after the conclusion of the peace treaty generous arrangements would be made for their release.

Article 22

The French delegation was assured that it was the task of the German Armistice Commission to arrange for the *carrying out* of the stated provisions of the treaty. They must abide by the treaty and had no right to make new or different demands.

No. 525

365/206115-16

Memorandum by the State Secretary

St.S. No. 471

BERLIN, June 22, 1940.

The Italian Ambassador called on me today at about 6:00 p. m. in order to give me a letter from the Duce to the Führer.

The translation of the letter reads as follows:¹

"Führer: In order to facilitate the acceptance of the armistice by the French I have not included among the clauses the occupation of

¹ The Italian text of the letter is F12/201.

the left side of the Rhone, or of Corsica, Tunis, and Djibouti, as we had intended in Munich.² I have limited myself to a minimum, that is, to the demand for a demilitarized zone 50 kilometers in width. I consider this to be an indispensable minimum, also in order to avoid incidents. For the rest I have used the clauses of the German Armistice.

"Please accept my cordial and comradely greetings.

Mussolini

Rome, June 22, 1940/XVIII."

End of the letter from the Duce to the Führer.

Alfieri pointed out orally the great significance of this communication. He said the reason the Duce had reduced the occupation clauses agreed upon at Munich to such an extent was that the Duce wished to avoid difficulties at the present very important moment. In this he was also thinking particularly of the actual connection between the German-French and the Italian-French agreements.

The originals of the letters are leaving with the next plane courier for Baumschule.

Herewith submitted to the Reich Foreign Minister.

WEIZSÄCKER

² See document No. 479.

No. 526

365/206114

Adolf Hitler to Benito Mussolini

JUNE 22, 1940.

DUCE: I have received your communication.¹ France has been informed that, however you decide, the armistice will enter into force only if you obtain a similar result [*wenn Sie zu dem gleichen Ergebnis kommen*].

Please accept my cordial and comradely greetings.²

ADOLF HITLER

¹ See document No. 525.

² Marginal note: "1. I gave the original to Ambassador Alfieri on June 22 at 9:45 p. m.

"2. Copy of this to the Secretariat of the Foreign Minister.

"3. To the files. W[eizsäcker] June 23."

No. 527

365/206120-21

The State Secretary to the Foreign Minister

Teletype

BERLIN, June 22, 1940.

Just as the Armistice Commission is under military direction, so a peace commission under the general direction of the Foreign Minis-

ter should be set up in the near future. Since requests relating to the peace treaty are already being voiced by various offices and suggestions are being received here, I propose the following:

1. It should be established now by means of a directive from the Führer that a peace commission is to be set up and that it will be under the general direction of the Foreign Minister.

2. The more important departments should delegate representatives to this peace commission. Most of the contributions to the peace treaty will, of course, have to be worked out in advance by the experts in the departments.

3. The framework within which these contributions are to be kept must be determined by the Foreign Minister in accordance with the general directives of the Führer. Coordination of the requests and their formal compilation in treaty form must be done by the Foreign Ministry.

4. The Foreign Ministry will be the office that will process the wishes of third countries.

5. The details of the internal organization of the peace commission should be arranged by the Foreign Minister.

Such suggestions and wishes regarding the peace treaty as are already arriving at the Foreign Ministry are being collected and filed here for the time being.

WEIZSÄCKER

No. 528

205/142438-39

Memorandum by the State Secretary

St.S No. 473

BERLIN, June 22, 1940.

I asked Minister Richert to call on me this afternoon and told him the following with regard to the conversations still to be held on the transit of war material and members of the Wehrmacht through Sweden to Norway:¹

His statements of June 19 (St.S. No. 452²) had been gratefully received. As a consequence of these statements, contact would probably be made by Germany with the Foreign Ministry in Stockholm on Tuesday, the 25th of this month (Monday, the 24th, is a holiday in Sweden). As to whether or not the Legation, assisted by the Wehrmacht Attachés would negotiate or a special person be sent from here, I preferred not to commit myself at the moment. I would consider it desirable if the general outlines of the provisions for the new transit procedure could be agreed upon between the German negotiators and the Foreign Ministry. The details and the current arrangements regarding the transports themselves could then possibly be left to a subcom-

¹ Richert's report on this conversation is in *Transmitteringsfrågan Juni-December 1940*, pp. 16-17.

² Document No. 486.

mittee consisting of members of our Legation, particularly the Wehrmacht Attachés.

M. Richert agreed to this procedure and asked that he be informed later of the persons who were to conduct the negotiations on our side.

I agreed with the Minister that the separate economic negotiations which are due between Germany and Sweden, and which will be conducted by Herr Walther, should not be merged with the aforementioned ones.³

The Minister concluded this part of our conversation with the remark that the Reich Foreign Minister had put in prospect that a satisfactory solution of this transit problem would remove the thorn in our relations.⁴ His Foreign Minister, who was indeed constantly striving for friendly terms with Germany, hoped that he had now done his share.

WEIZSÄCKER

³ See document No. 486, footnote 4.

⁴ Apparently a reference to certain statements by Ribbentrop made in the course of his interview with Richert on June 15. See document No. 466, and Richert's report on the interview cited in footnote 2 thereto.

No. 529

B15/B002580

Memorandum by the State Secretary

CONFIDENTIAL
St.S. No. 474

BERLIN, June 22, 1940.

During a conversation with the Swedish Minister on another subject, I showed him this afternoon a press report from London which stated that Lloyd George was to enter the Government and to take over the post of Prime Minister in order to conclude a compromise peace with Germany.

M. Richert said at once that this version was new to him and he could hardly believe it. On the contrary Richert repeated on this occasion, too, that a peace trend was beginning to be perceptible in the present English Cabinet. Going down the list of the more important members of the Cabinet, he eliminated Churchill, Eden, Duff Cooper, Chamberlain, and Simon as unsuitable for this and hinted that Halifax represented the peace trend. When I again said that we knew nothing of such peace moves in England, Richert said more emphatically than at his last visit that we would soon hear something more of this, but he could of course not say in what way.

Herewith to the Foreign Minister (by teletype).¹

WEIZSÄCKER

¹ In a supplemental memorandum of June 23, Weizsäcker added the following: "In the same connection Richert asked me whether it was true that the Führer would deliver a speech on June 28, 1940, in the Hall of Mirrors at Versailles" (490/232242).

No. 530

2081/444786-87

Memorandum by the State Secretary

St.S. No. 475

BERLIN, June 22, 1940.

Field Marshal Göring telephoned me this noon and inquired how it was to be explained that Minister Clodius in Rome¹ was negotiating on dividing the economic products of the Balkans between Germany and Italy.

I replied that I knew nothing of such negotiations and that I would make inquiries. The report was probably incorrect.

Thereupon the Field Marshal criticized the fact that the Foreign Ministry had recently called a meeting² on greater economic sphere policies. Only yesterday he had again received confirmation from the Führer that he—Göring—was the responsible authority with regard to management of the entire economy, while the Foreign Ministry had jurisdiction only over that sector which referred to negotiations with foreign countries.

I replied to the Field Marshal that this was absolutely clear. To be sure, as soon as there were to be negotiations with foreign countries, the requirements of Germany's entire economy would have to be brought into agreement with foreign policy. This was the business of the Foreign Ministry.

As the Field Marshal spoke of new written instructions by the Führer with respect to his jurisdiction and referred to the instruction which had also been given to the Reich Commissioners in Norway and Holland, I replied that I was familiar with these instructions. However, there are no further written orders by the Führer with regard to the jurisdiction of the Field Marshal, a fact which was confirmed to me by the latter himself.

The Field Marshal finally said that he had really no objections to the busy activity of the Foreign Ministry and that he had confidence also in Minister Clodius. Still, as the responsible top leader of the economy of the Reich he had to be informed about all economic questions which we were discussing with foreign countries.

With regard to this discussion therefore the only matter left is to clarify what Herr Clodius did talk about in Rome, and what else thereof might be told to the Field Marshal.

¹ See document No. 480 and footnote 1 thereto.

² In the files are two letters, dated May 21 and May 22, in which Ambassador Ritter invited the Government departments concerned to attend a meeting at the Foreign Ministry on May 24 dealing with the greater European economic sphere (830/280362-63). Also in the files are notes in Ritter's handwriting, partly in shorthand, which seem to have been taken at that meeting (830/280365-70).

Herewith to Ministerialdirektor Wiehl with the request to provide the necessary data.¹ I shall then submit this note with your supplement to the Foreign Minister.

WEIZSÄCKER

¹ On June 24, Wiehl submitted to Weizsäcker a memorandum (2081/444788) stating that Clodius had negotiated in Rome on German-Italian raw material deliveries. Wiehl added however that prior to Clodius' departure he had discussed with him the possibilities created by the recent events that Germany might take over those exports of Balkan countries which previously went to the West. "In order not to enter into unnecessary competition with Italy in this connection, I asked Herr Clodius to discuss this question also on the occasion of his presence in Rome and to sound out the Italians, whether, in connection with their increased imports from the Balkan countries, they had any requests which might conflict with ours." Wiehl finally referred Weizsäcker to a memorandum by Clodius on that subject which is printed as document No. 531.

No. 531

2081/444788

Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Economic Policy Department

BERLIN, June 22, 1940.

With regard to questions affecting the states of southeastern Europe, I have discussed the following with Ambassador Giannini in Rome:¹

1) The petroleum transports from Rumania to Italy which now must also go by the land route have to be organized in such a way that they do not interfere at all with the German transports, or as little as possible. Giannini recognized in principle that the Danube must be reserved primarily for us as a transport route. The details of transport by rail will be arranged in joint discussions of the management of the railroads concerned.²

2) Contrary to what I had been afraid of, the Italians have expressed their willingness to continue to supply us with the amounts of copper from Yugoslavia promised in February,³ in spite of Italy's entry into the war.

3) Giannini and I agreed that we wished to interfere as little as possible with each other's purchases in southeastern Europe and that, if necessary, even agreements on price policy could be made in certain cases.

4) There was agreement that Germany and Italy have an identical interest in cutting off southeastern Europe from the western markets by all available means.

Herewith to be submitted to the State Secretary through the Director.

CLODIUS

¹ See document No. 530 and footnote 3.

² A confidential protocol settling details of the transport to Italy of a monthly quota of 40,000 tons of Rumanian petroleum products was signed at Rome by Martius and Giannini on July 8 (4536/E144303-09).

³ See vol. VIII, document No. 627.

No. 532

947/300216-18

*The Minister and Plenipotentiary of the German Reich in Denmark
to the Foreign Ministry*

SECRET

COPENHAGEN, June 22, 1940.

D. Pol. 3/588

Subject: Future character of German-Danish relations.

Because of the tempo of the military and political development, the problem of the reorganization of Europe in accordance with a German *Grossraumpolitik* has entered an acute stage. Included in this complex of questions there is also the future character of the relationship of Denmark to the Greater German Reich. As the result of any settlement, naturally only the closest alignment of Denmark with the Reich in regard to foreign, military, and economic policy can be considered. Still to be decided, however, is the form in which the practical inclusion of Denmark in the Greater German area is to be accomplished.

In contrast to the other countries which have been occupied by German troops in the course of the war, a kind of treaty relationship exists with Denmark, in which Germany has taken over the protection of Danish neutrality and at the same time assured to Denmark her national sovereignty and integrity. On the assumption that the situation permits sparing Danish sovereignty, the demands which we can make on Norway, Belgium, and Holland, for instance, in connection with the peace provisions, must with respect to Denmark be obtained through an international treaty. I have the honor to suggest consideration of the question as to whether the time has not already come to make preparations for the conclusion of such a treaty, which might also serve as a model for other neutral countries.

If a synthesis is to be achieved between the formal preservation of Danish sovereignty and Germany's over-all political interests in this country, then, in my opinion, certain basic conditions have to be satisfied.

1) *In the economic field:*

The best guarantee for the inclusion of Denmark in the Greater German area would consist in the establishment of an economic union, while the question as to whether a unified currency is necessary may remain open. Perhaps it is enough to bring the Danish crown into a fixed relationship with the mark. It is, in my opinion, primarily a matter of creating guarantees that in the future a Danish foreign trade policy not controlled by us shall no longer be possible. The history of this country has shown that commercial interests have always been decisive with respect to the over-all political attitude of Denmark.

2) *In the military field:*

It seems to me obvious that Denmark will also be included in our military sphere of interest. We will have to demand that the bases needed for the defense of the Greater German area by the three branches of the German Wehrmacht, but particularly by the Navy and the Luftwaffe, be made available to us, and that the right to use the harbors and the transportation routes on land, in the air, and on the sea be granted us to the extent necessary. The external framework for the settlement of this question could be a military convention which would also assign to the Danish armed forces duties in the defense of the Greater German area (treaty of alliance or mutual assistance pact) and give to Denmark not the feeling of a subject state, but rather of a partner.

3) *In the domestic field:*

An essential condition for a development of German-Danish relations in accordance with our wishes is the installation of a Danish government which is prepared by inner conviction for close collaboration. The personalities of the Ministers and leading officials must preclude all danger of a passive resistance or even political sabotage. Changes in the Danish Constitution would also be necessary in order that such a government might not be prevented by parliamentary obstruction from observing a straightforward policy with respect to Germany. I would like to reserve the right to make particular proposals with regard to this at the proper time.

4) *In the field of foreign policy:*

Danish foreign policy, in so far as it is possible to speak of such at all, has always been decisively determined by the economic interests of this country. In view of the complete economic dependence of Denmark on the Reich, Danish foreign policy will in future have to orient itself with almost automatic certainty exclusively in the direction of Germany. Safeguards will have to be created against any Danish attempts at side maneuvers with regard to foreign policy; in addition to the permanent occupation of military bases by the Reich, by conclusion of a special treaty, for example, a treaty of alliance or a mutual assistance pact with a clause providing for consultation. In the interest of a collaboration without any loopholes in the field of foreign policy, consideration might also be given to installing a permanent German liaison office in the Danish Foreign Ministry. On these conditions, there would, in my opinion, be no objection to allowing Denmark to retain the right to Diplomatic Missions as an external attribute of her sovereignty. The selection of the Danish foreign representatives would, however, have to take place in agreement with the Reich Government.

I would be grateful for information as to whether the Foreign Office is fundamentally in agreement with my suggestions and whether I am authorized to prepare the ground in Denmark on this general basis.¹

V. RENTHE-FINK

¹ No direct reply to this report has been found.

No. 533

821/198807-09

Memorandum by the Minister to Lithuania

BERLIN, June 22, 1940.

The crisis in relations between the Soviet Union and Lithuania which has lasted for several weeks and during which the Soviet Union avoided making any kind of concrete demands on Lithuania, had caused a high degree of nervousness among leading Lithuanian politicians, which was heightened still more by the fruitless sojourn of Minister President Merkys and Foreign Minister Urbšys in Moscow. On the evening of June 14 the Soviet ultimatum regarding the reconstruction of the Lithuanian Government and the entry of an unlimited number of troops, was delivered to Lithuania.¹ The majority of the Lithuanian Cabinet favored acceptance.

Complete panic broke out in Kaunas when, on June 15, the Lithuanian proposal to form a new cabinet under General Raštikis was turned down by the Russians, and at the same time there was announced the entry of Russian troops into Lithuania. A few hours later, when the entry of the Soviet troops into Kaunas was already imminent, President Smetona and Musteikis, the Minister for War, asked me for a visa as they were in utmost danger of their lives. Unfortunately it was no longer possible to consult Berlin. I issued the visa to Smetona and Musteikis—without prejudice to the complete freedom of action of the Reich Government—because there was the danger that they would be stood against a wall, and because then British propaganda would certainly have laid the blame at our door; furthermore, because politically Smetona's flight was bound to be extremely welcome to the Russians as it provided them with the best opportunities for propaganda against his Government. The last few days have fully borne this out: The new Government has exploited Smetona's flight in every conceivable way for the purposes of propaganda against him and his adherents.

When it became known next day that Smetona had crossed the "green frontier" (without making use of the visa), I at once informed the Tass representative in Kaunas, who had a graphic de-

¹ See document No. 436.

scription published in the Soviet press of how Smetona, with trousers turned up, had waded across the boundary stream.

Meanwhile the situation has developed in such a way that today Lithuania is already completely under the domination of the Soviet Union. Soviet commissars are installed in all government offices; the police, especially, is now in the hands of extreme Communists. One of the influential members of the new Cabinet is a Jew. Communist propaganda is developing with such speed and force that presumably already within the next few weeks elections to the Soviets will take place, which will then in all probability soon proclaim annexation by the Soviet Union. For this reason it is quite generally expected that Lithuania's formal independence will not last very much longer.

During this period, however, there are still very important German interests to be safeguarded in Lithuania. For one thing, the Reich Germans and Volksdeutsche living there in the midst of general unrest and a complete change in all conditions are now in very special need of the protection of the Legation. In this connection too, we must take into account the existence of the numerically very strong and anti-German Jewish element in Lithuania, which now plays an important part politically, and whose growing insolence can be distinctly felt. If the national group is to remain in Lithuania for some time yet, the presence of the Legation in full strength, would, for that reason, be especially important.

"It would, however, in my opinion be better if preparations for the resettlement of the national group could be made in the near future. This would, of course, have to be preceded by an understanding on the matter with Moscow. I believe that resettlement of the national group could not but be welcome to the Soviets, because in Soviet circles in Kaunas there is a great inclination to regard all Germans in Lithuania as spies. In particular, however, the Russians will see in the resettlement of the national group the strongest proof that Germany is finally disinterested in Lithuania. Therefore I recommend the resettlement of the national group.

In view of the size of the German national group in Lithuania and the important German interests which would need to be protected in the event of their resettlement, and still more if they remain there, I recommend that the Legation be left at full strength, especially as the Lithuanian State cannot expect to remain in existence for long.²

ZEHLIN

² Marginal note: "I too believe that the ministerial post ought not be left long unoccupied at this time. I recommend therefore that Herr Zechlin be sent back to Kaunas soon. W[eizsäcker] 23/6."

A memorandum of June 24 by Schmidt directed to the State Secretary stated: "The Foreign Minister agrees to Minister Zechlin returning to Kaunas." (321/193306)

No. 534

8719/E609604

The Ambassador in Argentina to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

No. 686 of June 22

BUENOS AIRES, June 22, 1940—6:02 p. m.

Received June 23—1:40 a. m.

P 11429.

With reference to Press circular telegram P 11110.¹

The entire press here carries very conspicuously American reports concerning the planned export-surplus cartel,² reports of their own representatives in the United States, as well as editorial comments; these do not without exception demand that approval should be given, but that the practicability of the American plan should be thoroughly studied in view of the economic interests, which have been traditionally bound up with Europe. On our part, appropriate counterarguments have been instigated in the press. *Pampero* of June 18 and 20 already took a stand against American strangulation (the Argentine meat question). Press reports follow in open telegram No. 687.¹

In conversations with Argentineans of importance and with representatives of the Government, attention has been directed for weeks by me and by members of the Embassy to the great possibilities for trade with Germany after the war; in this connection it has been suggested that it would be advantageous for Argentina to approach us with proposals as soon as possible. Trusted intermediaries are influencing the President and influential Ministers in this sense. Report by wire to be made at an appropriate occasion.

THERMANN

¹ Not found.

² In a statement by President Roosevelt on June 21, announcement was made of the plan to place before the American Governments a proposal "to create by mutual agreement an appropriate inter-American organization for dealing with certain basic problems of their trade relations, including an effective system of joint marketing of the important staple exports of the American republics;" Department of State, *Bulletin*, 1940, vol. II, p. 675. Reports from the Embassy in Washington reporting on the "cartel" plan in its earlier stages have not been found.

APPENDICES

Appendix I

ORGANIZATION OF THE GERMAN FOREIGN MINISTRY¹

DECEMBER 1, 1939

THE REICH FOREIGN MINISTER
von Ribbentrop

- (a) **Secretariat:** Minister Dr. Schmidt (Paul)
Counselor Dr. Kordt (Erich)
Counselor Dr. Sonnleithner
- (b) **Personal Staff:** Head: Senior Counselor Hewel
Counselor Likus
Counselor Dr. Baron Steengracht
von Moyland

THE STATE SECRETARY OF THE FOREIGN MINISTRY
Freiherr von Weissäcker

Secretariat: Counselor Dr. Siegfried
Counselor von Kessel
Amtsrat Reifegerste

THE HEAD OF THE AUSLANDSORGANISATION
IN THE FOREIGN MINISTRY
State Secretary E. W. Bohle

STATE SECRETARY FOR SPECIAL DUTIES
W. Keppler

AMBASSADOR FOR SPECIAL DUTIES
Dr. Ritter²

Attached: Minister Eisenlohr
Minister Leitner
Counselor Mackeben

¹ This organization plan has been translated and condensed from a German Foreign Ministry organization circular of Dec. 1, 1939, filmed as serial 1767, frames 405690-709. A similar table of organization for Dec. 1, 1937, is printed in vol. I; for June 1, 1938, in vol. II; for Sept. 1936, in vol. III; and for Feb. 15, 1939, in vol. IV.

² In a circular of Oct. 9, 1939, Ribbentrop notified the other Reich Ministers in Berlin that he had placed Ambassador Ritter in charge of all Foreign Ministry activities relating to economic warfare: general trade policy, economic warfare against the enemy and defense against economic warfare, blockades, contraband, blacklists, economic relations with neutrals, German property abroad and foreign property in territories controlled by Germany, etc. (1780/406615).

PROTOCOL DEPARTMENT

Diplomatic Corps in Berlin, foreign consuls in the German Reich, audiences with the Führer and Reich Chancellor, ceremonial, decorations:

Chief of Protocol: Minister Dr. Freiherr von Dörnberg

Deputy: Counselor Dr. von Halem

PERSONNEL AND ADMINISTRATIVE DEPARTMENT (PERS.)

Director of Department: Ministerialdirektor Kriebel

Deputy Director: Minister Schroeder

Director for Administration: Minister Dr. Rohde

Director for Budget and Financial Affairs: Senior Counselor Dr. Schwager

Special duties: Minister Schroetter

Pers. H	Organisation of the foreign service, training for the foreign service, personal data of higher officials, of honorary consuls, experts, etc., information center:	Minister Schroeder
---------	---	--------------------

Pers. M	Personal data on other officials and employees, organisation and efficiency of the working of the Ministry:
---------	---

Pers. Geh.	Administration of special funds:	Minister Schroeder Regierungsrat Strempel
------------	----------------------------------	--

Pers. Nachwuchs		Minister Freiherr von Killinger Senior Counselor Dr. von Etzdorf
-----------------	--	---

POLITICAL DEPARTMENT (POL.)

Director of Department: Under State Secretary Dr. Woermann

Deputy Director: Under State Secretary Habicht¹

Dirigent: Minister Prince von Bismarck

Pol. I	League of Nations, military questions, armaments, aviation, defense:	Senior Counselor von Kamphoevener Counselor Schultz-Sponholz Counselor Dr. Freiherr von der Heyden-Rynsch Counselor Count von Hohenthal Counselor von Nostitz
Pol. Ia	Special duties:	Consul General (unassigned) Dr. von Luckwald

¹ By a directive of the Foreign Minister of Nov. 21, 1939, Under State Secretary Habicht, in addition to his duties as Deputy Director of the Political Department, was attached to the Foreign Minister personally for special duties and in that capacity was assigned to the Foreign Minister's Secretariat. To insure cooperation with the Ministry of Propaganda in the field of foreign propaganda, the Information Department and the Radio Section of the Cultural Policy Department were placed under Habicht's supervision (1780/406605).

Pol. II	Western Europe (Great Britain, Ireland, British possessions—unless dealt with elsewhere—France—North Africa, Morocco, Tunis—Belgium, Netherlands, Switzerland, Luxembourg):	Senior Counselor von Rintelen Counselor Freiherr Marschall von Biberstein
Pol. IIIa	Spain, Portugal:	Counselor Dr. Schwendemann
Pol. IIIb	Vatican:	Counselor Dr. Haidlen
Pol. IV	Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, Italy (Ethiopia, Libia), Yugoslavia, Rumania, Hungary:	Counselor Dr. Heinburg
	Special duties:	Minister Dr. Eisenlohr
Pol. V	Eastern Europe (Poland, Soviet Union):	Senior Counselor Dr. Schliep
Pol. VI	Scandinavia and Baltic States (Denmark, Sweden, Norway, Iceland, Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania):	Senior Counselor Dr. von Grundherr
Pol. VII	Near and Middle East (Egypt, Afghanistan, Arabia, Ceylon, Cyprus, Palestine, Syria, Turkey, India, Iraq, Iran, Sudan):	Senior Counselor Dr. von Hentig
Pol. VIII	East Asia and Australia (Japan, Japanese mandated territories, China, Manchukuo, Mongolia, French Indochina, Siam, Straits Settlements, Malay States, Netherlands East Indies, Philippines, Australia, New Zealand, South Sea territories):	Counselor Dr. Knoll
Pol. IX	America: North America (United States with possessions—except Philippines—Canada, Mexico), Central and South America, Cuba, Haiti, Dominican Republic:	Senior Counselor Freytag
Pol. X	Africa (except Morocco, Algeria, Tunis, Italian possessions, Egypt, Sudan), mandate and colonial questions:	Senior Counselor Dr. Bielfeld
Pol. XI	War guilt questions:	Senior Counselor Dr. von Schmieden
Pol. M. C.	Matters connected with German property seized in the United States, German-American Mixed Claims Commission:	Senior Counselor Dr. Roediger (Conrad) acting
Pol. Grens	Frontier treaties and other technical questions concerning Reich frontiers, which are the subject of negotiations with foreign governments:	Senior Counselor Dr. Roediger (Conrad)

ECONOMIC POLICY DEPARTMENT (W)

Director of Department: Ministerialdirektor Wiehl

Deputy Director: Minister Dr. Clodius

Section for liaison with Defense Economy Staff:		Senior Counselor (unassigned) Dr. Dumont
W I	General section for questions concerning economics and finance. Commercial and forestry attachés; German customs law, technical preparation of commercial treaties:	Consul General Doehle
W II	Western and Southern Europe (except Great Britain and Italy): Belgium, including colonies and mandated territories; France, including colonies, protectorates, and mandated territories; Luxembourg, Netherlands, including colonies:	Senior Counselor Sabath
	Switzerland; Portugal, including colonies; Spain, including colonies:	Counselor Dr. Baron von Maltzan
W IIIa	Southeast Europe (except Rumania): Protectorate, Slovakia:	Counselor Schüller
	Hungary, Yugoslavia:	Minister Moraht
	Bulgaria, Greece:	Senior Counselor Dr. Hudecek
W IIIb	Italy, including colonies, Ethiopia and Albania; Rumania:	Counselor Adamovic-Waagstätten
W IIIc	Near and Middle East (Afghanistan, Egypt, Arabia, Cyprus, Iraq, Iran, Palestine, Transjordan, Sudan, Turkey, Yemen):	Counselor Dr. Busse
W IV	Eastern Europe (Soviet Russia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, former Poland):	Counselor Dr. Junker
W V	Northern Europe (Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, economic questions affecting the Antarctic); whaling:	Counselor Dr. Ripken
W VI	Great Britain, British Dominions (except Canada), and British colonies. General questions of commercial and economic warfare:	Minister Dr. Schnurre
W VII	East Asia (China and Hong Kong, Japan, Manchukuo, Philippines, Siam, South Sea territories):	Counselor Dr. van Scherpenberg
		Senior Counselor Rüter
		Senior Counselor Dr. Voss

W VIIa	North America (Canada, United States, Mexico), Cuba, Dominican Republic, Haiti; also Liberia:	Senior Counselor Dr. Davidsen
W VIIb	South and Central America (Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, El Salvador, Uruguay, Venezuela):	Secretary of Legation Dr Pamperrien
W IX	Shipping (including care of crews and passengers of German ships in neutral countries):	Senior Counselor Dr. Bleyert
W X	Reich Office for Foreign Trade (economic news and information service; chambers of commerce abroad):	Senior Counselor Dr. Wingen
W XI	Raw materials, defense industry, liaison for control of German ships in neutral ports:	Senior Counselor Dr. Biase
W XII	Transport (except matters relating to deliveries):	Minister Dr. Martius (directly subordinate to the Director of the Department)

LEGAL DEPARTMENT (R)

Director of Department: Under State Secretary Dr. Gaus

Deputy Director: Senior Counselor Dr. Albrecht

R I	1. International law, cooperation in conclusion of treaties. Arbitration, Permanent Court of International Justice: 2. Basic questions on laws of war and neutrality; general questions on sea warfare: 3. Legal questions on offenses against the laws of war; liaison with the International Committee of the Red Cross:	Counselor Dr. Lohmann (Johann Georg)
R S	Conduct of the war on seaborne shipping:	Counselor Dr. Lohmann (Johann Georg)
R II	Diplomatic law, extraterritorial rights. Customs matters affecting German and foreign diplomats. War damage questions:	Counselor Günther
R III	Nationality. Constitutional and administrative law. Ecclesiastical law. Penal law:	Senior Counselor Dr. Siedler

R IV	1. Compulsory military service. Compulsory labor service: 2. Exemption from military service of Foreign Ministry personnel, replacement personnel: 3. Prisoners of war at home and abroad, interned armed forces personnel, enemy aliens in Germany, Germans in enemy countries:	Senior Counselor Dr. Sethe
R V	Labor law. International Labor Office. Police: Passport Office: Visa Office:	Senior Counselor Rodiger (Gustav) Counselor Reimke Consul (unassigned) Dr. Bergfeld
R VI	Consular jurisdiction in matters of civil law:	Senior Counselor Dr. Schwagula (acting)
R VIa	Matters connected with inheritance:	Counselor Navé
R VII	Austrian legal matters. Austrian state treaties. Legal questions emanating from the Sudetengau:	Senior Counselor Dr. Schwagula
R VIII	Passports, welfare, refugees, pensions. Entry and residence permits. Extradition:	Senior Counselor Dr. Kraneck
R IX	1. Consular law. Consular treaties: 2. International finance: 3. Patent and copyright law: 4. Enemy and neutral property in Germany. German property in enemy and neutral countries: 5. Former Czechoslovak representation in the Reich. Adjustment of Czechoslovak state treaties to the German treaty system:	Senior Counselor Dr. Schiffner
Special assignments	Reform of consular law:	Minister (unassigned) Dr. Kraske
	Settlement of citizenship questions:	Consul General (retired) Dr. Vassel

CULTURAL POLICY DEPARTMENT (KULT.)

Director of Department: Minister Dr. von Twardowski

Deputy Director: Senior Counselor Rühle

Kult. A	Position of German national groups abroad and of minorities in the Reich:	Senior Counselor Dr. Lorenz
Kult. B	Economic questions relating to Germanism. Resettlement of Volksdeutsche:	Senior Counselor Grosskopf

Kult. E (Kult. Nf) (Kult. E. Rf. Zv.)	Emigration and repatriation. Settling abroad. Germanism in the Soviet Union:	Counselor Dr. Kundt
Kult. Gen.	General cultural policy:	Counselor Dr. Stolzmann
Kult. H	Financial affairs of the department:	Consul Count von Bethusy-Huc
Kult. K	International relations in the field of the arts:	Counselor Dr. Kolb
Kult. R	Radio questions:	Senior Counselor Rühle
Kult. S	German educational system abroad. Foreign educational systems:	Counselor Dr. Wolf (Gerhard)
Kult. Spr.	Drive for spreading German language abroad:	Consul Aeldert (acting)
Kult. U	University affairs. Exchanges and guest professorships. Scholarships for foreigners in Germany:	Counselor Dr. Schaefer-Rümelin
Kult. V	Treaties and agreements in the cultural field:	Counselor Dr. Pfeleiderer
Kult. W	General scientific relations with foreign countries and foreign learned organizations. Congresses and exhibitions:	Counselor Dr. Roth

NEWS SERVICE AND PRESS DEPARTMENT (P)

Acting Director: Senior Counselor Dr. Schmidt (Paul)

Deputy Director: Minister Braun von Stumm

P gen.	Organizational and administrative questions. Personnel:	Counselor Dr. Krümmer
Special duty	Southeastern questions in general:	Minister (unassigned) Dr. Kirchholtes
German press		Attaché Lohse
P I	England, Ireland, South Africa, British possessions not assigned elsewhere, Netherlands, Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia, Slovakia:	Secretary of Legation Dr. Wissmann
P II	France and possessions: Belgium, Luxembourg:	Attaché Dr. Achenbach Secretary of Legation Dr. Platzer
P III	Spain, Portugal, Vatican, Italy (Albania, Ethiopia, Libia), Switzerland:	Counselor Zelleissen
P IV	Bulgaria, Greece, Yugoslavia, Rumania, Slovakia, Hungary:	Minister (unassigned) Dr. Schwörbel

P V	Eastern Europe (Poland, the Soviet Union):	Counselor Dr. Staudacher
P VI	Scandinavia and the Baltic States:	Secretary of Legation Dr. Schlemann
P VII	Near and Middle East (including British India):	Minister (unassigned) Dr. Schwörbel
P VIII	East Asia, Australia, New Zealand, Netherlands East Indies, Thailand, Philippines:	Prince von Urach
P IXa	United States, Canada:	Dr. Sallet
P IXb	Central and South America, Pan-American affairs:	Consul General (unassigned) Dr. Soehring
P X	Reading of the foreign and domestic press, archives:	Werthmann (acting)
P XI	Oral and written reporting on the press:	Dr. Schacht
P XII	News service, radio transmission German periodicals:	Referent Kleinlein
P XIII	Foreign journalists:	Senior Counselor Dr. Jahncke
P XIV	German colonies:	Dr. Blohm

INFORMATION DEPARTMENT (INF.)

Director of Department: Minister Dr. Altenburg

Deputy Director: Counselor Dr. Rahn

Special section	General planning:	Counselor Dr. Rahn
Inf. I	Procurement and evaluation of reports and other material usable for propaganda (German origin):	Counselor Dr. Kastner
Inf. II	Military reporting and propaganda services:	Consul (unassigned) Baron von Tucher
Inf. III	News release and feature article service (foreign press):	Consul Dr. Seelos
Inf. IV	Mass propaganda:	Consul von der Damerau-Dambrowski
Inf. V	Propaganda direction (Supervision of the propaganda activity of internal German agencies):	Völkera
	Liaison office for radio:	Counselor Dr. Schirmer
	Liaison office with Ministry of Propaganda and the Dienststelle Ribbentrop:	Secretary of Legation Büttner

SPECIAL SECTION FOR GERMANY

Information for foreign missions about important internal political events. Policy toward the Jews. Racial policy. Anti-Comintern questions. International police cooperation. Emigré affairs. Flags. National hymns:	Counselor Dr. Schumburg
---	-------------------------

SPECIAL PARTY SECTION

Business between the Foreign Ministry and the departments of the NSDAP (excluding the sphere of the AO and liaison with the Security Service and the Gestapo). The Party Rally. Visits abroad by prominent persons in the State and Party.

Senior Counselor Luther

Appendix II

LIST OF GERMAN FILES USED

The following table identifies the German file from which each document has been derived. The documents of the Foreign Ministry were bound into volumes by the Germans. As documents in these volumes have been microfilmed, each film of a file has been identified by a film serial number, while each page of the documents has been identified by a frame number stamped on the original at the time of filming. The documents published in this collection are identified by the film serial number and frame numbers in the upper left-hand corner of each document. By reference to the following table of film serial numbers the location in the German Foreign Ministry archives of the copy of the document used in this publication may be determined. In some few cases separate files, usually on closely related topics, have been filmed consecutively under a single serial number; these are marked by an asterisk (*). A number of serials are given as supplementary to earlier ones; these are cases where re-examination of the file in question indicated that additional filming might be useful to scholars or, as is more often the case, where in the process of editing for publication the editors wished to provide a film record of documents of lesser importance to which references appeared in the documents selected.

<i>Film Serial Numbers</i>	<i>Title of File</i>
19	State Secretary: United States.
22	State Secretary: Norway.
30	Under State Secretary: Scandinavia.
51	Under State Secretary: Naval Warfare.
59	Head of the Auslandsorganisation: England, Japan, Estonia, Finland, France, Greece, Iraq, Iran, Ireland.*
66	Secret Files of Paul Schmidt.
73	State Secretary: Hungary.
77	State Secretary: Morocco.
91	State Secretary: Ireland. Under State Secretary: Ireland (Veesenmayer).
100	German Embassy in Italy: Mackensen's Papers.
103	State Secretary: Russia.
109	State Secretary: War in Africa; Entry into Belgium, Holland and Luxembourg; Anglo-Italian Relations.*
115	Reich Foreign Minister: Liechtenstein; Lithuania; Latvia; Luxembourg; Memel; Austria.*
116	Reich Foreign Minister: Africa; Albania; Danzig; Estonia; Croatia.*
121	State Secretary: Franco-German Relations.
124	State Secretary: Political Correspondence of the State Secre- tary with Officials of the Foreign Service.
136	State Secretary: German-Spanish Relations.
141	State Secretary: Belgium.
159	State Secretary: Greenland, Guatemala.*

<i>Film Serial Numbers</i>	<i>Title of File</i>
171	German Embassy in the Soviet Union: Political Relations of the Soviet Union with the Northern States.
173	State Secretary: Netherlands; Netherlands Indies.*
174	State Secretary: Japan.
175	State Secretary: Rumania.
176	State Secretary: Mexico.
191	State Secretary: China.
205	State Secretary: Sweden.
216	State Secretary: Indochina.
220	State Secretary: Scandinavia.
230	State Secretary: Yugoslavia.
233	State Secretary: Argentina.
234	Under State Secretary: Indochina.
235	State Secretary: Brazil.
247	State Secretary: Denmark.
259	State Secretary: Anglo-German Relations.
265	State Secretary: Turkey.
270	German Embassy in the Soviet Union: Political Papers (secret).
319	Economic Policy Department (Wiehl): Sweden.
321	State Secretary: Lithuania.
323	State Secretary: Latvia.
324	Economic Policy Department (Wiehl): Spain.
328	State Secretary: Luxembourg.
354	German Embassy in the Soviet Union: Special File—Political Relations between Germany and Other Countries—War.
357	German Embassy in the Soviet Union: Special File—Political Relations between Germany and Other Countries—War.
365	State Secretary: Peace Negotiations with France.
366	German Embassy in the Soviet Union: Political Relations of the Soviet Union with Italy.
371	Under State Secretary: Slovakia.
372	German Embassy in the Soviet Union: Political Relations of the Soviet Union with the Balkan States. Balkan Pact, Mediterranean Questions, Black Sea, Bessarabia.
384	Pol. V: Political Relations of Russia with Germany.
406	State Secretary: Estonia.
407	Under State Secretary: Occurrences involving the Soviet Union and Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia.
413	Under State Secretary: Belgium, Holland, Luxembourg.
425	German Embassy in the Soviet Union: Miscellaneous Papers—Political Situation in Spain, the Balkans, Scandinavia.
449	State Secretary: Greece.
464	State Secretary: Protest Action of the American States.
486	State Secretary: The War.
490	State Secretary: The War.
582	State Secretary: German-Italian Relations.
585	State Secretary: Bulgaria.
790	State Secretary: Memoranda by the State Secretary on Visits of Diplomats.
830	Ambassador Ritter: Greater German Economic Sphere.
897	Information Department/Cultural Policy Department (Secret Papers): North America.

<i>Film Serial Numbers</i>	<i>Title of File</i>
947	Renthe-Fink Personal Files: German Administrative Infiltration. Gestapo Reports on Danish Political Scene.
956	Renthe-Fink Personal Files: German Propaganda. Personal Reports on Personnel of German Legation.
1228	Political Department: Political Affairs—Russia.
1247	Etzdorf Memoranda.
1379	German Embassy in the Soviet Union: Political Relations of the Soviet Union with Germany.
1570	Supplementary to 121.
1571	State Secretary: Italo-German Relations.
1576	Pol. VI: Baltic Entente.
1632	Pol. IV: Political Relations between Rumania and the Soviet Union.
1889	Pol. I M: Agents and Espionage—Individual cases.
1892	Under State Secretary: The War—West.
1900	Pol. VI: Iceland.
1918	Pol. IV: Czechoslovakia—Political and Cultural Propaganda, Political Activities of Emigrés—National Socialism, Fascism and Similar Movements.
1922	Pol. VI: Greenland.
1947	Pol. VII: Jewish Question. Political Relations between Iran and Germany.*
2031	Economic Policy Department (Wiehl): Italy.
2097	Economic Policy Department (Wiehl): Russia.
2110	Economic Policy Department (Wiehl): Finland.
2134	State Secretary: Memoranda on Visits of Diplomats.
2135	Economic Policy Department (Wiehl): Denmark.
2153	Economic Policy Department (Clodius): Turkey.
2190	Luther Files: Mussert.
2281	German Embassy in Italy: Secret Papers.
2332	Pol. VIII: Political Relations between Japan and the Netherlands East Indies.
2422	Pol. IX: Political Relations of the United States with Germany.
2423	Pol. IX: Political Relations of Argentina with Germany.
2431	Pol. IX: United States—Foreign Policy, General.
2858	Information Department/Cultural Policy Department (Secret Papers): White Books. White Book Materials.
2931	Pol. VIII: Political Relations between China and Japan.
2953	German Legation in Norway: Occupation of Norway (secret).
2969	German Legation in Norway: Occupation Policy.
3066	Supplementary to 352, 354, 357, 359, 2763.
3145	Economic Policy Department (Wiehl): Occupied Countries.
3355	Supplementary to 2135 and 2578.
3623	Pol. IV: Yugoslavia.
3638	Pol. VI: War between Germany, England, France, and Poland. Extension of the War to the Scandinavian States.
3664	German Legation in Norway: Occupation Policy, April 9–May 18, 1940.
3680	Adjutants to the Führer: Telegrams.
3783	Economic Policy Department (Wiehl): Russia.
3832	Pol. II: Switzerland—Internal Politics, Parliament, Parties.

*Film Serial
Numbers**Title of File*

- 3918 German Legation in Switzerland: Political Relations between Switzerland and Germany.
- 3998 Pol. II: War between Germany, England, France, and Poland. Neutrality Questions.
- 4031 Economic Policy Department (Clodius): Switzerland.
- 4041 Economic Policy Department (Wiehl): Holland.
- 4050 Economic Policy Department (Wiehl): Switzerland.
- 4386 Supplementary to 121 and 1570.
- 4459 German Embassy in Italy: Secret Papers.
- 4467 Aussenpolitisches Amt: Norway, S-Z.
- 4469 Aussenpolitisches Amt: Norway, M-S.
- 4496 Pol. IX: Political Relations between Argentina and Germany.
- 4531 Economic Policy Department (Wiehl): Turkey.
- 4691 Secret Files of Paul Schmidt.
- 4809 Economic Policy Department: Secret Papers, Trade in War Material—Iran.
- 4896 Economic Policy Department: Secret Papers, Trade in War Material—Spain.
- 5235 Legal Department: Armistice with France, 1940.
- 5556 Economic Policy Department: Secret Papers, Trade in War Material—Rumania.
- 5570 Economic Policy Department: Secret Papers, Trade in War Material—Yugoslavia.
- 5668 Economic Policy Department IVa: Southeast Europe—Effect of British Naval Warfare on German Trade with Southeast Europe.
- 8230 Navy Archives: 1 Skl.—Cooperation between Germany, Italy, Spain, Japan, Russia, Hungary and Rumania.
- 8339 Economic Policy Department: Treaties, Italy.
- 8589 Navy Archives: OKW Directives.
- 8612 Economic Policy Department, IIb: Trade 11a, Great Britain.
- 8614 Economic Policy Department, IXb: Havana Conference.
- 8719 Supplementary to 8614.
- 8785 Pol. VIII: Political Relations between Japan and the United States.
- 8818 Legal Department: International Law. Red Cross. Poland.
- 8821 Pol. I M: War between Germany, England, France and Poland.
- 8822 Supplementary to 2422.
- 8823 Press Department: Circular Instructions.
- 8824 Supplementary to 2858.
- 8835 Economic Policy Department (Clodius): Russia.
- 8862 Legal Department: International Law, laws of War—Argentina. Capture and Sinking of Argentine Merchant Ships by Germany.
- 8867 Pol. IX: Political Relations of Argentina with Germany.
- 8893 Supplementary to 5556.
- 8895 Legal Department: Intercessions 1941.
- 8896 Economic Policy Department, IVc: Trade 11. Yugoslavia. Imports, Exports, Transit. General and Basic Material.
- 8899 Supplementary to 5235.
- 9255 Economic Policy Department, IVa: Trade 12-1, Greece, Imports, Exports, Transit. General and Basic Material.

<i>Film Serial Numbers</i>	<i>Title of File</i>
9514	Asservat OKW 183.
9865	Supplementary to 1889 and 3993.
9870	Legal Department: International Law. Laws of War— England.
9917	Italian Foreign Ministry archives films—Lettere del Führer al Duce e del Duce al Führer. See p. 104, footnote 1.
B14	State Secretary: German-Italian Relations.
B15	State Secretary: German-English Relations.
B21	State Secretary: United States.
F2, F3, F5, F8, F9, F12, F14, F17, F18, F19:	German Foreign Ministry film of files of the Reich Foreign Minister's Secretariat. (See Appendix V and the General Introduction to this series which was published in vols. I-IV.)
APA Reel No. 290:	Film of files of the Aussenpolitisches Amt.

Appendix III

LIST OF PERSONS¹

- ABETZ**, Otto, Official in the Dienststelle Ribbentrop with rank of Minister; Representative of the Foreign Ministry with the German Military Commander in Paris, June 1940.
- ALBA** and **BERWICK**, Duke of, Jacobo María del Pilar Carlos Manuel Fitz-James Stuart, Spanish Ambassador in Great Britain, 1939-1945.
- ALBRECHT**, Erich, Deputy Director of the Legal Department, German Foreign Ministry, 1937-1943.
- ALFIERI**, Dino, Italian Ambassador to the Holy See, 1939-1940; Ambassador in Germany, May 1940-September 1943; member of the Fascist Grand Council.
- ALTENBURG**, Günther, Minister, Director of Information Department, German Foreign Ministry, 1939-1941.
- ANFUSO**, Filippo, chef de cabinet to Count Ciano, Italian Foreign Minister.
- ARANHA**, Oswaldo, Brazilian Minister of Foreign Affairs, 1938-1944.
- ARITA**, Hachiro, Japanese Foreign Minister in the Yonai Cabinet, January-July 1940.
- ATTOLICO**, Bernardo, Italian Ambassador in Germany, September 1935-April 1940; Ambassador to the Holy See, May 1940-February 1942.
- AURITI**, Giacinto, Italian Ambassador in Japan, 1933-1940.
- BABARIN**, Evgeny, Trade Representative in the Soviet Embassy in Germany.
- BADOGLIO**, Pietro, Italian Field Marshal, Chief of the Army General Staff, 1925-1940.
- BALBO**, Italo, Italian Governor General of Libia, 1933-June 1940.
- BAUDOUIN**, Paul, Secretary, French War Cabinet, April-June 1940; Under Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, June 1940; Minister of Foreign Affairs in Pétain Government, June-October 1940.
- BEIGBEDER Y ATIENZA**, Juan, Spanish Foreign Minister, August 1939-October 1940.
- BELOW**, Carl von, Counselor, German Legation in Sweden.
- BENE**, Otto Wilhelm August Gottfried, German Consul General at Milan, 1937-1943; temporarily assigned as representative of the Foreign Ministry with the Reichskommissar for occupied Netherlands from May 28, 1940.
- BENZLER**, Felix, German Consul General at Amsterdam, 1937-1940.
- BERG**, Paal Olav, President of the Norwegian Supreme Court; Head of Administrative Council, April-September 1940.
- BERGEN**, Diego von, German Ambassador to the Holy See, 1920-1943.
- BERGERET**, Jean Marie Joseph, French Air Force General; member of French Delegation to negotiate the armistices with Germany and Italy.
- BERGGRAV**, Eivind, Norwegian Bishop of Oslo.
- BERNARD**, Hans Albert Wilhelm, German Minister in Slovakia, July 1939-August 1940.
- BERRYER**, Joseph Marie Vicomte, Counselor, Belgian Embassy in Germany, 1938-1940.

¹ The biographical details given relate principally to the period and subjects covered by the documents in this volume.

- BISMARCK**, Otto Christian, Prince von, Deputy Director of the Political Department of the German Foreign Ministry, November 1936–April 1, 1940; Counselor, German Embassy in Italy, April 1940–September 1943.
- BODENSCHATZ**, Karl Heinrich, German General, Chief of Staff to Göring.
- BÖTTICHER**, Friedrich von, German General, Military and Air Attaché in the United States, 1933–1941.
- BOHEMAN**, Eric, Secretary General in the Swedish Foreign Ministry.
- BOHLE**, Ernst Wilhelm Hans, Gauleiter, Head of the Auslandsorganisation of the Nazi party, 1933–1945; also State Secretary in the German Foreign Ministry, 1937–1941.
- BOLAND**, Gerald, Minister of Justice of Eire.
- BORCHEERS**, Heinrich Franz Johannes, German Consul General in New York.
- BORMANN**, Martin, Reichsleiter, Chief of Staff to Führer's Deputy, Hess.
- BRAUCHITSCH**, Walther von, German General, Commander in Chief of the German Army, 1938–1941.
- BRAUER**, Curt, German Minister in Norway, 1939–1940.
- BRUNHOFF**, Kurt, Counselor, Press Department, German Foreign Ministry.
- BÜLOW-SCHWANTE**, Vicco von, German Ambassador in Belgium, 1938–1940.
- BÜCKNER**, Leopold, Captain, German Navy, Head of the Foreign Intelligence Branch in the Office of Foreign Intelligence and Counterintelligence in the OKW, 1938–1945.
- BULLITT**, William C., American Ambassador in France, 1936–1940.
- CAKMAK**, Marshal Fevzi, Chief of Staff, Turkish Army.
- CAMPINCHI**, César, French Minister of Marine, Daladier and Reynaud Cabinets, 1939–1940.
- CANARIS**, Wilhelm, German Admiral, Chief of the Office of Foreign Intelligence and Counterintelligence of the High Command of the Wehrmacht.
- CANTILLO**, José María, Argentinian Foreign Minister.
- CAROL II**, King of Rumania, 1930–1940.
- ČERNÁK**, Matúš, Slovak Minister in Germany.
- CHAMBERLAIN**, Neville, British Conservative M. P., 1918–1940; leader of the Conservative party; Prime Minister, May 1937–May 1940.
- CHAUTEMPS**, Camille, Vice President of the French Council of Ministers and Minister of Coordination in the Daladier Cabinet, 1938–1939; Minister of State, 1939–1940; Vice President of the Council and Minister for Alsace-Lorraine, March–July 1940.
- CHIANG KAI-SHEK**, Generalissimo; Leader of Kuomintang (Chinese Nationalist party); President of the Executive Yuan (Premier).
- CHRISTIAN X**, King of Denmark and Iceland; from April 10, 1940, King of Denmark.
- CHURCHILL**, Winston Spencer, British Liberal and Conservative M. P. since 1900; First Lord of the Admiralty, September 5, 1939–May 10, 1940; Prime Minister, May 10, 1940–July 1945.
- CIANO DI CORTELLAZZO**, Count Galeazzo, son-in-law of Mussolini; Italian Foreign Minister, 1936–1943.
- CINCAR-MARKOVIĆ**, Aleksander, Yugoslav Foreign Minister, 1939–1941.
- CLODIUS**, Carl, Deputy Director of the Economic Policy Department of the German Foreign Ministry, 1937–1943.
- COOPER**, Alfred Duff, British Conservative M. P., 1924–1945; Minister of Information, 1940–1941.
- CRAIGIE**, Sir Robert, British Ambassador in Japan, 1937–1941.
- CRIPPS**, Sir Stafford, British Labor M. P. and jurist; Ambassador in Russia, June 1940–January 1942.
- CRUTESCU**, Radu, Rumanian Minister in Germany, 1939–1940.

- CÁIKY**, Count István, Hungarian Foreign Minister, 1938-1941.
- CVETKOVIĆ**, Dragisha, Yugoslav Minister President, 1939-1941.
- DALADIER**, Édouard, President of the French Council of Ministers and Minister of National Defense, April 1938-March 1940, also of War and Foreign Affairs, September 1939-March 1940; Minister of War, March-May 1940.
- DANKWORT**, Karl Werner, Counselor, German Legation in Sweden.
- DAVIGNON**, Vicomte Jacques, Belgian Minister in Germany, April 30, 1936; Ambassador, November 21, 1938-1940.
- DEGRELLE**, Léon, Leader of Belgian Fascist Rex party.
- DEKANOV**, Valdimir Georgievich, Soviet Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs; Soviet Commissioner for the annexation of Lithuania, June 1940.
- DE VALERA**, Eamon, Prime Minister of Eire and Minister for External Affairs, 1937-1948.
- DIETRICH**, Hans Heinrich, German Ambassador in the United States, May 1937; recalled to Berlin for consultation, November 1938, and did not return to his post; on special assignment in the Foreign Ministry, 1938-1943.
- DRAGANOV**, Parvan, Bulgarian Minister in Germany, 1938-1942.
- DURČANSKÝ**, Ferdinand, Slovakian Foreign Minister, March 1939-July 1940, also Minister of Interior from October 1939.
- EDEN**, Anthony, British Conservative M. P. since 1923; Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 1935-1938; Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, 1939-1940; Secretary of State for War, January-December 1940.
- ERBACH-SCHÖNBERG**, Viktor, Prinz zu, German Minister in Greece, 1936-1941.
- ERDMANNSDORFF**, Otto von, German Minister in Hungary, 1937-1941.
- ETTEL**, Erwin, German Minister in Iran.
- ETZDORF**, Hasso von, Senior Counselor, Representative of the German Foreign Ministry with the High Command of the Army, 1939-1945.
- FABRICIUS**, Wilhelm, German Minister in Rumania, 1936-1941.
- FALKENHORST**, Nikolaus von, General, Commander of German Forces invading Denmark and Norway, April 9-15, 1940; thereafter German Military Commander in Norway.
- FARINACCI**, Roberto, member Italian Fascist Grand Council.
- FAVAGROSSA**, Carlo, General, Undersecretary for Armament, Italian Ministry of War.
- FILOV**, Bogdan, Bulgarian Minister President, February 1940-September 1944.
- FISH**, Hamilton, United States Congressman from New York.
- FRANCO Y BAHAMONDE**, Francisco, Chief of State, President of the Government, and Generalissimo of the Army, Navy, and Air Force in Spain from October 1936.
- FRANCO Y BAHAMONDE**, Nicolás, Spanish Ambassador in Portugal.
- FRANÇOIS-PONCET**, André, French Ambassador in Italy, November 1938-June 1940.
- FRANK**, Hans, Reichsleiter, Governor General of Poland.
- FRÖLICHER**, Hans, Swiss Minister in Germany.
- FROHWEIN**, Hans, German Minister in Estonia, 1936-1940.
- FUNK**, Walter, German Minister of Economics, 1937-1945; President of the Reichsbank, 1939-1945.
- GAFENCU**, Grigore, Rumanian Foreign Minister, December 1938-June 1940.
- GAUS**, Friedrich, Director of the Legal Department of the German Foreign Ministry, 1923-1943.
- GEREDE**, R. Hüsrev, Turkish Ambassador in Germany, September 27, 1939-1942.
- GERSTENBERG**, Alfred, Colonel in the Luftwaffe, German Air Attaché in Rumania.
- GIANNINI**, Amedeo, Director of Commercial Affairs in the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

- GIGURTU, Ion, Rumanian Foreign Minister, June-July 1940; Minister President July-September 1940.
- GÖRING, Hermann Wilhelm, President of the Reichstag, 1932-1945; Minister President of Prussia and Reich Minister for Air, 1933-1945; Commander in Chief of the Luftwaffe, 1935-1945; Commissioner for the Four Year Plan, 1936-1945; designated successor to Hitler, 1939; Reichsmarschall, July 19, 1940-1945.
- GREW, Joseph Clark, American Ambassador in Japan, 1932-1941.
- GRUNDHERR, Werner von, Head of Political Division VI in the German Foreign Ministry, 1936-1945.
- GUANI, Alberto, Uruguayan Foreign Minister.
- GÜNTHER, Christian, Swedish Foreign Minister, 1939-1945.
- GUSTAF V, King of Sweden, 1907-1950.
- HAARON VII, King of Norway, 1905—.
- HABICHT, Theodor, Deputy Director of the Political Department in the German Foreign Ministry, with title of Under State Secretary, 1939-1940.
- HAGELIN, Wiljam, Quisling's representative in Germany, 1939-1940; Minister of Commerce and Supply in Quisling's Norwegian government of April 1940.
- HÄGGLÖF, Gunnar, Counselor and head of the commercial policy department in the Swedish Foreign Ministry.
- HALDER, FRANZ, German General, Chief of the Army General Staff, December 1938-October 1942.
- HALIFAX, Viscount, Edward Wood, British Conservative party leader; Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, February 1938-December 1940.
- HAMBRO, Carl Joachim, member of Norwegian Storting from 1919; President of the Storting, 1926-1940.
- HEBERLEIN, Erich, Counselor, German Embassy in Spain.
- HEDIN, Sven Anders, Swedish Asiatic explorer.
- HEEREN, Viktor von, German Minister in Yugoslavia, 1933-1941.
- HEMPFEL, Eduard, German Minister in Eire, 1937-1945.
- HEWEL, Walther, Senior Counselor, personal representative of the Foreign Minister with the Führer, 1938-1945.
- HEYDEN-RYNSCH, Bernd Otto, Freiherr von der, official in Political Division I of the German Foreign Ministry, 1936-1940.
- HEYDRICH, Reinhard, SS-Gruppenführer, Chief of the Security Police and of the Security Service.
- HILGER, Gustav, Counselor of Legation, 1923-1939, Counselor of Embassy, 1939-1941, in the German Embassy in the Soviet Union.
- HIRSCHFELD, H. M., director of the department of commerce and industry in the Netherlands Ministry of Economic Affairs.
- HITLER, Adolf, Leader of the German National Socialist party from 1921; Chancellor of the German Reich, January 30, 1933; Führer and Chancellor, 1934-1945; Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht, 1938-1945.
- HOARE, Sir Samuel, British Conservative M. P., 1910-1944; Lord Privy Seal, 1939-1940; Air Minister, April-May 1940; Ambassador in Spain, May 1940-1944.
- HOOVER, Herbert Clark, President of the United States, 1929-1933.
- HORTHY DE NAGYBÁNYA, Miklos, Admiral, Regent of Hungary, 1920-1944.
- HULL, Cordell, American Secretary of State, 1933-1944.
- HUNTZIGER, Charles-Léon, General, Head of French delegation to negotiate the armistice with Germany, June 1940; President of French delegation at the German Armistice Commission in Wiesbaden, June-September 1940.
- İNÖNÜ, İsmet, General, President of the Turkish Republic, 1938-1950.

- JAGWITZ, Eberhard von, Official of the Auslandsorganisation of the NSDAP; Under State Secretary and Chief, Foreign Currency Department in the Ministry of Economics; member, General Council, Four Year Plan.
- JODL, Alfred, General, Chief of the Operations Office and Operations Staff of the OKW, August 1939–1945.
- KAUFISCH, Leonhard, Colonel General, Commander, German forces in Denmark, April 1940–January 1941.
- KEITEL, Wilhelm, General, Chief of the OKW, 1938–1945.
- KENNEDY, Joseph P., American Ambassador in Great Britain, January 1938–November 1940.
- KEPPLER, Wilhelm Karl, State Secretary for special duties in the German Foreign Ministry.
- KILLINGER, Freiherr Manfred von, Minister, Inspector of German Diplomatic Missions in the Balkans, December 1939–July 1940.
- KNATCHBULL-HUGHESSEN, Sir Hughe M., British Ambassador in Turkey, 1939–1944.
- KNOLL, Karl, Counselor, Head of Political Division VIII, German Foreign Ministry.
- KÖCHER, Otto, German Minister in Switzerland.
- KÖRNER, Paul, State Secretary and permanent deputy to Göring as Commissioner for the Four Year Plan, 1936–1945; State Secretary, Prussian State Ministry, 1933–1945.
- KÖSTRING, Ernst, Lieutenant General, Military Attaché, German Embassy in the Soviet Union, 1935–1941.
- KOFT, Halvdan, Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs, 1935–1941.
- KOLLONTAY, Alexandra, Soviet Minister in Sweden.
- KONOYE, Prince Fumimaro, Japanese Prime Minister, 1937–1939; Minister without Portfolio, January–August 1939; President of Privy Council, January 1939–June 1940; Prime Minister, July 1940–July 1941.
- KOTZE, Hans Ulrich von, German Minister in Latvia, 1938–1940.
- KRAHMER, Eckart, Colonel, German Air Attaché in Spain.
- KROLL, Hans Anton, Counselor of the German Embassy in Turkey, 1936–1943.
- KRUTIKOV, Alexei D., Soviet Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Trade.
- KURUSU, Saburo, Japanese Ambassador in Germany, December 1939–February 1941.
- LAIDONER, Johan, Commander in Chief of the Estonian Army, 1934–1940.
- LAMMERS, Hans, Chief of the Reich Chancellery, 1934–1945, with the rank of State Secretary, 1934–1937, and Reich Minister, 1937–1945; member and Executive Secretary of the Secret Cabinet Council, 1938–1945.
- LANDFRIED, Friederich, State Secretary of Reich Economics Ministry, 1939–1943; member, General Council, Four Year Plan.
- LANDON, Alfred M., Governor of Kansas, 1933–1936; Republican candidate for the Presidency, 1936.
- LANGMANN, Otto, German Minister in Uruguay, 1938–1942.
- LAVAL, Pierre, President of the French Council of Ministers and Minister of Foreign Affairs, 1935–1936; Senator, 1926–1940.
- LEBRUN, Albert, President of France, May 1932–July 1940.
- LEOPOLD III, King of the Belgians, 1934–1951.
- LEQUERICA Y ERQUIZA, José Félix de, Spanish Ambassador in France, 1939–1944.
- LEWIS, John L., American labor leader, president of the United Mine Workers of America.
- LIXUS, Rudolf, of the Dienststelle Ribbentrop from 1935, Counselor of Legation, member of the Personal Staff of the Reich Foreign Minister.

- LINDBERGH, Charles A., American aviator; Colonel, United States Army Air Corps Reserve.
- LLOYD GEORGE, David, British Liberal and Independent Liberal M. P., 1890-1945; Prime Minister, 1916-1922.
- LOTHIAN, Philip Carr, Marquess of, British Ambassador in the United States, 1939-1940.
- LE LUC, Maurice, Vice Admiral, member of the French Armistice delegation, 1940.
- LUTHER, Martin, Senior Counselor, Head of Special Party Section, German Foreign Ministry; from May 7, 1940, Director of the Department for German Internal Affairs.
- MAGISTRATI, Count Massimo, First Secretary of the Italian Embassy in Germany, 1934; Counselor, 1936-1940; Minister in Bulgaria, 1940-1943.
- MAISKY, Ivan Mikhailovich, Soviet Ambassador in Great Britain, 1932-1943.
- MALAN, Daniel F., South African Nationalist party leader; member of the South African Parliament.
- MANDEL, Georges, French Minister of Colonies, Daladier Cabinet, April 1938-March 1940; Reynaud Cabinets, March-June 1940.
- MARRAS, Efsio Luigi, General, Italian Military Attaché in Germany, 1939-1943.
- MARTIUS, Minister Dr., Head of Division W XII (Transport) in the Economic Policy Department of the German Foreign Ministry.
- MASSIGLI, René, French Ambassador in Turkey, 1938-1940.
- MENEMENCIÖGLÜ, Numan, Ambassador; Secretary General of the Turkish Foreign Ministry, 1937-1942.
- MERKYS, Antanas, Lithuanian Minister President, November 1939-June 1940.
- METAXAS, John, General, Greek Minister President; also Foreign Minister and Minister of War, Navy and Air, 1936-1941.
- MIKOYAN, Anastas Ivanovich, People's Commissar for Foreign Trade of the Soviet Union, 1938-1949; Deputy Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars.
- MILCH, Erhard, Colonel General, State Secretary in the Reich Air Ministry, 1933-1934; Inspector General of the Luftwaffe, 1936-1945.
- MOHR, Otto Carl, Director in the Danish Foreign Ministry.
- MOLOTOV, Vyacheslav Mikhailovich, Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the Soviet Union, 1930-1941; People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, 1939-1949.
- MONNET, Jean, French economic expert, Chief of the Anglo-French Economic Committee.
- MORUZOW, General, Chief of the State Secret Police of Rumania under King Carol II.
- MUNCH, Peter, Danish Foreign Minister, 1929-1940.
- MUSSERT, Anton Adriaan, leader of the Netherlands National Socialist movement.
- MUSSOLINI, Benito, founder of the Italian fascist party; Head of the Government and Prime Minister, 1922-1943; Commander of the Armed Forces, 1940-1943.
- NEUBACHER, Hermann, leading Austrian National Socialist; Mayor of Vienna after the Anschluss; appointed special envoy in charge of economic questions in Southeastern Europe, stationed at Bucharest.
- NEUBAUS, Hans Joachim von, Counselor, German Legation in Norway, 1938-1940.
- NEUMANN, Erich, Staatsrat; Second State Secretary for the Four Year Plan; member of the General Economic Council.
- NIISI, H., Head of the European Department, Japanese Foreign Ministry.

- NOËL**, Léon, French Ambassador in Poland, 1935-1939; member of French Armistice delegation, 1940.
- NOMURA**, Kichisaburo, Admiral, Japanese Foreign Minister in Cabinet of General Abe, September 1939-January 1940.
- NYGAARDSVOLD**, Johan, Norwegian Prime Minister, 1935-1945.
- OLIVERA**, Ricardo, Argentine Ambassador to Germany, 1930-1940.
- ORTIZ**, Roberto, President of Argentina, 1938-1940.
- OSHIMA**, Hiroshi, General, Japanese Ambassador in Germany, November 1938-December 1939, and February 1941-1945.
- OTT**, Eugen, Major General, German Military Attaché in Japan, 1934-1938; Ambassador in Japan, 1938-1943.
- PAASIKIVI**, Juho K., Finnish Minister in Sweden, 1936-1940; Chairman of Finnish delegation for negotiations with the USSR, 1939; Minister without Portfolio, 1939-1940; Chairman of Finnish peace delegation in Moscow, 1940.
- PAPEN**, Franz von, German Ambassador in Turkey, 1939-1944.
- PARISOT**, Henri, General, member of the French Armistice delegation, 1940.
- PAUL**, Prince, Regent of Yugoslavia, 1934-1941.
- PEPPO**, Ottavio de, Italian Ambassador in Turkey, 1938-1940.
- PÉTAÏN**, Henri Philippe, Marshal of France; Ambassador in Spain, 1939-1940; Deputy President of the Council of Ministers, May 18-June 16, 1940; President of the Council, June 16-July 11; Chief of State, July 11, 1940-1944.
- PHILIPPS**, William, American Ambassador in Italy, 1936-1941.
- PIERLOT**, Hubert, Belgian Minister President, 1939-1945.
- PILET-GOLAZ**, Marcel, President of the Swiss Federal Council.
- PITTMAN**, Key, United States Senator from Nevada, 1913-1940, Democrat.
- PIUS XII**, Pope, Eugenio Pacelli, elevated to the Papacy in March 1939.
- POPOV**, Ivan Vladimír, Bulgarian Minister of Foreign Affairs.
- PRÜFER**, Curt Max, German Ambassador in Brazil, 1939-1942.
- QUISLING**, Vidkun, Norwegian politician and official; leader of the Norwegian Nasjonal Samling party.
- RADOWITZ**, Otto von, German Minister in Luxembourg, 1936-1940.
- RAEDER**, Erich, Admiral, Commander in Chief of German Navy, 1935-1943.
- RAŠTIKIS**, Stasys, General, Commander in Chief of the Lithuanian Army.
- RENTHE-FINK**, Cecil von, German Minister in Denmark, 1936-1942.
- RESENBERG**, Karl, Counselor, German Embassy in the United States.
- REYNAUD**, Paul, French Minister of Finance, November 1938-March 1940; president of the Council of Ministers, March-June 1940; Foreign Minister, March-May 1940.
- RIEBENTROP**, Joachim von, German Foreign Minister, February 4, 1938-1945.
- RICCARDI**, Raffaello, Italian Minister of Trade and International Payments, 1939-1940.
- RICHERT**, Arvid, Swedish Minister in Germany, 1937-1945.
- RICHTHOFEN**, Herbert, Freiherr von, German Minister in Bulgaria, 1939-1941.
- RINTELEN**, Emil von, Senior Counselor, Head of Political Division II in the German Foreign Ministry.
- RINTELEN**, Enno von, General, German Military Attaché in Italy, 1936-1943.
- RITTER**, Karl, Ambassador on special assignment in the German Foreign Ministry, 1939-1945.
- RIZA KHAN PAHLEVI**, Shah of Iran, 1925-1941.
- RIZO-RANGABÉ**, Alexander, Greek Minister in Germany, 1933-1941.

- ROATTA, Mario, General, Deputy Chief of the Italian Army General Staff.
- ROMALO, Alexander, Rumanian Minister in Germany, June–September 1940.
- ROOSEVELT, Franklin Delano, President of the United States, March 4, 1933–April 12, 1945.
- ROSENBERG, Alfred, Reichsleiter, Head of the Aussenpolitisches Amt of the NSDAP, 1933–1945; deputy of the Führer for supervision of spiritual and ideological training of the NSDAP, 1934–1945.
- RUGE, Otto, General, Commander in Chief of Norwegian forces during German invasion, 1940.
- RUSSELL, John, Irish Nationalist leader.
- SABATH, Hermann Friedrich, Senior Counselor, Head of Division W II in the Economic Policy Department of the German Foreign Ministry.
- SARACOGLU, Sükrü, Turkish Foreign Minister, 1938–1941.
- SATO, Naotake, former Japanese Foreign Minister, 1937; Ambassador on special assignment.
- SAVCHENKO, G. K., General of Artillery, Soviet Army.
- SAYDAM, Refik, Turkish Minister President, 1939–1943.
- SAYRE, Francis B., United States High Commissioner in the Philippines, 1939–1942.
- SHEEL, Arne, Norwegian Minister in Germany, 1921–1940.
- SCHIEDT, Hans-Wilhelm, director of the department for Northern Europe of the Aussenpolitisches Amt of the NSDAP.
- SCHERPENBERG, Hilger, Freiherr van, Counselor; official in German Foreign Ministry, 1926–1944.
- SCHICKEDANZ, Arno, Chief of Staff of the Aussenpolitisches Amt of the NSDAP.
- SCHLOTTERER, Gustav, Ministerialdirigent, German Ministry of Economics.
- SCHMIDT, Paul Otto Gustav, Minister, interpreter in the German Foreign Ministry, 1923–1945; attached to the Foreign Minister's Secretariat from 1939.
- SCHMUNDT, Rudolf, Colonel; Chief Military Adjutant to Hitler.
- SCHNURRE, Karl, Minister, Head of Division W IV in the Economic Policy Department of the German Foreign Ministry.
- SCHOEN, Wilhelm, Freiherr von, German Ambassador in Chile, 1935–1943.
- SCHULENBURG, Friedrich Werner, Count von der, German Ambassador in the Soviet Union, 1934–1941.
- SERRANO SUÑER, Ramón, brother-in-law of General Franco, Spanish Minister of the Interior, January 1938–October 1940.
- SEYSS-INQUART, Arthur, Reichsminister, Deputy Governor General in the Government General of Poland, 1939–1940; Reichskommissar for the occupied Netherlands, 1940–1945.
- SHKVARTESEV, Aleksander A., Soviet Ambassador in Germany, September 1939–November 1940.
- SIMA, Horia, leader of Rumanian Iron Guard.
- SIMON, Sir John, Viscount, British Liberal and Liberal National M. P., 1906–1940; Chancellor of the Exchequer, 1937–1940; Lord Chancellor, 1940–1945.
- ŠKIRPA, Kazys, Lithuanian Minister in Germany, 1939–1940.
- SKÖLD, Per Edvin, Swedish Minister of Defense.
- SMETONA, Antanas, President of Lithuania, 1938–1940.
- SMUTS, Jan Christian, General, Prime Minister, Minister of Defence and Commander in Chief of South African armed forces.
- SONNLEITNER, Franz von, Counselor, member of the Secretariat of the Reich Foreign Minister.
- SPAAR, Paul-Henri, Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs, September 1939–1946.
- STAHMER, Heinrich, in charge of Far Eastern questions in the Dienststelle Ribbentrop.

- STALIN**, Josef Vissarionovich, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist party of the Soviet Union; member of the Politburo and Orgburo, 1922-1953.
- STAUNING**, Thorvald, Danish Minister President, 1924-1926 and 1929-1942.
- STOHRER**, Eberhard von, German Ambassador in Spain, 1937-1943.
- SUTENS**, M., Director General for Foreign Commerce in the Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
- SUMA**, Yakichiro, press liaison officer, Japanese Foreign Ministry.
- TAFT**, Robert A., United States Senator from Ohio, 1938-1953, Republican.
- TAMM**, Fabian, Admiral, Commander in Chief of the Swedish Navy.
- TATARESCU**, George, Rumanian Ambassador in France, 1938-1939; Minister President, November 1939-July 1940.
- TAYLOR**, Myron Charles, American lawyer and businessman, personal representative of President Roosevelt to Pope Pius XII from December 1939 with the rank of Ambassador.
- TELEKI**, Count Pál, Hungarian Minister President, February 1939-April 1941.
- TERBOVEN**, Joseph, Reichskommissar for occupied Norway, 1940-1945.
- TERENTIEV**, Alexei, Soviet Ambassador in Turkey, 1938-1940.
- TEVOSSYAN**, Ivan T., Soviet People's Commissar for Shipbuilding.
- THERMANN**, Edmund, Freiherr von, German Ambassador in Argentina, 1936-1942.
- THOMAS**, Georg, General, Head of the War Economy and Armaments Office (*Wehrwirtschafts- und Rüstungsamt*) of the OKW.
- THOMSEN**, Hans, Counselor of Embassy, Chargé d'Affaires of the German Embassy in the United States.
- TIPPELSKIRCH**, Werner von, Counselor of Embassy, 1935-1940; Minister, 1940-1941, in the German Embassy in the Soviet Union.
- TISO**, Joseph Monsignor, leader of Slovakian Peoples party; President of Slovakia, 1939-1944.
- TODT**, Fritz, Reich Minister for Arms and Munition; Plenipotentiary General for construction industry, Four Year Plan.
- TOGO**, Shigenori, Japanese Ambassador in Germany, 1937-1938; in the Soviet Union, 1938-1940.
- TUKA**, Vojtech, Slovakian Minister President, 1939-1945.
- ULMANIS**, Karlis, President of Latvia, 1936-1940; Minister President, 1934-1940.
- URBŠYS**, Juozas, Lithuanian Foreign Minister, December 1938-June 1940.
- URDAREANU**, Ernest, Minister of the Rumanian Royal Court and Grand Chamberlain to the King.
- UTHMANN**, Bruno von, General, German Military Attaché in Sweden.
- VANDENBERG**, Arthur, United States Senator from Michigan, 1928-1951, Republican.
- VARGAS**, Getulio Dornelles, President of Brazil, 1934-1945.
- VEESENMAIER**, Edmund, referent in office of State Secretary Keppler, frequently employed on special assignments.
- VIGÓN**, Juan, General, Chief of the Spanish Supreme General Staff under Franco, 1939-1940.
- VISSER**, Philips C., Netherlands Minister in Turkey, 1938-1940.
- VUILLEMIN**, Joseph, General, Chief of Staff of the French Air Force, 1939-1940.
- WALSHE**, Joseph Patrick, Secretary General of the Ministry for External Affairs of Eire, 1922-1946.
- WALTER**, Ministerialdirektor, in charge of the department of customs and trade policy in the German Ministry of Food and Agriculture.
- WANG CHING-WEI**, Chinese political leader; head of a Chinese Central Government approved by Japan.

- WEHRER**, Albert, Secretary General of the Luxembourg Government.
- WEISSACKER**, Ernst, Freiherr von, State Secretary of the German Foreign Ministry, 1938-1943.
- WELLES**, Sumner, American Under Secretary of State, 1937-1943.
- WENNINGER**, Ralph, Lieutenant General, Air Attaché in the German Embassy in Belgium, accredited also to the Netherlands.
- WESTRICK**, Gerhardt Alois, Commercial Counselor, German Embassy in the United States.
- WEGAND**, Maxime, General, Commander in Chief of French Forces in the Eastern Mediterranean, 1939-1940; named Chief French General Staff and Commander in Chief Allied Forces, May 19, 1940.
- WHITE**, William Allen, editor of *Emporia* (Kansas) *Gazette*; founder and chairman of the Committee to Defend America by Aiding the Allies.
- WIED**, Viktor, Prinz zu, German Minister in Sweden, 1933-1943.
- WIEDEMANN**, Fritz, Captain, German Consul General in San Francisco, 1939-1941.
- WIEHL**, Emil Karl Josef, Director of the Economic Policy Department of the German Foreign Ministry, 1937-1944.
- WILHELMINA**, Queen of the Netherlands, 1890-1948.
- WOERMANN**, Ernst, Director of the Political Department of the German Foreign Ministry with the title of Under State Secretary, 1938-1943.
- WOHLTHAT**, Helmut, Prussian State Councilor; Ministerialdirektor for special assignments in the Four Year Plan; Bank Commissioner in the Netherlands, 1940-1941.
- WOODRING**, Harry Hines, American Secretary of War, 1936-1940.
- YAGÜE**, Juan Blanco, General, Spanish Minister of Aviation, 1939-1940.
- YBARNEGARAY**, Jean, Minister for Ex-Service Men and the Family in French Government of Pétain, June 1940.
- YONAI**, Mitsuomasa, Japanese Prime Minister, January-July 1940.
- ZAHLE**, Herluf, Danish Minister in Germany.
- ZAMBONI**, Guelfo, Counselor, Italian Embassy in Germany.
- ZECH-BURKERSRODA**, Julius von, Count, German Minister in the Netherlands, 1928-1940.
- ZECHLIN**, Erich Wilhelm, German Minister in Lithuania, 1933-1940.
- ZHDANOV**, Andrei Alexandrovich, member Politbureau, Organization Bureau, and Control Commission, Central Committee of the Communist party of the Soviet Union; Chairman, Foreign Affairs Committee, Council of the Soviet Union.

Appendix IV

GLOSSARY OF GERMAN TERMS AND ABBREVIATIONS¹

- AA**, Auswärtiges Amt
Abteilung (Abt.), department, section
Abwehr, counterintelligence, the Foreign Intelligence Service of the OKW
Amt Ausland/Abwehr, the office of foreign intelligence and counterintelligence of the OKW
Amtsleiter, section head in an organization of the NSDAP
Angabe (Ang.), additional item in a file
AO, Auslandsorganisation
APA, Aussenpolitisches Amt
Assessor, a grade representing an early stage in the German Civil Service
Aus, Ausl., Ausland
Ausland, foreign intelligence department of the OKW
Auslandsorganisation, foreign organization of the NSDAP concerned with German nationals living abroad
Aussenpolitisches Amt, foreign affairs office of the NSDAP; headed by Alfred Rosenberg
Auswärtiges Amt, German Foreign Ministry
Baumschule, code word for headquarters of the Foreign Minister
BRAM, Büro RAM
Brigadeführer, SA and SS rank equivalent to Brigadier General
Büro RAM, office of the Reich Foreign Minister
Büro St.S., office of the State Secretary
Chefsache, top secret military
Deutsches Nachrichtenbüro (DNB), German News Agency, owned by the Ministry of Propaganda
Dienststelle Ribbentrop, office of Ribbentrop in his capacity as foreign affairs adviser to Hitler; of decreasing importance after his appointment as Foreign Minister
Dirigent, **Dirigent der Politischen Abteilung**, deputy head of the Political Department
DNB, Deutsches Nachrichtenbüro
e. o., ex officio; where this precedes the file number, it indicates that there are no previous papers on the subject bearing this number (see **zu**)
Fall Gelb, Operation Yellow, code name for German operation against the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg
Fall Weserübung, Operation Weser Exercise, code name for German operation against Denmark and Norway
g., geheim
Gau, the largest territorial administrative unit of the NSDAP
Gauamtsleiter, section head in a Gau organization of the NSDAP
Gauleiter, highest official in a Gau
geheim (geh.), secret
geheime Kommandosache, top secret military
geheime Reichssache, top secret
Gehelmrat, Privy Councilor, title conferred on high Government officials prior to 1918
Gen. Qu., General Quartiermeister, staff officer and staff unit of OKH
Gen. St. d. H., Generalstab des Heeres, the General Staff of the Army

¹ Abbreviations are explained by giving the full German terms. These terms are explained at their proper alphabetical listing.

g Kdos (g. k.), geheime Kommandosache

Grossraumpolitik, policy of achieving an empire or area of self sufficiency

g Rs, geheime Reichssache

Gruppenführer, SA and SS rank, equivalent to Major General

Hauptreferat, head office or principal office in a governmental or other organization

Hauptsturmführer, SA and SS rank equivalent to captain

HA, Handelspolitische Ausschuss

Handelspolitische Ausschuss, Commercial Policy Committee, an inter-departmental committee on commercial policy

HPA, Handelspolitische Ausschuss

Inf., Informationsabteilung

Informationsabteilung, the Information Department of the Foreign Ministry

K, Kulturpolitische Abteilung

Kult., Kulturpolitische Abteilung

Kulturpolitische Abteilung, Cultural Policy Department of the Foreign Ministry

Landesgruppe, NSDAP organization for a foreign country, controlled by the Auslandsorganisation, headed by a Landesgruppenleiter

Landesgruppenleiter, leader of an NSDAP Landesgruppe

L, Landesverteidigung

Landesverteidigung, the department of National Defense in the Wehrmachtführungsamt or Wehrmachtführungsstab

Ministerialdirektor, a grade in the Civil Service, usually the director of a department in a Ministry

Ministerialdirigent, a grade in the Civil Service, usually deputy director of a department in a Ministry

Ministerialrat, Ministerial Counselor, a grade in the German Civil Service

Multex, a circular telegram

Nachrichten- und Presseabteilung, News Service and Press Department of the Foreign Ministry

Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei, National Socialist German Workers' party, the full title of the Nazi party

Nordische Gesellschaft, Northern Society, an organization engaged in the promotion of cultural relations between Germany and the Scandinavian countries

NSDAP, Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei

Obergruppenführer, SA and SS rank equivalent to Lieutenant General

Oberkommando des Heeres, High Command of the Army

Oberkommando der Kriegsmarine, High Command of the Navy

Oberkommando der Wehrmacht, High Command of the Wehrmacht

Oberpräsident, highest civil official of a province

Oberregierungsrat, a grade in the German Civil Service

OKH, Oberkommando des Heeres

OKM, Oberkommando der Kriegsmarine

OKW, Oberkommando der Wehrmacht

Ortsgruppe, subdivision of an NSDAP Kreis or district, headed by an Ortsgruppenleiter

Ortsgruppenleiter, head of an NSDAP Ortsgruppe

P, Nachrichten- und Presseabteilung

Passstelle, passport office

Pers., Personal- und Verwaltungs-Abteilung

Personal- und Verwaltungs-Abteilung, Personnel and Administrative Department of the Foreign Ministry

Pol., Politische Abteilung

Politische Abteilung, Political Department of the Foreign Ministry; subdivided according to geographic areas, each designated by a Roman numeral, e. g., Pol. IV (see appendix I)

Presse, Nachrichten- und Presseabteilung

R, Rechtsabteilung

RAM, Reichsaussenminister

Recht., Rechtsabteilung

Rechtsabteilung, Legal Department in the German Foreign Ministry

Referat Deutschland, also **Sonderreferat Deutschland,** special section for German internal affairs in the Foreign Ministry

Referent, drafting officer, expert, specialist, competent official
Regierungsrat, a grade in the German Civil Service
Reichluftministerium, Reich Air Ministry
Reichsamtseiter, a principal official in the Reich office of an NSDAP organization
Reichsaussenminister, Reich Foreign Minister
Reichsbahn, the German State Railways
Reichsbahndirektor, an official of the German State Railways
Reichsbankdirektor, a director of the Reichsbank
Reichsdeutsche, Reich Germans, i. e., those Germans who were Reich subjects, used usually with reference to those living outside the frontiers of the Reich (see *Volksdeutsche*)
Reichsführer SS, Commander in Chief of the SS
Reichsgruppe Industrie, Reich Group Industry, an official organization for the control of German industry
Reichskommissar, a Reich commissioner for special functions, a governor of an area occupied by Germany
Reichskreditkasse, Reich credit institution established in occupied territories; affiliated with the Reichsbank
Reichskreditkassenscheine, notes issued by the Reichskreditkasse, which served as occupation currency in occupied territories
Reichsleiter, highest NSDAP rank
Reichsmark, the unit of German currency
Reichsmarschall, Reich Marshal, military rank given to Göring
Reichsminister, Reich Minister; any member of the Reich Cabinet but in Foreign Ministry documents usually the Reich Foreign Minister
Reichssicherheitshauptamt, Reich Main Security Office, office of the Chief of the Security Police and the SD
RLM, Reichluftministerium
RM, Reichsmark; Reichsminister

SA, Sturmabteilung
Schutzstaffel, elite corps of the NSDAP, used for military and police purposes
SD, Sicherheitsdienst
Seekriegsleitung, Naval War Staff
Sicherheitsdienst, security service; intelligence and counterintelligence agency of the SS
SKL, Seekriegsleitung
SS, Schutzstaffel
Staatsrat, state councilor (Prussia)
Staatssekretär, State Secretary, the highest career official of a Reich Ministry
Stabsleiter, head of the personal staff of the head of a central department in the NSDAP
St.S., Staatssekretär
Sturmabteilung, Storm Troops of the NSDAP (brown shirts)
Sturmabteilungsleiter, SA and SS rank equivalent to Major
Unterstaatssekretär, Under State Secretary
U. St.S., Unterstaatssekretär
Volksdeutsche, ethnic Germans, i. e., persons belonging to the German cultural community living outside the frontiers of the Reich and not Reich subjects
Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle, (VOMI), central agency for problems concerning *Volksdeutsche*; formed as the Büro von Kursell in 1936, renamed and placed under SS-Obergruppenführer Lorenz in 1937; directed covertly the political agitation of German minorities
Volksgruppenführung, leadership of a Volksgruppe or German national group outside the Reich
W, Wirtschaftspolitische Abteilung
Wehrmachtführungsamt, Wehrmacht Operations Staff, an office in the OKW engaged in operations planning
Wehrwirtschaftsstab, War Economy Staff, a division of OKW, title changed in 1939 to Wehrwirtschafts- und Rüstungsamt, Military Economy and Armaments Office

Weserübung, Weserübung Süd, Weserübung Nord, code name for German operation against Denmark and Norway in April 1940. **Weserübung Süd** referred to the occupation of Denmark and **Weserübung Nord** to the attack on Norway

WFA, Wehrmachtführungsamt

Wirtschaftspolitische Abteilung, Economic Policy Department of the Foreign Ministry

zu, to, in connection with; where this precedes the file number it indicates that the previous papers on the subject have this number

Appendix V

ANALYSIS OF THE FOREIGN MINISTRY ARCHIVES

The schedule attached to this note gives a rough picture of the captured Foreign Ministry archives. When captured, the documents were, for the most part, packed in bundles. On average, each bundle contains some six files or volumes, totaling perhaps a thousand to fifteen hundred pages. The schedule purports to show only whether there is much or little material. Qualitatively, the table tells nothing: one bundle may be more important than a hundred other bundles.

Apart from the Schmidt files (item 66) the items listed in the schedule are those files which were in April 1945 in the Political Archives of the Foreign Ministry. This department never received the working files in use at the end of the war and precise details of their fate are not known. Certain files formerly in its custody, notably those of the *Kolonialabteilung* and the bulk of those of the pre-1920 economic policy department (Abt II: of which the *Restakten* form item 2), were transferred to other State Archives before World War II.

Apart from these transfers the files from 1867-1920 seem intact.

The post-1920 files remaining in or subsequently received by the Political Archives suffered the following casualties between 1943 and April 1945:

One of the trucks moving the secret political files of the period 1920-36 (item 25) to the Harz in October 1943 caught fire at Aschersleben and many of its contents were destroyed or damaged.

The evacuation center at Burg Friedland, south of Berlin, through which the post-1920 economic files were being transferred to the Harz, was apparently overrun by the Red Army before the process was complete. Consequently, for the period 1920-36, the economic files for Austria, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, England, Guatemala, Hungary, Italy, Portugal, Spain, U. S. A., and also some of those for Danzig, Greece and Poland, have not been available. The same applies to almost all such files for Denmark, Far East, Finland, Italy, Near East, Poland and Russia for the period 1936-45.

The degree to which the destruction order of April 10, 1945 was executed has been checked by means of the packing lists of the Political Archives and details are given below in connection with the departments concerned.

The destruction list included the most important files from 1934 onwards but only 3 bundles from the 1920-36 section of the archives are known to have been destroyed. Unfortunately, these bundles comprised a large part of the material on armament questions. With these and the exceptions noted above it can be tentatively stated that the evacuated archives of the Foreign Ministry are intact from 1920-36.

In 1936 the three geographic departments (*Länderabteilungen* II-IV) and *Sonderreferat W* were fused into two departments, Political and Economic, and the corresponding reorganization of the filing system can be most clearly studied in relation to the organization of the offices it served. The division of responsibility within the Foreign Ministry on December 1, 1939, is shown at Appendix I.

At the top was the Reich Foreign Minister. The files of his personal secretariat bore the general title "Office of the Reich Foreign Minister" (*Büro RAM*). Part of these files was destroyed on Ribbentrop's orders, and only a fragment was captured. It is obvious that the collection contained material of great importance. Some 10,000 pages of this material, however, are recorded on a German microfilm whose authenticity has been fully established. It is of the greatest value, since it contains many highly important documents of which no other copies have been found. The last documents recorded on the film date from 1943; after that there are a substantial number of records of important conferences and other documents of similar quality preserved in a box belonging to Paul Otto Schmidt, the senior interpreter at the Foreign Ministry. Unfortunately, the records of the personal staff which accompanied Ribbentrop on his various moves in the latter stages of the war (while the *Büro RAM* remained in Berlin) are not in our possession.

Next under the Foreign Minister came the State Secretary. The State Secretary's office (*Büro des Staatssekretärs*) kept extensive files which are almost complete until they break off during the latter years of the war. They include both the State Secretary's own memoranda and correspondence and also copies of telegrams and other documents handled by the different departments of the Foreign Ministry. The only known gap is the highly secret group of volumes supplementary to the "War" series; according to notations on the covers of the "War" series, these files were kept in an iron box, but neither this box nor its contents have been found. It is known, from cross-references in the files, that these volumes contained papers on peace moves not found elsewhere. On the whole, the State Secretary's files form the most important single collection for the period after 1936.

Of the major departments of the Foreign Ministry, the most important was the Political Department (*Politische Abteilung*). Until February 1938, the Director of this Department was Weizsäcker, and he was succeeded by Woermann, for whom the title of Under State Secretary (*Unterstaatssekretär*) was revived. The Under State Secretary had his own files, but these do not in general compare with those of the State Secretary in range and value. The Political Department was divided into a number of sections, mainly along geographical lines. By and large the open files of the political divisions are not available for the period from 1941 on. Presumably the current files remained in Berlin or in the Mühlhausen area. The secret files of the political divisions (*Pol. Geheim*), except for a few special categories, also represent a gap in the available documentation.

The files of the remaining departments have less importance. The secret files of the Legal Department (*Rechtsabteilung*), headed for many years by Ministerialdirektor Gaus, are missing, since all 23 bundles listed for destruction were actually destroyed. Distribution lists on other documents show that the Legal Department received many of the most important political papers.

The files of the Personnel Department (*Personal- und Haushalts-Abteilung*) were also partly destroyed, but this is probably a less serious loss.

The files of the Press and Cultural Departments (*Presse- und Kulturpolitische Abteilungen*) are apparently complete, except for the secret files of the Press Department.

In addition to the losses noted above, the secret files of the Economic Policy Department (*Wirtschaftspolitische Abteilung, Handelspolitische Abteilung*), except for certain files on war material, were destroyed. The survival of the *Handakten* of Ritter, Wiehl and Clodius, which contain copies of secret and top secret documents of importance, has compensated in large measure for these losses. There are many such *Handakten* for officials of other departments, normally reflecting

their own special interests, but sometimes containing copies of important documents not circulated elsewhere.

In January 1937 Ernst Wilhelm Bohle, the chief of the organization concerned with Reich Germans living abroad (*Auslandsorganisation*), entered the Foreign Ministry, and in December 1937 was given the title of State Secretary. In spite of the fact that he ranked level with the State Secretary and reported directly to the Foreign Minister, Bohle's files have yielded little of value and, indeed, he sometimes complained himself that he was inadequately informed of current Foreign Ministry activities.

For many years there had existed a special internal office in the Foreign Ministry (*Sonderreferat Deutschland*) responsible for questions concerning the relations between foreign and domestic policy. In December 1938 Ribbentrop added another special office for party questions (*Referat Partei*) responsible for liaison between the Foreign Ministry and all party organizations. Its chief was Martin Luther, an old collaborator of Ribbentrop in the *Dienststelle Ribbentrop*. In May 1940 these two offices were amalgamated into one (*Ableitung Deutschland*), and during the war years Luther succeeded in increasing the scope of his activities, including, in 1942, control over a directorate of propaganda abroad (*Auslandspropagandaleitstelle*). However, in February 1943 Luther was arrested and sent to a concentration camp on charges of plotting against Ribbentrop. The place of the *Ableitung Deutschland* was taken by two "groups" (*Gruppe Inland I und II*) directly under the Minister. The files of these various offices, though numerous, are far from complete.

The files of the German Diplomatic Missions abroad are comparable in bulk with those of the Foreign Ministry and are very important for filling gaps in the Foreign Ministry records. The files of the Embassies in Rome and Moscow, and of the Legation in Prague, are particularly valuable. Most of the secret files of the Paris Embassy were destroyed by the German archivists in accordance with the destruction order, but those that survive contain documents of the war years not available elsewhere. The files of the London Embassy were not mentioned in this order, but no secret files later than 1936 have been found; it is possible that, in this and similar cases, the files had already been destroyed at the Embassy.

Of the files from other sources in the collection, the largest are those of the Old and New Reich Chancellery (*Alte and Neue Reichskanzlei*). These are mainly concerned with internal affairs, but those of the Old (pre-Nazi) Reich Chancellery contain minutes of Cabinet meetings at which foreign policy was discussed.

*Schedule of Documents in the Custody of the Foreign Office
and the Department of State*¹

No.	Division	Subdivision	Period ²	Bundles
A) DOCUMENTS OF THE FORMER GERMAN FOREIGN MINISTRY				
I. DOCUMENTS PRIOR TO 1920				
1	Ia	Pol.	1867-1920	4296
2	II—Restakten		1853-1920	252
3	Treaties	Pol.	1867-1920	107
4		World War	1914-1918	547
5		General Headquarters	1915-1918	58
6	Conferences		1890-1920	22
7		Welfenfonds	1870-1914	20
8	Missions	Bogotá	1913-1918	58
9		Petersburg	1816-1914	206
10		Tangier	1845-1914	88
11		Cetinje	1906-1914	1
II. DOCUMENTS 1920-1936				
12	World War		1921	16
13	Office of the Reich Minister		1920-1936	175
14	Office of the State Secretary		1920-1936	100
15	Handakten of various heads and Deputy Heads of De- partments	Ritter (Sonderreferat W)	1920-1936	63
16		Heads of Departments II-IV	1917-1935	50
17		Gaus (Department V— Legal)	1914-1930	64
18		Miscellaneous Hand- akten (so-called Kleine Archive)	1914-1932	85
19	Special Departments and Sections	Friedensabteilung (later Department II F)	1920	140
20	Friedensabteilung		1919-1920	7
21		Friedensvertrag	1920-1921	50
22		Referat Deutschland	1920-1936	89
23		Sonderreferat W— (Transportation and Shipping Questions, pre- viously in Depart- ment IV)	1920-1936	840
24		W Rep. (Reparations)	1920-1936	230

¹ For the period before 1936, the schedule of documents was compiled from fragmentary German lists, not from the documents themselves.

² The dates indicated in the fourth column are the extreme dates of the first and last document in each series. For instance, for practical purposes the *Pol.* files numbered 80-91 end with December 1940. Isolated documents only are found after this date. Similarly, the *Inland* series numbered 69-74 are of most value for the period after 1938, though a few documents go back to 1929.

<i>No.</i>	<i>Division</i>	<i>Subdivision</i>	<i>Period</i>	<i>Bundles</i>
25	Secret papers of Department F and the Geographic Divisions		1920-1936	467
26	Department II	II. Pol.	1920-1936	634
27		II W	1920-1936	514
28		II be (occupied areas)	1920-1936	470
29		II F Air	1921-1936	104
30		II F Military, Navy	1921-1936	130
31		II F Secret	1932-1936	4
32		II F Disarmament	1921-1936	100
33		League of Nations (previously Sonderreferat)	1923-1936	400
34	Department III	III Pol.	1920-1936	449
35		III W	1920-1936	167
36	Department IV	IV Pol.	1920-1936	892
37		IV W	1920-1936	278
38	Treaties	Department II	1920-1936	150 ³
39		Department III	1920-1936	42 ³
40		Department IV	1920-1936	160 ³
41		Shipping	1920-1936	24
42	Commissions ⁴		1920-1924	300
43	Delegations ⁴		1920-1932	130
44	Plenipotentiaries, Commissioners ⁴		1921-1923	140
45	Representatives of the Foreign Ministry ⁴		1920	17
46	Plebiscite Area in Upper Silesia ⁴			
47	War Guilt Section		1920-1936	131
48	Committee of Inquiry into the War Guilt Question		1923-1925	12
49	Reichstag Investigating Committee		1914-1926	20
III. DOCUMENTS 1936-1945				
50	Reich Foreign Minister		1936-1943	9
51	Dienststelle Ribbentrop		1935-1944	36
52	State Secretary		1936-1944	127
53	Head of the Auslandsorganisation in the Foreign Ministry		1937-1943	40

³ Reckoned in files; an estimated figure.

⁴ Mostly relating to peace negotiations and treaties.

No.	Division	Period	Bundles
<i>Miscellaneous Handakten</i>			
54	Ettel	1939-1944	3
55	Etzdorf (Representative of the Foreign Min- istry to the OKH)	1939-1944	6
56	Hencke	1922-1944	9
57	Hewel	1937-1943	9
58	Keppler	1930-1944	5
59	Krümmer	1934-1943	2
60	Künsberg	1938-1943	29
61	Luther	1936-1943	18
62	Megerle	1934-1942	7
63	Rahn	1942-1943	2
64	Ritter	1938-1945	14
65	Schmidt (Press)	1938-1943	10
66	Schmidt (Interpreter)	1938-1944	12 ^a
67	Representative of the For- eign Ministry to the Reich Commissioner for the Ukraine	1941-1944	4
68	Liaison Office of the Com- missioner for Information Services	1940-1943	16
<i>Groups Inland I and II</i>			
69	Inland I D	1938-1945	22
70	Inland I Partei	1929-1944	101
71	Inland II A and B	1935-1945	355
72	Inland II C	1933-1945	51
73	Inland II D	1929-1945	47
74	Inland II Geheim	1936-1945	117
75	Referat D VI (Bauten)	1938-1943	21
<i>Papers of the Political Department</i>			
76	Under State Secretary Pol.	1936-1943	27
77	Pol. I League of Nations	1936-1940	6
78	Pol. I M	1936-1944	56
79	Pol. I Air	1936-1940	56
80	Pol. II	1936-1944	43
81	Pol. III	1936-1942	79
82	Pol. IV	1936-1944	110
83	Pol. V	1936-1944	144
84	Pol. VI	1936-1944	26
85	Pol. VII	1936-1943	10
86	Pol. VIII	1936-1941	27
87	Pol. IX	1936-1944	15
88	Pol. X	1936-1944	5
89	Pol. XI (War Guilt Question)	1941-1943	3
90	Pol. XII (Preparations for Conclusion of Peace)	1941-1945	1

^a Reckoned in files.

No.	Division	Period	Bundles
91	Pol. XIII (Russland Gremium)	1936-1942	11
92	Pol. Geheim	1936-1943	25
93	Directives Pol. II	1940-1943	18
94	Handakten Wiehl	1921-1943	62
95	Handakten Clodius	1921-1945	65
96	Handakten Collection (Ha. Pol.)	1914-1944	76
97	Papers of the Economic Policy Department	1936-1945	825
98	Papers of the Legal Department	1880-1945	3264
99	Papers of the Cultural Policy Department	1890-1945	1885
<i>Treaties</i>			
100	Political Department	1936-1944	80 ⁶
101	Economic Policy Department	1936-1944	44
102	Legal Department	1920-1943	400
103	Cultural Policy Department	1920-1941	28
104	Press Department	1915-1944	520
105	Protocol Department	1920-1944	227
106	Personnel Department	1860-1945	5042
107	Accounts Division	1920-1944	1100
108	Politisches Archiv (Geschäftsakten)	1920-1944	185
109	Referat Pers. (Historisches Referat)	1937-1939	4
110	Asservate zum Politischen Archiv ⁷	1920-1944	15
111	Politisches Archiv (Geschäftsakten Meisdorf, Friedland, Degnershausen)	1936-1944	6
112	Asservate ⁷	1860-1945	122
113	Nachlässe ⁸	1860-1945	300
<i>Missions</i>			
114	Ankara	1875-1943	213
115	Athens	1927-1940	28
116	Belgrade	1876-1944	71
117	Bern	1854-1943	860
118	Brussels	1845-1940	89
119	Budapest	1910-1944	209
120	Bucharest	1867-1940	177
121	Hague	1858-1944	172
122	Helsinki	1899-1944	27
123	Copenhagen	1862-1944	139

⁶ Reckoned in files.⁷ Small miscellaneous accessions to the archives from various sources.⁸ Documents of defunct sections or former officials.

No.	Division	Period	Bundles
124	Kovno	1895-1941	246
125	Lisbon	1869-1943	277
126	London	1861-1937	433
127	Luxembourg	1879-1940	61
128	Madrid	1865-1942	580
129	Moscow	1921-1941	216
130	Oslo	1890-1940	610
131	Paris	1871-1944	1438
132	Prague	1918-1939	333
133	Pressburg	1922-1944	390
134	Reval	1919-1941	207
135	Riga	1868-1941	273
136	Rome (Quirinal)	1818-1943	1517
137	Rome (Vatican)	1849-1943	179
138	Sofia	1879-1944	113
139	Stockholm	1825-1941	368
140	Warsaw	1920-1939	193
141	Washington	1870-1938	504
142	Vienna	1867-1939	758
143	Zagreb	1921-1944	773

Missions—Secret Papers

144	Antwerp	1931-1939	1
145	Athens	1937-1938	1
146	Bern	1939-1942	5
147	Bucharest	1936-1942	3
148	Ciudad Trujillo	1941	1
149	Lisbon	1928-1943	8
150	Madrid	1936-1943	9
151	Moscow	1937-1941	18
152	Paris	1938-1944	26
153	Prague	1938-1939	1
154	Rome (Quirinal)	1920-1943	66
155	Rome (Vatican)	1903-1942	7
156	Sofia	1931-1938	1
157	Tirana	1924-1943	6
158	Zagreb	1940-1944	28
159	Special Commissioner Southeast	1944	1
160	Consulates	1845-1944	4270*
161	Miscellaneous Documents		800*

B) DOCUMENTS NOT ORIGINATING IN THE FOREIGN MINISTRY

162	Handakten Epp	1900-1945	36
163	Handakten Frank	1918-1945	86
164	Handakten Speer	1936-1945	18
165	Ibero-Amerikanisches Institut	1933-1945	69

* Estimated figure.

<i>No.</i>	<i>Division</i>	<i>Period</i>	<i>Bundles</i>
166	Alte Reichskanzlei	1920-1933	3665 ¹⁰
167	Neue Reichskanzlei	1933-1945	1630 ¹⁰
168	Präsidialkanzlei	1919-1940	125
169	Chancellery of the Deputy of the Führer	1933-1942	168 ¹⁰
170	Office of the Führer's Adjutants	1935-1940	328 ¹⁰
171	Party Offices	1930	15
172	Various documents of foreign origin		50

¹⁰ Reckoned in files.



